The Effectiveness of National Women’s Mechanisms in Latin America: A Window of Opportunity to Advance Women’s Equality or Merely Window-Dressing?

PhD

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Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

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List of abbreviations

AFM Feminist Articulation Marcosur
BDPfA Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEPAL United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIM Inter-American Commission of Women
CNM National Council of Women, Argentina
CONAMU National Women’s Council, Ecuador
CoNGO Committee of Non-Governmental Organisations
CPEM Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women, Colombia
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSW Commission on the Status of Women
DAW United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women
ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council
EFLAC Latin American and the Caribbean Feminist Meeting
EU European Union
FLACSO Latin American Faculty of Social Science
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GII Gender Inequality Index
GM Gender mainstreaming
HDI Human Development Index
IIDH Inter American Human Rights Institute
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INAM National Women’s Institute, Honduras
INAMU National Women’s Institute, Costa Rica
INAMU National Women’s Institute, Panama
INMUJER National Women’s Institute, Venezuela
INIM Nicaraguan Women’s Institute, Nicaragua
INMUJERES National Women’s Institute, Mexico
INMUJERES National Women’s Institute, Uruguay
INSTRAW International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISDEMU Institute for Women’s Development, El Salvador
JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency
LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual and Intersexed
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NWM National Women’s Mechanism
OAS Organization of American States
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
OSAGI Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
SEPREM Presidential Women’s Secretariat, Guatemala
SERNAM National Women’s Service, Chile
SPM Special Secretariat of Policy for Women, Brazil
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
VIO Vice Ministry of Equality of Opportunities, Bolivia
WHO World Health Organisation
Abstract

Victoria Díaz-García

The Effectiveness of National Women’s Mechanisms in Latin America: A Window of Opportunity to Advance Women’s Equality or Merely Window-Dressing?"1

The United Nations supported the idea of National Women’s Mechanisms (NWMs) since the 1970s. NWMs have been promoted internationally as the primary institutional tool to achieve women’s equality since the Beijing Platform for Action was adopted in 1995. Despite their widespread adoption, NWMs have been criticised in the academic literature and by practitioners as ineffective institutions that have not necessarily led to progressive change for women. This thesis examines the effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America. It asks, has their establishment produced potentially effective institutions, or have States been merely compliant with UN promoted global norms? The research uses a cross-national survey study of the eighteen Latin American States based on three questionnaire surveys of three target groups –UN Women offices, NWMs and civil society organisations. Based on this survey, four case study countries - Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua and Bolivia - were selected for in-depth analysis. The research was facilitated by my role in UN Women permitting me access to key informants, events and meetings. The result of the survey demonstrated that almost all NWMs in Latin America are ineffective entities indicating a fundamental flaw in either the design of the global norm or in its implementation. The research did not find a strong link between States’ compliance with the global norm and the effectiveness of NWMs. The Chilean NWM was compliant and effective while that of Nicaragua was also compliant but ineffective. Uruguay had an effective NWM in spite of a low level of compliance. In Bolivia the NWM was neither compliant nor effective. The conclusion to the thesis suggests that reforming this global norm may allow NWMs to become more effective institutions.

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1 The phrase “window of opportunity or window-dressing” is borrowed from Amnesty International (2008).
Introduction

National Women’s Mechanisms or Machineries (NWMs), as such entities are commonly called, are a key policy advocated by the United Nations (UN) at the national level to promote gender equality and to improve the status of women. Their global promotion by the UN can be traced back to the First World Conference on Women (Mexico) in 1975 but it is since 1995 at the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing) that they became the dominant institutional solution to address women’s issues. It was in the published outcome of the 1995 conference, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA), that a list of concrete measures that States need to follow to ensure that they establish effective NWMs was specified for the first time. This aspect of the BDPfA became an integral part of UN policy and has been promoted internationally. With the result that since 1995, NWMs have proliferated across the world and, by 2014, all 193 Member States of the UN had set up some sort of women’s institutional mechanism (United Nations 2014). While initially widely welcomed by international women’s organisations and also described positively in the academic literature, the lack of tangible positive outcomes for women as a result of the institutionalisation of NWMs has led to a growing criticism of their use as a policy tool. The use of the NWM blueprint contained in the BDPfA, promoted by the UN, has also been implemented by a range of international organisations and development assistance agency has been particularly influential in States in receipt of development assistance and States that are democratising or emerging from conflict. The use of NWMs in these circumstances has received particular criticism as an external imposition, lacking grassroots support or links to a national women’s movement.

The UN framework for the way in which NWMs should be established, what role they should play and how they should relate to the government and to their stakeholders is contained in the BDPfA. This remains the global norm by which NWMs are assessed in global, regional and national fora (United Nations 1995, see Appendix 1). These UN guidelines deal with the hierarchical status that is recommended for these institutions in the governmental structure; the mandates they should be assigned; and the resources and capacities deemed necessary to fulfil their assigned mandates. It suggests the type of interaction NWMs should have with internal institutional actors and external key constituencies in order to anchor and guide their work. The BDPfA also recommends that gender mainstreaming (GM) should be the key strategy adopted by NWMs that would allow them to help shape public policy in order to trigger pro women’s equality changes across all socio-economic and political spheres (United Nations 1995, paragraph 202). This framework prioritises the creation of a series of structures and procedures, but it does not discuss policy outcomes or how NWMs can be both part of government and respond to key stakeholders, especially women’s organisations. Even the use of gender mainstreaming appears to be an end in itself rather than a means to achieve gender equality. A core criticism of application of the UN blueprint is that a country can create an NWM that complies with the Beijing standards yet the NWM may not be capable of promoting greater gender equality in public
policy or of acting as a voice in government that can raise issues of concern to its key constituencies. This problem has been considered particularly acute in the circumstances in which NWMs are set up in developing countries and in democratising countries and in many cases NWMs have been considered a form of window-dressing designed to improve the international image of the State rather than improve conditions for women.

As a practitioner working on gender issues in developing countries, I was aware of the gulf between NWMs and the activities and goals of national level women’s organisations. In many cases government-established NWMs did not respond to the policy demands of their national organised women’s movement and, in some cases, there was no interaction between the NWM and women’s groups. This is not to suggest that an NWM cannot be considered effective unless it promotes the policy goals of organised women’s groups, given the frequently diverse needs and objectives of these organisations, but it would be expected that an NWM would engage with this key constituency to help frame its own agenda of reform. This view was reinforced by my work with UN Women in Latin America where I observed that it was only in a few cases that NWMs’ work was informed by feminist and women’s core demands. I was concerned that such a major, and widespread institutional vehicle to promote women’s rights should appear to be ineffective in so many cases, in spite of critical voices both of practitioners and in the academic literature. My observation through my work indicated that in many cases governments did not implement the framework as detailed in the BDPfA. This led me to question whether it was the failure to fully implement the framework that resulted in weak or ineffective NWMs, or if the framework itself was at fault. I was motivated by the knowledge that the global norm that formed the basis for NWMs, and against which States are assessed, has not been revised since 1995. The review process critiques the performance of individual States based on the 1995 framework – there has been no formal process of review of the framework that could take stock of the effectiveness of the framework itself.

The Latin American region is a relevant region to study NWMs’ effectiveness as it has been significantly influenced by the global UN led normative developments and as a region has a long history of NWMs, with some being set up in the 1940s and 1950s. Most States had NWMs by the 1970s and all eighteen countries have adopted new NWMs or reformed existing NWMs since 1995. Latin America has been both relatively poor in international terms and also politically unstable. It has experienced a widespread process of democratisation from the late 1980s and the reform or re-establishment of NWMs was part of that process of democratisation. The region shares a common cultural and historical identity, but the levels of inequality, poverty and social exclusion significantly vary between countries. All countries in Latin America have been recipients of foreign aid at some point in their recent history, frequently during periods of democratisation, but poorer countries have had a greater dependency on aid and in many cases, donors have used aid to fund gender-related national development policies, legislation and plans, including supporting the creation and the work of NWMs. Latin America therefore contains States with different levels of engagement with international organisations as well as a
diversity of political structures and levels of stability. The aim of the thesis is to examine the effectiveness of Latin American NWMs. Their effectiveness or a lack of effectiveness is attributable to the degree to which the UN framework has been adopted or to other factors. The thesis therefore proposes to assess the potential effectiveness of NWMs in terms of not only compliance with global norms on NWMs but also in terms of the demonstrated commitment shown by States to ensure that NWMs as institutions can promote gender equality and engage with women’s organisations.

The thesis assesses how effective NWMs have been in the eighteen Latin America States applying an original typology that combines a set of compliance and of commitment indicators. Compliance is measured in terms of whether NWMs fulfil the global Beijing standards, therefore demonstrating the level of States’ adherence to the global norm. Compliance indicators reflect the parameters established by the BDPfA that States must follow to observe the global standards that would ensure in theory that they establish effective NWMs. These refer to the institutional design of NWMs, their legal basis and their stated mandates. Commitment is measured in terms of the viability of NWMs as a public policy tool, therefore demonstrating States’ willingness to ensure that they can effectively fulfil their goals. For this measure the thesis examines NWMs’ institutional design, the appropriateness of the relationship between their design and their responsibilities and the resources allocated to them. It also measures the capacity of NWMs to engage with key stakeholders, including women’s civil society organisations, in order to promote gender equality and build their institutional legitimacy. In relation to engagement with civil society, the characteristics of the leadership of the NWMs are also considered. These indicators are drawn from the debates in the academic literature on what factors have led to producing effective or ineffective NWMs.

The thesis conducted a cross-country regional survey study tracing the institutional trajectories of all NWMs that have been created in the eighteen Latin American countries up to 2016. The analysis of the effectiveness of NWMs only deals with the period post Beijing, that is since 1995. Information on effectiveness was drawn from two main sources. The first was the five-year reviews of States’ compliance with the BDPfA conducted as part of the Beijing+ appraisal sessions that are run by the international body, the Commission on the State of Women (CSW). The second source was a questionnaires survey of key informants, the NWMs, relevant civil society organisations and UN Women offices in all eighteen countries. As it was not possible in all eighteen States to look in more depth at the national dynamics behind the indicators or to link levels of effectiveness to policy outcomes, four representative case studies were chosen to explore these issues further. The regional analysis demonstrated a low level of both compliance and commitment and States were grouped into four categories; compliant and committed; non-compliant and committed; compliant and non-committed; and neither compliant or committed. Chile and Uruguay were chosen as cases of relatively effective NWMs. In the case of Chile, an NWM that was both compliant and committed and in the case of Uruguay an NWM that was not compliant but demonstrated commitment. Nicaragua was chosen as a
case of compliance but not commitment and Bolivia as an NWM that was neither compliant nor committed.

The regional examination of the eighteen Latin American countries was made possible thanks to my positionality in the UN working in this policy area since 2007. During this time, I have had the privilege to work very closely and liaise on a regular basis with NWMs, colleagues from different UN agencies, feminist and women’s organisations, academia and CEDAW Committee experts from across Latin America. My positionality allowed me to apply three questionnaires to UN Women national offices, NWMs and feminist and women’s movements, networks and organisations from all eighteen countries. It also allowed me to access information that is not necessarily public. Through my role I was a participant at many internal and external meetings and different fora of relevance to this topic. I also had access to different stakeholders and I was able to have informal discussions with them that informed my understanding and allowed me to corroborate information. Given my engagement with practitioners in the region, the research aims to contribute to the work of practitioners on how best to ensure that the application of global gender norms in concrete contexts can be adapted to trigger positive results. This is crucial given the hegemonic acceptance of the global norm on NWMs as the main institutional framework for the promotion of gender equality and the continued high expectations placed on them to be able to reduce inequality despite their proved limitations (Ríos Cázares 2017, p.708).

Structure of the thesis

Chapter One: National Women’s Mechanisms and the pursuit of gender equality

This chapter discusses the development of the idea of NWMs and the role of the UN in this process. It engages with the international debate on NWMs since 1995 and the discussions of their weaknesses and on their potential to be effective institutions. In particular, it analyses what are the key elements identified by scholars and practitioners that can be used to measure the potential effectiveness of NWMs. These attributes are institutional design; mandates and functions; resources and capacities, including consistency with responsibilities; collaboration and coordination with key constituencies; and leadership.

Chapter Two: Assessing the Effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America

This chapter describes the methodology of the thesis and the sources that it uses. It discusses how States’ compliance with global norms on NWMs and how the commitment of States to allow them to become viable institutions are defined in the thesis. The primary sources used in the thesis are described including how the surveys were conducted, how the participants were selected, and the documentary resources used. It explains how my role in the UN facilitated access to key informants and gave me unique opportunity to engage in participant observation. It deals with the data sources that
were used to describe the position of women in Latin America. It also explains how the in-depth case study countries were selected.

**Chapter Three: The evolution of National Women’s Mechanisms in Latin America**

This chapter analyses the political, economic and social changes shaping the Latin American region from 1990 onwards. In particular, it discusses the link between democratisation and demands for greater gender equality. In doing this it describes the evolution of the organised regional feminist and women’s movement and the construction of a common women’s agenda. It also discusses the performance of countries in key areas of concern regarding women’s rights and gender equality. It then analyses the evolution of NWMs in the eighteen Latin American countries from 1970 until 2016, to provide a contextual basis for assessing the current status of NWMs, discussing their trajectory and the key influences on their development. It deals with the post Beijing period, from 1995 onwards, in greater detail as it is from this date that the current international norm on NWMs was codified. The aim of the chapter is to identify the institutional features of NWMs, their type, hierarchical status, and legal basis, in order to assess the compliance of States with the dominant international norm on NWMs and in order to link it to other aspects of their international engagement.

**Chapter Four: The potential effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America**

This chapter analyses the potential effectiveness of NWMs in the eighteen Latin American States. This is done through an analysis of the commitment indicators discussed in Chapter Two covering the mandates assigned to NWMs by governments, the level of coherence between NWMs’ mandate and status, the resources (financial, human and technical) they are allocated to fulfil that mandate, the extent to which they engage with civil society organisations and the nature of their leadership. The mandate of NWMs is discussed in terms of the functions assigned, and also whether or not the status of the NWM is appropriate to its mandate. The way in which NWMs relate to other government departments and State agencies is also discussed. In terms of their leadership, the analysis focuses on how the leaders are appointed, their professional or political background and their links with feminist or women’s organisations. This group of indicators are internal to the State and to a large degree reflect government decisions. The chapter also considers the impact of external factors and actors and the way in which these interact with the decision and actions of domestic factors and actors, discussing the key drivers that led to the set-up or significant reform of NWMs. Finally, countries are clustered into four groups depending on their level of compliance and commitment. From these groups four exemplary cases are selected for an in-depth analysis.

**Chapter Five: Relatively effective NWMs in Chile and Uruguay**

This chapter conducts an in-depth analysis of the cases of Chile and Uruguay as comparable exemplary cases of relatively effective NWMs. In the case of Chile, the trajectory and attributes of the
NWM indicate that the State, both complied with the prescribed international normative standards on NWMs and showed the necessary commitment to allow the NWM fulfil its assigned role. In the case of Uruguay, albeit not complying with the global policy norm on NWMs, the country has shown greater commitment to enable its NWM to achieve its goals than most other States in the region. The chapter discusses the historic development of the NWM in the context of the political and social development of the State. It analyses the current position of the NWMs focusing on their relationship to government and the resources allocated to them. It also discusses their relationship with key constituencies and the role of leadership.

Chapter Six: Ineffective NWMs in Nicaragua and Bolivia

This chapter analyses the cases of Nicaragua and Bolivia. According to the measures of commitment used in Chapter Four both States had not demonstrated the will to allow the NWMs to become potentially effective vehicles for promoting gender equality or issues of women’s welfare. In the case of Nicaragua, this contrasts with a relative compliance with global norms on the institutional structure of NWMs, not found in the case of Bolivia. For both States, the chapter analyses the relationship between the trajectory of the NWM and the political and social development of the State. It discusses in detail the current position of the NWMs, paying particular attention to the issue of how the NWM is resourced and its relationship to government and also to key constituencies.

Chapter Seven: National Women’s Mechanisms in Latin America: an effective policy measure to advance women’s equality?

NWMs have generally not been an effective policy measure to advance women’s equality in Latin America. The findings of the research point to problems with the framework contained in the UN led policy norm in its current form.
Chapter One: National Women’s Mechanisms and the pursuit of gender equality

The idea of national women’s mechanisms (NWMs) strongly emerged with the second-wave women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s when States sought to create formal institutions to address women’s status (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.28). Subsequently, NWMs experienced widespread growth, that was reinforced following the Third and Fourth World Conferences on Women taking place in Nairobi in 1985, and in Beijing in 1995, respectively. The 1970s were the take-off period for the creation of women’s mechanisms in the Western World (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.225), and the 1990s the period of their international diffusion (True & Mintrom 2001). From the 1990s ‘gender mainstreaming’ became the strategy that governments most frequently adopted to demonstrate their commitment to gender equality (Jacquot 2010, p.121; Squires 2007, p.49) and NWMs have been seen as the primary institution to implement this strategy. The creation of these entities has been hailed as a feminist victory that had the potential to give greater leverage for women’s demands to influence their States. However, from their inception there has been a debate on their potential effectiveness to enhance gender equality through their engagement with public policy (Rios Cázares 2017, p.689; Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, p.29; Mazur 2005). This critique has reflected the difference in the ways NWMs have been established and the different forms they have taken (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.48; Guzmán & Bonan 2008). It is also linked to the limitations of gender mainstreaming in public policy. There is a perceived difference between NWMs that have been established in developed states (see for example McBride & Mazur 2010; Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008; Bleijenbergh & Roggeband 2007; Sawer 2003, 1998; Aseskog 2003) and those set up in developing countries (see for example Rios Cázares 2017; Adams 2007; Goetz 2003; Rai 2003b; Honculada & Pineda 2003; Friedman 2000). It has been suggested that NWMs in donor dependent or in newly democratising countries are not strong advocates for gender equality as they owe their foundation to either external actors or to the desire by governments to enhance their reputations in the international community (Rios Cázares 2017; Matos & Paradis 2013; Guzmán & Bonan 2008; Adams 2007; Franceschet 2007; Goetz 2003).

As a region, Latin America has a long history of NWMs, with some being set up in the 1940s and 1950s. All eighteen States have adopted or reformed NWMs since 1995 and most had NWMs in the 1970s. It is also a region that has a diverse range of States in terms of levels of development and also of political stability, although most States share the experience of moving from authoritarian governments to democracy. It is also a region that has had a poor record on women’s rights and on gender equality. Given its uneven level of development, its high levels of inequality in terms of access to resources and its experience of democratisation, it attracted the assistance of international donors and of the United Nations (UN). High levels of assistance have also meant direct and indirect intervention, an instance of this being the support that international actors have given to the development of NWMs as a strategy to achieve a greater degree of gender equality.
To analyse the effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America as a vehicle to promote gender equality and to consider what factors make for more effective NWMs, this chapter discusses the UN led development of the idea of NWMs and the international debate on their potential effectiveness. In particular, it analyses what are the key elements identified by scholars that can be used to define the effectiveness of NWMs.

The international evolution of the idea of NWMs

A variety of terms has been used to refer to the institutions created to promote women’s status and gender equality. The denominations preferred by the academic literature include “women’s policy agencies” (Ríos Cázares 2017; McBride & Mazur 2010; Stetson & Mazur 1995), “women’s policy mechanism” (Franceschet 2007), “institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women” (Rai 2003a), and “gender mainstreaming mechanisms” (True & Mintrom 2001). The terms used by the United Nations since the 1970s are “national mechanisms for the advancement of women” or “national mechanism for gender equality”, also referred to as “national women’s mechanisms” or “national women’s machineries”. Throughout the thesis this type of institution will be referred to as “national women’s mechanisms” (NWMs).

The first World Conference on Women, convened by the UN in Mexico City in 1975 to coincide with International Women’s Year, was also the first time a national mechanism to promote women’s interests was recommended at the global level. The resulting Declaration and Plan of Action identified the need to establish mechanisms to promote the status of women at the national and regional level where they did not exist, and their strengthening where they already existed (see United Nations 1976).

Following this First Conference, the United Nations Decade for Women (1976-1985) encouraged a focus on the development of policy norms related to women’s rights (see United Nations 1975). Two other global Conferences on women were held during this decade - the Second World Conference in Copenhagen, in 1980, and the Third World Conference in Nairobi, in 1985, which also supported the establishment of national mechanisms for the promotion of women’s rights. By the end of the International Decade, such mechanisms had been set up in 127 countries (Rai 2003a, p.1; United Nations 2000b).

Although NWMs existed across the range of countries, by 1985 the promotion of such mechanisms was focused on women in the context of developing States. This reflected the perceived higher level of gender equality in developed countries and the focus of the UN as an institution with a

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2 See for example paragraphs 31, 34, 36, 43-1 (n), and section A on “organizational machinery” (1) and (2). The Plan of Action included a set of recommendations and guidelines for national action to be followed by States to implement their commitments on the promotion of women.

3 Central themes in this Conference were equality, development and peace, and efforts were to be devoted to effective and sustained national, regional and international action to implement the World Plan of Action and related resolutions of the Conference.
strong interest in development (see United Nations 1985, 1980). The final agreement of this Conference included a chapter dedicated to the “establishment and strengthening of machinery for the integration of women in development” (see United Nations 1980, chapter 39). States were urged to establish mechanisms where they did not yet exist and to ensure that they were equipped with adequate financial, technical and human resources. The aim of this recommendation was to consolidate the role that such mechanisms were considered to play “in the integration of women in the development process” (United Nations 1980, chapter 39). This also reflect the reality for developed States that although there had been many equality gains for women in the 1970s, by 1985 women’s organisations were experiencing an anti-feminist backlash and felt the need to pursue different strategies to defend their achievements and to make further gains (see for example Bailey 1997; Marshall 1985). Expanding the demand for similar equality gains to those achieved by women in developed States into the development agenda seemed both achievable and desirable (Bunch 1990).

The third UN women’s conference recommended that national measures adopted by States should encompass a wide range of issues, including employment, health, education, industry, science and the environment, and it explicitly linked the pursuit of this policy to the development of NWMs (United Nations 1986). This was the result of the strategic reconsideration by first world feminists and led to the promotion of the policy idea of ‘gender mainstreaming’ (Squires 2007; Daly 2005; Verloo 2005, 2003, 2001; True 2003; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000; Jahan 1995), which at its most positive declared that “all issues were women’s issues” (United Nations 1986). The document from this conference was critical of the progress that had been made on NWMs worldwide, stating that where such entities existed, they generally lacked the resources, focus, responsibility and authority to be effective (United Nations 1986, paragraph 106). The conference called for measures to be put in place at the national level so that NWMs could become institutions capable of strengthening “intersectional coordination in promoting women’s participation” (United Nations 1986, paragraph 127) and that governments should “provide adequate resources, commitment and authority at the highest level of government” (United Nations 1986, paragraphs 123 and 125).

The UN Decade for Women also provided the momentum to push for the global adoption of the CEDAW Convention in 1979 (United Nations 1979). This was considered a breakthrough in that it was an international normative binding instrument, and “an international bill of rights for women” (quoted in Bunch 1990, p.495). The CEDAW Convention defines what constitutes discrimination against women⁴ and sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination. By ratifying the Convention, States are expected to undertake a series of measures to end all forms of discrimination against women as defined by CEDAW, including the incorporation of the principle of equality between

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⁴ Discrimination is defined as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”, see United Nations (1979).
women and men into their legal system, the abolition of all discriminatory legislation, setting up
mechanisms to protect women’s rights, and the adoption of favourable measures to promote equality,
such as temporary special measures (United Nations 1979, selected articles included in Appendix 2). In
addition, as the Convention is a binding instrument, States must report periodically to the Committee
of Experts on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (also known as the CEDAW
Committee), on the progress achieved in applying the Convention.

From the 1980s, the CEDAW Committee explicitly promoted the creation and improvement of
NWMs. In 1988, it adopted General Recommendation5 No. 6 on “effective national women’s
mechanisms”, urging States to report on the status of their NWMs (Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women 1988, included in Appendix 3). This recommendation requires States to
establish or strengthen their NWMs at a high level in government and with governmental resources,
commitment and authority to advise on the impact that governmental policies have on women, monitor
the situation of women and support the effective formulation and implementation of policies, strategies
and measures to eliminate discrimination again women (Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women 1988). To encourage States to take action on this, as part the periodic
examination that they must undergo on their progress in implementing the Convention, the CEDAW
Committee reviews NWMs. It observes inter alia their autonomy, authority and capacity and their
relations with civil society. On the basis of the findings, the Committee issues tailored recommendations
to each State for the improvement of their NWMs. This action by CEDAW reinforces international
pressure on nation States to comply with this blueprint and also provides a vehicle for civil society
groups to critique State actions on this issue via shadow reports.

These UN led global processes contributed to making the idea of NWMs familiar and to
promote their use as a policy tool to achieve gender equality worldwide. In addition to the major inter-
governmental events and agreements, the influence of transnational women’s networks, national
feminist and women’s organisations, epistemic communities and other non-state actors in promoting
NWMs in global inter-governmental fora have had a major influence on the content of the UN led
international agreements (Walby 2005a, b; True 2003; True & Mintrom 2001). This is exemplified by
the dynamic, coordinated work of women’s organisations across the world leading up to and during the
Beijing Conference (Pietilä 2007, pp.69-72), including lobbying to ensure that the issue of NWMs was
explicitly included among the conference outcome recommendations. As a result of this activity, the
Fourth World Conference on Women is considered to have been “an important watershed” in the
capacity of “transnational feminist advocacy” to influence a conference of this type (Reilly 2005, p.2).

At the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), women’s mechanisms were put at
the heart of gender equality measures and received considerable attention. This is evident in the listing

5 General recommendations are issued by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and directed to States. Their purpose is to guide States in better understanding the provisions of the Convention as well as to reflect and develop emerging issues faced by women. See OHCHR (2017b).
of “Institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women” as one of the twelve critical areas of concern of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA) and the explicit detailing of key objectives and conditions to ensure their adequate strengthening (see Area of Concern H in United Nations 1995, included in Appendix 1). The Beijing Conference landmark outcome document is considered as the crucial international driver that led to the normalisation of NWMs internationally (Rai 2003a; Woodward 2003; True & Mintrom 2001). The BDPfA identified NWMs as central institutions in ensuring that governments adopt and apply a GM approach in all policy-making (United Nations 1995, paragraph 201). The intention was to make NWMs part of mainstream policy-making processes so that gender equality and women’s demands could be placed at the centre stage of States’ agendas. The BDPfA defines NWMs as having multiple functions, including in the design, promotion, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, advocacy and the mobilisation of support “for policies that promote the advancement of women” (United Nations 1995, paragraph 196). This definition gives NWMs a central coordination role in the task of mainstreaming gender equality within the governmental and State structures, apparatus and modus operandi.

The recommendations identified in the BDPfA stemmed from the acknowledgement that, following the initial enthusiasm of the 1970s, existing women’s mechanisms were “diverse in form and uneven in their effectiveness” and that in some cases they had even been discontinued (United Nations 1995, paragraph 196). Women’s entities were described as often “marginalized in national government structures” and “frequently hampered by unclear mandates, lack of adequate staff, training, data and sufficient resources, and insufficient support from national political leadership” (United Nations 1995, paragraph 196). Drawing on these deficiencies, and on existing academic literature on NWMs, the BDPfA identified several conditions deemed to be necessary to ensure an effective functioning of NWMs. These included being placed at the highest possible level within government (i.e. under the responsibility of a minister); being vested with adequate authority, mandates and functions; ensuring the existence of institutional mechanisms and processes that facilitate planning, implementation and monitoring; ensuring the involvement of civil society organisations “from the grass-roots upwards”; having sufficient resources in terms of budget allocations and professional capacity; and having opportunity to influence the development of all governmental policy making (United Nations 1995, paragraph 201). This UN document developed a statement at the highest international level that listed the conditions thought necessary for an NWM to be effective. NWMs were promoted by the UN as “the primary institutional mechanism entrusted with the implementation of the strategic objectives contained throughout the [BDPfA] at national level” (Ertük 2003, p.xv). As part of the BDPfA, since 1995, the status of NWMs is evaluated every five years through an appraisal process during the periodic sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). This appraisal is based on the submission of

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6 The Commission on the Status of Women was established in 1946 and is the main global intergovernmental body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Since 1999, it
national, regional and global progress reports on the implementation of the Beijing Platform, and it is a distinct process from the CEDAW periodic reporting. It is clear that from this time the UN was promoting a detailed blueprint of what an NWM should be and also defining NWMs as the institutional key to achieving gender equality, this is demonstrated by the identification of NWMs in the first five-year review (Beijing+5) as “catalysts” for promoting gender equality (United Nations 2000a).

Since 1995, momentum has not been favourable to push for a Fifth World Conference on Women, the positive international environment had already changed by 2000 when the Beijing+5 review took place. This first Beijing appraisal was seen by women’s organisations as a recognition of how little States had advanced in implementing the Platform and how reluctant States were to make new commitments on issues that had not been included in the Beijing agreements - such as women’s sexual and reproductive rights (Bunch 2001, p.134). By 2005 when the Beijing+10 review took place, the changing international policy and political climate had significantly shifted and threatened the agreed commitments of Beijing with a pushback from conservative religious and political forces from around the world (Molyneux & Razavi 2006). This meant that the framework provided by Beijing remains the one in which the UN and its agencies work regarding NWMs. The negative atmosphere for advancing women’s rights and assessing the progress made by States was indicated by the reception given to the Beijing+20 review, in 2015. In particular, this review was critiqued for deliberately limiting civil society’s participation and producing a pre-cooked weakened inter-governmental political declaration that allowed States to renege on their commitments (Shameem 2015). The UN had by then dismissed the possibility of holding a Fifth World Conference on Women on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the BDPfA. Internationally linked women’s civil society groups and many States agreed with this position and called for caution, in particular given the danger from powerful conservative governments and non-State actors who actively sought to roll back women’s rights if international agreements on women’s rights were reopened for discussion (Goetz & Sandler 2015).

**Critiquing Gender Mainstreaming - the framework for NWMs?**

Between the Third and Fourth World Conferences on Women there was an international process of ideational change that shifted the focus of the role assigned to NWMs from one that focused on improving women’s status to one that was primarily concerned with coordinating a process of gender mainstreaming (GM) (Mazur 2005, p.3; Rai 2003; Staudt 2003; Rees 1998, p.142). Gender mainstreaming was defined as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels […] so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated” (United Nations 1997a). While the

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monitors the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as part of its annual sessions (see UN Women 2017c).
idea of GM was present in the equal opportunities approach that informed the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 (Rees 2002, p.45), it underpinned the policy positions that emerged from the Fourth World Conference in Beijing in 1995 (Pietilä 2007). The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA) embodied the commitment of the international community to adopt GM as “a formal goal of all UN member states” and provided “a global mandate for change, and a template against which judge both national and international policies” (Hafner-Burton & Pollack 2002, p.340). This directive to mainstream a gender perspective envisaged, in its ideal form, that gender equality would become one of the outcomes of all interventions in social, economic and political spheres, and NWMMs were identified as the most suitable institutional form to coordinate GM across all policy areas at the national level.

The form of GM that was embodied in the BDPfA is conceptually grounded in feminist theory and conceived as a framework that, could both analyse deeply embedded inequalities in social norms and structures, and also provide a way to address them thereby achieving social transformation (Jacquot 2010, p.121; Woodford-Berger 2007, p.123). In this way GM was not an end in itself but a strategy to achieve gender equality. Positive assessments of GM have argued that it has more potential to have a serious impact upon the social transformation of gender relations than earlier feminist strategies (Woodford-Berger 2007; Verloo 2005, 2001; Walby 2005b; Woodward 2003; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000; Mazey 2000; Rees 1998;). It is the problems associated with its implementation and the weakness of the outcomes associated with it, that have led to negative perspectives of its progressive potential (Halpern, Jacquot & Le Galès 2011; Jacquot 2010; Benschop & Verloo 2006; Daly 2005; Moser & Moser 2005; Bacchi & Eveline 2003; Hafner-Burton & Pollack 2002, 2000; Verloo 2001).

The emergence of GM as a strategy reflects the increasing engagement with the formal structures of the State and mainstream politics promoted by third-wave feminism from the 1980s onwards (Squires 2007, p.4). From the mid-1970s the inevitable slowdown of social movement activity meant that autonomous women’s activism was gradually replaced by “an increasingly professionalized, state-oriented network of gender equality advocates” that had access to mainstream politics and institutional spaces in a way that was not possible in the 1970s and this access to the State was seen as a route to progressive change (Squires 2007, p.2). However, in the process of gaining access and becoming part of the policy-making process, feminist advocates inevitably made concessions and modified earlier feminist demands (Squires 2007, p.2). In this “new politics of gender equality” the emphasis was no longer placed on having “voice” through the assertion of positive action measures but on “presence” and “process” embodied in strategies such as gender quotas and GM, respectively (Squires 2007, p.2). This shift also involved the dismantling of previous gender equality strategies which had followed a positive action rationale and also had a focus on women. As a result, women-specific policy agencies, sections, mechanisms or units were either weakened or disappeared. This was for example the case of the dismantling of the free-standing Ministry of Women’s Equality in British Columbia, Canada, after a decade’s work representing and providing voice to women in high-level
decision-making spaces (Teghtsoonian 2003); or the dismantling or downgrading of different women’s institutional entities and policies in Australia (Bacchi 2001, 2000). The common rationalisation behind episodes like this was that gender equality had become the “responsibility of all” and should not be “ghettoised”, therefore, specific institutions dedicated to women were deemed to be no longer necessary (Rees 1998, p.146). A decline in budget allocations for women-specific measures was also a concrete result of this shift (Rees 1998; Jahan 1995). This undermining of processes which focused on “voice” resulted in the de-politisation and technocratisation of gender equality to the detriment of a more participatory democratic process (Squires 2007, p.18). The politics of presence has also led to depoliticising the women’s agenda in the State for example “through the privileging of professional “gender experts” at the expense of opportunities for input and participation by activists within the women’s community” (Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, p.43). As a result, gender equality activism became a technocratic pursuit which can be measured by the number of women represented in the formal structures of the State, by whether State institutions have a gender equality policy and similar measures (Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead 2007, p.5; Staudt 2003, p.48; Razavi & Miller 1995a).

The perceived advantages of adopting a gender focus in strategies aimed at improving the position of women included turning a “political” issue into a “technical” one, with the aim of advancing women’s issues within public policy and institutional settings (Staudt 2003, p.48). However, the price for this has been an overemphasis on processes and procedures to the detriment of concrete actions and outcomes and this is also one of the main criticisms of NWMs as the key institutional vehicle for implementing GM (Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead 2007, p.5; Staudt 2003, p.48; Razavi & Miller 1995a). This criticism is that institutions, such as NWMs, are focused on the process of mainstreaming gender, rather than on the expected impact of implementing policy (Staudt 2003, p.41). The policy aim of promoting gender equality through an array of strategies, policies, tools and checklists, made it easy for an institution to nominally at least have the appearance of implementing GM. For feminists, the hope was that implementing gender mainstreaming would create a dynamic that would lead to greater equality in spite of the aims of individual governments and the lack of clarity around equality goals and targets (Woodford-Berger 2007, p.123). There is a consensus in the critical literature that, once implemented by institutions and bureaucracies, including NWMs, GM has led to “policy evaporation” (Standing 2007; Subrahmanian 2007). Policy commitments to gender equality are often lost, reinterpreted, or heavily diluted, as they become part of the bureaucratic process (Standing 2007, p.101). The weaknesses of gender mainstreaming as a strategy has an influence on the capacity of NWMs. In contexts where this strategy is adopted without the engagement of civil society organisations promoting equality or without the support of the government this situation will be exacerbated.

There is a further concern regarding the assumption underlined by the global norm that NWMs will be able to effectively coordinate the application of GM and that this will trigger gender equality outcomes at all levels. The BDPfA states that GM must be the “shared” responsibility of all public policy institutions and that NWMs have a coordination and oversight role (see United Nations 1995,
paragraph 202). However, unless GM is prioritised by all institutions, the weight of the responsibility can end up resting solely on NWMs. Setting up gender institutions with the structure and resources necessary to allow them to “address the full scope of issues which influence women’s lives” remains a challenge (Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, p.46). In this regard, Staudt (2003, p.63) points out that the task of mainstreaming gender across human development cannot be addressed by a single “machine” within a nation or institution. Furthermore, charging institutions and bureaucracies with the ambitious project of social and political transformation professed by GM does not take into consideration that these sector bureaucracies operate in an inherently non-transformatory context and are not engines of social and political transformation (Standing 2007, pp.104-105). Standing (2007) emphasises that the place to achieve social transformation is the political arena, rather than bureaucratic structures. If NWMs are established with the objective of implementing GM, then their capacity to be effective may be compromised from the beginning unless transformations are experienced at other levels.

**NWMs as an intentional norm**

The weakness of GM as a framework is not the only concern that has been raised about the potential effectiveness of NWMs. It has been argued that the status of NWMs as an international norm has led to their adoption but in a form that from their inception was not intended to have a positive effect on gender equality, particularly in countries in the global South (see for example Ríos Cázares 2017 on the case of creating NWMs in every State of Mexico; Kwesiga 2003 on the case of the NWM in Uganda; Rai 2003b on the case of the NWM in India). A key discussion in the literature is that the political and socio-economic context matters. In Nordic countries, for example, relative successful experiences of the application of this policy have been linked to the welfare state model (Aseskog 2003). The “embeddedness [of NWMs] in the national context, the political and socio-economic system and the needs of an accountability to women” were identified at the CSW as key factors for their success (quoted in Rai 2003a, pp.3-4). Therefore, although the idea of NWMs has become an international ‘norm’ widely promoted by international agencies (True & Mintrom 2001), the effectiveness and form of the institution established under this norm varies widely (Jahan 2010).

The spread of NWMs is a case of policy diffusion across different contexts that has been linked to the increase of instant communications, the continuous technological advancements and the intensification of global, regional and sub-regional political, economic and social integration (Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett 2007; Simmons & Elkins 2004; Rubio 2002; Drezner 2001; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 1996; Stone 1999). Such factors have been associated with the increased interdependency among countries which has favoured the transfer of ideas and policies. Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) make a key distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer, that is, “between cases of direct coercive transfer and those cases in which the push factors leading to policy transfer are more indirect” (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, p.346). Although cases of direct coercive transfer are rare, Dolowitz & Marsh (1996)
identified supra-national institutions as playing a crucial role in ensuring the transfer of policies if countries are subject to leverage (trade, aid, or security dependence). Policy transfer can therefore be associated with relevant international meetings where such policies are discussed and developed (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, p.457).

Theories of policy diffusion used to explain the diffusion of policies across countries, identify that States are prompted to adopt new policies either by a change in ideas or a change in incentives (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, p.450). Whilst constructivists link changes in policies primarily to changes in dominant policy ideas (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, pp.452-454), adopting international policy norms has also been described as a deliberate ploy used by State governments to acquire legitimacy in the international community (Marsh & Sharman 2009, p.272). Strong international actors can also use the promotion of international norms to further their own objectives, therefore, the promotion of “hegemonic ideas” by powerful and resourceful actors has been identified as a soft form of coercion (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, p.456). In these cases, States comply with certain global norms without necessarily having the commitment, intention or means to implement them. The establishment of the NWM in authoritarian Cameroon is an example of a case where soft forms of coercion were a strong reason for adopting an NWM, as it was driven by the desire to increase international legitimacy and to attract foreign development aid (see Adams 2007). This had an added advantage for the government as it could also use development assistance to support domestic patronage networks through the NWM and, thereby, channel women’s activism toward projects and goals set by the State (Adams 2007). In the case of the creation of weak women’s policy agencies in the 32 States that make up the Federate State of Mexico in the period 2007-2014, Ríos Cázares (2017) found that this may have been a low-cost act of legitimacy.

Members of transnational epistemic communities can also influence the decision of States to establish NWMs by identifying the usefulness of this policy for decision-makers and linking it to the solution of identified problems (True & Mintrom 2001). True & Mintrom’s study (2001) found that the global diffusion of NWMs in the period 1975-1998 was made possible primarily because of the transnational networking of women’s organisations and gender policy entrepreneur advocates, particularly those present at the UN global conferences on women, and their links to local women’s organisations (True 2003, p.372; True & Mintrom 2001). In this period, it was the pressure from internationally networked women that influenced national governments and international institutions to promote these measures (True & Mintrom 2001, p.41).

The idea of soft coercion helps elucidate whether these norms were adopted by countries as a result of internal dynamics and domestic demand, or whether coercive factors were at play or whether there was a mixture of voluntary and coercive motives (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 1996). This also highlights the importance of analysing the domestic context to policy adoption as an indication of the potential for effectiveness of the NWM. As an illustrative example, in her study of the transfer of gender mainstreaming policies in EU member States, Mazey (2002) found that some countries responded to
voluntary transfer and others to coercive transfer, depending on their internal dynamics. In this case
domestic factors were critical to understanding why some cases of adoption were more effective than
others.

As international fora can exert a “soft” coercive influence on individual States (Dobbin,
Simmons & Garrett 2007, p.456), the influence of international norms and powerful international actors
that promote the adoption of NWMs is linked with the chances of success of such institutions. Kardam
& Acuner (2003, p.99) indicate that the establishment of NWMs as a result of these foreign pressures
result in “symbolic commitments, usually not backed by realistic resource allocations” to enable NWMs
to fulfil their mandate. It is now well established that women’s mechanisms have not always been the
result of States’ desire to improve gender equality and women’s status, or a direct response to pressure
from women’s organisations at the local level, although in some cases women’s organisations have been
a factor. For example, Goetz (2003) analysed the cases of Bangladesh, Chile, Jamaica, Morocco and
Vietnam, and found that the establishment of an NWM responded to demands from the women’s
movement only in the case of Chile and to a lesser extent in the case of Jamaica. Motives such as gaining
international legitimacy, appearing democratic and progressive, attracting foreign cooperation funding,
or simply complying with international gender norms have been found to be behind the establishment
of many NWMs across the world. Illustrative examples include Goetz’ research (2003) on the cases of
Bangladesh, Morocco and Vietnam; Franceschet’s (2007) on several cases in Latin America; Kwesiga’s
(2003) on the case of Uganda; Adams’ (2007) on the case of Cameroon. Such motives are also found
in the creation of women’s entities at the sub-national level in federate States. In the case of the creation
of 32 national entities in the United States of Mexico, Ríos Cázares (2017, p.707) found that despite
having a “broad mandate and high administrative status”, these entities were systematically
underfunded, making them dependent on external funding, which in turn made them rely on “temporary
staff”. This situation led the entities to face an “institutional dilemma” as in order to operate with such
constraints, they were forced to limit their activities to selected policy areas and, in praxis, “abandon
the broad mandate that was conferred by the state legislation” (Ríos Cázares 2017, p.707).

While the above analysis emphasises the impact of international norms on the form and
effectiveness of NWMs, aspects of the national context have also been identified as important
determinants of outcomes (Trebilcock & Mota 2017; Standing 2007; Daly 2005; Kabeer 2003;
Woodward 2003). In Guzmán’s view (2006, p.2), NWMs are empirical and material expressions of
political relations, social practices and visions about the world which get publicly and officially
institutionalised by means of historic processes involving political struggle. Their different expressions
reflect not only the political momentum of the country and political commitment of the government but
also the strength of the women’s movement (Guzmán 2006, p.2). Furthermore, their success can be
conditioned by existing State norms on gender equality, symbolic conceptions and discourses on gender
within the State, and the strength that the gender equality agenda has within and outside the State
(Guzmán 2006, p.2). In Rai’s view (2003a, p.23) as these institutions are expected to represent women’s
interests in the State, it is important to identify whose interests they are representing. In order to analyse the effectiveness of an NWM in its national context, as well as its relationship to the international system, it is therefore necessary to ask for what purpose was the NWM created and for whom was it created, that is whose agenda or interests was it designed to serve.

Asking for what purpose is an NWM created has two aspects. Firstly, it focuses on what an NWM is supposed to do in terms of its defined responsibilities and areas of work and whether or not it is designed and resourced in order to fulfil these responsibilities. Secondly, it refers to what was the incentive structure faced by key actors and motives that led them to the establishment of an NWM. Were the motives of key actors instrumental in the setting up of the NWM or was the establishment driven by objectives that were not related to the ostensible purpose of the institution? Linked to these questions is the issue of for whom are NWMs established. In other words, to what extent is the NWM designed to serve the interests of its target audience, that is women. This asks whose “voice” and “agency” are represented by NWMs, as proposed by Verloo (2005) and Squires (2007).

The effectiveness of NWMs is periodically assessed according to the parameters set by the BDPfA (United Nations 1995, paragraph 201). These include aspects concerning the institutional design of NWMs (their location within the governmental structure, their autonomy and authority); their mandate, role and responsibilities; their capacity in terms of human, financial and technical resources; and their coordination and collaboration with internal and external key actors. The adoption of GM as a key strategy applied by NWMs to meet their goals is also a common feature of the assessment. This manner of assessing NWMs according to the BDPfA parameters is predominantly focused on evaluating the actual existence of structures and tools (see for example United Nations 2014; CEPAL 2013; Jahan 2010).

In contrast, scholars such as Rai (2003a), Goetz (2003) and McBride & Mazur (2010) emphasise the need to not only focus on the compliance with global norms on the form of institutional structures and tools, but also on the existence of features and conditions that enable NWMs represent, promote and strengthen women’s agency and anchor their work in women’s realities and priorities. Rai (quoted in Rai 2003a, p.18) takes the view that since the establishment of NWMs is part of the process of State democratisation and good governance, the engagement NWMs should have with the State and with State institutions is one of working “in and against” the State. She considers that this “in and against” the State approach allows NWMs to seriously and critically mainstream gender equality through and within the State (Rai 2003a, p.18). To succeed in implementing this approach an NWM must be able to ensure that it is not used to “co-opt the gender agenda within State policy, thus divesting it of its radical edge”, particularly where a strong women’s movement is not present in a given State (Rai 2003a, p.19). They can indeed be used as “neutralizers of civil society organizations and feminist advocates” (Ríos Cázares 2017, p.707). An NWM must have an element of independence of either opinion or action to be able to realise this goal. In broad agreement with this position, Guzman (2006,
p.7) refers to NWMs as “a potentially democratising nexus” seeing their capacity for independent inputs existing between different proposals on State reform coming from elites and from society, in a context where new rules are established between the State and society, including among different political and social actors. This view particularly resonates with States that are either going through a process of democratisation or have recently gone through such a process. Rai (2003a, pp.34-39) identifies several aspects of democratisation that are critical to assessing the success of NWMs. These include whether NWMs are decentralised entities, the role played by political parties, whether monitoring and auditing systems exist that ensure the NWM is accountable to civil society, whether governmental leadership shows commitment to gender equality agendas, and whether women’s presence within broader political institutions of the State and government has increased. The identification of these elements is a good approximation of how close to women’s organisations NWMs are, which women’s voices they represent, and whether the overall State and government structure is favourable to women’s equality. They can therefore provide a checklist against which to assess NWMs.

The comparative analysis conducted by Goetz (2003) of the effectiveness of five NWMs in the global South found that the level of success of NWMs was the result of a combination of factors that point to those conditions established by the global blueprint on NWMs as well as others that point to NWMs’ relations with their constituents. Goetz’s study (2003, pp.90-94) found that the internal factors that had most influence on the degree of effectiveness of NWMs were firstly their human, technical and financial capacity and resources, followed by the degree to which public servants had a knowledge of gender issues, and the existence of effective coordination mechanisms that enabled NWMs to coordinate gender mainstreaming across ministerial policies. Influential factors external to NWMs were found to be the degree to which NWMs had developed constituencies concerned with gender both in and outside the State, the internal politics in each country, and the degree to which NWMs had managed to stay detached from partisan politics or electoral patronage systems (Goetz, 2003, pp.93-94). Some of these aspects are also found by Vega Ugalde (2003, p.125) who examines the case of the NWM in Ecuador and highlights the importance of the “political” as an influential factor, including the political affiliation of the party in government, the necessary links with States’ staff and the role of women’s groups in “proposing, pressuring, negotiating, overseeing, criticizing, demanding explanations”.

McBride & Mazur’s (2010) research project on thirteen women’s policy agencies focused only on Western countries that they defined as post-industrial. In this study they traced the trajectories of women’s policy agencies by gathering information about their alliances with women’s movement actors as well as their participation in policy arenas, their institutional form, mandate, powers and resources. Their study did not find easy explanations nor patterns for different levels of institutional effectiveness. Factors such as having a strong pro women movement inside the State, administrative resources, capacity or identifiable levels of women’s movement resources, favourable policy environment and

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7 Own translation, the original Spanish term used is “bisagra” which literally means “hinge”.

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support from left oriented governments did not provide consistent paths to effectiveness across the board (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.242-247). Teghtsoonian & Chappell (2008) found that whereas left oriented governments tended to be relatively more supportive of women’s institutions and the feminist agenda in the State, and right oriented governments less supportive, this was not always the case and there was more complexity than just distinguishing between left and right parties and ideologies. On the one hand, they found that the “variability among parties of the right” and the “particular political and ideological commitment of individual leaders” were key in assessing the progress of the women’s agenda in the State (Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, p.43). On the other hand, social democratic parties or centre-left parties that have adopted a neoliberal influenced approach may marginalise the feminist agenda and women’s institutions in the State based on a “cost-efficiency” rationale (Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, p.43). McBride & Mazur (2010, p.242) concluded that “there is no one recipe for success” and that outcomes were “complex, context specific and conditional”.

McBride & Mazur (2010) examined seven aspects of NWMs to assess their influence on effectiveness: institution type; policy orientation and policy mission; the appointment of the agency head; leadership; proximity to decision-making power; policy-making powers; and access to administrative resources. Regarding the institutional type, they took a broad definition of the possible form an NWM could take including: an agency, a ministry, an administrative office, a commission in the political executive, a judicial body, an advisory council, a legislative council, or a section of a political party (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.48). In the case of policy orientation or policy mission they asked if the NWM oversaw a single issue, multiple issues, or if it had a cross-sectional remit (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.49). They were interested in how the agency head was appointed drawing a distinction between a political appointment, compared to a bureaucratic appointment, or a lay panel appointment (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.48). Their study also assessed whether the NWM was close to, moderately close to, or distant from decision-making power within its national institutional setting and if the NWM had the power to propose policies, or on the contrary if its role was to merely review and recommend, or some combination of these (McBride & Mazur 2010, pp.48-51). They considered the possible impact of whether or not the head of the NWM had ever belonged to or had been someone from a feminist or women’s movement (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.50). Finally, their study assessed the range and volume of the “administrative resources” the NWM could command in terms of staff, administrative divisions, field offices, a separate budget, subsidies for women’s groups, and research resources (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.51).

Some of these aspects are found to have determined the effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America. In general terms the existing research from this region agrees that that these institutions have collectively experienced institutional instability, vulnerability to change and inadequate capacity and resources to fulfil their assigned roles, including the responsibility of coordinating gender mainstreaming (Matos & Paradis 2013; Franceschet 2007; Montaño 2006; Guzmán 2006; Vargas 2004). Franceschet (2007) analysed some trends in NWMs in Latin America and found considerable
variation in terms of the capacity of NWMs to fulfil the roles they had been assigned. The determinant factors that affected their capacity at that point in time – more than ten years ago - were their location within the hierarchy of the government, the possibilities of engagement with women’s organisations, and the lack of administrative and financial resources (Franceschet 2007, p.4). She found that these three factors were guaranteed only in the cases of the NWMs of Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico (Franceschet 2007, p.4). She also found that most NWMs had been created by governmental decision, not by law, with the only exception of the NWMs of Chile and Costa Rica, and that most NWMs had been affected by institutional instability. Another trend found was that most NWMs were headed by leaders with few links to women’s organisations (Franceschet 2007, p.8). Many of these aspects may point to both weaknesses inherent in the nature of the international norm and may also be influenced by the local context in which each NWM is inserted. For example, in the Beijing+15 ECLAC regional report, Fernós (2010, pp. 33-34) found that in the larger and more developed countries of Latin America, NWMs tended to show greater institutionalisation and that this translated into increases in their budgets, influence, public recognition and support for their work. Related to these aspects, Guzmán (2004) proposes that an assessment of effectiveness needs to take into account both legitimacy and institutional stability as two critical features of success.

From the above discussions it can be inferred that existing research, including from Latin America, has found different factors to be determinants of the relative success or failure of NWMs. Some of these factors are contained in the global norm as defined by Beijing, specifically those that define the location of the NWM is the government structure, its mandates, capacity and resources, and relations with internal and external actors. However, academic research has identified other influential factors such as the perceived legitimacy of the NWM, its leadership and its contextual environment, crucially including the political environment of its national context – all of which are not reflected in the global norm. Emphasising the importance of this context, existing research demonstrates that cases of relatively successful NWMs are context specific and time specific and that these advances can be easily reversed. For example, the case of the NWM in Australia is an illustration of an emblematic case of success that inspired the global norm, yet it is also an example of subsequent negative reforms because of a governmental change of orientation and of political and economic factors (Sawer 2003). Teghtsoonian & Chappell (2008) also offer an analysis of the institutional trajectories of women’s policy agencies in British Columbia in Canada and in New South Wales in Australia and how they fared depending on the partisan complexities of the successive governments in power. To capture the capacity for effectiveness of NWMs at a point in time it is necessary to analyse both the factors contained in the UN blueprint and those factors identified as significant in the academic literature.
Assessing the effectiveness of NWMs

The analysis in the literature does not suggest a hierarchy of factors that can contribute to making NWMs more or less effective. The factors identified can be seen as linked and in some cases co-dependent. These factors fall into two main categories. The first considers the institutional design of NWMs. It asks the extent to which States have complied with the international norm on institutional form that has emerged from the international debates and which has been codified in UN documents, in particular in Area of Concern H of the Beijing Platform for Action (BDPfA) (see Appendix 1). This institutional form has widespread recognition and has been widely debated, it is therefore used as a standard against which NWMs are regularly measured in UN led appraisals. A second set of factors are intended to interrogate the purpose for which an NWM is established and whose interests it is expected to serve. This draws on the international literature particularly of McBride & Mazur 2010, Franceschet 2007, Rai 2003a, Goetz 2003, True & Mintrom 2001, and on literature from Latin America, particularly of Ríos Cázares 2017, Guzmán & Bonan 2008, Franceschet 2007, Guzman 2006 and Montaño 2006. An additional factor is added by the work on policy diffusion that discusses the role of soft coercion in the decision to adopt policies, especially those based on individual norms (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, p.456). This literature provides evidence that the mode of adoption is a determinant factor in the effectiveness of policies or institutional structure that have been imported through a process of diffusion (Marsh & Sharman 2009, pp.283-284; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 1996).

The institutional design of the NWM is one of the key parameters widely referenced both by global normative processes and empirical research. The most common way of assessing the institutional design is by examining the NWM’s institutional type and its status in the hierarchy of government (see for example CEPAL 2013; Jahan 2010; True & Mintrom 2001). The type and status are not clearly specified by the BDPfA but have been interpreted as referring to the following aspects: the location and hierarchical position that the NWM has within the government structures; the autonomy the NWM has in terms of decision-making and the capacity to operate; and the authority it has vis-à-vis other State and government institutions (McBride & Mazur 2010, pp.48-51; Rai 2003a, pp.3-4). The BDPfA recommends that NWMs be placed at the highest possible level within the government, under the responsibility of a minister, and that they have adequate authority and the opportunity to influence all policy-making processes (United Nations 1995, paragraph 203). NWMs have generally taken the form of ministries, entities attached to a ministry, or free-standing institutions. The critical aspect is whether the location and autonomy of the NWM allows it to have direct access to the highest level of decision-making, which in Latin America States is the Presidency, and if it forms an integral part of the governmental cabinet where public policy decisions are generally coordinated by sectoral ministries, or whether they are located wherever it was possible or seen as suitable (Montaño 2006, p.6).

True & Mintrom (2001, p.31) distinguished between a “high” and a “lower” hierarchical level, a “high-level” institution typically being “stand-alone government ministries”, “offices within the head
of state’s department”, or “quasi-autonomous state agencies such as national commissions”, and a “lower-level” machinery typically being “bureaus or divisions for gender equality within Ministries of Labor, Social Welfare, or National Development”, or “quasi-autonomous governmental commissions and institutes for gender machineries”. In Latin America, the hierarchical status indicator of ECLAC’s Gender Equality Observatory is commonly used, differentiating between a “high”, “medium” and “low” hierarchical level (CEPAL 2013). This indicator (described in detail in Chapter Two) allows to capture more nuances than the indicator applied by True & Mintrom (2001). For example, in Latin America it is common to assign ministerial status to the heads of certain institutions that are not ministries. This means that the head of that entity is part of the governmental cabinet together with all other sectoral ministers, even if the institution she or he leads is not a full-fledged ministry. Such entities are considered to have a “high” status, yet they are not expected to count with the same treatment and resource allocations that full-fledged ministries are entitled to.

Empirical research has found both advantages and disadvantages of being located at the highest level possible within the governmental structure. For example, Rai (2003a, p.28) noted that being located at the highest level raises the profile of NWMs and sometimes improved their economic and political resources, in addition to improving their capacity for cross-ministerial work. McBride & Mazur (2010, p.52) support this view, finding that ministries tended to be well resourced, with permanent staff and “have some organizational capacity with separate divisions and budgets”. However, location at the highest level of government can also make the NWM be regarded as distant from and therefore, less accountable to citizens, and also less autonomous from political developments, even risking political co-optation (McBride & Mazur 2010, pp.28-29). While free-standing mechanisms can avoid some of these threats and enjoy greater autonomy to operate without being influenced by politics, they can also experience “lack of political clout and therefore of political and economic resources” (Rai 2003a, p.27). In her assessment of the NWM in Australia, Sawer (2003, p.245) noted that feminists “decided against a self-standing bureau or ministry on the grounds that it might simply become a “waste-paper basket for women’s problems” and “an alibi for gender-blind policy in the rest of government” and that it would therefore “lack policy clout”. Location within the governmental structure also provides an indication of the intended orientation of the NWM, as Rai (2003a, p.27) notes, being attached to a particular sectoral ministry clearly reflects the States’ assumptions regarding women’s needs and concerns. For example, the location of NWMs within ministries charged with social affairs reflects the traditional association made by States on women’s needs as a “vulnerable” group and this view tends to frame NWMs as assistentialist bodies (Montaño, 2006, pp.6-7).

Another aspect of the institutional design of the NWM, that although not explicitly included as a recommendation in the BDPfA is present in subsequent Beijing reviews, is the legal basis of the NWM. Particularly in the Latin American context, being created by law, in contrast to being set up by a governmental decision, is considered to provide a more solid basis for the NWM that can protect it from disappearing or being restructured when there is a government change or institutional
restructurings and a “desire within the public-political sector for continuity—often elusive” (ECLAC 2015, p.25). Indeed, Franceschet (2007, p.5) found that the creation of most NWMs in Latin America by presidential decree, rather than by law, had been an important source of vulnerability. This was also noted by Waylen (1997, p.96, p.102) in the relative greater stability of the NWM created in 1991 in Chile by law, compared to the NWMs created by governmental decision in neighbouring Argentina and Peru. Having a legal basis can therefore be considered as an indicator of institutional stability across time.

The BDPfA recommends that NWMs are set up with “clearly defined mandates” (United Nations 1995, paragraph 203, see Appendix 1) and includes a suggestion of functions that they should perform (United Nations 1995, paragraph 205, see Appendix 1). In practice, the functions of NWMs have covered a wide array of responsibilities ranging from providing policy advisory technical support to other institutions, to directly providing services to women (see for example Franceschet 2007, pp.2-4; Montaño 2006, pp.7-10). An assessment of the description of NWMs’ mandates can also indicate the extent and nature of the responsibility assigned to NWMs.

The UN led normative agenda has tended to prioritise NWMs’ “catalytic” normative role to mainstream gender across policy over an implementation role (United Nations 2000a). Rai (2003a, p.31) argues that taking on this “catalytic” GM role can be useful for NWMs to strengthen their profile within the State and with civil society in different ways including: expanding the network of State institutions involved in GM; “raising the profile of the gender equality agendas”; and developing and conducting research to feed policy development. She also argues that it can result in a “more effective use of political and economic resources [rather] than trying to use scarce resources to implement policies which might be best done by individual ministries” (Rai 2003a, p.31). This view does not take account of the many problems of trying to implement a GM approach that the literature has identified that would weaken the capacity of an NWM to effectively implement this role and also weaken their effectiveness more generally (Teghtsoonian & Chappell 2008, pp.45-46; Squires 2007, p.18; Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead 2007, p.5; Standing 2007; Subrahmanian 2007; Benschop & Verloo 2006; Daly 2005; Bacchi & Eveline 2003; Staudt 2003, pp.41, 48; Verloo 2001; Razavi & Miller 1995a). The experiences of NWMs charged with mainstreaming gender has been severely hampered by the constraints posed by conceptual, political and organisational factors in particular national contexts, making the implementation of GM an impossible task (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.98). An alternative to GM would be for NWMs to have “an achievable agenda” which is appropriate to specific national contexts (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.112).

A related aspect linked to the possibility of NWMs being effective in fulfilling their assigned roles is the fact of whether their resources match their responsibilities. The BDPfA states that adequate resources are a critical element that governments must ensure when establishing NWMs (United Nations 1995, paragraph 203). A number of empirical studies have identified the lack of resources as a serious reoccurring threat for NWMs’ effective functioning (Jahan 2010; McBride &
Mazur 2010; Goetz 2003; Rai 2003a), including in Latin America (Ríos Cázares 2017; Fernós 2010; Guzmán 2006; Montaño 2006). Rai (2003a, p.34) asserts that “resources are political”, therefore, “the state elite’s political will (or lack of it) can determine the extent” to which NWMs “are considered important political actors and given access to the policy making and implementation infrastructure of the state”. The extent to which governments allocate adequate and sufficient resources to NWMs, in financial, human and technical terms, and whether or not the adequate allocation of resources is institutionalised, is an indication of the political leadership commitment to gender equality and to the institutions in charge of supporting this pursuit (Rai 2003a, p.34).

In the context of the global South, the literature identifies the key role that international cooperation plays in funding much of the gender equality work, including the NWMs. Montaño (2006, p.13) for example indicates that States in Latin America that experience an excessive dependency on international cooperation are bound to reflect the priorities of external actors in their public policy agenda. While international cooperation can provide breathing space for many NWMs to access essential resources to perform their duties, in contexts of aid-dependency the sustainability of the gender work and of NWMs themselves when externally funded is a critical question. Kardam & Acuner (2003, p.99) found in the case of the establishment of the Turkish NWM that reliance on donor funding proved to be “a double-edged sword” as the objectives of international donors may conflict with the objectives of the recipients, in this case bureaucracies that receive funding for gender-related projects. In particular, donors may be more interested in ensuring appropriate performance whereas NWMs may wish to maximise their autonomy and resources (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.99). Another associated issue linked with donor dependency is that reliance on external funding may diminish the local commitment or interest in gender issues or “lead to the perception that gender-related activities are ‘foreign imports’” (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.99). This can also have an impact on NWMs aligned to donor priorities and not necessarily with their national constituencies, that is with women’s organisations (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.101). Ríos Cázares (2017) clearly found that it is self-defeating to create gender institutions by law with a “broad mandate” if they are underfunded. Like the rest of aspects, it is clear from the above that the features of responsibilities, resources and constituencies are inter-related.

In terms of the need for NWMs to ensure adequate coordination and collaboration with internal and external key actors, the BDPfA recommends governments to “[e]ncourage and promote the active involvement of the broad and diverse range of institutional actors in the public, private and voluntary sectors to work for equality between women and men” (United Nations 1995, paragraph 203, f). It further recommends NWMs to establish and promote “cooperative relationships with relevant branches of government, centres for women’s studies and research, academic and educational institutions, the private sector, the media, non-governmental organizations”, emphasising particularly “women’s organizations”, and “all other actors of civil society” (United Nations 1995, paragraph 205, b). This expectation that NWMs must coordinate with a wide range of internal and external constituents is at the heart of what Rai (2003a, pp.18-19) considers to be the important role that NWMs can play in
“working in and against” the State. Guzmán & Bonan (2008, p.110) emphasise that for GM to be applied by all relevant State and governmental institutional actors, a gender institutional “warp and weft” needs to be in place whereby gender equality issues are addressed in an integral and coordinated manner and the necessary resources are allocated from different bodies. Therefore, key aspects to ensuring the success of women’s entities, are the allocation of specific resources, not only to the entity itself but to all policy-making fields. This would involve ensuring that gender equality outcomes are identified as part of every planning and budgetary decision made, ensuring a minimum critical mass of gender expertise in each department or unit, as well as proper training, evaluation and auditing processes that enhance accountability and transparency for results (Staudt, 2003, pp.58-59). Here again it becomes clear how different features are inter-related, in this case aspects related to coordination, capacity and resources.

As part of their conception of the State Feminism Framework, McBride & Mazur (2010, p.33) distinguish two types of State feminism: Movement State Feminism and Transformative State Feminism. These are grounded on the key distinction between the different aims of women’s movements and feminist movements and build on Karen Beckwith’s (2000, 2005) distinction between a movement that aims at women and women’s issues without challenging patriarchy (named women’s movements) and a movement that does challenge patriarchy (named feminist movements) (described in McBride & Mazur 2010, p.33). For McBride & Mazur, women’s policy agencies sit “at the intersection between movement and government” (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.48), and herein lies the importance of identifying the type of links they have with, and their representation of, women and feminist organisations.

NWMs’ expected coordination and collaboration with external constituents, has been described by the UN Secretary General Beijing+20 Report as the need to involve non-governmental stakeholders, especially women’s organisations in the work of the NWM, and also to strengthen coordinated action on gender equality (United Nations 2014, paragraph 254). The key features of the nature of the relations between NWMs with civil society focuses on the recognition and legitimacy that NWMs enjoy in the eyes of women’s organisations, including the nature of the leadership of NWMs. As Rai (2003a, p.25, p.32) points out, the mandate of NWMs “places a great deal of stress on their agenda-setting role [within the State], while their legitimacy derives from the close contact they are able to maintain with women’s groups” which ideally should be “mutually reinforcing”. It is considered that to be effective NWMs not only need to legitimise their agendas with women’s organisations but they also need to be in tune with emerging gender issues that require the government attention (Guzmán & Bonan, 2008, p.110). Having a broad base support from civil society is not only associated with effectiveness and building legitimacy, but also with a path to “get political commitment” (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.102). In this way, the NWM is seen as having the potential to fill the “gap” between civil society and the State (Kardam & Acuner 2003, p.103) or become “conduits between civil society and the State” (Rai 2003a, p.23). In turn, enjoying the recognition of women’s organisations as their key constituents is essential to both
feed their work and to have organisations who will defend them in times of difficulty. As Franceschet (2007, p.6) points out, women’s organisations will not defend NWMs when they are under threat because of governmental changes or political junctures unless they feel adequately represented and engaged by them.

Notwithstanding, this form of engagement has a less positive side as formalised relations between government and women’s organisations through “participatory mechanisms” can also act as a “legitimation strategy” that pushes “societal-based women’s movements to become involved in organizing around gender equality promises made by state actors” (Franceschet, 2007, pp.6-7). While this type of engagement has “expanded access for civil society”, it does not automatically “translate into increased influence” either for the civil society organisations or for NWMs with which they may work (Franceschet 2007, p.7). In this way governments can support the politics of “process” at the expense of the politics of “voice” (Squires, 2007). As a result, both NWMs and women’s civil society organisations will, in spite of improved access, find that they lack the capacity to effectively achieve their concrete policy goals. Another aspect of effective engagement of the broad diversity of key external constituents is that NWMs need to avoid treating women as “essensialised” and “assimilated” and the diversity of their demands and priorities needs to be respected (Squires 2007, p.9; Woodford-Berger 2007, pp.127-132). This also ensures that diverse women’s groups can have “voice” in policy-making processes mediated via the NWM (Guzmán & Bonan 2008, p.110; Verloo 2005).

The leadership of NWMs has been identified as an indicator of the extent to which governments are committed to an effective NWM. While leaders with a background in women’s activism may have the capacity to relate to women’s organisations resulting in effective collaboration and coordination, having political influence and “capacity to persuade more powerful actors to adopt their priorities” has also been identified as necessary (Franceschet 2007, p.8). In this respect, it has been noted that leaders with a background in the women’s movement may not necessarily have this level of political influence (Franceschet 2007, p.8). As NWMs need to build and ensure their legitimacy both within and outside the State, as well as the legitimacy of pursuing gender equality, they therefore need to build alliances with all key actors in order to achieve their goals and this can be achieved by a political insider (Guzmán 2006, pp.3-4). In the words of Ríos Cázares (2017, p.690), leadership involves having a “proven authority among the network of social organizations and within the state bureaucracy”. This, again, suggests Rai’s (2003a, pp.18-19) idea of working “in and against the state”. Therefore, although not reflected in the Beijing norm, the leadership of the NWM is associated with the potential to convey women’s priorities and to influence all the necessary State and government actors for change.

From the above it is clear that there is not a single model of NWM or a list of the structural capacities that make an NWM strong or weak, or a list of criteria that indicate success or failure (Universidad Externado de Colombia 2015, p.42; McBride & Mazur 2010, p.242). In the words of Ríos Cázares (2017, p.689), “[i]t is not possible to identify a unique factor (or group of factors) that improves the likelihood that a [Women’s Policy Agency] will be effective in advocating for a women’s agenda
(or the feminist agenda) in the debate and the policy process”. Although the BDPfA sets out a global prototype, there is an international diversity and for an individual NWM its effectiveness is determined by a complex relationship between the different empirical manifestations found in its particular context. It is also evident that the combination of different features can produce different results. For example, an NWM with the highest hierarchical level within the government but not recognised by women’s movements could be deemed to be compliant with the BDPfA prototype regarding its institutional location but not necessarily reflect the State’s commitment to allow it to become a vehicle to improve women’s equality via public policy. The opposite case can also occur, an NWM with strong links with the women’s movement but deficient institutional status within the government could become an effective platform for the women’s agenda but lack political muscle to trigger changes through public policy. The inter-relation between the different features is also clear. Ríos Cázares (2017, p.689) suggests that although it is not possible to determine the specific factors that determine effectiveness, “there is a core set of variables that remain significant, regardless of context”. Among these, she includes: structural location, the scope of the mandate, the administrative capabilities (human and financial resources) and institutional leadership (Ríos Cázares 2017, p.690). I concur with the criteria proposed in the literature and propose that the coherence or congruence between the different factors also needs to be examined as an indication of potential for effectiveness. Examining an NWM needs therefore to consider the congruence in terms of its institutional design, capacity and resources, its collaboration and coordination with key constituencies and its legitimacy and recognition by the constituents in the name of whom it is established. Although the type of appointment of the head of the NWM, and their background and relationship to women’s and feminist movements, are not included as a criteria in BDPfA, empirical research considers this to be an important contributing factor towards effectiveness and the promotion of the agency and voice of women’s organisations (Ríos Cázares 2017; McBride & Mazur 2010, p.48; Guzmán & Bonan, 2008, p.110; Franceschet, 2007, p.8; Guzmán 2006, pp.3-4). In contrast to this omission, factors emphasising structure are discussed in detail by the BDPfA. This indicates that the prototype of NWM promoted by this norm prioritises structure over agency. The manner NWMs have been conceived in the global norm indicates that they experience inherent deficiencies which can impede their effectiveness and prevent them from achieving their goals unless modified by aspects that are outside the global norm.

In summary a list of indicators of NWMs’ effectiveness can be drawn from this literature, as follows:

- Institutional design
- Mandates and functions
- Resources and capacities, including consistency with responsibilities
- Collaboration and coordination with key constituencies
- Leadership
The thesis asks, in the context of the widespread adoption of NWMs in Latin America, has the adoption of this policy produced potentially effective institutions, or has it produced institutions that are merely compliant with UN promoted global norms? For the purpose of this thesis effectiveness is measured in two ways. Firstly, it is measured in terms of whether NWMs fulfil the global Beijing standards, therefore demonstrating the level of States´ compliance with the global norm. Secondly, it is measured in terms of their viability as a public policy tool, therefore demonstrating States´ commitment to ensure that they can effectively fulfil their goals. The thesis examines their institutional design, the appropriateness of the relationship between their design and their responsibilities and the resources allocated to them. It also measures the capacity of NWMs to engage with key stakeholders, including women’s civil society organisations, to promote gender equality and build their legitimacy.

The next chapter sets the analytical framework used to conduct the research including a thorough description of how the four-category typology of NWMs´ effectiveness applied by the thesis was constructed, how the research was designed, what data collection methods and sources were used, how the regional contextual analysis was carried out and how the selection of case study countries was informed.
Chapter Two: Assessing the Effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America

The thesis examines the effectiveness of the NWMs attached to the executive branch of the eighteen Latin American States in the period between 1970 and 2016. The term “Latin America” is used in this thesis to refer to democratic sovereign States located in the Americas where Spanish and Portuguese are spoken. These States are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The political and administrative systems of Latin American States are different. Some NWMs operate in federate States (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) with greater administrative complexity and more levels of government whereas most NWMs operate in unitary States where the complexity is relatively minor. However, as the thesis focuses on mechanisms established at the national level only, it treats each State as a unit, which of necessity ignores the internal political and administrative differences that exist, especially those between federate and unitary States.

The research question asks are NWMs in Latin America potentially effective institutions that can have a positive impact on women’s rights, women’s welfare and on gender equality? To answer this question, the thesis asks the following related questions:

Do NWMs in Latin America comply with international norms on the institutionalisation of NWMs? In particular, do NWMs follow the guidelines in terms of hierarchical status, policy orientation and legal status?

Is there coherence between the institutional design of NWMs, the resources allocated to them and their assigned goals? Do NWMs have sufficient resources to fulfil their assigned mandates thereby demonstrating the commitment of States to facilitate their operation as effective institutions?

Do NWMs have the capacity to engage with key stakeholders, including women’s civil society organisations and other institutions of government, to promote policy on gender equality and women’s rights? Therefore, are States committed to facilitate the effective engagement of NWMs with women’s interests at the national level and are they committed to creating an institutional environment in which NWMs can be an effective voice in government policy processes?

The thesis does not assess effectiveness in terms of the impact of NWMs on favourable outcomes for women. It assesses potential effectiveness by analysing the appropriateness of the institutional design, resources and autonomy, that is those features that the literature agrees are necessary for an NWM to be capable of positive engagement or of effecting positive change. The primary sources for the thesis are a questionnaire survey of all Latin American NWMs, all UN Women offices in Latin American States, and engaged feminist and women’s civil society organisations (CSOs) operating within the different States. It also uses a wide range of national and international official documents and reports. As a member of staff of UN Women, I was also able to engage in participant observation at many key events and I had privileged access to key informants. The questions for the
survey were based on indicators of effectiveness drawn from the literature. Following the analysis of the survey study of all NWMs, four case study countries were selected as exemplars of the different categories of NWMs proposed by the thesis and an in-depth analysis was conducted into the level of compliance and commitment demonstrated by each State. This was done in order to analyse in more detail the linkage between, on one hand, the compliance and commitment on the part of the State and, on the other, the progress in key gender areas. This chapter discusses how States’ compliance with global norms on NWMs and commitment to allow them to become viable institutions are defined; the way in which my position in the UN facilitated this research; how the surveys were conducted; what documentary resources were used; and how the construction of countries rankings to contextualise the analysis and measure the progress of women’s rights in the region was conducted.

Assessing Compliance with Global Norms for NWMs

The selection of compliance indicators was informed by the UN global normative parameters and the scholarly discussions on the institutional design of NWMs. The BDPfA, as discussed by the academic literature in Chapter One, is a crucial document in defining the international norms on the establishment of NWMs. The features of NWMs used to assess the degree of State compliance were: the type of entities created; their hierarchical location within the governmental structure; and their legal basis. The thesis traced the establishment and reform of the different entities that fall under the term NWM at the national level in each of the eighteen Latin American States, from 1970 until 2016 (see Appendix 13). Information on the legal basis, hierarchical status and administrative line of reporting was compiled for each individual NWM in that period. A coding system was applied in the documentary compilation and in the analysis of foundational events and reform events traced experienced by the NWMs of each country (see Appendix 13). A foundational event (F) refers to when a new entity was created. A reform event (R) refers to when an existing entity was modified. Symbols plus (+) and minus (-) were used when it was possible to determine that a specific event meant an improvement or regression, respectively, in relation to the preceding or existing entity. Improvement and regression events were identified according to the parameters set by the BDPfA both retrospectively prior to 1995, and post 1995. Positive reform events were considered to be changes in the status and conditions of NWMs that appear to allow the entity to enhance authority or capacity or to enable it to play a stronger coordinating role in policy making or to gain greater influence in the process of policy making. Typical positive events traced were modifications experienced by the entity to elevate its hierarchical status within the governmental structure; modifications to attach it directly to the Presidency or to a ministry dedicated to women’s affairs or gender-equality related affairs; changes to elevate the status of the head of the entity to ministerial status; changes to improve the mandate and functions assigned to the NWM, including to focus exclusively on gender equality and women’s issues; and changes to improve its coordination with other governmental and State institutions or to improve its collaboration with key
external constituents. Conversely regression events included changes to downgrade the hierarchical level of the entity within the governmental structure; changes to remove the attachment of the entity to the Presidency or to a ministry dedicated to women’s affairs or gender equality related affairs; changes to eliminate the ministerial status of the head of the entity; changes to attach the entity to a ministry that oversees broad family or social issues; changes that imply an overlap of mandates and functions with other State and governmental entities; reforms that weaken the mandate and functions, including the assignment of responsibilities regarding family, children or other population groups; deterioration of the mechanisms that allowed the entity to perform its coordination role within the State and government entities; deterioration of mechanisms that facilitated the cooperation with key external constituents.

The level of compliance of States with the BDPfA regarding the trajectory and status of their NWMs was established by examining the hierarchical status of each NWM across time. The commonly used qualitative indicator that analyses the institutional authority of NWMs is their hierarchical status within the governmental (True & Mintrom 2001), as discussed in Chapter One. The thesis applied the indicator used in the Latin America and the Caribbean region by ECLAC’s Gender Equality Observatory capturing further nuances. This indicator describes the status that countries have formally conferred on their NWMs through laws, decrees and other official measures and distinguishes between the following three levels (CEPAL 2013):

- **High hierarchical level:** mechanisms that have ministry status or whose head has ministerial status and full participation in the governmental cabinet
- **Medium hierarchical level:** mechanisms that depend on the Presidency and whose head does not participate in the governmental cabinet (i.e. those reporting to presidential offices, secretariats, national institutes and other such mechanisms)
- **Low hierarchical level:** mechanisms that report to a ministry or an authority of lower rank (deputy ministries, institutes, councils and other such mechanisms)

The assumption behind the BDPfA is that the higher the hierarchical rank of the machinery, the greater the possibility of influencing policy making through an effective policy coordination role. The Beijing standards hence assume that a higher status implies greater responsibilities, adequate and sustained State budget allocations and better relations with key actors within and outside the State. These assumptions, as discussed in Chapter One, have been proved to not always be the case as a high status can also involve less autonomy, a greater risk of co-optation and detachment from women’s constituents (McBride & Mazur 2010, pp.28-29; Rai 2003a, p.27).

This documentary compilation and analysis of the evolution of NWMs also tracked the legal basis of NWMs, that is whether they were created by law, or by governmental decision as being created
Assessing Commitment to making NWMs Effective

The commitment indicators are informed by the scholarly discussions of Chapter One and were applied to the NWMs that were in place in 2016. They reflect the extent to which States facilitate NWMs’ fulfilment of their functions and of the goal of improving gender equality. This includes the extent to which NWMs are assigned adequate mandates, the level to which they are resourced, and the extent to which there is coherence between the responsibilities assigned to NWMs, their institutional design, and the resources that the States allocate to them in order for them to fulfil these responsibilities. The commitment indicators allow an analysis of the potential impact that NWMs can be expected to have. The indicators examined include their formal policy orientation and approach; their formal mandates and functions; the level of coherence between their hierarchical status and their responsibilities; their capacity to perform their mandates and functions (financial, human and technical resources); the coordination with other State and governmental bodies; and the existence and nature of collaboration with key civil society groups, in particular with feminist and women’s organisations, and the nature of the leadership of NWMs.

These commitment indicators were operationalised as follows. The mandates and functions formally assigned to NWMs were examined and compared to a list of fifteen tasks (see Table 1) drawn from the recommendations of the BDPfA in relation to the responsibilities that NWMs should have, with an addition from the CEDAW convention (see Appendices 1, 2 and 3). They include: providing advisory services to State and governmental bodies on mainstreaming gender equality in all policy areas and at all governmental levels; supporting the elaboration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policy impacts, plans and other actions to promote gender equality; conducting research and producing knowledge on women’s status and gender equality; supporting gender training, awareness-raising, communication and advocacy; supporting accountability for and reporting on progress on gender equality and women’s status.

As measures aimed at fostering changes in the structural root causes of gender inequality such as awareness-raising initiatives, advocacy, communication and education initiatives to promote changes in socio-cultural patterns in favour of eliminating gender discrimination and inequality are not explicitly mentioned by the BDPfA but are spelled out as part of Article 5 of the CEDAW Convention (see Appendix 2), these were also included.
### Table 1.- List of NWMs’ functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Accompany the formulation and implementation of public policies on gender equality or women's empowerment</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Design and/or implement programmes or projects dedicated to women or gender equality</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Legislative reforms to reflect or correct measures in favour of gender equality</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Monitoring or evaluation of the implementation of public policies</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Impact analysis of laws, policies, plans or programmes on gender equality or women's empowerment</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Follow-up and/or report on compliance with international commitments assumed by the State in matters of gender equality and women's rights</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Coordination or cooperation with sectoral governmental entities to ensure the mainstreaming of gender equality in public policies</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cooperation or collaboration with civil society organisations</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H1 &amp; H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Support gender institutional architecture (at sub-national level and/or other State branches)</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cooperation with international, regional or sub-regional organisations</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Research, analysis or elaboration of studies on women and/or gender equality</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Training for government officials to incorporate gender perspective in its policies and programmes</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Awareness-raising, communication or education to foster socio-cultural changes in favour of gender equality and women's rights</td>
<td>Article 5, CEDAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Gender statistics initiatives</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gender budgeting initiatives</td>
<td>BDPfA Strategic Objectives H2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to this, the thesis used two different ways to classify the policy approach of NWMs. The first considered the range of policy areas the NWM was expected to deal with using the classification of single issue, multiple issue or cross sectoral, proposed by McBride & Mazur (2010, p.49) as follows:

- **Single issue**: The NWM is oriented towards women’s affairs only
- **Multiple issues**: The NWM is oriented towards women’s affairs and/or gender equality as well as other issues which could include affairs related to family, social issues, children, and other population groups
- **Cross-sectoral**: The NWM applies a gender mainstreaming approach across policy making areas
It is important to note that any given NWM can simultaneously follow two or three of the approaches as the formal descriptions of the mandates and functions of NWMs can reflect a mix of approaches. The predominant approach was prioritised in the analysis, except in cases where the mix of approaches was significant, and all had the same weight.

The second policy approach traced considered the institutionalised working approach of NWMs to the policy making process. Drawing from Squires (2005, p.371), Verloo (2005, pp.347-348) and Jahan (1995, p.13), these were defined as follows:

- Integrationist approach: The NWM is charged with bureaucratic tasks in the policy making process including the creation of structures and tools. It works within existing policy processes without challenging existing policy paradigms or being a policy innovator.
- Agenda-setting approach: The NWM focuses on promoting the participation, presence, and empowerment of women and it is expected to influence or change the way policy making and legislative processes are conducted.
- Transformative approach: The NWM is expected to represent and give voice to “subaltern or non-hegemonic counterpublics” (Verloo 2005, p.348) or traditionally excluded groups of women, and involve them as agents of change.

The level of coherence between the status (hierarchical rank) and the number of responsibilities assigned to each NWM was examined to determine the gap between what is expected of an NWM and how feasible it is that it can effectively fulfil its mandate.

The commitment of States to ensure that their NWMs can perform their mandates and functions is further examined from the point of view of the financial, human and technical resources that they are allocated and whether those resources are institutionally sustainable.

The technical capacities that NWMs have in different sectors and the policy areas in which they are regularly requested to provide advisory services as part of their GM role are also examined. The nature of the coordination between the NWM and other State and governmental institutions is also examined. This is done by analysing how NWMs are expected to liaise with other State and governmental institutional entities, how feasible this is considering their status and authority and to what extent a GM approach is applied across the governmental system (see United Nations 1995, paragraph 202).

The last commitment indicator analysed is the nature of the relations of NWMs with civil society, in particular with key constituents such as feminist and women’s organisations. The BDPfA mandates the promotion of an active involvement of the broad and diverse range of institutional, governmental and non-governmental actors that work for gender equality, including key constituents such as the NGO sector and women’s organisations (United Nations 1995, paragraph 203, f; paragraph
As discussed in Chapter One, effective involvement of the broad range of civil society in public policy making is needed to ensure that women are not “essentialised” and “assimilated” and that the diversity of women’s demands and priorities is respected (Squires 2007, p.9; Woodford-Berger 2007, pp.127-132). It can also ensure that diverse women’s groups can have “voice” in policy-making processes mediated via the NWM (Guzmán & Bonan 2008, p.110; Verloo 2005) and that engagement translates into “influence” (Franceschet 2007, p.7). To assess the external engagement of NWMs, the form and frequency of their engagement of women’s organisations as well as the type of organisations they engaged with was analysed. The background of the leaders of NWMs as of December 2016 is also examined by tracing their previous political or civil society experience as suggested by McBride & Mazur (2010) and Franceschet (2007, p.8). This indicator serves to assess how inclined governments are to appoint leaders who have previous experience of engaging women’s organisations. Their past experience provides an indication as to whether or not the NWM will promote progressive pro women reforms, and how likely the NWM is to maintain good relations with key external constituents including CSOs’ acknowledgment of their legitimacy as an actor in this policy area.

**Key Informants, Participant Observation and Questionnaire Survey**

My position at UN Women, and the participant observation which that position facilitated, informed and influenced the research design, execution and analysis of this thesis. In particular it gave me access to key informants and facilitated the application of a questionnaire survey. UN Women is the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women created in 2010 to support States to meet international standards on women’s rights and gender equality by providing support to key partners such as NWMs and civil society.\(^8\) As part of my regional functions at UN Women’s Regional Office for the Americas and the Caribbean from 2013 and formerly as Gender Programme Officer at UNDP’s national office in Nicaragua from 2007-2008, I meet regularly and engage with NWMs, feminist and women’s organisations, academics and UN personnel from across the region. In my current position at UN Women, I am in charge of coordinating the normative work, inter-governmental processes and relations with civil society organisations. In this role, I support regional inter-governmental and civil society consultations, meetings and conferences on a regular basis such as the CSW regional consultations held annually in Latin America ahead of the global CSW session convened by the UN in New York, the Regional Conferences on Women of Latin America and the Caribbean, convened by ECLAC and UN agencies every three years, the regional feminist meetings

\(^8\) The creation of UN Women came about as part of the UN reform agenda to enhance and bring together the existing gender equality and women’s affairs resources and mandates of DAW, INSTRAW, OSAGI and UNIFEM at a higher level in the UN system and under one unique institutional umbrella. The mandate and functions of UN Women consist of the mandate and functions of its predecessor entities, providing the new entity with a stronger and overarching composite mandate that includes normative and operational functions. In addition, UN Women has a coordination mandate rendering it in charge of leading, coordinating and promoting the accountability of the UN system in its work on gender equality and women’s empowerment. See United Nations (2010).
convened by regional and national feminist networks and organisations from across the region (including the EFLACs), among others. NWMs, civil society organisations and UN staff are gathered in these key fora to assess progress in the implementation of States´ gender commitments, identify challenges and propose strategies to overcome constrains. As part of my responsibilities, I provide regular technical support and advisory guidance to UN Women offices, NWMs and civil society organisations from across the region on different issues related to the implementation and monitoring of global and regional standards on gender equality and women´s rights at the local level. My positionality enabled my direct engagement and access to key target groups and key informants as well as to information that is not publicly available. My own direct participant observation allowed me to regularly access formal and informal internal and external meetings and conversations with UN staff, governmental representatives, civil society organisations, leading academia representatives and CEDAW Committee Experts from the region.

My role at UN Women facilitated the contact and communication with the three target groups for the survey questionnaires that are a key part of this research and with a range of key informants. I authored a regional report for UN Women on the status of women´s machineries in Latin America (see Díaz-García 2016). The preparation work for this report allowed me to survey UN Women offices, NWMs and civil society as well as directly and regularly consult with key informants. Without the support of UN Women, the direct access to all NWMs, all UN Women offices and the wide and diverse range of regional and national civil society feminist and women´s organisations, movements and networks, this thesis would not have been possible. My role in UN Women positively affected the research process as I was able to compare and contrast different views and perceptions held by different key actors as well as consult with key informants from other UN agencies or bodies and academia. Indeed, the wide range of primary and secondary sources allowed me to contrast and triangulate the information provided by States with the views and perceptions of other key actors, such as civil society and representatives from UN entities. It also allowed me to overcome information gaps and limitations and address any bias that my own direct observation might have incurred in. The fact that I was using UN Women´s institutional channels to apply the questionnaires may have caused some level of bias in the responses, particularly by NWMs as UN Women works directly with all of the surveyed NWMs. However, their responses were analysed bearing in mind this potential bias and NWMs´ responses were contrasted with the responses of the other two target groups (UN Women´s offices and CSOs) as well as with the views of key informants and documentary evidence such as the CEDAW Committee recommendations.

Given the sensitivity of the positions held by most questionnaire respondents and key informants consulted, their names have been kept confidential through anonymised references, in

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9 The report described the status of gender machineries at the national and regional level in Latin America and identified recommendations to guide UN Women´s work in supporting these entities.
keeping with ethical standards. The safeguarding of their anonymity was imperative to avoid compromising or damaging them personally or professionally.

**Survey Questionnaires:** the survey research method involves “the use of standardized questionnaires or interviews to collect data about people and their preferences, thoughts, and behaviours in a systematic manner” (Bhattacherjee 2012, p.73). The choice of questions for the surveys was informed by the key debates identified in the literature discussed in Chapter One. The three survey questionnaires included both structured and unstructured questions, combining open and close questions. This allowed for both the aggregated quantitative and qualitative analysis of the information yielded on facts and perception. The questions were designed to include the collection of both factual information on the NWMs and also the perceptions held by NWMs and civil society. Factual questions included, for example, country of respondent, whether the NWM was a decentralised entity or not, and whether the work conducted was normative or programmatic. Questions on perceptions included, for example, the extent to which the design of NWMs was considered to potentially contribute to their effectiveness, how appropriate their assigned responsibilities were seen, how adequate their resources and technical capacities were perceived to be, how their coordination and cooperation with key internal and external constituents was viewed, and so forth. Blank copies of the three questionnaires are included in Appendices 4, 5 and 6.

The three questionnaires were applied on-line using the platform SurveyMonkey (2017) and targeted the three groups of informants: UN Women offices in Latin America, NWMs and civil society representatives in each of the eighteen States. The UN Women field offices and civil society representatives were being asked to comment on the NWMs in their respective States, providing the research with a perspective on the NWM and on its external relationships. The advantage of using a survey like this is that it gave access to a wide variety of data, such as preferences and factual information that could not have been accessed any other way and the potential number of respondents was too large and geographically dispersed to contact via interviews (Bhattacherjee 2012). The main disadvantages of survey research like this are considered to be non-response bias, sampling bias, social desirability bias and recall bias (Bhattacherjee 2012). Not all of these were relevant in this case as the survey was sent to all potential respondents in the target groups. The non-response bias was minimised by allowing enough time for respondents to reply and by sending regular reminders and clarifying doubts and enquiries received regarding the questions. In the case of the questionnaire applied to NWMs and to UN Women offices in Latin America, sampling bias was reduced to a minimum as the questionnaires were applied to the entire target population and there was a very high rate of responses. In the case of NWMs, out of eighteen NWMs, sixteen responded to the questionnaire. The only two NWMs that did not respond to the questionnaire were Argentina and Nicaragua despite several requests being sent and alternative means used such as official correspondence sent from UN Women via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of both countries. In the analysis for the thesis, both of
these States were demonstrated to have particular weak NWMs, Argentina both in terms of compliance and commitment and Nicaragua in its level of commitment and degree of political control. The response rate of NWMs accounts for 89 percent of the entire NWM population. In the case of UN Women offices in the region, out of fifteen existing offices, fourteen responded. The only UN Women office that did not fill out the questionnaire was Uruguay as the staff member in charge of that office had left the post and the position had not been filled at the time the questionnaire was applied. The response rate accounts for 93 percent of these informants.

With regards to the questionnaire applied to representatives of feminist and women’s organisations, it is not feasible to determine the degree of a possible sampling bias as the entire population is not known. However, the selection of participants from this key group of informants was conducted on the basis of targeting all representatives of feminist and women’s civil society organisations, networks and movements that could be reached through other organisations in the region. All member organisations of UN Women’s Civil Society Advisory Groups (see UN Women 2017a) that exist at the country and regional level in Latin America, were included. These representatives were selected by UN Women offices on the basis of guiding principles (see UN Women 2017b), including strong diversity criteria to ensure their representativeness in terms of geographic location, ethnicity, race, age, urban/rural location, sexual diversity, orientation and identity, women living with HIV-AIDS, grass-roots, women living with a disability, academia representatives and migrant women. Member organisations of the Commission on the Status of Women Committee of NGOs from Latin America and the Caribbean (CSW CoNGO) were also included. This group is made up of national, sub-regional and regional NGOs and networks. In addition to this, the Executive Committee of this Commission is made up of representatives of the group reflecting the diversity of women in the region (see Commission on the Status of Women Committee of NGOs from Latin America and the Caribbean - CSW CoNGO LAC 2016). Other regional, sub-national and national networks and organisations targeted included all those with whom UN Women has relations. The civil society questionnaire yielded a total of 149 responses from all the Latin American States examined. This questionnaire contains an unavoidable element of sampling bias as in order to respond, the participants needed to have access to a computer connected to the internet and have computer literacy.

The number of civil society responses obtained varied substantially among the eighteen countries. This may reflect a desire by women’s groups in certain countries to use the questionnaire as a means of protest or a critique of the NWMs in their country, whereas in other countries women’s organisations may not have been as motivated to comment on the NWM either because they were less critical or because they did not see the NWM as relevant.

The first questionnaire was designed and applied in English to all UN Women offices and consisted of eight questions. It was created on 21 August 2014 and applied between 9 September and 27 October 2014 (see a blank copy in Appendix 6). The second questionnaire was designed and applied in Spanish to all NWMs and consisted of thirty-four questions (see translated version of a blank
questionnaire in Appendix 4). It was created on 29 April 2015 and applied between 18 May and 20 July 2015. The third questionnaire was designed and applied in Spanish to civil society organisations and networks from across the region and consisted of eighteen questions. It was created on 8 June 2015 and applied between 8 June and 13 July 2015 (see translated version in Appendix 5).

The responses to the first questionnaire provided insight information about NWMs and this informed the design of the second and third questionnaires, applied to NWMs and CSOs, respectively. To contrast the differing or converging views of NWMs and civil society, the same questions were applied to both target groups where appropriate, for example, questions on NWMs´ resources and technical and human capacities, questions on the type of civil society organisations that NWMs engaged with and key factors that contributed to NWMs´ effectiveness. The answers to these questions could be aggregated and the different perceptions of NWMs and CSOs compared.

**Documentary resources**

Primary documentary sources included national legislation related to the creation or modification of the NWMs in the eighteen Latin American countries from 1970 until 2016; national gender related legislation, policies and plans; official reports submitted by States to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the CEDAW Committee), Concluding Observations issued by this Committee to each State; reports submitted by States for the Beijing+5, +10, +15 and +20 review sessions; global and regional UN and inter-governmental agreements and reports; CEDAW, governmental and NWMs´ official websites, and press articles. All are listed in the bibliography under national official, United Nations or other references as relevant.

Among the UN primary sources used, the Concluding Observations issued by the CEDAW Committee were very useful to contrast the information provided by the surveys and to gauge the status and constraints faced by NWMs. As discussed in Chapter One, the CEDAW Committee examines the progress made by States in the application of the CEDAW Convention based on the periodic reports that States are required to submit describing both the legislative, judicial and administrative measures taken to implement the provisions of the Convention, and the obstacles they have encountered in their implementation. The CEDAW Committee also takes into account the information provided by civil society shadow reports and UN confidential reports. The Committee generally examines the status of NWMs as part of the application of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention (see Appendix 2) and its Concluding Observations are tailored to each State and include a brief assessment of the status of the NWM and recommendations on how the State should strengthen or improve it to allow it to fulfil its role (see OHCHR 2018a, 2017b and all relevant Concluding Observations issued to each Latin

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10 Consisting of twenty-three experts on women’s rights from around the world, serving up to two terms of four years, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. See OHCHR (2017a, 2017b).
American State since their first periodic report until 2017 listed in the bibliography under Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women).

The periodic Beijing appraisal events also request States to report on the status of their NWMs and of enabling conditions in place to facilitate the work of these entities. All existing country Beijing+5, +10, +15 and +20 reports consulted are included in the bibliography under the official governmental references section. In the case of the Beijing reviews, the UN does not issue tailored recommendations for each country but regional and global ones (see Díaz-García 2016; ECLAC 2015; United Nations 2014, 2000a; Jahan 2010; Fernós 2010). These were also used by the thesis. Both CEDAW and Beijing periodic reports were major sources of information that facilitated the tracing and assessment of the trajectory and evolution of NWMs.

Other documentary resources included studies carried out on NWMs, the feminist monitoring instrument Isoquito, UN publications, reports, observatories, statistical data, and relevant press articles, listed in the bibliography under academic, national official, United Nations or other references.

Describing the position of women in Latin America

The analysis of NWMs is situated within the broader context of the political, economic and social development in Latin America. As well as using the literature to contextualise the developments of NWMs, the thesis used the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2018a) as it provides a summary of achievements in three key dimensions of human development, namely a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP 2018b, p.2). The Gender Inequality Index (GII) provides a view of gender-based disadvantage in three dimensions, namely reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market (UNDP 2018b, p.7). In other words, it allows to see the loss that countries experienced in potential human development because of inequality between men and women (UNDP 2018b, p.7). The GII index value ranges from zero to one, zero being where women and men fare equally and one where one gender fares as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions (UNDP 2018b, p.7). To enable a comparison of countries, the measures divide the countries by level of development (very high, high or medium as none of the eighteen Latin American countries are considered to have a low development level). It considered the HDI rank and value of 2017, the GII value and GII rank in the region and worldwide, and the adjusted HDI rank when GII is taken into account. These measures provide a general view of the different levels of human development and of gender inequality in the eighteen countries.

To complement the contextual analysis, the thesis constructed three index rankings to facilitate a comparison of the States in more specific areas. The thesis compared the gender normative and legal frameworks, progress in women’s political representation and progress in gender socio-economic equality by constructing three regional rankings. The rankings allow a comparison of these key gender indicators and the status of NWMs in the individual states to see if there is a discernible pattern. It also
informs the selection of exemplary cases for a more in-depth analysis of NWMs’ effectiveness. The three indices used values from zero to one, zero reflecting the worse performance and one the best.

For the ranking on gender normative and legal developments, the indicators used include measures for which data was available and gathered by the thesis for two different points in time, namely 2007 and 2018. Given that all Latin American States have ratified the CEDAW Convention, the measures included are the status of ratification of the CEDAW Optional protocol and the status of periodic CEDAW reporting (see Appendix 7). The CEDAW Optional Protocol increases the powers of the CEDAW Committee to monitor the implementation of the Convention by States and establishes reporting and investigation mechanisms (OHCHR 2017d). States party to the Optional Protocol grant the CEDAW Committee jurisdiction to receive complaints from individuals or investigate "grave or systematic violations" of the Convention (OHCHR 2017d).

States party to the CEDAW Convention are obliged to periodically report on progress achieved in the implementation of the specific measures adopted to address gender inequality. The compliance with the mandated regular reporting can indicate the importance given by the State to its obligations on improving women’s status and gender equality, and on reporting on progress achieved, and it can therefore be taken as an indication of States’ performance regarding their normative commitments. States are obliged to implement this international human rights binding instrument in terms of not only ratification but also implementation through concrete constitutional, legislative and policy measures adopted. As described in Chapter One, States agree to take all appropriate measures, including the enactment of legislation and adoption of temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The index tracks the existence of equality legislation and public policies or plans in each country. Equality legislation instructs the definition of policies and actions in favour of equality and non-discrimination based on gender and constitute a means of implementing the obligations assumed by the States for the fulfilment of women's rights, especially in terms of the obligations reflected in CEDAW and other international human rights treaties (see Article 15 in Appendix 2). The ranking on gender normative and legal developments therefore also traces the existence of gender equality legislation (see Appendices 8), and the existence of key legislation on issues that have been at the centre of feminist and women’s demands. The latter includes laws on political quotas or parity legislation (see Appendix 10), laws on violence against women - including the legal recognition of “femicide” or “feminicide” (see Appendix 11), and the legal status of abortion (see Appendix 12).

There is a gap in the adoption by States of legal equality measures and the signing of international conventions and the reality of women’s lives. As described by CEDAW expert Alda Facio (2012), the CEDAW defines substantive equality and the principles needed to achieve equal rights, namely the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of intervention or State responsibility. This includes equal opportunities, equal access to opportunity and equality of results, and recognises that 

\textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} equality are both necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of substantive gender equality.
The existence of equality legislation does not guarantee the enjoyment or exercise of rights. CEDAW compels States to implement three processes or stages to ensure substantive equality: 1) recognition of the rights by enacting laws, 2) the enjoyment of the rights by providing the necessary conditions, 3) the exercise of the rights through the existence of mechanisms for rights’ holders to denounce the violation of their rights and obtain redress. The existence of legislation on equality is used to measure States’ status regarding the first stage.

National policies and plans are normally meant to strategically conceive how gender equality is to be promoted by means of concrete actions, by periods of time and by key actors. Their existence was also included in the gender normative and legal ranking (see Appendix 9) as an indicator of commitment expressed by States to put in place nation-wide public policy instruments to guide and facilitate the work of NWMs (United Nations 1995, paragraphs 204 (c) and 205 (a)). Such instruments are expected to provide an important source of legitimacy and accountability for NWMs and for all other State institutions. The existence of a national public policy or plan on equality is expected to provide strategic direction on how gender equality is to be promoted by all public policies as well as a clear identification of entities in charge, responsibilities, concrete actions, results expected, timeframe, accountability mechanisms and in some cases funding available for their implementation. They reflect how States intend to overcome the existing challenges regarding gender inequality and discrimination in all areas of development, in line with their international commitments on women’s rights and gender equality (CEPAL 2017b). In turn, NWMs play a key role in ensuring the implementation of national gender equality plans and policies (CEPAL 2017b). Yet, compared to national legislation, national policies and plans are regarded as “soft laws” and regulations (Halpern, Jacquot & Le Galès 2011, p.1) and their perceived weakness can rebound on NWMs as the implementations of these ‘plans’.

For the rankings of women’s socio-economic equality and political equality, respectively, the thesis draws from the feminist monitoring tool Isoquito to identify progress in these two areas. Isoquito is a feminist and advocacy monitoring tool constructed by feminist organisations in Latin America on the basis of States’ official data available in ECLAC’s Gender Equality Observatory. Isoquito produces States’ rankings to monitor their progress in the spheres of women’s autonomy: social and welfare, economic and political autonomy. Two-time reference points selected by Isoquito are 2007, the year the instrument was designed and the baseline measures were set, and 2013, the last year for which comparable official information is available for all eighteen Latin American countries (Articulación Feminista Marcosur - AFM - 2017). It examines women’s political representation and parity in decision-making in terms of percentage of women in parliament, in the legislative and in the supreme court of justice or highest national entity (AFM 2017). This measure is complemented by the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s measure of women’s representation in parliaments, both in the lower or

11 Isoquito was conceived after the Tenth Regional Conference on Women where the Quito Consensus (2007) was adopted calling for civil society’s monitoring of States’ performance in concrete gender outcomes related to normative developments women’s political representation, socio-economic status and physical autonomy.
single house and in the upper house or senate, in 2008 and 2018 (IPU 2018, 2008) to provide a more updated view of women´s representation in parliaments and how this has changed over the last decade. Taken together, both measures show the status of women´s parity in decision-making spaces in the State.

*Isoquito* also examines progress in women´s social welfare and economic parity status including percentage of women between 15 and 24 years of age who cannot read or write, maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births, percentage of women in poor households, men and women´s participation in the labour market, men and women´s social security coverage, men and women´s unemployment rate, percentage of men and women without own income, salary gap and rate of feminisation of poverty (AFM 2017). The information is drawn from States´ available official data gathered by ECLAC as part of the regional Gender Equality Observatory for the period 2007-2013, 2013 being the last year for which comparable official data is available for all eighteen countries (CEPAL 2017a). Performance in these areas is also assessed in relation to the level of development and inequality observed in HDI and GII indices.

**Case Study selection**

Following the analysis of the levels of compliance and commitment demonstrated by the eighteen States to institutionalising an effective NWMs, the States are divided according to the four-category typology developed by the thesis:

- Compliant and committed States
- Committed but not compliant States
- Compliant but not committed States
- Neither compliant nor committed States

According to the scholarly discussions, the thesis considered that NWMs can be potentially more effective when they meet both the global normative standards on NWMs and all or most of the indicators that demonstrate their viability (i.e. compliant and committed States), or when they meet the latter without complying with the global norm (i.e. committed but not compliant States). The logic behind this is that whereas compliance indicators focus on the existence of structures, commitment indicators provide a clearer picture of the likelihood that NWMs will be able to fulfil their goals, even if they do not meet the ideal institutional design proposed by the global norm. In contrast, the thesis considered that NWMs can be potentially ineffective when they meet the global norm standards but not the indicators that demonstrate their viability (i.e. compliant but not committed States) or when they fail to meet both the global standards and the necessary indicators to enable them to fulfil their goals (i.e. neither compliant nor committed States).
Based on this typology and on the trends observed in the performance of States in the gender and development rankings, four countries were selected as exemplary cases of each category – Chile as an exemplary case of compliance and commitment; Uruguay as an exemplary case of commitment but lack of compliance; Nicaragua as an exemplary case of compliance but lack of commitment; and Bolivia as an exemplary case of a lack of both compliance and commitment. Chile and Uruguay are cases of relatively effective NWMs and Nicaragua and Bolivia of ineffective NWMs. The purpose of the case studies is to test the conclusions of the eighteen-country survey by means of an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the individual NWMs and their place in the political systems of their respective countries and their relationship to a range of key actors. Examining these cases in more detail gives a more nuanced understanding of the meaning of effectiveness as it is applied to NWMs in concrete domestic settings.

The next chapter describes the socio-economic and political context that characterised the period when NWMs were adopted. Subsequently, it focuses the analysis in the evolution of these entities in the eighteen Latin American countries from 1970 until 2016 in order to assess the compliance of these institutions with the dominant international norms.
Chapter Three: The evolution of National Women’s Mechanisms in Latin America

Following the wave of democracy in Latin America beginning in the 1980s, the States in the region became open to the impact of international norms, including gender policy norms, as the form of their international engagement changed. The process of democratisation led to the replacing of the authoritarian regimes prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s with elected governments. This period was also marked by the adoption of market-oriented reforms and neoliberal economic policies that led to increased inequalities and uneven economic growth (Roberts 2002; Smith, Acuña & Gamarra 1994). Despite a generalised reduction of its poverty levels since 1990, Latin America is still considered one of the most unequal regions in the world (CEPAL 2018, p.42) and inequality has a gender aspect as the feminisation of poverty deepened during this period (Vásconez 2017). While the democratic transitions did not change the fundamental inequalities in Latin America, it did change State-society relations, allowing society to organise collective action as part of non-governmental movements and to have a less confrontational engagement with the State. Drawing from their organisational experience under authoritarian rule, women organised into both feminist and women’s movements that expanded across the region (Vargas 2008, 2002; Jaquette 1994, 1989). They became more professionalised and also began to see the State as a worthy interlocutor that could bring about solutions to their collective demands. Their agendas began to identify common socio-economic and political issues that crossed national frontiers (EFLAC 2014a; Vargas 2002; Álvarez 1999). Feminist and women’s organisations, following international trends, also demanded that their States created specific institutional entities dedicated to advance the women’s agenda influenced by international normative processes (EFLAC 2014a) that received significant support from international cooperation (Fernós 2010, pp.12, 41).

This chapter analyses these political, economic and social changes shaping the Latin American region from 1990 onwards. In particular, it discusses the link between democratisation, and demands for greater gender equality. In doing this it describes the evolution of the organised regional feminist and women’s movement and the construction of a common women’s agenda. It also discusses the performance of countries in key areas of concern regarding women’s rights and gender equality. It then analyses the evolution of NWMs in the eighteen Latin American countries from 1970 until 2016, to provide a contextual basis for assessing the current status of NWMs, discussing their trajectory and the key influences on their development. It deals with the post Beijing period, from 1995 onwards, in greater detail as it is from this date that the current international norm on NWMs was codified. The aim of the chapter is to identify the institutional features of NWMs, their type, hierarchical status, and legal basis, in order to assess the compliance of States with the dominant international norms on NWMs and to link it to other aspects of their international engagement.
Latin America, democratisation and gender equality

Latin America was among the first regions worldwide to experience the global political transformation known as the “third wave” of democratisation (Huntington 1991, p.76). From the 1980s to 1996, former authoritarian rule gave way to democratic transitions and civilian rule returned to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. Peace agreements were signed in conflict-scarred El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua during the 1990s. The region witnessed the consolidation of electoral politics and market-oriented economic reforms that shaped the region in the following decades. Despite the survival of vestiges of authoritarianism, the overall political gains of democratic change were impressive. In no other period before 1990 there were so many constitutional governments elected under effective universal suffrage in what most observers deemed as free, fair and competitive elections (Kirby 2003, pp.77-80). Building on initial political reforms there was a gradual establishment of political rights and civil liberties that radically transformed State-society relations and opened previously unknown spaces for the expression of reformist political agendas (Torres-Rivas 1993, p.94). The end of the Cold War facilitated the emergence of new actors that contested power and representation in the public arena including the rise of groups that advanced particularistic agendas transcending traditional ideological, party and class-based cleavages (Almeida & Cordero 2015). One such group was the dynamic and diverse feminist and women’s movements.

Along with transitions to democracy, Latin American countries consolidated a radical shift in economic policies that had begun in the early 1980s. State-led development strategies gradually gave way to market-oriented reforms imposed by International Financial Institutions in the context of the debt crisis that hit the developing world in the early 1980s (Kirby 2003, pp.51-67; Roberts 2002, p.6). The duration of the debt crisis and its lasting economic consequences challenged the economic paradigm that had prevailed in Latin America since the 1960s, focusing on State-led economic policy aimed at import-substituting industrialisation (Kirby 2003, pp.40-47). Policies of structural adjustment were imposed alongside with a series of measures aimed at de-regulating the economy, privatising public assets, easing trade barriers, promoting foreign direct investment, and reducing public subsidies and social protection schemes (Kirby 2003, pp.51-67; Roberts 2002, p.6).

Latin America’s intertwined political and economic transitions contain a contradiction that influenced the political developments in the ensuing decades. Democratisation, de-militarisation and increased political participation did generally not lead to the rule of the majority, nor to good governance (Torres-Rivas 2011, 1993). Market-oriented policies, which in the long-term hurt the interests of the working and middle-classes, were implemented amid harsh, externally imposed, conditionality and in a top-down fashion that failed to consider the social consequences of structural adjustment (Roberts 2002, p.6). Neoliberal policies that emphasised market reforms gradually diffused across Latin America and by the early 1990s had become hegemonic across the region (Kirby 2003). Encouraged by
international-aid agencies, Latin America embarked on decentralisation as a means of reducing the inefficiencies associated with the "centralist tradition" in Latin American politics (Willis, Garman & Haggard 1999, p.1). Decentralisation was also seen as a route to increase accountability and transparency in governance, as well as to promote greater participation by ethnic minorities and traditionally excluded social groups (Kirby 2003, p.83; Willis, Garman & Haggard 1999, p.2).

The vigour and extent of market-oriented reforms did not solve Latin America’s economic problems and the 1990s ended with a general sense of economic failure, as these reforms failed to bring about strong economic growth rates, or to sustain employment expansion and improve the equality of income distribution (Escobar 2010, p.8; Kirby 2003, pp.108-124; Roberts 2002, p.7; Stahl 1994). In line with the international experience neoliberal economic reform contributed to further concentrate income and wealth and to exacerbate the chronic inequality that characterised the Latin American region (ECLAC 2016c; Escobar 2010, p.8; Stahl 1994, pp.66-67). The simultaneity of transitions to democracy and the adoption or expansion of neoliberal economic policies involved re-asserting the public/private divide or the political/social divide, which had become blurred under former authoritarian regimes (Craske 1998, p.111). Neoliberal policies implied the withdrawal of State services causing an increase of women’s burden in reproductive and care activities and leaving them less time for activism in some countries (Craske 1998, p.114). Discontent against prevailing economic conditions, growing dissatisfaction with the function of electoral democracies and frequent scandals of corruption and misuse of public funds led to increased social contestation on the part of organised civil society (Luna & Filgueira 2009; Chavez, Rodriguez & Barrett 2008, pp.40-41). Beginning in the year 2000, contention escalated causing major political crises including the ousting or premature resignation of democratically-elected presidents in Argentina, Ecuador and Peru, as well as a failed coup d’état in Venezuela in 2002.

The negative effects of market-oriented policies led to the rejection of conservative leaders and was supported by the consolidation of a strong civil society in many States that became a major driver of political change (Almeida & Cordero 2015). Composed of organised social movements active since the 1990s (including women, environmentalists, anti-globalisation activists and indigenous groups), civil society forged tactical alliances to advance an agenda that combined demands of increased representation, socio-economic redistribution and participatory democracy (Goldfrank 2011).

Social mobilisation and an increasing rejection of the consequences of neoliberal policies led to a gradual “turn to the left” across the Latin American region (Seligson 2007). Beginning with the election of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999-2013), at least fifteen countries of the region witnessed the democratic election of left-leaning leaders with a strong anti-neoliberal platform.12 The

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specific programmatic agenda of each of the left leaning governments was coloured by national contextual issues producing “many lefts”, ranging from populist Peronism in Argentina to neoliberal economic based socialist governments in Chile, middle-class social democracy in Uruguay, guerrilla governments in El Salvador and Nicaragua, indigenous socialism in Bolivia or a more traditional socialist regime in Venezuela (quoted in Becker 2013, pp.58-59). Some of these are considered more populist and others more leftist (Chavez, Rodriguez & Barrett 2008, pp.32, 43-44). Still, they shared common themes in their political platforms, generally including a rejection of the dominance of neoliberal economic policies together with the adoption of more progressive social policies that emphasised transfers and services to the poorest segments of the national population, and also, the implementation of direct and deliberative mechanisms for democratic decision-making (Goldfrank 2011; Weyland, Madrid & Hunter 2010; Luna & Filgueira 2009; Seligson 2007). The turn to the left witnessed increased participation of women in formal power structures, including as democratically elected heads of State such as President Michelle Bachelet, elected in two different terms in Chile; and President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina and President Dilma Roussef in Brazil, both of whom were re-elected in continued terms.13 Unlike previous periods, the governmental cabinets of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela experienced increases in female representation during left-wing administrations (UNDP, UN Women & IDEA International 2017).

The shift towards the left coincided with the beginning of a cycle of high global commodity prices that bolstered the economies of many of these countries and were instrumental for high rates of economic growth, increasing public spending, expanding public services (especially in healthcare, food and education) and the creation of social safety nets targeting the poor (Chavez, Rodriguez & Barrett 2008, pp.53,59; Lomelí 2008). According to ECLAC, up to sixty million Latin Americans escaped poverty in the first decade of the twenty-first century and became part of the growing middle-classes (ECLAC 2016c, p.47). The economic success of many of the leftist governments resulted in consistent high approval rates that were key for re-election, the election of candidates of incumbent parties and the successful use of referenda for Constitutional reform. Electoral successes in turn allowed for long-term planning and the implementation of a neo-developmentalist economic model (Chavez, Rodriguez & Barrett 2008, pp.65-70) aimed at reducing external dependency and regaining national economic sovereignty.


13 Centre or right leaning elected female Presidents include President Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua (1990-1997), President Mireya Moscoso in Panama (1999-2004) and President Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica (2010-2014). Both President Chamorro and President Moscoso had previously been the first ladies in their respective countries.
In many States the neo-developmental model remained dependent on natural resources and extractive industries that left them vulnerable to external shocks (Escobar 2010, p.47). The fall of oil and commodity prices following the 2008 global financial crisis brought economic hardship and austerity measures to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador and marked what has been described as the gradual decline of the “pink-tide” (Bull 2013). The global economic recession diminished the allocation of international development cooperation aid to the Latin American region as many of the traditional European donor countries reduced or ended their aid (Tezanos & Martínez 2010), increasing the pressure on governments.

In this period governments came into conflict with social movements that had formed part of their original political platforms, including women, indigenous and environmental groups (Petras & Veltmeyer 2016; Weyland, Madrid & Hunter 2010). In Ecuador for example, President Correa experienced “stormy relations” with social movements for “failing to foster transformation of the structures that exploit and oppress marginalized communities” leading social movements to experience the complex task of “challenging Correa from the left without strengthening a common enemy on the right” (Becker 2013, p.59). From the late 2000s, the region witnessed the intensification of a conservative backlash against democratically elected left-wing leaders beginning with the “soft” coup d’état that ousted President Zelaya in Honduras in 2009 (López Segrera 2016, p.78). Major political crises were experienced also in Paraguay where left-wing democratically elected President Lugo was removed from power by a parliamentary impeachment in 2012, also considered a “soft coup” (López Segrera 2016, p.78; OAS 2009), and in Brazil, where democratically elected left-wing President Dilma Rousseff was removed from power by means of a Senate impeachment in 2016, considered as “an institutional coup” (Moreira da Silva Filho 2018) or “soft coup” (López Segrera 2016, p.78). The changing politics that benefitted the return of the right in the region was caused by multiple factors including: the powerful media campaigns of the right, the perpetuation in power of several left parties, the failure of the left to reach consensus with the right in the undertaking of their reformist agendas, the increasing rejection by the masses of clientelist practices which bought electoral support but did not alleviate poverty, the imposition of top-down technocratic structures that did not achieve a genuine empowering grassroots organisation, corruption scandals that deteriorated the mobilising mystic of and trust in left party leaders, and the triumphalist tendencies that did not recognise errors and did not allow any self-criticism (López Segrera 2016, p.96). By 2018, countries that had experienced a return to right-wing governments included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Paraguay. The new political turn to the right was accompanied by a return to neoliberal market economic policies, privatisation, and a radical shift in the political and social agenda (Matos & Molina 2016).

From the 1980s until 2000, Latin America followed global trends showing a sharp increase of income distribution inequality, which from 2000 onwards continued to grow but at a slower pace (ECLAC 2016a, p.37). This particularly affected women as during the 2000s, despite strong economic growth experienced by most countries in Latin America that produced a significant reduction in general
poverty rates and increased participation of women in the labour market, poverty continued to have a predominantly female face. According to UN Women, between 2002 and 2014, poverty decreased in Latin America almost 16 percentage points; however, during the same period, the index of feminine poverty increased eleven points and by 2014, the percentage of poor women was 18 percent higher than that of men (UN Women 2017d, p.6).

Political and economic crises produced widespread social discontent and protests across the region post 2010. The turmoil has been capitalised by religious organisations, conservative social movements, economic elites and conservative politicians and parliamentarians to call for the dismantling of gender equality policies (EFLAC 2018, pp.191-196). The result has been a regression in political and democratic spaces and the threat to gains made by women during the era of democratisation (Díaz 2017). The swing to the right has also been characterised by a steady decreasing number of female heads of States. From March 2018, Latin America was governed again by men only after President Bachelet handed over the presidency to conservative former President Sebastián Piñera (Lissardy 2017). There has also been an adverse effect on the relationship of governments with women’s organisations.

The evolution and increased engagement of feminist and women’s movements with the State underwent the same trajectory as most civil society groups and social movements across the region during the period of democratisation. This evolution was characterised both by greater autonomy from political parties and greater dialogue with the State (Vargas 2002, pp.1-3). In conceiving the State as a valid interlocutor, women’s organisations and movements increasingly identified common priorities and demanded concrete actions from State institutions (Vargas 2002, pp.2-3). Feminist and women’s organisations and movements were also marked by greater professionalisation, experiencing a boom in the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 1990s (Álvarez 1999), as well as greater incorporation of many of their representatives into State and governmental structures (Vargas 2002, p.4).

In the neoliberal era of the 1990s, civil society was regarded as a necessary third actor in the new “tripartite model” of State, market and society which flourished in most Latin American countries (Avritzer 2004, p.54). Civil society at that time became both a viable channel to convey society’s demands to State institutions and a substitute or complement in contexts of downsizing of the State and its decreasing influence as a service-provider (Stahl 1994, p.67). On the negative side, State institutions “evolved to serve narrow political and economic interests” where “the electorate was seen more as a clientele for power struggles of politicians than as citizens with rights” (Pearce 2004, p.62). In this context, external factors such as aid donors and the international financial institutions, turned to civil society as “a means to build accountability mechanisms between State institutions and society and deepen the quality of post-transition democracy”, viewing civil society as “an instrument for

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14 Calculated as percentage of women aged 20 to 59 living in poor households compared to the proportion of men in the same age range (UN Women 2017d, p.6).
institutional reform and democratization” (Pearce 2004, p.62). As a result of these various factors civil society organisations developed to play a significant role in the politics of Latin American States.

Latin American feminist and women’s movements were part of these trends. In line with the international experience, some women’s organisations remained anchored to grass-root movements and either continued to contest State actions and policy or were marginal to the State, and did not have engagement with State institutions, while other groups became professionalised and collaborated with the State (Pearce 2004; Vargas 2002; Álvarez 2000, 1999). Some groups who remained apart from the State, did so since they saw the State as representing the interests of a privileged minority that did not wish to engage with civil society and feared its “autonomous and often oppositional character” (Pearce 2004, p.63). Such groups that remained aloof tended to regard professionalised organisations that collaborated with the State in service delivery and in advocacy roles as having been “co-opted” by the State (Pearce 2004, p.63). Organisations that chose to engage with the State argued that they were taking advantage of the public spaces being opened by governments and external donors and using this as an opportunity to influence governmental policy and make the State accountable (Pearce 2004, p.65). This political division remains a feature of the diverse women’s organisations in Latin America and are reflected in the Latin American and the Caribbean Feminist Meetings (EFLAC is its commonly used Spanish acronym). Since the first EFLAC gathering took place in 1981, the EFLACs have forged the construction of a collective regional feminist agenda committed to women’s rights. The EFLACs have been increasingly characterised by the inclusion of a wide and diverse range of different feminist and women’s priorities, including issues of identity, sexual diversity, inter-sectionality, age, disability, ethnicity and race, among others (EFLAC 2014a). These feminist meetings have been used to discuss divergent and convergent feminist positions and agendas, assess progress, setbacks and identify emerging challenges to achieve feminist priorities. They have been regarded as a “vital mediating space between national, regional, and global movement arenas” (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.5). They have proved extremely influential in constructing a strong regional feminist voice to influence States and the international community as they “not only reflect but also reshape local, national, and regional movement discourses and practices” (Álvarez et al. 2003).

The EFLACs have undergone the same challenges and changes over time as other civil society movements in Latin American, navigating through internal and external tensions to keep their autonomy, that is, to avoid co-optation and misrepresentation by actors such as political parties, the State, international funding organisations, and even other social movements (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.8). In the 1990s, the EFLACs witnessed a heightened specialisation and professionalisation of feminist organisations and greater engagement with national and international political institutions. This was viewed by activists as necessary to advance a feminist agenda, but others considered it, at best an unwise strategy and, at its worst, a form of collusion with governments whose policies were framed by “neoliberal patriarchy” (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.15). Many feminists in favour of the former view took the chance to enter formal politics, or State institutions, or created NGOs dedicated to women’s issues
(Vargas 2002, pp.4-5). This, it was argued, allowed the articulation of a feminist agenda from within formal institutions and organisations and pushed for the adoption of favourable gender measures, such as the creation of NWMs, the adoption of political quotas and the passing of legislation on violence against women (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.16).

The EFLACs were influenced by the UN led normative processes including the Beijing World Conference on Women, despite the resistance of some groups to this development (IIDH 1996). Many national feminist and women’s organisations increased their engagement with the UN led gender agenda and used this as part of their strategy to influence their governments (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.17). Their hope was that the combination of international and domestic pressure would force the implementation of women’s rights legislation and commitments adopted during the democratisation period (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.17; Keck & Sikkink 1998). During the 1990s feminist and women’s organisations demanded the adoption of corrective measures to counter the effects of neoliberal policies on women’s poverty; the recognition of the diversity of women and of different inequalities among women (based on class, race, age, and ethnicity); and the adoption of institutional and normative policies and measures to promote gender equality (Vargas 2002, pp.4-5). In the twenty-first century, feminist and women’s organisations demands closely followed international trends with a heightened focus on sexual and reproductive rights – including abortion rights (EFLAC 2014a). Other key demands included the eradication of all forms of violence against women and girls, the recognition of women’s unpaid work, the need to assess the quality of democracy and the need to address the threats posed by religious fundamentalisms (EFLAC 2017a, b, 2014a, b).

During the 2017 EFLAC meeting, women attending from more than thirty countries in the region denounced what they saw as the unprecedented “fundamentalist onslaught” on the gender equality gains of the previous three decades as a result of the wave of conservative political and social opinion that was spreading through the region.15 This onslaught linked to the new political right governments was said to be accompanied by an “ultra-neo-liberal” economic policy agenda in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, and Guatemala.16 It was also a feature of left leaning government such as Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador and Venezuela.17 Feminists attending the meeting expressed the belief that the region was witnessing the dismantling or deterioration of existing gender institutions and the abolishment or weakening of progressive legislation related to women’s rights and gender equality.18 Paraguay is an example of the anti-women backlash, as the Ministry of Education prohibited in 2017 the use of the word “gender” in all public academic policies, institutions, curricular content or material (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2017a).

15 Author’s participant observation during the XIV Regional Feminist Meeting of Latin America and the Caribbean (EFLAC) held in Montevideo, Uruguay, from 23-25 November 2017, gathering more than 2,000 feminists from more than thirty countries.
16 Author’s participant observation during the XIV EFLAC.
17 Author’s participant observation during the XIV EFLAC.
18 Author’s participant observation during the XIV EFLAC.
Participants at the EFLAC attributed this widespread chauvinistic backlash as a response to the gains made by feminism in recent decades and to the deterioration of democracy across the region, including the increased influence of very conservative social and religious institutions.19

Prior to this backlash Latin America advanced significantly in the adoption of instruments reflecting international gender norms that were intended to promote women’s status and gender equality and also in the introduction of reforms at the national level. The region generally complied with the endorsement of binding international women’s rights treaties and in enacting gender equality legislation and adopting gender national policies and plans. However, despite ratification of the main international binding instruments aimed at ending discrimination against women by 1990, namely the CEDAW Convention (1979), its Optional Protocol (1999) has not been fully adopted by all Latin American States (see Appendix 7). Chile and El Salvador have signed but not ratified the Optional Protocol, and Honduras and Nicaragua have yet to sign. Most States in Latin America, however, have complied with the regular submission of periodic reports related to the CEDAW convention. One exception is Nicaragua that has not reported to the CEDAW Committee since 2007.20

Following the adoption of gender equality legislation, based on an international norm, beginning with Costa Rica in 1990, the region witnessed the adoption of such legislation in eleven countries (see Appendix 8). The adoption of equality legislation was concomitant and, in some cases, occurred after the adoption of national equality policies and plans. Indeed, Latin America experienced a trend towards the design and implementation of gender equality policies and plans from the 1990s onwards, with increased impetus in the 2000s (CEPAL 2017b). By 2018, all States in Latin America had a national gender equality policy or plan, and for many States these were their second or third generation national policies or plans (Appendix 9). The exception was Argentina where such policy or plan has not been produced at the national level.

Policies to ensure women’s equal political representation such as quotas and later parity legislation proliferated across the region, with a wave of quota legislation experienced in the 1990s (see Appendix 10). In 1991, Argentina became the first country in Latin America to adopt a quota law to increase women’s political representation at the national level and it was soon followed by ten countries in the same decade. By the 2010s, after twenty years of quota legislation, limited effects and misuses of these measures were evident and their shortcomings began to be addressed with the promotion of parity legislation (Pérez 2015). Parity legislation no longer sought a minimum percentage of women’s representation (most quota laws in the region set a 30 percent minimum) but instead promoted 50/50 parity representation between men and women in all spheres. By 2018, all Latin American countries except for Guatemala had adopted affirmative action mechanisms to improve women’s participation on electoral lists, most of them quota laws, two had reflected parity in their electoral codes (Honduras and

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19 Author’s participant observation during the XIV EFLAC.
20 OHCHR (2017a).
Panama) and five had adopted comprehensive parity legislation (Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua) (see Appendix 10). The use of quotas to increase the number of women in parliaments from the 1990s has become a strong international norm and has radically altered the numbers of women in parliaments globally (Wangnerud 2009, p.52). It is also recognised that it has been used by individual States to enhance their international reputation without actually improving the substantive representation of women (Sunn Bush 2011, p.131; Wangnerud 2009). The region ranked second in the world in 2017 with an average representation of 28.1 percent of members of parliament being women, yet with “large differences in terms of parliamentary representation in the lower or single chamber among the different countries of the region” (Tello Rozas & Floru 2017). In 2018, some countries had over 40 percent of women elected such as Bolivia (50 percent), Mexico (48.7 percent) and Nicaragua (45.7 percent) and some that had less than 20 percent including Colombia (19.2 percent), Panama (18.3 percent), Paraguay (16.4 percent), Brazil (12.8) and Guatemala (12.7 percent) (IPU 2018).

Violence against women, considered by the World Health Organisation as a “global health problem of epidemic proportions” (WHO 2013), has been at the forefront of public policy agendas and civil society’s activism across Latin America in the past decade (EFLAC 2018, 2014a). In response to civil society’s mobilisation and gradual greater visibility given to the problem, both at the national and international level, the region experienced a series of waves in the adoption of legislation on this topic (see Appendix 11). Between 1994 and 2005, all States adopted a first generation of legislation that punished domestic and intra-family violence. Between 2007 and 2018, all States had adopted new legislation or reformed existing legislation to legally recognise the crime of “femicide” or “feminicide”. Sixteen countries recognise “femicide” or “feminicide” (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) and two (Argentina and Venezuela) recognise aggravated homicide for gender reasons. Indeed, Latin America was considered pioneer for legally differentiating and recognising the murder of women based on their sex, “femicide”, as an aggravated crime compared to common homicide, and assigning greater penalties to it. The focus on this issue in the region reflects its very high levels of violence against women and the killing of women compared to other regions. Latin American continues to have high rates of “femicide”, according to UN Women, among the twenty-five countries with the highest rates of “femicide” in the world, fourteen were from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017 (UN Women 2017e). According to the latest comparable data available for 2016 and 2017, the countries with the highest rates of “femicide” were El Salvador (10.2 women per 100,000 women), Honduras (5.8), Guatemala (2.6), Dominican Republic (2.2), Bolivia (2.0) and Paraguay (1.6) (CEPAL 2017a; ECLAC 2016b).

The widespread enactment of legislation to promote women’s political representation and to punish violence against women were not matched by progress regarding women’s sexual and

reproductive rights. Despite decades of feminist and women’s mobilisation and activism, abortion continued being banned in most countries (see Appendix 12). Only Uruguay liberalised abortion in 2012 (Uruguay 2012). Most other countries allowed abortion only on most of the commonly accepted grounds recognised by international human rights standards (Center for Reproductive Rights 2017a, b, 2015). These are the cases of danger to the life or health of the mother, non-viable pregnancy or pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. However, there were opposing movements across the region, either fighting for an expansion of existing legislation or for restricting it further. For example, in Bolivia, where abortion was already allowed in the case of rape, incest or risk to the life of the mother, the legislation was expanded in September 2017 to also make it legal in the case of minors, pregnant students or women who have under their care other children, older adults or a person with a disability (Molina 2017). In contrast, in Brazil an overwhelmingly evangelical influenced Congress approved the banning of abortion in the case of rape or danger to the life of the mother in November 2017 (Reuters 2017). In 2018, the countries with the most restrictive abortion laws, where abortion was banned without exception, were Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (see Appendix 11). Ironically, all these countries used to allow abortion on the three commonly agreed grounds but moved to criminalise it on all grounds in the recent past. Chile had been part of this group until in 2017 it lifted the complete ban on therapeutic abortion (Chile 2017b), which had been imposed at the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship (The Guardian 2017). The lack of access to reproductive health services, comprehensive sexuality education and adequate contraception were considered as pending demands that prevented women from fully enjoying their rights as citizens (Center for Reproductive Rights 2015, p.i). The total ban of abortion was one of the causes for the high numbers of maternal mortality found in the countries that had the most restrictive legislation (Center for Reproductive Rights 2015; Amnesty International 2009). Women with no choice, most often the poorest, resorted to unsafe abortions while middle and upper-class women had the option to travel to other countries with less restrictive laws (see for example Nóchez & Aguirre 2018).

In contrast to reproductive rights, progress on women’s economic status has been widely acknowledged, particularly in relation to the increase in their participation in the labour market and their inclusion in social protection systems from 1990 to 2015 (UN Women 2017d, p.2). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, in the context of economic growth and rising commodity prices, public spending on health, education, housing and social protection was increased in many States, and policies to improve the balance between work and family life were adopted, benefitting women directly and indirectly (UN Women 2017d, pp.3-4). However, both women’s achievements and the constraints on their economic empowerment reflect the deep socio-economic inequalities that are characteristic of the Latin American region, exacerbated by patriarchal family relations and violent patterns of behaviour (UN Women 2017d, p.2).

According to UN Women, the proportion of women without an income of their own fell from more than 40 percent in 2002 to less than 30 percent in 2014 (UN Women 2017d, p.6). Among women
of child-bearing age, who frequently reduce paid work to cope with childcare responsibilities, the proportion without their own income also fell, thanks to a combination of their increased participation in the labour market and greater access to social protection, including conditional cash transfers for mothers or caregivers of young children (UN Women 2017d, p.6). There were also significant improvements in access to personal income for women aged 60 years and older, largely due to the expansion of non-contributory pensions (UN Women 2017d, p.6). Improvements in universal pension coverage were experienced in countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico (UN Women 2017d, p.6).

However, despite a period of strong economic growth accompanied by improvements in social and labour market policies, Latin America continued to lag behind in terms of gender equality, showing a large gender gap in women’s labour force participation and unemployment. The proportion of women without an income of their own was twice that of men and the gender pay gap persisted even in the face of women’s significant educational accomplishment (UN Women 2017d, p.6). Other obstacles for women’s economic autonomy included the high rate of female headed households (women were the main income providers in one third of households in Latin America in 2014) and the burden of unpaid domestic, care and reproductive work, estimated to be more than three times that of men (UN Women 2017d, p.8). Inequality did not affect all women equally. Among women, the inequality was exacerbated by the inter-section with socioeconomic, geographic, ethnic and racial conditions, making certain groups of women such as poor, rural, indigenous or afro-descendent women, women with children or women with low educational level, even less equal vis-à-vis other women (Vásconez 2017; UN Women 2017d, p.8).

Despite being a region with many commonalities, there are important differences among countries and the performance in key development and equality fields has not been the same across the region. The comparative position of the eighteen countries is discussed using UNDP’s human development and inequality indices for 2017 (UNDP 2018) and the three regional aggregated rankings constructed to examine the comparative performance of the eighteen countries in gender normative and legal frameworks (see Appendices 7, 8, 9,10, 11 and 12), women’s political parity (AFM 2017), supplemented with the percentage of women in parliaments for 2008 and 2018 (IPU 2018, 2008) and women’s socio-economic and welfare parity (AFM 2017). Countries are ranked according to their performance in two different points in time and, where relevant, to assess progress or regression in key indicators.

Three countries have a high development level (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay), five a medium development level (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras) and the remaining ten have a medium development level (see Table 2). There is a very large difference in the HDI value between countries with a very high development level and countries with a medium development level. In particular, there is a difference of 0.22 points between the highest-ranking country (Chile, with an
HDI rank position 44 in the world scale) and the lowest-ranking country (Honduras, with an HDI rank position 133 in the world scale). This illustrates how wealthy and more developed Chile, Argentina and Uruguay are compared to most other countries, particularly to the five in the medium development group (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras).

Table 2.- Human Development Index ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Human Development</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI rank 2017</th>
<th>HDI value in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>127</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the most developed countries in Latin America are generally also the most gender equal according to the Gender Inequality Index (GII) ranking (Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico and Argentina), all lose positions in the HDI rank when the GII index is taken into account (see Table 3). The most notable cases are Argentina losing 34 positions and Chile losing 28 positions because of gender inequality. There are other highly developed countries that do not show a high position in the inequality index yet also lose significant positions in the HDI when GII is taken into account. These include Panama losing 43 positions and Venezuela losing 27 positions. The opposite case is also observed. The least developed countries tend to feature among the bottom positions in the GII rank, yet most gain significant positions in the adjusted HDI rank when GII is factored in. This is the case particularly of El Salvador gaining 30 positions, Honduras gaining 24 positions, Nicaragua gaining 18 positions, Bolivia gaining 16 positions and Guatemala gaining 7 positions.
Table 3.- Gender Inequality Index ranking and adjusted HDI according to inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Human Development</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GII value in 2017</th>
<th>GII ranking position in Latin America</th>
<th>GII ranking position in the world</th>
<th>Adjusted HDI rank according to GII</th>
<th>Position lost or gained as per adjusted HDI rank reflecting GII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All countries improved in terms of their adoption of gender related international norms, of key legislation and national policies and plans in the period 2007-2018 (see Figure 1). This index measures States’ compliance with obligations enshrined in international human rights bodies on women’s rights such as the signature or ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol, the obligation to submit periodic reports on the status of application of the CEDAW Convention, the adoption of legislation on equality, the adoption of national gender equality policies or plans, the enactment of quota or parity legislation, of violence against women related legislation and the legal status of abortion. The States that reflected the best performance in 2018 are Uruguay and Mexico with 0.93 in the index, followed by Peru and Costa Rica (0.86), Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela (0.79), Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador and Panama (0.71). The ones that showed the lowest performance are Argentina, Brazil, Honduras and Nicaragua (0.57).
Regarding progress in women´s political decision parity, Figure 2 shows the performance of countries in women´s political representation and parity in decision-making in terms of percentage of women in parliament, in the legislative and in the supreme court of justice or highest national entity in 2007 and 2013 (AFM 2017). Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador clearly stand out for their performance in 2013 whereas most other countries, although they did also show improvement, they did not reach the level of performance of these three countries. In the case of Argentina, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay, the period 2007-2013 showed a regression in their performance.

*Figure 2.- Women´s political parity*
As the data for all eighteen countries was not available to construct the women’s political parity index for the period 2014-2018, this measure was completed by the performance of countries in the IPU ranking measuring women’s representation in parliaments, both in the lower or single house and in the upper house or senate, in 2008 and 2018 (IPU 2018, 2008) (see Figure 3). According to this index, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua continue showing a significant performance in 2018, together with Costa Rica and Mexico.

Figure 3.- Women’s representation in national parliaments

Figure 4 gives an index of women’s social welfare and economic parity in the period 2007-2013, made up of percentage of women between 15 and 24 years of age who cannot read or write, maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births, percentage of women in poor households, men and women’s participation in the labour market, men and women’s social security coverage, men and women’s unemployment rate, percentage of men and women without own income, salary gap and rate of feminisation of poverty (AFM 2017). The significance of this table in not the level of change experienced by each individual State, which is predictably small given that it is only a five-year period, it is the relative position of the States with Nicaragua being an outlier and a significant difference observed between the best performing States and those middle ranking States. The countries showing the best performance in 2013 are Uruguay (0.905), Chile (0.86), Argentina (0.845) and Brazil (0.84). The countries showing the worse performance are Bolivia (0.625), Honduras (0.56), Guatemala (0.475) and Nicaragua (0.135). Out of these, Guatemala and Nicaragua experienced a regression in the period 2007-2013, together with Panama and Venezuela.
Figure 4.- Women’s social welfare and economic parity

Based on the information gathered, States were ranked according to their performance in the different areas and periods examined. Table 4 shows how some of the top performers in gender normative and legal developments were the same in 2007 and 2018, namely Mexico, Uruguay and Costa Rica, and some of the bottom performers also remained the same, namely Honduras and Nicaragua. The most remarkable improvements were experienced by El Salvador gaining 7 positions and Chile gaining 6 positions.

Table 4.- Ranking of countries according to performance in gender normative and legal developments

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>0.93</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.57</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>0.79</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 ranks countries according to their performance in women’s political parity for the period 2007-2013, showing a very different configuration in the ranking for countries’ performance in 2007 and 2013. Most notably, the top performers in 2007 lost positions (Argentina lost 5 positions, Costa Rica lost 2 positions, Honduras lost 8 positions, and Chile lost 5 positions) and the top performers in 2013 were completely different with Nicaragua leading the ranking (having gained 5 positions), followed by Bolivia (no data was available for 2007 for Bolivia so it was not possible to measure the gain) and Ecuador (having gained 7 positions). Countries that showed the greatest regression are Panama and Honduras, both losing 8 positions. These major changes are remarkable given that the period covers only five years. A paradox is found in the case of Uruguay as being the country ranking top in the gender equality index and one of the top countries in the HDI index, it shows the worse performance in 2013 in terms of women’s political parity, having lost 4 positions since 2007.

Table 5.- Ranking of countries according to performance in women’s political parity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>0.71</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the above results with the IPU measures for 2008-2018 (see Table 6), the trend is generally the same. The most remarkable positive shift experienced in the percentage of women in parliaments is shown by Bolivia shifting from a bottom position in 2008 to the top position in 2018, which is a change of 12 positions. Other countries that experienced a significant shift are Mexico, Nicaragua and Chile, all gaining 4 positions, and in the cases of Mexico and Nicaragua achieving second and third positions, respectively. Countries regressing in the previous ranking such as Honduras and Panama continue to regress whereas in the case of Uruguay it shows an improved performance compared to the previous ranking. Costa Rica, although losing some positions in both rankings, kept a leading position through the periods of analysis.
Table 6.- Ranking of countries according to performance in women´s representation in parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regards to countries´ performance in women´s social welfare and economic parity (see Table 7), the comparison between 2007 and 2013 does not show any major shift and coincides with the HDI rank. The top performers are the most developed countries in the region, namely Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, whereas the bottom performers are the least developed countries, namely Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. One country that shows a major negative shift is Venezuela losing seven positions.

Table 7.- Ranking of countries according to performance in women´s social welfare and economic parity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Taken together, the analysis of the different rankings clearly shows that women’s political parity was the area where most changes were experienced across the region, both in terms of improvement and regression. This is an interesting finding given that most countries adopted some sort of legal instrument to promote women’s representation in decision-making spaces (see Appendix 10). However, whereas some countries experienced a remarkable positive shift such as Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, others actually regressed, including Argentina which was the first country in the region to adopt a quota law. Furthermore, the countries progressing further in this field are not the most developed countries. Another remarkable trend found is that most countries performing top and bottom in the gender related normative and legal frameworks and in women’s social welfare and economic parity were largely the same across the periods of analysis. In the case of women’s social welfare and economic parity, there is a clear correspondence between higher levels of development, therefore wealth, and better performance in indicators related to women’s socio-economic status, and vice versa.

These results serve as a backdrop against which to conduct the analysis of the evolution of NWMs in Latin America of the following section. They can help discern whether there were any significant links between States’ performance in gender equality and development, and the establishment of NWMs.

**The evolution of NWMs in Latin America**

In the period 1970-2016, NWMs diffused in different waves of foundational and reform events in Latin America (Table 8). Many NWMs showed a “zig-zag” trajectory across years, as suggested by Guzmán in 2006 (p.4), such as in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua Panama, Peru and Venezuela, whereas others showed very few institutional changes, such as in Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Paraguay (see individual trajectories in Appendix 13).
Table 8: NWMs foundational and reform events in the period 1970-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Global events</th>
<th>International turning points (1971-1985)</th>
<th>Beijing</th>
<th>Beijing+5</th>
<th>Beijing+10</th>
<th>Beijing+15</th>
<th>Beijing+20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td>F x 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>R+</td>
<td>R-</td>
<td>R+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R+</td>
<td>R-</td>
<td>R+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R+</td>
<td>R-</td>
<td>R+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td>F, R</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>F R</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td>F R</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td>F x 2</td>
<td>R+</td>
<td>R-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>F x 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>F R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>F x 4</td>
<td>R+</td>
<td>R-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td>F x 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EVENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>12F 3R</td>
<td>21F 1R</td>
<td>10F 3R</td>
<td>12F 3R</td>
<td>21F 1R</td>
<td>12F 3R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events per decade</td>
<td></td>
<td>12F 3R</td>
<td>21F 1R</td>
<td>22F 6R</td>
<td>5F 12R</td>
<td>3F 17R</td>
<td>3F 17R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- **F**: Year/decade democratisation process began
- **F+**: Foundational event (neither positive nor negative)
- **F+**: Foundational event (positive in relation to previous event)
- **F-**: Foundational event (negative in relation to previous event)
- **R**: Reform event (neither positive nor negative)
- **R+**: Reform event (positive in relation to previous event)
- **R-**: Reform event (negative in relation to previous event)
The patterns followed by the region in the changes experienced by their NWMMs can clearly be seen in Figure 5. The tendency to create new entities beginning in the 1970s peaked in the 1990s, the decade of the Beijing Conference, and subsequently decreased. In parallel, the tendency to reform existing NWMMs followed the reverse trajectory. It was not common in the 1970s and 1980s but became increasingly common from the 1990s at the same time that the tendency to create new entities decreased.

Figure 5.- Trends in NWMMs’ foundational and reform events

It is clear that Beijing marked a watershed in the evolution of NWMMs in Latin America. This makes it imperative to examine separately the era before and after Beijing.

NWMMs before Beijing (1970–1994)

The NWMMs that were established in Latin America post 1995 have a considerable legacy from earlier decades. A total of forty-three women’s mechanisms were created in the period between 1970 and 1994 (see Appendix 13). Some of these were embryonic, or the predecessors of what would eventually become NWMMs that were administratively attached to the executive branch of the State. Many were created only to disappear after a short period of time. For example, in Argentina, the National Directorate of Women and Family created in 1983 and the Sub-secretariat of Women created in 1987, were both short lived and closed down following changes of government and governmental restructurings, respectively.

A greater diversity in the type of mechanisms can be observed in this period than in the post 1995 period. This diversity included offices, directorates, commissions, secretariats,
councils, institutes and programmes. Most mechanisms had “low” status within the structures of the government (Table 9), with only two NWMs having a “high” hierarchical status. The two high-ranking mechanisms were the Ministry of State for the Incorporation of Women into Development created in Venezuela in 1979 and the Governmental Women’s Office created in Honduras in 1994, attached directly to the Presidency. Both had been created during progressive governments in their respective countries, a pattern observed across the region over time. The NWM in Venezuela disappeared in 1984 and was replaced by a new entity – the National Women and Family Office (FLACSO 1994q), while the mechanism in Honduras was downgraded following a change in government.

Table 9.- Hierarchical status of NWMs created in 1970-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchical level of NWM</th>
<th>States and number of mechanisms</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Honduras, Venezuela</td>
<td>2 mechanisms (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Argentina (x2), Chile, Colombia (x2), Dominica Republic, Nicaragua (x2), Paraguay, Venezuela (x3)</td>
<td>12 mechanisms (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Argentina (x2), Bolivia (x2), Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica (x2), Ecuador (x2), El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico (x3), Nicaragua, Panama (x4), Paraguay, Peru (x5), Uruguay (x2), Venezuela</td>
<td>29 mechanisms (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>43 NWMs, 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the period 1970-1994, most NWMs were devoted to women's issues, exclusively or in combination with family-related issues or social issues. Most were attached to the Presidency or to social sector ministries.22 Fourteen out of forty-three were directly attached to the Presidency, a minority with the express purpose of influencing all policy-making sectors,23 and others simply following recommendations from international normative fora such as CEDAW and the international conferences on women.

Thirteen NWMs were located under ministries overseeing family, children, youth or social affairs. Two created in Argentina, one in Bolivia, two in Costa Rica, two in Ecuador, one in Guatemala, one in Mexico, three in Panama and one in Venezuela. To a lesser extent,

22 For example, the Coordination Council of Public Polices for Women set up in 1991 in Argentina; the Governmental Women’s Office created in 1994 in Honduras; the Nicaraguan Women’s Institute created in 1987 in Nicaragua; the Women’s Secretariat created in 1992 in Paraguay; the Feminine Advisory Commission of the Presidency of the Republic created in 1989 and the National Women’s Council created in 1993 in Venezuela.

23 In Chile, although not attached to the Presidency, SERNAM was created under the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation with the purpose of influencing all policy-making fields (Chile 1991; FLACSO 1994d).
mechanisms were created under ministries of justice (one in Brazil, one in Paraguay and two in Peru), ministries of education (two in Peru and one in Uruguay), or ministries of labour and welfare (one in Uruguay). The direct attachment of women’s mechanisms to these ministries had an emphasis on promoting women’s equality in the law, greater access to formal education or improved labour rights and social welfare provisions. Independently of their location within the governmental apparatus, most stressed a direct association between women’s issues and their traditional roles in society (see Appendix 13).

The few reform events experienced in this period, seven in total, were generally due to changes in the administrative attachment of these mechanisms because of governmental restructurings. For example, the National Institute for Minors, Women and the Family in Bolivia was transformed into the National Secretariat for Ethnic, Gender and Generational Affairs in 1993 and attached to a newly created Ministry of Human Development (Appendix 13). Other reforms were due to changes in NWMs’ working arrangements. For example, the Nicaraguan Women’s Institute was reformed with the creation of an advisory council in 1993 (Nicaragua 1993). None of the seven reform events implied a change in hierarchical status. In the case of Uruguay, the remit of the mechanism created in 1987 exclusively overseeing women’s issues was expanded to cover family issues after a period of inaction because of a governmental change (FLACSO 1994p; Uruguay 1987).

The lack of a legal basis in the majority of cases meant that most NWMs in this period had a very weak institutional basis. Out of the forty-three mechanisms traced, evidence was found of only five created by law,24 whereas twelve had been established by governmental decree (see Appendix 13).25 For the remaining twenty-six no evidence of a formal legal or governmental instrument was found. The lack of a legal basis meant that it was more likely that the NWM would be subject to change or disappearance due to changes in government compared to NWMs that had a more formal basis. As noted in Chapter One, in Chile, for example, the creation of SERNAM in 1991 by law was found to have been determinant in its relative greater stability in comparison to similar bodies created in neighbouring Argentina and Peru (Waylen 1997, p.96, p.102). The instability of NWMs is some countries is indicated by the fact that five different mechanisms were created and dismantled in Peru between 1972-1987 (Casafranca 1996, p.50; FLACSO 1994o), and four in Argentina between 1983-1992 (FLACSO 1994a); none of them had been established by law (see Appendix 13).

As described in Chapter One, favourable international normative fora were decisive drivers for the creation of mechanisms in Latin America. The United Nations Decade for Women (1976-1985), the adoption of the CEDAW in 1979, and each World Conference on Women taking

24 In Bolivia, (1993); Brazil (1985); Chile (1991); Costa Rica (1986); and Paraguay (1992).
place in 1975, 1985 and 1990 pushed for the creation of such mechanisms. In many countries, the number of different foundational events correspond with the need to prepare the country to either respond to, or to represent the country in these fora. For example, Argentina created mechanisms in 1991 and 1992 to follow up on CEDAW recommendations and to report on progress in international fora (FLACSO 1994a), Brazil created mechanisms to examine the situation of women vis-à-vis the International Decade of Women (1976-1985) and follow up on international treaties (FLACSO 1994b) and in Mexico, the creation of the National Programme for the International Year of Women in 1975 and of the National Programme for Women’s Integration to Development in 1980 responded to the First World Conference (Mexico City, 1975), the International Decade on Women (1976-1985) and the Third World Conference (Nairobi, 1985) (FLACSO 1994k). In Panama, the National Commission for the Celebration of the International Year of Women was set up in 1975 (FLACSO 1994m), while in Venezuela, the Ministry of State for the Incorporation of Women into Development was created in 1979, the year of the adoption of the CEDAW Convention (FLACSO 1994q).

Apart from global drivers, regional actors such as the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM) were also instrumental in the establishment of women’s mechanisms in the period prior to 1995, for example in Guatemala (FLACSO 1994j) and Uruguay (FLACSO 1994p), as well as the Regional Conferences on Women, convened by ECLAC every three years since 1977. Both CIM and ECLAC provided a high level of support to governments and played a prominent role in global and regional normative processes where milestone normative instruments on gender equality and women’s rights were adopted, expanding to the national level.

Although organised women’s movements were behind the creation of some mechanisms, for example in Brazil (FLACSO 1994c), in Chile (FLACSO 1994d), in Nicaragua (Disney 2008), in Uruguay (FLACSO 1994p) and in Venezuela (FLACSO 1994q), their role was generally not found to have been as crucial in this period as international drivers in many countries. In the countries where they had been key advocates for the creation of these mechanisms such as in Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua, the appointment of leaders to these mechanisms with a background in women’s issues or a proved trajectory of commitment to advancing women’s issues offered the NWMs a great degree of legitimacy. However, episodes of rupture between women’s organisations and the NWM occurred in a number of cases, either because of governmental changes or as a result of political crises, this estrangement inevitably damaged the legitimacy of the NWM. For example, in Brazil where the National Council for Women’s Rights had overseen major progress over four consecutive years (1985-1989) in close collaboration with women’s organisations, following a political crisis in 1989, the NWM became dominated by the government resulting in the loss of its financial and administrative autonomy (FLACSO 1994b). The new staff appointed did not enjoy recognition by women’s organisation and this, together
with the downgrading in its status, led the NWM to lose its former political space and legitimacy vis-à-vis women’s organisations (FLACSO 1994b).

In some cases, parliaments were key supporters of the creation of NWMs, for example in Honduras, the Women’s Commission in the Congress was a key driver of legislative reforms, including for the creation of a national mechanism for women (Méndez & Montesdeoca 2003, p.13). In Brazil, female parliamentarians and women’s organisations joined forces in supporting the creation of a women’s mechanism at the federal level (FLACSO 1994c).

Umbrella national women’s mechanisms attached to the executive were often created after other analogous entities had been created within sectoral ministries or at the sub-national level. This was the case, for example, in Honduras, where in the early 1980s "the tendency towards the creation of institutions remained sectoral and diluted in each State Secretariat, without creating coordination mechanisms between the different technical units" (Méndez & Montesdeoca 2003, p. 9). This was the case until the first NWM, the Governmental Women’s Office, was created in 1994. In Brazil, various women’s mechanisms operated at the sub-national governmental levels before the national coordination mechanism was created in 1985 at the federal government.

International cooperation played a key role in supporting the regular functioning and work of many of these entities. In Bolivia, for example, 75 percent of the budget of the National Secretariat for Ethnic, Gender and Generational Affairs came from international cooperation (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1995a, paragraph 55). In Colombia, the Presidential Advisory Office for Youth, Women and Family was partly funded by international cooperation agencies and partly by the national budget (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1994a, paragraph 461). States commonly referred to political crises, the legacy of authoritarian rule, economic structural adjustments and financial constraints to justify the lack of consolidation of their NWMs, including their lack of adequate capacity. In a number of reports in 1994, FLACSO found that many NWMs faced operating constraints due to lack of adequate resources, lack of autonomy or lack of authority to influence policy, including in Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama, Chile and Ecuador (FLACSO 1994d,i, j,m.p).

In the period 1970-1994 States increasingly complied with emerging international normative recommendations on the establishment of NWMs. This period witnessed the creation of many NWMs across the region, although not their consolidation. Most mechanisms shared a “low” hierarchical status within the governmental apparatus, a lack of legal basis and administrative lines of reporting to social affairs ministries or to the Presidency (see Appendix 13). The international events linked to the global gender equality normative agenda were major

26 For example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1990, paragraphs 253 and 351), in the case of Peru and Mexico; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1986, paragraph 265), in the case of Venezuela; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1996b, paragraph 111), in the case of Chile.
drivers for their establishment, and to a lesser extent the role of regional women’s entities, local women’s organisations and parliamentarians. The succession of international normative events together with changing internal politics were the main reasons behind the creation and disappearance of many mechanisms. Towards the end of this period, States that showed the greatest relative compliance with global norms on NWMs were Chile, Nicaragua and Honduras, with the establishment of SERNAM, INIM and the Governmental Women’s Office, respectively. Out of these three entities, only SERNAM in Chile had been created by law. Both SERNAM in Chile and INIM in Nicaragua were autonomous entities with their own staff and budgets. The heads of SERNAM in Chile and of the Governmental Women’s Office in Honduras had ministerial rank. This meant that even though the mechanisms were not ministries, their leaders were appointed as ministers and fully participated in the governmental cabinet together with other ministers. However, all three shared with the rest of the region the same challenges related to inadequate funding, much of which was provided by international cooperation agencies. The NWMs of this period did not have homogeneity as the international women’s normative agenda had yet to identify clear parameters for their establishment and consolidation.

**NWMs after Beijing (1995-2016)**

As discussed in Chapter One, States globally agreed on a definition of the parameters for the establishment and strengthening of NWMs during the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. The BDPIA recommended that NWMs should be set up as governing bodies, oversee the application of a gender mainstreaming strategy (GM) across all policy areas, be located at the highest position possible within the governmental hierarchy (i.e. ministerial position), be assigned clear mandates and functions and have access to adequate financial, human and technical resources to undertake their mission. Following this, in the period 1995-2016, the region experienced the creation of twenty-three new NWMs and forty-two reforms in total (see Appendix 13). Beijing produced the last wave of newly created entities, with twelve out of the twenty-three new NWMs being created within four years of the Fourth World Conference. From 2000 onwards, the phenomenon of founding new entities decreased, with only eight mechanisms created in the 2000s, and three in the period 2010-2016.

There was also a trend towards improving the hierarchical status of mechanisms (Table 10). Almost half the newly created mechanisms had a “high” hierarchical status (eleven out of twenty-three), 35 percent a “low” hierarchical status (eight newly created NWMs) and 17 percent a “medium” rank (four in total).
A clear preference for the creation of new NWMs by law and not by governmental decree is observed as fifteen out of the twenty-three newly created NWMs were established by law (see Appendix 13). Another tendency has been the reform of existing NWMs. Three were reformed between 1995-2000, twelve in the 2000s and seventeen in the six years between 2010 and 2016. A clear pattern observed is that, once NWMs were established by law, subsequent changes to their remit, working arrangements, administrative attachment and hierarchical status were increasingly adopted by governmental decision, not by law. In the period 1995-2016, sixteen out of the forty-two reform events were carried out by executive decrees, twelve by means of legislative changes and in the case of four, it was not possible to determine the instrument used to enact the reform. It is likely that the increasing legal consolidation of many NWMs, has also made them more stable with governments opting for reform rather than dismantling existing institutions and replacing them with new ones.

This has not been an overall positive experience as the trend has been for an increasing number of negative reforms that reduced the capacity or compliance of States on NWMs. Fifteen out of forty-two reforms between 1995-2016 were of a negative nature, twelve of a positive nature and the nature of others was undetermined or did not imply a positive or negative modification to the NWM. The negative reforms implied different aspects. They commonly involved the downgrading of the status of the NWM. As examples, the NWMs in Honduras and Panama were downgraded from a “high” to “low” status in 2014 and 2005, respectively; the NWM in Costa Rica was downgraded from a “high” to a “medium” status in 2010; and the NWMs in Argentina and Nicaragua were downgraded from a “medium” to a “low” status in 2002 and 1998, respectively (see Appendix 13).

Negative reforms also involved merging mandates of different institutions or expanding the remit of the NWM to cover issues other than women’s affairs. This was for example the case of the Secretariat of Policies for Women in Brazil which became the Ministry of Women, Racial Equality, Youth and Human Rights in 2016, merging under a single institutional umbrella the

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**Table 10.- Hierarchical status of NWMs created in 1995-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchical level of NWM</th>
<th>States and number of NWMs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,</td>
<td>11 mechanisms (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Colombia (x2), Ecuador (x2)</td>
<td>4 mechanisms (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico (x2), Panama,</td>
<td>8 mechanisms (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 NWMs, 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mandates and work of four former stand-alone ministries (the Ministry of Human Rights, the Ministry of Racial Equality, the Ministry of Youth and the Ministry of Women), and attaching them directly to the Ministry of Justice. Another example was the Vice-Ministry of Women in Bolivia which was transformed in 2006 into the Vice-Ministry of Gender and Generational Affairs and in 2009 into the Vice-Ministry of Equality of Opportunities (Brazil 2016a, b). A further example was found in Peru where the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development was transformed into the Ministry of Women and Social Development in 2002 and into the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations in 2012 (Peru 2012).

Negative reforms could also involve modifying working arrangements that negatively impact on the work of the NWM. As illustrative example was found in Guatemala where the nomination method for the head of the NWM was changed in 2012 (Guatemala 2012a), thereby limiting the influence of women’s organisations (Sector de Mujeres 2012). The Guatemalan NWM experienced further negative aspects with the creation of a new mechanism in 2014 (Guatemala 2014) causing duplication and lack of clarity in the division of labour between the NWM and the new entity.

The positive reforms were mainly related to improvements in the status of the NWM. For example, the “medium” ranking NWMs in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay were transformed into “high” ranking ministries in 2010, 2013 and 2012, respectively; the “low” ranking NWM of Brazil was transformed into a “high” ranking NWM in 2003 (see Appendix 13). Positive reforms could also imply improvements in the remit of the NWM. For example, the remit of the NWM in Uruguay was modified in 2005 and it no longer covered family affairs (Uruguay 2005b).

Out of the fifteen negative reforms, nine took place over six years, particularly in the period 2010-2016 indicating an increasingly negative environment for women’s rights. This took place in the context of the swing to the ‘right’ in the region described earlier.

In terms of the administrative attachment of the newly created mechanisms, the tendency has been to connect them directly to the Presidency (see Appendix 13). Out of the twenty-three newly created NWMs, fifteen have been directly attached to the Presidency, only five to social

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27 The Secretariat for Women’s Policies in Brazil in 2003, the Ministry of Women and Gender Equality in Chile in 2015, the National Directorate for Equity for Women in Colombia in 1995, the Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women in Colombia in 1999, the National Women’s Institute in Costa Rica in 1998, the State Secretariat for Women in Dominican Republic in 1999, the National Women’s Council in Ecuador in 1997, the National Gender Equality Council in Ecuador in 2014, the Presidential Women’s Secretariat in Guatemala in 2000, the National Women’s Office in Honduras in 1998, the National Women’s Institute in Mexico in 2001, the Ministry of Women in Nicaragua in 2013, the Ministry of Youth, Women, Children and Family in Panama in 1997, the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development in Peru in 1996, and the Ministry of the State for Women’s Affairs in Venezuela in 2008.
affairs ministries, two to the home affairs ministry and one to the justice ministry. This demonstrates that the traditional association of women’s issues with institutions charged with social affairs, particularly family, infancy and children, as in the previous period, had changed. Most newly created mechanisms were set up as governing entities overseeing the mainstreaming of gender equality across all policy fields.

The period 1995 – 2016 witnessed greater compliance with the global norms on NWMs and greater homogeneity among NWMs. There is predominance of high-ranking ministries and institutes, greater legal institutionalisation, and a clear detachment from ministries overseeing social, family and children’s affairs. The preference for improvements in the hierarchical status of NWMs is clear, as, in 1995, most NWMs had a “low” status, and by 2016 a majority had a “high” status (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Evolution of NWMs’ hierarchical rank in 1995-2016

However, the improvements, particularly in the hierarchical status, do not imply improvement in other aspects of the NWMs. In addition to this, not all changes in status were in a positive direction. Overall, ten NWMs experienced gradual positive improvements, four remained with the same status, and four experienced setbacks in the period 1995-2016 (Table 11).

29 The National Women’s Programme in 1996 and the General Coordination of the National Women’s Commission in 1998 in Mexico.
30 The Secretariat for Women’s Rights in Brazil in 2002.
### Table 11. Change in NWMs’ hierarchical status in 1995-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of change</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Status</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chile (high), Costa Rica (high), Dominican Republic (high), Guatemala (high), Mexico (high), Nicaragua (high), Paraguay (high), Peru (high), Venezuela (high), Ecuador (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Same Status</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Colombia (medium), Bolivia (low), El Salvador (low), Uruguay (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decrease in Status</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brazil (low), Honduras (low), Argentina (low), Panama (low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The post-Beijing period is distinguished from the earlier period by the fact that, the international normative parameters on NWMs, embodied by the BDPfA, were more clearly developed and, therefore States had a clear blueprint to follow that would confer a recognised status on their institution. States still tended to adapt the blueprint to their political needs but in the region some States did upgrade mechanisms within the governmental apparatus, provided them with a solid legal basis and charged them with the mainstreaming of gender equality across all policy fields. The separation of women’s issue and gender equality from traditional fields such as children, family and social affairs increased during this period. However, the generalised improvements experienced in aspects such as hierarchy, remit and legal basis did not necessarily translate into greater autonomy, authority, legitimacy or capacities. Gaining a higher hierarchical status did not automatically lead to greater visibility, authority or power and the reasons and interests behind the changes experienced by NWMs differed from one country to another and affected differently their chances to be successful institutions, even when they took the same institutional form as suggested by Fernós (2010), Franceschet (2007) and Guzmán (2006).

By 2016, countries showed differing levels of compliance with global norms on NWMs, particularly regarding the increased hierarchical level in comparison with the period before Beijing and the type of institutions they chose to set up (see Table 12). By 2016, more than half NWMs had a “high” hierarchical status, two a “medium” status and seven a “low” status. Their institutional types ranged from full-fledged ministries (six in total), institutes (six), secretariats (two), councils (two), vice-ministry (one) and advisory office (one). There was more compliance regarding their legal basis as all had been created by law with the only two exceptions of the NWMs of Argentina and Guatemala.

The traditional association of NWMs with social affairs continued to be largely overcome, as most NWMs were charged with mainstreaming gender equality across all policy fields. The exceptions were Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, where their NWMs were also responsible for family affairs, infancy and childhood as part of their remits. However, issues related to traditional gender
roles continued to be part of the mandates and functions of many other NWMs and this position was increasingly gaining the support of conservative forces that were proposing changes to existing NWMs. Almost all NWMs, sixteen out of eighteen, had been created by law. The only two exceptions were the NWWs of Argentina and Guatemala. Despite the increasing establishment by law, the number of negative reforms that many NWMs underwent implies that a solid legal basis was not necessarily a barrier to downgrade or dismantle them. This was the experience of the NWMs of Brazil, Honduras and Panama, and threats of downgrading faced by the NWMs of Paraguay, Costa Rica, Peru and Dominican Republic. Notably, this finding indicates that the establishment of NWMs by law as an indication of greater stability suggested in the literature in the case of some NWMs (Franceschet 2007, p.4-5; Waylen 1997, p.96, p.102) did not seem to be relevant for protecting NWMs from experiencing major negative changes which have become more common in the region, particularly since the 2010s.

There were important differences and nuances within the groups of six women’s ministries and six women’s institutes. For example, the ministries of Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela were focused on women and gender equality, at least in terms of their formal remit, whereas that of Peru had a wider remit that also covered other population groups. With regards to the women’s institutes, the ones in Costa Rica and Mexico enjoyed full institutional autonomy, their heads had ministerial rank and full participation in the governmental cabinet. This was also the case of the Women’s Institute of Honduras until it was re-structured in 2014. The change pushed Honduras into the group of El Salvador, Panama and Uruguay where their women’s institutes all had a “low” status, lacked administrative autonomy and were attached to and represented by ministers of social affairs (see Appendix 13).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hierarchical status</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>National Council of Women - Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres (CNM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivia</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Vice-ministry</td>
<td>Vice-Ministry of Equality of Opportunity - Viceministerio de Igualdad de Oportunidades (VIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Special Secretariat of Policy for Women - Secretaria Especial de Políticas para as Mulheres (SPM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Gender Equity - Ministerio de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Advisory Office</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women - Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer (CPEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute - Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (INAMU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Women - Ministerio de la Mujer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ecuador</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>National Gender Equality Council - Consejo Nacional de Igualdad de Género</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Salvadorian Institute for Women’s Development - Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ISDEMU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidential Women’s Secretariat - Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer (SEPREM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honduras</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute - Instituto Nacional de la Mujer (INAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexico</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute – Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (INMUJERES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Women - Ministerio de la Mujer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panama</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute - Instituto Nacional de la Mujer (INAMU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paraguay</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Women - Ministerio de la Mujer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peru</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations - Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute - Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (INMUJERES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of the Popular Power for Women and Gender Equality - Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Mujer y la Igualdad de Género</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to assess the level of compliance shown by countries regarding their NWMs according to the indicators used, Table 13 shows whether they comply in terms of the three compliance indicators: type of institution (a full-fledged ministry charged with gender equality and women’s rights being the prototype promoted by the Beijing norm), hierarchical level (“high” being the optimal level) and whether NWMs have been set up by laws, not by government decrees. According to the analysis conducted, five countries showed a high level of compliance while twelve showed a medium level and only one a low level. Most met the compliance indicators in terms of creating NWMs by law (16 in total), almost half in terms of providing them with a “high” hierarchical level (8 in total) and, to a much lesser extent, with the type of institutions set up, namely full-fledged ministries fully dedicated to gender equality and women’s rights (5 in total). Argentina was the only country that did not comply with any of the three compliance indicators.

Table 13.- Level of compliance with key norms on NWMs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance indicators</th>
<th>Level of compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type (ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that despite a long history of NWMs in Latin America since the 1970s, by 2016 only five NWMs fully conformed to the global prototype. The examination of the trajectory, formation and reform of NWMs shows close ties between these developments and shifts in the external environment and in the development of global norms. An examination of the indicators on equality policy, political parity and economic and social welfare indicate that Latin American countries have embraced global norms in a number of policy areas. It also indicates that in spite of these advances, the position of women has deteriorated in many States. The following chapter moves beyond measuring structural compliance to the global norms and focuses on measures of commitment in order to assess the potential effectiveness of NWMs.
Chapter Four: The potential effectiveness of NWMs in Latin America

The analysis conducted in the previous chapter shows that despite great progressive developments experienced by NWMs in Latin America in the period 1970-2016 as well as progress in key gender related developments, particularly in the last decade, most of the NWMs by 2016 did not show full compliance with the prescribed global norm. This chapter analyses the potential effectiveness of NWMs in the eighteen Latin American States. This is done through an analysis of the commitment indicators discussed in Chapter Two covering the mandates assigned to NWMs by governments, the level of coherence between NWMs’ mandate and status, the resources (financial, human and technical) they are allocated to fulfil that mandate, the extent to which they engage with civil society organisations and the nature of their leadership. The mandate of NWMs is discussed in terms of the functions assigned, whether or not the status of the NWM is appropriate to its mandate. The way in which the NWM relates to other government departments and State agencies is also discussed. In terms of their leadership, the analysis focuses on how the leaders are appointed, their professional or political background and their links with feminist or women’s organisations. This group of indicators are internal to the State and to a large degree reflect government decisions. The chapter also considers the impact of external factors and actors and the way in which these interact with the decision and actions of domestic factors and actors, discussing the key drivers that led to the setting up or significant reform of NWMs. Finally, countries are clustered into four groups depending on their level of compliance and commitment. From these groups four exemplary cases are selected for an in-depth analysis.

Mandates and Functions of NWMs

In terms of the formal mandates, NWMs can be charged with overseeing a single issue (women’s affairs) or overseeing multiple issues (women or gender affairs plus other affairs related to family, specific population groups, social affairs or other). They may also be charged with cross-sectoral responsibility and therefore be responsible for applying a gender mainstreaming (GM) approach across all policy fields. As described in Chapter Two, assessing the approach of NWMs in these terms allows to evaluate the range of policy areas that a given NWM is expected to deal with (McBride & Mazur 2010, p.49). Its analysis in turn has implications regarding the coherence between the type of NWM, including the hierarchical level, the range of issues it is charged with as well as the capacity and resources that it counts with to be able to fulfil them.

The officially stated functions for the majority of NWMs followed a cross-sectional approach (thirteen NWMs out of eighteen), demonstrating the diffusion of GM in the region, as the majority were formally expected to operate across all policy playing a coordination role in the
application of GM (Argentina 2010a,b, 2009a; Bolivia 2009; Chile 2015b; Colombia 2014; Costa Rica 1998; Dominican Republic 2010b; Ecuador 2014; Honduras 2014, 1998; Mexico 2001; Panama 2008; Paraguay 2012; Peru 2012; Venezuela 2009). Out of the thirteen NWMs following a cross-sectional approach, three (the NWMs in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) also reflected a multiple-issue policy orientation as their remit covered not only women’s affairs and gender equality but also other population groups (Bolivia 2009; Ecuador 2014; Peru 2012). In fact, these three NWMs reflected a mix of an equality of opportunity focus, diversity mainstreaming and GM. In the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, predecessor mechanisms had overseen women’s issues and gender equality only, but this focus shifted to include other population groups, which is considered a lessening of the NWM’s potential effectiveness (Bolivia 2009, 2002; Ecuador 2014, 1997). Five NWMs (Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay) had a predominant single-issue policy orientation, as their mandates reflected a focus on women’s integration into development policies and initiatives rather than on gender mainstreaming (Brazil 2016 a, b; El Salvador 1996; Guatemala 2000; Nicaragua 2013; Uruguay 2005 b, c). The Honduran NWM strongly showed a mix of a single-issue policy orientation and cross-sectional policy orientation (Honduras 2014, 1998).

Ten NWMs were expected to support the integration of the gender perspective into existing policies without questioning the policy-making processes (Argentina 1998; Bolivia 2009; Brazil 2016b; Colombia 2014; Guatemala 2000; Honduras 1998; Nicaragua 2013; Paraguay 2012; Peru 2012; Uruguay 2005 b, c). For example, the NWMs in Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia were set up to support the integration of the gender perspective into existing or new policies, programmes, plans, instruments or the creation of mechanisms but they did not have a role in the construction of these policies (Bolivia 2009; Brazil 2016 a, b; Colombia 2014). The remaining eight NWMs reflected an agenda-setting approach whereby they were expected to not only integrate the gender perspective into policy-making processes but also identify and propose modifications to these (Chile 2015b; Costa Rica 1998; Dominican Republic 2010b; Ecuador 2014; El Salvador 1996; Mexico 2001; Panama 2008; Venezuela 2009). However, the NWMs differed in their scope to question or propose modifications to the manner in which policy-making was conducted. In particular, the NWMs of Chile and the Dominican Republic were the only two NWMs charged with analysing the impact that laws, policies, plans or programmes have on gender equality or women's empowerment (Chile 2015b: Dominican Republic 2010b). Together with the NWMs of Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, they also had leverage to propose legislative changes and proposals to promote gender equality and/or remedy discriminatory policies and measures (Chile 2015b: Dominican Republic 2010b; Honduras 2014, 1998; Mexico 2001; Panama 2008; Venezuela 2009). The NWMs of Chile and Ecuador were the only ones with the capacity to propose positive discrimination measures to promote equality and eradicate discrimination (Chile 2015b; Ecuador 2014). None of the formal mandates and functions analysed
reflected a transformative approach as defined in the literature (Squires 2005, pp.371-372; Verloo 2005, pp.346, 348), as no NWM was explicitly expected to actively involve diverse groups of women so that they can articulate their different interests via the work of NWMs, and act as a platform for women to voice their concerns and to pressurise the government to address them. Particularly by involving “subaltern or non-hegemonic counterpublics” (Verloo 2005, p.348) or traditionally excluded groups of women, and involve them as agents of change. Particularly, enhancing their voice and agency and ensuring their autonomy free of control from political or other dictates, not as passive recipients of policy prescriptions or as present in decision-making spaces but without autonomy to translate their presence into “voice”.

In practice, the work of NWMs deviated from the formal mandate and functions under which they were established, and in some cases their actual work even contradicted their mandate. For example, many NWMs did not have the obligation to regularly and proactively engage with civil society groups according to the description of their mandates and functions (for example Argentina 2010 a, b; Peru 2012; Dominican Republic 2010b). However, the lack of an official mechanism for engagement does not mean that NWMs did not do so, what happened in practice depended on a range of factors, including governmental changes, political context, leadership of the NWM and social developments.

The formal mandates of NWMs were similar in their range of tasks, and there is a significant degree of convergence between the responsibilities assigned to NWMs and the recommendations set by the BDPfA and CEDAW (see list of functions in Table 1 in Chapter Two). All eighteen NWMs were set up as the governing bodies charged with the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality through public policy. Almost all (seventeen NWMs) had the responsibility to design and/or implement programmes or projects dedicated to women or gender equality (all except Ecuador). The same number was expected to coordinate their actions or cooperate with civil society organisations (all except Peru). However, in most cases, the manner in which this was to be done or the type of civil society organisation to be engaged with was not described. Fifteen NWMs (83 percent) were charged with monitoring or supporting the evaluation of the implementation of public policies, and the same number was charged with the follow-up and/or reporting on States’ compliance with international commitments related to gender equality and women’s rights. The coordination or cooperation with sectoral governmental entities to ensure the mainstreaming of gender equality in public policies was an assigned responsibility in the case of fourteen NWMs (78 percent). Twelve NWMs (67 percent) were in charge of supporting the gender institutional architecture at the sub-national level and/or in other State branches. The same number was responsible for fostering cooperation with international, regional or sub-regional organisations. Half (nine NWMs) were charged with supporting advocacy, awareness-raising, communication or education initiatives to foster socio-cultural changes in favour of gender equality and women’s rights. While ten NWMs (56 percent) were charged with supporting
legislative reforms to reflect, or to correct measures in favour of gender equality. All these various tasks assigned to the NWMs reflected international norms.

There were other responsibilities that were not as common, as less than half the NWMs were responsible for them. Many of these were related to actions for the actual incorporation of gender equality into planning processes and outcome assessment. This included supporting research, analysis or elaboration of studies on women and/or gender equality, supporting training for government officials to incorporate the gender perspective into its policies and programmes, supporting gender statistics initiatives, supporting the analysis of the impact that laws, policies, plans or programmes have on gender equality or women's empowerment, and supporting budgeting initiatives.

NWMs were also in charge of other functions not explicitly recommended by the BDPfA. For example, one third of NWMs were charged with attracting or managing international cooperation funds (the NWMs of Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic and Venezuela), and two were in charge of directly providing services to women (the NWMs of Peru and Venezuela). In fact, NWMs were found to be frequently charged with additional duties that were not described in their formal responsibilities but were enshrined in the legal or policy instruments related to other State and governmental bodies. This reflects the cross-sectional role that many NWMs are expected to perform in supporting other institutional actors.

For most NWMs the description of their functions indicates that they were charged with the direct implementation of programmatic or operational initiatives. Direct implementation consumes a significant amount of staff time and resources and it is likely to take priority over more intangible functions such as advocacy and policy development. The questionnaires addressed this issue and asked NWMs about the distribution of their workload in terms of whether they dedicated more time to normative work (advocacy and policy development), to programmatic/operational work or an equal amount of time to both. Out of the sixteen responses received from NWMs, eight considered that they spent more time on programmatic or operational work than on normative work, seven considered that they devoted equal time to normative work and to programmatic/operational work and only one, the NWM of Uruguay, responded that it devoted more time to normative work than to programmatic/operational work. This demonstrates that, despite NWMs’ formal governing role, which orients the institution towards providing advisory and guidance support to other State and governmental entities, in practice, programmatic or operational work predominated. Given the extent to which NWMs were engaged in implementing initiatives and delivering services, their provision of advisory support to other institutions was not prioritised in practice to the extent that the formal mandated duties would indicate. The questionnaires indeed revealed that none of the NWMs recognised that they were not able to fulfil all of their normative and operation demands but up to nine UN Women
questionnaire respondents\textsuperscript{31} identified this as a challenge. These UN Women respondents also coincided in identifying the technical and financial support provided by different UN agencies as critical in allowing the NWMs meet some of their demands, and one indicated that given the dedication of the NWM to operational initiatives, the quality of the normative work was often compromised.\textsuperscript{32}

As a way of assessing the extent to which the formally assigned mandates and functions in fact reflected the work carried out by NWMs, representatives from both NWMs and CSOs were asked in the questionnaires: “do you consider that the mandates and functions of [the NWM] are adequate to advance in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?” The answers demonstrated strongly divergent views between NWMs and CSOs. While more than 87 percent of NWMs considered that their assigned mandates and functions were adequate for the purpose of advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment, only 29 percent of CSOs agreed with this view. There was also a wide gulf between the perception of NWMs and CSOs when they were asked the direct question of whether they considered that those assigned mandates and functions guided the actual institutional work of NWMs. While 88 percent of NWMs agreed that that was the case, only 2 percent of CSOs did. This indicated a gulf between all NWMs and CSOs in their States, and points to either a lack of political or institutional freedom to critique aspects of their structure and workload or a lack of reflection and self-criticism by NWMs.

NWMs and CSOs were asked about the factors that positively influenced the ability of NWMs to fulfil their mandates and perform their duties. Both NWMs and CSOs downplayed the importance of financial and human resources. More than 93 percent of NWMs considered the most important factors to be the existence of processes and structures to allow inter-ministerial work, public policy monitoring, competence and technical capacities, as well as political willingness at the highest level of government and involvement of civil society in their work. Notably, these reflect some of the key factors identified in the international norms that have developed around NWMs and therefore the personnel of the NWMs were repeating a policy position with which they were very familiar. Civil society organisations agreed on the importance of some of these factors, although they downplayed the significance of linking structures within government, nor did they consider the hierarchical rank of NWMs as a crucial factor in their potential effectiveness. The hierarchical location of the NWMs was downplayed by 20 percent of the NWM respondents, independently of whether their institution had a “high”, “medium” or “low” rank within the governmental structures. Only in the case of Uruguay and Honduras the “low” rank of their NWMs was considered to negatively affect their capacity to fulfil their roles. This seems to negate the priority that has been given to achieving a “high” institutional ranking

\textsuperscript{31} Questionnaire respondents 13, 55, 76, 86, 94, 100, 113, 130 & 144.

\textsuperscript{32} Questionnaire respondent 158.
both in the work of the UN (the BDPfA) and also in some of the academic literature discussed in Chapter One (see for example Franceschet 2007). For more than 64 percent of civil society respondents, their involvement in the work of NWMs was an important key feature that in their opinion positively influenced the ability of NWMs to pursue their goals.

Similarly to the divergence between NWMs and CSOs on the question of whether or not NWMs performed their mandated functions, there was also a strong divergence on the perceived usefulness of GM as a strategy that may allow NWMs to improve the position of women and to increase gender equality. When asked the question “do you consider that the gender mainstreaming strategy has an impact on the achievement of gender equality and women’s empowerment”, the perception of NWMs was largely positive, with more than 60 percent replying that GM had a positive impact. In contrast, when the same question was answered by civil society organisations, they demonstrated scepticism about the usefulness of GM with more than 60 percent considering that GM has a limited or no impact. This indicates that despite the UN’s strong promotion of this strategy as having significant potential to transform societies (Benschop & Verloo 2006; Daly 2005), civil society representatives in Latin America at least were not persuaded about its benefits. The academic literature has in the past pointed to the lack of evidence for any concrete positive impacts of this strategy (see for example Squires 2007; Daly 2005; Moser & Moser 2005), and this lack of impact may explain why it has been, a largely unchallenged international norm, and why governments continue adopting it as a preferred strategy, but it is also clear that CSOs do not think that it is a credible strategy.

The manner in which NWMs were formally set up does not reflect an intention to allow them to be channels of communication and advocates for women’s demands in their role in policy-making. NWMs were typically set up as agents to coordinate GM with other entities within the State and the government, and therefore responded to State and government bodies, rather than acting as allies for CSOs within the State. This meant that their agendas and actions were not anchored in women’s organisations’ demands or in the realities of women’s lives. The institutional form of the NWMs prioritised procedural and technical solutions to women’s problems, rather than political solutions that take into account women’s demands. In addition, some NWMs were set up to oversee issues related to other population groups further diluting their capacity to prioritise women’s issues and resulting in the stretching of their resources in an attempt to respond to the needs of different population groups – or to governmental priorities with regard to different population groups.

Coherence between mandate and status

This analysis of NWMs demonstrated that coordination or cooperation with different State and governmental bodies at different levels was generally identified as a responsibility of
the NWMs. At the national level, the duty to coordinate with sectoral governmental entities to ensure the mainstreaming of gender equality in public policies was found to be an assigned responsibility in the case of fourteen NWMs. They were also expected to coordinate and support the gender institutions existing at the sub-national level and in other State branches. In addition, they were required to cooperate with international, regional and sub-regional gender bodies.

The UN considers that a higher hierarchical status allows for better coordination at both the political and technical levels, as the head of the NWM is part of the governmental cabinet and has direct access to all other governmental and State institutions and has better access to State resources. In contrast, a lower status in theory does not allow the NWM to have direct access to other State and governmental bodies and there may be poorer access to resources. The survey demonstrates that key actors, particularly the relevant CSOs but also the NWMs themselves do not generally consider that hierarchical status plays a significant role in ensuring effectiveness. As it is not possible to assess how their status in the hierarchy of the State influenced the effectiveness of NWMs, as part of the measure of government commitment the research examined the degree of coherence between the status of NWMs in the government hierarchy and their formal mandated tasks. It examined if the potential degree of political status enjoyed by a given NWM matches the authority needed to carry out its assigned tasks. This measure, which assumed that all of the fifteen mapped functions had the same weight, was used as an indication of how feasible it was that NWMs would be able to perform the functions assigned to them. Were NWMs with a “high” status expected to undertake more functions than NWMs with a “low” status? Were NWMs with a “low” status given a narrower range of functions?

Consistency between the status of NWMs and their level of responsibility was found in the case of eleven NWMs (Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala, Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina and Uruguay). The opposite was found in the case of six NWMs (Panama, Honduras, Peru, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Ecuador). In the case of the latter group, it was striking that “low” hierarchical ranking NWMs such as the ones in Panama and Honduras were found to have been assigned a large number of responsibilities (thirteen out of the fifteen mapped functions, and ten out of fifteen, respectively). The opposite contradiction was found in the full-fledged Ministries of Women in Nicaragua and Paraguay which only had less than half the functions mapped assigned to them (seven out of fifteen and six out of fifteen, respectively). This indicated that whereas the NWMs of Panama and Honduras may have been overloaded or overstretched, the remits of the NWMs of Nicaragua and Paraguay may have been deliberately limited despite their “high” status.

Similar to the range of mandates to coordinate and support GM across all policy areas at the national, sub-national and supra-national level, this implies that NWMs needed to have adequate authority and capacity. Therefore, NWMs with greater authority would be expected, in theory, to coordinate with different institutions at different levels whereas those with less
authority would be expected to have less coordination obligations. In this regard, coherence between status and expected coordination was found to exist in most cases. However, some inconsistencies were also observed. In particular, three “high” ranking NWMs (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay) and one “medium” ranking NWM (Ecuador) were not set up to coordinate with all State and governmental institutions as would be expected according to the BDPfA. It is particularly remarkable that none of them were expected to support the sub-national gender architecture and, in the case of Nicaragua, the NWM was not even expected to support sectoral ministries. Not being required to support sectoral ministries or the sub-national gender architecture, particularly in the case of high-ranking mechanisms, contradicts the formal obligation to support GM as enshrined in the formal duties of these NWMs. The opposite case was also observed. The NWMs of Argentina, Bolivia and Honduras were expected to not only support sectoral ministries but also the sub-national gender bodies. Given that they had insufficient authority, the feasibility of their being able to effectively achieve such levels of coordination was questioned.

Coordinating with international gender institutions was generally part of the expected work of most NWMs. Indeed, both NWMs and civil society expressed in the questionnaires high regard for the positive influence of the collaboration with regional and sub-regional gender mechanisms.

The extent to which other government and State bodies applied a GM strategy and relied on their own policies, resources, mechanisms and tools to implement this, impacted directly on their coordination with NWMs. The questionnaires showed that, less than 20 percent of NWMs considered that other public institutions implemented a GM strategy. From this, it was inferred that GM was not a shared responsibility and most State institutions were not implementing a GM strategy.

Ten NWMs were mandated to actively engage and support the sub-national gender entities. As discussed in Chapter Three, following the decentralisation of government, it was assumed that the decentralisation processes would bring about greater accountability and transparency in governance and increase the participation of socially excluded groups in policy-making processes (Kirby 2003, p.83; Willis, Garman & Haggard 1999). The logic of subsidiarity also assumed that decentralised entities were more efficient and effective because of their closeness to the final beneficiaries in the territories. Unlike the traditional concept of public policy, which is top-down, decentralisation theory assumed that public policy processes were closer to the citizens, in what was conceived as a bottom-up public policy process. Decentralisation in turn was supposed to imply the redistribution of power and resources from highly centralised States to sub-national or local bodies. Following this logic, decentralised NWMs would be closer to the public that they are expected to serve and to sub-national governmental gender bodies that they are expected to support. The research found that although some NWMs were not immune to
decentralisation processes, decentralised NWMs were not common in the region. Only four NWMs were set up as decentralised entities (in Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico and Panama). This indicates that NWMs were generally expected to operate from the top-down and this points to a high level of centralisation of the work in the majority of NWMs. It also indicates a certain detachment from the public they were expected to serve and that States had not considered it important that their presence was strengthened outside the capital cities.

From this analysis it is clear that some NWMs did not have the adequate authority and power to be able to support the multiplicity of institutional actors whereas other actors in the government were not required to support NWMs in their work. It demonstrates that the duty of NWMs was often not commensurate with their status.

Overall, there was a gap between the formal mandates and function of NWMs and what NWMs actually did. Most NWMs were burdened by tasks that were operational in nature or directly related to service provision, some of which did not even form part of their formal mandates. There was a clear gap between the self-perception of NWMs and how they were perceived by CSOs and by the UN Women’s offices in terms of the usefulness of their mandates and the extent to which they could fulfil their tasks. A key issue given its centrality to the UN model is attitudes towards GM. Civil society organisations were not convinced about the benefits of GM whereas NWMs were. For civil society, their own involvement in the work of NWMs was more important to advance gender equality than the status, formal obligations or resources of NWMs.

Resourcing NWMs?

The capacity of NWMs in terms of their financial, technical and human resources, was determined through a review of the concluding observations of CEDAW Committee reports issued to the eighteen countries in the period 1986 to 2017. Collectively, these reports showed the identification of human, financial and technical deficiencies as major constraints faced by most NWMs in the region. This was particularly found in the observations issued to all States with the exception of Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The other fifteen States had received specific recommendations to improve, increase or strengthen the allocation of the human, technical and

33 In the case of Chile, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2017e, 2016b); for Costa Rica, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2017c); and for Venezuela see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2014b).

34 In the case of Argentina, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2016a, paragraph 14a); Bolivia, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2015a, paragraphs 12 and 13); Brazil, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2012a, paragraph 15); Colombia, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2013b, paragraph 11); Dominican Republic, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2013c, paragraphs 18 & 19); Ecuador, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2015b, paragraph 15); El Salvador, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
financial resources allocated to their NWMs. The Committee consistently recommended that States increased and improved the capacities and resources of not only the NWMs themselves, which was a recommendation most countries shared, but also of flagship governmental programmes led by the NWMs. This demonstrated a generalised underfunding of both the NWMs themselves and of key gender initiatives that they were expected to lead or support.

Surprisingly, the perception of NWMs about their capacities to carry out their mandated tasks differed from the CEDAW Committee observations. According to the questionnaires, 63 percent of NWMs considered that they always had the capacity to deliver on their mandate and to carry out their functions and 37 percent believed that this was regularly the case. In contrast, CSO respondents considered that NWMs hardly ever had the required capacity. The big perception gap indicates, again, a lack of self-criticism by NWMs, which in this case could include the disassociation of the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘resources’.

The analysis of the budget allocated in 2014 or 2015 to the NWMs in thirteen countries for which data was gathered\textsuperscript{35} showed that the budget was generally less than 0.05 percent of the total State budget. The only exceptions were El Salvador where it reached 0.12 percent and Venezuela where it reached 0.22 percent. These figures did not show whether the totality of the funds allocated were actually spent, or whether some were later re-oriented towards other areas if other governmental priorities emerged, so the actual expenditures of NWMs could have been less than the projected allocations.

Data constraints did not allow for an analysis of the trajectory of budgetary allocations to NWMs over several years that could have indicated the trajectory of funding over time. However, examples of drastic reductions to the budget of NWMs were found. For example, in Peru, the NWM experienced an 82 percent cut to its budget in 2012 as a result, partly, of the creation of a new Ministry of Social Development towards which some of the funds were channelled (García 2017). In Argentina, the CNM budget was cut by 70 percent in 2000 and further reduced by 27 percent is 2001 in a context of economic crisis (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2002b, paragraph 343), although it was increased afterwards (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2016a, paragraph 14).

\textsuperscript{35} Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela.
When specifically asked about budgets, the NWMs and CSOs surveyed agreed that the financial allocation for NWMs was a limitation to their capacity. Three quarters of NWMs (13 out of 17) considered that they did not have sufficient resources allocated by the State, while only one quarter considered that they did. The overwhelming majority of CSOs (96 percent), considered the financial resources allocated by the State to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in general, including via the NWMs, to be insufficient. When asked about non-financial resources, 82 percent of NWMs considered that they did not have sufficient human resources, and 81 percent considered that they did not have sufficient technical resources. In contrast, almost all CSO respondents (99 percent) considered that the State allocated sufficient human and technical resources to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment. These responses contradicted the perception that NWMs had the necessary capacity to fulfill their mandates and functions. For NWMs, it seemed to indicate that while they would not admit that they could not realistically achieve their goals, they did admit that human and technical constraints existed. The responses from civil society indicated that they considered that NWMs did have enough human and technical resources but could not fulfill their goals. Indeed, many civil society respondents clearly considered that other impediments were more significant such as lack of political will, governmental orientation or personal commitment of the NWM leader, were among the most common reasons found in their responses.

The questionnaires asked NWMs about the policy areas in which they had the necessary technical skills to support other entities and, also, where they were required to provide advisory support on a regular basis. The responses showed that all NWM respondents took the view that they had technical capacity in the areas related to violence against women and were regularly required to support State and governmental entities involved in this field, including the judicial branch of the State and police authorities. This reflects what has been a major international issue in gender equality (OHCHR 2017c). Other fields in which NWMs considered that they had the necessary technical capacity and from where their support was regularly required were related to the traditional fields associated with women, such as social policy, family, vulnerable populations, education and health. This indicates that NWMs were to a large extent still oriented towards the traditional roles of women, which probably reflected the way society and governments perceived women. It also shows that the trend observed in the region of no longer attaching NWMs to ministries associated with women’s traditional roles, although largely overcome as discussed in Chapter Three, did not necessarily translate into NWMs de facto not continuing looking after issues traditionally linked with women such as family and social affairs.

NWMs were required to provide support in the areas of national planning, immigration, foreign affairs, labour, agriculture and economic affairs and also felt that they had some capacity in these areas. Other areas in which NWMs did not consider that they had strong technical capacity nor were required to provide advice were the fields of finance, the environment, defence
and trade affairs. In the area of national budgeting in particular, NWMs believed that while they did have the necessary technical capacity they were not regularly called on to support those policy fields.

Given the perceptions in relation to human, financial and technical constraints examined above and the overwhelming number of States that had received recommendations by the CEDAW Committee to improve these, the perception of NWMs about their own technical expertise in different policy fields denotes either a lack of awareness of their actual capacity or is a reflection of their political orientation and their support for the government.

Evidence from the CEDAW Committee observations and civil society perceptions on NWMs indicates that countries generally underfunded their NWMs and gender initiatives given the mandates placed on them. The lack of adequate human, financial and technical resources were a common constraint faced by most NWMs and calls into question their real capacity to deliver on their mandates. NWMs tended to believe that they had more technical abilities to support other institutions when requested. This was especially so in policy areas related to women’s traditional roles, rather than non-traditional areas, although they also claimed to have expertise in policy-making processes such as planning and budgeting, which are areas that have received increasing GM attention (UNIFEM 2010). The CEDAW Committee and the civil society organisations surveyed, both indicated that underfunding and under-sourcing were a major limitation faced by most NWMs and that it was therefore not possible for NWM to fulfil their wide mandates.

The engagement of NWMs with civil society

According to the functions assigned to NWMs, all NWMs were formally expected to coordinate their actions or liaise with civil society organisations to carry out their duties, with the exception of the NWM of Peru. NWMs such as those in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru oversaw multi-issue areas covering diverse groups of people, in addition to women. In these cases, they were expected to actively engage other population groups apart from women. In the official documents describing the formal mandates and functions of the eighteen NWMs, the word “feminist” is not mentioned. In the description of the functions of the majority of NWMs women’s movements and women’s organisations are also not mentioned. In the few cases where such organisations do feature they were largely mentioned as passive actors (Guatemala 2000), targets or recipients of public policies (Honduras 1998) or not as active actors that could be involved in the process of decision-making (Peru 2012). In Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras, the involvement of CSOs is described in an instrumental manner, their purpose is primarily to legitimise processes, without involving real consultation or representativeness (Colombia 2014; Guatemala 2000; Honduras 1998). The need to involve a diversity of women’s groups, including ethnic groups, was reflected only in the description of six NWMs, in particular, in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru as part of the
NWMs multi-issue remit, as well as in Chile, Honduras and Panama. A more proactive and empowering description of women organisations’ engagement was found in Uruguay, Costa Rica and El Salvador. The description of the mandate and functions of INMUJERES in Uruguay is the only case where “guaranteeing the access and full participation of women in the power structures and in the adoption of decisions” is referred to (Uruguay 2015b). The Costa Rican INAMU includes among its functions the task of promoting women’s associative activities, providing organisations with the required support for their establishment and better development (Costa Rica 1998). The NWM of El Salvador, ISDEMU, oversees the promotion of the effective participation of women’s organisations, communities and other civil society entities, in the prevention and solution of the problems that affect women (El Salvador 1996).

Notwithstanding, the formal description of the expected engagement of NWMs with civil society, this was not necessarily found in practice. NWMs and CSOs were asked in the questionnaires about their perception on the nature and type of relations. The responses showed a significant divergence in perceptions.

When questioned about the type, nature and frequency of involvement of civil society in their work, NWMs considered their engagement to be very proactive and empowering. In particular, more than 60 percent of NWM respondents considered their relations with CSOs to be “institutionalised”, “collaborative” and “consultative”, while half considered their engagement to be merely “informative”, and only a quarter viewed it as “ad-hoc”. None of the NWMs reported lack of involvement of women's organisations in their work. This picture contrasted dramatically with the negative perceptions expressed by CSO respondents. In particular, less than 20 percent considered that their engagement with NWMs was “institutionalised” and less than half that it was of a “collaborative”, “consultative” or “informative” nature. Almost a quarter considered their involvement to be “ad-hoc”, and the same percentage stated that there was no engagement with the NWM whatsoever. Notably, these perceptions indicated that, contrary to a very positive and possibly self-serving view expressed by NWMs, civil society did not feel proactively engaged.

Large discrepancies were also observed in the perception of NWMs and of CSOs regarding the type of CSO organisations that NWMs engaged with. Notably, there was a gap in perception about the regular involvement of organisations representing migrant women, women living with disabilities or living with HIV/AIDS, community-based women, indigenous women, rural, or women of African ancestry. NWMs tended to report that these organisations were often engaged, whereas CSOs reported that they were not regularly engaged. The responses also indicate that NWMs did not tend to engage with a diversity of women’s groups or, with subaltern groups. In other words, NWMs did not tend to engage the groups of women most affected by poverty, discrimination and exclusion.
Despite the existence of concrete procedures to regularly engage civil society in the work of some NWMs, and despite their obligation to do so according to the formal description of their mandates and functions, it was observed that political factors had a major influence on the type and manner of the engagement. Indeed, numerous examples were found of governmental persecution of selected groups of women’s organisations or women leaders, co-optation, and acute polarisation of the relations between women’s organisations and the government. Feminist and human rights organisations reported politically motivated persecution and the heightened criminalisation of their work as defenders of human rights in, for example, El Salvador (FESPAD 2015), Nicaragua (Romero 2017), Honduras (Protection International 2014) and Bolivia (Heroínas 2012). Political persecution was often ideologically motivated, such as the persecution by State institutions in El Salvador related to abortion (La Vanguardia 2017). In other cases, motivations were political, ideological and personal such as in Nicaragua (Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres de Nicaragua 2009; Castán 2008; CIMAC 2008). Damaged relations between the government and civil society as a result of the confluence of economic, political and religious interests were also reported for example in Paraguay after the parliamentary coup against its democratically elected president in 2012 (Soto 2013). There are examples of political contexts or changes of government that caused a drastic change in the relations between NWMs and feminist and women’s organisations. This was observed, for example, in Brazil following the politically motivated dismissal of President Rousseff and the take-over by a conservative government with strong support from religious politicians and powerful economic conglomerates (see for example Hernández 2017; Agencia Paco Urondo 2017; Rodríguez 2017). In such contexts, NWMs were forced to engage with pro-government civil society organisations only, as there was often an ideological or political line they could not cross. Many of these examples are part of the backlash by conservative religious and political groups that feel that the gains of the women’s movements of the last few decades have gone too far and threaten to corrupt what they view as the traditional family model. Such groups also tend to conflate the rights gained by groups fighting for the recognition of different sexual identities, sexual orientation and same-sex marriage with a purely women’s rights agenda.

The wide divergence between NWMs and CSO on perceptions of engagement of NWMs with CSOs points to very different views on what constitutes engagement underlining the extent to which NWMs are creatures of government. The political nature of NWMs and their work is also demonstrated by the type of CSO with which they most frequently engage.

**The leadership of NWMs**

The way in which the head of each NWM is appointed in conjunction with their prior professional or political experience and their links to women’s organisations is an indicator of
government attitudes to the role of NWMs. The research found that all NWMs´ leaders are directly appointed by the government, more particularly by the President. In the cases of Mexico and Guatemala, civil society organisations have the possibility of making recommendations to the government but ultimately, like in the rest of the region, it is the President who selects the person to lead the NWM.

The background of the appointed leaders affects how they are perceived by CSOs and also what type of person the governments look for when they make this appointment. In twelve out of eighteen NWMs the appointed NWM leaders had either been a female politician, a public administrator or a woman who had previously held governmental positions. Leaders of NWMs were in some cases appointed for their close links to, or membership of, the party in power. This was the case for example of the NWMs´ leaders examined in Bolivia, Nicaragua and El Salvador. A decade earlier most NWMs were headed by leaders with few links to women´s organisations, as noted by Franceschet (2007, p.8). In December 2016, a third of women heading NWMs (six out of eighteen) had definite women´s movement links; out of which four leaders were recognised feminists (Maria Fabiana Túñez of Argentina, Janet Camilo of the Dominican Republic, Yanira Argueta of El Salvador and Mariella Mazzotti of Uruguay) and two others had previously belonged to or worked with women´s movements (Martha Ordoñez Veraones of Colombia and Liriola Leouteau of Panama). This appears to be a slight improvement over time although not a strong trend.

Civil society has been critical of the appointment of NWM leaders in cases when those selected were not known by feminist or women´s organisations or their orientation was considered to go against women´s rights. In Brazil, for example, the appointment of Fátima Lúcia Pelaes by President Temer’s conservative government was strongly criticised by feminist and women´s organisations, including by Brazilian CEDAW Committee Expert Silvia Pimentel,36 as Ms Pelaes had openly declared herself opposed to women´s right to abortion stating that she herself had been conceived as a result of a rape (Globo 2016). In Mexico, the appointment of Lorena Cruz Sánchez was denounced by feminist and women´s organisations for not having the required profile for the post (Díaz 2013). She was also criticised for having “minimized” the problem of “femicides” in the State of Mexico when she had overseen the entity that looked after family issues in that State. In Paraguay, the appointment of Ana María Baiairdi came as a surprise as she was not known to feminists (Última Hora 2013). In Nicaragua, the appointment of the Minister of Women, Ángela Yadira Meza Vargas, was denounced by feminist and women´s organisations as her background was not known (Miranda 2016). The appointment of María Fabiana Tuñez, the head of the NWM in Argentina was initially praised by women’s organisations as she was known as a feminist with a long history of working to combat violence against women, however she proved a

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36 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at UN Women.
disappointment and was criticised for joining President Macri’s conservative government and once appointed not speaking up against gender violence (Bianco 2016).

These examples demonstrated, on the one hand, that, the appointment of the leaders of NWMs has frequently been contentious based on the preference of governments for a technocrat, versus the expectation from women’s organisations that NWM leaders should first and foremost represent them and their interests. Even when feminists are appointed to lead the NWM, they may bow to political pressure rather than align themselves with progressive pro-women agendas. Leaders of NWMs may be forced to prioritise governmental or party loyalty over women’s rights and gender equality when these issues are counter to official priorities. One example was the case of the former leader of the NWM in El Salvador, Julia Evelyn Martínez. In 2010, she positioned herself in favour of revising the country’s restrictive legislation regarding women’s access and right to therapeutic abortion at a regional conference on women and was immediately dismissed by the left-wing government of President Funes (Arauz 2010). The official justification given for her dismissal was that she had lost the President’s trust and had voted against the governmental position on the issue of therapeutic abortion.

How an NWM engages with civil society organisations and who its leader is have a potential impact on its effectiveness, or at least on perceptions of its effectiveness. It is also an indication of the purpose for which the NWM is instituted by the State. Other indicators of the purpose for which an NWM is established are the mixture of external and internal influences and expectations, including the relationship between internal demands for an NWM, the external pressure of international norms and actors, and the expectations of key external constituencies.

The impact of external and internal factors and actors

To analyse the relationship between the different drivers of change, NWMs and CSOs were asked in the questionnaires to identify the factors and actors that influenced both the foundation and reform of their national NWMs. The influence of local women and feminist movements was identified by nine of the seventeen NWMs as a critical driver in their foundation. The critical support of the government, including of female presidents in the case of Costa Rica and Chile, were identified by seven of sixteen NWMs. Another key factor identified was the existence of favourable gender legal and normative frameworks (identified by six out of sixteen NWMs). The country’s desire to comply with the international normative commitments related to gender and women’s rights was acknowledged by only five NWMs to have been a major influence in their countries’ decision to create or strengthen their NWMs, showing that NWMs
generally downplayed the influence of this key external normative driver. In contrast, one NWM stated that its creation was “the State response to the Beijing commitments”.  

Civil society respondents generally agreed with the NWMs’ assessment, however, they identified additional aspects that were omitted or downplayed by NWMs in their responses to the questionnaires. In particular, civil society respondents gave greater importance to the international normative drivers than NWMs did. They also clearly identified that the establishment and status of NWMs were also the result of concrete political contexts and junctures, a point that was not identified by most NWMs. This was found to be the case for example of the positive institutional design developments experienced by the NWMs in Brazil (until 2016), Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. This clearly confirms the importance of the political context and of political willingness, as highlighted by scholars (Franceschet 2007; Guzmán 2004; Goetz 2003; Rai 2003).

The support of women in different decision-making roles was also identified by civil society as having been very influential. This included the integration of civil society representatives, including feminists, into positions in State institutions, their integration into political parties, the presence of networks of women's organisations in the international arena, the cross-alliances between women organisations and institutions, and the support of women from academia. Indeed, the analysis demonstrates that the status of NWMs generally improved during female presidencies. This is the case for example of the creation of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity during President Bachelet’s second term in office, the re-establishment of the ministerial status of the head of INAMU in Costa Rica during President Chinchilla’s administration, and positive modifications of the NWMs of Brazil and Nicaragua during the administrations of President Rousseff and President Chamorro, respectively. Notably, in Panama, the NWM was downgraded from a high rank to a low rank as soon as President Moscoso’s term ended. Women in other key positions of power also played a critical positive influence. For example, the Salvadorian NWM gained greater visibility and coordination leverage with other sectoral entities, despite its “low” rank status, thanks to the role played by the first lady, who was also appointed Minister of Social Inclusion and president of ISDEMU.

It is notable that the influence of internal political factors and the role played by women in different spaces, clearly identified by civil society as having been crucial, were not identified by NWMs. The majority of NWMs focused primarily on internal factors that prompted the government to decide to set up or restructure an NWM but no strong single theme dominated their

37 Questionnaire respondent 95.
38 Questionnaire respondents 45, 46 & 47; consultation with key informants 4, 16, 20, 22 & 53.
39 Questionnaire respondent 48; consultation with key informant 22.
40 Consultation with key informants 2, 25, 51 & 54.
41 Consultation with key informants 18 & 36.
42 Consultation with key informants 3 & 55.
perspective. The lack of recognition of the role played by women in different spaces, apart from as heads of State, may have been motivated by caution as during the application of the questionnaires, several NWMs needed the clearance of superiors before submitting the responses so it is possible that some of the views expressed followed the governmental line and expressly overlooked political factors and the role of women in certain contexts where relations between women’s groups and the government are not smooth. Two notable exceptions of this were the responses from the NWMs of Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay.

The influence of politics was found to have both affected the improvement and weakening of NWMs. The changes experienced by the NWM in Brazil exemplifies both how a particular positive political momentum served to boost the NWM’s status resulting in a thirteen-year period of positive development (2003-2016) while a different political context reduced its capacity and stunted its progress after 2016. The experience of dramatic setbacks from 2016 was a result of the political and economic debacle that led to President Rousseff’s impeachment, major ministerial restructuring, and the adoption of austerity measures by the right-wing neoliberal government of President Temer. A similar political crisis led Paraguay to improve the status of its NWM to legitimise what was considered a “coup” government, this was widely seen as a tactical move and therefore critically affected the legitimacy of the NWM vis-à-vis the women’s movements.

Governmental re-structuring was found to have caused setbacks to the status of NWMs throughout region. This is the case for example of recent negative reforms experienced by the NWMs in Brazil, Honduras, Ecuador, Guatemala and Costa Rica. In the case of Ecuador, a protracted five-year long institutional transition experienced by its NWM caused significant institutional instability and the discontinuity of actions (Ecuador 2015), resulting in the institution having relatively less capacity, autonomy and legitimacy than its predecessor entity. In the case of Guatemala, episodes of control of the leadership of the NWM by the government and episodes of creation of parallel structures (Guatemala 2012a,b) that undermined the role of the NWM were experienced. In Costa Rica, the ministerial status of the leader of the NWM was deposed during the administration of President Oscar Arias (2006-2010). In Nicaragua and Bolivia, the NWMs experienced institutional changes with almost every change of government (see Table 8 in Chapter Three and Appendix 13).

A few of the negative reforms experienced by NWMs were rolled back partly thanks to the mobilisation and activism of women’s groups, such as in the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica. However, risks of setbacks influenced by the political context were present across the region in for example Costa Rica (Quirós 2016, Barrentes 2013), the Dominican Republic

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43 Consultation with key informant 1, 2, 20, 22, 51 & 54.
44 Consultation with key informant 22.
45 Consultation with key informant 12.
46 Consultation with key informant 5.
47 Consultation with key informants 5 & 28.
The existence of gender legal and normative instruments, both at the international and national level was identified by both NWMs and CSOs as enabling the enhancement and work of NWMs. NWMs were identified as key governing bodies charged with the design and supervision of the implementation of national gender legislation, policies and plans, together with other governmental bodies. However, the recognition of the effectiveness of such instruments to achieve gender equality differed as NWMs had a more positive view than CSOs. NWMs clearly indicated that these tools served as guiding instruments to frame their work and a clear expression of governmental commitment to promote gender equality, including enhancing the gender institutions. However, a common criticism made by both NWMs and CSOs was that the existence of such tools did not guarantee effective implementation and that governments did not ensure the allocation of financial and other resources needed. Indeed, the desire to comply with international gender norms, together with local pressures, seem to have often led to the adoption of gender policies, including the creation of NWMs, although most NWM did not acknowledge this in their responses to the questionnaire.

International cooperation and development aid from both international agencies and bilateral donors was critical not only for the start-up but also for the regular functioning of NWMs across the region given the lack of appropriate funding from the States. This was generally downplayed by most NWMs but confirmed by UN Women key informants, and by CEDAW Committee experts from the region. In Guatemala for example, in 2010 approximately 37 percent of SEPREM’s total budget came from international cooperation agencies (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2010c, paragraph 14). In Colombia, the NWM was partly funded by international cooperation agencies and partly by the national budget (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1994a, paragraph 461).

After Beijing there was a strong international framework in place that had a major influence in the formal institutionalisation of NWMs. Although the institutional form was also influenced by domestic political conditions, including the strength of the women’s movement and its political linkages. How effective these mechanisms were and what they could achieve was determined by local conditions as the same institutional form could produce different outcomes. NWMs and CSOs had very divergent perceptions about the drivers that prompted the adoption of these norms. NWMs tended to downplay the role of the international normative agenda, the role of women in key decision-making spaces and the role of politics. CSOs gave greater importance

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48 Consultation with key informants 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 52 & 56.
49 Consultation with key informants 22, 25 & 26.
to the influence of international norms and stressed the key role played by political junctures and interests and by women in different spaces within and outside the State. NWMs emphasised the existence of structures and States’ compliance, whereas CSOs prioritised outcome and women’s agency.

**States’ compliance and commitment**

By comparing the analysis of compliance of Latin American States with global norms that mandate the setting up of NWMs of Chapter Three, with the analysis of the level of demonstrated commitment shown by States to ensure that their NWMs can effectively fulfil their roles, it is remarkable to see that only a minimum number of countries match both compliance and commitment (see Table 14). The six indicators used to assess levels of commitment are appropriate institutional design in terms of mandates and functions (e.g. being charged with responsibilities in line with their mandates on women’s rights and gender equality); coherence between their institutional status and their responsibilities; having adequate resources and capacities; counting with adequate coordination with key internal actors as part of their GM role; having relations with key external actors (e.g. women’s organisations); and type of leadership (e.g. being headed by leaders with a background or previous experience in women’s issues and gender equality).

The analysis shows that out of the five NWMs that showed compliance with the Beijing norm, only two match their compliance with commitment (Chile and Venezuela). The other three do not match their compliance with commitment (Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Nicaragua). Paraguay and Nicaragua are also the only two NWMs that do not fulfil any of the six commitment indicators.

In contrast, three NWMs that did not show compliance, namely Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay, show a high degree of commitment fulfilling five out of six indicators in the case of Costa Rica and four out of six in the cases of El Salvador and Uruguay. Independently of the hierarchical rank, it is striking that only five NWMs show a high level of commitment (Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela), four show a medium level (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Panama), and half the NWMs show low commitment (Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, Nicaragua, and Paraguay). From this it can be inferred that most countries consistently fail to put in place the necessary conditions to enable their NWMs to meet their goals.
Table 14.- Level of commitment shown by States regarding their NWMs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment indicators</th>
<th>Level of commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appropriate institutional design, mandates and functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexico</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panama</strong></td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ecuador</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivia</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honduras</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peru</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paraguay</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis demonstrates that the credibility of NWMs was undermined as they faced intrinsic limitations and in many cases contradictions in the incompatibility of their design compared to their mandates and functions. Most NWMs were expected to undertake a wide range of responsibilities, but the enabling conditions necessary to facilitate their work were in the majority of cases not put in place. This included being vested with the required authority and capacity and ensuring collaboration with key actors within and outside the State. The way in which they were set up and the behaviour expected of them in most cases did not respond to women’s concerns, but to governmental and State interests.

Degrees of commitment differed across the indicators analysed. The indicator where most commitment was shown was the one measuring coherence between status and responsibilities, met by eleven countries, the indicators measuring relations with key external actors (nine countries), and with internal actors (eight countries). The indicators on type of leadership of the NWM was met only by a third of NWMs (six in total). The other indicator also met a third of NWMs was the one on the appropriate institutional design, mandates and functions. The most outstanding finding was regarding the indicator measuring resource and capacity as it was met by only three countries (Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela). Taken together with the higher results in the rest of indicators, this is clear demonstration that countries are willing to set up NWMs even at the highest governmental level and confer on them a multiplicity of responsibilities in most cases according to their status, however, this is not matched with the resources and capacities necessary to accomplish all of their goals. Here also lies an important link with the supplement in resources provided by international cooperation to fund gender related work, including funding core expenses of NWMs as well as programmatic initiatives led by them. In other words, governments did not seem willing to put their money where their mouth was to prove their commitment.

Table 15 classified countries according to their level of compliance and commitment according to the analysis conducted in the previous and current chapters, using the typology developed by the thesis. The thesis is conscious of nuances in the different types of NWMs, for example, between “medium” and “low” ranking NWMs as “medium” rank entities report directly to the Presidency whereas “low” rank entities report to a sectoral ministry. However, for the purpose of simplifying the analysis, “medium” and “low” rank NWMs have been put together as they do not fulfil the optimal prototype set by the Beijing norm which is “high” rank entities set at ministerial level. The thesis considered potentially more effective NWMs to be those that fulfil the global norm recommendations and also meet most of the commitment indicators or meet the latter without complying with the global norm. The logic behind this is that whereas compliance indicators focus on the existence of structures, commitment indicators provide a clearer picture of the likelihood that NWMs are able to fulfil their roles, even if they were not created by law, had a “low” or “medium” rank and were not ministries. In particular, as pointed out in the
academic literature, critical features that increase the likelihood of being effective are engaging women’s organisations - including being headed by leaders that have an affinity with the women’s agenda, having adequate responsibilities that are commensurate with their institutional design, and counting with adequate resources and capacity. Without these, NWMs could have the best institutional design and comply with the global prototype in form but be ineffective window-dressing entities.

Table 15.- NWMs ranked by compliance and commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Effective NWMs</th>
<th>Ineffective NWMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliant and committed</td>
<td>Non-compliant but committed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the typology developed by the thesis, Table 15 shows that more than half the NWMs in Latin America, ten in total, reflect the lack of both compliance and commitment of their States regarding their NWMs. Three show lack of commitment even if they comply with the Beijing norm. Other three countries show commitment even though they do not comply with Beijing. Remarkably, only two States match their compliance with their commitment. In terms of potential effectiveness based on the analysis conducted, it is feasible to discern that only five NWMs, corresponding to 28 percent, show relative potential effectiveness (Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay) and thirteen show ineffectiveness (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru), corresponding to 72 percent.

When taken together with the results of the analysis of countries’ performance in key gender outcomes and levels of developments, a number of trends emerge. Some of countries that
ranked in the top three positions in gender normative and legal frameworks in 2018 are also countries showing high commitment: Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Uruguay. Out of these, only Chile and Venezuela are compliant and committed countries, whereas Costa Rica and Uruguay are committed but not compliant. In contrast, all the countries in the bottom rank in gender related normative and legal frameworks are all countries that have ineffective NWMs, all of them are neither compliant nor committed except for Nicaragua that shows compliance but lack of commitment. When it comes to the performance in women’s political parity, the most striking result is that countries showing ineffective NWMs such Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, rank top in this field. In contrast, Uruguay which is classified as having an effective NWM, ranks bottom. The results of IPU´s women´s parliamentarian representation confirm these results except that Uruguay improves its position to a middle rank. When it comes to women’s social welfare and economic parity, there is a complete correlation between countries with the top performance and effective NWMs, namely Uruguay and Chile, although other countries ranking high have ineffective NWMs such as Argentina and Brazil. At the other extreme, most countries with ineffective NWMs rank at the bottom of the women´s social welfare and economic parity such as Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Out of these, Nicaragua is the only NWM that showed relative compliance despite its lack of commitment.

When assessing levels of growth and development, there is a clear correlation between the most developed countries and the countries showing highly effective NWMs (Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Uruguay), except for El Salvador which is a medium development country yet has a relatively effective NWM. When assessing gender inequality, three of the relatively most equal countries in the region are also countries with relatively effective NWMs, namely Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile, out of which only Chile meets both compliance and commitment indicators. Yet, all three lose some positions in the Human Development Index (HDI) rank when the Gender Inequality Index (GII) is factored in, the most striking case being that of Chile.

Another trend is that some of the relatively most gender unequal countries have ineffective NWMs, namely Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay and Guatemala. Out of this latter group, Nicaragua and Paraguay are cases of compliance but lack of commitment. A further striking observation is that some of the least gender equal countries gained significant positions in the HDI rank when inequality was factored such as Honduras, Bolivia and Nicaragua, all with ineffective NWMs.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the low level of compliance found in the previous chapter is further complicated by an abysmal level of commitment. When a closer look is taken at how States ensure that the existence of NWMs is matched with the existence of the necessary conditions and resources that facilitate that these entities can realistically fulfil their goals, it is clear that most governments have not set up viable NWMs to advance the cause of women. In order to analyse in more detail the effectiveness of NWMs according to different combinations of compliance and commitment in specific contexts, four exemplary countries were selected to conduct in-depth case studies: Chile as an exemplary case of compliance and commitment; Uruguay as an exemplary case of commitment but lack of compliance; Nicaragua as an exemplary case of compliance but lack of commitment; and Bolivia as an exemplary case of a lack of both compliance and commitment. The four countries selected are unitary States (not federate States) with comparably similar administrative arrangements. Given that the analysis of the survey results demonstrates that NWMs' self-perceptions of their role in those areas that demonstrate commitment on the part of governments, and the views of CSOs on these issues, were very widely different, the use of case studies will allow for a more detailed and nuanced analysis of the development of NWMs in these States using the issues already identified as indicating commitment and how this affects effectiveness. The case study chapters will also discuss the changing conditions for women in these exemplary countries.

Chapter Five will analyse Chile and Uruguay as cases of relatively effective NWMs and Chapter Six will examine Nicaragua and Bolivia as cases of ineffective NWMs.
Chapter Five. - Relatively effective NWMs in Chile and Uruguay

This chapter conducts an in-depth analysis of the cases of Chile and Uruguay as exemplary cases of relatively effective NWMs according to the indicators discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of Chile, the State has both complied with the prescribed international normative standards on NWMs and demonstrated commitment to allow the NWM to fulfil its role. In the case of Uruguay, although it did not comply with the global policy norm on NWMs, the country has shown greater commitment to facilitate its NWM to achieve its goals than most other States in the region. Both Chile and Uruguay are among the most prosperous and developed nations in Latin America and have strong consolidated democratic institutions, a result of their comparably greater socio-economic and political stability since the era of democratic transition. Chile is one of the most prosperous nations in Latin America, although prosperity has not translated into equality. It is also one of the countries in the region to have experienced a comparably smooth and peaceful democratisation process and to have a stable democratic system. Since 2015, the Chilean NWM is the full-fledged Ministry of Women and Gender Equity, created by law to replace its historic institutional predecessor, the National Women’s Service (SERNAM) that was originally set up in 1991. This make it the most long lived and successful NWM in Latin America. The aim of the chapter is to examine the details behind the indicators discussed in the previous chapter and the relationship between norm compliance and comparative effectiveness. The chapter will discuss each of the case study countries in turn, finishing with a comparative conclusion.

The case of Chile: a case of both compliance and commitment

Chile has a population of nearly eighteen million, 90 percent of which are white or non-indigenous and the remaining 10 percent indigenous (CIA 2018b). Its predominantly white population is a result of the country experiencing various migration waves coming mainly from Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (DIBAM 2018). The Country’s period of dictatorship began with the military coup of General Augusto Pinochet that abruptly ended the Socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. Up to that point Chile had been one of the longest standing Latin American democracies (Noonan 1995, p.92). Characterised by State-sponsored terrorism, concentration camps, the disappearance of people, and wide spread executions, the seventeen-year long dictatorship was a “reign of terror” that targeted trade unions, suppressed the left and sought to “push women back into traditional roles” (Noonan 1995, p.82). Women played a key role in Chile in the development of the resistance, they “were the first to take to the streets, publicly condemning human rights abuses and protesting against the military
regime” (Hensman 1996, p.52). Women formed groups that demanded the return of democracy and equality and incorporated in their demands a women’s rights agenda including issues such as “domestic violence, sexuality, equality in the home and the workplace, contraception and abortion” (Hensman 1996, pp.52-53).

Since the return of civilian rule in 1990 Chile is one of the most stable democracies in the region (Silva 2002, p.73; Freedom House 2018b), demonstrated by the smooth and peaceful alternation in power of six different centre-left and right oriented governments since the end of authoritarian rule. In contrast to the authoritarian era when relations between the State and civil society were broken given the high level of repression and political persecution, during the democratisation process civil society actors enjoyed a high level of engagement with state institutions (Noonan 1995). Chile’s late transition to democracy compared to its neighbours is said to have allowed Chilean feminists to learn from the experiences in other countries and therefore enabled them to have an impact on the developing democracy (Jacquette 1994, p.8). Initially feminists gained influence in the new democratic government of Patricio Alwyn in 1989 by helping the centre and left coalition of parties, known as the Concertación, against Pinochet (Chuchryk 1994). However, once democracy was established, in line with the experience of other States, the high levels of activism that had characterised the push for democracy was drastically reduced (Silva 2002, p.74). Civil society in post-transition was mainly composed of human rights movements and NGOs demanding social accountability from the different State branches concerning inefficiency and corruption and promoting the development of a civic culture in which civil servants are held accountable (Avritzer 2004, p.48). The moderate and reconciliatory character of the new democratic authorities, the country’s good economic performance, the relatively efficient functioning of institutions, the strength of the political parties system and the social and cultural impact of the neoliberal model of society imposed by Pinochet, as well as the relative absence and lack of influence of the international donor community to actively promote a larger role for civil society, were key elements that influenced a diminishing of civil society activism in post-transition Chile (Silva 2002, p.74). Chilean feminists and women’s movements were also faced with the dilemma common in the region during democratisation of whether to evolve as movements autonomous from political party influence and become professionalised NGOs or engage with political parties including the parties of government (Franceschet 2003). Since 1990, feminist and women’s organisations, despite their internal divisions and fragmentation, focused their attention in demanding actions by the State on issues related to violence against women, sexual and reproductive rights, and women’s representation. This focus was both reflected by and facilitated through the setting up of an NWM in 1991.

Chile is now considered a very high human development country ranking 44 out of 189 countries in the HDI, which is the top position in Latin America (UNDP 2018a). Its economy is considered one of the region’s fastest-growing in recent decades (World Bank 2018b). This
facilitated a recent significantly reduced poverty and in its high inequality levels (World Bank 2018b). Chile holds the third position in the GII in the region, however because of the relatively low percentage of women in its parliament the country drops twenty-eight positions in the HDI rank when gender inequality is considered (see Table 3, Chapter Three). Although feminist activism was part of civil society engagement since 1990, beginning in 2010, there has been a wave of feminist activism with massive protests led by youth, feminists and students demanding concrete action in the range of areas that had for a long time been the subject of women’s demands (Ferrer 2018). During the period 2007-2013, the country had experienced an increase in its rate of women’s labour market participation, women’s access to social security and a reduction of the rate of female poverty (AFM 2017). Post 2013, the country’s performance in terms of women’s political representation has improved with the percentage of women in the National Assembly increasing from 19 to 35 women, 16 percent to 22.7 percent of total representation; and in the Senate, woman’s representation increased by 10 female senators, 15.8 percent to 23.2 percent of representation (Chile 2017a). The next section looks at the trajectory of the NWM in relation to these developments.

The trajectory of the Chilean NWM

As part of the democratisation process, Chile set up the National Women’s Service (SERNAM) in 1991 to promote women’s rights and gender equality and to coordinate GM within public policy (Chile 1991, art.2). SERNAM was created as an autonomous entity attached to the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation and its head had ministerial status (Chile 1991, art.1-4). Its leader therefore was a member of the governmental cabinet. From the beginning the NWM conformed to the main criterion of the UN led norm. The location of SERNAM within the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation – responsible for overseeing nationwide development planning and initiatives supported by international cooperation, was intended to facilitate its mainstreaming role in influencing other ministries (Franceschet 2003, p.21; Goetz 2003, p.77). The ministerial rank of SERNAM’s head was also intended to facilitate her direct interaction with sector ministers (Franceschet 2003, p.21). Aspects of its institutional design were found by Goetz (2003, pp.72-73) to undermine its effectiveness. In particular, she found that its institutional character as neither “a full Ministry, or an established boundary-bridging body […] diminished its potential impact” (Goetz 2003, p.72). She also found that SERNAM lacked “clear mechanisms” by which it could have an impact on government decisions, or through which it could review either government policy, or the complaisance of government departments “with the [women and gender related] policy mandate” (Goetz 2003, pp.72-73). In addition to this limitation its mandate excluded the NWM from the direct implementation of its own initiatives (Goetz 2003, pp.72-73).
In its first decade of existence, SERNAM focused its work mainly on gender awareness campaigning, small group projects and supporting legislative reforms (Franceschet 2003, p.19-23; Goetz 2003, p.73; Waylen 2000, p.786). It contributed to the establishment of a network of regional offices and Information Centres on Women’s Rights, the adoption of an Equal Opportunities Plan with a clear feminist orientation, awareness-raising initiatives on domestic violence and illegitimacy, and legislative reforms on intra-family violence (Waylen 2000, p.786). Waylen (2000, p.786) found that in this period, some of the constraints faced by SERNAM regarding its inter-sectoral coordination role, because of its lack of oversight powers and lack of institutionalised working arrangements with many sectoral ministries, were partly countered by a heavy reliance on personal relations between the head of SERNAM and other institutional actors. Given differing political views, and pressure from the right and from the Catholic Church, SERNAM tended to focus on issues that were not highly contested, and it steered clear of divisive or controversial issues such abortion and women’s reproductive rights (Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet 2002; p.457; Waylen 2000, p.787).

Inspire of its institutional constraints SERNAM demonstrated relative effectiveness, visibility and influence during most of the six governments that alternated in power since 1991. It was able to effectively lead concrete landmark public policy and legislative initiatives (Valdés 2011). Some of what had been considered key limitations can also be seen as positive features. For example, the fact that it had a restricted mandate for project implementation made it focus on mainstreaming gender across sectoral policies by increasing its policy influence across sectors and enabling access to policy for women’s organisations (Franceschet 2003, pp.19-26), it also allowed it to gain visibility as an advisory entity. By international standards, SERNAM was considered a relatively strong and stable NWM (Franceschet 2003, p.36). Chile’s experience on GM across the public sector was considered “one of the boldest policy innovations” requiring “all public services to incorporate gender-based goals into their programme, and to disaggregate all indicators by sex” (Franceschet 2007, p.9). This track record was further enhanced from the time of President Bachelet’s first administration (2006-2010) as the work on GM and gender parity across all governmental and State actions was significantly prioritised (Valdés 2011).

During President Piñera’s administration (2010-2014), SERNAM was transferred to the newly Ministry of Social Development and this shift limited its power and capacity for independent action (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2016b, paragraph 6). Its work during this period was criticised for perpetuating women’s traditional roles and having limited influence over sector ministries (Guillou 2014). Indeed, Piñera’s government was said to undermine some of the gains achieved during President Bachelet’s first administration (2006-2010).\(^{50}\) President Bachelet herself considered that President Piñera’s government had

\(^{50}\) Key informant 4.
wrongly shifted the focus of her first administration on women’s economic and political “empowerment” and physical autonomy to a focus on “women’s entrepreneurship” (Escobar 2014, p.120). She attributed this shift to Piñera´s business background (Escobar 2014, p.120). SERNAM’s staff acknowledged that being located under the Ministry of Social Development had limited its capacity to operate during this period.51

These additional difficulties during President Piñera’s administration together with the institutional limitations faced by SERNAM allowed the demand to upgrade the institution to a full-fledge ministry of women to gain greater traction amongst women’s organisations. This demand was met with the creation of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity in 2015 as soon as President Bachelet returned to government after winning the elections a second term. The Ministry was created by law, as had been the case of SERNAM in 1991, this feature of SERNAM was identified as a determinant factor in its relative greater stability in comparison to similar bodies created in neighbouring Argentina and Peru (Waylen 1997, p.96, p.102). The following sections examine other key features defined by the thesis to demonstrate the commitment of the State to supporting the effectiveness of the NWM - the willingness to improve funding and to facilitate its engagement with key constituencies inside and outside the State.

**Resourcing the NWM**

Compared to the rest of the region, Chile is an exemplary case of increasing commitment on the part of the government to provide adequate resources to allow the NWM to fulfil its role. In line with the common experience across the region, international cooperation funding had been critical for setting up SERNAM and providing the resources to allow it to function (Goetz 2003, p.73; Waylen 1997, p.97), this was particularly true of its first decade of existence. SERNAM was reported to receive up to 60 percent of its budget from international donors when it was initially set up, and this was said to have allowed it to “compete effectively with other government priorities” (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1995b, paragraph 12). Throughout the 1990s, its dependency on foreign aid declined substantially as regular government funding increased, although during this period much of the work of SERNAM was still funded by external donors. Except for the economic crisis that impacted Chile in 1998 and led to drastic cuts across all government departments, SERNAM’s budget progressively increased during its twenty-five years of existence (Chile 2015a, p.43; Chile 2000, p.7). It experienced a significant budget boost in 2006 when it received a 30 percent increase in its budget during President Bachelet’s first term in office (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2006a, paragraph 5). This was reversed when SERNAM experienced a 30 percent reduction of staff during President Piñera’s administration as part of it the relocation to the

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51 Questionnaire respondent 47.
Ministry of Social Development (Valdés 2011). Despite this setback, over time SERNAM’s budget was gradually increased to the extent that it no longer depended on foreign aid. Its human and technical resources were also gradually improved and by 2015 the financial, human and technical resources of the Ministry were institutionally guaranteed.

The increasingly greater responsibility and obligation of different institutions to allocate specific resources for the implementation of gender measures and initiatives were experienced in Chile across the years. This was the case for example of the country’s successive programmes to improve gender responsive public service management and to provide incentives to ministries and other institutional entities for committing to generate gender equality outcomes as part of their responsibilities (Chile 2015a, pp.43-46). These programmes had the technical and advisory support of the NWM. However, the funding did not come from foreign aid or from the NWM’s own budget but from the different sectoral ministries and other public institutions involved (Chile 2015a, p.43). By 2016, the Ministry of Women and Gender Equality had a total of 567 staff members, out of which 132 were staff members of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equality itself and 435 of SERNAM (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2017e, paragraph 31). These figures reflect a big improvement from the 270 staff members that SERNAM was reported to have in 2007, out of which only 10 percent were permanent staff (World Bank 2007, p.74). Despite the major improvement in funding and staffing some of the questionnaire respondents still considered that the resources allocated by the State to the NWM were insufficient to allow it to fulfil all its aims. This view may reflect the high level of ambition the respondents have for the potential work of the NWM.

**Legal status and engagement with key actors**

During the first decade of its existence, SERNAM enjoyed the support of key feminist politicians and senators who had been part of Chile’s transition to democracy (Waylen 2000). It integrated among its staff many former activists and leaders of the feminist and women’s movements, so much so that the women’s movement was said to have been “beheaded” by SERNAM’s creation (quoted in Waylen 2000, p.788). At the same time, the integration of feminists into the State was regarded as a positive influence in SERNAM’s orientation, even if it faced internal political constraints (Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet 2002, pp.446-448). SERNAM’s staff were aware of the impact its creation, and integration of former civil society women leaders into its organisation, had on the women’s movement and attempted to remedy this by putting in place communication channels and strategies to strengthen the women’s movement as a policy actor (Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet 2002, p.447). This made SERNAM’s relations

52 Key informants 4 & 16.
53 Questionnaire respondents 45, 46 & 47.
with civil society complex. On the one hand, SERNAM undermined the strength of the women’s movement not only by employing the former women’s movement leaders but also by becoming the main recipient of foreign cooperation funds that had previously gone directly to a range of feminist and women’s organisations, so women’s groups now received funds via SERNAM leading to accusations of ‘clientelism’ (Waylen 2000, pp.787-788; 1997, p.101). On the other hand, the creation of SERNAM need not necessarily be considered as having a negative impact on women’s activism as it provided the women’s movement with important resources such as a common women’s equality discourse, that gathered together formerly dispersed women’s groups and identified common concrete goals around which to organise their actions and pressure the State to fulfil its commitments (Franceschet 2003, pp.447-448). SERNAM’s main weakness in terms of its relationship with organised women’s groups is their comparative failure to engage with grassroot women’s linked to popular movements (Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet 2002, p.457; Waylen 2000, p.787).

This weakness remained a feature of the Chilean NWM over time and it 2015 it still had less regular interaction with certain groups of women, including indigenous and rural women and women living with disabilities.\(^{54}\) One of the reasons for this has been identified as the limitations faced by women’s organisations themselves such as their own organisation weakening, their lack of strategies and tools and their lack of advocacy to effectively work with the NWM and to engage in gender policy initiatives.\(^{55}\) As a result of this the Chilean NWM and UN Women implemented a programme in 2014-2016 to support the revitalisation and strengthening of women’s organised activism given the progressive weakening of the movement.\(^{56}\) In spite of the problems with the NWM’s engagement with civil society, key informants agreed that more had been achieved in Chile through the State than in other Latin American States with more active women’s movements, and that this positive response by the State could even explain the reduction in women’s movement activism.\(^{57}\) In the words of a civil society informant:

The [women’s] movement has been debilitated in Chile and this is clear when compared with the often-explosive activism seen in neighbour Argentina. However, it is also true that the different governments since the end of Pinochet have generally been proactive and open towards women’s demands and perhaps this also explains why there is less women’s activism.\(^{58}\)

Although governments have been broadly supportive of women demands Chile, in common with the region, Chile has seen a growth in the influence of a conservative anti-women’s agenda led by religious organisations. However, the chances of this agenda gaining traction and

\(^{54}\) Questionnaire respondent 46.
\(^{55}\) Questionnaire respondent 46.
\(^{56}\) Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
\(^{57}\) Key informant 16, 19 & 28.
\(^{58}\) Key informant 28.
triggering the dismantling of gender measures achieved across more than three decades was considered by one questionnaire respondent to be small given that Chilean women would “fiercely defend in the State and on the streets the gains achieved.” Also it is considered that these reforms are now well embedded in the fabric of the State, and that this has been reinforced by the legacy of the two administrations led by President Bachelet so that, “any attempt to reverse those gains would be seen as out-of-date and embarrassing for politicians unless they want to be seen as dinosaurs.” This is demonstrated by the new Minister of Women and Gender Equity, Ms Isabel Plá, who was appointed in March 2018 by the centre-right government of President Piñera. With a background in politics and work on gender equality and violence against women, she has acknowledged that President Michelle Bachelet is the most important woman in the history of Chile (Ahumada 2018). Although she does not share the position of Bachelet’s government regarding abortion, she has expressed her commitment to implement all State obligations and legislation including those adopted under Bachelet’s administration and to continue the projects initiated by the previous government (Ahumada 2018; Contreras Gómez 2018).

The setting up of the NWM as a full ministry was one of President Bachelet’s electoral gender promises and one of her gender agenda aims during her second term in office. It was a response to feminist and women’s demands for a full-fledged ministry that would address the constraints faced by SERNAM (Guillou 2014). Ministerial staff who responded to the questionnaire identified President Bachelet’s personal and political support as a key driver in fulfilling women’s demands for the creation of the Ministry, improving its GM coordination role and allocating better resources to enable it to fulfil its aims. This engagement between the presidential candidate and the demands of the women’s movement is an example of one of the factors that are considered to indicate an effective NWM, that is, its capacity to engage with a wide range of civil society actors and to bring together political actors and women’s organisations. Respondents considered a strength that SERNAM had historically been able to engage with the women’s movement, and had done so positively, although not without tensions. The setting up of the NWM as a ministry explicitly included the expectation that it would engage with a full range of women groups and ensure respect for diversity of women’s groups and of ethnic groups as part of its relations with civil society, in its work and in the measures it promotes (Chile 2015b). Key informants and questionnaire respondents confirmed that the NWM did in fact encourage the regular participation of civil society representatives as part of its consultative boards and working arrangements. The range of women’s organisations included rural women, grassroots women groups, women in academia and in the media. It also engaged with women who experienced

59 Key informant 16.
60 Key informant 16.
61 Key informants 4 and 16.
62 Questionnaire respondent 45 & 46.
63 Questionnaire respondent 45 & 46.
particular problems or had specific policy needs including female heads of households, and women victims of violence. As well as civil society the NWM brought together women from formal State institutions including female trade unionists, female politicians and parliamentarians.64

The designation of Ms Claudia Pascual in 2014 as head of SERNAM and as Minister of Women and Gender Equity in 2015 was an indication of the government’s decision to respond positively to women’s demands for policy reform and maintain good relations with women’s groups. Ms Pascual was a communist politician and trained anthropologist, who had supported President Bachelet in the designing of her gender programme for the presidential election campaign in 2013. This included key women’s demands such as the creation of the Ministry and the revision of abortion legislation. Ms Pascual openly declared herself committed to the improvement of women’s rights, including sexual and reproductive rights, and to revising Chile’s abortion legislation (Carvallo 2014). The support for abortion laws reform was controversial, there had been a total ban on abortion since Pinochet’s dictatorship, and prior to this election SERNAM had not lobbied on this issue.

The fact that SERNAM had from its inception been created by law and held a relative high position in the government system were key aspects of the institution that conformed to the global norm. This was reinforced by establishing the NWM as a ministry. Most survey respondents to both the governmental and the civil society questionnaires coincided in identifying the creation by law of both entities as a key feature of their institutional continuity and stability. However, a representative from SERNAM indicated that even though being created by law was a necessary factor of stability, “it was not in and of itself enough to ensure institutional effectiveness”.65 For example, in effectively coordinating a GM strategy across different policy fields, governmental staff identified the work, engagement and support of key internal and external actors, including civil society as critical features to ensure success.66 This cross-alliance building between women (and men) inside and outside the State, as well as working with society at large, was described by one respondent in the context of the work on gender mainstreaming as:

it is important to empathise with the work of the [NWM], and to internalise a transformative gender equality approach in the measures, programmes and policies. It is important to have permanent contact with civil society and the women’s movement. It is important to create networks with the legislative branch, so that they take ownership of the gender agenda and take it into account when legislating. [It is important] to count with communication strategies that allow to raise the awareness of society at large.67

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64 Questionnaire respondent 45, 46 & 47; key informant 4.
65 Questionnaire respondent 46.
66 Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
67 Questionnaire respondent 46.
The continuous engagement of external and internal actors, particularly of the women’s movement, sectoral ministries and State branches has been identified as essential to ensure the NWM’s legitimacy and recognition. These were described by a questionnaire respondent as vital so that “[people] see that the existence of this institution has triggered a change in their lives and immediate environment, as well as in their potential development.” On this basis it is possible to argue that having a solid legal basis might have prevented the Chilean NWM from disappearing or being dramatically transformed as a result of governmental changes. However, it is evident also that other indispensable features such as the support it had from women’s constituencies and allies within the State, as well as the necessary resources allowed the entity to reasonably effectively fulfil its role.

Overall, the consolidation of the Chilean NWM and its comparative effectiveness benefited from generally having engaged and ensured the support and recognition of those it was set up to serve and represent, with whom it tended to have a fluid engagement and regular interaction. The consolidation of the NWM also benefited from being able to count on internal support within the institution and within the State, including the presence of its staff of gender advocates who were able to promote progressive policies from inside the State and by having political support at the highest level in the government for crucial periods.

The status of the NWM and its role in promoting women’s rights

The improved status of the NWM as a full-fledged Ministry of Women and Gender Equity was celebrated by feminists and women’s groups, public servants from across the sectoral ministerial spectrum, the judiciary and the legislative bodies. Since 2015, the Ministry is the normative body charged with the “design, coordination and evaluation of policies, plans and programmes aimed at promoting gender equality, equality of rights and the elimination of all forms of arbitrary discrimination against women (Chile 2015b, art.1). SERNAM did not disappear with the creation of the Ministry but continues to exist attached to it as an entity in charge of the implementation of the initiatives designed by the Ministry (Chile 2015b). This maintained the continuity between the new ministry and what is perceived to be a successful NWM. The Ministry of Women and Gender Equity, according to the indicators used in Chapter Four, is one of the NWMs in Latin America with the most progressive orientation, working approach and assigned functions. An example of this progressive orientation is the fact that the Ministry is one of the few cases found of an NWM charged with proposing positive action measures to address women’s discrimination as part of its normative role (Chile 2015b). The Ministry is also mandated with the sweeping task of working towards promoting the transformation of social and cultural stereotypes,

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68 Questionnaire respondent 46.
69 Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
prejudices and practices, including those based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of any of the sexes (Chile 2015b). Although this is an aspirational goal it does indicate a progressive culture. The Chilean case is also one of the few examples where the remit of the NWM explicitly extends to cover private affairs that affect women’s lives and gender equality such as maternity, co-responsibility and domestic and care work (Chile 2015b). This is more than just aspiration as the promotion of the Law of Carers in 2017 (Chile 2017c) - which protected the rights of working mothers and fathers who need to take time off work to care for a child and not experience financial hardship - demonstrates.

The Chilean Ministry shows coherence between its status and expected level of coordination with other institutional actors at the national, sub-national and supra-national level. The existence of specific working arrangements and mechanisms to facilitate inter-sectoral coordination were identified as conducive to support its GM role within public policy, as they facilitate its relations with internal constituents.70 One such coordination mechanism, which predates the setting up of the ministry, is the Council of Ministers for the Promotion of Gender Equality, created in 2000 during President Ricardo Lagos´ administration (2000-2006) to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender across all sectoral ministries and policies (Chile 2014b). This Council is led by the President and the head of the NWM. The existence of the Council enabled the NWM to have greater leverage to influence different policy fields at the highest level. The NWM’s coordination role was also judged to be significantly facilitated by the existence of a strong network of gender units and focal points within most sectoral ministries, at the other branches of the State, and at the national-governmental institutions.71 The Council has continued to exist under President Piñera´s new government (2018-2022) under the name of Inter-ministerial Committee for Equality of Rights and Gender Equity (Chile 2018a). Piñera’s new government has also launched a Gender Equity Agenda with twelve priority areas of work to promote gender equality in the public and private sectors reflecting many of the initiatives promoted under Bachelet’s administration such as reforming the Constitution to enshrine the principle of non-discrimination and gender equality, eliminating discriminatory legislation, improving women’s pensions, improving pre-school care to enable work-life balance, promote women’s representation in private and public entities, including in political positions, among others (Chile 2018b). This agenda, although still early to assess its implementation, reflects the intention to continue the previous government’s work on women’s equality. The creation of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity with an improved status, capacities and resources indicates the intention to address the identified limitations that SERNAM faced, including budget constraints, lack of effective influence and authority.72

70 Questionnaire respondents 45, 46 & 47; key informant 4.
71 Questionnaire respondents 45 & 46.
72 Key informant 16.
The strengthening of the NWM in Chile went hand in hand with progress in gender policy and legislative developments as well as in women’s socio-economic status, as illustrated in Chapter Four. While it is difficult to trace the NWM’s specific contribution to Chile’s performance in key gender indicators and the impact of concrete gender measures on women’s status and gender equality, most key informants and questionnaire respondents agreed the NWM had played a very proactive role across time in promoting the adoption of important gender measures. Given its predominantly normative and advisory role and its widely accepted legitimacy within public policy, the Chilean NWM had regular and proactive input into the process of designing and promoting the adoption of key legislative measures. For example, the NWM actively supported the adoption of a law on intra-family violence in 1994, followed by a law on sexual crimes in 1999 and the reforms to the penal code in 2010 to recognise the crime of “femicide” (see Appendix 10). It was also a promoter of Law 20609 on discrimination adopted in 2012 (see Chile 2012 and Appendix 8). The Ministry was also a supporter in the design of legislative measures to promote women’s political participation and to improve their socio-economic status. For example, in 2016 it supported the adoption of two laws amending the Constitutional Organic Law on Political Parties to provide for gender parity in the composition of collegiate bodies by guaranteeing a minimum of 40 percent of women candidates (see Chile 2016b, 2006a). Previously, in 2015, it supported the adoption of a legislative measure that established a proportionate, inclusive electoral system for congressional elections, putting an end to the existing binomial system (see Chile 2015d). The same year, it supported the adoption of a law on civil unions (see Chile 2015c) and, in 2014, it supported the adoption of legislation on improving working conditions for domestic workers (see Chile 2014a). In 2017, it even successfully ventured into supporting controversial measures such as the long-overdue reform to the restrictive abortion legislation that led to an ease of the former total ban on abortion and the legalisation of voluntary termination of pregnancy on three specific grounds (see Chile 2017b).

Chile signed up to the CEDAW Optional Protocol but is yet to ratify it in its legislative court despite a proposal having been submitted in 2001 (Corporación Humanas et al. 2018, p.2; see Appendix 7). Despite this failure across the years, the Chilean NWM was an active coordinator of key national gender policy instruments such as the Fourth National Plan on Equality between Women and Men (2018–2030), preceded by three national gender plans formerly designed and coordinated by SERNAM (see Appendix 7). The NWM also coordinated the adoption and implementation of various sectoral policies and plans across time, some of the most recent ones being the National Action Plan against Trafficking in Persons (2015–2018) and the National Plan of Action on Violence against Women (2014–2018). Although it is difficult to assess the impact of these instruments, partly because the responsibilities for their implementation are shared among
various institutional actors, the NWM was a crucial architect in their design, coordination and in monitoring their implementation, demonstrating a strong inter-institutional coordination role.\textsuperscript{73}

The NWM also played an active role in the design and implementation of specific programmes to strengthen inter-sectoral coordination and the mainstreaming of gender across the public sector, including the creation of a specific department charged with mainstreaming gender equality across all legislative measures and proposals (see Chile 2010, pp.19-22). Chile is indeed widely recognised as a pioneer in the region in integrating gender equality results as an outcome of all institutional interventions.\textsuperscript{74} For example, the above-mentioned implementation of programmes to improve gender responsive public service management, giving incentives to ministries and other institutional entities for committing to generate gender equality outcomes as part of its responsibilities and for reporting regularly on progress (see Chile 2015a, pp.43-46). From 2002, the integration of gender as part of the performance of sectoral ministries and other institutions was made compulsory (Chile 2015a, p.43). As a result, between 2002 and 2013, the percentage of institutions that had committed to concrete gender results was reported to have been between 82 and 90 percent (Chile 2015a, p.43). The progress in Chile’s substantive gender developments in legislation and public policy as well as in socio-economic parity have occurred despite the Chilean Constitution being one of least gender-responsive constitutions in the region (UN Women 2016a). However, the government of Piñera has initiated a process of reforming the Constitution with the support of the NWM to enshrine the principle of gender equality (El Mostrador 2018).

The consolidation of the Chilean NWM is an example of institutional stability, continuity and progressive improvement. It is also an example of the influence that the incorporation of the gender agenda and of women had in the State across time.

**The case of Uruguay: a case of commitment despite non-compliance**

Uruguay is an exemplary case of a country that despite not being compliant with international normative frameworks on NWMs it has demonstrated commitment to allow its NWM to be relatively more effective than the majority in the region. The Uruguayan NWM has always had a “low” hierarchical status within the governmental structure and this is the main reason why it is considered to be non-compliant with international norms. Its institutional design and remit have improved over the years, and the weaknesses of it institutional design have not prevented it from enjoying a relative greater institutional stability than other NWMs in the region.

\textsuperscript{73} Key informant 4; author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.

\textsuperscript{74} Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
or prevented it from building a strong relationship with feminist and women’s organisations, making it more effective than most NWMs including many full-fledged ministries of women.

Uruguay is characterised as a socio-economic and political stable country with a very homogenous society, most of them descendants from different massive waves of migration, mainly from Spain in the sixteenth century and from Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century (SICREMI 2018). It is one of the smallest countries of South America and it has a population of only 3.3 million, 87.7 percent of which are white, 4.6 percent black and the rest indigenous and other groups (CIA 2018d). It is a high-income and high human development country ranking 55 out of 189 countries in the HDI, which is the third best performance in the region after Chile and Argentina (UNDP 2018a). Uruguay is the most gender equal country in Latin America ranking top in the GII rank, although it loses two HDI positions when GII is considered (see Table 3, Chapter Three).

In recent years Uruguay significantly improved its gender legal and public policy frameworks, holding a top position in the regional ranking (see Table 4, Chapter Three). It also significantly improved women’s socio-economic and welfare parity status and maintained a top position in the region in terms of this measure (see Table 7, Chapter Three). During the period 2007-2013, Uruguay experienced an increase in its rate of women’s labour market participation, access to social security and a reduction of the rate of female poverty (AFM 2017). In contrast, Uruguay’s women’s political parity did not improve comparatively and as a result it dropped down the regional rankings (see Table 5, Chapter Three). In the parliament, female representation improved in the period 2008-2018 making Uruguay gain two positions from tenth to eighth (see Table 6, Chapter Three).

Uruguay stands out in Latin America “for being an egalitarian society and for its high per capita income, low level of inequality and poverty and the almost complete absence of extreme poverty” (World Bank 2018d). According to the World Bank, Uruguay has managed to attain a high level of equality of opportunity in terms of access to basic services such as education, running water, electricity and sanitation (World Bank 2018d). Unlike other countries in the region, the unique socio-economic path followed by Uruguay in its public policies during the period 1985-2005 has been praised for not following “a resolutely neo-liberal course, but rather a hybrid one”, resulting in “a liberal labour regime coupled with a three-dimensional social policy balancing the market, the old corporatist welfare State and the new welfare state targeting specific beneficiaries” such as women and children (Alegre & Filgueira 2009, p. 317). From 2005 onwards, the feminist and social reform agenda experienced a major impetus with the arrival of the left to power and the country continued to stand out in the region with its progressive social reforms (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011).

Like the case of Chile, Uruguay is an example of a State that had a comparably strong democratic consolidation and has a high level of political stability. The country has experienced
the peaceful alternation in power of seven different governments since the return of multi-party democracy in the early 1980s. Uruguayan politics was historically dominated by the power struggle between two centre to centre-right oriented traditional parties, the *Colorado* and the National party, with a predominance of the *Colorado* party. However, from 2005, a coalition of left and centre-left parties called *Frente Amplio* has ruled the country and won three consecutive elections led by Tabaré Vásquez for the period 2005-2010, José Mujica for the period 2010-2015 and again Tabaré Vásquez from 2015 until elections take place in 2020.

Uruguay stands out in the region in terms of its political and civil rights, as the country is considered to have a “historically strong democratic governance structure and a positive record of upholding political rights and civil liberties while also working toward social inclusion” (Freedom House 2018d). Relations between the State and civil society in the post-authoritarian era have been characterised by strong social mobilisation and consensus-building, albeit not completely absent of tensions in some periods. Since 2005, the arrival to power of the centre-left coalition of parties under the *Frente Amplio* brought to the table the social movements that had always been the main source of support of the left, such as trade unions, students, human rights and cooperative movements, and gave more space and voice to some of the new social movements such as feminists and the environmental activists (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1039). The three left administrations that have alternated in power since 2005 have generally been characterised for promoting greater inclusion and active participation of diverse stakeholders and citizens in social and institutional reforms (De Armas, Luzuriaga & Machado 2009).

**The trajectory of the Uruguayan NWM**

Together with Nicaragua, Uruguay was one of the first countries in the region to set up an NWM in the 1980s. The Uruguayan National Women´s Institute (INMUJERES) was created by governmental decision in 1987 as a “low” rank entity attached to the Ministry of Education and Culture. This took place two years after the return to democracy, during the conservative administration of President Julio Sanguinetti (1985-1990). Like in Chile, organised women from political groups and social movements, including leading feminists, were behind the creation of INMUJERES. During its first years, INMUJERES worked as an inter-sectoral entity charged with conducting research on the status of women and proposing measures to implement the recommendations of the International Conference on Women, Population and Development (FLACSO 1994p). The Institute was dismantled in 1990 as a result of the election of conservative President Luis Alberto Lacalle. In 1992, it was replaced by the National Family and Women’s Institute, created by law and, once again, attached to the Ministry of Education and Culture (Uruguay 1992). The focus of the new NWM was no longer only on women’s equality but had a more conservative remit promoting traditional gender values, including the role of women in the
family and covering population groups other than women (FLACSO 1994). The National Family and Women’s Institute received funding directly from the Ministry of Education and Culture, however from 1995 it began to receive funding directly from the national budget, and during between 1995-2000 it experienced a doubling of its budget allocation (i.e. its allocation from the State budget was USD50,000 in 1995 and USD100,000 in 2000) (Uruguay 2005a, p.17). It also received additional funding from the Ministry of Education and Culture injected extra funding to the NWM to support specific aspects of its work (Uruguay 2005a, p.17). Despite this, its resources were insufficient to undertake all its assigned responsibilities and many of the initiatives it undertook were supported by international cooperation funding until 2000 when most of the funding it received from external sources was “discontinued” (Uruguay 2005a, p.17). The major reduction of international cooperation funding experienced in Uruguay in the 2000s was compensated by progressive greater allocations of gender specific resources by the State. These funding allocations became compulsory by law from 2007 onwards and subsequently systematically mandated according to the national budgeting legislation (Uruguay 2015a). The number of personnel attached to the NWM also increased significantly from only 16 in 2005 (Uruguay 2005a, p.17), to approximately 100 ten years later in 2015.

In the 1990s, the Uruguayan NWM undertook various initiatives considered to have been very successful, especially as they were able to be sustained across time, for example the creation of Information Centres for Women, the organisation of workshops on violence against women, and the establishment of regular consultations and meetings with non-governmental organisations (FLACSO 1994). The NWM also supported the creation of the Women’s Police Stations in 1988 to investigate cases of violence against women and to provide gender sensitive specialised services to victims (FLACSO 1994). This soon became a flagship initiative imitated by other countries in the region. Many of these initiatives relied on the support of women from all income sectors, and in particular they were strongly supported by the “feminist intelligentsia” who together managed to place critical issues such as domestic violence and reproductive rights onto the public agenda (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1043).

Except for the negative change in focus experienced in 1990, the NWM kept the same institutional design during the four conservative governments that alternated in power from 1985 until 2005. Such relative institutional stability during more than twenty-five years contributed to the smooth flourishing of strong links with the feminist and women’s movement and the consolidation of its engagement with key constituents. The change in government in 2005 to a leftist government led to significant changes for the NWM. The institutional weakness of the NWM was widely recognised and acknowledged by the State from 2005. The Beijing+10 report was used by the new government to criticise previous governments policies towards the NWM,

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75 Key informants 17 & 50.
including that the location of the NWM “limited its influence” to promote gender equality (Uruguay 2005a, p.2) and that its institutional weakness impeded the performance of its advisory role (Uruguay 2005a, p.16). The State also acknowledged a lack of institutionalisation of gender equality initiatives as many were sustained by international cooperation organisations and there was a lack of inter-institutional coordination, making their success often due to the personal commitment of the individual public servants who led them (Uruguay 2005a, p.16). The government in the document also acknowledged that progress towards gender equality led by the NWM was negatively affected by changes in government, resulting in the frequent dismantling and restarting of initiatives (Uruguay 2005a, p.16).

Under the new government from 2005 INMUJERES regained its focus on women’s issues and gender equality, while its status and institutional design remained largely unaltered. From this time a new agenda for social policy reform was adopted by the government combining an orientation towards child welfare and a feminist or gender-oriented agenda (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1039). For example, positive social reforms were experienced in the education sector, healthcare, social security, family allowances, pensions and retirement (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011). Many of these reforms benefitted from a stronger institutionalisation of gender equality across public policy sectors through the adoption of concrete public policy instruments that made compulsory the promotion of gender equality across all sectors. Such instruments included the enactment of the Law for the Promotion of Equality of Opportunities and Rights between men and women in 2007 (Uruguay 2007), the adoption of a First National Plan of Equality of Opportunities and Rights, adopted also in 2007 after a consultation process that involved more than 3,000 people from State and civil society (Uruguay 2010, p.1), and the creation of the National Gender Council. In addition, the obligation to allocate specific funding and set up specific mechanisms for the promotion of gender equality in all State and governmental institutions was clearly reinforced by these instruments. In all these processes, INMUJERES was systematically identified as the key institutional entity in charge of providing advisory support and guidance (see for example Uruguay 2015a; 2010).

**The engagement of the NWM with key actors**

Like the case of Chile, the creation of an NWM was a demand of the organised feminist and women’s movement and INMUJERES came about because of the organised work and lobbying of female political leaders and intellectuals gathered under a female parliamentary alliance (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1043). Since its foundation women´s organisations have advocated both within and outside the State for an improvement in the hierarchical status of the NWM in the belief that this will help address its limitations.76 The

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76 Questionnaire respondents 173, 175 & 176; key informants 17, 19, 21, 46 & 50.
relations between the State and women’s organisations have generally been constructive and collaborative since the era of democratic transition with no episodes of rupture. Questionnaire respondents agreed in confirming the existence of regular engagement of women’s organisations by the NWM in a range of different modalities.\textsuperscript{77} Civil society representatives also identified the high level of political support that INMUJERES has had from most governments and the designation of feminist or gender sensitive leaders to head INMUJERES as key factors that have consolidated the legitimacy that the institution enjoys vis-à-vis civil society.

For example its leader since 2016, Ms Mariella Mazzotti, is a recognised feminist public servant and social worker with a long history of engagement in women’s issues and public policy at the local and national level, in addition to strong relations with feminist and women’s organisations.\textsuperscript{78} Former leaders of INMUJERES had a similar feminist background and strong ties with women’s organisations.\textsuperscript{79} Questionnaire respondents and key informants overwhelmingly had virtually no criticism of the work and leadership of the NWM.\textsuperscript{80} Instead, respondents expressed their support for the institution, including in advocating for and pressuring the government to improve its status and capacities.\textsuperscript{81} An acknowledgement of the regular constructive engagement of feminist and women’s organisations by not only the NWM but also other State and governmental institutions was also a constant feature reported in all of the Beijing reports issued by Uruguay (see Uruguay 2015, 2010, 2005a, 2000). A feminist civil society key informant summarised the relationship built over the years with the NWM as follows:

In Uruguay, [INMUJERES] is clear about who they must represent, and governments are smart enough to appoint leaders who will be accepted by the women’s movements and work with us, not against us. INMUJERES exists thanks to our activism and it would be a bogus institution without our support. That is why the staff in INMUJERES and we, the women’s movements, work in the same direction.\textsuperscript{82}

Another key element that has influenced the feminist public policy agenda in Uruguay, since the change of government in 2005, is the presence of women in a range of decision-making positions, including as heads of several ministries, many of whom come from the feminist, human rights and social movements (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1044). The head of INMUJERES, Ms Mazzotti, considered that despite the deficient institutional form of the Uruguayan NWM and the low levels of women’s political parity compared to other countries, the influence of the feminist agenda in the governmental sectoral policies and the leverage that

\textsuperscript{77} Questionnaire respondents 173, 174, 175 & 176.
\textsuperscript{78} Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
\textsuperscript{79} Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
\textsuperscript{80} Key informants 19, 20 & 21; author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women; questionnaire respondents 174, 175, 176 & 177.
\textsuperscript{81} Author’s participant observation as part of the Regional Feminist Meeting taking place in Uruguay in November 2017.
\textsuperscript{82} Key informant 21.
feminists had both within and outside the State to promote pro women initiatives was decisive in effecting positive change. In this process she identified the feminist and women’s movements as the key actors that need to be engaged to push for progressive reform and to avoid setbacks in this agenda. The engagement between women’s movements and government departments has developed over time, and from 1995 the State has recognised that the organised women’s movement has a role in monitoring the implementation of gender commitments by the State. It acknowledged that civil society organisations play a “credible” and constructive role in identifying the priorities for women and the gaps in the implementation of public policies to address gender issues, indicating the path for progressive reforms (Uruguay 2005a, p.20). This strategic role is recognised in all the Beijing regular reports (Uruguay 2015a, 2010, 2005a, 2000).

The government institutions give regular feedback to civil society organisations and society at large on progress achieved on the women’s rights agenda and challenges faced. As an example, a public feedback session was held by INMUJERES and representatives from the three State branches to widely disseminate the recommendations received by the State of Uruguay from the CEDAW Committee in 2016, discuss challenges and the way forward (Uruguay 2016). This is an exercise of accountability rarely seen in the region when States undergo the periodic assessment by the CEDAW Committee. Other examples include the regular participation of representatives from INMUJERES, including of its director Ms Mazzotti, together with leading representatives from the feminist and women’s movements, in nation-wide civil society marches, feminist campaigns or public television interviews to denounce the violation of women’s rights, to propose public policy and legislative changes or to discuss progress and setbacks in the implementation of specific gender measures.

An illustrative example is a public television interview held in 2016 with the director of INMUJERES and a leading feminist pro-abortion civil society representative to constructively discuss the progress in the implementation of abortion legislation, to educate the public about the existing abortion legislative measures and public services available for women, to take stock of challenges in the implementation of the legislation, and to identify strategies to overcome them (Mazzotti & Abracinskas 2016). In general, the NWM has come to be perceived as a positive forum for the promotion of women’s rights, that has the support of women’s groups as it is recognised by the government as a legitimate voice in public policy. This situation was

83 Author’s participant observation during the XIII Regional Conference on Women held in Montevideo, Uruguay, November 2016.
84 Author’s participant observation during the XIII Regional Conference on Women held in Montevideo, Uruguay, November 2016.
85 Author’s participant observation as part of her support to governments and civil society in CEDAW processes as well as exchanges with CEDAW Committee experts.
86 Author’s participant observation during more than five years working with NWMs and civil society in Latin America including regularly participating and supporting regional conferences, marches, meetings, campaigns and similar events across the region.
built on the long-term positive relationship that has existed between the NWM at its key constituents.

The status of the NWM

In 2018, the National Women’s Institute (INMUJERES) of Uruguay remained a “low” ranking entity attached to the Ministry of Social Development. It is exclusively dedicated to women’s issues and gender equality since 2005 (Uruguay 2005b, 2005c). Its institutional design and remit have remained unaltered during the three left-oriented administrations of President Tabaré Vásquez (2005-2010), President José Mujica (2010-2015) and President Vásquez’ second term in office (2015–2020). INMUJERES’ mission is described as “guaranteeing the material and symbolic equality conditions for the development of women as holders of rights” and “contributing to the sociocultural change so that social, interpersonal and collective relations are fostered in an equality, symmetric and democratic context, free of violence and of abuse of power, both in the public and private spheres” (Uruguay 2017). Like the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity in Chile, INMUJERES was set up primarily as an advisory body and does not directly implement programmatic initiatives. The latter are implemented by the Ministry of Social Development where it is located. Although it has the implementation of GM as part of its remit it has never fulfilled this function, this is partly due to its lack of capacity to effectively coordinate GM, but also because it has successfully focused on other aspects of its brief. Given its attachment to the Ministry of Social Development, INMUJERES does not have budget autonomy and does not participate in the government cabinet meeting. At these meeting it is represented by the Minister of Social Development. Unlike many other NWMs the level of responsibilities assigned to INMUJERES is coherent with its low status in the government hierarchy. Compared to other NWMs in the region, INMUJERES is well resourced. It was reported to have 100 staff members in 2015 (comparable to Chile which is a much larger country), and although this number was deemed to not be enough by some respondents, these staff positions were institutionally stable, were part of the budget, and had increased over the years.

The lack of adequate status, capacity and budget was identified by both governmental and civil society representatives as limiting the impact of INMUJERES. The CEDAW Committee, in line with its support for the international norm on NWMs, issued strong recommendations to the State of Uruguay in its latest report of 2016, to upgrade its women’s machinery to ministerial level with authority to directly coordinate all public policies and strategies for gender equality

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87 Questionnaire respondent 173.
88 Key informants 17 & 50.
89 Questionnaire respondents 173, 175 & 176.
INMUJERES is one of the few NWMs found in the region to be attached to a ministry of social affairs. However, the Ministry of Social Development is far from projecting the traditional gender orientation that other similar ministries in the region do. While women and children are the key target groups that the Ministry works for, it does so with the aim of addressing issues of care, work, gender and inequality (Filgueira, Gutiérrez & Papadópulos 2011, p.1044). When asked about how this institutional attachment affects the orientation of its work, a source close to INMUJERES admitted that even though its institutional location is not the most strategic to influence public policy, “what saves them” is the fact that the orientation of the government is progressive and open to “feminist demands”, including the female minister of social affairs overseeing INMUJERES.\(^{90}\) The same source made the following comparison with the ministries of women of other countries in the region:

We want INMUJERES to become a Ministry of Women and we have been fighting for it. However, if it is to become a ministry to shut its mouth and assent, [we would] better stay with our small institute [INMUJERES]. What is the point of having a Ministry of Women such as in Nicaragua or Paraguay where their ministers of women cannot push a pro-women agenda because it goes against the governmental agenda and the ministers are told with which women’s groups they can engage and with which they can’t? We want INMUJERES to become a Ministry of Women but not at the expense of losing its current credibility.\(^{91}\)

Despite its institutional constraints, the State has in many ways demonstrated its commitment to enable the NWM to fulfil its remit, albeit a limited one.\(^{92}\) One such demonstration is the consolidation of a network of inter-institutional mechanisms at a high level that allow INMUJERES to coordinate with other State and governmental institutions. Another is the existence of different sectoral policies, plans and gender units in most ministries and State branches, as well as at the local governmental level.\(^{93}\) The existence of mechanisms that allow the engagement of civil society organisations in the work of INMUJERES, including the existence of several tripartite mechanisms made up of State institutions and sectoral ministries, civil society and the NWM are also a sign of commitment to allow the NWM to have a prime role in policy coordination and to engage civil society. One such mechanism is the National Gender Council, created in 2007 by the Law of Equality of Opportunities and Rights (Uruguay 2007). This Council is an inter-institutional coordination mechanism presided by INMUJERES and integrated by representatives from all sectoral ministries, local governments, the legislative, the judiciary, academia and civil society to agree on intervention priorities and follow up on progress in the

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\(^{90}\) Key informant 47.
\(^{91}\) Key informant 47.
\(^{92}\) Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women; questionnaire respondent 173.
\(^{93}\) Author’s participant observation as part of her exchanges with UN Women colleagues in Uruguay and leading feminist and women’s organisations representatives.
implementation of gender commitments though public policy (Uruguay 2015a). Other instruments identified as conducive to enable INMUJERES to carry out its work are the design of national gender budgets, the existence of gender statistics and the regular gender training of civil servants. All informants from civil society expressed high regard for these mechanisms and initiatives as they were said to allow effective and regular engagement of key women’s groups by the NWM, all State branches and sectoral ministries. One informant expressed the view that women’s civil society groups generally felt “genuinely consulted on the different issues they represented,” whether on women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, women’s labour rights or women’s political representation. She further elaborated describing the common understanding that exists between the State and civil society groups working on women’s rights and gender equality:

Unlike other countries, in Uruguay State representatives do not dare go ahead with policy reforms without constructively involving and consulting civil society as they would be punished in the streets, on the ballots and in the media. This does not mean that we agree on everything, we often have opposing views, but we both know that the only way to move forward is to engage each other. 

The relative consolidation of the Uruguayan NWM in terms of becoming a viable vehicle to represent women’s priorities through public policy despite its severe institutional constraints has been accompanied by substantive progress in key gender indicators in Uruguay. In comparative terms, given its limited institutional setup, the role played by INMUJERES has not generally been that of taking the lead in promoting the adoption of concrete measures but rather advising and supporting measures proposed by State and government institutions, and civil society organisations, as well as supporting and monitoring their implementation. Such is the case for example of the enactment of pro women’s legislative measures proposed by parliamentarians or the provision of advisory services provided by sectoral ministries to women victims of violence.

Uruguay has ratified the CEDAW convention and its Optional Protocol. It has one of the most gendered normative frameworks in the region having adopted progressive gender equality legislation including on violence against women, the rights of domestic workers, the recognition of domestic care work, among others (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2016d, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6). Favourable legal and public policy developments have not stayed on paper but have been translated into concrete actions or have actually been preceded by the implementation of pro women and pro gender actions before changes were triggered in

94 Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
95 Key informants 19, 21, 47, 48 & 49.
96 Key informant 47.
97 Key informant 47.
As an example, Uruguay progressively constructed an integral State care system that specifically addresses gender inequalities, hailed as a success in the region (CEPAL 2014). Progress in this front was gradual and sustained long before a National Integral Care System was created by law, and before specific legislation was enacted on the universal right to care in 2015 (Uruguay 2015b).

Another example is the implementation of concrete public measures targeting domestic workers and raising awareness on their rights, jointly undertaken with trade unions. These preceded the adoption of specific national legislation in 2006 to extend the labour rights of domestic workers to the standards of other workers, including “provisions for an eight-hour workday, adequate food and housing for live-in domestic workers, and safeguards for domestic workers terminated because of pregnancy,” and Uruguay’s ratification of ILO’s Convention No. 189 on the rights of domestic workers in 2012, which made the country a world champion for being the first country to ratify this international convention (Human Rights Watch 2012).

Another area where Uruguay stands out is in sexual and reproductive rights with the ground-breaking legalisation of abortion in 2012 (Uruguay 2012), making Uruguay the only country in the region to allow abortion on all circumstances within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. The country is recognised as a model in the region for its integral approach to women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights. It is considered “the first Latin American country to offer a comprehensive and equal health care plan for the entire population”, including the provision by the government of “easily accessible information and counselling around family planning, with the ultimate goal of reducing the number of abortions” (Center for Reproductive Rights 2015, p.6). The country’s outstanding performance in this field is considered the result of a decade-long implementation of wide range social, health and education actions aimed at protecting women that began long before the legislation was finally changed in 2012 (Briozzo, Gómez, Tomasso & Faúndes 2016, p.22).

On the downside, Uruguay shows the worst performance in women’s political parity in the region (see Table 5, Chapter Three). Despite the adoption of electoral quota legislation in 2009 (see Appendix 10), the lack of progress in women’s political parity is attributed to profound weaknesses in the design of the quota legislation adopted, which has allowed political parties to manipulate its application, as well as the persistence of traditional patriarchal structures in political parties that continue to promote hegemonic gender roles (Delisa 2016, Martínez & Garrido 2013). This is an area where INMUJERES expressed a need to redouble efforts in favour of changing the mentality and behaviour of political parties (Delisa 2016). Although still below the region average the representation of women in the parliament has improved (see Table 6,

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98 Author’s participant observation as part of regular exchanges with UN Women colleagues in Uruguay, UN colleagues from other agencies, CEDAW Committee experts and leading feminist and women organisations representatives.
Chapter Three). In 2018, female representation in the upper house was 20.2 percent and in the lower house 29 percent (IPU 2018), still not a top performance compared to greater parity achieved in Bolivia (50 percent), Costa Rica (49 percent), Mexico (46 percent) and Nicaragua (46 percent). Yet, this has not impeded the adoption of some of the most progressive pro women reforms in the region. As a very illustrative example, in October 2012 when Uruguay adopted legislation to liberalise abortion, its female representation in the lower house was 12.1 percent and in the upper house or Senate 12.9 percent, the third bottom position in the region at the time (IPU 2012). Despite the lack of a critical mass of female legislators, the successful adoption of abortion legislation was attributed to the effective, concerted and constructive advocacy and lobbying efforts undertaken by the feminist and women’s movements who promoted public debate, engaged citizens, garnered the support of public institutions and society at large and built alliances with key legislators and political representatives, both male and female (Pousadela 2015).

Uruguay stands out as an example of a successful NWM even though it does not adhere the UN blueprint. It is successful in that it has legitimacy and relevance both in the eyes of civil society and of political parties. It has served a clear role in policy development, policy promotion and the monitoring of implementation. It has acted as a two-way bridge between civil society and the State and it has been a key actor in the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights.

**Conclusion**

Key aspects shared by both countries that contributed to the establishment of relatively effective NWMs include their almost unique democratisation processes, characterised by political stability and economic growth. Both countries rank top in the region in terms of economic affluence and development indicators and both managed to reduce their inequality gap, particularly during the ruling of left oriented governments from the mid-2000s. Women’s socio-economic status was historically one of the highest in the region and has continued to improve. The higher level of development has meant greater State investment in gender policies and an absence of dependency on foreign aid. Gender progressive developments have occurred despite a significant lack of progress in women’s formal representation in decision-making spaces compared to other countries in the region. Without reaching parity in positions of power, in both countries it was the role played by feminist-oriented women in concrete positions that allowed a promotion of pro women policies as well as having reached social consensus on them. Despite differences in the trajectories of their NWMs and a lack of compliance by Uruguay with the global standards on NWMs, both countries shared a profound positive perception from civil society and State actors towards their NWMs. The legitimacy and recognition that these institutions enjoy
indicated that the constructive engagement of State and civil society generally allowed the NWM to overcome institutional deficiencies, in particular true in the case of Uruguay. The comparably high levels of development found in Chile and Uruguay and the more egalitarian conscience imprinted in social policies made the pursuit of women’s equality widely accepted across sectors and ensured greater support across the spectrum of different institutions and social actors than in other countries of the region. In contrast to many NWMs in the region, the consolidation of the NWMs in these two countries benefitted from their smooth democratisation process and peaceful alternation of different parties in government. The support of gender advocates inside and outside the State and the generalised support from most Presidents undeniably gave them the political backing needed to perform their role. In both countries, the idea of having NWMs had the strong support of local constituencies and was not seen as a foreign import.

The Chilean NWM is one of the few NWMs in the region to have experienced most institutional stability since its inception. Its improved status and authority were accompanied by other conditions that enabled it to be more effective in pursuing its goals, such as improved capacity and resources from the State and a proactive engagement with internal and external actors.

In the case of Uruguay, despite not having what was considered by international actors as a strong institutional design, the NWM has become a recognised vehicle to represent and mediate women’s voices through its public policy role. The lack of institutional strength of the NWM was partly compensated by the fact that the pursuit of gender equality became the explicit aim of other State and governmental actors. The lack of compliance with the global norms on NWMs found in the Uruguayan case did not impede the country to achieve substantive progress in gender equality and women’s status. Uruguay is one of the countries in the region with the most liberal gender orientation policies including being the only country in the region to have liberalised abortion.

The outcome in terms of the effectiveness of the NWM in both countries was similar in spite of the differences in institutional design. The support of progressive governments and the legitimacy in the eyes of key constituents proved to be much more important factors in their relative success. They have both experienced in recent years in particular above average levels of resourcing. The case of Uruguay in particular indicates that the hierarchical status of an NWM, which plays such an important part of the international norm, may be insignificant compared to other factors.
Chapter Six. - Ineffective NWMs in Nicaragua and Bolivia

This chapter analyses the cases of Nicaragua and Bolivia. According to the measures of commitment used in Chapter Four both States had not demonstrated the will to allow the NWMs to become potentially effective vehicles for promoting gender equality or issues of women’s welfare. In the case of Nicaragua, this contrasts with a relative compliance with global norms on the institutional structure of NWMs, not found in the case of Bolivia. Features shared by these two case studies are under resourcing, over-reliance on foreign development aid and weak engagement with women’s groups. Both countries have historically been among the least developed in the region and have a history of political instability. The chapter will deal firstly with the case of Nicaragua and then Bolivia, it subsequently analyses the similarities and differences of these two cases and the way in which they illuminate the relationship between international norms and pro-women reform.

The case of Nicaragua: compliant but not committed?

Nicaragua remains one of the least developed countries in Latin America (World Bank 2018c), ranked as a medium human development country, 124 out of 189 in the global HDI, it is also one of the most unequal countries in the region in terms of GII (UNDP 2018a), although it gains eighteen positions in the HDI rank when GII is taken into account (see Table 3, Chapter Three). It is a relatively small country with a population of just over six million, the majority of the population (70 percent) are of mixed race (CIA 2018c). Its comparatively lower development level has historically meant that the country has been a recipient of significant amounts of international cooperation aid, making it very aid dependent. In 2010 Nicaragua ranked among the top ten recipients of Overseas Development Assistance in the world, both in terms of per capita and ratio to GDP aid receipts (Utz 2010, p.6,10). The recent history of the country has been marked by political instability and violence. In 1979 the left leaning Sandinista movement came to power and, in spite of their popularity, spent the following decade fighting a guerrilla war against the Contra movement, which was financed and armed by the US government. The country transitioned to a multi-party system in 1990, at which time the Sandinista party led by Daniel Ortega lost the elections. From 1990 to 2006 there were three conservative governments. Daniel Ortega returned to the Presidency in late 2006 and since that date has progressively centralised power in the hands of the executive in a process of “de-democratization and caudillismo” (Martí i Puig 2016). During each of these political phases Nicaragua had an NWM which took various forms. From the 2000s in line with international developments, Nicaragua improved women’s political parity indicators (see Tables 5 and 6, Chapter Three), and in 2018 women were 46 percent of the parliament (IPU 2018). In other policy areas its performance was weak with women
performing less well in terms of economic and welfare parity (see Table 7, Chapter Three). In gender normative and legal developments, Nicaragua experienced overall progress in the period 2007-2018 yet continues to rank at the bottom in the region (see Table 4, Chapter Three).

The case study discusses the trajectory of the NWM and the women´s agenda in each of the three key political phases between 1979 and the present. It then analyses the current NWM established in 2013 in terms of the compliance indicators discussed in Chapter Four and of the views expressed by key informants and in the survey.

The trajectory of the Nicaraguan NWM

The Sandinista Revolution in 1979 put an end to over four decades of authoritarian rule under the Somoza family dynasty (Torres-Rivas 2011, pp.337-374). This was followed by a decade long period of revolutionary government under President Daniel Ortega, which was destabilised by the US-backed Contras counterinsurgency that provoked a civil war in the 1980s, impoverishing the country and dividing the population (Torres-Rivas 2011, p.470). During the Sandinista government, Nicaragua was relatively progressive regarding the role of women (Disney 2008; Stoltz 1994), for example, it set up a Women´s Legal Office in 1983 to provide women with legal advice on divorce procedures, children’s maintenance, inheritance, property and other rights (Stoltz 1994, p.181). The Legal Office was “strategically located in the president’s office” with the intention that it would “have an impact on all stages of national planning” (Stoltz 1994, p.181). In spite of this action to benefit women, the Sandinista massive mobilisation of women for the revolutionary project did not lead to the prioritisation of a feminist agenda during the Sandinista government of the 1980s (Molyneux 1985). Although women played a key role, its related women organisations did not have autonomy from the party (Disney 2008; Stoltz 1994).

Nicaragua was commended99 for setting up one of the first NWMs in the region prior to democratisation, with the creation of INIM in 1987 (see Nicaragua 1987). INIM was similar to Chilean SERNAM as it was an autonomous entity and its head had ministerial status. INIM’s status at this time was comparatively stronger than that of SERNAM as it was a “medium” rank entity directly attached to the Presidency and its mandate combined a normative and operational role. INIM enjoyed visibility, autonomy and relative authority during the late 1980s.100 Its founding decree was progressive, on paper at least, describing the State’s desire to “eliminate discrimination against women and achieve their full integration to the social life of the country, by removing all the obstacles which impede their integration and equality, by means of fighting against all ideological, legal and social factors” (Nicaragua 1987, art.4). INIM was part of the Council of Ministers giving it a potentially influential role as part of governmental and sectoral

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99 Key informants 18, 23, 24, 31, 32 & 36.
100 Key informant 23.
decision-making with much of its work focused on addressing discrimination against women in the law.101

Notwithstanding the progress that was made in many areas, the fight against the Contras proved a battle that the Sandinista government could not win and, under the conditions of Peace Agreements signed in the late 1980s, multi-party elections were introduced in 1990. During the 1980s the lack of autonomy for women’s groups within the Sandinista party had led a number of Sandinista women leaders to leave the party and establish their own independent women’s organisations. The electoral defeat of the Sandinista party in 1990, accelerated this process and various feminist orientated NGOs were established as part of the NGO boom, driven by the availability of external funding that the country experienced in the 1990s (Serra Vásquez 2007, p.48; Ewig 1999; Stoltz 1994).

From 1991 until 2006, Nicaragua was led by the three neo-liberal conservative governments of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1996), Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2001), and Enrique Bolaños (2002-2006). All three were characterised by neo-liberal market-led economic reform including extensive privatisation programmes and drastic public-sector reform (Brown & Cloke 2005). A coalition of opposition parties under the leadership of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro - called the National Opposition Union – won the 1990 election. During Chamorro’s government, many women who had been part of the Sandinista party built relations between their recently founded NGOs and State and governmental institutions in spite of the overall conservative and anti-feminist position of the government (Close 2005; Kampwirth 1996). Chamorro, the only female President in Nicaraguan history, portrayed herself as “the mother of all Nicaraguans” and projected conservative and traditional values for women (Close 2005; Kampwirth 1996, p.67). Her administration supported concerted efforts to foster national reconciliation after the Contra war and to repair the damage to the country. In this context, the government had an open engagement with diverse socio-economic and political actors, including women’s organisations, without vetting their ideological orientation (Close 2005). This engagement followed the regional trend of women’s greater engagement with the State that exemplified democratisation processes across Latin America. This changed in 1997 during President Aleman’s openly anti-feminist, anti-international cooperation and anti-NGO government. NGOs, including feminist women’s organisations, became a target of political persecution because of their funding from cooperation aid, and in the case of some, because of their links with the opposition Sandinista party (Serra Vásquez 2007; Kampwirth 2003). Following the dramatic jailing of Aleman on corruption charges and the election of Enrique

101 Key informant 23.
Bolaños in 2001, relations between the government and civil society improved as Bolaños needed to distance himself from the previous administration (Serra Vásquez 2007, p.54).

During the period of conservative governments Nicaragua experienced an unprecedented growth of the anti-women’s rights movement (Lacombe 2009; Kampwirth 2008, 2003, 1996). This growth galvanised support from traditional anti-feminist groups such as the right and religious groups (Gooren 2010; Serra Vásquez 2007, p.59-60), as well as from the Sandinista party which had adopted an increasingly conservative position since its electoral defeat in 1990 (Kampwirth 2008).

During Chamorro’s conservative government (1990-1996), INIM maintained its design as an autonomous “medium” rank institution reporting directly to the Presidency and its head maintained its ministerial status.102 It continued to be a “normative body” and some of its areas of work remained largely the same as in the previous period (Nicaragua 1995a, p.39). However, the conservative orientation of the government influenced its prioritisation. In fact, Chamorro’s government was anti-feminist and it blamed the former Sandinista revolutionary government for the destruction of the family, the promotion of loose sexuality, a high divorce rate and an increase in women working outside the home (Close 2005; Kampwirth 1996). In this period INIM began to actively promote traditional family gender roles and values, the rhythm method as the only acceptable form of contraception and procreation as the fundamental purpose of sex (Stoltz 1994, p.186) leading to the loss of its former liberal feminist status. This shift in focus was marked as it stopped carrying out research on strategic issues and began implementing welfare projects that promoted women’s traditional roles with initiatives such organising sewing, cooking and beauty training workshops for women.103

Due to this radical change of orientation, INIM enjoyed the political support of President Chamorro who showed a desire to comply with global norms on NWMs provided they did not conflict with the conservative gender ideology of the government. As a result, during the Chamorro years, INIM had an active role in the promotion of key gender legislative and policy measures. Some were compatible with the family orientation of the government such as the creation of the first Women and Children’s Police Stations to address intra-family violence, and the creation of a National Commission on Violence Against Women (Nicaragua 1995a, pp.40-41). Others could be described as a top down compliance that did not have the capacity to modify the thrust of government policy including the adoption of the first National Plan for Women, and the coordination of gender awareness-raising campaigns and training for governmental institutions (Nicaragua 1995a, pp.40-41). These initiatives were strongly supported by

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102 Key informant 40.
103 Key informant 23.
international cooperation institutions (Nicaragua 1995a, pp.40-41) who played a vital role in their adoption.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1998, INIM was downgraded to a “low” level rank and attached to the Ministry of Family by President Arnoldo Alemán’s conservative administration (1997-2001) (Nicaragua 1998). This meant that INIM stopped participating in the governmental cabinet and was instead represented by the Minister of Family. INIM’s visibility, autonomy and influence drastically decreased and its budget was said to be insufficient to pay its staff meaning that its role was largely limited to the implementation of programmes and projects funded by international cooperation.\textsuperscript{105}

The Nicaraguan women’s movement organised massive protests to stop INIM’s relegation (Iniciativa para el Seguimiento de Beijing 2000, p.25) arguing that the Minister of the Family was “not aware of women’s rights” and would only promote his own conservative political project in relation to women (Iniciativa para el Seguimiento de Beijing 2000, p.25). The situation was made worse by President Aleman’s governmental antagonism towards some international cooperation agencies and also towards women’s organisations (Serra Vásquez 2007, p.50; Kampwirth 2003), which negatively impacted INIM’s work and funding.\textsuperscript{106} Feminist and women’s organisations critiqued the lack of governmental willingness to honour gender equality and women’s rights agreements and commitments (Kampwirth 2008; Iniciativa para el Seguimiento de Beijing 2000, p.24). Despite these constraints and thanks to the continued support of international cooperation, INIM implemented some successful initiatives, including the creation of a credit fund for rural women, the promotion of communal development banks, the creation of a Programme to Fight Gender Violence, and the promotion of a National Plan to Address Violence against Women, Children and Youth (Iniciativa para el Seguimiento de Beijing 2000, p.25).

INIM’s attachment to the Ministry of Family was maintained during President Bolaños’ administration (2002-2006). Under this government INIM undertook various gender equality initiatives, including supporting gender statistics, gender trainings and awareness-raising campaigns, and supporting the mainstreaming of gender across policy fields (Nicaragua 2005, p.15). These initiatives reflected the changing priorities of donors and international cooperation aid from an array of different UN agencies, bilateral cooperation banks and governmental bilateral cooperation and development agencies who effectively decided on these initiatives and also funded them.\textsuperscript{107} As a result of this relationship it was during Bolaños’ administration that Nicaragua’s first Gender Equality National Plan was adopted in 2006. Following the international blueprint for such initiatives, it was designed with the support of INIM’s Advisory Board where all ministries were represented, it was consulted with women’s organisations,\textsuperscript{108} and it was funded

\textsuperscript{104} Key informant 23.
\textsuperscript{105} Key informant 18.
\textsuperscript{106} Key informant 16, 18 & 23.
\textsuperscript{107} Key informants 23, 24, 31, 32, 35 & 37.
\textsuperscript{108} Key informant 18.
mainly by the Spanish Cooperation and Development Agency as part of its bilateral cooperation aid agreements with Nicaragua. A UN source acknowledged that the lack of institutionalisation of the Plan by sectoral ministries and the dominant role played by external cooperation actors demonstrated the extent to which it was not an integral part of government policy and the government had no commitment to ensuring its implementation.

The Sandinista government from 2006

When the Sandinista party regained power in the elections of late 2006 the party was under the undisputed leadership of Daniel Ortega (Martí i Puig 2010). Following the election, he has handed over half the power to his wife Rosario Murillo and she has acted as his closest political ally, First Lady, governmental spokesperson, coordinator of the Council of Communication and Citizenship, minister with special powers and, since 2017, Vice-President (Confidencial 2017). The “Presidential couple” (as the President and his wife are popularly called) have sought to perpetuate themselves in power by controlling all branches of the State and all governmental institutions, and by creating para-governmental entities that are loyal to them (Martí i Puig 2016; Almendárez 2009). They have expanded their electoral support using clientelist initiatives, including the appointment of family members and political allies to key positions (Confidencial 2017; Martí i Puig 2016, 2010; Almendárez 2009). The key structures to cement the populist base of their power are the Popular Power Councils and Family Cabinets that have been set up in every department and local community under the leadership of Rosario Murillo (Martí i Puig 2016; Almendárez 2009). The latter emphasised the conservative view of gender relations embraced by the government.

The anti-feminist direction in the party developed from the electoral defeat of the Sandinista party in 1990, over time the party lost many of its long-term progressive leaders and its intellectual members as it became less ideological and also less progressive (Martí i Puig 2010; Kampwirth 2008). During his sixteen years in the opposition, the main purpose of Ortega was to regain power (Martí i Puig 2010) and to achieve this end he made a pact with the Catholic and Evangelical right-wing elites (Martí i Puig 2010; Kampwirth 2008; Serra Vásquez 2007, p.50). This alienated the feminist movement from the Sandinistas. The rift had been reinforced from 1998 when Ortega was accused by his step-daughter Zoilamérica Narváez Murillo of having sexually abused her as a child in the 1980s while he was president (Jubb 2014; Lacombe 2009; Kampwirth 2008, pp.125-127). The strength of the anti-women’s movement stance that the Sandinista party had developed in the opposition is exemplified by its support to the legislation

109 Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UNDP Nicaragua.
110 Key informant 18.
adopted in late 2006 to criminalise therapeutic abortion, right before the party returned to power, and by its lack of support to reverse the measure once in government.

For more than 100 years, abortion had been recognised as “legal, legitimate and a necessary medical procedure” in the cases of risk to the life or health of women and girls and in cases of rape and incest (Amnesty International 2009, p.7). The impact of the legislative reversal on women’s reproductive and sexual rights was devastating. Amnesty International documented an increase in cases of denial or unacceptable delays in the treatment of obstetric complications, in the severe pain and suffering experienced by women and girls, in the criminalisation of medical professionals, in unsafe abortion practices and in maternal mortality and morbidity (Amnesty International 2009). This was a result of a campaign mounted by the Catholic and Evangelical religious elites who had given support to the Sandinista Party based on their promise to support the outlaw of therapeutic abortion and to maintain it when in government (Gooren 2010; Serra Vásquez 2007, p.59-60). In addition to the influence of religious elites, and the rise of the anti-women sentiments, the divisions within the feminist and women’s movements also contributed to the legislative setback (Reutersward, Zetterberg, Thapar-Bjoorkert & Molyneux 2011, pp.826-827). In the campaigning to reinstate therapeutic abortion that followed, the lack of independence of the Supreme Court from political influence also contributed to the failure to revise the ban (Reutersward, Zetterberg, Thapar-Bjoorkert & Molyneux 2011, pp.826-827), despite the exceptional high level of feminist and women’s activism and strong international condemnations. In these events the NWM was a passive bystander and the development of the NWM post 2006 has been defined by the political aims of the President and his wife.

Initially with the return of the Sandinista party to power, in spite of the banning of abortion, INIM regained its former visible position as it was again directly attached to the Presidency (Nicaragua 2007, art.4), an action that was initially welcomed by women’s organisations and leading feminists. However, it was soon evident that INIM’s decision-making was centralised in the hands of Rosario Murillo. In this situation the NWM lost visibility and legitimacy in the civil society sphere as it broke its relations with long standing feminist and women’s movements and organisations. The co-optation of the NWM by the government was seen as part of the long-term political project by the presidential couple to prolong their government beyond the five-year presidential period.

111 Key informants 10 & 18.
112 Author’s participant observation as part of her role in UNDP Nicaragua.
113 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN; key informants 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 31, 32, 35 & 37.
114 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at UNDP in Nicaragua; key informants 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 31, 32, 35 & 37.
115 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at UNDP in Nicaragua.
The Nicaraguan NWM was transformed into a Ministry of Women in 2013, however its capacity for action was limited. It has been described as “a Ministry by name only but not a Ministry in terms of ministerial status” as it has no budget that would allow it to work “to influence public policies or coordination with women’s organisations or civil society.”\(^{116}\) In the eyes of civil society organisations, the level of independence, authority and visibility of the Ministry of Women is lower than that of INIM during the previous conservative governments.\(^{117}\) Despite being a full ministry, the decisions of the NWM are controlled by Rosario Murillo. Both civil society and UN sources considered that she has controlled the NWM from the early days of government in 2007, annulling any authority of the NWM leader.\(^{118}\) Murillo was said to also use the NWM to mediate the distribution of perks and gifts to loyal supporters through the Popular Councils and Family Cabinets established in all communities under her control.\(^{119}\) Under Murillo the NWM is said to have become a political tool of the Presidential couple and to have only served those loyal to the government.\(^{120}\)

Murillo’s public discourses proclaim that Nicaragua is “Christian, socialist and giving \([\text{solidaria} \text{ in Spanish}]\)” and “is united in faith, family and community”, in contrast with the former revolutionary Sandinista party policies (Martí i Puig 2016).\(^{121}\) This shift, like its support to ban abortion, aimed to gain votes by winning the support of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches (Martí i Puig 2010; Sooren 2010). The accusation of sexual abuse against Ortega by his step-daughter in 1998 (Kampwirth 2008; Lacombe 2009) and Rosario Murillo’s support for Ortega rather than for her daughter during the scandal informed the government’s active promotion of reconciliation in cases of sexual abuse or other conflicts experienced in intra-family relations rather than legal and judicial action (Jubb 2014).\(^{122}\) The sexual scandal of 1998 contributed to the increasing anti-women’s policies of the Sandinista party (Lacombe 2009, p.74). For example, the NWM stopped supporting programmes related to justice for victims of sexual abuse.\(^{123}\) The government in 2016 also closed down the Women and Children’s Police Stations, which had been widely recognised for their work over twenty years in addressing the pandemic levels of women and children’s sexual abuse (McCoy 2016; Romero 2016). A key focus of the current Sandinista administration’s gender policy is the promotion of reconciliation between men and women and Christian family values, rather than on either gender equality, or on improving the social and economic position of women (Sooren 2010, p.50; Kampwirth 2008, p.122).

\(^{116}\) Questionnaire respondent 134.
\(^{117}\) Author’s participant observation; key informant 18.
\(^{118}\) Key informants 10, 18, 23 & 24.
\(^{119}\) Key informant 18.
\(^{120}\) Key informant 37.
\(^{121}\) Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN; key informants 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 31, 32 & 37.
\(^{122}\) Key informants 18, 24, 35 & 37.
\(^{123}\) Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN; key informants 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 31, 32 & 37.
The Nicaraguan Ministry of Women, in contrast to the Chilean and Uruguayan NWMs and to its own institutional predecessor (INIM), was limited to an operational role. Its work was centred around contributing, together with other sectoral ministries and departments, to the implementation of governmental flagship poverty alleviation programmes such as Zero Poverty and Zero Usury. These programmes were widely criticised as a populist ploy to increase the Sandinista electoral support (Martí i Puig 2016; Almendárez 2009) and were largely funded by international cooperation from Venezuela (Chamorro 2008).

In spite of this policy framework and a high level of internal criticism, Nicaragua has at a superficial level expanded its compliance with some international norms. Its constitution demonstrates a commitment to gender equality and it has a strong gender legislative framework in place (UN Women 2016a). However, the perception of the effectiveness of these measures is that they are ineffective as they exist on paper only and are not implemented. For example, the Law on Equal Rights and Opportunities adopted in 2008 was considered very progressive and, on paper, it addresses many of the issues\textsuperscript{124} that did not allow the NWM to perform its role in the past. The law identifies the government as responsible for guaranteeing the NWM’s participation “in strategic economic and social planning to guarantee a gender perspective and the application of the [Equal Rights and Opportunities] law” (Nicaragua 2008, articles 30-31). It also guarantees funding and human and material resources so that the NWM can carry out the duties mandated by this legislation (Nicaragua 2008, articles 33-34). The Equality Law also mandates the creation of a National Equality Council to be led by the President, coordinated by the NWM, with the purpose of supporting the implementation of the law in all parts of the governmental system and in non-governmental organisations (Nicaragua 2008, article 36). However, the law has so far not been implemented.\textsuperscript{125} This reflects the fact that Nicaragua is also one of only two countries in Latin America that have not signed up to the CEDAW Optional Protocol (see Appendix 7). As described in Chapter Two, this Protocol increases the powers of the CEDAW Committee to monitor the implementation of the Convention, establishes reporting and investigation mechanisms and allows the CEDAW Committee to receive complaints from individuals or investigate "grave or systematic violations" of the Convention (OHCHR 2017d).

During the 2006 election campaign Ortega promised to appoint a 50/50 male/female cabinet (Confidencial 2017) and a 50/50 parity distribution in the appointments to public positions (World Economic Forum 2015). Once in government, legislation mandating parity in the representation of men and women in local public positions was enacted, leading to a significant

\textsuperscript{124} The law reaffirms the role of the NWM as a governing body charged with the provision of advice and coordination for the design, implementation and evaluation of all public policies with a gender perspective at the national, regional and local governmental levels, including the implementation of the legislation on equality of opportunities and the regular reporting on progress achieved (Nicaragua 2008, articles 30-31).

\textsuperscript{125} Key informants 18, 23, 24, 31, 32, 35 & 37.
increase of women’s political representation in the local elections. However, the application of parity in practice has meant that only women loyal to the Presidential couple were appointed to public positions. Similarly, the good performance of Nicaragua in terms of the percentage of women in parliament, has been the adoption of an international norm, that has not led to a substantive improvement in policies impacting on women.

The position of the NWM

Formally, the Ministry of Women established in 2013 is the normative entity charged with the design, promotion, implementation and evaluation of policies, plans and programmes that guarantee women’s participation in economic, social, cultural and political processes (Nicaragua 2013, art. 3). These include the promotion of policies and reforms to end discrimination against women; to represent the State in international fora on women, and to attract and to manage funds aimed at women’s programmes and actions (Nicaragua 2013, art.3). The Ministry is considered to have a limited scope of action in spite of its high rank, especially when compared to the former INIM during the Sandinista government of the 1980s. There is also a disconnect between its stated functions and its actual actions.

Despite being instructed to collaborate with international inter-governmental institutions and bodies specialised in women’s issues (Nicaragua 2013, art.3), the Ministry of Women does not play an active role in supporting the State’s monitoring and reporting on progress in the fulfilment of its obligations regarding gender equality and women’s rights vis-à-vis international human rights bodies. In fact, since the Sandinista party returned to power, the State of Nicaragua has stopped reporting to some international human rights bodies such as the CEDAW Committee (see Appendix 7). This lack of engagement with the CEDAW Committee was considered by UN sources, women’s organisations and feminists a manifest indication of the government’s lack of commitment to women’s rights and of its profound disregard for the State’s human rights obligations. It was described as “a slap on women’s faces” and a further indication of its unwillingness to ensure gender equality given that the previous conservative governments had complied with the State’s obligation to report to the CEDAW Committee, “even if only to keep an appearance.”

The Ministry’s role is invisible in other key inter-governmental women and gender related meetings at the regional and global level such as the periodic Regional Conferences on Women convened by ECLAC or the annual regional consultations ahead of CSW convened by UN

126 Also known as Law 50/50 (see Nicaragua 2007).
127 Key informants 23, 24, 31, 32 & 37.
128 Key informants 10, 18, 23, 31, 32 & 37.
129 Key informant 37.
130 Key informant 32.
Unlike other States where NWM leaders are designated to attend, Nicaragua is typically represented by a diplomat or civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than by the Minister of Women. Invariably, the position of the governmental representative from Nicaragua vis-à-vis the issues being discussed related to women’s rights and gender equality is one of the most conservative ones in the region. At the global CSW periodic sessions for example, Nicaragua tends to align with the Vatican and with the block of conservative governments from around the globe. This demonstrates the degree of control exerted by the executive over the NWM and the conservative position it regularly endorses regarding women’s issues, and the fact that the upgrade of the NWM into a full-fledged high-ranking Ministry did not mean autonomy or a pro women orientation.

The resourcing of the NWM

The Ministry of Women is responsible for seeking and managing foreign aid funds dedicated to women’s initiatives (Nicaragua 2013, art. 3). This implies that it is in charge of ensuring its own financial sustainability by attracting funds from donors. It is evident that the NWM in Nicaragua has significantly depended on international foreign aid for its functioning and for the implementation of programmatic initiatives. Since its creation, a considerable amount of INIM’s funds came from international cooperation aid, which according to one key informant had given it a certain degree of autonomy and independence. This is similar to the support found in Chile where international cooperation is considered to have given SERNAM a financial boost in its initial years. However, unlike the case of Chile, INIM’s budget was not improved over the years reflecting a lack of support from the government. During President Alemán’s administration, feminist and women’s movements denounced the clear disregard of the executive for women’s issues given the allocation of only 2.7 percent of the budget of the Ministry of Family to INIM, which corresponded to 0.003 percent of the general State budget for 1999 (Iniciativa para el Seguimiento de Beijing 2000, p.25). In contrast, INIM benefitted from the political support of President Enrique Bolaños’ administration (2002-2006) experiencing a budget allocation increase from 0.03 percent for the period 1993-2001 to 0.04 percent in 2001 and 2002 (Nicaragua 2005, pp.15-19). Still, President Bolaños’ government recognised that INIM’s budget was insufficient to adequately accomplish its mission (Nicaragua 2005, pp.15-19) and, many of the initiatives during his government were also heavily funded by international cooperation.
It was not possible to determine the exact level of the State’s budget allocated to the Ministry of Women since its creation in 2013. A press article of March 2018 reported that the budget of the Ministry of Women was almost one million dollars per year (see Espinoza 2018). It estimated that the equivalent of approximately 99.5 percent of that budget was spent on “salaries, per diem and administrative expenses” and the remaining 0.05 percent on training (Espinoza 2018).

Most questionnaire respondents agreed that the State did not allocate sufficient financial, human or technical resources to the NWM and that situation has been made worse as the deterioration of governance and democracy in Nicaragua, as well as the global financial crisis of 2008, have led many donors to withdraw their support and close their programmes, including those that funded the NWM. UN sources close to the government indicated that all projects funded by international cooperation were under the scrutiny of the President’s wife and that some had been forced to close down if found to engage with anti-government civil society groups.137 Another informant stated that “given the high politicisation of all State powers and governmental entities, most of the funds the Ministry of Women received were probably destined to support the government position, not to meet the demands of women’s movements.”138

The organisational chart of the Ministry of Women available in the governmental website shows the existence of a large Division on Foreign Aid and Projects (Nicaragua 2018), indicating that international cooperation has continued to fund many of the Ministry’s initiatives. Yet, given the lack of transparency and the centralisation of information that characterises President Ortega’s government, it was not possible to access concrete information on the budget coming from international cooperation or on the initiatives implemented with these funds. Historically, initiatives funded by international cooperation included the salaries of project technical personnel and support staff given the lack of stable and adequate human resources of the NWM.139 The existence of the Division on Foreign Aid and Projects within the NWM indicates that this trend has continued during Ortega’s rule.

The relationship of the NWM with key actors

In the current period the Ministry has become completely detached from feminist and women’s organisations, with the exception of Sandinista partisan groups. The high centralisation of power and decision-making has led to an “institutional paralysis” that has been criticised by many leading feminists and representatives from women’s organisations.140 The transformation of INIM into a Ministry of Women has been described as the “institutionalisation of more

137 Key informants 10 & 18.
138 Key informant 11.
139 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN and key informants 10, 11 & 18.
140 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN and key informants 10, 11 & 18.
bureaucracy without advancing women’s rights”. The new ministry is perceived to promote the presidential couple’s subtle “misogyny” alongside traditional family values. Most civil society respondents agreed that there had been a lack of engagement of feminists and women’s groups by the State and a closure of dialogue and of democratic spaces in which they could operate.

One symptom of the high centralisation of power was the high turnover of the heads of the NWM, generating significant institutional instability and uncertainty. During the period 2007-2018 the Nicaraguan NWM has been led by nine different leaders. All the heads of the NWM were appointed by President Ortega and his wife and they were removed from office if they did not demonstrate unwavering loyalty and subservience to the government. Both the high rotation of the head of the NWM, the lack of relevant experience of those appointed and their failure to engage with civil society have been widely criticised by women and feminist organisations (Espinoza 2018; Miranda 2013). Relations between the NWM and civil society were also strained by President Ortega’s political persecution of key representatives from the feminist and women’s organisations who had supported his step-daughter during the sexual abuse scandal (Jubb 2014; Lacombe 2009). There was also a more general targeting of women’s organisations, with those most likely to be targeted working on women’s sexual and reproductive rights, violence against women and related issues. Two of the personally targeted feminists (both members of the Women’s Autonomous Movement and former members of the Sandinista party) described their experience as “vindictive” persecution.

As a result of these events the Ministry of Women had not enjoyed a productive relationship with civil society that represents a woman’s rights constituency. The only civil society organisations with which it effectively engages are the partisan organisations created by the government. The role of these organisations was criticised by many questionnaire respondents as being limited to clientelist initiatives led by the government such as the handing over of food

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141 Key informant 37.
142 Questionnaire respondent 134.
143 Questionnaire respondent 137.
144 These are Emilia Torres, Rita Fletes, Claudia Cerda López, Lilia Alfaró, Perla López, Isabel Green Casaya, Arlén Patricia Vargas Padilla, Martha Érica Martínez González and Ángela Yadira Meza Vargas.
145 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN; key informants 10, 11 & 18. See also Espinoza (2018).
146 Author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN; key informants 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 31, 32, 35 & 37.
147 See Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres de Nicaragua (2009) for a detailed chronology of the politically motivated persecution and criminalisation of leaders of the women’s movement by President Ortega’s government between 2007 and 2009.
148 Key informants 24 & 35.
149 Questionnaire respondent 130.
vouchers or the coordination of the governmental flagship clientelist initiatives in exchange of political support.\textsuperscript{150}

The appointment in 2014 of Minister of Women, Ms Ángela Yadira Meza Vargas, was denounced by feminist and women’s organisations as they argued that she was completely “unknown” in either political or civil society circles (Miranda 2016). The weakness of the ministry is also emphasised by its absence from the public media. Information about the work of the NWM is only found on government-controlled media channels, which is typical of all other governmental institutions, and when the work of the NWM is covered it is usually represented by Rosario Murillo and not by the Minister of Women.\textsuperscript{151} According to a UN source, the gender reports that the Ministry of Women is periodically required to submit to international organisations are generally written from the Presidency’s office.\textsuperscript{152} The dominance of the presidential office is also demonstrated by the fact that any formal engagement with the Ministry needs to be channelled through it and requires the authorisation of the President’s wife.\textsuperscript{153} Nicaragua, together with Argentina, were the only two NWMs that did not fill out the survey questionnaire applied by the thesis with the support of UN Women, neither did the country acknowledge receipt of the invitation to fill it out in spite of several formal requests being sent by UN Women’s Regional Office directly to the Minister of Women, to the Presidency and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The non-response was in itself a strong indication of the lack of autonomy and of effectiveness of the NWM. At the time the questionnaire was applied, UN Women funded and implemented programmatic initiatives with the Ministry of Women and, as with the application of the questionnaire, all communications related to these programmes had to be channelled through the Presidency. In March 2018, the Minister of Women was described as “little known” in a press article titled “Ministry of Women - what for?” questioning the lack of relevance for women of this Ministry (Espinoza 2018).

Although Nicaragua has a full-fledged ministry, the State has damaged and co-opted the relations that a potentially effective NWM needs to develop with key external constituents. Nicaragua has created a high-ranking Ministry of Women that is expected to be loyal to the governmental, political and personal interests of the President. In 2018, the president of the Coordinadora de Mujeres Rurales denounced that “for [rural women] the ministry does not exist, maybe it benefits other women but not those organised under [the Coordinadora]” (Espinoza 2018). A UN source summarised the relations of the NWM with civil society organisations as follows:\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{150} Questionnaire respondents 134 & 138; author’s participant observation as part of her roles at the UN and key informants 10, 11 & 18.

\textsuperscript{151} Key informant 18; questionnaire respondent 143.

\textsuperscript{152} Questionnaire respondent 130.

\textsuperscript{153} Author’s participant observation as part of her UN roles.

\textsuperscript{154} Questionnaire respondent 18.
The involvement of the Ministry of Women is mainly with the organisations created by the political governmental structure and with those with which it has affinity. These are organised at the local, municipal, department and national level. Other civil society organisations that do not share affinity with the government are not taken into account.

Relationships with external actors in this area have also deteriorated. The role of international donors was not without problems. International cooperation financed initiatives that reflected their own policy objective even if sometimes this meant duplicating existing initiatives. In 2008 an advisory Gender Technical Unit was set up within the National Assembly Modernisation Commission as part of a UNDP funded programme. The purpose of this unit was to revise all legislative proposals and to mainstream gender across them to guarantee that all new legislation was non-discriminatory or contravened international human rights instruments. This unit was seen as a duplication of the role of the Women’s Commission existing within the National Assembly since 1991. It was also not clear how or whether it coordinated with the NWM as the normative entity in charge of mainstreaming gender across legislation and polices. The Gender Technical Unit was closed down in 2017 as part of a restructuring of the National Assembly (Navas 2017). In 2015, one of its main promoters and funders, UNDP, had been asked by the government to end its operations in the country. The existence of this unit can be interpreted as an indication that the NWM was not performing its advisory role that was at the core of UN strategies.

Despite being, in form, a full-fledged Ministry of Women, the Nicaraguan NWM is an ineffective institution that cannot support the promotion of women’s equality through public policy. Its institutional trajectory is marked by reforms the have been driven by a narrow set of political needs, focused on enhancing the power of the presidency. The NWM has not been allowed to develop working relationships with its key constituents. Even though it has been dependent on foreign aid, it has also been prevented from engaging with international organisations and in international networks.

The heightened centralisation of power by the Presidential couple and their dismantling of the democratic system has further polarised the relations between the State and civil society and led to increased political tensions (Martí i Puig 2016, 2010). In April 2018, the non-democratic actions of the government caused increasing social discontent and sparked a political and socio-economic crisis, the worse since the civil war of the 1980s. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has reported that the government response to the protests has been “characterised by multiple forms of repression and other forms of violence that resulted in

155 Key informant 41.
156 Key informant 45.
157 Author’s participant observation as part of her UN roles.
thousands of victims, including approximately 300 deaths and 2,000 persons injured” (OHCHR 2018, p.7). The case of the treatment of the NWM is an illustrative example of the type of governmental strategic actions that have led to the current crisis. The fragile state of the democratisation process and the interference of powerful anti-feminist political and religious interests have created a gulf between the aspirations of the organised women’s movement and State action. In these circumstances, although the State may choose to establish an institution that can superficially conform to international norms, it cannot be effective. In the case of Nicaragua, the NWM, especially post 2006, has been irrelevant to promoting women’s rights or welfare in the State.

**The case of Bolivia: non-compliance and non-commitment?**

Bolivia is a case of generalised non-compliance with global norms on NWMs and lack of commitment on the part of the government to allow the NWM to fulfil its stated objectives. Like Nicaragua, Bolivia has historically been one of the least developed countries in Latin America, very dependent on foreign aid and subjected to significant instability. In the last decade, the country experienced significant socio-economic and political shifts. It shows the greatest improvement in women’s political parity in the region (see Table 5, Chapter Three) and one of the top worldwide in terms of female parliamentarian representation, with 53.1 percent of women in the Legislative Assembly and 47.2 per cent in the Senate, the second position after Rwanda (IPU 2018). It also shows significant progress in gender legal and public policy developments in the period 2007-2018, jumping from position seven to four in the region (see Table 4, Chapter Three).

Bolivia has over eleven million inhabitants and its population is 68 percent mestizo (of mixed white and Amerindian ancestry), 20 percent indigenous (predominantly Quechua and Aymara), and 5 percent white (CIA 2018a). Like Nicaragua, Bolivia recently graduated from being considered a lower-income to a middle-income country. However, it is still one of the poorest countries in Latin America with a HDI position 118 in the global scale and one of the most unequal in the region (UNDP 2018a), although it gains sixteen positions in the HDI rank when GII is considered (see Table 3, Chapter Three). Like Nicaragua, Bolivia has been very dependent on foreign aid and in 2010 it also ranked among the top ten recipients of Overseas Development Assistance in the world according both to per capita and ratio to GDP aid receipts (Utz 2010, p.10).

After several decades of military coups and authoritarian regimes, civilian rule was restored in the country in 1982. Bolivia was however deeply convulsed by political instability, economic crises and unresolved social struggles. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Bolivia followed an orthodox neoliberal economic model, undertaking significant State reforms to meet
externally imposed economic targets (Montaño 1998, p.4). Yet, despite important institutional reforms initiated in the mid-1980s, the legitimacy and efficiency of the State was never fully established (UNDP 2003, p.29). Bolivian politics is depicted as having traditionally operated based on a historically rooted clientelist system, benefitting mainly urban middle-class middle-age white men (UNDP 2003, p.29). This policy regime was supported by the country’s high dependency on foreign aid and the leverage that this gave to foreign international organisations and the government of the United States to influence its internal policies (Ichuta 2008).

The continuous political instability experienced throughout the second half of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in disruption of public policy initiatives as governments frequently changed. This culminated in a period of extreme social, economic and political instability - between 2001 and 2006 Bolivia had five different presidents (two of whom were forced to resign). In the first half of the 2000s, Bolivia was intensely divided along class, race and geographic lines, out of which two blocks emerged: a leftist oriented indigenous group made up of peasant and worker organisations, and a bourgeois block made up of groups representing agroindustry, financial and petroleum capital (Webber 2010, p.51).

In late 2005 leftist Evo Morales was elected President, the country’s first indigenous president. President Morales has since been re-elected in 2009 and 2014 after the Constitutional reform of 2009 allowed for his re-election. His administrations have been characterised by a positive shift in the human development paradigm of the country driven by an agenda of substantial socio-economic and political reforms (Durana 2012; Mendonça & Santaella 2010). President Morales’ political project actively promotes the formal recognition of the diversity of the population and the involvement of traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous people, women and youth, in decision-making and representative spaces (Durana 2012; Agreda 2012, p.62; Mendonça & Santaella 2010). A key process in this new political project was the Proceso Constituyente (constituent process) led by Morales during which social movements from across the country were consulted and involved in the design of the reorganisation of the State and of its relations with civil society (Agreda 2012, p.62). This process led to the adoption in 2009 of the new Constitution that defines Bolivia as a multicultural and multi-ethnic nation, reflecting its ethnic diversity, and recognises different forms of political representation and mechanisms of direct democracy (Agreda 2012; Mendonça & Santaella 2010, p.190). The Constitution also reflects the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination (Agreda 2012, p.65). The shift in the development paradigm was signalled in the “National Development Plan: Dignified, Sovereign, Productive, and Democratic Bolivia” (Bolivia 2007). Both the Plan and the Constitution were conceived based on the “good living” concept derived from the Quechua principle suma qamana which promotes the wellbeing among individuals and the equilibrium between humans and nature. The manner in which the aspirations of this new development model
have been put in practice and their impact on women’s rights and gender equality have been criticised by some feminist commentators (Vega 2013).

Prior to the Morales presidency, the Bolivian women’s movement was characterised by tensions and fragmentation (UNDP 2003, p.30). The gender agenda was led by the “institutionalised” urban middle-class feminist and women’s organisations, generally excluding indigenous, rural, working class and peasant women from outside the capital city. The gender agenda promoted by the “institutionalised” movement reflected the feminist and pro-women orientation that was embodied in international norms, however it was not representative of the majority of Bolivian women. This situation was reversed when Morales was elected president, his sweeping reforms benefitted historically excluded grassroots women’s groups such as indigenous, rural and peasant women, many of whom could directly engage with the State for the first time. How beneficial this change in policy direction has been for women’s equality is a debated issue.

The trajectory of the Bolivian NWM

Bolivia was comparatively late in establishing an entity dedicated to women’s issues after the country’s return to democracy in the early 1980s. It was only in 1993 that a Women’s Programme was created within the National Secretariat for Ethnic, Gender and Generational Affairs (FLACSO 1994b). The National Secretariat was located in a newly created Ministry of Human Development which had the overall aim of promoting development and reducing poverty. The location and focus of the Secretariat meant that the focus of the work was not on promoting gender equality or women’s rights but on addressing women’s poverty conditions (FLACSO 1994b), with the Women’s Programme having the stated aim of addressing women’s issues as a “significant social investment” (UNDP 2003, p.33). Actions undertaken by the State to address women’s issues under this logic included initiatives such as reducing maternal mortality, improving women’s access to education and promoting their productive role (UNDP 2003, p.33) all of which are desirable objectives given the levels of poverty in Bolivia. However, these initiatives were undermined by the State’s lack of human and financial resources and its “resistance” to policies that would improve them (UNDP 2003, p.33).

In 1998, the Secretariat was reformed by governmental decree becoming the Vice-ministry of Gender, Generational and Family Affairs, attached to the Ministry of Development and Planning (Bolivia 1998), maintaining the focus on development and poverty reduction. The entity applied a GM focus in its work in the context of development policy and its mission was described as promoting the achievement of “equal opportunities for women and men in the

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158 Key informants 7, 51, 53 & 56.
framework of sustainable human development and strengthening democracy in politics, society, the economy and the family” (Bolivia 2000, p.2). This position reflected a dominant concern of the international community at this time (Guzmán & Bonan 2008; Guzmán 2004). As part of its advisory role, the Vice-ministry was officially assigned the task of supporting a wide range of legal reforms and sectoral policies and programmes, involving inter-institutional and inter-sectoral coordination (Bolivia 2000). In this period, the first ever Plan for Equal Opportunities was adopted in 1997 and the NWM was identified as a key institutional actor in this process with donors playing a strong role in these developments (Bolivia 2000, p.10).

These reforms were influenced by the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, as well as the Regional Conferences on Women and the concerted efforts undertaken by women within and outside the State, who had taken part in these international processes. It was also a result of the actions of international cooperation institutions who provided funding to ensure the implementation of the Beijing commitments (UNDP 2003, pp.37-39). Even though there was a change of government in 1997, many of the existing gender initiatives and policies were honoured by the new government and continued to be implemented (UNDP 2003, p.39). There was a shift of emphasis in what was being supported by donors and more attention was given to the work on GM across all institutions and policies (UNDP 2003, p.39; SIDA 2002, p.12). Although some governmental and institutional actors who opposed an emphasis on gender equality and particularly the attempt to make GM a key role of the NWM, it was a strategy that was being prioritised by international cooperation funders who were demanding its implementation in return for development aid (UNDP 2003, p.39).

In 2002 the Vice-ministry was replaced by a new entity created by law with a focus on women’s issues only (Bolivia 2002). This new entity was the Vice-ministry of Women, attached to the Ministry of Peasantry, Indigenous, Gender and Generational Affairs. It continued to focus on GM as its main strategy (SIDA 2002, p.12). In 2003 the NWM was transferred to the Ministry of Sustainable Development (Bolivia 2003). These changes were expected by donors to allow the NWM to better oversee the processes of public policy making across different sectors, even if it was still within a development framework. In this period, the NWM contributed to several policy instruments such as the adoption of Bolivia’s National Plan for Gender Equity (2001-2003), reflecting different sectoral commitments to achieve gender equality (Bolivia 2005, pp.2-4; SIDA 2002, p.12). It also contributed to the adoption of a National Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Gender Violence and a Programme for the Reduction of Women’s Poverty (2001-2003) (Bolivia 2005, pp.2-3; SIDA 2002, p.12). These and other similar gender equality policies and plans adopted in this period were considered by donors as a sign of the acknowledgement that gender needs had to be dealt with by all sectoral institutions (UNDP 2003, pp.38-39; SIDA 2002, p.12).
The coercive nature of the relationship between international cooperation institutions and the government shaped the gender developments in this period, the outcomes were donor led and did not reflect the policy objectives of the governments. For example, the pressure exerted by Sweden and Holland were determinant in the restructuring of the NWM as it was a \textit{sine quoi non} condition to ensure the continuity of their funding as reflected in a report commissioned by these two donors (SIDA 2002, p.22). This process of coercion was documented by the donors in the SIDA report of 2002 that described how, in the negotiations with the government in 1999, “the Swedish delegation maintained an intensive dialogue with the Bolivian Ministry of Sustainable Development” which at that time was overseeing the NWM, and both Sweden and Holland proposed “a series of changes to the [NWM]” because in their opinion there was an “institutional crisis of the [NWM]” that included “the lack of definition of its responsibilities” and “the lack of political willingness to support the [NWM]” (SIDA 2002, p.22). The report goes on to state that it “was made clear [to the government] that, in case these issues were not addressed, Sweden and Holland would find it impossible to continue justifying their support to the [NWM]” (SIDA 2002, p.22). At this time Sweden and Holland were the only donors supporting the NWM and, to force the government to undertake the reforms they proposed, they suspended their subsidies in 1999 and 2000 (SIDA 2002, p.22). In addition, as a result of this pressure three National Gender Plans were presented and officially adopted by the government in 2001 (SIDA 2002, p.22).

The Bolivian government acknowledged that most of its gender work continued to be heavily financed by international cooperation and that the NWM lacked the adequate status to influence decision-making circuits, including budgeting decisions (Bolivia 2005, p.7). It recognised that the NWM faced challenges regarding a lack and high rotation of qualified human and technical resources, as well as the instability caused by the political changing context which impeded the implementation of many of the initiatives undertaken (Bolivia 2005, pp.27-28). The above-mentioned report on the role of Swedish and Dutch cooperation for gender initiatives in Bolivia across a ten-year period (SIDA 2002) indicates that the gender financial, technical and human support provided by international cooperation funders was a permanent feature in the country and supported not only the NWM itself but also the GM work undertaken by sectoral ministries.

The government considered that its relations with women’s civil society organisations were reasonably good in this period. As an example, common priorities were jointly identified between civil society and the NWM as reflected in a Minimum Gender Agenda, subsequently adopted under the coordination of the NWM with the support of the three branches of the State (Bolivia 2005, pp.2-3). This Minimum Agenda was translated into a Legislative Agenda that prioritised thirteen different legal reforms to be undertaken during the period 2008-2012, reflecting women’s concerns as a roadmap for the State’s legislative work (Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012; Bolivia 2005, p.6). Additionally, the government stated that progress in the
achievement of gender equality commitments was ensured via the establishment of institutional mechanisms that guaranteed the participation of civil society organisations (Bolivia 2005, p.2). However, many of these mechanisms and modes of engagement between the government and civil society organisations were also coordinated, mediated, and funded by international cooperation. One key coordination forum was the gender equality donors group (*Mesa de Donantes*) gathering most UN agencies and bilateral donors interested in funding and supporting gender work in the country.¹⁵⁹ This forum often allowed the participation of the “organized women’s movement”, considered to represent the “institutionalised” women’s organisations, so that they could interact with the State and international cooperation (UNDP 2003, p.30; SIDA 2002, pp.23-24). Many of these organisations were financially supported by donors themselves. As an example, Swedish and Dutch cooperation significantly contributed to the work of the *Coordinadora de la Mujer*, one of the main feminist networks and a key interlocutor with international cooperation institutions and the State (SIDA 2002, p.26), representing more than twenty Bolivian feminist and women’s organisations (*Coordinadora de la Mujer* 2012). The engagement with civil society groups working on gender was often restricted to urban middle-class organisations and did not involve indigenous women or women organisations based outside the capital city. This was acknowledged by donors themselves:

> The firm support to the Coordinadora de la Mujer has elevated the leverage capacity on gender issues in the political arena, although it has limited the reach of the direct dialogue with indigenous women. Even if it is an instrument of defence of certain gender aspects, the Coordinadora de la Mujer does not represent the practical and strategic interests of the totality of Bolivian women [original underlining]. Indigenous women hence lack representation in donors’ fora and in international dialogue fora (SIDA 2002, p.26).

This weakness would influence government attitudes to the NWM and to the State’s relationship with civil society under the Morales presidency.

Overall, the vulnerability and institutional volatility of the NWM was a reflection of the reality of the country and a reflection of the State (UNDP 2003, pp.39-41). It is evident that, being characterised by political and economic instability, crises and dependency on foreign aid, Bolivia was subjected to donors’ policies and priorities. This openly coercive relationship cannot be overlooked in assessing the changes experienced by the NWM. The period 1998–2003 was described by a UNDP Gender Report as being characterised by a profound institutional weakening of the NWM given a series of factors including the withdrawal of much international cooperation funding, the weakening of the support of the “institutionalized” women’s movement, technical capacity limitations as well as pressures from international cooperation organisations that sought to continue their financial support (UNDP 2003, p.39). Indeed, many of the “gender achievements” of this period such as the adoption of laws, polices and plans that were never

¹⁵⁹ Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
implemented or showed little concrete results were described by UNDP as “achievements on paper” (UNDP 2003, p.41). In this scenario, it is understandable that the gender initiatives heavily supported by external actors were dismantled if the funding ended, especially in the context of the comparatively low level of development of the State, unless the government was convinced of a strong need to continue supporting them.

Despite the challenges faced, many questionnaire respondents considered that the Vice-ministry of Women created by law in 2002 had been relatively more effective than the one existing when the questionnaire was applied in 2015. However, this view may reflect the fact that internationally networked organised women’s groups had stronger links with the NWM of this period. One civil society respondent stated that its status had deteriorated across the years as “at some point it was a Vice-ministry [of Women], now it is part of a Directorate [for the Prevention and Eradication of All Forms of Violence based on Gender or Age] with less status”. Another civil society respondent reflected on the key features that characterised the Bolivian NWM in 1995 in comparison to the NWM of 2015 as follows:

[...] although [the NWM] did not have a high hierarchical status [in 1995], it had great impact because of its willingness to engage the diversity of civil society organisations and because of its highly qualified human resources. If the NWM [in 2015] had a high hierarchical status, willingness to work with civil society organisations and highly qualified human resources together with an adequate budget, the life of Bolivian women would be very different and if we row together in the same direction we can achieve this, instead of excluding and criticising each other which is what the patriarchal system seeks.

This view, given the documented weakness of the NWM from its inception could be partly seen as criticism of the policy orientation of the current NWM and the loss of influence of the women’s organisations based on well-educated urban women.

The relationship of the NWM with key actors

Since the election of Evo Morales to the Presidency, feminist and women’s organisations have not supported the NWM as they did during previous governments. They have accused it of working under the “State tutelage, in an authoritarian and very little democratic manner, vetoing the participation of some organisations and institutions” (Estrada 2012, p.46). However, this language is the language of a political opposition and cannot be taken as evidence that there are more institutional problems with the current NWM than with its predecessor as it was never a strong entity. Similarly, the charge that it is led by the party priorities of the current government (Estrada 2012, p.46), again is the language one would expect from political opponents in a very divided State. One civil society questionnaire respondent described the government’s de facto
policy that determined the type of women’s organisations with whom the institution developed relations as follows:

The NWM has developed some relations with peasant women’s organisations […] However its link is ad-hoc and political, seeking to generate adherence to the party in power […] it has not developed any relations with the more traditional women’s movement […] NGOs or development organisations.162

In this case ‘traditional women’s movement’ implies the feminist organisations that had engaged with the NWM and donors before 2005. This externally focused view is emphasised by listing development organisations amongst those the NWM has not built a good relationship with. The Vice-ministry’s engagement with a range of women’s groups is described by another respondent:

In Bolivia, there is a distinction between “women’s NGOs” which are considered by the government to represent white upper class with little interest in for example indigenous women. There are however indigenous and rural women’s organisations that have a proximity to the government. They are included in the work [of the NWM]. They are however not always the strongest on gender issues.163

This statement indicates the elite nature of the gender equality project as defined by international norms.

The lack of engagement by the NWM with a range of feminist and women’s organisations that have a focus on gender equality was identified as a major constraint on the effectiveness of the NWM by a number of questionnaire respondents.164 The view was expressed that it was only grassroots indigenous and rural women’s organisations close to the government that were encouraged to engage with the NWM and that gave it political support.165 It was also argued that there was a gradual increase in the instrumentalisation of the engagement of these women’s groups on the part of the government; for example, through the organisation of three “Women’s Social Summits” by the NWM that gathered thousands of indigenous and non-indigenous women with the purpose of identifying common priorities (Agreda 2012, p.66). This forum was considered a very participative space for women from all social, class and ethnic origin, however, by the time the third summit was celebrated in 2011, it had lost a sense of independence (Estrada 2012, p.46). According to Estrada (2012, p.46) some statements of consensus at the end of the Summit endorsed governmental policy and had not been widely discussed during the summit. They included censuring the attitude of media to Venezuelan President Chávez’ health issues and stating support to the process of change led by President Morales (Estrada 2012, p.46).

162 Questionnaire respondent 21.
163 Questionnaire respondent 17.
164 Questionnaire respondent 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27 & 28.
165 Questionnaire respondent 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27 & 28.
A new forum set up by Morales with the support of the NWM is the Alianza de Mujeres (Women’s Alliance). The Alianza is a network of sixteen women’s organisations from across the country that are closely coordinated with a “council” of female ministers and female parliamentarians to identify a shared women’s agenda and to promote women’s political participation and political advocacy (Vega 2013, p.87). The Alianza is not exempt from internal tensions as well as tensions with the “pre-existing feminist organisations” (Vega 2013, p.88). Its work features the “reduction of the feminist agenda at the expense of the negotiations with power” and “the political instrumentalisation of the women’s movement” (Vega 2013, p.88). This is a criticism that could be made at many similar institutions internationally, that also includes serving women politicians and that of necessity involves compromise with the current government. One of the major points of debate between the government party and the institutionalised feminist movement is the extent to which the ethnicity and anti-colonial agenda, that aims to promote the rights of indigenous people, has displaced a focus on gender.

Various of the heads of the Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunities have been indigenous women whose former professional experience was linked to Morales’ government or related to children’s affairs; including Ms Miriam Evelin Agreda, appointed in 2007, Ms Karina Marconi appointed in 2012, and Ms Estefanía Morales appointed in 2017 (Bolivia 2017c; Agreda 2012; Agencia de Noticias FIDES 2007). These NWM leaders did not have any previous experience on women’s issues and gender equality or any links with civil society women’s groups. Indeed, in media and governmental websites, they were typically portrayed engaging in issues related to youth, children and the elderly or expressing political support to Evo Morales or to the governmental party, but not engaged in issues related to women’s rights and gender equality (see for example Bolivia 2017a). The profile of the NWM leader, Ms Estafanía Morales, includes the following description in the governmental website of the Vice-ministry: “[Ms Estefanía] Morales declares her ideology to be left-wing and anti-imperialist” (Bolivia 2017c), a very political statement but not an overtly feminist one. Respondents from institutionalised women’s organisations see this focus on left work or anti-colonial politics as a weakness and argue that their adherence to the policy agenda of the government is a condition for them to remain in the post. While this internationally is not an unusual situation, the polarisations of opinion between the institutionalised feminist groups and women who support the government party is clearly a reflect of the partisan and divided polity that is a feature of Bolivia.

In gender inter-governmental regional fora convened by UN Women and ECLAC, it is common that the head of the NWM does not represent Bolivia but is displaced by the Minister of

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166 Key informants 7, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 & 56; author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
Justice. However, since the election of President Morales, the Minister of Justice has typically been a woman, often representing grassroots women’s organisations.

Since his election, President Morales has adopted and implemented parity legislation to ensure an equal representation of women in political and decision-making positions. This was reflected for example in the designation of a 50/50 parity ministerial cabinet in 2010 (Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012, p.63). The same tendency was reflected across other State branches and to a less degree at the sub-national governmental level. Again, there is a gulf between the perception of women’s organisations and those of party-political women. The parity policy has been criticised as a form of window-dressing on the grounds that the women selected to occupy positions of power generally had no real margin of manoeuvre or autonomy for decision-making. In the words of one questionnaire respondent, putting more women in positions of power did not translate into progress as “[those]women do not respond to women’s needs” because of the high politicisation and control exerted over them by the government. Another respondent considered that in spite of the 50 percent parity representation according to the constitutional mandate, women were being used and subordinated by the masculine domination in the sphere of political power. These statements are criticisms that could be made of women’s engagement in many other national contexts. Similarly, the extent of the division is indicated by the way in which one questionnaire respondent believed that the feminist discourse had been adopted by the government but devoid of its political content and misused and another that the co-optation of the gender equality agenda and discourse by the government was done “to gain popularity”.

The resourcing of the NWM

The Bolivian NWM has been characterised by a chronic lack of adequate financial, human and technical resources. Its existence has only been made possible by the support of international cooperation aid. The NWM recognised in 2015 that it faced budget and resource limitations that did not allow it to fulfil its role and that, as a result, most of its efforts were concentrated on the implementation of programmatic initiatives rather than on normative work. The lack of adequate resources, as well as the high rotation of staff, were identified by most questionnaire respondents as major constraints that undermined its potential effectiveness. These

167 Author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
168 Key informants 7, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 & 56; author’s participant observation as part of her role at UN Women.
169 Questionnaire respondent 26.
170 Questionnaire respondent 24.
171 Questionnaire respondent 28.
172 Questionnaire respondent 27.
173 Questionnaire respondent 14.
had also been a constant feature during the previous governmental periods, as discussed in the previous sections. International cooperation played a major role in funding Bolivia’s NWM and its gender work across time. The work of many of the active feminist and women’s organisations was also significantly funded by international cooperation. As an example, the Coordinadora de la Mujer received a grant from UN Women of almost 2.5 million dollars, thanks to which the Legislative Agenda work described earlier was conducted during the period 2008-2012 (UN Women 2013, p.16).

The dependency of the gender work on foreign aid was evident as gender initiatives were subjected to lack of continuity when the aid landscape changed. As an example, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the policies of President Morales made many traditional donors withdraw or reduce their support to Bolivia, hugely impacting the gender work conducted across the State. Many donors withdrew their financial and technical support to the NWM blaming the lack of results shown by the institution over the years, the lack of commitment shown by the government to ensure the entity’s access to information and processes, and the lack of commitment shown to improve its status and its financial and human resources so that it could be effective. Although some of the traditional donors withdrew or diminished their aid, others remained and even increased their allocations. In 2014 the NWM was funded mainly by UN Women and Canada (JICA 2014, p.40). In 2018 UN Women continues to be one of its main technical and financial supporters.

Several questionnaire respondents believed that there was no real political will to improve the NWM or to implement the existing gender normative and legal framework set by international norms, including by allocating adequate resources. One respondent believed that without the necessary institutional status, budget and human resources, its existence was “merely symbolic.” Another respondent indicated that without political will to ensure the economic resources for the NWM and for the effective implementation of gender measures, the NWM was a “simple screen.”

The status of the NWM

In 2018, the Bolivian NWM continues to be situated in the “low” ranking Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunities, which is one of four vice-ministries attached to the Ministry of

174 Key informants 7, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 & 56.
175 Questionnaire respondent 17.
176 Questionnaire respondent 17, 20 & 21.
177 Questionnaire respondent 26.
178 Questionnaire respondent 28.
The Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunity had been originally created by law in 2002 as a Vice-ministry of Women (Bolivia 2002). However, it had subsequently experienced two negative reforms, the first one transforming it into the Vice-ministry of Gender and Generational Affairs (Bolivia 2006) and the second one into the Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunities (Bolivia 2009). Both reforms had been adopted by governmental decrees, not by law, in line with the increasing regional tendency of reforming NWMs by governmental decision even if such institutions had been set up by law, as discussed in Chapter Three. Both reforms expanded the remits of the Vice-ministry as it no longer oversaw women’s affairs and gender equality but also issues regarding youth, the elderly, people living with disabilities, and the prevention and eradication of all forms of violence based on gender or age (Bolivia 2009; 2006). From 2013, it also became the entity overseeing adoptions (Bolivia 2013).

In contrast to the regional trend, the Bolivian NWM was one of only three found in the region to reflect a multi-issue policy orientation as its remit expanded beyond women’s issues and gender equality, with implications for the dilution of the focus on women’s issues. The official mandate and functions of the Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunities were overlapping, combining a mix of an equality of opportunity focus, diversity mainstreaming, gender mainstreaming and “decolonisation” and “de-patriarchalisation” (Bolivia 2017a, b, 2009, 2006).

The work of the NWM was expected to support the incorporation of the gender perspective into existing or new policies, programmes, plans and instruments without having any say in deciding how these were constructed. For example, its stated functions included the formulation of national policies to protect and promote gender equality and the rights of women and the evaluation and monitoring of existing equality plans and policies (Bolivia 2009, art. 83). However, in practice the NWM played no role in for example the formulation and implementation of some of the key related national policy efforts such as the National Development Plan, the Equal Opportunities Plan or in the emblematic “de-patriarchalisation” policy (Vega 2013). However, its responsibility was overwhelmingly disproportionate to the human and financial resources it had (JICA 2014, p.35). Apart from its deficient institutional status and capacity, other factors impeded it to fulfil its obligations such as the lack of political will, the lack of legitimacy and recognition by some women’s organisations who tended to be more feminist and internationally networked, and its displacement by other institutional actors and by other governmental agendas.

The NWM was expected to coordinate GM and support sectoral ministries and sub-national gender bodies (Bolivia 2009, art.83). However, this did not materialise in practice and instead, other institutions were perceived to lead the work on GM in sectoral public policies and

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179 The other three vice-ministries were the Vice-ministry of Justice and Fundamental Rights, the Vice-ministry of Indigenous, Aboriginal and Peasant Justice and the Vice-ministry for the Defense of the Rights of Consumers and Users, see Bolivia (2017a).
in legislation.\textsuperscript{180} For example, the \textit{Coordinadora de la Mujer} documented the process of elaboration of a Legislative Agenda described earlier and considered this to have been a very successful and emblematic long-term consensus-reaching process jointly led by the \textit{Coordinadora} and female parliamentarians from different political parties, involving more than 20,000 women, female law-makers and female members of the National Assembly (Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012). Important though this was the NWM was barely involved in the process (Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012).

The “decolonisation” and “de-patriarchalisation” approaches of the government were considered ground-breaking in the region and gained great acceptance for their relevance and progressive outlook. The Minister of Cultures, charged with overseeing the process of applying the two approaches across all public policy and in line with the adoption of the new Constitution and the recognition of Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse State, stated that Morales’ government acknowledged that “the State is patriarchal and colonial” and that “discrimination, racism and machismo” have been the main causes of the historic subordination and exclusion of women and of indigenous people (Salguero 2012, p.119). The government was said to actively seek to remedy this by applying these two approaches of “decolonisation” and “de-patriarchalisation” across the entire State and governmental action, on the premise that without the latter the first cannot be accomplished (Salguero 2012, pp.119-121). These aspirations were recognised as laudable, imperative and praiseworthy both by feminists, women’s activists and researchers (Vega 2013; Estrada 2012). However, the prioritisation of the “decolonisation” approach became the most prominent, whereas “de-patriarchalisation” and addressing women’s issues were subordinated, meaning that the focus on women and gender was displaced by the ethnicity agenda (Vega 2013; Estrada 2012).

Estrada (2012, p.39), a recognised feminist sociologist and activist, identified the gap between the governmental aspirations of applying the two approaches of “decolonisation” and “de-patriarchalisation” and the actual praxis as “worrying tensions and contradictions between the ideological discourse and the political practice”. This led her to question their effective fulfilment by the government. She argued that in practice, the “emancipatory project” had been translated into “adding women to the ongoing State transformation project” without allowing them to identify the “deficits, gaps and silences” of the project as if women were not part of it (Estrada 2012, p.43). For her, the “de-patriarchalisation” intentions were being subordinated by political interests and evidence of the lack of real political will to advance feminist and women’s demands were the fact that the NWM was “increasingly being debilitated, [it] reproduced visions that were not in harmony with the decolonising Good Living discourse and [instead] the equality of opportunities approach was being recycled in public policy” (Estrada 2012, p.44).

\textsuperscript{180} Questionnaire respondent 13.
The CEDAW Committee recommended in its latest report issued to Bolivia in 2015 that the State establish “a ministry of women’s affairs or other high-level office with authority to coordinate and articulate all public policies and strategies for gender equality and the advancement of women” (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2015a, paragraphs 12 and 13). The recommendation had previously been issued in 2008 (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2008a, paragraph 10). More than 80 percent of the Bolivian questionnaire respondents agreed with this recommendation and identified the need to improve the NWM, including by establishing a stand-alone ministry for women’s issues and building strong relations with the women’s organisations to improve its effectiveness. One such respondent described this generalised view as follows:

The NWM is weak in terms of budget and programmes, its location in the decision-making structure of the Ministry of Justice is subordinated. The Ministry of Justice is not the best entity to host the NWM. A decentralised entity with ministerial rank or a specific Ministry could be better options for the improvement of women’s status or at least a higher location […] within the Vice-ministry of Equality.181

Since the election of President Morales, Bolivia’s gender work has concentrated on adopting gender legal and public policy instruments and promoting parity in women’s political representation. Bolivia, like Nicaragua, is one of the countries in the region with one of the most gender responsive constitutions (UN Women 2016a). The number of legislative measures adopted in the past years in Bolivia made the CEDAW Committee commend the State for the normative progress in favour of gender equality and women’s rights. Bolivia reformed its Constitution in 2009 reflecting the principle of equality between women and men and non-discrimination, as well as sanctions for gender-based violence and specific guarantees of women’s rights and gender parity (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2015a, paragraph 4). Bolivia was also pioneer in innovative measures such as legislation to prevent, address and sanction political harassment and violence against women who have a role in politics and public life (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2015a, paragraph 4). Other gender legislative measures recently adopted included legislation on women’s rights to live a life free of violence in 2013, measures that stipulated that education should be “anti-patriarchal”, and electoral system reforms to ensure the application of the principles of gender equity, gender parity and alternation in the procedures for proposing, preselecting and electing persons for public office in 2010 (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2015a, paragraph 4). Notably, Bolivia expanded its legislation on abortion in 2017 permitting it in the case of minors, pregnant students or women that have other children, old adults or people with disabilities under their care, apart from in the cases of incest, rape or risk to the life of the mother where it

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181 Questionnaire respondent 25.
was already legal (Molina 2017). The reform was led by progressive parliamentarians and the NWM did not have any direct role in the process.

Regarding the efforts to improve its gender policy framework, Bolivia also had a prolific generation of instruments such as the Comprehensive Plurinominal System to Prevent, Address, Punish and Eliminate Gender-based Violence (2013-2015); the Strategic Institutional Plan of the Ministry of Education (2010-2014), which defined the approach to dismantle patriarchy through education; the National Strategic Plan for Sexual and Reproductive Health (2009-2015); and the National Human Rights Action Plan “Dignified Bolivia for Living Well” (2009-2013) (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2015a, paragraph 4). Notwithstanding, the fact that international cooperation continued financing much of these gender developments sheds doubts as to the genuine commitment of the government with such measures and the likelihood of implementation. As with the historic funding of the NWM, international cooperation was behind the promotion and funding of many of these initiatives. For example, UN Women’s Fund for Gender Equality was a key funder of much of the extensive advocacy work of the Coordinadora de la Mujer, who was the main promoter of the landmark law against harassment of women political leaders (UN Women 2012).

Most questionnaire respondents agreed that the lack of adequate financing by the State of this extensive normative and legislative framework and the lack of powers of the NWM contribute to the weakness of their implementation. Some used the term “letra muerta” (“dead letter” in Spanish) implying that although all those measures exist, they exist only on paper, not in practice. One questionnaire respondent made the point that “laws by themselves are not going to change the chauvinistic mentality” and that “the equality problem is systemic.” The approach adopted vis-à-vis gender legislative instruments, policies and the NWM itself was depicted by another respondent as a governmental and political approach, rather than a State and institutional approach. Given the high politicisation of many of these measures, their dependency on foreign aid and the high polarisation among key actors, it is plausible to imagine that they risk being dismantled as soon as there is a governmental change.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has demonstrated that the history of the NWMs in Nicaragua and Bolivia did not lead to the consolidation of effective institutions that can promote women’s equality. A number of similarities and differences are observed in these two countries where there was a generalised lack of commitment by the different governments with the global norm.

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182 Questionnaire respondents 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27 & 32.
183 Questionnaire respondent 16.
184 Questionnaire respondent 26.
The process of democratisation has been very different to what Chile and Uruguay experienced. Neither Nicaragua nor Bolivia had a long history of democracy. Their political histories were characterised by long periods of authoritarian rule, in the case of Nicaragua followed by a popular revolution and a civil conflict that left the country more divided in the post-conflict era. Bolivia has been characterised by a history of deep socio-political divisions. The historic exclusion of indigenous population from most aspects of State action and their prioritisation as part of Evo Morales’ government since 2005 has led to heightened antagonism between elite organisations and the government. In both countries, the high levels of political instability, although different, have meant that a ‘normal’ relationship has not developed between the State and civil society actors of all sorts.

Both countries have historically been among the least developed in Latin America making them very donor dependent. Along with a desire to obtain international recognition, particularly as part of the democratisation process, the availability of foreign aid led to the adoption of gender policies and measures often in a superficial manner and perceived as foreign impositions. The internal support for these measures therefore, including for the creation of NWMs, did not necessarily exist or was led by women’s organisations that were themselves externally funded and did not necessarily represent the diversity of women. The political instability did not allow a sustained engagement between feminist and women organisations in all their diversity and the State, including the NWMs.

In both cases, external actors were instrumental in the institutionalisation of the NWM and in supporting the civil society organisations necessary to engage with both the NWM and with donors. This is part of the well-documented professionalisation civil society noted in this region. As such, the idea of establishing NWMs was mainly considered an elite project and did not have roots in wider society or in the political system. The professionalisation of civil society is a contested strategy used by donors to fulfil a number of their objectives of which the promotion of formal gender equality was only one aspect. It is also argued that it was doomed to failure and not capable of producing real change. In Bolivia, the high level of political contestation and the radical nature of many of the reforms the government is undertaking make the continuation of the NWM externally driven project unlikely.

Although similarities were found among the two countries, the implications on the long history of aid dependency and the political divisions in both countries were not the same. In Nicaragua, the previously leftist broad-based Sandinista political party abandoned its former policies and became highly personalised and anti-feminist. In Bolivia, a grassroots-based party is struggling with a difficult political situation given the divisions caused by the dislocation in the system of a privileged minority representing the elite groups. Although in both countries their latest presidents have sought to stay in power, in Nicaragua there is a concentration on preserving the personal power of the President, whereas in the case of Bolivia the project is a deeper process
of reform with the stated aim of improving the life of the majority of Bolivian citizens. In both cases, the active promotion of women’s formal representation in power has also been actively promoted with contested results.

The two cases demonstrated how the relative compliance of Nicaragua with global norms on NWMs and the lack of compliance of Bolivia was irrelevant in terms of adopting pro women measures. As an example, in Nicaragua the Sandinista party in power supported the complete ban on abortion whereas in Bolivia, the government supported the expansion of abortion rights despite having one of the weakest NWMs in the region.

The two cases shed light into how ineffective and irrelevant NWMs can be in contexts where international pressure was determinant for their establishment and where relations between women organisations and the State have not been consolidated. As externally imposed and funded institutions, it is understandable that most governments did not show commitment to fund NWMs, considering that scarce resources meant that foreign aid funded many aspects of State functions and policy and governments had to weigh funding NWMs against other State priorities. The purpose of having an NWM did not correspond to the global norm. In the case of Nicaragua, the NWM was used as a political instrument and in the case of Bolivia it was displaced by other institutions and by the ethnicity agenda.
Chapter Seven. - National Women´s Mechanisms in Latin America: an effective policy measure to advance women´s equality?

The thesis examined the NWMs in the eighteen Latin American countries and found that the majority of these NWMs have not been an effective policy measure capable of advancing women’s equality or of promoting women’s welfare. Given the dominance of this form of institution internationally as the primary vehicle to promote women’s rights, this is a significant criticism. The effectiveness of NWMs was examined in terms of, their adherence to normative standards set by the UN in 1995, and also in terms of their viability as institutional conduits to engage with women’s groups and to promote their interests in national policy processes. The majority of countries in Latin America have set up NWMs that do not follow the UN recommended parameters or show the necessary commitment to enable these institutions to become effective NWMs. This is not just a failure on the part of national governments, more importantly, the findings also point to major problems with the UN led policy norm.

As Chapter Three demonstrated, while post 1990 many Latin American countries have embraced global norms in a number of policy areas related to gender equality, in spite of these advances the position of women has deteriorated in many States. As part of the trend of adopting global norms, all eighteen States established NWMs but in 2016 only five NWMs (28 percent) conformed to the UN institutional framework, meaning that in 72 percent of the States, NWMs did not conform to this recommended framework. When commitment indicators were analysed in Chapter Four it was demonstrated that more than half the States in Latin America, ten in total, neither complied with global norms on NWMs or demonstrated the commitment to making NWMs effective. A further three show lack of commitment, even if they to some extent complied with the Beijing norm. Three other States demonstrated commitment even though they do not comply with Beijing. Only two States, out of eighteen, demonstrated both compliance and commitment according to the indicators. In terms of potential effectiveness, the proportions are similar to those on compliance, only five NWMs (28 percent) demonstrate potential effectiveness (Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay), whereas thirteen (72 percent) appear to be ineffective (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru). This is a serious criticism of the capacity of such a dominant international institutional norm to have a meaningful impact.

Countries that occupied the top positions in an analysis of the 2018 ranking of gender normative and legal frameworks, discussed in Chapter Three, are also countries that show a high level of commitment to their NWMs. These are Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Uruguay. Out of these, only Chile and Venezuela are compliant with the international norm, while Costa Rica and Uruguay demonstrate commitment but are not compliant. In contrast, all the countries at the
bottom ranking in gender related normative and legal frameworks are all countries that have ineffective NWMs, all of them are neither compliant nor committed, with the exception of Nicaragua that shows compliance but a lack of commitment. There is a negative relationship between the level of women’s political representation and the potential effectiveness of a country’s NWM. Countries with ineffective NWMs such Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, have the highest percentage women in their parliaments in the region. In contrast, Uruguay which is classified as having an effective NWM, has a relatively low level of women’s political representation. In terms of the rankings of women’s social welfare and economic parity, there is a positive relationship between some countries’ performance in this area and the effectiveness of their NWMs. Uruguay and Chile are highly ranked and have effective NWMs, but Argentina and Brazil are also highly ranked and have ineffective NWMs. This indicates that while an NWM can be present as part of a more positive response by governments to women’s needs, it is not necessarily a policy vehicle for governments. At the other end of the rankings, most countries with ineffective NWMs have a low level of the women’s social welfare and economic parity such as Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. It is noticeable that countries with a high level of gender inequality also have ineffective NWMs including Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay and Guatemala.

The four case studies selected on the basis of the finding of the eighteen countries survey allow the strengths and weaknesses of NWMs to be discussed in more details. Chile and Uruguay had relatively effective NWMs and both countries share a democratisation process, unusual in Latin America, in that this process in both States was characterised by political stability and economic growth. The higher level of development enjoyed by these States has also meant they have been less dependent on foreign aid. Both countries are relatively affluent for the region, and both managed to reduce their inequality gap, particularly during left oriented governments from the mid-2000s. Women’s socio-economic status was historically among the highest in the region and has continued to improve. Despite differences in the trajectories of their NWMs and a lack of compliance by Uruguay with the global standards on NWMs, the NWMs of both countries enjoy a positive perception from civil society and State actors. This level of constructive engagement between the State and civil society has perhaps been a key factor underpinning their effectiveness, even though Chile conforms to the global blueprint NWM, and Uruguay has a very low level of compliance. The lack of compliance with the global norms on NWMs found in the Uruguayan case did not impede the country achieving substantive progress in gender equality and women’s status. Uruguay is one of the countries in the region with the most liberal gender orientation policies including being the only country in the region to have liberalised abortion. This suggests that it is not the structure of the NWMs that produces positive results for women but the attitude of the government and favorable social and economic conditions. It is perhaps these favorable conditions that allow these relatively successful NWMs to exist and in the absence
of this global norm it is likely governments would promote similar policies using different mechanisms.

In contrast the history of the NWMs in Nicaragua and Bolivia did not lead to the consolidation of effective institutions able to promote women’s equality. The process of democratisation has been very different to that of Chile and Uruguay. The political histories of Nicaragua and Bolivia have been characterised by long periods of authoritarian rule. In the case of Nicaragua followed by a popular revolution and a civil conflict that left the country very divided. Bolivia has been characterised by a history of deep socio-political divisions. The historic exclusion of indigenous population from most aspects of State action and their prioritisation as part of Evo Morales’ government since 2005 has led to heightened antagonism between elite organisations (including women’s organisations) and the government. In both countries, the high levels of political instability, although different in character, have meant that a ‘normal’ relationship has not developed between the State and civil society actors of all sorts. Both countries have historically been among the least developed in Latin America making them very donor dependent. Along with a desire to obtain international recognition, particularly as part of the democratisation process, the availability of foreign aid led to the adoption of gender policies and measures often in a superficial manner and perceived as foreign impositions. The internal support for these measures therefore, including for the creation of NWMs, did not necessarily exist, neither was the process of campaigning for an NWM led by women’s organisations. In addition to this, the credibility of national level women’s organisations was also weaker as they were also externally funded and did not necessarily represent the diversity of women in those States.

In these two countries, the implications of the long history of aid dependency and the political divisions in both countries produced different outcomes. In Nicaragua, the previously leftist broad-based Sandinista political party abandoned its former policies and became involved in highly personalised politics promoting anti-feminist policies. In Bolivia, a grassroots-based party was faced with a difficult political situation, given the divisions caused by the historic dominance of a privileged minority representing the elite groups. In both cases, increasing the number of women in parliament has also been actively promoted with contested results in that both States have a high level of women’s political representation that is critiqued by feminists as failing to ensure independent women’s voices. The two cases demonstrated how the relative compliance of Nicaragua with global norms on NWMs and the lack of compliance of Bolivia were irrelevant in terms of whether or not the country adopted pro women measures. As an example, in Nicaragua the Sandinista party in power supported the complete ban on abortion whereas in Bolivia, the government supported the expansion of abortion rights despite having one of the weakest NWMs in the region. The two cases illustrate how ineffective and irrelevant NWMs can be in contexts where international pressure was a key determinant in their
establishment and where relations between women organisations and the State have not been consolidated. As externally imposed and funded institutions, it is understandable that most governments did not show commitment to continue to fund NWMs - in a context were foreign aid was funding many aspects of State functions and policies. In these circumstances, governments would weigh funding NWMs against other State priorities. The net result in both States was weak NWMs that have become increasingly irrelevant to feminist campaigns to promote gender equality.

The case studies demonstrated that the reasons for adopting NWMs, and the circumstances in which NWMs were set up and operated are crucial indicators of their future potential effectiveness. The soft coercive nature of the UN global norm was the main trigger for the different waves of establishment of NWMs observed in Latin America. The pervasiveness of the global norm was also supported by the strong role played by international donor organisations funding the setting up and regular functioning of NWMs, particularly in donor-dependent States. The regional patterns observed in the trajectories of NWMs from 1970 to 2016 indicated the leverage of the evolving international norms on NWMs. Most of the clusters of establishment or reform events coincided with the world conferences on women or with the post 1995 Beijing appraisal sessions. The form NWMs took, particularly after 1995 when the Fourth World Conference on Women took place, showed that States increasingly adopted key aspects of the parameters set by the Beijing Platform for Action most frequently charging them with the coordination of gender mainstreaming, improving the hierarchical status of NWMs or creating these mechanisms by law instead of by governmental decree. While the research has demonstrated that these features of NWMs are not significant indicators of their effectiveness, their adoption was part of democratisation processes, frequently involving State reform and an active role for international cooperation. This period was also characterised by greater engagement of women with the State and a greater openness of the State and governmental agendas to work with organised women’s groups, as well as by the greater incorporation of women into the formal structures of the State. By the 2010s however, the waning influence of the Beijing norm, the impact of the withdrawal of international cooperation aid plus the expansion of the anti-women’s movement across the region resulted in the weakening of NWMs, along with a deterioration in the quality of democracy. Even prior to 2010 the level of nominal compliance with the Beijing norm, was not matched with the same level of demonstrated commitment to allow NWMs to be effective policy institutions. This was most evidenced by lack of adequate resources - both financial and in terms of personnel - allocated to NWMs to fulfil their often-ambitious responsibilities. There was a mismatch between what NWMs were mandated to do and the powers they were assigned to carry out these functions. Relations with civil society, particularly with a diversity of women’s groups were often inadequate and, in some contexts, selective or even non-existent, bringing the legitimacy of NWMs into question.
The survey of national level women’s organisations confirms that many lobbied for the setting up of NWMs in their countries and for their reform. Women’s organised activism was influenced by international developments as they sought to use the international agenda to create a “boomerang effect” to force their countries into the adoption and implementation of progressive reforms (Álvarez et al. 2003, p.17; Keck & Sikkink 1998). However, women’s original support to the idea of NWMs and the greater engagement they experienced with the State during the democratisation period did not necessarily lead to continuous collaboration and engagement with NWMs once they had been established. The research demonstrates the importance of the local context and domestic factors as the key determinants of success or failure of NWMs, including the level of engagement with organised women’s groups. The research also demonstrates that it is not possible for NWMs even if they are fully compliant with the global institutional norm to work, as Rai (2003a, p.18) suggested, both within the State structures and “against” the State in their promotion of a pro-women agenda. The case study countries showed that even working within the State to promote a pro-women government endorsed agenda was only possible when the State and, more particularly, the government in power, endorsed reform and encouraged the NWM to fulfil a policy development role and engaged with civil society groups. The role that NWMs have been permitted to play therefore has, in most circumstances, been dominated by the government in power. The lack of autonomy of the NWMs is supported by lack of critical reflection found in the responses of NWMs to the questionnaires. NWMs in their responses presented a government position that did not suggest any weaknesses in the institutional structure or resources provided for the NWM. This was in sharp contrast to the responses of CSOs and the views of key informants, who were not only very critical of most NWMs, but also indicated that NWMs lacked the autonomy to reflect on their shortcomings or to suggest possible reforms.

Although the blueprint of institutional framework for NWMs embodies the idea that the main role of NWMs is to promote gender mainstreaming, and that gender mainstreaming is the main policy tool to achieve gender equality, the thesis found that - with the possible exception of Chile - no NWM played an effective gender mainstreaming role. NWMs were not designed in a manner that allowed them any meaningful role in the implementation of gender mainstreaming, for the most part they were not accountable for concrete policy outcomes and did not have the necessary resources to undertake this work. Only in Chile did the government attempt to implement a gender mainstreaming policy, in this case the NWM has an inter-sectoral coordination mechanism and appropriate resources, but also gender mainstreaming was not primarily the responsibility of the NWM, it was a government wide policy in which the NWM played a part. While many NWMs across the region were nominally tasked with a gender mainstreaming coordinating role, they could not possibly fulfil it as they lacked any mechanism to carry out this role, or sufficient funding. The questions raised in the academic literature on the weakness of gender mainstreaming as a policy tool (Halpern, Jacquot & Le Galès 2011; Jacquot
2010; Squires 2007, p.2; Benschop & Verloo 2006; Daly 2005; Moser & Moser 2005; Bacchi & Eveline 2003; Hafner-Burton & Pollack 2002, 2000; Verloo 2001) is supported by the incapacity of NWMs to engage in this task. Also, more importantly, it is supported by the results of the questionnaires that demonstrated that promoting of gender mainstreaming was not an important focus for civil society organisations. Civil society expressed the view that this was not an appropriate policy measure as they did not believe it had the capacity to deliver greater gender equality.

The research indicates that NWMs in their current form, including the focus on gender mainstreaming, are an ineffective means to promote gender equality particularly in the context of developing countries, and in circumstances where democratic consolidation is still being challenged. The widespread critique of gender mainstreaming in the literature (Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead 2007, p.5; Standing 2007; Subrahmanian 2007; Staudt 2003, p.48; Razavi & Miller 1995a) is confirmed by the views of society groups working on women’s issues or on gender equality. The centrality of gender mainstreaming to the current institutional form of NWMs is a major weakness, not only because it is an impossible task, but also because it prioritises processes over outcomes. The assumption of universal applicability of the NWM blueprint, including gender mainstreaming, does not take specific contexts and domestic factors into account, which is also a major weakness. Feminist panelists and participants from across the region convened by UN Women at the 2017 Regional Feminist Meeting shared the view that politics, power and the “patriarchal” State had perverted the purpose of setting up NWMs.\footnote{185} This research demonstrated that when the socio-political and economic environment is not conducive to advance women’s rights, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for an NWM to push a progressive agenda and when a country experiences turmoil, the women’s rights agenda often experiences a backlash from anti-women forces. This mix of factors shapes public opinion and the complexation and political agendas of governments. The current design of NWMs as part of the government executive, means that they are of necessity dominated by the government of the day. While having close collaboration with and enjoying the recognition of women’s organisations, can ensure continued legitimacy for the NWMs, this can only happen when the government in power permits this development.

The assumption of universality in the Beijing norm includes the idea that all the parameters of the institutional framework are of equal importance. The research demonstrated that some aspects of the framework are important if NWMs are to be effective institutions to promote a pro-women agenda while other aspects are either secondary or even conflict with this primary goal of NWMs. The four exemplary cases demonstrated that, apart from the enabling

\footnote{185} Reflections shared by feminist panelists and participants in an activity organised by the author on behalf of UN Women during the XIV Regional Feminist Meeting of Latin America and the Caribbean. See EFLAC (2017b).
context, the two most critical factors in making NWMs effective were their relations with civil society and the level of their resources. While a “high” hierarchical rank in the government system could be considered important in enabling NWMs to coordinate gender mainstreaming, as virtually no NWM did this and it was not considered to be a useful policy tool by women’s organisations in the region, rank was therefore not critical to the potential effectiveness of an NWM. In addition to this, a focus on “hierarchical ranking” could be considered a weakness as having a high position in government ties the organisation to government policy and places a potential barrier between the institution and key constituents. In Nicaragua the NWM as a full-fledged Ministry of Women was completely subservient to the government, and in particular to the presidential office, with virtually no support from women’s organisations apart from those attached to the presidential party. In Chile the NWM was considered to have been effective even before it became a full Ministry. Similarly, Uruguay’s NWM was comparably effective given its strong relations with women’s organisations and its level of resources despite being a “low” ranked entity attached to a Ministry of Social Affairs.

The recommendation that NWMs should be placed within the executive branch of the State means that they are inevitably subject to political influence as they form part of the government apparatus. They also face the instability, even if they are created by law, that is a result of the inevitable changes to their leadership and personnel derived from a change of government following an election. This idea of creating National Women’s Mechanisms within the State structures emerged from the idea that this would help advance gender equality as part of all aspects of government policy. While this is still a worthy goal given that gender equality continues to be an intractable and elusive goal, NWMs in their current form have not been able to effectively promote gender equality in most circumstances. NWMs may have been more effective if they had a degree of autonomy from government and acted as institutions that brought together a wide range of women’s organisations to work out collective policy demands and to lobby the government for the implementation of those demands. A more suitable institutional design could be closer to that of an autonomous ombudsperson’s office rather than as part of the government executive. An autonomous body could have participation from all branches of the State and from civil society as part of their governance arrangements. Being closer to the key constituency of women’s organisation should be a sine-quo-non-feature and this should also include the appointment of leaders that have experience in this policy area.

As a policy strategy to promote gender equality in Latin America, NWMs have on the whole been a failure. This failure is not just a result of a failure by governments to adequately implement the framework but also because key aspects of that framework can be demonstrated to be at best problematic to implement and at worst an actual barrier to achieving progressive change. This is especially true of the focus on the need for an NWM to have a high status within the government executive and the emphasis on gender mainstreaming as the key policy. The
international policy norm on which NWMs are based had not been reviewed or amended for 23 years in 2018. It is perhaps time to reconsider a new strategy for UN Women to promote and to assist an international movement for greater gender equality.
APPENDICES

Selected paragraphs identifying actions to be taken by the governments and NWMS:

**Strategic objective H.1.- Create or strengthen national machineries and other governmental bodies.**

**Actions to be taken by Governments (paragraph 203):**

(a) Ensure that responsibility for the advancement of women is vested in the highest possible level of government; in many cases, this could be at the level of a Cabinet minister;

(b) Based on a strong political commitment, create a national machinery, where it does not exist, and strengthen, as appropriate, existing national machineries, for the advancement of women at the highest possible level of government; it should have clearly defined mandates and authority; critical elements would be adequate resources and the ability and competence to influence policy and formulate and review legislation; among other things, it should perform policy analysis, undertake advocacy, communication, coordination and monitoring of implementation;

(c) Provide staff training in designing and analysing data from a gender perspective;

(d) Establish procedures to allow the machinery to gather information on government-wide policy issues at an early stage and continuously use it in the policy development and review process within the Government;

(e) Report, on a regular basis, to legislative bodies on the progress of efforts, as appropriate, to mainstream gender concerns, taking into account the implementation of the Platform for Action;

(f) Encourage and promote the active involvement of the broad and diverse range of institutional actors in the public, private and voluntary sectors to work for equality between women and men.

**Strategic objective H.2.- Integrate gender perspectives in legislation, public policies, programmes and projects.**

**Actions to be taken by Governments (paragraph 204):**

(a) Seek to ensure that before policy decisions are taken, an analysis of their impact on women and men, respectively, is carried out;
(b) Regularly review national policies, programmes and projects, as well as their implementation, evaluating the impact of employment and income policies in order to guarantee that women are direct beneficiaries of development and that their full contribution to development, both remunerated and unremunerated, is considered in economic policy and planning;

(c) Promote national strategies and aims on equality between women and men in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of women’s rights and eradicate all forms of discrimination against women;

(d) Work with members of legislative bodies, as appropriate, to promote a gender perspective in all legislation and policies;

(e) Give all ministries the mandate to review policies and programmes from a gender perspective and in the light of the Platform for Action; locate the responsibility for the implementation of that mandate at the highest possible level; establish and/or strengthen an inter-ministerial coordination structure to carry out this mandate, to monitor progress and to network with relevant machineries.

Actions to be taken by national machinery (paragraph 205):

(a) Facilitate the formulation and implementation of government policies on equality between women and men, develop appropriate strategies and methodologies, and promote coordination and cooperation within the central Government in order to ensure mainstreaming of a gender perspective in all policy-making processes;

(b) Promote and establish cooperative relationships with relevant branches of government, centres for women’s studies and research, academic and educational institutions, the private sector, the media, non-governmental organizations, especially women’s organizations, and all other actors of civil society;

(c) Undertake activities focusing on legal reform with regard, inter alia, to the family, conditions of employment, social security, income tax, equal opportunity in education, positive measures to promote the advancement of women, and the perception of attitudes and a culture favourable to equality, as well as promote a gender perspective in legal policy and programming reforms;

(d) Promote the increased participation of women as both active agents and beneficiaries of the development process, which would result in an improvement in the quality of life for all;

(e) Establish direct links with national, regional and international bodies dealing with the advancement of women;

(f) Provide training and advisory assistance to government agencies in order to integrate a gender perspective in their policies and programmes.
Strategic objective H.3.- Generate and disseminate gender disaggregated data and information for planning and evaluation.

Actions to be taken by Governments (paragraph 207):

(a) Ensure the regular production of a statistical publication on gender that presents and interprets topical data on women and men in a form suitable for a wide range of non-technical users;

(b) Ensure that producers and users of statistics in each country regularly review the adequacy of the official statistical system and its coverage of gender issues, and prepare a plan for needed improvements, where necessary;

(c) Develop and encourage the development of quantitative and qualitative studies by research organizations, trade unions, employers, the private sector and non-governmental organizations on the sharing of power and influence in society, including the number of women and men in senior decision-making positions in both the public and private sectors;

(d) Use more gender-sensitive data in the formulation of policy and implementation of programmes and projects.

Selected articles:

Article 2

States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;

(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;

(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;

(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.

Article 3

States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

Article 4

1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.

**Article 5**

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;

(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.

**Article 15**

1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.

2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.

3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void.

4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,

Having considered the reports of States parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

Noting United Nations General Assembly resolution 42/60 of 30 November 1987,

Recommends that States parties:

1. Establish and/or strengthen effective national machinery, institutions and procedures, at a high level of Government, and with adequate resources, commitment and authority to:
   (a) Advise on the impact on women of all government policies;
   (b) Monitor the situation of women comprehensively;
   (c) Help formulate new policies and effectively carry out strategies and measures to eliminate discrimination;

2. Take appropriate steps to ensure the dissemination of the Convention, the reports of the States parties under article 18 and the reports of the Committee in the language of the States concerned;

3. Seek the assistance of the Secretary-General and the Department of Public Information in providing translations of the Convention and the reports of the Committee;

4. Include in their initial and periodic reports the action taken in respect of this recommendation.
Appendix 4.- Questionnaire applied to national women´s mechanisms.

1. Please indicate your country:

2. Please indicate the institution you represent and your contact details to follow up on your responses if necessary. Your responses and contact details will be treated with confidentiality:

3. Is your institution a decentralised entity?
   o Yes
   o No

4. How regularly do you consider that the mandate and functions that your institution has been assigned guide its institutional work?
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o Regularly
   o Always

   Comments:

5. Do you consider that the mandates and functions of your institution are adequate to advance in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?
   o Yes
   o No

   Comments:

6. How regularly do you consider that your institution has the capacity to fulfil its assigned mandate and functions?
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o Regularly
   o Always

   Comments:

7. In which way do you consider that the following factors influence the capacity of your institution to fulfil its mandate and functions?

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<thead>
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<th>Factor</th>
<th>It influences positively</th>
<th>It does not have an influence</th>
<th>It influences negatively</th>
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<td>Collaboration with regional or sub-regional gender mechanisms</td>
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<td>Other factors / Comments:</td>
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8. What key factors and actors allowed your institution to have its current status?

9. In which areas do you consider that your institution has the necessary technical capacity to support State and governmental institutions and bodies?
   - Agriculture
   - Trade
   - Defence
   - Economy
   - Education
   - Statistics
   - Family
   - Home affairs
   - Tax
   - Environmental affairs
   - Migration
   - Vulnerable populations
   - Planning
   - Judiciary
   - Police
   - Social policy
   - Budgeting
   - Foreign affairs
   - Health
   - Labour
   - Violence against women

Other / Comments:

10. In which areas does your institution receive regular requests for advisory support?

   - Agriculture
   - Trade
   - Defence
   - Economy
11. In general, how would you describe the distribution of your institution’s regular work?

- It dedicates more time to normative and advisory work than to operational/implementation work
- It dedicates more time to operational/implementation work than to normative and advisory work
- It dedicates the same time to operational/implementation work and to normative and advisory work

Other / Comments:

12. Does your institution apply a gender mainstreaming approach in its work?

- Yes
- No

Comments:

13. And the rest of public institutions?

- None
- Some
- Most
- All

Comments:

14. What impact do you consider that the gender mainstreaming approach has in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?

- It has great impact
- It has limited impact
- It does not have an impact

Comments:
15. If gender mainstreaming is applied by your institution and/or other State and governmental institutions and bodies, what factors and actors have been key for the successful application of this approach?

16. What impact do you consider that national gender plans and policies have in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?

   - They have great impact
   - They have limited impact
   - They do not have an impact

Comments:

17. What gender mainstreaming elements / mechanisms regularly exist in your country?

   - Gender plans, policies and strategies
   - Gender units in most State and governmental institutions and bodies
   - Focal points in most sectoral ministries and State branches
   - Gender units at the sub-national level
   - Regular gender training for civil servants
   - Impact evaluations of policies plans and programmes on gender equality
   - Gender budgeting
   - Gender statistics

Others / Comments:

18. What limitations or challenges can you identify that must be overcome so that gender strategies, plans and policies can have an impact?

19. What other strategies and mechanisms does your institution apply to promote the achievement of women’s rights and gender equality?

20. What percentage of the State Budget is allocated to your institution?

21. Is the State’s budget allocation for your institution guaranteed?

   - Yes
   - No

Comments:

22. Do you consider that enough financial resources are allocated?

   - Yes
   - No

23. With what human resources does your institution count?

24. Do you consider that they are enough?

   - Yes
   - No
25. Are they institutionally guaranteed?

- Yes
- No

26. Does your institution count with enough technical resources?

- Yes
- No

27. Are they institutionally guaranteed?

- Yes
- No

28. In general terms, what is the manner and type of involvement of women´s organisations in the work of your institution? Please select all relevant options:

- Their involvement is institutionalised and is regular
- Their involvement is ad-hoc
- Their involvement is collaborative (i.e. they are part of processes for the preparation of legislation, national plans, policies, etc)
- Their involvement is consultative (i.e. they receive information and provide feedback, etc)
- Their involvement is informative (i.e. they receive information, etc)
- There is no involvement

Please describe:

29. To what extent are the following types of organisations represented and/or involved in the work of the institution you represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Never</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rural women´s organisations</td>
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<td>Organisations of women living with HIV / AIDS</td>
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<td>Organisations that work with or represent migrant women</td>
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<td>Organisations that represent and/or work with children</td>
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<td>Academia</td>
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</table>
30. Are there follow-up and/or accountability mechanisms for the implementation of public policies on gender equality and women’s rights? Please describe:

31. Is your institution subject to follow-up and/or accountability mechanisms conducted by civil society organisations and/or other actors? Please describe:

32. What lessons learned can you identify on the work of your institution?

33. What promising and/or innovative practices can you identify on the work of your institution?

34. Thank you for your collaboration and participation in this questionnaire. Should you wish to make additional comments and/or suggestions please do so here:
Appendix 5.- Questionnaire applied to civil society organisations.

1. Please indicate your country:

2. Please indicate the organisation you represent and your contact details to follow up on your responses if necessary. Your responses and contact details will be treated with confidentiality:

3. Do you consider that the mandates and functions of the National Women´s Mechanism (NWM) in your country are adequate to advance in the achievement of gender equality and women´s rights?
   - Yes
   - No

Comments:

4. How regularly do you consider that the mandate and functions that the NWM in your country has been assigned guide its institutional work?
   - Never
   - Sometimes
   - Regularly
   - Always

Comments:

5. How regularly do you consider that the NWM in your country has the capacity to fulfil its assigned mandate and functions?
   - Never
   - Sometimes
   - Regularly
   - Always

Comments:

6. In which way do you consider that the following factors influence the capacity of your institution to fulfil its mandate and functions?

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</table>

7. What key factors and actors allowed the NWM in your country have its current status?

8. What impact do you consider that the gender mainstreaming approach has in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?
   - It has great impact
   - It has limited impact
   - It does not have an impact

Comments:

9. What impact do you consider that national gender plans and policies have in the achievement of gender equality and women’s rights?
   - They have great impact
   - They have limited impact
   - They do not have an impact

Comments:

10. What limitations or challenges can you identify that must be overcome so that gender strategies, plans and policies can have an impact?

11. What other strategies and mechanisms does the NWM in your country apply to promote the achievement of women’s rights and gender equality?

12. Do you consider that the financial resources allocated by the State to the NWM of your country are adequate?
   - Yes
   - No

13. Do you consider that the State allocates enough human and technical resources to the NWM?
   - Yes
   - No
14. In general terms, what is the manner and type of involvement of women’s organisations in the work of your institution? Please select all relevant options:

- Their involvement is institutionalised and is regular
- Their involvement is ad-hoc
- Their involvement is collaborative (i.e. they are part of processes for the preparation of legislation, national plans, policies, etc)
- Their involvement is consultative (i.e. they receive information and provide feedback, etc)
- Their involvement is informative (i.e. they receive information, etc)
- There is no involvement

Please describe:

15. To what extent are the following types of organisations represented and/or involved in the work of the institution you represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Type</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-descendant women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of women living with a disability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of women living with HIV / AIDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations that work with or represent migrant women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTI organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly women’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations that represent and/or work with children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / Comments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Does your organisation participate in follow-up and/or accountability mechanisms for the implementation of public policies on gender equality and women’s rights? Please describe:

17. What promising and/or innovative practices can you identify on the work of the NWM in your country?

18. Thank you for your collaboration and participation in this questionnaire. Should you wish to make additional comments and/or suggestions please do so here:
Appendix 6.- Questionnaire applied to UN Women offices.

1. Please indicate the country you are working in:

2. Which of the following actions are taken by the National Women's Mechanism (NWM) in the country where you work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate the formulation and implementation of government policies on equality between women and men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop appropriate strategies and methodologies for the effective implementation of policies on equality between women and men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake activities focusing on legal reform targeting gender equality measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote coordination and cooperation within the central government and with relevant branches of the State in order to ensure the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in policy-making processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and establish cooperative relationships with centres for women’s studies and research, academic and educational institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and establish cooperative relationships with the private sector and / or the media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and establish cooperative relationships with civil society, especially with women’s organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish direct links with national, regional and international bodies dealing with the advancement of women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide training and advisory assistance to government agencies in order to integrate a gender perspective in their policies and programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / comments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. To what extent do you think the following factors impact on the ability of the NWM to fulfil their actions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location within the governmental structure</th>
<th>It impacts positively</th>
<th>It does not have an impact</th>
<th>It impacts negatively</th>
<th>It does not apply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Institutional mechanisms or processes that facilitate decentralised planning, implementation and monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources in terms of budget</th>
<th>Resources in terms of professional technical capacity</th>
<th>Opportunity to influence policy-making</th>
<th>Ability and/or competence to influence policy and/or formulate and/or review legislation</th>
<th>Political commitment at the highest level of government</th>
<th>Mandates and/or authority</th>
<th>Staff training in designing and analysing data from a gender perspective</th>
<th>Procedures to allow the NWM to gather information on government-wide policy issues</th>
<th>Involvement of the broad and diverse range of institutional actors in the public, private and voluntary sectors to work for equality between women and men</th>
<th>Other / Comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 4. What is generally the manner and type of involvement of women’s organisations by the NWM?

- They are involved in an institutionalised and regular manner
- They are involved in an ad-hoc manner
- They are involved in a collaborative manner (e.g. they are involved in processes of elaboration of legislation, national plans, policies, etc)
- They are involved in a consultative manner (e.g. they receive information with opportunity for feedback, etc)
- They are involved in an informative manner (e.g. they receive information, etc)
- They are not involved

**Other / Comments:**

### 5. Are there internal and/or external accountability mechanisms for civil society and/or the government to monitor the performance of the NWM? Please elaborate

### 6. To what extent are different types of civil society organisations regularly involved and/or represented by the NWM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural women's organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban women's organisations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots women's organisations</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous women's organisations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-descendant women's organisations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of women living with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of women living with HIV-AIDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations working with or representing migrant women</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTI organisations</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Young women’s organisations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly women’s organisations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations working with or representing children</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / Comments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. What lessons learned can you identify for the improvement of the collaboration and/or coordination between civil society and the NWM in normative processes related to gender equality and women’s empowerment? Please elaborate:

8. Thank you for taking the time to participate in this questionnaire. If you have any additional comments, please insert them in the space provided below:
Appendix 7.- Status of CEDAW Convention and Optional Protocol ratifications and periodic reporting.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CEDAW (date of signature)</th>
<th>CEDAW (date of ratification)</th>
<th>Status of periodic report</th>
<th>Optional Protocol (date of signature)</th>
<th>Optional Protocol (date of ratification)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>July 17, 1980</td>
<td>Dec 7, 1989</td>
<td>2016 (submitted)</td>
<td>Dec 10, 1999</td>
<td>NOT RATIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>June 11, 1980</td>
<td>March 3, 1983</td>
<td>2015 (late submission)</td>
<td>NOT SIGNED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>July 17, 1980</td>
<td>Oct 27, 1981</td>
<td>Due since 2010 (not submitted – late previous submission)</td>
<td>NOT SIGNED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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186 As per information available in the website of the Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, see OHCHR (2018a).
Appendix 8.- National legislation on equality between women and men.\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Law for the Promotion of Women’s Social Equality (Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>General Law for the Equality between Women and Men (Ley General para la Igualdad entre Mujeres y Hombres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Opportunities between Women and Men (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades entre Mujeres y Hombres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Law for the Promotion of Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad de Derechos entre Hombres y Mujeres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Law of Equality of Rights and Opportunities (Ley de Igualdad de Derechos y Oportunidades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Law for the prohibition of discrimination (Ley 20.609 contra la discriminación)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) As per information provided by States in their Beijing+20 reports, governmental and NWMs’ websites, and CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations issued to each state, included in bibliography.
Appendix 9.- National gender policies or plans.\textsuperscript{188}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Name of national gender policy or plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>New Gender Agenda (Nueva Agenda de Género) 2014-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan of Equality between Women and Men (Plan de Igualdad entre Mujeres y Hombres) 2011-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Plan of Equality between Women and Men (Plan Nacional de Igualdad entre Hombres y Mujeres) 2018-2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>National Policy for Gender Equality and Equity (Política Nacional para la Igualdad y Equidad de Género) 2007-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III Plan for Equality between Men and Women (III Plan de Gobierno para la Igualdad e Igualdad de la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>II National Plan for Gender Equality and Equity (II Plan Nacional de Igualdad y Equidad de Género) 2007-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>National Agenda for Women and Gender Equality (Agenda Nacional de las Mujeres y la Igualdad de Género) 2014-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Policy for Gender Equality (Política Institucional de Igualdad de Género 2016-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>National Policy for Women (Política Nacional de las Mujeres) 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Plan of Equality (Plan Nacional de Igualdad 2016-2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>National Policy for the Integral Promotion and Development of Women (Política Nacional de Promoción y Desarrollo Integral de la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan for the Equity of Opportunities (Plan de Equidad de Oportunidades) 2008-2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>National Policy for Women (Política Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II Plan for Gender Equality and Equity (II Plan de Igualdad y Equidad de Género) 2010-2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>National Programme for the Equality of Opportunities and No Discrimination against Women (Programa Nacional para la Igualdad de Oportunidades y No Discriminación Contra las Mujeres) 2013-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>National Gender Equity Programme (Programa Nacional de Equidad de Género) 2006-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Public Policy of Equality of Opportunities for Women (Política Pública de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres) 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>III National Plan for Equality between Women and Men (III Plan Nacional de Igualdad entre Mujeres y Hombres) 2008-2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{188} As per information provided by States in their Beijing+20 reports, government and NWMS’ websites, CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations issued to each State, and CEPAL (2017b), see bibliography.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Plan Title</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>National Gender Equality Plan <em>(Plan Nacional de Igualdad de Género)</em> <strong>2012-2017</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>I National Plan for Equality of Opportunities and Rights <em>(I Plan Nacional de Igualdad de Oportunidades y Derechos)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 10.- Quota and parity legislation.\textsuperscript{189}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – lower chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas - unicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – upper and lower chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – upper and lower chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – lower chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas - unicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas - unicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas - unicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – lower chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – upper and lower chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas - unicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – lower chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas – upper and lower chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Parity legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Parity legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Parity legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Parity included in electoral legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Parity legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Parity included in the electoral code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Parity legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quota – upper and lower chambers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{189} As per information provided by Tello Rozas & Floru (2017), National Democratic Institute (2013), Pérez (2015), and Comisión Interamericana de Mujeres (-).
Appendix 11.- Violence against women related legislation.

1) First generation legislation: domestic violence or intra-family violence legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Law of intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Law on protection against family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Law against family or domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Law on violence against women or the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law to prevent, remedy and punish intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law 294 to prevent, remedy and punish intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law against domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law against intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law to prevent, eradicate and punish intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law to assist and prevent intra-family violence for the Federal District and other 22 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Law 230 to prevent and punish intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Law against intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Law against domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Law on state and society policy against family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Law won violence against women and the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Law 38 on intra-family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Law to prevent, detect early, assist in cases of and eradicate domestic violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Second generation legislation: violence against women legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Law on Sexual Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Law 11340 (Lei Maria da Penha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Law to punish violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free from Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>La won Women´s Rights to a Life Free from Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Law 1257 on Violence against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Law for the integral protection to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>women in the spheres where they develop their interpersonal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Special integral law for women´s lives free from violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Integral law against violence against women and reforms to law 641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Law for the Integral Protection of Women against any Form of Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3) Third generation legislation: legislation or legal reforms to recognise the crime of “femicide” or “feminicide”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Law to penalise violence against women, law 8589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Organic law won women’s right to a life free from violence (G.O 38668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Law 1257 on norms for the sensibilisation, prevention and punishment of forms of violence and discrimination against women, reforming penal code articles and law 294 (1996) and articles 103 and 104 are adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Law against femicide and other forms of violence against women, decree 22-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Reform to the penal code (article 390), law No. 20480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Law 30068 incorporates article 108-a to the penal code and modifies articles 107, 46-b and 46-c of the penal code and article 46 of the penal execution code, with the aim to prevent, sanction and eradicate femicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Law 26.791 modifying the federal penal code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Special Integral Law for a Life Free from Violence for Women, Law No. 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Reform to the federal penal code (article 325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Integral Law on violence against women, Law No. 779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Law No. 348, article 252 bis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Article 142 of the Penal Integral Organic Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Decree No. 23-2013, article 118-A modifying the penal code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Law No. 82, article 132-A of the penal code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Law No. 550-14, article 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Penal code reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Law of Integral Protection for Women against all forms of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Law modifying articles 311 and 312 of the penal code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 12.- Legal status of abortion.\(^{191}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Without restriction as to reason</th>
<th>Allowed on socioeconomic grounds</th>
<th>Allowed to preserve woman’s health</th>
<th>Allowed in cases of rape or incest</th>
<th>Allowed in cases of foetal impairment</th>
<th>Prohibited altogether</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only permitted when the raped woman has a mental disability

\(^{191}\) As per information drawn from Center for Reproductive Rights (2017a, 2017b, 2015), Molina (2017), Última Hora (2017) and Reuters (2017).
Appendix 13.- Institutional trajectory of NWMs in Latin America.\textsuperscript{192}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Events traced:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F foundational event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R reform event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ positive event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- negative event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NWMs’ hierarchical level:**
- **HIGH** - mechanisms that have ministry status or whose head has ministerial status and full participation in the governmental cabinet
- **MEDIUM** - mechanisms administratively attached to the Presidency and whose head does not participate in the governmental cabinet (i.e. those reporting to presidential offices, secretariats, national institutes and other such mechanisms)
- **LOW** - mechanisms that report to a ministry or an authority of lower rank (deputy ministries, institutes, councils and other such mechanisms)
- **Other** – none of the above

\textsuperscript{192} Elaborated on the basis of legislative measures, governmental decrees, Beijing related reports, FLACSO and ECLAC reports, detailed in the bibliography under country name or organisation name. Information from the questionnaires applied to NWMs, CSOs and UN Women field offices (ONU Mujeres 2015c, 2015d and UN Women 2014b) were also used to fill some information gaps
## 1. ARGENTINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>National Directorate of Women and Family (Dirección Nacional de la Mujer y la Familia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Secretariat for Human Development and Family</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Subsecretariat of Women (Subsecretaría de la Mujer)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsecretariat</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Action</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Coordination Council of Public Policies for Women</td>
<td>Decree 378/91</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>13 August 1992</td>
<td>National Council of Women (Consejo Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Decree 1426/92</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

193 Translated as “women” but in Spanish the original term used is “woman” (singular)
194 Idem
195 Idem
196 Idem
197 The structure of the National Council of Women is modified with the creation of a Unit within it for the National Coordination of the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women as Law 26.485 had identified the National Council of Women as the governing body in charge of designing public policies regarding violence against women.

The National Council is renamed as “of Women” (using the plural instead of singular term) to reflect a more inclusive view of the diversity of women to which the public policies it oversees are addressed.
## 2. BOLIVIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>22 September 1971</td>
<td>National Board of Social Action <em>(Junta Nacional de Acción Social)</em></td>
<td>Supreme Decree Nº 09922</td>
<td>Board</td>
<td>Presidency of the First Lady</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>National Institute for Minors, Women and the Family <em>(Instituto Nacional del Menor, Mujer y la Familia)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>17 September 1993</td>
<td>National Secretariat for Ethnic, Gender and Generational Affairs <em>(Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Étnicos, de Género y Generacionales)</em></td>
<td>Law Nº 1493</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Ministry of Human Development¹⁹⁹</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>8 January 1998</td>
<td>Vice-ministry of Gender, Generational and Family Affairs <em>(Viceministerio de Asuntos de Género, Generacionales y Familia)</em></td>
<td>Supreme Decree Nº 24938</td>
<td>Vice-ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>4 August 2002</td>
<td>Vice-ministry of Women <em>(Viceministerio de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>Law No. 2412</td>
<td>Vice-ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Peasantry, Indigenous, Gender and Generational Affairs</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>19 March 2003</td>
<td>Vice-ministry of Women *(Viceministerio de la Mujer)*²⁰⁰</td>
<td>Law LOPE No 2446</td>
<td>Vice-ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Sustainable Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁹⁹ Newly created ministry.
²⁰⁰ Transferred to Ministry of Sustainable Development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Supreme Decree Nº</th>
<th>Vice-ministry</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R- 30 Jan 2006</td>
<td>Vice-ministry of Gender and Generational Affairs (Viceministerio de Género y Generacional)</td>
<td>28612</td>
<td>Vice-ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| R- 7 Feb 2009 | Vice-ministry of Equality of Opportunities (Viceministerio de Igualdad de Oportunidades) | 29894             | Vice-ministry | Ministry of Justice                           | LOW

201 Expands its remit to cover areas dedicated to children, youth and the elderly.

202 Expands its remit to cover areas dedicated to people living with disabilities, children, youth, the elderly, and prevention and eradication of all forms of violence based on gender or age.
### 3. BRAZIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>29 August 1985</td>
<td>National Council for Women’s Rights (Conselho Nacional Dos Direitos de la Mulher)</td>
<td>Law Nº 7353</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Secretariat for Women’s Rights (Secretaria de Estado dos Direitos da Mulher)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>28 May 2003</td>
<td>Secretariat for Women’s Policies (Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres)</td>
<td>Law Nº 10683</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>19 August 2010</td>
<td>Secretariat of Policies for Women (Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres)</td>
<td>Law Nº 12314</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>25 June 2012</td>
<td>Secretariat of Policies for Women (Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres)</td>
<td>Decree Nº 7765</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>20 June 2013</td>
<td>Secretariat of Policies for Women (Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres)</td>
<td>Decree Nº 8030</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>5 April 2016</td>
<td>Ministry of Women, Racial Equality, Youth and Human Rights (Ministério das Mulheres, da Igualdade Racial, da Juventude e dos Direitos Humanos)</td>
<td>Law Nº 13 266</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>29 September 2016</td>
<td>Special Secretariat of Policies for Women (Secretaria Especial de Políticas para as Mulheres)</td>
<td>Law Nº 13 341</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Citizenship</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

203 It is conferred ministerial status.
204 Its remit is expanded.
205 Its structure is modified and its functions expanded.
206 Its structure is modified.
207 Its remit is modified and it is no longer only dedicated to women’s affairs and gender equality but also to human rights, youth, the elderly, children, people living with disabilities, minorities, people living with addictions, racial equality. This was the result of a ministerial reform that merged the former ministries dedicated to these issues separately. The responsibility of mainstreaming gender equality into public policies is eliminated.
208 It is no longer a ministry. The new entity is attached to a newly created Ministry of Justice and Citizenship.
### 4. CHILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>National Women’s Secretariat <em>(Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Office of the Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>National Women’s Secretariat <em>(Secretaría Nacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Office of the first lady</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3 January 1991</td>
<td>National Women’s Service <em>(Servicio Nacional de la Mujer - SERNAM)</em></td>
<td>Law 19023</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Cooperation</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>National Women’s Service <em>(Servicio Nacional de la Mujer - SERNAM)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>8 March 2015</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Gender Equity <em>(Ministerio de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género)</em></td>
<td>Law 20820</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Office of the Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

209 Autonomous entity, its head has ministerial rank.
210 This Ministry was replaced in 2011 by a newly created Ministry of Social Development and SERNAM continued being administratively attached to it.
211 With the creation of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity in 2015, the National Women’s Service (SERNAM) did not disappear but was kept with a new name as “Service for Women and Gender Equity” under the newly created ministry, with the responsibility of executing the policies, programmes and plans of the ministry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>National Department for Gender Equality <em>(Departamento nacional de equidad de género)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>17 August 1990</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Office for Youth, Women and Family <em>(Consejería Presidencial para la Juventud, la Mujer y la Familia)</em></td>
<td>Decree 1878</td>
<td>Advisory Office</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>31 August 1995</td>
<td>National Directorate for Equity for Women <em>(Dirección Nacional de Equidad para las Mujeres)</em></td>
<td>Decree 1440</td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>29 June 1999</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women <em>(Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>Decree 1182</td>
<td>Advisory Office</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>17 September 2010</td>
<td>Senior Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women <em>(Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>Decree 3445</td>
<td>Advisory Office</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>2 September 2014</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Office for Equity for Women <em>(Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>Decree 1649</td>
<td>Advisory Office</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Name and functions modified.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Programme Office for Women and Family (Oficina de Programas para la Mujer y la Familia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>26 May 1976</td>
<td>Programme Office for Women and Family (Oficina de Programas para la Mujer y la Familia)</td>
<td>Executive Decree 5991</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>March 1986</td>
<td>National Centre for the Development of Women and Family (Centro Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Mujer y la Familia)</td>
<td>Law N° 7026</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>May 18, 1998</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres) (INAMU)</td>
<td>Law N° 7801</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>8 May 2014</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres) (INAMU)</td>
<td>Decree N° 38489-MP-MOPT</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

213 Autonomous entity attached to the Presidency whose head has ministerial status.
214 Its head no longer has ministerial status.
215 Its head recovers the ministerial status, as per agreement 5-P.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>17 August 1982</td>
<td>Directorate for the Promotion of Women (Dirección de Promoción de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Decree N° 46</td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>11 August 1999</td>
<td>State Secretariat for Women (Secretaría de Estado de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Law N° 86/99</td>
<td>State secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>8 February 2010</td>
<td>Ministry of Women (Ministerio de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Decree 56/10</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>Legal basis</td>
<td>Institutional type</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Early 1970s</td>
<td>Department of Women <em>(Departamento de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Prevision</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>29 May 2009</td>
<td>Transition Commission for the Definition of the Public Institution that guarantees Equality between Men and Women - Transition Commission towards the Women and Gender Equality Council <em>(Comisión de Transición para la Definición de la Institucionalidad Pública que garantice la Igualdad entre Hombres y Mujeres - Comisión de transición hacia el Consejo de las Mujeres y la Igualdad de Género)</em></td>
<td>Executive decree, Official Registry No. 601, paragraph 1733</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>National Secretariat for Peoples, Social movements and Citizens’ Participation</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Legal basis</td>
<td>Institutional type</td>
<td>Administrative attachment</td>
<td>Hierarchical level</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>National Family Secretariat <em>(Secretaría Nacional de la Familia)</em></td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1 March 1996</td>
<td>Salvadorian Institute for Women’s Development <em>(Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer)</em> (ISDEMU)</td>
<td>Legislative decree No. 644</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Family Secretariat</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Salvadorian Institute for Women’s Development <em>(Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer)</em> (ISDEMU)</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>National Secretariat for Social Inclusion</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Per Legislative Agreement 14-2000 of 24 March 2000, the Congress of the Republic had advised the Presidency of the Republic to create a Women’s Secretariat and this was the result of that recommendation. This entity had ministerial rank.

According to this Agreement, the President appoints directly the Presidential Secretariat of SEPREM. This reforms article 3 of the Governmental Agreement 200-2000 by which women’s organizations proposed to the President a list of ten candidates for the post of head of the NWM as established up until then by article 4 of the Governmental Agreement 200-2000 and article 10 of the Governmental Agreement 130-2001.

This reforms Governmental Agreement 130-2001 and creates the Directorate for the Prevention, Attention and Eradication of Violence against Women contradicting and duplicating some of the functions of SEPREM and the National Coordinator of Intra-Family Violence and Violence against Women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>10 June 1981</td>
<td>National Women’s Office (Oficina Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Governmental agreement 24-81</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Prevision</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>17 May 2000</td>
<td>Presidential Women’s Secretariat (Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer - SEPREM)</td>
<td>Governmental agreement 200-2000</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>2 February 2012</td>
<td>Presidential Women’s Secretariat (Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer - SEPREM)</td>
<td>Governmental agreement 34-2012</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>13 October 2014</td>
<td>Presidential Women’s Secretariat (Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer - SEPREM)</td>
<td>Governmental agreement 353-2014</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

216 Per Legislative Agreement 14-2000 of 24 March 2000, the Congress of the Republic had advised the Presidency of the Republic to create a Women’s Secretariat and this was the result of that recommendation. This entity had ministerial rank.

217 According to this Agreement, the President appoints directly the Presidential Secretariat of SEPREM. This reforms article 3 of the Governmental Agreement 200-2000 by which women’s organizations proposed to the President a list of ten candidates for the post of head of the NWM as established up until then by article 4 of the Governmental Agreement 200-2000 and article 10 of the Governmental Agreement 130-2001.

218 This reforms Governmental Agreement 130-2001 and creates the Directorate for the Prevention, Attention and Eradication of Violence against Women contradicting and duplicating some of the functions of SEPREM and the National Coordinator of Intra-Family Violence and Violence against Women.
### 11. HONDURAS

| Event | Date              | Name                                                                 | Legal basis                        | Institutional type | Administrative attachment | Hierarchical level |
|-------|-------------------|                                                                     |                                    |                    |                          |                   |
| F     | 28 February 1994  | Governmental Women’s Office *(Oficina Gubernamental de la Mujer)*  | Executive agreement N° 097          | Office             | Presidency                | HIGH              |
| F     | 30 September 1998 | National Women’s Institute *(Instituto Nacional de la Mujer - INAM)* | Legislative decree 232-98          | Institute          | Presidency                | HIGH              |
| R-    | 22 February 2014  | National Women’s Institute *(Instituto Nacional de la Mujer - INAM)* | Executive decree No. PCM 001-2014  | Institute          | Sectoral Cabinet for Development and Social Inclusion | LOW               |

219 Autonomous entity attached to the Presidency whose head has ministerial status.

220 As a result of a governmental re-structuring, the National Women’s Institute is no longer attached to the Presidency but to the Secretariat of Interior and Population which is attached to the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion. It maintains its autonomy and ministerial status. Other areas covered by the same Ministry are those related to children, family, education for work, community, water and sanitation, health, education and social policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>National Programme for International Women’s Year</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Programa Nacional del Año Internacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>National Programme for the Integration of Women in Development</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>National Population Council</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Programa Nacional de Integración de la Mujer al Desarrollo)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>General Coordination of the National Women’s Programme</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Coordinación General del Programa Nacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Programa Nacional de la Mujer, Alianza para la Igualdad)</em></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>31 August 1998</td>
<td>General Coordination of the National Women’s Commission</td>
<td>Official Journal of the Federation of 21 August 1998</td>
<td>Organism</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Coordinación General de la Comisión Nacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{221}\) Autonomous entity attached to the Presidency whose head has ministerial status.
## 13. NICARAGUA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>23 December 1975</td>
<td>Women’s Office <em>(Oficina de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta No. 292, Decree No. 101</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>6 August 1982</td>
<td>Women’s Legal Office <em>(Oficina Legal de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta, No. 183, Decree No. 1091</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Governmental Junta</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>29 December 1987</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Women’s Institute - INIM <em>(Instituto Nicaragüense de la Mujer - INIM)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta, No. 277, Decree No. 293</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of the Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>7 July 1993</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Women’s Institute - INIM <em>(Instituto Nicaragüense de la Mujer - INIM)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta No. 128, Decree No. 36-93</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of the Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>3 June 1998</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Women’s Institute - INIM <em>(Instituto Nicaragüense de la Mujer - INIM)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta No. 102, Law No. 290</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Family</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>29 January 2007</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Women’s Institute - INIM <em>(Instituto Nicaragüense de la Mujer - INIM)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta No. 20, Law 612, art. 4</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Office of the Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>13 February 2013</td>
<td>Ministry of Women <em>(Ministerio de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td>La Gaceta No. 28, Law No. 832</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency Secretariat</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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222 An advisory council of the INIM is created
223 INIM is no longer attached to the Presidency but to the Ministry of Family.
224 INIM is again attached to the Presidency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>National Commission for the celebration of the International Year of Women (Comisión Nacional para la celebración del Año Internacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>National Women’s Office (Oficina Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Women’s Department (Departamento de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Presidential decree</td>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>30 August 1995</td>
<td>National Women’s Directorate (Dirección Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Presidential decree No. 77</td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>19 November 1997</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth, Women, Children and Family (Ministerio de la Juventud, la Mujer, la Niñez y la Familia)</td>
<td>Law No. 42</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1 August 2005</td>
<td>National Women’s Directorate (Dirección Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Law No. 29</td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>23 December 2008</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer - INAMU)</td>
<td>Law No. 71</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

225 Its remit covers women, children, youth, the family, the elderly and people living with disabilities. The former National Directorate of Women is part of this newly created ministry.

226 This entity, which was part of the former Ministry of Youth, Women, Children and Family is attached to the Ministry of Social Development.

227 Autonomous entity attached to the Ministry of Social Development.
### 15. PARAGUAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
<th>Administrative attachment</th>
<th>Hierarchical level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>National Women’s Office <em>(Oficina Nacional de la Mujer)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Labour</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Directorate for the Professional Promotion of Working Women <em>(Dirección de Promoción Profesional de la Mujer Trabajadora)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Labour</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>18 September 1992</td>
<td>Women’s Secretariat <em>(Secretaría de la Mujer)</em>[^228]</td>
<td>Law No 34</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>26 July 2012</td>
<td>Ministry of Women <em>(Ministerio de la Mujer)</em>[^229]</td>
<td>Law No 4.675</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^228]: Its head has ministerial status.

[^229]: The former entity improves its hierarchical status and becomes a ministry.
## 16. PERU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Institutional type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Committee for the Revalorization of Women (Comité de Revalorización de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Women’s Office (Oficina de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Special Commission for Women’s Rights (Comisión Especial de Derechos de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Office for Women’s Affairs (Oficina de Asuntos de la Mujer)</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>25 October 1996</td>
<td>Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development (Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano)</td>
<td>Legislative decree No. 866</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>10 July 2002</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Social Development (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social)</td>
<td>Law No. 27779</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>20 January 2012</td>
<td>Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables)</td>
<td>Legislative decree No. 1098</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

230 Its remit covers women and family affairs.
231 Its remit covers women, children, family, the elderly and vulnerable populations.
232 Its remit covers women, children, adolescents, youth, the elderly, people living with disabilities, displaced people and internal migrants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
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<th>Hierarchical level</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Women’s Department</td>
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<td>Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Welfare</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>5 May 1987</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute <em>(Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres)</em></td>
<td>Presidential decree 226/87</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-</td>
<td>1 November 1992</td>
<td>National Family and Women’s Institute (Instituto (Nacional de la Familia y la Mujer))</td>
<td>Law No 16320</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>21 March 2005</td>
<td>National Family and Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Familia y la Mujer)</td>
<td>Law No 17866</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R+</td>
<td>19 December 2005</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres - INMUJERES)</td>
<td>Law No 17930</td>
<td>Institute</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

233 It is no longer attached to the Ministry of Education and Culture but to the Ministry of Social Development, article 6.
234 Its remit and name are modified. It no longer covers family affairs but only women and gender equality affairs, article 377.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Institutional type</th>
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<tr>
<td>F+</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Feminine Advisory Commission of the Presidency of the Republic (Comisión Femenina Asesora de la Presidencia de la República)</td>
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<td>2 April 2009</td>
<td>Ministry of the Popular Power for Women and Gender Equality (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Mujer y la Igualdad de Género)</td>
<td>Decree Nº 6.663</td>
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