Strategies and Determinants of Civil-Military Adaptation and Military Change in Insecure States

Evidence from Pakistan

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Declaration

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Signed:  (Candidate)

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List of Abbreviations

CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CVE	Countering Violent Terrorism
EUGS	EU Global Strategy
FATA	Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
FIR	First Information Report
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IO	International Organisations
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Da'wah
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
NACTA	National Counterterrorism Authority
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOC	No Objection Certificate
NUST	National University of Sciences and Technology
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Abstract

Strategies and Determinants of Civil-Military Adaptation and Military Change in Insecure States

Evidence from Pakistan

Cornelia-Adriana Baciu BA, MA

Civil-military cooperation represents one major component of hybrid approaches of peace, security and defence, which emerged to democratise security governance and effectively counter conventional and less conventional security threats and refer to interaction, coherence and 'strategic coordination' between local and liberal (international) orders and practices (Richmond 2016; Mac Ginty 2011; Schroeder *et al.* 2014). While hybrid approaches of peace and security are playing an increasing role, e.g. in EU and NATO global strategies, hitherto, little research has analysed the impact of hybrid mechanisms. This doctoral project fills a crucial gap in the field of civil-military relations and global security governance by analysing instances of civil-military interactions and military transition in Pakistan, as well as the determinants and strategies which can influence them. The conceptual framework is informed by theories of hybrid peace and security and civil-military relations. The empirical analysis is based on 40 survey responses and 54 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in four sample regions in Pakistan with senior representatives of the military (mainly retired), civil society, government, media and academia. Ethical approval was obtained prior to the field research from the DCU Ethics Committee. The computer applications NVivo and Stata were used for the data analysis. The research methodology employs process tracing and content analysis. Based on the results, the dissertation proposes key elements for a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation in insecure environments in transition. The findings are relevant for international organisations and donors and inform the EU Global Strategy on Foreign Policy and Security about hybrid and comprehensive peace and security mechanisms promoting military transformation and societal resilience in fragile countries, affected by complex insecurities. The results of this PhD dissertation advance theories of hybrid security and civil-military relations.

1 Introduction

Approximately 12.6% of the global GDP was the estimated cost of conflict and violence in 2017, while the development aid supplied by OECD countries was only 1% of that amount (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016; OECD 2017). Under its global strategy and in conjunction with the UN, 95% of the EU development aid for conflict, peace and security was allocated to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, and security system management and reform (European Parliament 2019: 6). Contrasting these efforts, the economic impact of violence in insecure and transitional countries affected by multiple conflicts and complex sources of violence, such as Pakistan, increased by 20% between 2007 and 2017 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018: 21), with Pakistan being among the four worst affected countries by terrorism and conflict in the world between 2007-2017 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018: 21). Why these imbalances still persist requires closer academic inquiry. Putting together the pieces of this puzzle, the problem which the dissertation addresses is that of the impact of reforms promoted by global actors, such as the EU, UN or donor agencies, on processes of democratic institutional change in insecure and transitional states. It does so by investigating estimated changes in civil-military relations during periods of transition and how civil society organisations (which many international organisations and donors support as avenues of democratisation) can contribute to a sustainable improvement of democratic security governance.

Existing donor approaches and strategies attempting to democratise security governance via local actors are largely based on understandings of hybrid peace and security which are underpinned by classical theories of civil-military relations and civilian oversight (Huntington 1957; Pion-Berlin 1992). While much of the literature on civil-military relations and the roles of non-state actors has focused on the conditions and determinants of democratic civilian control in consolidated democracies, more research is needed to adequately understand the conditions under which democratic civil-military relations can occur in insecure, fragile or otherwise transitional states, such as Pakistan. To address this crucial research gap, the dissertation studies instances of civil-military interaction in a post-military, insecure and transitional context. Building on existing theories of civil-military relations and hybrid peace and security, which this thesis advances by providing primary evidence from an insecure, transitional case, i.e. Pakistan, which is located in

South Asia and neighbours India, China, Iran, Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea, as shown in Figure 1.1:

Figure 1.1 Map of Pakistan
(Source: CIA World Factbook 2015)

I argue that, first, institutionalist approaches based on a dichotomic understanding of civil-military relations do not conceptually fit hybrid, multi-agency mechanisms such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), which international organisations (IOs) and donors promote in their strategies; second, traditional understandings of civil-military relations and democratic oversight are based on evidence from established democracies and thus incompatible with the dynamics in insecure states in transition, risking to have counterproductive effects during implementation. The dissertation proposes some key elements for a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation in insecure orders with limited institutional capacity.

The central research questions investigated in this thesis can be summarised as follows:

1. *How is the role of the security and defence institutions in insecure states perceived to change during periods of transition*?
2. *What is the perceived impact of civil society actors, funded by international organisations, on democratic security governance in transitional environments?*
3. *What kind of determinants can influence the civil-military interaction in the security governance and peacebuilding domain?*

These questions are important to answer because, first, it increases our understanding about tangible changes occurred in security and defence institutions during periods of transition in the context of support from international actors and complex insecurities and sources of violent conflict to which Pakistan, the case under investigation in this thesis, is exposed. Complementing existing literature on military change and transformation, which has to a large extent focussed on consolidated democracies, the dissertation provides key findings related to processes of change and transformation in the military organisation and strategy in fragile contexts of limited statehood. The dissertation finds that processes of military transformation can take place both top-down and bottom-up. Top-down changes can occur as result of exogenous factors, external to the military institutions, such as international actors or norm entrepreneurs, which can act as agents of change in Pakistan. Bottom-up processes of transformation can be endogenous to the military institution and determined from within. Processes of military change and transformation can emerge endogenously under influence or constraint from international actors as well as subsequent to changes in the domestic political culture, to which democratisation civil society organisations (CSOs) can contribute.

Second, answers to the research questions examined in this dissertation will shed light on the ways in which civil society actors, including international non-governmental organisation (INGOs) and think tanks[1], which are important avenues of development and democratisation attempts by international organisations and donors, can maximise their contribution on the democratisation of security governance in transitional insecure and difficult (post-military) environments. To study this question, a sample of local actors including (I)NGOs and think tanks is analysed. Existing specialist literature argues that local actors and non-state organisations funded by international actors (e.g. IOs, foreign governments or donors) can play a role in the democratisation of security governance by fulfilling four functions: input legitimacy, output legitimacy, diagonal accountability and elite pacting (Zürn 2000; Scharpf 1997; Cawthra and Luckham 2003). The results of the dissertation nonetheless reveal that CSOs can be generally perceived to have a mixed (sometimes positive, sometimes negative or weak) effect on peace and security. However, while non-state actors in transitional and insecure environments have very little possibility to fulfil output legitimacy and elite pacting, they have a considerable potential to promote input legitimacy (citizens participation) and diagonal accountability (especially the empowerment of citizens to exercise their accountability and monitoring functions). The positive roles of local actors and non-state organisations in democratising security governance can be related to their success in awareness building. The results of the dissertation advance theories of hybrid peace and security, which place a special focus on the empowerment of citizens and institutions to take ownership of the democratic process.

Third, the answers to the research questions stated above will facilitate our understanding about the factors which can catalyse or obstruct the efficiency and productivity of the relationship between peacebuilding CSOs and armed forces, by specifying the conditions under which good relations between the military and local actors can occur and factors which can impede such interaction. A thorough understanding of the determinants of the success or failure of their relationship with the military in conflict and post-conflict

[1] In this dissertation, civil society actors, local actors, CSOs, think tanks, NGOs, INGOs, non-state organisations, civil society associations or other peaceful not-for-profit organisations will be mentioned intermittently. These organisations can conduct activities at grassroots, middle-level and/or policy level. In Pakistan, the case study applied in this dissertation, all such organisations need to register formally under the 1860 The Societies Registration Act.

scenarios is essential for both domestic and international policies. It is important to understand the mechanisms of democratic civilian control in transitional contexts as well as the factors and conditions which influence them because higher levels of civilian control or influence, advocated by theories and approaches of hybrid peace and security such as Security Sector Reform, can be associated with higher democratic levels (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 198).

1.1 Thesis Structure

The dissertation is organised as follows: the next chapter discusses the theoretical framework and highlights the research gap and the expected contribution of the current research; the third chapter presents the research design and methodology used for the empirical analysis; the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters present the empirical analysis and discuss the findings; the last chapter summarises the results and emphasises the elements of a theory of civil-military adaptation, while also highlighting the implications of the findings for policy and further research.

Chapter 2 presents a review of key specialist literature and the conceptual framework on the basis of which the research questions of this thesis are examined. The conceptual framework is at the intersection of theories of hybrid (comprehensive) security governance, which seek to link domestic and liberal (international) orders (Richmond 2016; Mac Ginty 2011; Schroeder *et al.* 2014), and theories of civil-military relations and military change. These two theoretical clusters are beneficial for studying the research questions of this dissertation because they offer theoretical propositions underpinned by logics of pluralism, everyday life, change and friction, which are predominant in transitional, fragile states. The chapter elaborates on the different aspects of the research gap, which revolves around the issue of democratic control and civilian influence in transitional, insecure and fragile contexts which are exposed to complex security threats and vulnerabilities and have weak institutional capacity. Theories of hybrid security, on which international actors' strategies of democratisation of fragile states are based, apply a concept of democratic civilian oversight of armed forces based on traditional understandings of civil-military theories, which largely trace their foundations from data in established democracies. Thus, the gap consists in the lack of an adequate conceptualisation and understanding of civilian oversight and civil-military

relations in insecure states of limited statehood, which are different than established democratic contexts. The chapter concludes by highlighting the contribution of the dissertation and how it will fill the specific research gap outlined.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology and research design employed for the empirical analysis. It specifies the research questions studied and the research focus of the thesis. For the empirical analysis, the dissertation applies data in form of survey responses and semi-structured interviews which the author conducted with senior representatives of CSOs, media, academia, military (mainly retired) and government in four sample regions in Pakistan. Process tracing and content analysis are applied as research methods. The mixed methodological approach (two different types of data and two research methods) was chosen to deal with the problem of information volatility in fragile environments. The chapter describes how the data were coded using NVivo and justifies the case selection.

Chapter 4, 5 and 6 present and critically discuss the results of the dissertation in view of the research questions and conceptual framework. Chapter 4 estimates the level of perceived military change based on the respondents' perceptions. The results show that while there is some visible change in military's strategic preferences for peace and security and overall an improvement in civil-military relations, the processes of military transformation are rather asymmetric and incomplete, and the military continues to maintain the upper hand in politics. Weak government capacity generates a power vacuum which enables the armed forces to interfere and perpetuate asymmetric power relations. Chapter 5 discusses whether and how local actors supported by international organisations and donors – such as CSOs, think tanks and other non-state associations, which in Pakistan are all mainly referred to using the denominator 'NGO'/'INGO' or think tanks – can contribute to the democratisation of security governance and security institutions, including the military, in an insecure and fragile context. Four different CSO functions in stimulating democratic reforms of security and defence institutions and governance are evaluated: input legitimacy (citizens participation), output legitimacy (quality of political decision and outcomes), diagonal accountability and civilian oversight (directly, through empowerment of institutions or indirectly, through empowerment of citizens to exert their accountability and sanctioning functions), and 'elite pacting' (bridging the gap between old and new nomenclatures and facilitating the

process of transfer of power) (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). The results suggest that local actors have limited capacity and possibility to increase direct diagonal accountability and civilian oversight, output legitimacy or elite pacting functions. Nonetheless, they can be impactful in stimulating citizens' development and participation (input legitimacy and indirect diagonal accountability) and awareness building (which can overall improve the political culture of both citizens and institutions). Chapter 6 assesses the major determinants which can influence the nature and circumstances of civil-military relations and CSO-military relations in particular. It is found that the typologies of strategy which non-state actors use can influence their cooperative outcomes with the military. Organisations having clear strategies in place to co-opt the military in their activities are more likely to interact with the military and engage in synergies or even partnerships, as the Sabawoon project on deradicalisation, an instance in which a think tank was contacted by the military to elaborate on some of the recommendations they issued, the informal meetings between local actors and military representatives arranged by ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations) or another project on child protection between a local NGO and the military (more examples are highlighted in Chapter 4 and 5) have suggested. The organisation's vision and strategy with regards to institutional change, i.e. how it attempts to democratise and change the political culture and security institutions, was also found to be a determinant of civil-military relations. The military can be more reluctant and even conflictual towards organisations adopting more radical approaches of change and transformation. The findings suggest that democratic security change is more likely to occur from actors which do not have explicit objectives to change things, but work on social and political development and empowerment instead. Foreign funding can be both an impediment and a facilitator of CSO-military cooperation. Weak institutional and implementation capacity, political parties and media were found to be further significant determinants in processes of change of security institutions and governance.

Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by discussing the substantive implications of the findings and proposing some key elements for a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation in insecure and fragile states, with limited institutional capacity. It is argued that under auspices of international support from IOs and donors, via CSOs, trade or diplomacy, the institution of the military might adopt a pragmatic approach and undergo processes of endogenous change and transformation due to absolute and relative utility

gains and incentives. In this context, absolute gains and incentives refer to the military's decisions to behave pseudo-democratic, in the sense of 'pretending' to be more democratic, while continuing to maintain power and not being fully subordinated to the civilian government in the sense of 'democratic civilian oversight' in practice, for direct structural benefits (e.g. economic, military training or infrastructure) from IOs or foreign governments. The military can accept to be co-opted in civil-military partnerships when its sub-organisations also receive funding. By 'formally' not intervening in politics, the military can put itself in a better position to be acceptable to both domestic and international actors. This becomes an immense source of legitimacy for the military, as acceptability at domestic and international level of a (formally) non-interferent military can allow the men in uniform to perpetuate their economic activities, which are vital for their institutional survival, almost without any hindrance. At the same time, they can continue to maintain a 'hidden' role in politics through intimidation (e.g. monitoring procedures of CSOs), which allows them to *de facto* exert power. Armed forces are perceived as the most powerful actor on the ground in the everyday life. The adoption of new, traditionally non-military roles, such as the rehabilitation of captured militants can facilitate the military to maintain this soft, but nonetheless powerful position. A soft, but powerful position here refers to the current situation in Pakistan, in which the military is formally not in power, but can exert *de facto* power, through practices of intimidation, for example. Endogenous processes of a voluntary change and transformation in the military doctrine and strategy seeking to project a more democratic institution (while not being one *de facto*) imply nonetheless the indulgence to some extent of democratic values, such as freedom of expression, as the evidence on the increased media freedom post-Musharraf suggests. While the data reveal that there are still *taboo* topics, which the media and public opinion have difficulties to address, such as military operations and human rights in FATA and Baluchistan, the majority of the respondents acknowledged a tangible shift in military attitudes towards allowing greater freedom of expression. This was an important development which can contribute to democratisation. Institutional oversight capacity and effective implementation of formal oversight mechanisms would be a further step in the democratisation of security governance in insecure and transitional states. As the last chapter highlights, transparency and mechanisms of 'checking power', facilitated, *inter alia*, through incentives and support from IOs and effective CSOs' contributions to 'building power' and will for democratic change, is a key dimension of

a middle-range theory of civil-military relations and democratic oversight in insecure and fragile states with limited institutional capacity.

The following chapter presents the theoretical framework and a review of the literature in which this research is grounded.

2 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The conceptual framework of this PhD dissertation consists of two primary paradigms: theories of hybrid peace and security and theories of civil-military relations. What both theoretical clusters have in common is the notion of democratic civilian oversight, which refers to civilian, democratically elected institutions supervising the armed forces. The overwhelming diversity of civil-military theories, arguing for understandings of democratic oversight varying from institutionalist approaches (divergence) (Huntington 1957) to sociological (convergence) (Janowitz 1960) to fusionist or pluralist approaches Segal *et al.* 1974; Schiff 2012), reveals how difficult it is to operationalise the notion of civilian oversight. Hybrid security theories articulate a post-liberal understanding of international security and democracy, which transcend insufficiently substantiated models such as 'liberal peace' (Doyle 1986). Hybridity here is understood as pluralist, inclusive and networked environments of daily practice, interaction and decision-making. These types of environments entail a mix of actors with different views and thus imply continuous processes of negotiation and contestation. Hybrid peace and security paradigms became essential parts of international organisations' approaches in their strategies to democratise security governance in fragile states in transition, affected by conflicts and complex insecurities. I argue that, theories of civil-military relations and hybrid security do not provide sufficient propositions to allow for an elaborated understanding of democratic oversight in insecure states in transition. Policy approaches and strategies of international organisations, including those of the EU, to democratise security governance using hybrid peace and security philosophies based on understandings of democratic oversight as described by traditional theories of civil-military relations, are not only a mismatch with the reality on the ground, but attempts to pursue this type of oversight as a goal are likely to be inefficient. As I emphasise in the middle-range theory proposed in this dissertation and discussed in detail in Chapter 7, in order to work and effectively democratise insecure and hybrid environments two aspects need to be considered: a. processes of checking power and a system of checks and balances considering that powerful actors can find innovative ways to perpetuate their

power while co-existing with other actors in a plural environment; b. ways need to be found to avoid that the interactions or actions of the actors involved have antagonistic effects for democratic security processes. In fragile societies, formal processes of democratic civilian oversight are difficult to expect, especially in countries which experienced *coups d'état* and continued to be exposed to multiples insecurities and sources of threat, as such environments are assumed to be favourable to a strong military agency. The argument developed in this dissertation is that international organisations' attempts to democratise security governance in transitional and fragile states, *inter alia*, via local actors such as civil society organisations and think tanks, could be associated with a transition of the military institution. Exposure to democratic norms which diffuse from international actors and non-state organisations is expected to stimulate and foster processes of change in the political culture of the society, which becomes thus less inclined to accept a formal role in government of the defence forces. In response to changes but also to avail of important utility gains from international actors, the military is argued to undergo processes of adaptation and adopt new strategies to remain relevant. Thus, while civilian actors do not formally exert oversight, they can yield some influence on the military to change and adapt.

This chapter is organised as follows: first it provides a literature review of theories of hybrid peace and security and civil-military relations; then it discusses the research gap, i.e. the notion of civilian oversight and its need for special consideration during periods of transition, in which democratic civilian oversight takes rather the form of civilian influence. Following this, it articulates the research focus and contribution of this dissertation.

2.2 Theories of Multi-Agency (Comprehensive) Security: Hybrid, Networked, Inclusive

2.2.1 Theories of Hybrid Peace and Security

Theories of hybrid, comprehensive peace and security emerged to reflect the changes in the nature of security in the 21st century and have developed in reaction to the failure of frameworks based on 'liberal peace'. Liberal peace rests on conceptual foundations of

the democratic peace theory and preceded hybrid multi-agency security approaches. Democratic or liberal peace theory argues that the way to achieve 'eternal peace' (Kant 1795) is a liberal and democratic system of governance, based on market economy and democratic values (Kurtenbach 2007; Doyle 1986; Schumpeter 1955). The logic of liberal peacebuilding is that democracies and liberal states, based on "individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation" (Doyle 1986: 1151) are peaceful and would not fight wars against each other due to their commitment to peaceful values as well as due to rationalistic accounts, such as the costs of aggression. This hypothesis was provided confirmatory support by several empirical studies which found a correlation between democracy and peace (Haas 1974; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Ray 1993; Rummel 1995). However, the liberal (democratic) peace theory as well as the policy models based on it (and discussed in the upcoming sub-section) had come under intense critique after the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (*inter alia*), which increased reluctance in top-down approaches. Assessments of the role and impact of international organisations, donors and foreign governments in promoting peace by top-down regulatory governance have suggested a partial failure of the initial post-Cold War institutionalist 'statebuilding project' (Richmond 2014, 2016). Institutionalist theories are argued to be inherently flawed (because they fail to integrate relative gains) (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 19), and can thus can have only a limited impact on changing political preferences or behaviour, e.g. of going to war. This has led to a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of security and the actors involved in providing it. The logic of the new (post-liberal) peace and security paradigm, reflected by hybrid multi-agency approaches post-2000 was to: 1) promote democratic change, transformation and inclusive models of security which would enable the sustainable emergence of peace from below, i.e. bottom-up, and 2) empower local communities and disadvantaged groups. Post-liberal peace advocates that in order to be just and sustainable, peace and security need to "form" from below and "engage with the local" (Richmond 2014: 195). Drawing on post-Clausewitzian understandings of (post)modern wars, which claim more 'dovish' instead of 'hawkish' approaches to peace, post-liberal theories of hybrid peace and security claim that sustainable peace and stability requires multilateral and negotiated efforts which can result in inclusive and genuine approaches to security, owned by all relevant actors.

The post-liberal framework is essentially a revised version of the liberal peacebuilding theory, while it "still remain[*s*] cognizant of the liberal peace and its norms, technologies, capacities and advantages" (Richmond 2014: xiv; Visoka 2015: 543). The main development consists of the replacement of the exclusively top-down (liberal) approaches with a hybrid model of governance (Luckham and Kirk 2013: 7; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011), underpinned by 'normative pluralism' (Riches 2017). This is operationalised as bottom-up and multidimensional processes involving a multitude of interdependent actors, mechanisms, dynamics and relationships, and formal and informal types of interactions between them. These hybrid interactions are assumed to take place between "rational actors motivated by claims to power, justice, entitlements and welfare", and result in "dynamic change and transformation" (Visoka 2017: 308, 319). The outcomes of these interactions are strongly influenced by "contextual dynamics of negotiation, co-optation, domination, resistance, assimilation and coexistence" as well as "everyday practice" (Visoka 2017: 308). Given the complexity of "lineages, assemblages and figuration processes" (Visoka 2017: 319) that occur in hybrid processes, the outcomes are non-linear and influenced by a non-exhaustive set of determinants.

The rationale of multi-agency and hybrid models of security is underpinned by theories of collective action and collaboration, such as collaborative governance regime (Emerson *et al.* 2011) or Peacebuilding Systems Theory (PST) (de Coning 2008), which argue that interdependence, coordination and coherence between actors operating within a system on similar or adjacent areas can increase their performativity and the efficiency of the final outcome. The incentive for coordination between actors is that "the success of each individual programme is thus linked to the success of the collective and cumulative effort of the overall undertaking" (de Coning 2008: 60; Smuts 1927: 78). Instances of "collective action situations" (Williams 2014: 25) and "interactions" (Wittkowsky 2012: 2) between actors operating within a system constitute 'complex adaptive systems', which can change their attributes and intensity over time (Gray and Wood 1991*;* Ring and Van de Ven 1994), and which can involve a permanent negotiation and re-negotiation between the actors which are part in the process. Beyond the theoretical debate, it is worth exploring the approaches of hybrid peace and security used at policy level, by international organisations and donors in their strategies to democratise security governance in fragile states affected by complex insecurities.

2.2.2 Approaches of Comprehensive (Multi-Agency) Security at Policy Level

A new political and security order dominated by hybrid security risks and system instability emerged post-Cold War and particularly after 2000. This stimulated international organisations to adopt pluralistic policy models, based on institutional cooperation, multilateral decision-making, inclusiveness, interdependence and power-sharing mechanisms (Linklater 1996: 77). A multipolar architecture of the international system, complemented by multilateralism, was believed to ensure greater stability and system resilience, after the 'failure' of the bipolar balance of power in 1989, which constituted a key momentum for democratic change across the world. In an increasingly globalised, interdependent and pluralistic world order, authority was distributed among multiple actors, such as international organisations – e.g. European Union, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) –, civil society groups (CSOs), such as NGOs and think tanks, private actors and other stakeholders. With the hope of working on changing state preferences of going to war (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 7) and bringing democracy from below (Schirch 2011), i.e. bottom-up, non-state actors gained a prominent role in the creation of normative spaces and assistance to national states in key areas such as development, democratisation and security. Responsibilities and functions performed traditionally by the state in sectors such as development, security, education and poverty reduction have started to be taken, though in a temporally uneven process[2], by non-state actors (Mathews 1997). Mostly with funding by international organisations (notably EU, UN and World Bank's International Development Association) and foreign governments (e.g. US, Germany, Japan, Norway), NGOs specialised on specific thematic areas started to capacitate states in insecure, fragile or otherwise difficult and transitional environments of limited statehood. In this context, models of hybrid (pluralistic) security, envisaging objectives of strategic integration and inclusion began to be promoted. Aimed at overcoming shortcomings of zero-sum, bipolar conceptions of reality, these models promote the simultaneous existence of a *plurality* of

[2] Particularly in the period between 1991 and 2001 (9/11), there was an exaggerated sense of the role of civil society in bringing democratic change in Eastern Europe and a shift away from focusing on state capacity. This changed somewhat post-9/11 when the international policy discourse became more concerned with state failure as a feature of allowing al Qaeda to operate in Afghanistan and Somalia.

identities, processes and actors with diverse ideological and organisational structures. Such multi-agency systems allow for a plurality of centres of power and a subsequent concept of sovereignty shared between several authorities or alternating between different actors.

Some of the most prominent policy instruments encompassing hybrid, multi-agency models of security are: Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Edmunds 2002; Brzoska 2003; Fluri and Hadžić 2004); the counterinsurgency (COIN) model (Kilkullen 2006, 2010a, 2010b), comprehensive security (Schmid 2007; Ehrhart 2011; Barry 2012; Wittkowsky 2012; European Commission 2013; NATO 2016; Drent 2011) and whole-of-government approaches (OECD 2006; Christensen 2007). The main attributes of multi-agency security approaches are "integration, cooperation, inclusivity, and cohesion" as well as hybrid processes aimed at "dissolve[ing] boundaries" and stimulating the emergence of "shared interests and values" (Goodhand 2003: 287; Duffield 2007). 'Friction' "between the exporters and importers" of these approaches (Goodhand 2013: 288; Millar *et al.* 2013) is anticipated to occur, particularly between actors with different ideological and organisational structures, such as military and civilian actors, including NGOs. Processes of friction, often in the form of resistance, disagreement and sometimes conflict, emphasise the normative imperative for strategic integration of the plurality of aims and organisational structures as well as the challenges thereafter.

SSR (Brzoska 2003; Edmunds 2002; Schnabel and Born 2011; United Nations Security Council 2014; European Commission 2016) was designed by the international community (UN A/62/659; Brzoska 2003; Ejdus 2010) to reflect the changes in the understandings of security post-Cold War. SSR and the enhancement of "partners' capacities to deliver security within the rule of law" is a clear objective in EU Global Strategy (EUGS) on security and foreign policy of 2016 (EU Global Strategy 2016: 26). With a focus on "democratisation, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction" (Bruneau 2011: 42), SSR refers to "the process through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organizational demands of transformation" (Edmunds 2007: 25), in other words, the reform of security in developing, fragile or otherwise transitional states. Reforms and sustainable processes of transformation in the SSR framework aim at advancing good governance, the rule of law, civilian oversight of the security and defence sector, the justice sector as well as the

disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (UN 2012; Bleiker and Krupanski 2012; US Agency for International Development *et al.* 2009: 2; Ghebalia and Lambert 2007; Ball 2005; Cottey *et al.* 2002; Hänggi 2003). The peculiarity of SSR consists in its structural focus on two axes: 1) building power (instruments) and 2) checking power (accountability) (van Veen and van den Boogaard 2016: 307). The reinforcing objectives of "ensuring democratic civilian control of the security sector on the one hand, and developing effectiveness and efficiency in the security sector on the other" (Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation [OECD] 2000: 8; Hänggi 17-8) might overcome the classic dilemma of democratic civilian control, i.e. how much control should be exerted over the armed forces in order to maintain both democratic institutions and military effectiveness. Thus, SSR marks a sustainable transition from a Clausewitzian understanding of war and peace, in which the means of security and defence resided exclusively with the state, towards a more inclusive and less lethal model. Sustainable security and peace are exogenous to the success of cooperation "among a wider array of military and civilian institutions" (Bruneau and Matei 2008: 913; Fluri and Hadžić 2004; European Commission 2016), *inter alia*, armed forces, intelligence agencies, political institutions, civilian defence institutions (e.g. police) and civil society (NGO, mass media, academia, think tanks). This interdependent model prevents the accumulation of power by distributing it among several actors and fostering checks-and-balances among them. Multiple links and interdependence increase system stability, resilience and efficiency by decreasing transaction costs as well as the risk of defection or non-compliance and by enhancing innovation.

COIN represents another major policy instrument – developed by the United States as part of its foreign security policy, most particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Pakistan (particularly FATA region) (Khan 2012). COIN should not be confused with SSR, as the two approaches are very different. Goodhand (2013: 291) argues that COIN "can be understood as competition for governance, with the ultimate goal being less about killing the enemy than about 'out-governing' them", while Kilkullen (2006: 4) claims that COIN aims simultaneously at promoting both "effectiveness" and "legitimacy". Nonetheless, COIN, and here is a major distinction from SSR, has been designed for post-intervention environments to more effectively defeat insurgency rather than build sustainable long-term security. It has also been highly militarised in its practical

application in Afghanistan and Iraq with the military taking over development functions rather than building civil-military relations. Given COIN's less efficient performance on the ground, especially in the context of Afghanistan, this thesis embraces a more SSR-focused approach.

The comprehensive security approach and whole-of-government approach adopted by the European Union and NATO (Drent 2011; EU Commission 2013; NATO 2016) represents a further policy instrument epitomising pluralistic designs of peace and security and hybrid interactions. The comprehensive model is based on concepts of shared responsibility and networked security (Jaberg 2009; Gareis 2010; Wittkowsky 2012; Borchert and Thiele 2013) and entails a mix of civilian and military actors and instruments (Ehrhart 2011: 66). Depending on the conflict potential and stage, networked security can take the form of information exchange, coordination, cooperation and integrated action ("integriertes Handeln") (Wittkowsky 2012: 1). The European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy 2016 reiterated the principle of "practical and principled way in peacebuilding" and comprehensive security involving the whole society and state institutions, as well the synergy between "soft and hard power" (European Union 2016: 4, 9).

The novelty of these hybrid policy models, despite their different emphases, reflecting the organisations' role and history, lies in their (a) inclusive character, advocating the involvement of a plurality of actors and (b) ontological foundation on the development-democracy-security nexus. SSR and comprehensive security aim, at least theoretically, at fostering system resilience and effectiveness by promoting human development and inclusive security 'from the ground up' (Schroeder *et al.* 2014; Schirch 2009; Lederach 1997; Newman *et al.* 2009) and preventive approaches to eliminate terrorism, militancy and insurgency, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) (Nünlist 2015; Berger 2016) which aims at sustainably countering terrorism and militancy by preventing radicalisation. Human development through combating poverty and education as well as good governance represent necessary conditions of sustainable peace models (Lipset 1959, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). Citing Collinson and Elhawary 2010, Metcalfe *et al.* (2012: 6) claim that integrated security paradigms encompass "aid, political, military, security, rule of law and governance interventions under one overarching political objective". The elimination of threats to

internal security (US Department of Defense 2010: 75) or international security (OECD 2008: 185, 199), promotion of universally recognised values such as human rights, sustainable peace, rule of law, good governance and democratic principles (NATO 2006) and supplying political coherence to social, economic and political spheres (OECD 2005/2008; OECD 2011) constitute overarching objectives of integrated security approaches. Particularly in fragile, transitional states affected by armed conflict, insurgency and terrorism, which lack political and institutional capacity to deal with these security risks in a sustainable and democratic manner, hybrid security models can provide a normative framework for democratising security, the actors involved and corresponding dynamics.

One key dimension in the implementation of these approaches is the mechanism of institutional change and how democratic change can occur, which is discussed in the following.

2.2.3 Mechanisms of Democratisation in Security Governance

The role of domestic non-state actors, such as NGOs, post-Cold War, as a result of a redistribution of power among "states, markets, and civil society" in the form of a "power-sharing" model of democratic governance (Mathews 1997: 50) has intensified dramatically in the 21st century. Working closely with civil society as part of its integrated approaches to support good governance and accountable institutions represents a stated principle of the EU strategy of building resilience of fragile states (EU Global Strategy 2016). In this dissertation, non-state organisations are used intermittently with CSOs, NGOs, think tanks or civil society actors and refer to peaceful organisations, legally registered and non-profit, conducting activities, with or without foreign funding, in the security domains. Within the space comprised between the state and the market, interactions can occur between stakeholders and actors with different ideological backgrounds and strategies (Mendel 2010: 719). In particular in transitional SSR regimes, interactions are anticipated to take the form of cooperation (informal agreement), coordination (formal agreement) and collaboration (formal and informal agreement) (Schroeder *et al.* 2014: 214; McNamara 2008). Cooperation is based on informal agreements and channels of information sharing, while coordination happens

on the basis of "formalized agreements" and channels of interaction (McNamara 2008: 392). Collaboration has a more hybrid character which allows for joint engagement, based on both formal and informal agreements (McNamara 2008: 392). Unlike coordination and cooperation, collaboration requires increased integration systems with collective instead of individual goals and relies on trust relations (McNamara 2008: 392).

Collaboration is argued to better fit integrated multi-actor security approaches – which require long-term approaches and permanent dynamics of negotiations – than cooperation. Yalçinkaya (2013: 495) argues that collaboration is arguably the "most suitable mechanism for NGO-military relations" in volatile and difficult environments, as coordination and cooperation have "side effects" that can compromise principal standards of action, such as NGOs' principle of independence and impartiality. Thus, cooperation and coordination govern civil-military relations mainly during crises and complex emergencies in the humanitarian sector, which in principle have short-term objectives, as highlighted by policy models such as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord). In traditional settings of insecure environments, military and civilian actors, e.g. NGOs, might be seen as having "divergent aims and principles" (Taux 2000: 2), i.e. armed forces are responsible for the enforcement of peace agreements and implementation of security, while actors such as NGOs are mainly responsible to provide civilians with humanitarian assistance. However, from a human security perspective – which is pivotal to hybrid, multi-actor peace approaches – security and development are interrelated, it is necessary to converge military's and NGOs' apparent 'divergent' aims and objectives.

Thus, one possibility to converge civil and military objective is complementarity, which can be another type of interaction, in addition to coordination, cooperation and collaboration, and deserves distinct analytical attention. Complementarity is closely linked to collaboration, "which presupposes a desire to integrate approaches to achieve a common goal" (Lilly 2002: 2). Complementarity involves "distinct actions" (Jenny 2001: 23) or "working in parallel as separate/autonomous entities within the same system" (Barnes 2007: 99). Thus, complementarity is conditioned by strategic interaction between actors operating within a system in order to preserve their autonomy, but helps to foster coherence and to avoid duplication. Complementary approaches are indispensable for the interdependent comprehensive types of peace approaches under the

hybrid security paradigm. Particularly in identity-based conflicts, "use of force" promotes peace only if "it is closely linked to the diplomatic process, kept to a minimum and couples with use of security and trust-building measures" (Jakobsen 2000: 45; Stedman and Rothchild 2007). Complementarity is particularly necessary in theatres in which actors with different operational priorities and mandates – such as military and civilians – (Grünewald and de Geoffroy 2002: 462) operate.

Interactions between actors operating in systemic environments are significant because "if an important institution undergoes changes, other institutions are subject to realignment", "adjustment", "adaption" or "integration" (Redmond 2005: 501-3). Institutional change can work as a domino in a complex, multi-layered system. Changes in one layer, e.g. political culture, will result in changes of other layers, e.g. policymaking.

Civilian non-state organisations, such as NGOs can "relate to the state" in three ways: a. complementing it – e.g. in service delivery, b. opposing it – acting like pressure or lobby groups, in particular advocacy NGOs, or c. reforming it – engaging grassroots communities in change and transformation processes (Marcussen 1996: 418; Clark 1991: 75-6). These categories are non-exhaustive with many NGOs possibly playing cross-cutting roles. From a functional perspective, there are ways through which civil society groups, including academia and think tanks, can trigger institutional change and transformation, which are discussed below.

First, civil society organisations can play a role in the democratisation of security governance by increasing input legitimacy, i.e. citizens' participation (Zürn 2000: 183-4, Scharpf 1997). Civil society and non-profit groups could act as communication networks (Eder *et al.* 1998: 324; Habermas 1981, 1993), which through their work in one of three broad categories of action: service delivery, advocacy or education (Goel 2004: 29), can aggregate the needs and interests of the community at institutional level, exerting thus "representative or contestatory functions of social organizations outside the state" (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6). NGOs can foster civic and political participation (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6) at grassroots (Track 3) or middle level (Track 2) and/or transfer the preferences of specific social groups (e.g. women, ethnic groups, people from rural areas or different zones of conflict) at institutional level (Track 1.5). Particularly in countries in which "democratic mechanisms" are not well established, civil society groups

animating citizen involvement can democratise "public decision-making" (IDS 2006: 1) by enabling their participation and involvement. In this case, the institutionalisation of the democratic change – which is *sine qua non* for the sustainable consolidation of democratic structures – is likely to depend on the NGOs' performance and "ability to build networks and alliances that include reformers inside government" (IDS 2006: 3). In particular NGOs doing advocacy work are expected to have greater interest in communicating, transferring or integrating their preferences at policy level. By articulating the preferences of (local) communities, NGOs can foster an inclusive and democratic system, in opposition to a democracy "depend[ing] almost entirely on elite interactions" (Mainwaring 1989: 11). This type of role is potentially crucial in societies like Pakistan, where the formal role of elected institutions in providing oversight of the military is almost meaningless, and seeking to empirically measure its actual role is therefore important.

Second, non-state groups and organisations, particularly those specialised in certain thematic areas, can increase "system effectiveness or output legitimacy", i.e. the amount of "beneficial consequences" or citizens' "utility gains" by promoting the "welfare of the constituency in question" (Scharpf 1997; Sternberg 2015: 615). Academic scholars as well as research-oriented think tanks or NGOs can play a role in initiating or animating public policy debates and reforming the security sector by shifting the normative focus to human security (Cawthra 2003: 41; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309) and more sustainable inclusivist security approaches, while highlighting the shortcomings and side-effects of purely militaristic strategies (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309) in efficiently eliminating security risks. An active CSO role in democratisation by providing output legitimacy transcends a purely proceduralist understanding of democracy, in which decisions are taken based on democratic principles (i.e. "everyone affected by a decision should have a chance to participate", "regardless of the content of the decision" (Zürn 2000: 186), and it adds conditions that can enhance the quality of outcomes and increase the effectiveness of the "solutions provided to societal problems" (Bernauer *et al.* 2016). This post-national, post-Westphalian and rationalistic understanding of democracy integrates the logic of consequentialism and value-added to the sustainable advancement of the state. For example, a preference might be democratic in the sense that it was based on the choice of the majority of the people, but might be non-compliant with democratic content, e.g. human rights, based on "values of rationality and

impartiality" (Zürn 2000: 186). For example, honour killings or mob violence in rural areas in Pakistan and other countries might be assessed as democratic if the proceduralist definition of democracy is applied, as the outcome was deliberated by the majority. Nonetheless, such an outcome infringes human rights and the Lockean principles of civil liberties and freedom: one is free to "pursue ones' own goals as long as they do not limit the freedom of others" (Wetherly 2017: 41). A comprehensive understanding of strategic democracy, encompassing both input and output legitimacy, enables to transcend the (potential) zero-sum relationship between efficiency and democracy (Dahl 1994) into a trade-up. It follows that "democratic legitimacy", which is based on inclusive models and can maximise citizens' welfare, encompasses both input and output elements, and "can only be achieved by a mixed constitution comprising majority procedures and negotiated mechanisms" (Zürn 2000: 183). It is thus the process of negotiation, in which NGOs or CSOs can play a crucial role in fragile systems by facilitating social learning processes and information exchange between different stakeholders and levels of governance, and the extent to which this is happening in practice is therefore important.

Third, non-state actors can play a role in democratisation of the security and defence sector by strengthening accountability. In a post-Westphalian understanding of democracy, authority is shared among multiple centres of power (Roughan 2013; Slaughter 2004; Falk 2002, Sassen 1996; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2015) such as a. international organisations, e.g. UN, EU, NATO, b. civil society groups like NGOs and think tanks, but also academia, c. private actors and d. other (domestic or international) stakeholders, e.g. media. Consequently, accountability has shifted its meaning from mechanisms "by which individuals and organizations report to recognized authority or authorities and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards and Hulme: 1994, 2014: 9) to a broader concept. "Accountability has to be a reciprocal process" and "does not just mean reporting"; "it is a process of information exchange, consultation and joint decision-making (Biswas 2009: 4).

'Diagonal' or societal accountability (via civil society) is a major component of hybrid, multi-agency and comprehensive security approaches (Ejdus 2010). Diagonal accountability encompasses "hybrid combinations of vertical and horizontal oversight, involving direct citizen engagement within state institutions (Ackerman 2004; Paul 1992; Fox 2015). These 'hybrid' forms of accountability can thus take the form of "state-society

synergies" (Evans 1997; World Bank 2004), "co-governance" (Ackerman 2004) in the case of official bodies, or "state-society power-sharing" mechanisms (Fox 2015: 347) in the case of less institutionalised forms of hybridity. The presence of these concepts in everyday life and specific illustrations of how these concepts look like in practice are provided in the empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Diagonal accountability has a distinct relevance for achieving civilian control, and NGOs can play a role in the institutionalisation of civilian oversight by increasing awareness and empowering the existing monitoring and oversight bodies (horizontal accountability). Moreover, through processes of social learning and participation, CSOs can empower citizens to exert their monitoring, oversight and 'sanctioning' functions – i.e. "sanctioning the incumbent" (Przeworski *et al.* 1999: 44) – (vertical accountability). In fragile and instable environments such as Pakistan, "voters have incomplete information" and might not be able to fully exert their 'sanctioning' function, in other words vertical accountability. Through mechanisms of collective action, shaping the "public narrative" and other forms of participatory (informal) governance, CSOs can contribute to enhancing accountability through participation and social learning processes (Odugbemi and Lee 2011). To summarise, CSOs can foster (diagonal) accountability through 1) "empowering public oversight institutions to act" (Fox 2015: 348) (horizontal accountability) and/or 2) empowering citizens to act (vertical accountability). This paper argues that in particular in developing countries, with poor rule of law and weak political/institutional leadership, non-state actors, e.g. NGOs, think tanks, academia and media, have a significant potential to contribute (Ackerman 2003) to processes of social, security and political development and this thesis will explore what impact are those involved in peacebuilding perceived to have.

Fourth, in transitional environments, civilian non-state actors and NGOs are anticipated to play a role in "elite pacting" processes, i.e. a controlled transfer of power and authority as well as agreement about the new model of governance between the old and new nomenclatures (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309), which is an important determinant of transition. A "strong civil society" and actors from the international community can play a significant role in facilitating dialogue, capacity and negotiation between the two "orders" (Cawthra 2003: 35; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). NGOs are anticipated to play a role in "elite pacting" by establishing a liaison, through formal and informal connections, between the two political orders and connecting military and civilian

government institutions. Interaction and contact are central premises to establish confidence and trust and to enter dialogue and negotiation processes. Addressing issues related to human rights and legacies of the past (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 312), i.e. engagement with the past, on one side and interaction (at institutional or personal level) on the other side, can transform relationships by reducing the potential for prejudice and increasing trust (Allport 1979 [1954]). This amplifies the likelihood of dialogue, partnership and collaboration and can contribute to developing "a common understanding" or consensus about the design of "democratic institutions and politics" (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 312). As Adam Przeworski (1999: 80) puts it, "democracy cannot be dictated" and transition to democracy emerges from negotiations with representatives from the old nomenclature and the new, "pro-democratic forces". Thus, civil-military interaction can be seen as forms of "bargaining", in which CSOs and other non-state actor epitomise "pro-democratic forces" and the military represents the "old regime" (Przeworski 1999: 80). Evidence from countries which experienced transition from military to democratic regime suggests that civil society groups can play a role in mobilising dialogue and helping "articulate a democratic security strategy" based on an "adequate understanding of (…) specific problems and needs, as well as on building national consensus on political and military reform" (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 315). Through interaction, civil society actors can play an active role for change at personal, societal and political-institutional level (Goel 2004).

While many scholars argue that NGOs can strengthen state capacity (Carothers and Barndt 1999/2000: 26) by fulfilling the "public and non-public functions" (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004: 133; Edwards and Foley 2001) discussed above, another strand of literature argues that NGOs might undermine and decline the authority of the state. By overtaking responsibilities and functions which are traditionally implemented by the state, NGOs can "weaken and delegitimize the state" (Goel 2004: 31). Donor-funded NGOs in particular might induce a "so-called democratic deficit" (Mathews 1997: 65), because of the top-down direction of the funded projects. On a rationalist account, external interventions leading to institutional transformation and change are assumed to be compatible with donors' objectives. However, donors' objectives are not necessarily conflicting with the domestic priorities, *au contraire*, they might actually reinforce and strengthen them. For example, one of the stated objectives of the EUGS is "state and societal resilience to our East and South" (European Commission 2016). Societal

resilience is certainly a prerequisite for countries in the East and South to achieve their security objectives. Therefore, what at first sight appears to be a "decline in state power", "may actually strengthen the national system" (Mathews 1997: 65), by increasing both input and indirect diagonal accountability. Empirically testing these rival possibilities is important to our understanding of the underlying processes.

Transition to democracy is not expected to result in a full democracy in one move, but it may lead to an intermediary form of democracy: representative democracy, "formal democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, *delegative democracy* [or] *low-intensity democracy*" (original emphasis, Serra 2008: 8-9, O'Donnell 1994, 2001). Established specialist literature (Rustow 1970: 346; Serra 2008: 10) distinguishes between three intermediary stages of transition to democracy: a. "preparatory", i.e. "one of struggle and conflict over power between different social forces"; b. "decision-making", i.e. "an act of explicit consensus in which (…) political leaders accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, agree to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedures" and c. "habituation", in which "politicians and citizens alike apply the new rules to other issues and adjust to the new democratic structure". Civil-military interaction, including with NGOs, can be thus conceptualised as "negotiated bargains" between actors with "heterogeneous interests" (Wood 2010: 188; Przeworski 1991: 182), which in turn is anticipated to trigger processes of institutional change. These mechanisms of institutional change and transformation are key to our understanding of the processes of change and democratisation of security institutions and governance.

2.2.4 Approaches of Democratic Institutional Change and Transformation

Change is conditioned by the transformation of institutional and social orders, both in terms of principles and personal systems of values and beliefs, in a society (Goel 2004: 10-11). Institutions are defined as "recognized patterns of behaviour or practice" (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 8), e.g. "habits, norms, customs, rules, or laws" (Redmond 2005: 501), and can have soft and hard forms. "Social change requires" the adoption of "an integrated approach that looks for positive synergies between different bases of change and different systems of power" (Goel 2004: 13). Via processes of interaction between

military and civil society actors in the framework of hybrid security approaches, institutional change and norm diffusion is anticipated to take place in fragile, post-military states.

There are two ways to explain how transformation of the institutional architecture can occur: 1) exogenously – sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism argue that the sources for institutional change are usually external, i.e. "imposed or imported from outside" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Cappocia and Kelemen 2007) during periods of "critical junctures", "when constraints on actions are (…) lifted" or 2) endogenously, i.e. change can occur due to changes in the distributional power dynamics, which basically means "shifts in the balance of power" (Knight 1992: 145, 184; Thelen 1999). It is distinguished between four types of institutional change: a. "displacement – the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new one"; b. "layering – the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones", c. "drift" – "the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment" and d. "conversion" – "the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15-6), as presented in Table 2.1.

	Displacement	**Layering**	**Drift**	**Conversion**
Removal of old rules	Yes	No	No	No
Neglect of old rules	-	No	Yes	No
Changed impact/ enactment of old rules	-	No	Yes	Yes
Introduction of new rules	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table 2.1 Modalities of Transforming Institutional Designs
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 16)

The institutional and financial support provided by international organisations in insecure states with limited institutional capacity, *inter alia* via CSO, is expected to result in one of the modalities of institutional change presented in Table 2.1, or possibly in a hybrid form, encompassing parts from more than a single type of change. Theoretically, the magnitude of institutional change can vary in function of the veto ability of the "targeted institutions" to "block" change, political context and "type of change agents" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 18-23, 27, 31). Considering the powerful position of the military in the case under analysis in this dissertation and its expected ability to 'block' change, it is

anticipated that NGOs adopting 'rapid' displacement strategies are likely to have less interaction with the military. Endogenous type of change and transformation is an interesting type of change, which argues that "institutional change" does not "emerge from actors with transformational motives", but it is "an unintended by-product that grows out of distributional struggles in which no party explicitly sought the changes that eventually occurred" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 22-3).

Institutional change is often associated with (power) struggles between the "concurrent social or cultural forces" (Redmond 2005: 501) operating in a system and could result in tensions. Tensions can be expected in post-military transitional states between civilian non-state actors (including think tanks, media and academia) on one side, the military on the other side, but also government institutions and external actors (e.g. international institutions and foreign governments). Based on logics and dynamics of "appropriateness" (March and Olsen 1984), people are expected to be acquiescent and accommodate well-established institutions such as the military in Pakistan, which has been in government for more than half of Pakistan's existence as an independent country (four military *coups d'état* in total). Under a natural tendency towards the reproduction of the same or similar institutions, i.e. 'structural isomorphism' (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 5), traditional institutions, such as the military in post-military states, are expected to oppose and attempt to resist to institutional change inflicted by actors such as NGOs, media or academia. Some extremely useful notions in relation to processes of civilian control and change are provided by theories of civil-military relations and military transformation.

2.3 Theories of Civil-Military Relations and Military Change

2.3.1Theories of Civil-Military Relations

Classic theories of civil-military change attempt to explain how to achieve civilian control of the military drawing on institutionalist (divergence-based) logics (Huntington 1957), sociological (convergence-based) approaches (Janowitz 1960, 1971; Moskos 1970), rationalistic frameworks (Feaver 1996; Desch 1999), neo-institutionalism (Avant

1994; Pion-Berlin 1992) (Croissant el al. 2013: 42) or pluralistic rationales (Segal *et al.* 1974; Schiff 2012), which advocate an interdependent, variable or fusionist type of relationship between civilians and the military in order to meet imperatives of both democratic control and military efficiency. As discussed more in-depth below, I argue that while classical civil-military theories are helpful as a starting point to understand the relationship between military and civilians, they are not sufficient to explain civil-military dynamics in insecure states in post-military transition. Before going into depth on the pluralistic types of civilian control, the shortcomings of some of the classic theories of civil-military relations are briefly discussed.

The problem with the professionalisation (institutional divergence) approach (Huntington 1957) is that it is not able to explain the developments in the case under analysis in this paper. Despite the organisation of the Pakistan armed forces in a disciplined manner and a professional ethic, the military staged four military *coups d'état* and was in power for almost half of the existence of the state of Pakistan. Benefitting from a strong administration, infrastructure and economy, the Pakistan Army continued to interfere in politics even after the end of the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, indicating that a highly professional and autonomous military does not preclude the risk of intervention. Another shortcoming of Huntington's theory is that policy decisions based on a bipolar, institutionally divergent understanding of civil-military relations can pose significant hazards to security, as emphasised by the US decision of military intervention in Iraq, which was taken based on Huntington's understanding of civil-military relations (Schiff 2012: 320). An institutionalist understanding of civilian oversight, assuming an autonomous military, continues to be central to handbooks and conceptual frameworks of SSR (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder 2004), on which EU programmes in Pakistan and other third countries rely. Professionalisation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of civilian control and its operationalisation in the framework of multi-agency, inclusive security approaches needs to be revised. In fact, in Pakistan and Egypt, the professionalism of the army assisted in overthrowing civilian governments.

Sociological approaches of civil-military relations argue that the way to achieve civilian control of the military is an integration of the armed forces with the values of the society (Boëne 1990: 27; Janowitz 1960), i.e. "societal control" (Feaver 1996: 166). To

overcome the dilemma of balance of power between civilians and military, Janowitz (1960: 418) proposes the pragmatic concept of "constabulary forces" which refers to a military which is "committed to a minimum use of force". The pragmatic military acts as a "pressure group" (Janowitz 1960: 343) which aims at justifying its role and importance in domestic and international affairs. The constabulary approach draws on the police model and assumes that the armed forces are "sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment in international security affairs" (Janowitz 1960: 420). The way to achieve civilian control is through a "meaningful integration" of the military "with civilian values", while formal oversight remains mainly the duty of parliamentary and/or executive institutions (Janowitz 1960: 343, 349, 420, 440). Nonetheless, "fundamental organisational differences" (Janowitz 1971: 21) between military's primordial role in the use of violence and deterrence (Segal *et al.* 1973: 2; Boëne 1990: 5) and civilian institutions make a total convergence between civilians and the military neither feasible nor desired. In fact, the sociological approach does not claim total convergence in the *stricto sensu* of "structural isomorphism", but sees the relationship between civilian and the military as asymptotic (Segal *et al.* 1974) or "tangential" (Moskos 1970: 170). In this context, CSOs and non-state organisations – distinct from the so-called 'non-civil' society – can help by strengthening democratic norms and thus change the environment in which the military operates, which can put new types of pressure on the armed forces to change or adapt. The sociological approach has multiple points of similarity with hybrid models of democratic civilian control which are described in the following.

The proliferation of hybrid peace and security approaches has opened the space for more concertation, coherence and collaboration between actors working on similar projects in order to increase efficiency and eliminate duplication or contradiction. Post-Cold War hybrid approaches of civil-military relations aimed to overcome the convergence/divergence dichotomy sustained by previous theories (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1964; Moskos 1970, 1986) by arguing that the level of civilian control is placed on a continuum and oscillates in function of several determinants. Convergence and divergence are claimed to co-exist and/or alternate in function of major determinants such as the mission type (combat or technical support activities) (Segal *et al.* 1974: 2), (civilian) monitoring capacity (Feaver 1996, 1999, 2003), types of threat (internal or

external) (Stepan 1971: 229, Desch 1999) or strategic exigencies (Schiff 1995, 2012; Cottey *et al.* 2002; Boëne 1990).

Among hybrid approaches of civil-military relations, which advocate interdependent civil-military relations and complementary roles, Rebecca Schiff's concordance model deserves particular attention. The concordance theory of civil-military relations argues that a "targeted partnership" and inclusive interaction and dialogue between "military, political elites and citizenry" in the political decision-making process are necessary for an effective defence, security and counterinsurgency strategy (Schiff 2012: 318-9). A "targeted partnership" and inclusive interaction between "military, political elites and citizenry" in the political decision-making process (Schiff 2012: 319) is likely to enable an optimal environment of information symmetry and maximise the perspectives for efficiency by increasing "strategic literacy" (Foster 2005: 99). Strategic literacy refers to "the intellectual sophistication and capacity to appreciate the larger purpose and ramifications of sound civil-military relations" and can be enhanced by a "transparent collaborative dialogue among all parties to the civil-military relations" (Foster 2005: 99). This inclusive approach fosters the achievement of the "strategic aims" of the post-modern (post-national) democracy, i.e. guarantee of security, crisis prevention and the sustainable safeguard of the society (Foster 2005: 93). Strategic literacy can optimise domestic decision-making outcomes and increase state capacity to cope with international security threats (Brooks and Stanley 2008). Under the strategic imperative, "the military professional cannot ignore the political consequences of his military action, for national interest and international public opinion is now playing a crucial role in military conflict and the legitimacy of the whole military enterprise is at stake" (Boëne 1990: 17). The substantive importance of Schiff's concept of 'targeted partnership' for the case under analysis in this dissertation lies in its potential explanatory power to account for interchangeable roles and levels of democratic civilian control depending on security demands, i.e. more control during periods of peace and less control during periods of crisis.

A good example of such targeted partnership comes from the Philippines, where local communities and civil society actors initiate platforms which enable exchange, dialogue and negotiation with the local government and security forces (Mason 2016). Recent research (Espesor 2019) has provided evidence of NGOs' role in informing armed forces

and military staff about conflict transformation mechanisms and training soldiers on SSR approaches in the Philippines. Another striking example comes from post-conflict Sri Lanka, where the military has intensively integrated both domestic and international NGOs in humanitarian, development and de-mining projects (Government of Sri Lanka 2007). However, these studies do not provide sufficient data to understand whether CSOs can put a real limit on military power. The current dissertation aims at adding to this evidence by providing empirical data on the role of non-state actors in democratising security governance: What is their role in civil-military change and democratisation of security institutions and security governance? The concept of civilian control might yet be premature for a transitional, insecure country such as Pakistan, but SSR and comprehensive, multi-agency security processes could be a pre-cursor of civilian control in the future under certain conditions which I specify in this thesis. This dissertation hypothesises that non-profit actors, such as NGOs, think tanks, media, academia and other non-state organisations can capacitate the state in influencing the strategy of the armed forces. Interaction between military and civilian non-state actors, including foreign funded NGOs and international actors, could facilitate trust and good relationships between civil society and decision makers from the security sector, but also enable the diffusion of democratic norms or approaches. Comprehensive dialogue and information exchange are important because they can increase information symmetry and maximise the perspectives for efficiency in COIN, SSR and other security operations. The dissertation will complement existing theories of civil-military relations, specifically sociological and fusionist approaches by specifying how a 'targeted' civil-military partnership could look like.

Shifts from conventional war to deterrence strategies due to transformations in the social and economic order (Boëne 1990) generated a pragmatic shift in the role of armed forces from classic combat missions to "humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations" in the post-Cold War period. Drawing on Janowitz' sociological model of civil-military relations, the post-modern, cosmopolitan military (Moskos *et al.* 2000; Gilmore 2015) relies on "constabularization", i.e. the understanding that "security services must act with a minimum use of force" and aim at "viable international relations rather than victory" (Lambert 2011: 161-2; Boëne 1990: 22). Johansen (1992: 115) claims that "demilitarization" and "democratization" are mutually reinforcing. Social change, driven by technological progress and advocacy by "values-based organisations"

(Goel 2004: 26), such as NGOs (Pearce 1993), leads to a necessarily active role of the military in policymaking (Lambert 2011: 160; Boëne 1990: 35). However, in the case of Pakistan, it is likely that some military actors would dispute this logic and either believe that Pakistan was not ready for such democracy or that the military was the defender of democracy. In such cases, how are *an active role of the military in politics* and *civilian oversight* reconcilable, particularly in insecure, transitional environments of limited statehood, is an issue which is explored later in this dissertation.

The military vision of the balance of power between the military and civil society in fragile states is likely to be radically different from the assumptions of much of the classic literature. It is the transition from an authoritarian (e.g. military regime) system to a phase of pluralism and democratisation and its links to a process of institutional military change and transformation, which is crucial to understand.

2.3.2 Military Change and Transformation

Military transformation is defined as the processes of significant change which the institution of the armed forces undergoes in order to optimise military capabilities operations (Prezelj *et al.* 2016; Reynolds 2007; Davis 2010; Kugler 2006). Military transformation is a dynamic process, in which input variables such as security threats, intervening factors and public support result in output variables which concern the armed forces' responsibilities, organisational structure, operations, mobility and deployability (Prezelj *et al.* 2016). Because military transformation is a "process that clearly needs an effective monitoring mechanism", in other words, (formal) democratic civilian oversight, it is military change and adaptation that we could expect in transitional states.

Mechanisms of military change can be of three types: innovation, adaptation and emulation (Posen 1984; Rosen 1991; Farrell and Terriff 2002; Schmitt 2015; Grissom 2007). The process of innovation refers at the "development of new military technologies, tactics, strategies and organisational structures" (translated from French, Schmitt 2015: 152). The process of adaptation refers to the "adjustment of existent military means and methods, generally under the demand of an [armed] conflict" (Schmitt 2015: 152). Third, emulation refers to the importation of new military means and styles (manners) through processes of imitation of other armies (Schmitt 2015: 152).

In particular processes of military emulation are strongly related to dynamics of norms diffusion and isomorphic processes claimed by neo-institutionalist theories of change (DiMaggio and Powell 1993; Frumkin and Galaskiewicz; Schmitt 2015: 153; Coticchia and Moro 2016: 11). Institutional convergence through norms diffusion can take place through coercive, mimetic or normative processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1993). 'Coercive isomorphism' "stems from political influence" and "results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which the organizations function" (DiMaggio and Powell 1993: 150). Thus, coercive isomorphism, in the form of persuasion, invitation or more coercive pressure to comply (e.g. sanctions), can mainly be a result of alliances or cooperation agreements, as they are assumed to require structural or legislative alignments between armed forces or states of those armed forces. 'Mimetic isomorphism' results "from standard responses to uncertainty", in the sense that "uncertainty encourages imitation" (DiMaggio and Powell 1993: 150). It is mimetic isomorphism (via imitation of other actors, not only armies) which we could expect to be observed in fragile and insecure states, as imitation is theoretically anticipated to happen in poorly organised societies, with ambiguous goals and volatile environments (March and Olsen 1976; DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151). 'Normative isomorphism' is a third source of institutional change, which "stems primarily from professionalization" (DiMaggio and Powell 1993: 152) understood as "the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work", to control "the production of producers" (Larson, 1977: 40) and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 152). This definition of professionalisation distinguishes from Huntington's definition of military professionalisation (Huntington 1957: 7-10), understood as specialised military personnel, which would not stage *coups d'état* or interfere in politics due to respect and military ethic. As it has been argued in a previous sub-section, military professionalism has failed to explain the series of military *coups* in the case applied in this dissertation and beyond, despite the high numbers of military officers going to the US and Europe for military training and despite the Pakistan Army displaying high levels of professionalism understood as "expertise, responsibility and corporateness" (Huntington 1957: 9-17). This dissertation makes a significant contribution to theories of military change by assessing to what extent and under what conditions can militaries in post-military states exposed to significant internal and

external security threats undergo processes of normative isomorphism. Processes of change are expected to have begun to take place after the transfer of power from the military to civilian institutions and the beginning of the process of democratic transition. Interaction with civilian actors, specifically NGOs, is anticipated to trigger processes of emulation, i.e. there is expected to be a transfer/import of values, norms and security approaches from the actors with which the military interacts.

2.3.3 The Need to Adapt. New Military Functions and Military Adaptation

New challenges to security have opened the space for a change in the ways of doing politics, both at international and domestic level. State-centric decision-making patterns have been replaced by "axes and alliances" and "fluid alignments" (Hamilton 2010: 5-6). The "emergence of new types of conflict" and the shift of civilian casualties from "collateral damage" to deliberate targets (Tauxe 2000: 1) in the framework of hybrid and unconventional types of warfare increased the demands for adaptation in order to restore order and security, prevent massacres and enable regional stability. New approaches of peace, security and defence after the Cold War yielded a change and 'expansion' of the military's traditional functions of "exercising military power coercively" to "non-coercive roles" (Takai 2002: 139; Lambert 2011: 160). In a post-traditional understanding, military forces are expected to perform several roles (based on Bruneau and Matei 2008: 917; Oliveira 2010: 54):

- Combat missions and operational readiness to fight and "be prepared to fight" both internal and external "wars or insurgencies" in order to guarantee "certain conditions" and security standards.
- Combat domestic, transnational and global terrorism and ensure border security.
- Maintain safety, public order and rule of law, by, *inter alia*, taking action against violent crime.
- Assist in humanitarian missions and provide support to local population and refugees.
- Conduct "peace support operations", including reconstruction support, "help remove landmines" and medical assistance.
- Disarmament of insurgents and arms control.

- "[S]upport the setting-up of civilian institutions, law and order, guarantee the functioning of the judicial system, the electoral process, and the other aspects of the political, economic, and social life of the territory".
- While providing the functions above, "ensure protection of ethnic minorities" and "protect cultural and religious landmarks".

The military's capacity to fulfil these functions in the framework of a sustainable, 'positive' understanding of peace and security, require the military forces to possess expertise in several core areas: accurate conflict assessment, multilateral operations, including cooperation with non-military actors, efficient and timely response management (Oliveira 2010: 55-6; Albert and Hayes 2003: 54).

I argue that new functions and roles facilitate and even impel greater convergence between armed forces and civilian actors. It can be expected that military and CSOs for example can play complementary roles in a series of domains, as emphasised in Table 2.2:

Military's functions	CSOs' functions
Provide a secure environment	Demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), arms control
Disarmament of insurgents	Reintegration of insurgents
Restoration of the rule of law	Promote human rights and respect for the rule of law, democratic change, enable "social pluralism"
Enforcement of peace agreements	Monitoring
Protect members of minority groups	Protection of civilians
Humanitarian and reconstruction support	Humanitarian assistance and service delivery
Guarantee the functioning of the judicial, economic and political system	Research, advocacy, facilitation of high-level dialogue, public communication

Table 2.2 Military and CSO Complementarity and Functions
(Own tabulation, based on: Abiew 2003: 8-9; Oliveira 2010: 54; Bruneau and Matei 2008: 917; Paffenholz 2010: 67; Barnes 2006: 32-76; Marcussen 1996: 406).

The main functions of the military, such as providing a secure environment, disarmament of insurgents, restoration of security and enforcement of peace agreements (Abiew 2003: 8-9) can be, at least theoretically, complementary with peace- and resilience-building

functions of CSO. To be able to fulfil traditional and a series of non-traditional functions emphasised above, armed forces must undergo a series of alterations, including a shift in the military doctrine (Goodhand 2013: 291; Miller and Mills 2010). Multi-agency approaches of security, such as SSR and integrated/comprehensive security approaches, promote the constabularisation of armed forces and a "gradual decrease of the projected military force" (Oliveira 2010: 53), demanding the armed forces to enter a coherent system of complementarity in multidimensional operations and get the "ability to adapt" simultaneously (Tauxe 2000: 3).

Civil-military collaboration is assumed to be a prerequisite for military effectiveness (Abiew 2003: 7). Efficiency and sustainability imperatives necessitate unified and complemented efforts by both civilians and armed forces "in order to create the conditions for long-term stability and peace" (Abiew 2003: 5). Sustainable peace approaches need to address "the longer-term tasks of state-building, reforming the security sector, strengthening civil society and promoting social reintegration" (Eide 2001: 8). Peacebuilding and state-building are "part of the same medal" (Ehrhart 201:170), which require a close cooperation between states and non-state actors such as civil society actors. State-building "is a top-down process of institutionalisation", understood as a function of "the means of coercion – in practical terms, armies and police – under the control of a central political authority" (Fukuyama 2007: 11). The process of hybridisation might facilitate managing expected frictions between 'importing' and 'exporting' agendas. In order to become effective, particularly in deterring and combating hybrid threats, insurgency and terrorism and ensuring societal resilience, armed forces need to adapt to the changing security environment and constellation of threats (Prezelj *et al.* 2016).

2.3.4 Determinants of Military Change

Much of the existing literature has argued that changes in the military doctrine can stem from several sources: 1) civil-military relations (Posen 1984), 2) interservice politics, i.e. "relationship between military services" (Grissom 2007: 910-1), 3) intraservice competition, i.e. competition between different (domestic) military departments (Rosen 1991), or 4) culture, defined as "intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world

that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action (Farrell and Terriff 2002: 7-8).

> *"The civil-military model argues that senior civilian decision-makers interpret the geopolitical context and impose innovation upon the military services with the help of maverick proxies within the service. The interservice model of military innovation argues that senior service decision-makers, such as the chiefs of staff, determine the best course for the status and health of the service and then induce the service bureaucracy to innovate accordingly. The intraservice model contends that senior service leaders imagine a new 'theory of victory' then leverage the internal politics of their service to put the new theory into practice. Finally, the cultural model argues that a set of implicit beliefs exerts fundamental (if largely unseen) influence on the direction of military innovation." (Grissom 2007: 920)*

All four models argue that due to the military's "institutional resistance" (IISS 2001: 24) to change – the "military organizations are intrinsically inflexible, prone to stagnation, and fearful of change" (Grissom 2007: 919) – all four models assume that military transformation is a top-down process, triggered by exogenous factors. In the cultural model, "senior leaders" or civilians are regarded to be major sources of triggering change, i.e. "agents of innovation": "They recognize the need for change, formulate a new way of warfare, position their organization to seize the opportunity of innovation, and bludgeon, politically leverage, or culturally manipulate the organization into compliance" (Grissom 920). In the framework of the cultural model, "external shocks" and "cross-national professional military culture" can trigger processes of military change. External shocks can "reshape culture by providing fertile ground for innovation", while cross-national professionalisation can trigger change through processes of emulation (Grissom 2007: 917).

This dissertation focuses in particular on two types of factors of military change: 1) civil-military relations and 2) cultural change in the military institution.

First, in relation to civil-military relations as a factor of military change, a series of variables can shape civilian-military relations and determine the level of democratic civilian control or civilian influence. The substantive capacity of civilians to exert control over armed forces can vary in function of "the weight and role of coercion in governance" (Alagappa 2001c: 57), the negotiation process between military and civilian leader during

the periods of transition (Agüero 1995: 139-153) as well as "structural factors that define regime capacity", i.e. the "strength of civilian institutions", institutional legacies, path-dependencies and the degree of "civilian expertise" (Trinkunas 2005: 16; Croissant *et al.* 2012: 43). Evidence based on qualitative case-oriented studies from Asia (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 208; Mietzner 2011) conclude that the robustness of civilian control strategies depends on the level of "consensus among relevant civilian elites" and "support for democracy". It can generally be expected that these factors are influenced by macro-structural factors such as the level of socio-economic development and modernization, the "international context" or the level and type of security threat (Alagappa 2001c: 41; Desch 1999). Robert Putnam (1967: 84) identifies four factors which can influence the military's predisposition to intervene in politics: "1) aspects of socioeconomic development; 2) aspects of political development; 3) characteristics of the military establishment itself; and 4) foreign influence". More specifically, Huntington (1995: 14) conceptualises four factors which can determine the balance of military-civilian power in "new democracies": "Military-interventions in politics, pre-existing military privileges, the definitions of roles and missions and the development and diffusion of new military technology". Kuehn (2016: 7) divides the variables influencing civil-military relation in "military-internal factors" and "military-external factors". The first category includes:

> *"[N]ormative variables such as military values – for instance, "professionalism" (Huntington 1957; Barany 2012) – or the degree of popular support for the military (Mares 1998) but also structural and institutional factors such as the military's class structure (Nun 1967), its corporate interests or grievances (Beeson and Bellamy 2008), its size (Collier and Hoeffler 2006), and its internal cohesion (T. Lee 2014)." (Kuehn 2016: 7-8)*

In other words, the first category of factors refers to the ability of the military organisation to "reproduce itself and its values" (Karabelias 1998: 37). Military-external variables include:

> *"[H]istorical factors such as colonial history (Collier and Hoeffler 2005), the nature and type of the regime preceding the new democratic system (Agüero 1997), and the prevalence of military coups prior to the transition to democracy (Ezrow and Frantz 2011); structural variables such as existing domestic security threats (Alagappa 2001), socioethnic cleavages (Frazer 1995) and socio economic factors*

> *(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006); institutional explanations such as the cohesion of the civilian elites (Serra 2010), the specific configuration of political institutions and the system of government (Trinkunas 2005), and the degree of consolidation the new democratic institutions have achieved (Croissant et al. 2013); and international factors such as the influence of international actors and organisations (Ruby and Gibler 2010) and external security threats (Desch 1999)." (Kuehn 2016: 8)*

Second, building *inter alia* on the military-internal variables of change in civil-military relations, I argue that the cultural model (Farrell and Terriff 2002: 7-8) can act as a model of bottom-up military change under the constraint or as a result of external factors. To test this argument, I use the military's interactions with civilian actors, e.g. in the framework of SSR and related activities. The (initially) top-down process, i.e. determined by external 'shocks' or transnational spill-over can stimulate the bottom-up emergence of processes of change and adaptation. In the framework of multi-agency models of (post-liberal) security, top-down incentives are complemented by multidimensional processes and hybrid (both formal and informal) types of interactions. Thus, multiple "contextual dynamics of negotiation, co-optation, domination, resistance, assimilation and coexistence" as well as "everyday practice" (Visoka 2017: 308) between military and NGOs are argued to stimulate the bottom-up emergence of military change and eventually transformation. Hybrid interactions taking place between "rational actors motivated by claims to power, justice, entitlements and welfare" are anticipated to result in "dynamic change and transformation" (Visoka 2017: 308, 319).

Particularly in volatile and fragile environments, which face insurgency and terrorism, building military capacity to effectively and sustainably eliminate threats requires strong partnerships with civilians (Andersen and Malmvig 2018). Deep-rooted, protracted conflicts, such as the sectarian and ethnic motivated conflicts in Pakistan's Baluchistan, Sindh, Lahore and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces raise particular difficulties in conceptualising transition models encompassing the optimal military contingent in order to assure sufficient security on one side and enable democratic transition on the other side. The success of military operations in zones of conflict, insurgency or other types of violence requires that "military objectives at strategic and operational level (…) change the will of the people" and are "related to establishing a safe and self-sustaining environment for the local population, the territory and the region" (Oliveira 2010: 53).

Thus, interactions with civilians can steer the process of military transformation in 'the right direction'.

The next part of this chapter highlights the research gap in the literature, which is the notion of democratic civilian control as a component of the two blocks of theory discussed hitherto in this this chapter (hybrid peace and security theories and civil-military theories). It reveals the shortcomings of the mainstream theoretical understanding of democratic civilian control to explain processes of military change and democratisation in transitional, post-military environments with limited institutional capacity.

2.4 Research Gap: Mechanisms of Democratic Control During Periods of Transition – Civilian Influence

Democratic civilian control is one major component of approaches of hybrid multi-agency security theories and policy approaches. Simultaneously, democratic civilian control is key to democratic civil-military relations as it represents a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy (Croissant 2014: 23; Dahl 1989: 244-5; Diamond 1999: 11; Przeworski 1991: 73-9) and military effectiveness (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 197; Brooks 2007: 2; Bruneau and Matei 2008: 921, 924; Avant 2007: 87; Frühling *et al.* 2003; Bailey and Dammert 2005; Matei 2007; Gibson and Snider 1999: 213). Croissant *et al.* (2013: 197) define civilian democratic control as "the situation in which civilians possess effective political decision-making power in all relevant political matters". Democratic civilian control of the security forces is also embedded in international norms and standards on democratic governance of the security sector adopted by, *inter alia*, the EU, UN, OSCE or NATO (for a full list, see Hänggi 2004: 14). Previous studies found evidence that reforms and democratic control increase the efficiency of the mission outcomes by diminishing costs and increasing public acceptance, information symmetry, expertise and trust. Cooperation between military actors and civil actors, including NGOs and think tanks, enables the achievement of outcomes which would not be possible through individual efforts. An efficient and democratic strategic security policy requires thus the subordination of the military to (elected) civilian institutional actors.

Countries affected by insurgency and terrorism, with high security demands, as well as "legacies of undemocratic politics" (Luckham 2003: 14) can be at particular risk of long-term instability if the security sector is not governed in a democratic manner (Ball 2005: 26). Theories of democracy (Dahl 1994; The Economist 2008) argue that security, together with government capacity, represent major prerequisites of democratisation processes. In particular in countries in transition from authoritarian (or military) rule, civilian institutions might lack capacity to bring the military under democratic control and "the quality of political leadership" (Hutchul 2003; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 310) becomes significant for the success or failure of the reforms in the security and defence sector. This raises an interesting point regarding to the relation between security and democracy in insecure, fragile states: is the absence of political capability generating a vacuum for armed forces to engage in political functions, beyond their role, in a manner which has some civilian acceptance or even legitimacy if they persuade the people of the necessity to do so in order maintain security?

The major research gap addressed in this dissertation is the lack of a coherent set of theoretical propositions in relation to effective mechanisms to strengthen democratic civilian control in fragile, transitional countries, located in difficult security and geopolitical environments. Periods of transition deserve particular attention because they entail situations of political vacuum and offer windows of opportunity for negotiations and bargaining of new power relations and authority between political stakeholders. Citing Schmitter and Karl (1991), Croissant *et al.* (2013) define periods of transition as 'structured contingency', "in which the potential for choice, strategic decisions, and political manoeuvring is enhanced but agents are not completely free to ignore structural context" (Croissant el al. 2013: 44), such as path-dependencies or "historical determinacy" and "cultural influences on action" which impact the "equilibrium" claimed by traditional rational choice theories (Agüero 2001: 207-209; Levi 1997; North 1990).

As stated above, civil-military relations are considered to be an inherent part of democratic consolidation and military effectiveness. Croissant *et al.* (2013: 197) define civilian democratic control as "the situation in which civilians possess effective political decision-making power in all relevant political matters". Empirical evidence suggests that "increased democratic control" fosters "effectiveness in military, intelligence, and

police forces" (Bruneau and Matei 2008: 921, 924; Avant 2007: 87; Frühling *et al.* 2003; Bailey and Dammert 2005; Matei 2007; Gibson and Snider 1999: 213). The causal mechanism here is that reforms and democratic input can increase efficiency of the mission outcomes by diminishing costs and increasing public acceptance, information symmetry, expertise and trust. Evidence from multiple cases suggests that efforts "to develop clear structures and mechanisms for coordination and leadership", in other words a "common ground or shared goals" has increased efficiency at operational level (Metcalfe *et al.* 2012: 29).

Drawing on theoretical propositions from historical institutionalism and institutional change, Croissant el al. 2013 develop a conceptual framework for explaining democratic civilian control in transitional polities. They claim that the level of civilian control (low, medium or high) depends on the type of mechanism which the civilians apply, as described in Figure 2.1:

Mechanism	**Power**	**Legitimisation**	**Compensation**
Robustness	Robust	⟷	Weak
Strategies	Sanctioning Counterbalancing Monitoring	Ascriptive selection Political socialisation	Acquiescence Appreciation Appeasement

Figure 2.1 Mechanisms and Strategies of Civilian Control
(Source: Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49)

Sanctioning refers at "punishing military disobedience and depriving military officers of benefits" and holding the military accountable for "military defeat, political or economic failures or human rights abuses" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49; Herspring 2001). Counterbalancing is defined as a strategy of civilian control for restricting the armed forces' ability for "organized resistance by existing rivalries or conflicts between different military factions or organizations in the security sector" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49; Frazer 2005: 41). Monitoring is conceptualised as activities that amplify the "chances of punishing military misconduct" and "detecting misbehaviour", which would "reduce the probability of military insubordination" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49; Nelson 2002: 158; Feaver 2003: 68-75). Ascriptive selection attempts to minimise the "military's disposition to subvert civilian control by promoting and appointing politically reliable

officers, based upon criteria like class affiliation, ethnic origin", et cetera. (Croissant el al. 2013: 50). "Political socialization aims at strengthening the acceptance of civilian control by transforming the professional norms and mindset of the military officer corps through political education, the reform of officer training programs, and the reorganization of leadership principles" argue Croissant *et al.* (2013: 50). Appeasement, acquiescence and appreciation represent weak forms of civilian control, which refer to "setting incentives for the armed forces to refrain from politics" (Feaver 1999: 228; Nelson 2002: 158), "refrain from intruding on military prerogatives and the institutional autonomy of the military" (Huntington 1995: 14; Trinkunas 2005: 10; Fuentes 2000: 119) or even "enhance public support and appreciation for the armed forces (Agüero 1995: 243-345; Nelson 2002: 158; Mares 1998), claim Croissant *et al.* (2013: 50).

The research focus of this dissertation is to explore if and how collaboration among the political elites, civil society and the military can enable the achievement of sustainable and strategic solutions to initiate forms of civilian control and democratic security governance in transitional, insecure, post-military environments with limited statehood. Do civilians (including civil society organisations, media and academics) and the military pursue collaborative relationships? Do civil society organisations and experts working in or on the sector perceive any positive impacts from such collaborations and see any change over time between periods of military and civilian rule?

2.5 Civil-Military Adaptation in Insecure and Transitional Contexts

While theories of civil-military relations are dominant in the literature and they provide a conceptual framework for hybrid peace and security approaches used in international actors' strategies and attempts to democratise security governance in fragile states, they do not address the limitations which are in place in insecure, transitional environments, with restricted institutional capacity. To address this gap, this dissertation proposes a theory of civil-military adaptation in insecure, transitional environments. The approach adopted in the thesis is as follows.

First, it is argued that exogenous models of transformation alone are not sufficient to explain potential change of the military institution in insecure, post-military

environments. Starting from the assumption that the militaries are rational actors and pursue "self-reinforcing" (Greif and Laitin 2004: 633) goals, it follows that military change can also take place endogenously. That is, there is a bottom-up, endogenous preference for "deviat[*ion*] from the behaviour associated" with an institutional equilibrium (Greif and Laitin 2004: 633) (i.e. general stability of an institution). The motivation for change can be due to three factors: "The utility gain agents associate with decoupling from institutional equilibria, positive externalities derived from similar decoupling among one's neighbours, and accommodation by state actors" (DellaPosta *et al.* 2016: 5). Change in the strategic approach to democratisation within the Pakistan Army could thus develop due to (a) perceived utility gains and/or (b) due to support and pressure from important stakeholders. The Pakistan Army may choose to undergo change for utility gains, *inter alia*, financial support or military assistance from great powers, such as the United States or European Union states. It is also explored to what extent the military may undertake changes in order to be better able to get the support of the population and thus legitimise its dominant position in politics, even after the second transfer of power from a civilian to another civilian government in 2010. Previous evidence from the case of Egypt suggests that the military in countries with long military traditions aim at "increasing political autonomy, as well as preserving their economic" interests (Sayigh 2012; Roll 2015; Abul-Magd). In order to maintain these objectives, a stable environment is necessary, therefore the military is anticipated to be concerned with "the stability of the nation-state" (Roll 2016: 24). Changes in the Pakistani Armed Forces can be anticipated to occur in the form of adaptation and soft institutional reform, *inter alia*, as part of SSR activities. There is therefore a plausible narrative about potential causal change in the attitude and behaviour of the military which could lead a civil society organisation to seek to engage with and collaborate with the military, for reasons that go beyond simply securing short-term practical support. While there is a danger that such cooperation strengthens the undemocratic influence of the military leadership in political life, civil society organisations could potentially see such activities as strengthening elements of the military, who have a broader view of security and who see engaging with civil society as good for peacebuilding and do not feel threatened by it. The military (or indeed civil society) may misjudge or underestimate the long-term impacts of such collaboration but they can both see advantages in the short to medium terms which are not inconsistent with their differing immediate priorities.

Second, while measuring the causal impact of civil-military interactions is extremely difficult, this dissertation explores whether those involved in such work, from CSOs to ex-military officers, perceive that through such democratic engagement, promotion of good governance principles, advocacy and monitoring, civil society organisations (think tanks, NGOs and other non-state associations) can contribute to the democratisation of security governance, even though they are not at this time able to achieve 'democratic control'. CSOs are anticipated to potentially perform four functions: increase input and output legitimacy (quality of democratic governance); diagonal accountability (monitoring) and 'elite pacting', i.e. bridging the gap between civilian and military institutions. In insecure and conflict environments, CSOs are anticipated to have limited capacity to pursue democratic control strategies over the armed forces or mechanisms establishing a robust system of checks and balances assuring civilian control over the military and "good governance of the security sector" (Pantev and Ratchev 2005: 105; Lambert 2011: 157). They can nonetheless work as observers of the military's policies and enterprises and signal breaches of human rights, democracy and rule of law. While reinforcing existing literature states that "only civilians elected to positions of political authority can actually decide on institutional change" (Croissant el al. 2013: 45), this dissertation explores whether CSOs can be seen as a factor building the capacity of society and ultimately of the state in the enterprise to establish civilian control. Particularly in emerging and new democracies, state apparatuses lack adequate capacities to efficiently and democratically "manage the security sector" (Croissant *et al.* 2012: 54). Through building awareness, civil society organisations can enhance democratic political culture of both citizens and institutions, and thus empower them to develop more democratic preferences and exert their 'sanctioning' capacity. As a result of social learning processes, citizens and institutions will become aware of their accountability responsibilities and the attributes of the military, being more able to discern where the 'redlines' for the military intervention in politics should be.

Third, the dissertation assumes that significant variation can occur in civil-military interactions due to contextual or structural determinants. Actors operating in a transitional environment in which power relations are not fully established or institutionalised but rather fluid, and who are in a genuinely weaker position than other actors can pursue specific strategies in order to seek to co-opt more powerful actors. As the "successful stabilization and institutionalization of civilian control" is expected to

"ultimately depend on domestic governments, institutions, and civilian actors" (Croissant el al. 2013: 205; Serra 2010: 241), the government capacity to offer a favourable environment for CSOs to positively contribute to the democratisation of civil-military relations and of the security governance is also anticipated to influence that nature of interaction. In this regard, political parties and media are expected to play the role of intervening factors and either favour or hinder civil-military cooperation and the thesis will seek to identify the varied forms of interaction and to analyse how they are perceived by informed expert sources.

Fourth, the dissertation will explore whether the empirical analysis requires an expanded theory of civil-military adaptation which can better explain the nature of democratic civilian influence (control) in insecure, transitional environments. In post-military regimes, the armed forces will naturally tend to perpetuate their power and infrastructure. However, under pressure from international actors and CSOs, the military can be 'trapped' to undergo endogenous processes of normative change to maximise its utility gains. Due to changes in domestic political culture and enhanced strategic engagement with international actors, such as the EU, a military directly intervening in politics will have potential diplomatic and possibly economic costs. Adopting a new identity, that of a pseudo-democratic military, which formally accepts elections, political parties and a freer media, can be associated with greater utility gains than a formal *coup*. Thus, the military can continue to exist and further expand its economic and political power. While under the aforementioned exogenous types of pressure the military can become more constrained in its choices, strategies and preferences, its infrastructure and power will continue to develop. The transformation of military roles towards development and human security domains, while simultaneously empowering and transferring power and resources to civilian security institutions (e.g. police), could result in a change in the civil-military balance of power in the long-run. Checking power and transparency are essential elements for establishing civilian oversight in insecure, transitional environments. Both checking power and formal transfer of military power and resources to civilian institutions require an appropriate degree of institutionalisation at macro-level and sufficient implementation capacity. The implementation of oversight of the military is assumed to be realised by appropriate institutional structures, operationalised as "a set of human-made operational rules and organisations that regulate, constrain, and enable the behaviour of civilians and the military on a day-to-day basis" (Kuehn 2016: 7; North

1990; Ostrom 1990: 50–55; Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). In transitional states however, the level of rule of law and the government institutional capacity (statehood) are anticipated to be limited, thus actors might lack the capacity to formally exert accountability of the military (checking power); building their power to do so would be a first step to checking power in more formal and institutionalised ways. CSOs, including those funded by international organisations, could play a role in altering the preferences of citizens, political parties and public opinion and building power and will for democratic change. The thesis will assess to what extend they can foster input legitimacy (citizens participation), diagonal accountability (empower citizens and institutions to exert monitoring and sanctioning functions) and a more democratic political culture through awareness building. Grassroots engagement and training, but also media engagement could constitute key channels to perform those functions.

2.6 Contribution

This dissertation makes a contribution at both theoretical and empirical level. Using deductive and inductive logics of reasoning, the contribution to the theoretical debate is multiple.

The dissertation provides a framework for analysing civil-military relations based on an inclusive, hybrid notion of security. In the light of integrated, multi-agency and comprehensive security and counterterrorism approaches previously outlined, it is important to understand the relationship between the state, market and society in providing democratic security. Postmodern, integrated approaches to security such as SSR or comprehensive security governance models "lack a consistent conceptualization" (Bruneau and Matei 2008: 914) in relation to crucial notions such as legitimacy, accountability, sovereignty and leadership. Existing studies on NGO-military interaction focused exclusively on humanitarian action in the framework of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military interaction (CMI) and civil-military coordination (CMCoord) approaches implemented by international organisations in zones of war and complex security crises. This study investigates interactions between civilians and the military in Pakistan. While many papers have studied the contribution of civil society to social capital, democracy, good governance or peacebuilding (Cook 2001; Hardin 2002; O'Connell 1999; Paffenholz 2010), there is currently no thorough study explaining the

role of non-state actors, such as CSOs and international organisations, in developing democratic civilian oversight in insecure, post-military states.

The specific methodology is outlined and discussed in the next chapter, and the thesis will present an analysis of the perceptions of the leaders of civil society groups, military officers, retired military officers, government representatives, academics, journalists and other experts, gathered during fieldwork in four sites in Pakistan. Using this primary data, the thesis will analyse both interactions occurring at "operational" level (Greenwood and Balachandran 2014: 17) (Track 2 and Track 3) and formal, political level (Track 1.5), which has not been researched so far. Roberts (2010: 220) emphasises the need to provide empirical evidence for the types of NGO-military interaction mechanisms specific for each stage of conflict as well as the conditions under which "different coordination mechanisms are utilized". The dissertation explores the strategic choices of NGOs to engage in security-related work (or not) and, when they do, it explores their perceptions of how the military has reacted. Do different strategies result in different institutional responses? How do CSOs and others perceive the impact of their work on the democratisation of security governance, and in particular do they perceive it has had any impact of civil-military relations in general. In addition, the dissertation identifies the major perceived factors influencing NGO-military relations and helps understanding which determinants can foster relations and which hinder them. While many international organisations (e.g. EU, UN, NATO and OECD) fund and implement projects in fragile states with limited institutional capacity and do this by utilising hybrid, comprehensive approaches, these yield for a more critical theoretical assessment. Most of these approaches advocate a notion of civilian control based on a narrow institutionalist approach, which is 1) less likely to be present in fragile insecure countries and 2) conceptually incompatible with hybrid approaches of security advocating strategic interdependence. This dissertation will seek to elaborate key concepts for better understanding CSO-military relations in post-modern peacebuilding and security governance approaches. The findings will inform the EU Global Strategy about how to bring instances of SSR and civilian control and inclusive and accountable governance – both promoted under the 2016 EUGS – in a coherent relationship.

This thesis will fill a critical gap in the field of military change. The dissertation aims at complementing the literature on military institutional change, democratic innovation and

transformation by exploring the process of transformation in developing, fragile countries. "[M]ilitary transformation has become one of the permanent activities of the most developed countries since the end of the Cold War" (Prezellj *et al.*), with previous literature in this domain exploring predominantly units from Western or developed countries (Piella 2016; Edmunds *et al.* 2016; Norheim-Martinsen 2016; Fevolden and Tvetbråten 2016; Coticchia and Moro 2016). I argue that militaries in developing countries with traditional societies do also undergo processes of change and this thesis will explore whether the CSOs and/or other experts interviewed perceive that such change is occurring. Based on the empirical findings, the thesis will seek to develop a conceptual framework to study change and strategic adaptation in difficult environments of limited statehood.

In particular in countries affected by multiple insecurities, with strong armed forces – in possession of full spectrum capabilities including nuclear – and a long-lasting military institutional culture, such as Pakistan, it is essential to understand whether and how change occurs. The next chapters analyse the opinions of key informants in different parts of Pakistan in order to analyse their perceptions of the mechanisms, processes and determinants associated with the change and lack of change in the military, as they see it at local, regional or national level. Many studies analyse the process of military transformation from the perspective of military capabilities and technological modernisation (Jasper 2009; Farrell *et al.* 2010; Sterner 1999; Knox and Murray 2001), but there is a research gap related to the processes of change encompassing military doctrine, strategy and culture and how (and if) armed forces interact with civil society is an opportunity to gain some insight into the relatively closed world of military doctrine in partly democratic societies. In particular in countries in which tremendous ideological and organisational differences prevent greater civil-military cooperation and coordination, it is important to understand the processes of transformation at ideological and cultural level, because they can influence changes in other domains (e.g. military operations and technology). The findings will complement previous research on military change and adaptation by providing insights and conceptualising the process of hybrid military transformation, exploring both top-down and bottom-up dynamics, through processes of interaction with non-military actors, specifically CSOs.

The findings will make a contribution to civil-military theories and civilian control. "Much of the existing debate uses a narrowly defined institutionalist approach, in the sense that it focuses on the formal political and legal mechanisms through which the civilian sector controls the military" (Cottey *et al.* 2002: 40). However, fragile and developing countries are likely to lack highly institutionalised forms of governance and rule of law. While existing civil-military theories make predictions about the impact of structural factors on civil-military relations, there is currently no coherent theory explaining the role of 'agency' in form of "strategic interactions between civilian and military actors" (Croissant and Kuehn 2011: 213; Croissant *et al.* 2013: 42-3) in countries in transition. In particular because of the "interplay between agency and the environment" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 43), it is important to understand what conditions facilitate and what conditions hinder democratic control of armed forces in asymmetric environments. By exploring internal and external intervening factors in the relationship between military and civilians, the dissertation will seek to develop a middle-range theory which is able to better explain the behaviour of state institutions and policy development in the context of perceived internal and external threats and identify the conditions for effective civil-military collaboration. While the thesis draws on a limited range of sources and is focused on exploring respondents' *perceptions* of engagement, continuity and change, analyses of military strategy in partly democratic or undemocratic societies are based on limited sources. The need for "a clearer sense of what factors encourage or inhibit smooth civil-military coordination" (Staniland 2008: 362) or a theory of civilian control that addresses "the conditions under which delegation happens and identify hypotheses about factors that shape the delegation in observable ways" (Feaver 1996: 169) is clearly underlined in the literature. Existing empirical evidence (Croissant *et al.* 2013) shows that factors conceptualised by previous theories, such as professionalisation of armed forces (Huntington 1957, 1962), fail to provide sufficient explanation for the mechanisms of democratic control. By "transcend[ing] the concept of professionalization" (Feaver 1996: 169), a new middle-range theory, generalizable to the population of insecure, transitional states, can facilitate a better understanding of the interaction between perceived threats and domestic politics (Staniland 2008: 362). If a pattern of behaviour and a pattern of perceptions of behaviour on civil-military interactions can be identified and systematised, this can provide a new source of empirical information by which to judge a possible change in the military posture. This in turn can allow us to draw some tentative conclusions as to whether CSOs perceive that

their engagement with the military has tended to strengthen or weaken democratic influence or the military. Ultimately, in the absence of democratic control, do such interactions build gradual restraints on the freedom of action enjoyed by the military, or at least raise the perceived costs of any attempt to further strengthen military power over civilian competencies?

The thesis seeks to make a substantial methodological contribution. In complex environments, imperilled by multidimensional, unconventional threats, the maximisation of knowledge and harness of data can help make better evaluations and assessments. I argue that the study of hybrid peace, security and defence requires a complex research design, able to capture the multitude of relationships, interactions and transfers of knowledge, agency and power. I propose a methodology encompassing content analysis and process tracing for studying perceptions related to military change and hybrid peace and security. The dissertation makes a significant contribution with regards to the data used for the empirical analysis. Less than 15% of the literature in *Armed Forces and Society* is relying on interviews, targeted or mass surveys and questionnaires, while 73% trace their conclusions from secondary sources (Olmeda 2012: 71). In addition, explaining military doctrine and change in fragile post-military environments might be challenging, as it is almost impossible to know what the military is thinking, thus a content analysis of key strategic documents would most likely not be an accurate measure of the variables of interest. The estimation of perceptions (via interviews and survey responses in sample-regions) can have a methodological value-added in studying changes in civil-military relations in fragile states. The dissertation provides a comprehensive dataset comprising observations from more than 90 data points (54 interviews and 40 survey answers) related to civil-military relations. This dataset will be particularly valuable for future empirical research, considering the sparse availability of data from middle- and micro-level from countries facing insecurity and violence. The next chapter presents the methodology, research methods and data used for the empirical analysis in this dissertation.

3 Methodology and Research Design

3.1 Research Questions and Research Focus

This dissertation attempts to assess the process of democratic transformation of armed forces in fragile states and generates an understanding of the main determinants of this change. These objectives are conceptually grounded in the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2, which concluded that military change and strategic adaptation can be linked to the interaction with civilian actors (e.g. NGOs) in the framework of institutional reform approaches promoted by donor agencies.

The problem which this dissertation attempts to address is that of the impact of institutional reforms promoted by international actors, such as the EU, UN or international donor states, on processes of democratic institutional change in fragile and insecure states. Despite considerable international financial and institutional support, the security environment in fragile countries, such as Pakistan, continues to remain volatile, while democratisation processes continue to be unstable. An in-depth examination of these processes will contribute to a better understanding of the impact of international support in fragile states – often via local actors such as civil society organisations – but also the intervening factors: what conditions facilitate or hinder a more effective democratisation outcome? The study of change and transformation of armed forces and civil-military relations is *sine qua non* for the conceptualisation of democratisation processes envisaged by the international actors pursuing stabilisation and development in their global strategies. Particularly fragile and insecure states, with a longstanding military history – in which case, the military is expected to attempt to continue to play a dominant position, beyond security and defence policy – such as Pakistan, require a substantial transition of armed forces to reach a democratic level of civilian oversight.

The main research questions addressed in this research are:

1. *How is the role of the security and defence institutions in insecure states perceived to change during periods of transition?*
2. *What is the perceived impact of local actors, funded by international organisations, on democratic security governance in transitional environments?*

3. *What kind of determinants can influence the civil-military interaction in the security governance and peacebuilding domain?*

Institutions are defined broadly as "recognized patterns of behaviour or practice" (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 8), e.g. "habits, norms, customs, rules, or laws" (Redmond 2005: 501), and can have soft and hard forms. Military democratic change/transformation or adaptation refers to processes of change at both institutional and behavioural or attitudinal level. Processes of military change and transformation are assessed on the basis of the perceived changes in military strategy and doctrine. This is done by examining specifically the perceived military preferences for democratic peace and security approaches. Thus, the thesis features an epistemological vision based on a representation of reality understood as pluralism (Gadamer 2013), i.e. a mode of cognition which advocates that truth (ontology or what exists) exists only in relation to culture, identity, experiences, historical path-dependencies and context. Second, military's relationship with civilian actors is used as an indicator which can tell us something about changes in civil-military relations. This is assessed by examining the interaction between armed forces and civilians such as CSOs, the government, media, academia or international actors. Local actors refer to non-state groups and civil society organisations which can exert influence on social and political processes and are (most of them) funded by international organisations or donors. Civil society actors are anticipated to exert influence by enhancing input and output legitimacy and fostering accountability and the transfer of power to democratic government structures ('elite pacting'). Several intervening factors are anticipated to influence the nature of interaction between military and civilian actors: (engagement) strategies of civilian actors (e.g. NGOs), changes in the political culture, the institutional framework (including political parties and leadership) and the media.

In this research, democracy is used in the sense of a modern understanding of democracy, encompassing both participation (input legitimacy) and system effectiveness (output legitimacy) components.

3.2 Data

Table 3.1 presents the data used for the empirical analysis.

Data type	Respondent	Data points
Survey responses	Military	8
	NGOs and think tanks	25
	Government, media or academia	7
Semi-structured expert interview	Military	16
	NGOs and think tanks	26
	Government, media or academia	12
Total		94

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Data Used for the Empirical Analysis

The data were gathered by the author in four sample regions in Pakistan: Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar. The analysed sample encompasses 40 survey-based responses and 54 in-depth semi-structured interviews with representatives of NGOs (both international and domestic), academia (researchers), media, the Pakistan Army (mainly retired personnel, ranking from Colonel to Lieutenant General) – mostly, personnel in key strategic positions, including the ex-intelligence chief – and the government of Pakistan, *inter alia*, (former) federal or provincial ministers, leaders of political parties and senior members of the Senate.

The survey contained both closed and open questions. Different sets of questions were used for the three main categories of participants: 1) NGOs and think tanks (CSOs); 2) military; 3) researchers, journalists or government officials (see Annex 3). The closed questions enabled a better quantification of the answers and a focused approach on the thread studied in this thesis, while the open questions allowed to explore and find out *why* some things happened as they happened. The data points generated on the basis of the answers to the survey responses were complemented by data points generated on the basis of semi-structured interviews, which also contained both closed and open questions.

3.2.1 Benefits of Using Survey-Based Responses and Interviews as Data Collection Techniques

Using both survey responses and interviews increased the robustness of the findings. Rigorous methodologies gain particular importance in the contemporary international order, dominated by complex uncertainty. Survey responses and in-depth semi-structured interviews have a high potential for complementarity. The survey allowed for the collection of key information (e.g. demographic data) to estimate the parameters of interest in this research. The in-depth interviews contained a much smaller number of broader questions, which allowed the participants to make unprompted references. These were then coded into (*a priori* or *a posteriori*) categories relevant for this research.

a) The survey questions were standardised according to the participant group, i.e. military, civil society organisations and government/academia/media – there were three different sets of questions in total. The questions aimed at capturing the estimation and perception of the three groups with regards to:

- The evolution of civil-military relations post-Musharraf.
- The nature of civil-military (NGO/academia/media-military) interaction (formal, informal, repeated interaction, tense, other).
- Approaches towards democratic institutional change and democratic security governance.
- Strategies of engagement (particularly NGOs' strategies of engagement with the military).
- Area of operation (geographic and policy).
- Level of operation (e.g. policy level, middle level or grassroots).

The participants had to choose from several available answers (simple or multiple choices) and had the possibility to provide additional comments for each question in a comment field (optional).

b) The in-depth interviews had a semi-structured format. There were three sets of questions, each one for each of the three groups. A common sub-set of questions was addressed to each participant. Additionally, non-structured questions were addressed to each specific group, with the purpose of testing some of the participants' previous statements or control for possible (intervening) variables relevant for the research focus

of this dissertation. The questions for the in-depth interviews were built on a non-exhaustive logic, allowing participants to make references to the topic of interest without having a pre-set direction of answer. Instead, they were asked to narrate or to describe, 'based on their experience'. It was assumed that their experience consisted of factual sequences and they will focus on key political decisions and events which had a particular importance for them. The nature of details which were narrated based on their experience were thus voluntary chosen by the participants. The open-question design has ensured truthful answers and avoided the situation in which the participants would feel compelled to provide certain answers, particularly in the case of CSOs, out of fear that their answers might trigger retaliation from the military, government or donor agencies. Inferences with regards to the variables of interests were made on the basis of their answers. Additionally, data points were extracted from their answers using content analysis and coding in categories (both *a priori* and *a posteriori*), to complement the survey data.

Given that the topic of this research might count as sensitive, a series of techniques were used to elicit truthful answers during both survey and interview conduction:

- Protection of privacy – all survey responses were conducted online anonymously (no details related to personal data or to the name of the organisation were asked).
- Indirect questioning – questions were formulated as to refer to the average group, not the organisation or person in particular (e.g. "What is the greatest challenge of the military/NGOs in Pakistan" instead of "What is the greatest challenge of your military unit/NGO").
- Neutral and non-leading wording (e.g. "How would you describe the achievements/evolution of the military post-Musharraf?").
- For some of the survey questions, multiple choice options and the option "don't know"/ "other" were included in the set of answers.
- Respondent validation techniques during interviews.
- Test-retest techniques (e.g. asked the same question twice in different ways) in the survey to ensure stability of the answers.

3.2.2 Sampling

In order to avoid selection bias, several aspects were considered for the selection of the interview and survey participants. First, purpose sampling was applied for the selection of the four provinces, i.e. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Islamabad Capital Territory, in which interviews and surveying were conducted. The selection criterion for the four provinces was geopolitical diversity: Punjab and Sindh border India, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa borders Afghanistan while Islamabad is located quite central and epitomises an urban melting pot of different Pakistani ethnic groups. Pakistan is a diverse country and this selection was anticipated to enable great variation among the independent variables and ensure thus greater representativity of the results. As the data revealed, most of the research participants conduct operations and activities beyond their province of residence, which is assumed to be reflected in their answers and inputs. Participants in the interview and survey were selected among the major groups of actors relevant for the study of civil-military relations: senior CSO representatives, military officials, government representatives, established journalists and researchers. Applying randomisation for the sample selection was not possible because the size of the studied population is unknown or difficult to estimate. The respondents were selected from a database which I established ahead of the field research. To establish the database, desk research was conducted. The database was complemented during the field research, when additional potential respondents were referred to me during interviews. Geographical representativity, but also the background of the respondents, i.e. military ranking, religious background, domestic/international or gender in the case of CSOs, were considered in the selection procedure. This ensured that (retired) military officers from both strategic command and operational level, but also with different religious background (Shia, Sunni, Christian) are represented in the sample. In addition, it was ensured that the opinion of both domestic and international organisations operating in different provinces was captured. The respondents were contacted via e-mail. In most cases, the contact to the respondents was made in advance of the field research. The respondents were informed about the safe conditions of participating in the interview under the provisions of the ethical approval obtained from Dublin City University. They were also informed about the benefits and impact of this research. Interviews and surveys were carried out in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar.

3.3 Mixed-Methods Approach

3.3.1 Process Tracing

Process tracing was applied in order to trace the processes of military transformation and changes in civil-military relations between 2002-2017. This is done by triangulating observations from multiple sources (interviews, surveys, web content) to assess the dynamics and conditions of change from t_1 (2002-2008) to t_2 (2008-2017). By providing empirical evidence (e.g. respondent statements) to describe relevant sequences, moments or regularities, the analysis in this dissertation allows us to trace the processes of change and estimate, through systematic analysis of descriptive and more causal inferences (Collier 2011), relevant variables and intervening factors (conditions or determinants). The open questions from the survey and unprompted answers during the semi-structured expert interviews were mainly used as data points for the process tracing analysis.

A major utility of using process tracing in the single-case design is its capability to capture the complexity of "causal sequences" and trace "micro-causal relationships" (Rubak 2010: 478-9) and a variety of intervening factors. "Causal-process observations" (CPOs) (Collier *et al.* 2004: 277) can be inductively derived from the interview and survey data and employed for generating new theoretical inputs (Mahoney 2010: 125). Process tracing along the longitudinal case facilitates the identification of interactive effects, which are not "independent of each other", as well as path-dependent processes (George and Bennett 2005: 208). The rich variation of events and historical developments in Pakistan is expected to facilitate the identification of chains of influence and explanations for civil-military outcomes. In order to increase the validity of the results, attention was also accorded to alternative explanations (Bennett and Elman 2007: 183). Counterfactual analytical inferences were made in order to assess the relevance of the intervening factors for the outcome. Counterfactual analysis can have a particular contribution for additional clarifications as well as for the theory development endeavour, by identifying "critical variables" (George and Bennett 2005: 232) or "missed opportunities" (George and Holl 1997).

Through its epistemic innovation, process tracing allows for unfolding both the 'logic of appraisal' and the 'logic of discovery' (Popper 2002). On one side, inferences of interest can be tested by applying a focused approach. On the other side, theory-building inputs

can be generated by employing an inductive mode of reasoning and multiple data sources. Contrasting a monistic interpretation, Aristotle argued that outcomes can be determined by several types of causes: formal, material, efficient and final (Stein 2011). Process tracing techniques enable the identification of possible "equifinality" or multiple causality, i.e. alternative paths leading to similar outcomes. Considering the geographical outreach of the collected data, the rich variety of factors might make it possible to address "insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient" (INUS conditions) for the outcome (Mackie 1965: 245). This pluralistic perspective facilitates a differentiated typology for theory development (George and Bennett 2005) in the 'building blocks' sense. Even in single-case designs, process-tracing admits "contingent generalisations" (George and Bennett 2005: 217), from which middle-level theories can be derived.

3.3.2 Content Analysis

Content analysis is used for the analysis of the in-depth interviews, whose content was transposed into categories based on a pre-defined codebook using the software NVivo (the exact process is explained in the sub-section below). The interview transcripts comprised over 100.000 words, the equivalent of ca. 200 pages. Content analysis is a suitable methodological technique for processing information and extracting meaningful, significant and representative knowledge from large volumes of data (Krippendorff 2013: 46-7).

With its epistemological emphasis on *Erklären*, content analysis allows to explain why some organisations are more successful in their endeavour than others in interacting with the military and to compare the ability of different civil society actors to perform their work. In other words, what are the major determinants of civil-military interaction, e.g. is the type of CSO or their vision/strategy of engagement a determinant of their ability to engage in synergies with the military?

A further utility of the content analysis is the increased reliability, validity and generalisability of the results for further cases. Formal measures of reliability (Hardy *et al.* 2004) such as inter-coder reliability or "reproducibility" (Stemler 2001: 5) were applied in order to assure increased credence to the results of the empirical analysis. Coding was conducted by the author of this dissertation on the basis of a codebook

defining each category. A formal inter-coder reliability test was applied. During the inter-coder reliability test, the author's co-supervisor coded a significant sample (45 references) of data applying the same codebook. The average rate of agreement was 88% with an average Kappa coefficient of 0.71 (see Annex 2). These results suggest that the data were coded in a reliable manner.

3.4 Coding with NVivo

For increased efficiency and transparency of the data analysis process, NVivo was applied in the process of coding the data, managing the data (i.e. early coding, second coding and final stage coding) and documenting the coding. In order to avoid overcoding, focus has been placed on the research question and categories of interest (in the case of *a priori* coding). Relationship coding and matrix coding were applied for making associations between variables and identify possible intervening confounders. The results were useful in getting the major patterns and enabling a strategic view of the data. The analytical strategy was documented in a coding report in NVivo, in order to keep track of the evolution of the coding, which stretched over a period of circa three months. Moreover, memos and annotations were used for specifying the context or other relevant observations during the coding process of a particular unit, where needed. NVivo was very useful for managing the content delivered by the participants in this research, the quantity of what they said related to a specific category and the background of the participant (i.e. military, NGO or government/media/academia). For example, a chart with the share of references to the predominant themes associated with military change and civil-military relations was helpful for cross-validating findings from the survey or to identify the mainstream patterns or variables.

Both *a priori* (coding categories were set prior to commencing the analysis) and *a posteriori* (emerging coding involved coding into categories which emerged during the coding process) (Laver *et al.* 2013) category-building techniques were used for coding the data using the coding software NVivo.

One genuine advantage of the *a priori* approach is that it can make use of prior knowledge (Laver *et al.* 2003: 313) and can systematically examine the data with focus on the target of inference (Krippendorff 2013: 30). The deductive mode of reasoning allowed for precise inferences related to the categories of interest – military change, the impact of

non-state actors on the democratisation of security governance and factors influencing civil-military interaction. *A priori* coding in NVivo has a net advantage in comparison to automatised computer packages counting the frequency of words such as Wordscore (Laver *et al.* 2003) or Quanteda, as NVivo makes it possible for the researcher to consider the (immediate) context in which the words are used.

The analytical system based on categories is inherently committed to objectivity, because it implied consensus between different coders. One disadvantage of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories implied by the *a priori* coding is the need for "take-it-or-leave-it" propositions regarding the substantive meaning of the coded units (Laver *et al.* 2003: 313).

A posteriori coding involved three distinct stages. The first stage was more descriptive, the second coding more interpretatory of the data and the final stage was more research-led and involved more conceptual reasoning.

3.4.1 Value Added of the Epistemological Pluralism Methodology for Data Analysis

Epistemological pluralism, consisting in the multi-method approach encompassing content analysis and process tracing as well as different data types (survey responses and in-depth-interviews), has a specific value added for addressing the research questions of this project because of the compatibility and complementarity between the proposed methods in terms of data inputs used for the empirical analysis and analytical approach. The value added of the epistemological pluralism for the data analysis is increased validity of the results, in particular construct validity, understood as "concept validity" (Gerring 2012: 95), in other words the extent to which a concept "measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring" (Brown 1996: 231). Triangulation of two major data sources (interviews and survey responses) and two research methods (process tracing and content analysis) allows for better prospects of validity of the studied dynamics, processes and conditions. High levels of construct validity are tremendously important for the theory-building and conceptualisation purposes of this dissertation.

By focusing on key political decisions and events, process tracing is able, through a process of almost "relentless empirical research" (Bennett and Elman 2007: 183), to trace developments related to processes of change. By looking at interactions in context and

transformation dynamics, it helps to understand the institutional change of the military and security-related outcomes. Both content analysis (particularly the *a posteriori* part) and process tracing allow for a deliberate reflection on the implications of the context. A "pluralism of individual arguments" can lead to "partial theories" or "heuristic themes" (Kuehn 2016: 8; Kennedy and Louscher 1991: 1), enabling thus the generation of middle-range theoretical propositions with regards to military change and civilian actors' impact on security. The focus on theory generation allows the *accumulation* (Kuhn 2012) of knowledge in this field.

3.5 Case Study Pakistan

This dissertation proposes a longitudinal single-unit research design (Gerring 2004: 343), using Pakistan as a case study. The analysed timeframe is from 2002 to 2017, which encompasses the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf (2002-2008, t_1) and the post-Musharraf (democratic) transition period (2008-2017, t_2).

With an average of ca. 3.75 billion USD, Pakistan was the sixth major recipient of gross official development assistance (ODA) in the world in 2015 and nearly one quarter of the assistance came from the EU institutions and countries in 2017 (OECD 2019a). Particularly in the framework of the EU Global Strategy adopted in 2016, EU engagement for political, social and security development in Pakistan has intensified. External actors aiming at making Pakistan more secure and resilient have mainly adopted multi-agency peace and security approaches, encompassing a multitude of actors (hybrid security), democratic civilian control and conflict prevention mechanisms.

In 2015, the EU accounted for 23% of the Pakistan external trade, with EU imports from Pakistan almost doubling between 2006 and 2016 (European Commission 2018). Since 2014, Pakistan has been beneficiary of the updated tariff agreement EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+), in return to which Pakistan has agreed to ratify and implement 27 international legal items aimed at strengthening development and good governance (European Commission 2018).

China emerged as a major partner for the nuclear-state Pakistan after the deterioration in US-Pakistan relations in the aftermath of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation of capturing Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and multiple US Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations on Pakistani soil in the War on Terror framework. This

change in relations is also highlighted by the trends in arms trade. Pakistan's arms imports from the US decreased by 76% in the period 2013-2017 (compared to 2008-2012), with China being the major weapons supplier to Pakistan (SIPRI 2018).

20% of the total EU financial assistance to Pakistan between 2007 and 2013 occurred via NGOs/INGOs. The EU recognises NGOs as important actors providing "essential social services", which can foster development, particularly at grassroots level (EEAS 2007: 24).

To ensure conceptual consistency, NGOs are operationalised as formal, non-profit and peaceful organisations which are registered in Pakistan under the Societies Registration Act from 1860. This legislative provision does not use the word NGO, but refers to this type of organisations as "scientific and charitable societies" (Societies Registration Act 1860). Estimations of the total number of NGOs in Pakistan vary drastically between 60,000 to 70,000 civil society organisations and community-based organisations registered in Pakistan in 2010 (USAID 2016: 2; The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies 2013: Figure 1, Table 2; Soomro 2018) to some 25,000-30,000 in 2018.

While this thesis tends to generically use the term CSOs or local actors, this can refer to NGOs, associations, think tanks, trusts, INGOs or other civil society actors. It is differentiated between research-oriented NGOs (locally called think tanks) and other type of NGOs (associations, foundations, movements, societies, trusts and others) both domestic and international working in the areas of security, development and democracy. Foundations of political parties, "funded totally or partially by a [foreign] government or governments" are considered to be NGOs insofar "government representatives" are excluded "from membership" (Lawry 2009: 25).

Singh and Bailey (2013: 103-4) define Pakistan's system of governance as a "Pretorian democracy" in the sense that the "military allows multiparty elections to determine who will staff the formal machinery of government", while simultaneously "maintain[ing] paramountcy over all national institutions". Conceptually, Pretorian democracy represents a subtype of "illiberal democracy" (Diamond 1999: 18; Zakaria 2003: 99), considered a 'precursor of a consolidated democracy' (Diamond 1999). Singh and Bailey (2013: 103) argue that the system of Pretorian democracy in Pakistan is "not a transitional phase in a democracy consolidation, but an end-state". The name "Pretorian democracy" itself involves that Pakistan has undergone a change from a fully autocratic regime

(military regime) to a more democratic system after Pervez Musharraf. Inferences related to the impact of hybrid approaches of peace and security and the role of civil-military cooperation are made based on the provided evidence. The ongoing period of transition offers insights on the processes, actors and mechanisms associated with institutional change and transformation processes, which are aimed to be studied from a hybrid peace and security perspective. Process tracing proves particularly efficient to study the relationship between the military, state and society and to capture dynamic processes of transformation and change.

3.5.1 Justification for the Case Selection

Pakistan represents a key case for analysis because of its status of fragile and insecure state. Despite strong military influence in governance processes on one side and support from international agencies (both via government agencies, military and CSOs), the security environment in Pakistan continued to remain instable.

Pakistan is applied as a case of insecure and fragile state. These two attributes are summarised in Table 3.2 and discussed below:

Pakistan as Insecure State	Pakistan as Fragile State
Strategic environment – constellations of internal and external security threats; complex sources of insecurity and violence; Pakistan was among the four worst terrorism-affected countries in the world between 2007-2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016: 31).	Among the 14 most fragile states in the world between 2006-2016 and continues to be on alert. Fragility refers to the performance and capacity of the state institutions to provide basic needs to the people and to defend them from risks, insecurities and vulnerabilities.

Table 3.2 Pakistan as Insecure and Fragile State

The complexity of Pakistan's strategic environment and constellation of internal and external threats qualifies it for the label of highly insecure state. Being a highly insecure state Pakistan is a crucial case for this research, as multiple sources of insecurity and violence require a strong security and defence apparatus, which can thus be expected to perpetuate the military's primacy and importance in country's affairs, making the process of civilian oversight and control even more vulnerable. Pakistan is profoundly insecure due to a coincidence of complex security threats and instabilities. Pakistan was among the four worst terrorism-affected countries in

the world between 2007-2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016: 31), with attacks having increased in frequency and intensity after 2007. The South Asia Terrorism Portal estimates the total number of fatalities in terrorism-related incidents in Pakistan between 2000-2019 to 63,000. Some of the deadliest attacks were perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban, the Khorasan Group (affiliated to the Islamic State) or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. "Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was responsible for 233 deaths and 56 attacks in Pakistan in 2017, demonstrating a Taliban-related presence outside of Afghanistan" writes the Institute for Economic and Peace (Global Terrorism Index 2018: 16). The TTP attack on the Peshawar military school in 2013 (135 deaths) was one of the deadliest attacks in the Pakistani history. Pakistan is home to high levels of sectarian violence and terror attacks are often directed against religious minorities, as it was the case of the suicide bombing on the Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Sufi Shrine in Sehwan, Sindh (90 deaths, 2017), Easter bombing on Christians in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, Lahore (75 deaths, 2017) or the bus shooting on people from the Ismaili community in Safoora Goth, Karachi (46 deaths, 2015). Apart from internal sources of violence in form of terrorism and sectarian violence, there are also external threat perceptions from Afghanistan and India. The porous border to Afghanistan is an immense channel of arms smuggling and other illegal activities associated with violence. Along the India-Pakistan disputed border (Line of Control), the number of ceasefire violations increased dramatically, with approx. 880-1,140 incidents happening in 2017 alone (Jaffrelot 2018). I now move on to discuss Pakistan as a fragile state.

Pakistan was the among the 14 (of 178) most fragile states in the world between 2006-2016 and continues to be on alert, despite significant improvements (ranked 23rd in 2019), according to the Fragile States Index, which was formerly known as the Failed States Index. Fragility refers to the performance and capacity of state institutions to provide basic needs to the people and defend them from risks and vulnerabilities. The Fragility Index triangulates quantitative and qualitative data and applies a methodology compiling economic, political, social and cohesion indicators such as economic development, public services, the rule of law, demographic pressures, ethnic fractionalisation or security (The Fund for Peace 2019). In substantive terms, this set of empirical determinants is argued to capture issues related to poverty, conflict and governance (Marshall *et al.* 2008). Fragile

statehood sometimes also called 'limited statehood' (Risse *et al.* 2018), is not only linked to poverty and high vulnerability of domestic societies, but also to global terrorism (Carment *et al.* 2008). Building state and societal resilience is a major objective of the EU Global Strategy. Social and political development and state formation in the context of fragile statehood is particularly prone to the emergence of hybrid political orders (Boege *et al.* 2008). These hybrid environments can be key to processes of democratic change and transformation, as they constitute platforms of interaction and decision-making between representatives of the various (conflicting) orders. It is thus immensely important to understand how processes of transfer of power can be effectively and sustainably advanced in insecure states which require strong defence agencies, located in fragile contexts of limited statehood.

Another utility of the selected case for the empirical analysis is its rich variation on the independent variables, which make Pakistan a 'telling' case for research. Conflicts at inter-state (with India and Afghanistan) and intra-state level (in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces) as well as multiple sources of violence (from extremist, separatist and sectarian sources) make Pakistan a complex case. Pakistan has been one of the major recipients of international financial and institutional support, notably from the US, EU and China. Domestic, international, donor- or mixed-funded NGOs, operating at policy level, i.e. Track 1.5, middle-level (Track 2) and grassroots level (Track 3) conduct activities in the fields of security, counterterrorism, peacebuilding and to a certain extent research in the security and defence sector.

3.5.1.1 The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

With an active manpower of 653,800 personnel (550,000 reserve personnel) and expenditures of 11,376 billion US dollar (4% of the GDP) (IISS 2018; SIPRI 2019), Pakistan had the sixth largest army in the world in 2017 – comparatively, India has an active manpower of 1,4 million (1,15 million reserve) (second largest army in the world) and a defence budget of 66,5 billion US dollars (2.4% of the GDP). Due to its geostrategic position and continuous territorial threat (particularly from the Russian Empire), a strong defence was a necessary requirement in the region, already since the area that was to become Pakistan was under British colonial rule and an integral part of the East India Company. The emergence of Pakistan as an independent state can be linked with the end

of the Mughal Empire, which brought Muslims in South Asia in a weaker and "politically vulnerable" (Schofield 2011: 35) position. To address this vulnerability and create an environment in which the Muslim identity could flourish the Pakistan state was created by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1947 through the process of so-called 'partition' (based on religion) in the Indian Subcontinent. Due to dangers of invasion and annexation from the north (Russian threat), the area of today's Pakistan was strongly militarised and the armed forces played a pivotal position in guarding and defending the territory since the emergence of Pakistan. To cope with these extreme security risks, the British rulers started to train indigenous population to serve for the defence of the British Empire in the Indian Subcontinent. They established military cantonments and training centres already since 1912. In addition, in a move to counterbalance the number of Bengalis in the army, Punjabis from (West) Pakistan region were recruited. These "rapidly became the backbone of the Army" (Schofield 2011: 37-8). The new state of Pakistan derived "only about 20 per cent of the military assets" of the British India, as Britain was genuinely opposing the creation of a weak state in a strategically important region (Schofield 2011: 43). Thus, the military in Pakistan was relatively weak at the beginning but grew quickly, also thanks to US military aid and investments during the 1950s (Alavi 1990: 35).

The predominant role of the military in governance already prior to the independence of Pakistan in 1947 was favoured by shortages of civilian leadership after Jinnah's death and genuinely weak civilian institutional structures – which due to the late integration of West Pakistan into the British Empire (Sindh in 1843, Punjab and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 1849, while some parts, such as FATA, were never brought under full control) did not have time to develop(Schofield 2011: 35, 43). From this privileged position, the Pakistani military was able to maintain control over large parts of the economy and had the capacity and will to stage numerous military *coups d'état* (the first one already in 1951, just four years after Partition) and be in power for decades. The army's secret intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a significant role in growing the importance and power of the Pakistan military, particularly after the beginning of the Soviet War in Afghanistan in 1979 (Kiessling 2016). The country's foundation on religion and inadequate institutional design to reflect ethnic-linguistic diversity at the time of its creation, along with the proliferation of terrorist organisations (in the development of which the ISI and the military were also

blamed), are considered a main flaw since its creation and a source of insecurity and instability in the region (Ayaz 2013).

Search for legitimacy was one key concern of the military bureaucracy since the creation of the state of Pakistan (Alavi 1990: 20; Azfar 2013: 56). This was because of the thin base of representative democracy at the moment of creation of Pakistan, given the lack of political authority beside Jinnah (who died, soon after the Partition) and absence of political parties. This power and institutional vacuum, complemented by a difficult strategic environment and high security threats, opened the way for the Pakistan Army to establish a solid basis of "bureaucratic domination" (Alavi 1990: 42) in Pakistan since the start. Pursuing a doctrine of "power and responsibility" (Alavi 1990: 51), the Pakistan military has been able to be in government for several decades (General Ayub Khan 1958-1966; General Yahya Khan 1966-1971; General Zia-ul-Haq 1977-1988 and General Pervez Musharraf 1999-2008). This long history of military rule has allowed the military to penetrate state institutions, be in possession of major industries (important sources of revenues) and establish itself in the collective memory of the society as the unique 'guardian' and guarantor of Pakistan, but also as a fearful actor, which can resort to undemocratic and even oppressive practices to deal with its opponents, if it wants so.

After this brief discussion of the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan and how the military came to be what it is today, I now move on to thematise the utility of choosing a case-study methodology for studying the research questions examined in this dissertation.

3.5.2 Utility of a Case Study Design

The utility of an in-depth case study design in the study of civil-military relations is clearly emphasised in the specialised literature (Desch 1999: 19). Particularly when studying countries in transition, "context is crucial" (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 306), therefore a methodology which allows for capturing the context is crucial for this research. Also, a case study is more suitable for studying NGOs and civil society than a cross-sectional design, given their variation in definitions across countries and regions (Centeno 1994: 126; Salamon and Anheier 1997: 11).

Given the high degree of interdependence associated with hybrid approaches of security, a case-oriented design is particularly useful in studying relationships, processes and intervening factors. Interactive and collaborative systems and processes represent non-linear types of relationships (continuous negotiation of the status-quo) (Williams 2015: 25), which are anticipated to be influenced by a multitude of factors. "Different factors are interdependent and cumulative, reinforcing each other or cancelling out each other's effects", while being simultaneously exogenous to "actor's perceptions, skills, political will, preferences, and adaptability" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 205). Emphasising the importance of the context, Williams (2015: 27) states that "the dynamic of collaboration" can be strongly affected by contextual factors, "specifically the nature and organizational level of participants, the scale of the policy problem, and the size of the collaboration". Through the consideration of the context, both process tracing and content analysis are assumed to be able to capture the complexity of the mechanisms and agents of change.

Aiming at transcending the zero-sum between positivist and interpretivist research paradigms, this dissertation pleads for a pluralistic understanding of social sciences. Opposing the idea that social constructivist and rationalist paradigms are mutually exclusive, I promote the idea that they could perform simultaneously or intermittently depending on research circumstances and can be complementary.

4 Military Change, Democratisation and Transformation

This chapter discusses the processes of change and democratisation of security and defence institutions in Pakistan. It does so based on three major indicators: a. military strategic preferences for peace and security approaches, as described by the participants in interview and survey; b. change in civil-military relations, including military's strategy and attitudes towards civilian institutions and actors (including NGOs) and c. military's role in democratisation processes, as perceived by the three categories of respondents. The results, based on respondents' statements, suggest that there has been a significant transition in how the military seek to project their role in society, from an autocratic and closed institution of the armed forces during the military regime of Pervez Musharraf (t_1) to a situation where the armed forces are seeking to project a view of the military with a more democratic outlook in the post-Musharraf period (t_2). This change is highlighted by perceived changes in the military security strategy, improvement of civil-military relations and acquiescence of democratic processes. Nonetheless, as the findings show, respondents perceive that the actual balance of power remained strongly inclined in favour of the military institution, which continues to maintain an important veto over the elected civilian government and civilian civil service, particularly with regards to security, defence and foreign policy. Most respondents assess the military's active role in decision-making as 'compulsive intervention', due to weak capacity and performance of civilian institutions and leadership. The military's uncertain commitment to a sustainable and indiscriminate security and counterterrorism strategy, as well as to a progressive foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan jeopardises military's credibility as a democratic political actor. While the data show that the military are perceived to have undergone processes of adaptation and transformation and there is a military change from t_1 to t_2, these processes are asymmetric and incomplete. This is mainly due to military's inaptitude to efficiently perform the new military functions and government's weak capacity to exert democratic oversight and/or to request more far-reaching change.

4.1 Military's Preferences for Peace and Security Approaches

Pakistan's military are widely perceived to have changed their strategic security preferences, in the period since the end of the direct military rule of Pervez Musharraf, as summarised in Figures 4.1-4.3.

Figure 4.1 shows the military's preferences in relation to human security and national security. To enable a better comparison, NGOs' preferences are also displayed.



Figure 4.1 Preferences for Pakistan's Security Priority
Data based on survey responses [Question: "What do you think is /should be Pakistan's priority at the moment?"; Answer: multiple choice; N=33]

Almost all military respondents stated that they believed that there had been a shift in the military's strategy since the end of the period of military rule and they overwhelmingly argued that Pakistan's security strategy should focus on human security and national security in equal measure. Although the number of military respondents in the studied sample is relatively small, and it might be expected that the military would seek to project change, the prevalent preferences for the 'both equally' option can be interpreted as a predominant perception of transition from Pakistan Army's traditional exclusive focus on national security (as it was during the regime of Pervez Musharraf) to more comprehensive models of peace and security. The ongoing insecurity inside Pakistan could have been used to justify a focus on national security, without necessarily

defending or even acknowledging military control over the elected government, however military respondents chose instead to highlight approaches linked to integrated security models, which promote human security. Bottom-up processes of peace and security, such as countering violent extremism (CVE), were mentioned as a priority area by several respondents in the studied sample (Anonymous military participant in the survey; Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative). One respondent attempts to explain this unexpected but tangible transition: "Maybe on CVE they trust more, they listen, but comparatively is becoming easy to engage security institutions in intellectual discourse on SSR, extremism, it wasn't the same until 2008, 2009. It was quite hard" (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative). This can show a greater willingness of the military to work with civilian institutions on multidimensional, comprehensive security approaches, involving multiple agencies and preventive approaches to peace and security. Only one quarter of the respondents (see Figure 4.1 above) consider that Pakistan's security strategy should exclusively focus on national security, suggesting a significant change in the type of military culture, that respondents believe should be projected. Due to poor performance of the civilian government, the Pakistan Army is still seen by many as guardian of Pakistan's sovereignty and the role in performing national security functions is unconditionally accepted. One senior academic claimed:

> *'They have their concerns for national security issues. It is true that sometime political leadership does not take decisions freely, but the military needs solutions. If there is a problem in the society, they need solutions. Zarb-e-Azb was a landmark operation. Every person in Pakistan gives credence to General Raheel Sharif because he started the operation against terrorists. This is why the military is trusted.' (Interview Participant #13, Senior Academia Representative)*[3]

The armed forces were formally in power for nearly half of Pakistan's existence as an independent state and the military as a *governance and defence actor* is strongly embedded in the societal and collective culture. While a formal *coup* would be unacceptable for the majority of the society, a large section of the population still seems

[3] For most part of the interview transcripts, minor adjustments have been made by the author during the transcription process at linguistic level. For this reason, while the excerpts constitute the information transmitted by the respondent, single inverted commas instead of double inverted commas have been consistently used to signal the reader the partial paraphrasing which was made.

to support a strong role for the military, and a strong military institution is seen as a potential corrective authority for the gaps in the civilian administrations. The significant popular support for the military institutions means that perhaps the senior military figures do not fear a sudden and radical end to their political role. Nonetheless, the military are conscious that the influence remains controversial for many and they may be seeking to actively manage their public reputation by promoting a strategy emphasising the military's concern with both national security and more progressive and democratic, human security.

Figure 4.2 shows the military's preferences for security and counterterrorism approaches, based on survey data. The answer options draw on Goodhand 2010 and Kilcullen 2010.



Figure 4.2 Preferences for Peace and Security in Comparison
[Question: "What approaches you think are the most appropriate to achieve sustainable peace?"; Answer: multiple choice; N=40]

The results in Figure 4.2 reinforce the finding that the military's preference is perceived to have shifted to a more comprehensive and holistic approach. Interestingly, the 'integration of militants' and 'elimination of militants' represent the top strategies, which respondents believed the military to be prioritising. While apparently mutually exclusive, these results suggest that a differentiated approach is implemented in function of the radicalisation degree of the militants. For example, 'elimination', accompanied by the destruction of infrastructure is likely to be preferred for fighters in an advanced level of

radicalisation, while 'integration' is envisaged for less radicalised or moderate militants. One respondent claimed that while a hard approach is usually applied to "hardened cadres or leadership", whose ideology is "irreconcilable, (…) not prone to de-radicalisation or integration", integrative and rehabilitation measures are implemented for de-radicalisation and reintegrating low level fighters (Anonymous military participant in the survey). Another military respondent explains why he believes that 'elimination' alone might not sufficient:

> *'[E]liminating militants/insurgents or capturing them only removes the foot soldiers. The strategic planners and logistic providers are sitting abroad, mostly in Afghanistan, India and even in the US, UK, France and Israel. No amount of soldiering alone within Pakistan can bring about sustainable peace and security.' (Anonymous military participant in the survey)*

'Out-governing militants' was another significant response in relation to the defence forces' preferred security approaches. The military showed preferences for this mechanism even stronger than civilian respondents. This result, seemingly unexpected, might consolidate the findings showing a tendency of the military towards articulating comprehensive, multi-agency security approaches, such as SSR or COIN, which, Goodhand (2013: 291) assumes, are "less about killing the enemy" but more "about 'out-governing' them". The adoption of SSR mechanisms can be seen as impelled by a change in the strategy guiding military security missions. While Pakistan's military officers have always been exposed to 'Western' military training and can therefore articulate these strategic shifts better than civil society, nonetheless, there has been no obvious significant change in the degree of Western influence and yet military respondents consistently argued that there has been a shift in approach.

Overall, the results in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 suggest a military who considers pursuing security strategies encompassing both hard and soft approaches, both corrective and preventive mechanisms. "Militancy can be overcome more effectively by harnessing local support, elimination of poverty and giving education to the inhabitants of tribal areas, where militancy flourishes due to reasons I have suggested for eradication", claimed a senior military respondent (Anonymous military participant in the survey). These views support the claim that the military organisation became more aware and supportive of approaches of peace and security focusing on tackling root causes of terrorism. During a focus group discussion, it was highlighted that:

> *'[T]he military is beginning to realise that despite the fact that a lot of these actions have been given results, that is not enough in long term. They really need to put in place some soft measures, some in-depth, far-reaching nationwide and have a long-term vision in order to get rid of militancy.' (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives)*

These dynamics can suggest a quasi-constabularisation of the armed forces and a "gradual decrease of the projected military force" (Oliveira 2010: 53) after the military rule of Pervez Musharraf. A concern with non-violent means of eliminating radicalisation and extremism (which are conducive to terrorism) can play an auxiliary role in processes of democratic security sector governance and reform. For example, the disarmament, rehabilitation and training of captured militants to facilitate their re-integration in the society, can be more compatible with SSR approaches than (indiscriminately and exhaustively) 'eliminating militants'. Non-lethal military missions can range from disarmament of insurgents and arms control, reconstruction support and assistance in humanitarian missions, as well as support for setting-up civilian political structures. These types of activities involve a transition from "the traditional role exercising military power" to "non-coercive roles" and imply a comprehensive concept of security, encompassing components such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Takai 2002: 127, 139). Ability and capacity to perform these types of roles require a 'positive' understanding of security, focused on both eliminating root causes (sustainability of the approach) and reconstruction of the societal and political structures (efficiency of the approach). This leads us to infer that the perceived change in military's strategy post-Musharraf was more profound and concerned with adaptation to participate in a more democratic environment.

The perception of change in military strategy is further outlined by the military's preferences towards the actors who should play a normative role in security-related activities in Pakistan, as outlined in Figure 4.3.



Figure 4.3 Actors Who Should Participate in Security-Related Activities
Results based on survey-data, responses from (mainly retired) military personnel [Question: "Who should participate in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Pakistan?"; Answer: multiple choice; N=8]

The results emphasise the military's preferences for multi-actor security and hybrid approaches to sustainably countering terrorism and conflict. All respondents in the sample are of the opinion that institutions of the civilian government should participate in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and security related areas. An interesting finding is that the military claimed support for the involvement of civil society representatives in security-related operations. It could outline the military's acknowledgement or maybe acquiescence of approaches based on human security logics, emerging from local, grassroots level and designed to reflect the needs and understanding of local communities. The results in Figure 4.3 might also outline the military's differentiated preferences for civil society representatives on one side and NGOs (which, in this research and in literature in general, are conceptualised as part of the civil society) on the other side. One military respondent in the survey explains the differentiated perceptions towards civil society impact:

> *'Some representatives of civil society have a sobering impact and promote stability and peace. However, political, religious parties' heads and splinter groups with various names have an unsettling impact. Political parties are less disruptive but*

> *the religion-based militant groups are destructive and the main cause of insecurity in Pakistan.' (Anonymous military participant in the survey)*

The more positive scores for civil society reflect a view that the term is used to mean community-based organisations with a local focus, while NGOs also include more urban activist-based groups, including pro-democratisation groups. While the military respondents show appreciation for the impact of many civil society leaders and organisation on peace and stability, on many occasions, reluctance to the uncertain impact of other civil organisations was also expressed. The belief that NGOs might have disruptive effects on security is related to the development in recent years that some extremist organisations, registered as NGOs, were found to be involved in radicalisation, funding or recruitment for terrorism. Despite this major limitation, overall, the Pakistan Army seems to nonetheless collaborate with some NGOs. In the recent years, military has commenced a series of partnerships with NGOs. One illustrative example of military-NGO synergy is the Sabawoon rehabilitation centre in Swat Valley, run in cooperation with the domestic NGO Hum Pakistan Foundation and UNICEF (Khattak 2009; Parvez 2011: 132), in which qualified social workers were allegedly responsible for the rehabilitation of youth captured by the military during security operations (Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative). This example of hybrid projects, though rare, was perceived to suggest a certain realisation of the military "about the need to cooperate with civilian institutions and civil society" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). Engagement with civilian actors might also indicate the military's organisational weakness and gaps in fulfilling non-traditional functions, such as the rehabilitation of combatants. An increasingly critical military mindset as well as perceived readiness to accommodate civilian actors and democratic elements in their missions could suggest a modern military institutional actor, which can participate in comprehensive, multi-agency approaches of hybrid peace and security governance. However, the alleged involvement of a staff affiliated with the INGO Save the Children in the CIA operation to apprehend Osama bin Laden in 2011 was found to be a factor which immensely prejudiced military's relations with NGOs, particularly INGOs or externally funded CSOs. Thus, while this resulted in cooperation with CSOs often ending prematurely, it continued with some. Negative attitudes towards NGOs include activist human rights groups who do not want to cooperate, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Taliban attack on a military school in Peshawar, which resulted in the deaths of more than 120 school children in 2014, constituted an important momentum for a realignment of civil-military relations. This incident seemed to have had a unifying effect on military and civilian institutions, which was also highlighted during the focus group discussion:

> *'Especially since this incident in 2014 there is much more unity that is a collective national problem which is creating regional embarrassment for us, and that we need to collectively solve this problem. The military is not just recognising the contribution which non-military institutions have had, but they are also aware that they need that in order to win this fight.' (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives)*

The 2014 massacre was one of the most disturbing armed attacks of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The intensity and lack of scrupulosity of the attack, which targeted unarmed school children, not only shocked the whole country, but it also kept the headlines in international media. At domestic level, the attack was perceived as both a shock and embarrassment: shocking because such a large-scale bloody attack had not happened often in Pakistan and embarrassing because the attack put Pakistan in a negative light at international level, due to military's inability to sustainably deal with terrorism. Such extreme security risks could have disastrous effects on foreign direct investments, on which Pakistan's economy is highly dependent, because of the massive economic debt. Both government and military institutions (the latter own large centres of production and large shares of the domestic economy) had an interest in delivering an adequate response to this attack that could project stability of the security environment. The 2014 attack became thus a collective problem which required a collective response. In response to the 2014 TTP terrorist massacre, a new security and counterterrorism strategy, the National Action Plan (NAP) was adopted by the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) of the Ministry of Interior in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, with the objective to sustainably tackle terrorism and its root causes, notably terrorism funding, hate speech, radicalisation and militant or terrorist organisations. The NAP encompassed 20 points, most of which evoked a credible and sincere approach to sustainably end terrorism in Pakistan, such as "dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists" (Point 18) and "Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders" (Point 17) (NACTA 2017). A few points, such as the re-introduction of death sentence and re-

institution of military courts to deal with terrorist offences, were received with scepticism by many democratic actors. A wide range of military and non-military stakeholders, from federal and provincial level, including some NGOs and think tanks, were involved in the drafting process of the NAP. This is reflected in the multidimensional design of the document, which consists of several structural components: a military one, a foreign policy dimension, a madrassa reform and a social reform among others. However, several respondents commented on the deficient implementation of this new security strategy, especially with regards to the provisions related to human rights, which were included in the text, but not implemented in practice. This contrast is also reflected at military's public relations level, with the Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR) condemning terrorist groups and praising civil society's role in counterterrorism on public occasions (e.g. during the final address of the 13th Summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization held in Islamabad in 2017), while troubling them or their branches support in private (according to the opinion of many respondents, in the period studied in the thesis). This so-called double-level game not only diminishes military's credibility both domestically and internationally, but also imperils the sustainable democratisation of security governance and peacebuilding processes.

The results in the Figures 4.1-4.3 suggest a perceived change of the military, from a traditional, closed military organisation to a more open and modern one, capable of accommodating or co-existing to a certain extent with democratic peace and security approaches. This radical transition in military's policy and strategy post-Musharraf was depicted by some participants in the study:

- *'Until 2008, the army was only focused on hard power, execution. Not mindful of media, CSOs. Under General Kayani, things started changing. In this first meeting with the elected government, he said, look, keep us out. Do not ask us to take over a territory, because when we take over (...), so he understood the importance of the political. General Rahil Sharif was a different kind of person, all over. General Kayani was an intellectual deeper person (...). I became his friend because he began this interaction with intellectuals just to get more informed. We had three interactions with him, every time 4 hours, it went to 1 or 2 am. Because he was so preoccupied with Swat, Waziristan. Before that operation, he has a consultation with all of that. Five or six intellectuals. I do not think such interactions happen today. The biggest advantage of Kayani was that he was still consulting, he was*

getting informed.' (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives)

- *'We have done two interventions in which Army was involved. We have done child protection in a lot of public army school at their requested. Which is a big change. Because years ago, when we asked, they said no. and now they asked us. We have done them across the years in AJK and other provinces. Recently, ISPR, two months ago, they asked us to come on the radio.' (Interview Participant #12, CSO Representative)*
- *'There was zero contact until 2007.' (Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'The military has travelled along, they have moved from their positions to very positive. Today's military and ten years before is a very huge difference. It is more democratic, supportive and inclusive.' (Interview Participant #11, Senior Media Representative)*

Changes in the military's strategy, at both organisational and operational level, can be an indicator of *adaptation* or initial *transformation* of the military institution, which is defined in the literature as a process of significant change (Prezelj *et al.* 2016; Reynolds 2007; Davis 2010; Kugler 2006). Transformational change is a process which can take years or even decades and involves radical change, from an organisational/institutional status-quo to another. Through interaction and exchange with civilian actors, including NGOs and international actors, such as the EU, the military attempted to project relationships and systems of values, which might have triggered an intrinsic process of ideological change and adaptation from t_1 to t_2. Shifts in the military strategic preferences with regards to security approaches are complemented by shifts in civil-military relations and military's positionality towards democratic processes, as discussed in the following two sub-sections.

4.2 Change in Civil-Military Relations

Another indicator of the ideological shift in military's strategy and doctrine from t_1 to t_2 is the substantial change in civil–military relations and military's readiness to acquiesce processes which can enable the development of a democratic environment, for survival

purposes. As showed by the results in Figure 4.4 below, civil-military relations, including NGO-military relations, improved after the military regime of Pervez Musharraf.



Figure 4.4 Estimation of the Perceived Change in Civil-Military Relations
[Coded data based on interviews with civil society representatives, N=21]

More than two-thirds of the respondents in the analysed sample estimated that the operational environment in general and the conditions of interaction with the military, specifically, rather improved after 2008, despite civil-military interaction being technically greater in frequency and intensity during Musharraf, as all public officials, from federal and local government institutions, were from the Pakistan Army. Only 9% consider that the situation remained constant while 5% of the respondents in the analysed sample evaluate the change as rather negative, with the conditions for interaction during the Musharraf regime being perceived to have been better – "I feel, the government was also NGO friendly before, also because decentralisation of power and local government structures" (Interview Participant #10, Senior CSO Representative). Most respondents were of the opinion that the post-Musharraf period was not only *coup*-free, but also reflected a certain change of the military institution, strategy and attitudes towards democracy. This was emphasised by several (civilian) participants in the study:

- *'Military has changed from its position 10 years ago (…) today's military is democratic, supportive, inclusive.' (Interview Participant #11, Senior Media Representative)*

- *'Environment is more conducive right now. (…) The military institution is also more inclined to root out theses extremists from Pakistan.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'[S]ince 2008, the military is accepting their role under the command of civilians (at least formal).' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'Historically, Rehman[4] has a history for fighting the dictators and the rights of the people. During Musharraf time, they were banned. They were able to cross the finish line after Musharraf.' (Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative)*

In consistency with previous findings, the results in Figure 4.5 below suggest that the quality of civil-military relations post-Musharraf largely improved. The results illustrated in the figure present the types of interaction between NGOs and the military, distinguishing between coordination (formal), cooperation (informal), collaboration (mixed) and no interaction.



Figure 4.5 Type of NGO-Military Interaction
[Survey data; Question: "What type of interaction would you say better describes your relationship with the military"; Answer: single choice; N=26, all CSOs]

[4] I.R. Rehman is one of the most prominent and respected intellectuals, security analysts and human rights defenders in Pakistan.

More than half of the CSOs assess their interaction with the military as mainly cooperation, i.e. informal type of agreements and contact, while 16% estimated their relations with the military as collaboration (both formal and informal). Less than 5% of the organisations claimed to be engaged in formal operations with the military, while about one quarter stated that they do not have any interaction with the military. Interaction between CSOs and the military can take the form of joint projects, policy consultation, or participation in security-related conferences or research. For some organisations, it is more difficult to cooperate with the military than for others, mainly depending on their strategies, vision towards change and policy area in which they operate. Many CSOs consider coordination, cooperation or collaboration with the military unfeasible due to the lack of institutional liaising mechanisms, some reject it on principle and some have not thought about the possibility of integrating the military in their work. CSO-military coordination, i.e. formal agreement, is rare, as formal mechanisms of interaction are absent and coordination can usually take place via the government or ISPR, which is the media department of the Pakistan Armed Forces, in charge of coordinating news and information as well as of public relations.

The results presented in Figure 4.5 merit additional theoretical consideration, as they have been unable to demonstrate that collaboration is the most suitable approach for civil-military relations, and particularly NGO-military relations, as the literature argues. The results – that more than half of the organisations are engaged in cooperation with the military – fail to support Yalçinkaya's (2013) argument and finding. Yalçinkaya argued that NGOs are more likely to prefer to engage in relations of 'collaboration' with the military, because 'coordination' and 'cooperation' mechanisms are likely to imply the involvement of a "coordinator" or "work plan", which are anticipated to be unacceptable to NGOs as both a coordinator or working plan possesses "control capacity" (Yalçinkaya 2013: 494). NGOs are bounded by international principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Yalçinkaya's inference that coordination and cooperation mechanisms are linked to possible losses of control and thus encroachment of the sovereignty and independence of the actors involved in the interaction, are drawn from the definitions of cooperation, coordination and collaboration. However, the inferential assumptions made by Yalçinkaya result in conceptual ramifications which have different meanings than those applied in the interview design, which were based on the theoretical framework developed by McNamara (2013). McNamara (2012: 391-2) theorises coordination,

cooperation and collaboration based on conceptual reflections from the interorganisational theory literature. Table 4.1 illustrates the major differences between the three terms in the two conceptual models:

	Yalçinkaya (2013)	**McNamara (2012: 492)**
Coordination	‘‘[T]he organisation of the different elements of a complex body or activity so as to enable them to work together effectively.’’ (p. 494)	“Centralized control through hierarchical structures” “Formalized agreements” “Implementation of the partnership is based on a higher authority; a boundary spanner may be used to foster linkages” “A neutral facilitator may help resolve conflicts”
Cooperation	‘‘[T]he action or process of working together to the same end.” (p. 494)	“Work within existing organizational structures” “Informal agreement” “Implementation of the partnership occurs at the lowest levels; leaders are not involved” “Conflicts avoided through independence” “Fully autonomous; policies to govern the collective arrangement are not developed”
Collaboration	‘‘[T]he action of working with someone to produce something’’ (p. 495)	“Shared power arrangements” “Informal and formal agreements” “Not autonomous; policies to govern the collective arrangement are developed jointly by participants” “Implementation of the partnership is based on the participants; a convener may help bring participants together”.

Table 4.1 Coordination, Cooperation and Collaboration at Yalçinkaya (2013) and McNamara (2012) in Comparison

Table 4.1 suggests that there seems to be a difference with regards to the conceptual understanding of cooperation. While cooperation might involve "working together to the same end" (Yalçinkaya 2013), this does not necessarily involve the existence of a 'working plan'. Applying these conceptual models to instances of civil-military relations and interaction in the case examined in this dissertation, 'working to the same end' would mean the situation in which actors (with various objectives and strategic visions) are involved in joint projects or work during the *implementation* ('end') process. This was partially confirmed by the data. Based on instances of interaction between military and civilian organisations (narrated by the respondents), it was found that military and civilian actors might work together more effectively in the *implementation* phase of their projects, particularly in difficult or insecure contexts. NGO workers and military personnel do joint work, often at grassroots level, during the implementation of specific projects. For example, in difficult terrains such as Waziristan, FATA and Swat, the military often facilitate civilian organisations conducting activities there, in the form of transport, security and guidance:

- *'They provided us transport and everything. They guided us. (…) Sometimes they provide helicopters also. Then they invite many NGOs representatives, not only one. Then they go together. One higher officer like colonel or brigadier, he will coordinate and brief about the area, conflicts, problems, their operations and then we will implement or facilitate.' (Interview Participant #14, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'Once you get the NOC, which is a major step in implementing the project, they are quite adjusting and they help you in the field. They do support you, they provide security, but it is all dependent on the NOC. Once you get it, if you sit and talk to them, they understand. Still, there is a need for training, awareness sessions, capacity building on approaches which we are using as humanitarian actors and the commitments which we need to fulfil. Which the state is signatory of those commitments.' (Interview Participant #41, Senior CSO Representative)*

Compliance with legal provisions, in this case the obtainment of the No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Ministry of Interior, is a genuine prerequisite for cooperation with military institutions at grassroots level. The NOC is an approval which is issued by the Ministry of Interior to individuals or organisations who/which aim at travelling or conducting activities in certain regions of Pakistan, considered sensitive or restricted, due to the security situation. Particularly after the US security operation in relation to Osama

bin Laden with the alleged support of a staff affiliated with the US American INGO Save the Children, the process for obtaining the NOC has become more difficult and uneven. Many NGOs struggled or were unable to obtain the legal permission, while numerous NGOs, also from those participating in the study were found to be able to apply and get the NOC for conducting activities in restricted areas. It is mostly projects in the developing and assistance sector, such as offering medical and healthcare, training, housing, which were found to be more likely to get the support of the Ministry of Interior and receive the NOC, and then the support of the military staff on the ground.

The difficulty of a possible coordination between the military and civilian organisations, particularly NGOs, consists in the different objectives and strategic visions of the military and NGOs, which impede them to be involved in centralised decision-making structures required by processes of coordination. As one of the respondents emphasises:

> *'(…) [T]he approaches are different. The humanitarian actors have to follow some standards and international protocols, like Geneva conventions, human rights conventions, UN protocols, but the military have a different approach. They are working on the preventive side through the use of force. We are also working on preventive, but through different approaches, awareness raising, social cohesion, rehabilitation, social support, assistance in terms of soft and hard. We do face a lot of challenges and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, the humanitarian actors are quite vulnerable. They are also kind of (…), the community they do not trust CSOs because they see them as agents of some foreigners. And the military are also not satisfied with humanitarian actors, they think they are involved in corrupt activities and anti-state. But the story is not that. They are seeing it from their own perspective.' (Interview Participant #42, Senior CSO Representative)*

The results show that on the ground, particularly at the level of implementation, it is more *cooperation* (informal agreement) and far less *coordination* (formal agreement) taking place between agencies. The military is assisting civilian actors, including NGOs, in resource allocation and development activities in insecure regions and trust relations and routinised interactions might develop over time. This represents a significant shift in civil-military relations in comparison with the Musharraf era, when this type of cooperation was less conceivable or only conceivable during time of major crises and natural catastrophes.

The ideological shifts in the military institution were also emphasised by the military's change in its positionality vis-à-vis democratic processes. Through radical changes in its organisational structure and strategic vision, the way in which these dynamics take place is explained in detail in the next sub-section.

4.3 The Military Institution and Democratic Processes

This sub-section provides empirical evidence for processes of change and initial transformation in military's strategic and doctrinal preferences from t_1 to t_2. Further results which corroborate earlier findings presented in this dissertation are the respondents' perceptions of the military's acquiescence and to a certain extend quasi support of democratisation processes in several ways: a. formal acknowledgement of the civilian government, with which the military is engaged in a power-sharing relation (although the balance is inclined towards the men in uniform); b. the military provides a stable environment in which democratic processes can develop, by eliminating security risks (in particular military respondents display this view); c. allowing greater freedom of expression (unpromptedly mentioned by most respondents).

First, through the acquiescence of multi-party elections, the military is perceived to show support for civilian institutions and structures in government despite the lack of a complete transfer of power from military to civilians. Civil-military relations post-Musharraf can be conceptualised as an asymmetric power-sharing mechanism, in which the civilian institutions have formal political power and the military maintains an informal veto on issues notably related to security, defence and foreign policy. "There were three military coups in Pakistan, but this is the first time when the military is supporting the democratic process", claimed one respondent (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative) in relation to several occasions on which the military refrained from staging a *coup*. "There was one incident in which it was very likely that military would intervene, but major political parties stood together against this scenario" (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative), said the respondent, outlining the increasing stability of civilian structures. Becoming aware of the shortcomings of its strategy, the military has started to acknowledge its undemocratic history, and began to engage with it, claimed one senior military representative. The military would limit to

taking (partial) localised control only in the case of a major security crisis, e.g. after a terrorist attack – assuming control is usually linked to security operations in a region, as in FATA, where the military has most of the agencies under its control. Civil-military consultations got more frequent after 2008. The National Security Council was re-instituted in 2013 and serves since then as a platform for consultations and discussion between government and military on matters related to security, counterterrorism, defence and foreign policy. This consultation mechanism was perceived by several respondents as a tangible evolution from a monolithic military entity with authoritarian tendencies to an actor operating within a democratic structure.

Some respondents predicated that the military closely 'monitors' civilian institutions and puts pressure on them to tackle corruption, improve governance and deliver tangible results, which could lead us to infer a role of the military almost similar to a powerful opposition. The caveat here is that simultaneously, the military continues to seek to maintain the maximum degree of influence in politics and foreign relations possible. How this *sui generis* power-relationship looks like in reality is explained by one respondent: in the current "power-sharing" model of governance, the military "wants to have the key decision-making" (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative), i.e. on security and defence matters and foreign policy, but "they try to have it via the democratic regime". Many respondents are of the opinion that the democratic nature of the current 'power-sharing'/consultation model of civil-military relations and military's apparent democratic attitudes might be only a façade. The current military strategy is "fear of *coup* instead of *coup* itself", considers one participant in the study (Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative). The removal of two high-level government officials at the request of the Pakistan Army over the leak in the media of the information that the civilian government criticised (during a closed meeting) the military's support for terrorists, shows that the military can still have the upper hand in governance, if they want. At the same time, the military faces a lot of criticism because of their previous support for terrorism – which happened in conjunction with US interests in the region – and the ramifications of that support for the current security context in Pakistan. Some respondents regarded the period from 2014 to 2017 as a soft *coup*, "because was not complete takeover, but there were military courts and death penalty" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). "The military has figured out that they no longer need to be in power, in the government, they need to

be in the control of governance" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). This resembles to a great extent what Hamza Alavi (1990: 53) described as "a military philosophy of power and responsibility" and he very suggestively portrayed the military thinking in Pakistan: "As long as we [the military] have the power, let them [the civilians] carry the responsibility". This doctrine seems to have been pursued already since the conception of Pakistan, when the Pakistani military had a high stake and motivation to overtake power, while being in the same time preoccupied with finding new and innovative ways to strengthen their legitimacy. While inviting the civilians to govern has proofed to be a way to solve the "crisis of power" (ibidem) after the 1965 War with India in which Pakistan lost its eastern part (which became Bangladesh), similar strategies – acquiescence, co-existence and co-evolution with civilian governments – were adopted after the military rule of Pervez Musharraf to solve crisis of legitimacy. However, another transfer of power from a civilian to another civilian government in 2018 was anticipated by most participants in the sample to strengthen civilian political institutions and the government and thus increase the ability of civilians to exert oversight and hold the military accountable. While there are different views towards the military, from those who think the military is building democracy, to those who think they have just found a better way to be in control, the evidence of this thesis on this crucial question suggests that there is both change and continuity of the military institutions, and the military attempts to normalise its existence and infrastructure while embracing a pragmatic strategy.

Second, the military was perceived to play a role in democratisation by providing internal and external security and guaranteeing the sovereignty of Pakistan, which is a central premise of democratisation (Sørensen 1996: 903; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 18) as well as of human security. The military conducts numerous nationwide projects in the development sector, such as education, healthcare and assistance for disadvantaged groups (e.g. those with disabilities) (Interviews Participant #44, Senior Military Representative), which can arguably contribute to the democratisation processes (Lipset 1994). Benefitting from a well-established infrastructure and a solid stock market share (Siddiqa 2016), the military has the capacity to complement government efforts in areas in which the government is lacking resources or capacity. At this point it needs to be specified that while corruption and poor administration amplified in the last years, one reason for which there is so little government capacity on education and health is because

the military monopolise a lot of government resources and significant commercial resources, *inter alia* from Army Welfare Trust, Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Frontier Works Organisation (Siddiqa 2007).

Results of the survey analysis revealed that the armed forces' top-three thematic priority areas of collaboration are: development, good governance and empowerment of minority (or otherwise disadvantaged) groups, suggesting again that the military might foster democratisation processes by enabling *determinants* of democracy such as development and government capacity. "In the last five years, the military has kept a good balance between security and power", claimed one respondent (Interview Participant #12, Senior CSO Representative) and has increasingly acted as a political opposition vis-à-vis the government (Interview Participant #14, Senior CSO Representative). Despite relatively low levels of rule of law and governance effectiveness (World Bank 2017), frictions between military and non-military actors "emerge when major (constitutional) provisions start to be ignored or undermined" (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative), which put pressure on the military to conform to a certain position. While civilian oversight has not been fully established and it will take many years, probably decades, until this will be the case, the balance of power – in terms of decision-making – is incrementally shifting towards the civilian authority, despite the existence of some situations in which the military seemed to be *de facto* more powerful than the civilian government. The data provided by this thesis suggest that (civilian) political institutions became increasingly stronger. For example, recently, the Senate has become very active and "works on multiple fronts", claimed one respondent (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative). *Inter alia*, the Senate played a significant role in the adoption of several pieces of legislation criminalising violence against women (The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices, Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Bill 2010 and Domestic Violence Prevention and Protection Bill) and proved legal vigilance in the case of an expired bill (Protection of Pakistan Act) (Khan 2011; Mukhtar 2016; The Express Tribune 2012). In terms of parliamentary oversight, in a rare example of civilian oversight and military accountability, in 2011, Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Lieutenant General Pasha was heard in front of the Parliament in 2011 (Dawn 2011; Reuters 2011) after Osama bin Laden operation in Abbottabad.

Third, the military was found to enable the development of a democratic environment by 'allowing' greater freedom of expression. Most respondents consider that there was a

substantial improvement post-2008: "Media is vibrant now, NGOs can highlight issues through media (…), there was a time when you could not directly blame somebody" (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative). The military "has considered space for democracy in Pakistan" (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). For example, "the army allows greater freedom of expression, there are op-eds, news articles, in *Dawn*, even critical expressions" affirmed one participant (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). Space for civil society enlarged and NGO-military interaction seems to have become easier after 2008. "[C]ivil society in this form did not exist before 2008, it was bad… Now, people have improved" (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). "[N]ow is becoming more meaningful. I am not saying that civil society is complete, but they are now contributing factors adding to the security doctrine of Pakistan" (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative). According to statistical data, Pakistan's level of freedom, measured based on civil liberties and political rights improved from 5.5 in 2008 (the last year of the Musharraf regime) to 4.5 in 2015 (1 is most free and 7 is least free) (Freedom House 2015). Similarly, the media freedom improved from 65.67 (rank 159 of 175) in 2009 to 43.24 (rank 139 of 180) in 2018 (Reporters Without Borders). Here, a disclaimer needs to be made that despite these tangible improvements, Pakistan remains overall at low levels of media freedom or freedom of expression in global comparison. Two topics are found to be under greater restrictions when it comes to freedom of expression: Baluchistan and military's position vis-à-vis terrorism-related groups. "If you talk about the right of self-determination in Baluchistan, people [will] go missing next day and their bodies [are] found third day" (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative). This was highlighted by the kidnapping and taking into custody of several establishment-critical bloggers, for a short period of time in 2017. On the other side, their liberation after actions of protest by the public against these measures emphasised the growing potential and leverage of the civil society and a certain change in both political and military culture and balance of power in civil-military relations. One significant impediment associated with the shrinking space for NGOs is related to the existence of boundaries or 'redlines' for their operations.

> *'They very clearly say that this is the redline, you cannot talk about Pakistani army's role in promoting terrorism. You cannot talk about Baluchistan, this is the redline. If you do, we will cancel the NOC. I had to cancel events. A conference in Islamabad*

> *on Baluchistan inviting people from different schools of thought. I had to cancel it, because they asked me to.' (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative)*

While pushing beyond a certain limit is anticipated to have negative repercussions on that specific organisation (Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative), the parameters of that limit as well as the type of repercussions can vary substantially, from warnings issued by the intelligence agency until closure. The 'limit' is not formally designed, instead it is found to be an estimation of the impact which NGO operations are believed to have on the military's (national security) strategy:

> *'As long as they [NGOs] are not perceived as challenging the state narrative when it comes to the security paradigm, and foreign policy and domestic security policy objectives is fine. As long as they think you challenge those narratives (…) they start to intimidate, hit back.' (Interview Participant #38, Senior CSO Representative)*

The military showed propensity towards allowing greater freedom of expression to non- and moderately-critical media reports, however, it simultaneously continues to implement intimidation procedures to deter debates which might jeopardise its position or popular support. According to recent evidence (Gallup Report 2011), the Pakistan Army is the most trusted institution in Pakistan, mainly due to its clear record on corruption and demonstrated ability to perform and efficiently deliver tangible outcomes, and this is a position which the military might envisage to maintain.

The military not only allowed greater freedom of expression, but public relations and media engagement became a major attribute for the military institutions itself after Pervez Musharraf (Baciu 2019). The military's own media and public relations wing, the ISPR was intensively used as a channel of disseminating information related to ongoing military operations and strategic issues. Daily press releases, documenting the activities of the military, notably of the army (land forces) and the navy, have been made available from 2008 onwards. ISPR was perceived as an important tool of the military, as it can offer an element of transparency for the military's position and preferences. One respondent mentioned:

> *'[W]e have ISPR, it is very much active, is in touch with media, with the other, it collects the information and disseminates it. If you see that every day, ISPR is giving these press releases, this reflects that they are relying on civil society and are becoming increasingly transparent.' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*

The ISPR constitutes a contact point for non-military institutions and organisations, including NGOs, and the only formal possibility to initiate joint projects with the military. Moreover, a more intensive engagement with civilian media outlets and broadcasters was found. On many occasions, representatives of NGOs and the think tank community, journalists and other experts are invited to ISPR briefings, meetings or seminars on topics related to security and counterterrorism (Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative). On the other side, ISPR is seen by many as an instrument of military propaganda, through which the military attempts to indoctrinate the society with a certain mindset. Recent film productions, in which an NGO female staff apparently was represented as an Indian agent (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative), have added to this belief. Overall, ISPR offers insights into the military institutions, its preference, strategy and doctrine, which constituted a big shift during the post-Musharraf period. In addition to ISPR, public engagement of the military in civilian media outlets has intensified in recent years. Particularly retired personnel are invited to talk-shows to explain security developments or military decisions. Some high-ranking retired staff are regularly contributing columns and op-eds to English-speaking newspapers in Pakistan.

In order to better understand the dynamics underpinning the institutional outcome of change and transformation, we need to have a closer look at the factors driving such processes. Processes of institutional change and transformation of the military organisation could be argued to have been influenced by three major variables (among others): domestic military leadership, interaction with civilian actors and the influence of the international environment. First, changes in the military strategy and doctrine as well as in civil-military were found to be influenced by the military leadership, i.e. the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), in power. Many participants in the study claimed that civilian military relations in general started changing during General Kayani, who had a good understanding "of the political" and said "look, keep us out" (Focus Group Discussion with Senior CSO Representatives; Participants #9a and #9b). In particular informal civil society-military interaction was more intensive during the leadership of General Kayani (2007-2013): "General Kayani held regular informal consultations with leaders of civil society and intellectuals, I was invited" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). Second, interaction with civilian organisations, including NGOs, but also with citizens – particularly in the areas under military control

or with strong military presence – could have contributed to changes in the military strategy and doctrine through processes of norms diffusion and institutional isomorphism. Third, international-level variables, such as compliance with international law regimes (e.g. UN resolutions, GSP+ arrangements), and interaction with foreign actors during training with militaries abroad or with international staff working in Pakistan, were also found to constitute sources of change in the military's doctrine, though to a less substantive extent. This is demonstrated by the failure of GSP+ arrangements between the EU and Pakistan to generate a genuine self-sustaining structure of rule of law and security. Under GSP+ arrangements, Pakistan was coerced to ratify and 'effectively implement' 27 international instruments promoting good governance, human and labour rights and environmental protection. Seven conventions were on human rights and compliance with them required the establishment of a Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR), which was consequently founded in 2008. However, from the perspective of several interview participants, the new ministry is weak and lacks efficiency.

Despite the military's tangible shift from a closed institution, focused on hard power during the Musharraf regime towards a more open and democratic institution in the transition period thereafter, the military continues to have the upper hand in politics. The Pakistan Army maintains informal vetoes over strategic policy areas. Many participants in the study considered that the military interference in politics is a 'compulsive intervention' to stimulate good governance. This phenomenon and the underpinning dynamics are discussed in the next sub-section.

4.4 Military's 'Compulsive Intervention' in Politics Due to Weak Government Capacity

Weak government capacity seems to be often perceived as generating a genuine military 'responsibility' for maintaining national security and stability. The levels of civilian oversight are found to be low to moderate, with significant variation depending on the policy area. The military's upper hand in politics and strategic decision-making are highlighted by the results in Figure 4.6 below, which illustrates the perceptions of the respondents with regards to the civil-military balance of power.



Figure 4.6 Respondents' Perception of the Most Powerful Institution in Pakistan
[Survey data; Question: "In Pakistan at the moment, do you think the balance of power is inclined more towards which actor?"; Answer: single choice; N=32]

The results emphasise that the balance of power in transitional Pakistan is perceived to be inclined towards the military, with three quarters of the respondents estimating that the military has superior power in politics compared to civilian institutions. Only 9% of the respondents consider that the balance of power is inclined towards the civilian government. Less than a quarter estimate that political power is (equally) shared between the military and the government. These results lead us to infer that the Pakistan Army maintains a *de facto* veto in decision-making processes. The military's prevalent role in politics generates significant civil-military imbalances and inhibits processes of development of civilian political structures. The balance of power was perceived to be

strongly inclined towards the military, and the role of political in decision-makers seen as secondary, particularly in areas in which the military organised security operations, such as FATA and Swat. This was also highlighted during the focus group discussion: "There are seven FATA regions and every region is administrated by a political agent, called deputy commissioner. They became simply as the second figure, irrelevant as far as operations are concerned. (…) Civilian authority was rendered irrelevant." (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). Due to their weakened position and lack of capacity, civilian leaders seem thus to have slim chances to become agents of change in processes of military transformation.

Although the military's extended role in politics is unconstitutional – as per Art. 243 of the Constitution, "the Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces", the Pakistan Army has managed to successfully stage a number of *coups* and to be *de jure* in power for more than half of Pakistan's existence as an independent state, while being *de facto* in power for even longer. Constitutionally, the Armed Forces can "act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so" (Art. 245 of the Constitution of Pakistan), however the government appears to lack the capacity to completely subordinate the army under its political control or to "politically leverage, or culturally manipulate the organization into compliance" (Grissom 2007: 920) and it often remains acquiescent of its exceeded competences. Thus, the military has significant leeway in exceeding their constitutional role, often under the pretext of security and defence of the country of internal or external security threats. The civilian institutions' lack of capacity to exert oversight is emphasised in Figure 4.7.



Figure 4.7 Estimated Level of Government's Control of the Military
[Question: "How would you describe the government's monitoring capacity over the military at the moment?" Answer: Single choice; N=32]

The level of civilian oversight over the Pakistan Army was found to be perceived as low to moderate. No respondent assessed the government capacity as having the potential of sanctioning the military when its actions do not comply with the constitution or the rule of law in general. Sanctioning capacity here refers to the government's ability to punish military disobedience and hold the military accountable or even "deprive military officers of benefits" for "military defeat, political or economic failures or human rights abuses" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49). Very few respondents estimated that the government has the ability to counterbalance the military, i.e. the civilian government attempts to restrict and control armed forces' ability to organise themselves and threaten the democratic establishment, or to monitor the military, i.e. the civilian government has mechanisms in place to 'detect' military misconduct (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 49-40). Most respondents claim that despite the formal democratic system of government, the military is playing a key role in matters related to foreign policy, security and defence and other political sectors. International disputes with Afghanistan and India – which also have proxy effects on some of the domestic conflicts – were regarded to be used by the military to justify their (informal) veto on national security issues and foreign policy. Almost three quarters of the respondents estimate the government's oversight capacity as low to moderate: either 'appeasement' – civilian state institutions set "incentives for the armed

forces to refrain from politics" (Feaver 1999: 228; Nelson 2002: 158), 'acquiescence' – civilian government "refrains from intruding on military prerogatives and the institutional autonomy of the military" (Huntington 1995: 14; Trinkunas 2005: 10; Fuentes 2000: 119), or 'compulsive intervention' – limited efficiency of government institutions offers a window of opportunity (and necessity) for the military to intervene in governance issues (Mirza 2015). Only 10% of the respondents estimate the level of control exerted by civilian institutions over the military as 'political socialisation', i.e. the civilian government has strategies in place to "strengthen the acceptance of civilian control by transforming the professional norms and mindset of the military officer corps through political education, reforms of officer training programs" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 50; Larson 1974; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006). The lack of civilian oversight can be owed to military's rejection of government monitoring on one side and governments' and society's lack of capacity to monitor on the other side, as one respondent explains:

> *'The civil society has almost no control over military, in Pakistan the military is a state within the state, and they don't accept any civilian government monitoring. The civilian state when possible follows the policy of appeasement. The civilian government refrains from intruding on military, not because they lack will but because they lack the power to do so.' (Anonymous CSO participant in the survey)*

Lack of political engagement, management and good government often impedes civilian institutions from exerting civilian control and thus open the way for the military's 'compulsive' interference in politics. "There is lack of political will, capacity and massive corruption" claimed one civil society respondent in the anonymous survey. The deficient capacity of civilian political institutions to consolidate the rule of law, control corruption and conduct good policy, which would benefit the people, is illustrated in Figure 4.8, which is based on data from the World Bank:



Figure 4.8 Corruption, Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness in Pakistan (1996-2017)
[World Bank data; Author's own illustration]

In 2016, the government capacity to control corruption was lower than the levels in 2003 (see blue line in Figure 4.8). The rule of law dropped significantly in the year 2000, shortly after the transfer of power from Pervez Musharraf to civilians; the period of civilian government which followed was characterised by slight improvements, while the overall value continued to remain negative (ca. -0.7) in 2017 (see redline in Figure 4.8). Government effectiveness started to drop substantially from 2006 onwards and started to slightly improve again from 2013 (see light green line in Figure 4.8). The inability of the civilian institutions to establish the rule of law and maintain order and security seemed to have opened a vacuum which was filled by the military, and this had more or less the support of the society. As a formal overtake of power, i.e. *coup d'état*, would not be acceptable to the Pakistani elite or society, the military adopted approaches which can reflect the changes in the political culture as result of a rapidly growing middle class and an emerging specialised elite.

Thus, despite tangible changes in the military institution, the processes of institutional change exhibited inconsistencies and discontinuities, showing thus a pattern of an incomplete or hybrid transformation, in which elements of the old institutional structure and strategy co-exist with modern strategic and operational approaches. These dynamics are explained in detail below.

4.5 Asymmetric and Incomplete Transformation

While the results provided in this chapter showed that most respondents believed that there was a tangible withdrawal of the military from civilian affairs after 2008, the military was found to follow a trajectory of incomplete institutional change and transformation. This is suggested by military's uncertain disengagement from a 'good/bad Taliban' policy and deep-rooted (undemocratic) elements in the military organisational and decision-making structure.

First, despite several effective counterterrorism and counter-crime operations, the sincerity and credibility of military's counterterrorism strategy seems to remain uncertain. Confirmatory evidence was found for the military's shift from the 'good versus bad Taliban' policy (which was previously publicly acknowledged by high-level military officers), but simultaneously, a significant variation vis-à-vis this policy in military's actions in real life politics. There was a generalised opinion that the military has adopted a robust, indiscriminate approach to eradicate terrorism and militancy after the resurgence of large-scale terrorist attacks after 2014, but data of this research also confirmed the military's support for Jamaat-ud-Da'wah (JuD) (Interview Participants #19 and #44, Senior Military Representatives), a group formally registered and operating as a charity society (NGO) but known to be linked to the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). This has raised doubts about the sincerity of the military's approach to prevent home-grown terrorism but rather its utilisation as a foreign policy instrument vis-à-vis India or Afghanistan. Under the National Action Plan on security and counterterrorism, adopted after the Taliban attack on a Peshawar school in 2014, the military claimed to indiscriminately fight against terrorism and was thus presumed to have detached from its previous (publicly acknowledged) approach differentiating between 'good Taliban' and 'bad Taliban'. Many respondents pointed out that the Pakistan Army is not always pro-peace, and its commitments to indiscriminate counterterrorism remain fluctuant. The credibility of the armed forces' strategy is found to be impaired by the contradictory actions at operational level. For example, while the military took action against the JuD leader (Roggio 2017; Zahr-e-Malik 2014) under EU and US pressure, the data also showed the military's continued support for JuD activists operating in Baluchistan, KP or other 'restricted' or sensitive areas exposed to higher risks of recruitment and radicalisation. This antithesis reflects the military's heterogeneous position on the issue of security and terrorism. In addition, the Pakistan

Army was claimed to be responsible of numerous enforced disappearances, in particular in Baluchistan (Human Rights Watch 2011; Malik 2014; Siddiqui 2017). Increased transparency and access to independent commissions to monitor and investigate the human rights situation could shed light on these issues and perhaps increase the international trust deficit in the armed forces, but such mechanisms are not yet institutionalised.

The continuous necessity of security operations to maintain a secure and (relatively) stable environment highlights the weakness and failure of the approach to be sustainable. This was started to be questioned by more and more people in Pakistan. One senior NGO respondent was of the opinion that:

> *'[The] Army's approach is reproducing their existence while failing to be sustainable. I do not know how sustainable these operations have really been. If peace is going to be held as for so long as a man in uniform is standing in front of them (...) I do not know how successful that will be. (…) If human rights would be respected during security operations of the military we would not question that much (…) but there seems to be a general consciousness that is absolutely opposed to the idea of law and rule of law and (b) to the idea of being accountable to anyone. (…) We don't want them to be accountable to NGOs, but to their own mechanisms.' (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative)*

The perceived continuous military assertion of power and control can significantly inhibit the development of civilian political institutional structures. Particularly in conflict-affected areas, e.g. in FATA, structures of the civilian institutions have been largely undermined since the beginning of the counterinsurgency operation. Many believe that, due to its longstanding tradition in governance, the military "sees itself as the real guardian of this territory called Pakistan" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). As a result, this is likely to obstruct the process of transition from the traditional military vision and school of thought to new ones.

The dynamics of incomplete transformation were arguably also embodied in the adoption of the NAP, which was found to have become a prototype of civil-military engagement and joint decision-making for the Ministry of Interior and other security-relevant institutions after 2014, and which allowed the military to maintain actual control while creating the appearance of civilian oversight. The military's support for the NAP has been immensely acknowledged by the civil society as a shift towards an indiscriminate

counterterrorism approach. However, the NAP also emphasised the limitations of the military institution to act as a democratiser or democratic actor in a highly insecure and instable environment such as Pakistan. Criticism was exerted with regards to the asymmetric implementation of the different dimensions. In particular, there was lack of clarity towards the strategy on the social dimension of the NAP. At the request of several NGOs, a NAP on human rights was also adopted, with the objective of protecting human rights during the implementation of the NAP on counterterrorism (Interview Participant #38, Senior CSO Representative). Nonetheless, this aspect did not receive much attention during the announcement of the NAP or the implementation stage and it was overshadowed by the death sentence and the military courts at the enforcement level. Another weak point of the NAP was related to the assessment of the implementation progress and transparency. One respondent suggestively claimed that: "The biggest flaw in that design is that it is not designed in one integrated manner. This is the project, you group a number of actions, you do assign a person to implement and monitor, you design project outputs and results. Nothing is there." (Interview Participant #10, Senior CSO Representative). This view outlines the perception that, despite the involvement of various stakeholders, ranging from political institutions, to civil society representatives, including NGOs and think tanks, during the drafting and at various implementation stages, there are many opinions that the decision-making about the outputs is not a collective one, but that, instead, the vision of the military institution prevails: "One man is heading all committees" (Interview Participant #10, Senior CSO Representative).

Second, linked to the dynamic described above, deep-rooted traditional elements of military mentality, vision and organisational structure are found to constitute some impediments towards the modernisation of the military institution. "There is still this cocoon decision-making. One person sitting in the room, not much information around him, his will is implemented across the border" (Focus Group Discussion with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives). This once more highlights the critical importance of *leadership* as an intervening variable in processes of institutional change and transformation on one side and the asymmetric dynamic of change at intra-organisational level on the other side. The military lacks robust intra-organisational accountability or checks-and-balance mechanisms, and this can expose the organisation to various sources of instability. Depending on the constellation of exogenous and endogenous variables to which the institutional structures on one side and the military

personnel on the other side are exposed, processes of change can be performed quite differently and vary in magnitude and impact. For example, the military personnel which had extensive interaction with internationals or benefitted from training abroad (e.g. with other armies or in civilian frameworks) might have different attitudes towards institutional change and democratisation than military staff who did not benefit of such training or interaction. As a result of these complex and uncontrollable dynamics, the processes of change and transformation will come across relatively heterogeneous, inconsistent, asymmetric or even in form of contradictory processes of military adaptation.

4.6 Conclusion

Under the demand of a new strategic environment post-Musharraf, the military was widely perceived by participants in this research to have pursued processes of strategic adaptation at both doctrinal and operational level. At doctrinal and policy level, the military abandoned autocratic forms of government by formally refraining from overtaking political power and has, at times, integrated preventive and more democratic dimensions of peace and security, such as disarmament, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, which are advocated by comprehensive security models, in their operations. Hybrid processes of governance (Luckham and Kirk 2013; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011), underpinned by 'normative pluralism', were identified by many respondents as having taken place in the form of (informal and asymmetric) power-sharing mechanisms with civilian institutions, with the military maintaining an informal veto in governance, particularly on security, defence and foreign policy. Many but not all respondents articulated a view that the military's role as a quasi-political opposition put pressure on the government to deliver good governance and advance the rule of law and the justice sector. The military was found to engage in hybrid interactions with civil society, academia and media, in the form of cooperation (predominantly), but also collaboration and coordination (rather rare). According to comprehensive models of peace and security discussed in the theoretical framework of this dissertation, multi-agency interaction can provide a framework for change of security institutions, the actors involved and the corresponding dynamics. Multiple "contextual dynamics of negotiation, co-optation, domination, resistance assimilation and coexistence" (Visoka 2017: 308)

between military and non-military actors, including NGOs, were argued to stimulate bottom-up processes of military change and transformation.

The findings from interviews, survey responses and focus group discussion showed that, following the end of the period of direct military rule, the military were perceived to have adopted a modern institutional and organisational design by, for example, pursuing an active public relations wing in the form of ISPR, whereby military officers, active or retired were found to participate in public engagement via media analysis or activities organised by civilians, such as research and conferences. The military were believed to have had a positive contribution to transition processes by supporting (or at least permitting) multi-party elections, enabling a secure environment where democratic processes can develop and allowing greater freedom of expression, including of some more critical opinions. At operational level, the military entered partnerships with non-military actors, such as CSOs, showing preferences for pluralistic approaches to security that encompass multiple agencies. The military engaged in hybrid projects with organisations at grassroots level in some de-radicalisation and development programmes and involved civil society actors, think tanks and stakeholders from provincial and federal level in the consultations for drafting the NAP after the 2014 terrorist attack in Peshawar.

The transition of the military to new functions was believed to constitute a major driver of institutional change of the organisation of the Pakistan Army, although it showed only low ability to adapt to the new functions in an adequate manner. In addition, some of the 'new' military functions outlined in the literature (Bruneau and Matei 2008: 2017; Oliveira 2010: 54), discussed in the theoretical framework of this dissertation, such as contributing to human development and security through activities of de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and acquiescence of the electoral process and civilian institutions, the Pakistan Army was also found to play the function of political entrepreneur. This was highlighted by the military's role in initiating, designing and implementing the NAP as well as its role as a quasi-political opposition or "pressure group" (Janowitz 1960: 343). However, in both roles, the military demonstrated only limited ability to evince full democratic adaptation. In the case of the NAP, Pakistan's defence forces failed to make sufficient progress on the social and human rights dimension, with the NAP being significantly overshadowed by the re-introduction of the death sentence and the role of military courts at the enforcement level. In acting like a

political opposition, the military could not and indeed did not succeed in performing this role in a fully democratised manner, as the incident which had as a result the ousting of two cabinet members subsequent to a leak in the press, outlined. This incident showed that the military continued to dominate civilian political institutions and has not fully renounced to autocratic tendencies. Apart of its lack of success in acting like a fully democratic political entrepreneur, the military also showed gaps in some other democratising functions, such as enabling greater freedom of expression. While most of the respondents acknowledged the greater freedom of opinion post-Musharraf, including of more critical voices against security approaches or military doctrine, this openness was not always consequently pursued. The kidnapping and arrest in 2017 of several bloggers who were particularly critical to the establishment showed that the military institution continued to have difficulties in perseveringly acting like a democratic military. While the bloggers were released after immense pressure from the public opinion and society, the incident highlighted that non-democratic, even autocratic tendencies continue to persist in the Pakistan Army. Such deep-rooted tendencies make the process of democratic transformation asymmetric and incomplete.

Weak government capacity and low performance of civilian political institutions were found to hamper greater democratisation of the military. Despite widespread perception of a democratic shift within the Pakistan military, the balance of power remains inclined towards the military, which continues to be seen as the most powerful institution in Pakistan. The civilian government does not have mechanisms in place to 'detect' or sanction military misconduct or power abuse. Most of the time, the government is 'acquiescent' of the military behaviour. Moreover, the government does not have a system of "incentives for the armed forces to refrain from politics" (Feaver 1999: 228; Nelson 2002: 158) or any means of "transforming the professional norms and mindset of the military officers corps through political education, reforms or officer training programs" (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 50). The civilian leadership and decision-makers lack the capacity to initiate processes of effective military oversight and incline the balance of power in their direction.

It is uncertain to what extent the processes of military change are owed to norm diffusion and institutional isomorphism in the framework of hybrid multi-agency interactions with civilian actors. This is because these interactions continue to be mainly dominated by the military, which is in control of the framework of interaction. The difficulty of most NGOs

to obtain permission to operate or obtain the NOC shows that the terrain for NGOs in Pakistan continues to remain difficult. Though not formally intended to this purpose, the NOC can be used as a mechanism of selection of the NGOs with which the military wants to operate. This selection can serve as a 'shield' for the military to not be exposed to norms which they do not want to be exposed to, due to anticipated adverse effects or risks for the military organisation. The military's cooperation with actors of change is expected to be rather met with resistance by the military institution, which is largely considered to be "intrinsically inflexible, prone to stagnation, and fearful of change" (Grissom 2007: 919). The military's "institutional resistance" (IISS 2001: 24) can be demonstrated by its choices to interact and cooperate with some CSOs, while preventing interaction and even operation of others. The procedures to prevent several activists and organisations from operating (which are highlighted in detail in the next chapter) might reveal the military's intentions of keeping under control agents or forces to which the military does not want to be exposed to, or agents/forces which could change the environment in a manner which would imperil the military. It is thus the military's control over the means of selection of the actors which come into interaction with its organisation or which influence the environment in which the military operates, which does not allow the hypothesis of the norm diffusion via interaction with civilians and civil-military relations as a source of military change (Posen 1984) to be fully confirmed.

Military leadership was perceived to have significant leverage on processes of military change and transformation. Especially under the leadership of General Kayani as COAS, the Pakistan Army was found to display new visions, highlighted by an intensification of civil-military relations and preferences to remain outside processes of governance. This was affirmed by several interview participants who revealed that General Kayani thought that the military should be kept out of governance issues and that during Kayani the military policy was less India-centric (Focus Group Interview with Participants #9a and #9b, Senior CSO Representatives; Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative), despite Kayani's diminished popularity due to the CIA operation in Abbottabad. This piece of evidence provided thus corroboratory support for Grissom's (2007) claim of interservice politics as a source of military change (Grissom 2007). According to the intraservice model, senior leaders can "imagine a new 'theory of victory' then leverage the internal politics of their service to put the new theory into practice" (Grissom 2007: 920). However, such a vision might be quickly replaced by

another vision, as soon as the COAS position is taken by another leader. Military vision and doctrine can thus vary in function of the military leadership. Moreover, the implementation of the leader's vision across the military bureaucracy can be a very heterogeneous and asymmetric process, considering the size of the organisation. Structural- and individual-level variables, such as the volatility of the operational environment, contextual factors or the officers' individual attributes can intervene to different extents during processes of implementation of a leader's vision, resulting in hybrid processes of institutional change and transformation.

This chapter discussed the nature of military change in Pakistan after the autocratic regime of General Pervez Musharraf. The results showed that the military were perceived by the great majority of respondents to have undergone a significant process of transformation, evident from profound changes in military strategy, change in civil-military relations, preferences for electoral democracy as a form of government as well as for more democratic security approaches. There was a tangible transfer of power to civilian institutions post-2009. The processes of military change and transformation were however seen by respondents as incomplete, demonstrated mainly by the military continued dominance and autocratic tendencies on some occasions, as well as discontinuities in the decision-making structure at leadership and bureaucratic level. An interesting finding from this chapter was that civil-military relations and CSO-military relations in particular, were found to have an uncertain impact on military change. This is the more surprising as we consider that Pakistan was among top-ten recipients of net ODA between 2002-2018, and large amounts of development assistance, from both the EU and US, occurs via NGOs. To better understand why NGOs are considered to have an uncertain impact on processes of military democratisation and change, the next chapter discusses the impact of NGOs and think tanks on processes of democratic institutional change.

5 The Impact of Civil Society Organisations on Democratic Reforms of Security and Defence Institutions and Governance

International comprehensive approaches to democratic peace and security and civilian oversight imply the strategic integration of all relevant players and stakeholders, including civil society associations, into the decision- and policy-making process. The bottom-up creation of democratic normative spaces (Schirch 2011) premises pluralistic peace and security designs, based on institutional cooperation, multilateral decision-making, inclusiveness, interdependence and power-sharing mechanisms (Linklater 1996: 77). The reform of security institutions (via SSR approaches) in developing, fragile or otherwise transitional states require not only building democratic power (instruments) but also checking power (accountability) (van Veen and van den Boogaard 2016: 307), to which CSOs are expected to contribute. Networks, multi-actor communication and expert debate represent prerequisites of comprehensive approaches to security, to which SSR – as key approach of the European Global Strategy for reforming security in fragile and insecure states – subscribes (Baciu 2017).

Civil society associations constitute significant types of actors in fragile and insecure societies, taken into consideration their utility in peace programmes in insecure states post-Cold-War and their assumed role in 'changing preferences' (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 7) of key players as well as in the formation of 'hybrid orders' and 'infrastructures' of security governance (Richmond 2016; Luckham and Kirk 2013; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011; Stepputat 2018). The estimated number of CSOs in Pakistan in 2010 was approx. 60,000-70,000 and 20% of the total financial assistance to Pakistan between 2007 and 2013 occurred via CSOs/ICSOs.

Theories presented in the conceptual framework chapter of this thesis argued that CSOs can advance SSR and 'comprehensive security' approaches through strengthening accountability and governance capacity by having a positive and emancipatory impact on peace and security in general, input legitimacy (citizens participation), output legitimacy (quality of political outcomes), strengthening accountability and 'elite pacting' processes, i.e. controlled transfer of power and authority from the military to

civilian actors. The insights presented in this chapter are directly related to the second research question in this dissertation, which seeks to determine the perceptions of key informants, including civil society itself, of the impact of non-state actors on democratic reform of security institutions in insecure states.

5.1 CSOs' Perceived Mixed or Weak Impact on Peace and Security

The impact of civil society associations on advancing progressive reforms of peace and security was perceived as significantly less positive than the international literature suggests. A common view among the study participants (representatives of academia, government, media and military) was that CSOs' impact on peace and security in Pakistan is rather mixed, see Figure 5.1:



Figure 5.1 Civil Society Actors' Perceived Impact
Data based on survey and interview responses (N=21) [Question: "How do you perceive the impact of CSOs – think tanks, domestic and international non-governmental/civil society associations, et cetera – in Pakistan?"]

More than 80% of the military respondents (mainly retired personnel), academia, government and media representatives evaluated the impact of CSOs as mixed (sometimes positive, sometimes negative) or weak. It is also interesting that the military and other respondents had very similar perceptions, with the military being marginally

more positive and none of the non-military respondents characterising CSO work as 'mainly positive'. There was a generalised perception that CSOs often lack a demand-driven approach and work in a superficial manner, and predominantly on issues which would not jeopardise their projects, personnel or funding. CSOs were expected by respondents to perform with higher levels of commitment, dedication and creativity. This finding can be exemplified by several excerpts from the expert interviews:

- *'The perception is that these [CSOs] are created to consume funding, not do serious work.' (Interview Participant #39, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'CSOs should identity substantive, not cosmetic areas (…). If bilateralism in Kashmir issue failed, explore trilateralism (...) if Kashmir has failed, look at water issues, Siachen', says one academician in relation to CSOs' work towards India-Pakistan dispute.' (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'Some of them are doing an excellent job, but some support extremists or radicals and this phenomenon is not in isolation (…); there is an international support, a regional support for this. (Interview Participant #15, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'(…) for me it seems that civil society, specifically CSOs are not even interested to play such roles. And they are scared. I have seen so many NGOs, whenever is an area, like FATA and KPK, where you need to apply for the NOC. Most of the CSOs are not even interested to implement projects there. Because they know that if they apply for NOC there will be investigations and God knows.' (Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative)*
- *'A large number of CSOs, large number, the majority, are essentially interested in getting money from somewhere, finding a place for them to sit. A building, a car and that becomes their way of living. That is their means of living.' (Interview Participant #46, Senior Military Representative)*

First, some of the respondents seem to suggest that there is a generalised opinion that many CSOs/NGOs are more interested in getting funding than in having a positive impact. For example, they are criticised for not engaging in key substantive areas which could enable political progress or for not looking for alternative approaches and channels to overcome blockades (such as in the India-Pakistan dispute). Some CSOs were perceived as promoting terrorism and radicalisation, with regional or international support, e.g. from India or Saudi Arabia. In an attempt to enhance control of the INGOs'

impact, the Government of Pakistan adopted the notification No. 6/34/2015-PE-III in October 2015, which updated its policy for regulation of INGOs/ICSOs in Pakistan. While the government claimed that it "acknowledges the diverse contributions of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in the socio-economic development of Pakistan, through means such as awareness-raising, social-mobilization, infrastructure-development, service delivery, training, research and advocacy" and recognises the "need for collaboration with the INGOs by the Government as well as by the private sector", it sets out strict rules to enhance monitoring, scrutiny and transparency of the funding and impact of INGOs (Government of Pakistan 2015). Thus, all INGOs need to register online via the Website of the Ministry of Interior, which publishes the list of approved INGOs. Most recently, international governments and organisations, including the EU, have expresses concern over the closure of 18 INGOs in late 2018 over their alleged failure to comply with the registration process (Ahmed 2018). INGOs which fail to receive approval for operating in Pakistan can reapply after six months. In general, reports in the media about non-governmental organisations' impact and the alleged link of the INGO Save the Children to the killing of Osama bin Laden have enhanced the generalised negative perception towards internationally-funded civil society associations.

Second, an interesting result is the perception by several respondents (from academia, media, military and one critical NGO representative) that CSOs purposely avoid conducting difficult operations, e.g. in Pakistan's conflict zones that require special permission in the form of NOC from the Ministry of Interior. CSOs were believed to intentionally avoid operating in sensitive areas (e.g. KP, FATA, Baluchistan) (Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative), in order to minimise bureaucratic efforts and the hazard of exposing themselves to the risk of coming under the surveillance of intelligence institutions. This would equate with the assumption often made in the specialist literature that CSOs behave as rational market actors and are hesitant to enter less "profitable markets" or conduct "unprofitable services" (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004: 135). High security risks, rejection from conservative communities, as well as institutional barriers, such as the NOC, would be expected to make activities in highly sensitive areas such as KP, FATA and Baluchistan rather unattractive and prevent CSOs from conducting projects in these regions. However, the findings of this research show that this is not the case, as Figure 5.2 suggests.



12Figure 5.2 Distribution of CSOs' Area of Operation
(N=25) [Question: "Where is your organisation conducting activities?"; Multiple choice answer]

Over half of the organisations in the analysed sample conduct operations in areas of high risk, with conservative societies and which require an operational NOC, such as KP, FATA and Baluchistan. One possible explanation for this rather surprising finding is the availability of funds for projects in those instable areas. While lower contract competition and funding availability might explain CSOs' choice for these regions, the risk associated with projects in these areas is nonetheless likely to exceed the benefits. Thus, the arguments in the literature around the marketisation of CSOs are only partially confirmed, as while CSOs do apply strategies and principles of the market economy, these are rather aimed at project stability and to a lesser extent to profit-maximisation. Results in Figure 5.2 thus contrast the perception that CSOs purposely opt for conducting less difficult operations.

Third, the findings suggest that a major source of distrust in the CSOs' work is their *impact*. Many respondents are of the opinion that civil society organisations have little substantive impact and the organisations themselves are believed to be responsible for this failure:

- *'[N]o major tangible outcomes; (...) They can influence political processes, but when it comes to conflict...it depends on the topic. (...) CSOs can change narrative,*

but cannot relax visa. They cannot resolve water issue. Things that are at the level of government. They can only lobby, advocate.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)

- *'[A]s far as the peace issues are concerned, or counterterrorism, the main player is the military, not civil government. How much the civil society have influenced them? Very little.' (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative)*
- *'The civil society's impact on collaboration with the government in policy, in defining the problem, in finding a solution and in raising the problem at institutional level, I think the role of civil society is marginally.' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'In many cases, these local CSOs have been funded by the UN system and others like USAID and others. All of their impact has been significant but no extensive. (...) because CSOs impact is genuinely limited. (...) In times of natural or other disasters, the societies fill the gap that is always there because of underperforming state machinery. (...) CSOs and their response can always be temporarily.' (Interview Participant #19, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'For the last 15 years, billions of dollars have been invested in Pakistan and there is zero impact.' (Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative)*
- *'[I]nitial excitement about CSOs is reducing, (...) people are becoming suspicious, because they have agendas.' (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'[T]he impact of civil society in Pakistan has not been very strong.' (Interview Participant #21, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'I am not blaming military (...), because we have a lot of weaknesses in our structure. We have not created that impact, to show that we are a civil society.' (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'Democratisation process (...), they are coming to big hotels and inviting a few people and conducting workshops and get this check, activity done! But there is no big impact. (...) NGO impact on counterterrorism, conflict resolution, peacebuilding is minimal, minor (...) Many CSOs work for money.' (Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative)*

- *The impact is limited because is not linked to real concerns. They work just for reputation. For examples, their activities are held in five-star hotels (Paraphrased) (Interview Participant #48, Senior Military Representative)*

But Pakistan is a transitional state and non-governmental organisations are in the phase of finding their feet, just like the society and state institutions. The emergence of the NGO sector as a player in the public decision-making is quite new in Pakistan and their existence first felt after 9/11 and the intensification of EU-Pakistan strategic partnership after 2007. CSOs' weak capacity is inextricably linked to their short history and experience, as several respondents explained:

- *'NGO impact is fragile, is not well established, because CSOs have a long way to go (…) as far as the practical approach is concerned, the results are not coming.' (Interview Participant #29, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'There is increased NGO impact post-Musharraf; (…) civil society became more aware about its rights and media and courts. They have the courage to highlight or demonstrate the negativity of the armed forces' power.' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'[The role of CSOs in Pakistan] is limited, because Pakistan is in transition.' (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'[C]ivil society is still in the process of finding its feet (…) It has continued to develop and strengthen itself (...) in the last 10-15 years (…). Civil society is making its presence felt, especially on issues related to humanitarian issues, to the gender and certain aspects which impact poverty issues.' (Interview Participant #21, Senior Military Representative)*

Civil society organisations, most particularly (research) think tanks, as actors assisting in the process of security governance and decision-making "is a quite new phenomenon" in Pakistan related one expert (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative). Building capacity and creating a framework in which local actors and CSOs can provide "mature input" (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative) and have a positive impact in terms of conflict transformation, management and resolution, will require some time. While there are many intellectuals and specialists in Pakistan, intellectual capital is currently in the process of transformation (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative).

Fourth, another significant finding in relations to non-state actors' impact on democratic reforms in the security domain is the association made by several respondents between their impact and the *foreign sources of founding*. Foreign sources of funding were associated with reliance on Western paradigms and schools of thought, which was found to represent a source of opposition towards CSOs. Reliance on Western knowledge of conflict and peace studies is often preventing positive effects on the ground, believes one respondent: "Until that material is not published and disseminated in local language, it will not have an impact" (Interview Participant #29, Senior Academia Representative). "[B]orrowing the foreign or European perspective, terminology" can generate friction between the 'imported' values and local contexts: it might be difficult "for the security institutions to conceive their own problems in this framework" (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative). In particular at Track 3 level, specific knowledge and expertise are required to work on the different categories of conflicts in Pakistan, i.e. sectarian, ethnic and religious.

Friction "between the exporters and importers" of hybrid peace approaches was anticipated by specialist literature (Goodhand 2013: 288; Millar *et al.* 2013) to occur in transitional and fragile societies. The results show that processes of friction between CSOs and the military on one side and between CSOs and polity and society on the other side can take the form of disagreement, which could impede cooperation and even dialogue. Disagreement and friction can be reduced during processes of hybrid interaction (which will be explored in the next chapter) and if not addressed, can become a source of resentments and conflict. The resentments from both state institutions as well as society towards CSOs are related to the normative foundations of their operative framework, considered to be based on (Western-propagated) liberal and secular values. This can easily lead to sweeping generalisations about their scope and impact, which are often misrepresented in the media, particularly Urdu media, and transmitted as such to local communities. Particularly foreign funded organisations, which aim at changing social norms and values are often met with reluctance by both the military and local communities.

> *'There are several organisations, for which people have reservations, that whatever they are doing, they are not really contributing to the betterment of the people. Because they are spreading Western culture. They are spreading some alien culture which perhaps does not belong to this area. (…) Things may be very important for*

> *them and they may think that this is something which should be followed by every society. But that might not be welcomed here.' (Interview Participant #44, Senior Military Representative)*

Non-governmental organisations' work and impact are perceived as interferences by Western policy makers, with unknown (and possibly exploitive) objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan, and possibly meddling with its social values (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative). Misperceptions about their role and impact can become an impediment for such associations in establishing a positive and constructive dialogue with the military, polity and society.

Although CSOs' and INGOs' substantive impact on the ground has been little assessed, working in cooperation with them was found to have a genuinely negative connotation, "people consider that every NGO is linked to some sort of foreign funding" (Interview Participant #39, Senior CSO Representative). This can tremendously reduce trust in the intentions and mandate of non-state organisations, making it more difficult for them to develop dialogue and collaborative frameworks. Many respondents were of opinion that, for example, education and counter-radicalisation work, particularly at grassroots level, would be more effective if they relied on Islamic thoughts, e.g. based on Prophet Mohammed's condemnation of violence with reference to concrete verses from the Koran. Additionally, institutional support from the military and/or civilian government, particularly in sensitive domains such as child-marriage, domestic violence and blasphemy might reduce opposition towards CSOs operating in these domains. Non-ideological areas of operations, such as development and health, were found to be more likely to be supported by both communities, military and state institutions, although there have been cases in which organisations operating in these domains at Track 3 level, have also been stopped.

Fifth, both the military and society at large seemed to be of opinion that local actors have greater potential to deliver tangible results in policy areas related to development, aid and healthcare, because these are perceived to be the most stringent needs of Pakistan at the moment (apart of security issues):

- *'[M]any religious parties and CSOs which are carrying out relief efforts and capacity building at grassroots. They are more effective than these CSOs. (…) This*

is why there is support for JuD and JeI[5] so far. (…) CSOs have greater potential at grassroots mobilisation than at elite level.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)

- *'[T]hey have not solved core issues, e.g. educate poor children, health, corruption, (…) topics which are priority and allow tangible results; in good governance you cannot see results.' (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'After [the] military cleared FATA, KP and tribal areas, CSO performed some functions which would traditionally be performed by the state. (…) CSOs have provided those communities in areas with basic services, like health, food, education, some local employment training skills.' (Interview Participant #19, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'All these CSOs, which are local, provincial, national, federal could be injected new blood and asked to assist. So many people are displaced and need to be rehabilitated. The sooner they get there, the better it will be for all of us. Then comes the problem of educating them, health, facilities which are not existing. Basic facilities like roads and streets.' (Interview Participant #20, Senior Military)*
- *'There are some books which are against Christians and Hinduism, I would like that kind of late material should be abolished from our books. Why not working on this? It looks like range of activities are funding-dependent, CSOs will work on the area where are funds, which might not be the list of priorities.' (Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative)*

Operations on advocacy and transformation in the detriment of basic needs are perceived as unjustifiable to many representatives at community, government or military level. CSOs conducting activities in the areas of development, such as healthcare and education, or other basic needs sectors can be more likely to get the support and even assistance from the military, including in areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, tribal areas and Baluchistan (Interview Participants #26, Senior CSO Representative; #33 and #44, Senior Military Representatives), which appear to be hardly accessible to organisations operating in domains such as human rights or advocacy.

[5] Jamaat-ud-Da'wah is a terrorist organisation presumed to be linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba. Jamaat-e-Islami is a conservative Islamist party.

In sum, CSOs are perceived to generally have a rather mixed impact on advancing peace and security, but this result is balanced by the findings related to local actors' role in strengthening input and output legitimacy as well as diagonal accountability, presented in the following sub-sections.

5.2 Input Legitimacy

Theories of democratisation argue that non-state actors such as CSOs can play a role in democratic political change by increasing input legitimacy, i.e. citizens' participation (Zürn 2000: 183-4, Scharpf 1997). Civil society and non-profit groups could act as communication networks (Eder *et al.* 1998: 324; Habermas 1981, 1993), which through their work in one of three broad categories of action, i.e. service delivery, advocacy or education (Goel 2004: 29), can aggregate the needs and interests of the community at institutional level, exerting thus "representative or contestatory functions of social organizations outside the state" (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6). Civil society actors can foster civic and political participation (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6) at grassroots (Track 3) or middle level (Track 2) and/or transfer the preferences of specific social groups (e.g. women, ethnic groups, people from rural areas or different zones of conflict) at institutional level (Track 1.5). The more citizens are involved in a decision or contribute to a political outcome, the more legitimate an outcome/decision can be considered. Particularly in countries in which "democratic mechanisms" are not well established, civil society groups animating citizen involvement can democratise "public decision-making" (IDS 2006: 1) by enabling their participation and involvement.

This dissertation proposes to operationalise input legitimacy as non-violent (to differentiate it from 'uncivil' society) civic participation of citizens from any social group. Through mobilisation activities of various scales – ranging from smaller rallies to mass events involving the participation of thousands of citizens, CSOs can aggregate the will of the people and make it tangible for the process of decision-making.

Non-governmental organisations (mostly domestic) can contribute to the process of democratisation by providing greater input legitimacy through fostering civic participation, especially at grassroots and middle level. CSO participants in the study highlighted their contribution:

- *'(A)t micro-level, we had a madrassa project (…) it is difficult to operationalise the impact.' (Interview Participant #28, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We forced [the] government to reopen 1,000 schools (…) through advocacy in different districts (…). We formed peace committees, involving 60 women, 80 males and 600 of youth.' (Interview Participant #3, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'I can give you the example of Karachi, where we started a project with USIP. We were supposed to closely work with the police department. The purpose was to establish community-based mechanisms for dispute resolution. Because access to justice is a very important component of conflict resolution. We have a lot of spending in the justice sector. If you look to extremism, you will say that they originate in lack of justice. Government cannot do justice, you will do justice. The purpose of that project was to resolute community disputes through mediation and dialogue. If you look closely at Pakistani society, social cohesion is in-build in society. This culture is there. What terrorism means is destroying our cultural social cohesion, so it is a kind of cultural terrorism. So police department could play a great role at local level. So, there is trust between police and local communities. They would forward the cases to the mediators, instead of going to the court. This will build trust.' (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We provide legal aid to female litigate.' (Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'Local based CSOs in affected areas, they also play important roles to combat terrorism. Local based CSOs unite people, they posttheir moral and they say we (…) must eliminate terrorism. This is moral courage. They give moral courage to people to face these problems. This is very important role: facilitating.' (Interview Participant #14, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'I primarily work on CVE. I worked in Sindh and Punjab and KP. Not so much in Baluchistan, because I am not allowed to do. Internationally speaking, this is something what all donor agencies in the world are struggling with when it comes to CVE. How to measure the impact, how to measure and assess the impact? Many indicators are not accurate because of local dynamics and social conditioning is there. Is difficult to have standards parameters that clearly measure the success of the project in Washington DC as compared to Lyari in Karachi. For me, because I always work in a sort of social movement, the number of people joining me, registering online, liking me on Facebook, volunteering, is a very good*

indicator, in the last years, numerous people have joined, they have multiplied, started their own organisations sometimes, replicated our work, this was success, when it comes to monitoring a counter violence campaign, we do some survey responses. But I do not think this is very appropriate, because we only engage to them for one month, two months, one session. Afterwards, they go again to their societies. I suggest that our work should be continued by media and state. Narratives that exist and acceptable should be promoted. The people who joined has been a very indicator to me.' (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative)

- *'We have 15,000 members from all provinces. We go into public, do public mobilisation to bring them to one platform and make them realise. Important themes we embrace are: diversity, the impact of religious intolerance, Sufism. (…) Through rallies, meetings with parliamentarians, sit-ins, we emphasise the functions of state institutions; we remind them about their role of the state. We organised a festival: people from KP, Punjab, travelled together from Lahore to Karachi, from city to city to mobilise people to show unity and culture of diversity. We also organise music events, debates (…) there is an increasing number of participants.' (Interview Participant #22, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'Primary areas are KP and FATA. In FATA, we have been very, we have limited access. We work in education, inter-faith harmony and cross cutting theme of human rights and democracy and governance. (…) In Swat and Peshawar we had a project which was primarily peacebuilding and the development of formal and informal education institutions. The formal being schools and informal being various (...), we run it for about 1.5 years.' (Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative)*

Several respondents with military background acknowledged the civil society actors' contribution:

- *'There are some CSOs which can bring people together, create social cohesion.' (Interview Participant #15, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'CSOs work on issues, like (…) women. (…) Civil society keeps raising its voice.' (Interview Participant #28, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'The CSOs came to Pakistan: a bulk of them started after the earthquake. Before that, there were in the north of Pakistan. Agha Khan Foundation which does education and housing and medical. They do uplift in the areas in which are too*

> *far for the government to do too much. Agha Khan Foundation is doing tremendous work. It started after the earthquake. They did a lot of rehabilitation, supportive work. And since then, they come up as organisation very successfully. We had floods (…). I personally I feel we should revive them, inject more finance and capacity into them, they can increase the capacities. Presently, I think they are doing this for northern areas and other areas which have been cleared. Some people in Peshawar. Some people were doing this type of thing in conflict zones. People affected by the war are temporarily residing there. But they are not being financed by anybody, they are doing their own fundraising. I think, if CSOs are reenergised and reinforced and we get donors coming in, internationally, locally. (…) Strict monitoring should initially be done by the army, so that no wrong is made and the right people are held.' (Interview Participant #20, Senior Military Representative)*

These excerpts from the expert interviews indicate that respondents from different backgrounds were of opinion that CSOs can enhance input legitimacy by increasing social cohesion, interpersonal trust, eliminating root causes of non-participation (e.g. insecurity, poverty, injustice, lack of awareness or education). Through supporting disadvantaged groups, such as women, local organisations can enhance their participation to political and governance processes, which becomes thus more inclusive. One issue highlighted during the interviews was the difficulty to operationalise the impact of CSOs, e.g. in supporting citizens' political participation. Social media is used by some CSOs as a channel to reach and communicate with their target groups and this can be a modality to estimate their support.

The evidence presented lets us infer that appropriateness between organisations' approaches and society can constitute an important entry point for domestic CSOs, in particular at Track 3 level, for which social accountability and support from communities is particularly important. As one participant in this study put it: "The role of CSOs should be in cooperation with society itself" (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative). Domestic organisations could thus be anticipated to have greater acceptability at grassroots and middle level, due to their presumed greater understanding and embracement of discourses which are more compatible with the mindset of the people (Interview Participant #23, Senior CSO Representative). They might generate greater input legitimacy, as they can have the potential to mobilise citizens who would support their actions. Working with volunteers was seen as a further indicator for CSOs'

local support (Interview Participant #22, Senior CSO Representative). Engagement on a volunteer-base was perceived to increase acceptability from the community (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative). Many CSOs operating at grassroots level work with volunteers, however, attracting non-paid staff who is willing to engage in a substantive manner is generally difficult.

The pieces of evidence presented in this sub-section stimulate us to draw several important implications in relation to civil society actors' contribution to input legitimacy. Through the mobilisation and involvement of citizens in politically-related processes, non-governmental organisations can foster participation. Particularly in environments in which democratic oversight is not fully established, citizens' participation is essential for democratising the public space and decision-making. Thus, on one side, CSOs can 'unite' people and facilitate their pro-active participation, via rallies, public mobilisation or other types of deliberative events. In addition, they also fulfil functions which empower people to participate by working on the elimination of the sources of non-participation, with many organisations in the analysed sample working on cross-cutting themes of human rights, democracy, governance or access to justice for disadvantaged groups. *De facto*, this means projects and activities which increase trust, tolerance, formal and informal education, institutional development and peacebuilding. Several military respondents explicitly acknowledged the non-state actors' contribution in fostering social cohesion, development and participation, while also mentioned the need of 'strict monitoring' to ensure that there is no 'wrong doing'. Compatibility between CSOs' approaches and local mindsets and discourses might be essential to enhance domestic acceptability and thus increase CSOs' legitimacy. Measuring the impact of CSOs at grassroots level and on input legitimacy can be challenging, as it would require a more differentiated and context-sensitive estimators: 'the same set of indicators cannot be applied for a project in Washington DC and one in Lyari Karachi' (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative), as one respondent put it.

5.3 Output Legitimacy

As discussed in the theoretical part of this dissertation, theories of modern democracy argue that specialised non-governmental organisations and local actors can increase "system effectiveness or output legitimacy", i.e. the amount of "beneficial consequences"

or citizens' "utility gains" by promoting the "welfare of the constituency in question" (Scharpf 1997; Sternberg 2015: 615). Research-oriented think tanks but also academic scholars as well as other civil society associations can play a role in initiating or animating public policy debates and reforming the security sector by shifting the normative focus to human security (Cawthra 2003: 41; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309) and comprehensive security approaches while highlighting the shortcomings and side-effects of purely militaristic strategies (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309) in efficiently eliminating security risks. A conceptual understanding of democracy underpinned by output legitimacy invokes the consideration of the logic of consequentialism and value-added of decisions for the sustainable advancement of the state. For example, a preference might be democratic in the sense that was based on the choice of the majority of the people, but might be non-compliant with democratic content, e.g. human rights, which is associated with beneficial content for citizens. This definition of democracy allows ruling out that honour killings or mob violence in rural areas in Pakistan and other countries might be assessed as democratic only because the decision was deliberated by a majority. Thus, output legitimacy is considered to be "derived from the quality of the outcome" or the benefits it generates for citizens (Curry 2016). The more beneficial an outcome is, the more legitimate a political outcome/decision is. In order to overcome the difficulty to operationalise 'beneficial' (one outcome might be perceived to be beneficial for some groups, while other might consider it non-beneficial), this sub-section will focus more on the level of influence which CSOs had on improving public policy and governance outcomes/processes in fields related to human security.

Civil society organisations perceive their contribution to the improvement of political outcomes as per the following examples:

- *'[We] attempt to reach the parliament, share research inputs with them – assumed that final results reflect collective inputs; but there is no instrument to measure impact and whether inputs integrated.' (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We issued the Peshawar Declaration of Peace, at a time, we were stronger. (…) through advocacy in different districts, press conferences and a petition to Peshawar Court.' (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'I went to some session to NACTA when the CVE programme was drafted, they did not consider my recommendations. (…) I suggest that our work should be*

continued by media and state in promoting narratives that are build and are acceptable.' (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative)

- *'[S]ome bilateral projects with regional players, e.g. Afghanistan and Central Asian countries; (...) regional peace, connectivity and stability is key in these processes. (...) We do research, e.g. we research on the key drivers of radicalisation in Pakistan and draw recommendations for government and civil society. (...) One day we got a call from DG ISI saying that they adopt some of the recommendations and asking for future collaboration. So, there is a policy impact, but no mechanism to assess the impact of that policy, because several stakeholders are involved.' (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'Change can only be brought via political momentum – CSOs' role in stimulating that political momentum (...), but everything is finished when funding is finished. (...) There is impact on policy-making, via meetings in five stars hotels, with decision makers, they assist in the preparation of laws on protection of women laws, child marriage act; NGO workers are educated, have know-how.' (Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'From 2005, we work on SSR, counterterrorism, CVE and related security challenges; (...) Only 7-8 think tanks working in these areas. They help state and policy makers to map the trends and progress on the debate on security. (...) There is some contribution, including on formulating NAP, many CSOs were invited to give their inputs. In Islamabad, CSO engage in two areas which are security-relevant: 1) Counterterrorism, which is more hard security, they engage mainly with retired military personnel, police or their organisations and 2) CVE, is mainly at grassroots level.' (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative)*

These results indicate that participants with good knowledge of the sector believe that civil society actors can contribute to improving the quality of political decisions and outcomes in security-related policy areas by enabling the transfer of inputs (i.e. of own assessments or research) at policy level. Recommendations or key findings based on local assessments and measurements can be beneficial for advancing locally designed models of SSR, conflict transformation and management. Ownership of these processes and outcomes can enhance compliance (by both citizens and state institutions) and thus efficiency of democratic security governance. A few organisations were found to be involved in policy formulation processes during drafting phases. While some of the inputs they provided were sometimes considered in the final form of specific policies

(e.g. NAP), others were not. In a rare example, one organisation in the analysed sample was found to be involved in foreign policy and external security projects at regional and transnational level.

CSOs' role in generating output legitimacy, though difficult to operationalise, was perceived to be moderate by respondents from the media, academia and military, as the following interview fragments indicate:

- *'The role of CSOs' role in conflict resolution, conflict management, peacebuilding, advocacy, conflict transformation (…). Track 2 diplomacy is under way. Confidence building measures between India and Pakistan emerged as result of Track 2 activities. For example, the bus service, (…) CSOs and media played role in initiatives started by India and Pakistan. (…) Media and CSOs can influence the setting agenda; they do lobby work, conceive CBMs. (…) There is no clear study about the genealogy of political actions, but link is there.' (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'CSOs can be advocates of peace between India and Pakistan and they have been taken effort since 1970s, 1990, before Kabul war. That simply destructed this process between India and Pakistan. (…) The only solution is to build a narrative of peace via exchange of students, media, and intellectuals. (…). CSOs might have played a role, even during Musharraf – e.g. maybe they influenced Musharraf decision to go to India for negotiations or maybe they started supporting judiciary against Musharraf.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'CSOs play a constructive role in conflict resolution, conflict transformation, in context of conflict at state level, e.g. India-Pakistan, all these organisations have contributed very positively but at the level of CBMs. Civil society is a main tool for connecting these elements (…).' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'[The impact] is much more prominent in Islamabad as far as security and foreign policy issues are concerned. (…) In areas like education and gender, there is a significant impact.' (Interview Participant #21, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'CSOs work on issues, like conflict resolution, counterterrorism, upgrade laws, customs, women. (…) Civil society keeps raising its voice; those which are not associated with political parties, those independent, such as PILDAT, Youth Parliament. Other CSOs are funded with vested interests, some work for foreign intelligence, Saudi Arabia, UK, USA. There are strong lobbies, e.g. India finances*

> *CSOs in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh. Quality is not very high, but some are doing good work on children and women.' (Interview Participant #28, Senior Military Representative)*

It is generally acknowledged that Track 2 diplomacy is under way and non-state organisations had a contribution in the emergence of confidence building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, such as the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, which benefitted Kashmiri trade and families on both Indian and Pakistani side. In addition, the civil society organisations' potential and impact on building a narrative for peace, but also in promoting gender empowerment and education for children were outlined. Fears about the potential interference or espionage of some CSOs funded by regional or international powers were also expressed. Another issue highlighted was the impact of organisations working on foreign policy and security issues which is predominantly centralised and based in Islamabad, where federal governmental offices and institutions are located, while other provinces are perceived to be less represented.

Despite CSOs' visible work at policy level, many respondents perceive this has failed to have resulted in major tangible outcomes:

- *'So far, they could not make much impact, there are no major tangible outcomes. Efforts have been made to relax India-Pakistan visa, but visas not relaxed. There are some isolated exchange projects, but they did not make an impact, in particular working on the issue India-Pakistan, there are a lot of things of doubt here – CSOs are not perceived as trustful.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'In our organisation, we used to have a regular India-Pakistan convention, exchanges of a group of people (ca. 100), but has stopped, because of lack of funds. (…) did not have any impact on policy.' (Interview Participant #26, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'NGO impact is fragile, is not well established, because CSOs have a long way to go. (…). As far as the practical approach is concerned, the results are not coming.' (Interview Participant #29, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'As far as the peace issues are concerned, or counterterrorism, the main player is the military, not civil government. How much the civil society have influenced them? Very little.' (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative)*

- *'The civil society's impact on collaboration with the government in policy, in defining the problem, in finding a solution and in raising the problem at institutional level, I think the role of civil society is marginally. (…) There was increased impact after Musharraf; civil society became more aware about its rights and media and courts. They have the courage to highlight or demonstrate the negativity of the armed forces' power.' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'CSOs are developing in Pakistan; their impact is difficult to quantify. (…) In electronic and social media strong, but their impact on policymaking is unsure. (…) Initial excitement about CSOs is reducing, people are becoming suspicious, because they have agendas (…). Overall, civil society is getting more influential. (…) But they have not solved core issues, such as educate poor children, health, on corruption they had weak impact.' (Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative)*

The conflict between India and Pakistan was highlighted as one domain in which CSOs only had a limited impact, e.g. in exchanges or CBMs, but did not make substantive progress in achieving tangible measures towards settling the dispute, e.g. in the visa relaxation domain. Having an impact on security and foreign policy is often associated with having an impact on the military institution, because they are considered to be the last resort for these policy domains. The impact of civil society at institutional level is perceived to have considerably increased after Musharraf. CSOs have now more courage to pursue a critical public discourse and highlight, *inter alia*, the shortcomings of military's operations and approaches to foreign policy or internal security. The lack of trust in non-governmental organisations was highlighted as one recurrent impediment towards greater cooperation.

One significant impact of CSOs emphasised by many respondents was in awareness building:

- *'Through the awareness created, political parties were not ready to accept military intervention post-2008.' (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative)*
- *'CSOs have been successful in building public opinion. Few CSOs, e.g. HRCP, and journalists have been raising the issue of military support for Taliban openly. (…) Most CSOs and journalists are on the side of the establishment, so that they*

can operate. (…) There are taboo topics, like blasphemy, except HRCP, very few or none.' (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative)

- *'They brought a lot of awareness about human security related issues.' (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative)*

Non-state organisations were perceived to have had a tangible value-added for consolidating democratic security in several instances in which they were successful in co-opting political parties or the public opinion in signalling intolerance towards potential non-democratic developments, e.g. a military takeover.

The evidence presented leads us to the conclusion that the non-governmental organisations' role in generating output legitimacy, understood as 'beneficial consequences' or 'utility gains' for citizens, is rather moderate. Initiatives such as the Peshawar Peace Declaration or the inclusion of CSOs in processes of drafting national strategies, such as the NAP, indicate that CSOs can create some political momentum. However, as most of the non-CSO respondents perceived, the civil society's role is 'under way'. While non-state actors' work at policy level is 'visible', particularly in areas such as gender empowerment, there is a lack of major tangible outcomes. In the case under examination in this dissertation, CSOs were found to have a considerable positive effect in building awareness, particularly post-Musharraf. Still, civil society itself is in the process of formation and development. This development and the consolidation of the NGO sector is strongly hindered by mistrust in the organisations' objectives and impact, not only by the military, but often by civilian institutions and citizens as well. Why this is the case can be related to several factors. First, the expectations vis-à-vis CSOs are quite high, they are expected to 'solve' core issues and problems. Until the level of expectation will not drop to more realistic levels – NGOs cannot solve core problems of states, they can only capacitate and contribute to a limited extent – the contribution and impact of non-state organisations will not be accurately perceived. Second, the CSOs' impact will also depend on their training and capacity to have a positive contribution to democratising security governance and institutions. Third, the impact will also be strongly influenced by the power-relations with other actors and the space within which NGOs, think tanks and other non-state actors are 'allowed' to contribute. Fourth, think tanks' impact (at policy-level) in improving the quality of political decisions and outcomes for citizens' benefits will also depend on their numbers,

with few organisations expected to have a minimal impact while more could possibly form alliances and have a more substantial contribution.

The next sub-section discusses CSOs' impact in strengthening diagonal accountability and civilian oversight.

5.4 Diagonal Accountability and Civilian Oversight

Diagonal accountability and civilian oversight are further major components of comprehensive, multi-agency peace and SSR approaches. Civil society organisations were anticipated to contribute to enhancing democratic civilian oversight by increasing diagonal accountability in two ways: directly, through empowering oversight institutions and governance structures (vertical accountability or oversight) and indirectly, through empowering citizens to exert accountability functions (horizontal accountability or oversight). The findings suggest that CSOs' role in establishing channels for holding the military accountable for its operations and impact represents rather an exception than the rule, with significant variation between the two types of contributions (direct and indirect).

First, CSOs are found to have only a small impact on implementing or sustaining monitoring and oversight functions, in particular with regards to the institution of the military. They have the potential to play a third pillar role (and media, in particular English media, a fourth) in strengthening accountability of government and state institutions as well as of constitutional and judiciary mechanisms (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative), but there is little concrete output in this regard, as the excerpts from the semi-structured interviews below suggest.

With regards to the first function, that of empowerment of oversight institutions and governance structures (direct contribution to accountability), CSOs describe their role as follows:

- *'We emphasise the functions of state institutions; we have meetings with parliamentarians, we issue recommendations and remind them about the role of state; sometimes we sit in front of Punjab Assembly. This is people's pressure on state.' (Interview Participant #22, Senior CSOs Representative)*

- *'We have conversation with paramilitary or intelligence and ask them questions – moving interaction at personal level; (…) We collect data, regularly publish data and compel reports.' (Interview Participant #31, Senior CSOs Representative)*
- *'We work on enforced disappearances and we sometimes find that the military is at the other end. (…) We write complaints, reports or letters to DG Rangers, many times we do not hear back. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearance was formed as a result of a litigation which our organisation took to the Supreme Court.' (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSOs Representative)*
- *'We get reports of human violations from volunteers on the ground, after multiple checks, we try to intervene, e.g. in case of honour killings, we contact local administrations, province governor, our head office (…) might issue a statement. We report instances of human rights abuses on a daily basis, we compile reports for national and international authorities. (…) In FATA, we work with volunteers – FATA is a conflict zone. People have been killed. Volunteers members of our organisation have been killed in FATA. We lost two members. Journalists have been killed. By terrorists, Taliban. General security concerns, nobody can open an office in FATA. (…) We present reports at international forums, because when the government goes to UN/Geneva, and says everything is great in Baluchistan, we present our perspective and analysis.' (Interview Participant #38, Senior CSOs Representative)*
- *'We collect data related to security in Pakistan, e.g. attacks, drone strikes, we established a database. (…) We also study madrassa and radicalisation; (…) we verify our info, e.g. once it was a report about a militant who beheaded a police [man] in Swat, we revealed that it was a personal dispute, the attacker was a police officer, disguised in militant trying to mislead. With our database, we try to offer an independent source of information to ISPR released data.' (Interview Participant #39, Senior CSOs Representative)*
- *'There was a project in Peshawar on good governance. Previously, people were not given access to service, to FIR. But these two laws, one was in 2013 and one in 2014, our project was to do advocacy among masses to use these laws to get information. The idea was that if people get access to information and services, this could improve the environment. For that we worked with commissioners directly, they were invited. First, in the planning phase and then during the project as well. We used their material, because they already had some material so we build on it. So, we had manuals and trained public officers. If you are a*

government institution, any institutions, you should have a person who would be PO (public officers). So, we trained these officers from all institutions (e.g. hospitals in Charsadda and in another locality in KP. They were motivating us that we should go with them to the streets, to the community.' (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSOs Representative)

- *'It was a bit challenging to engage police. But we were surprised, the way they welcomed us. The Inspector General of Police, they have to nominate. The police directed the trainings. They have nominated police officials from different police stations for training. They have attended seminars, they spoke on some occasion and then they were ready to move forward and include those provisions into their regular police training unit. We are unfortunate that funding is a big challenge. In the second phase, we had to say, there is no more funding. Later we worked with the local government.' (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSOs Representative)*

Through projects promoting good governance, few CSOs were found to conduct training of public officers (including police) and government officials to empower them to exert their mandate in a more effective way. The training of commissioners and police officers in Peshawar constitutes a good example of how NGOs can contribute to the effective implementation of laws, enabling citizens to access public services, e.g. through the preparation of a First Information Report (FIR). The role of CSOs in the establishment of oversight institutions, such as the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances constitutes another example of non-state actors' role in diagonal accountability. Supplying institutions with research-based key items of information and interaction with representatives of relevant institutions can boost authorities' expertise and understanding of central dimensions related to democratic accountability and oversight. Furthermore, internationalising certain salient issues by bringing them to the attention of international oversight fora can also put pressure on public institutions to exert their functions in a more efficient manner. While these observations may suggest that CSOs can strengthen accountability and oversight capacity of civilian institutions in insecure environments of limited statehood, this finding needs to be relativised in the context of the public perception vis-à-vis CSOs' role in institutional empowerment and political development. One respondent emphasised that such impact by non-governmental associations is rare:

'Few CSOs, such as [anonymised] and some journalists have been raising the issue of military support for Taliban openly.' (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative)

Thus, non-state organisations could have a positive impact on improving accountability of state institutions and empower them to exert civilian oversight of the military, but only few have this capacity. Democratic civil-military relations and the concept of democratic oversight are relatively new standards in Pakistan, which are rarely approached in a purposeful manner by CSOs. Along the history, only few organisations have proved capacity to exert efficient accountability and monitoring functions. Via media engagement but also bilateral meetings, intellectuals and staff members affiliated with non-governmental associations fuelled the debate around national security strategies, counterterrorism policy and enforced disappearances. Media reports and public information campaigns or rallies were found to represent the main instruments to signalise, condemn or comment on actions of the military, *inter alia*, alleged human rights violations, enforced disappearances, the efficiency of security operations or military strategy. In a rare example of activities supporting the process of civilian oversight, one think tank was found to issue regular assessments, policy briefs and background research papers on the state of civil-military relations in Pakistan since 2008.

Second, civil society groups were anticipated to increase diagonal accountability by fostering the development of a participatory democratic culture. "[C]itizens learn citizenship partly through public-spirited activity and partly through bringing their experiences to bear on the consideration of public questions in open debate" (Alexander *et al.* 1999: 454). By contributing to informed public opinion debates and increasing citizens' capability to develop a critical opinion and exert accountability, civil society groups were anticipated to strengthen diagonal accountability. CSOs explained their role in diagonal accountability at micro-level (indirectly) as follows:

- *'We attempt to change perceptions at grassroots levels by bringing people together, e.g. through family exchanges.' (Interview Participant #24, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We organise activities aiming at promoting positive understanding, peace, harmony between people of different religions, women empowerment and conduct vocational trainings and programmes for children and youth; we work in all provinces, except FATA.' (Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'CSOs' role is to build awareness, that security can also be the responsibility of civilian institutions, e.g. police, and build trust between civilian institutions and citizens. E.g. we try to build awareness about police reform in KP via radio*

programme, community meeting, disseminate information; after radio/community meeting, we engage with the media.' (Interview Participant #9, Senior CSO Representatives)

- *'We focus on mobilising and educating youth against terrorism, we provide legal support in domestic violence for women, interreligious harmony. We operate in Sargodha, Hyderabad, Multan, Sahewal, Lahore. (...) We try to create awareness.' (Interview Participant #31, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We worked with madrassas, there are 20-30 madrassas, many students attending – their number is less than the students studying in private and public schools. But their influence in society is quite huge – because they are 'custodians of religion' and Pakistan is a religious country. (...) We ran a number of programmes for madrassa teachers; we trained 10,000 madrassas leaders so far. Our impact was limited (...), we realised that we cannot institutionalise the change without the support of the state, tried to connect with Ministry of Religious Affairs, (...) but madrassas opposed interference from government.' (Interview Participant #36, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We work on humanitarian issues in FATA and KP: education, livelihood and protection, child protection and gender-based violence.' (Interview Participant #41, Senior CSO Representative)*

At micro-level, CSOs believe that they can strengthen citizens' capacity to exert accountability and oversight through activities aimed at changing perceptions towards positive understandings of peace and human security, empowerment of key participants such as women and children (next generation) and general empowerment of citizens through providing basic needs. In addition, one of the respondents mentioned the objective of his organisation to increase trust between civilian institutions and citizens and build awareness about civilian institutions' role as security providers. These observations suggest that CSOs believe that they can play a relatively successful role in building public opinion and empowering citizens to exert their accountability functions and this finding is given support by the answers from several military, academia and media respondents:

- *'CSOs have been successful in building public opinion.' (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative)*
- *'Because without civil society assistance one cannot counter the terrorism. Is a significant element. The government can destroy the terrorist. They can kill them.*

But government alone cannot destroy terrorism. And for this you need the assistance of civil society. (…) CSOs are constructively helping us in conflict management, there is another civil society which are religiously radicalised and using this tool to radicalise.' (Interview Participant #39, Senior Academia Representative)

- *'CSOs can play a role in developing a counter narrative. In 2014, civil society was vocal against the Taliban and in rejecting extremism. (…) A common narrative against extremism and radicalisation is there. (…) Military operations (...) are something timely. There are phases when you have to consolidate. Consolidation (…) requires the soft approach in order to change the mindsets. Here comes the role of civil society (…). There is also a role in the government, if the government supports civil society. Consolidation is needed to make the gains made by the army lasting; campaigns of awareness are needed, education is important.' (Interview Participant #15, Senior Military Representative)*
- *'CSOs are successful in talking about religious tolerance, openness. Civil society and CSOs have an impact; e.g. in promoting freedom of expression, they have been successful in changing. (…) Talking liberal things is difficult.' (Interview Participant #48, Senior Military Representative)*

CSOs can thus be argued to play a role in empowering citizens to exert their accountability functions in building democratic public opinions and counternarratives to terrorism and religious intolerance (which is a root cause of terrorism). One retired military respondent highlighted the necessity for complementarity between military security operations as well as the CSOs' potential to consolidate security and peace through reconciliation and the development of a democratic political culture. The civil society's role in expanding freedom of expression, promoting religious tolerance and changing mindsets was also emphasised, while the difficulty of talking about 'liberal' values in insecure and conservative societies was simultaneously acknowledged.

The data provided in this sub-section route us to the following conclusion in relation to non-states' role in diagonal accountability. While CSOs aspire to the role of a third pillar (after government and military), their impact in providing direct diagonal accountability or civilian oversight in the traditional understanding of monitoring and sanctioning the military, is very little. Only one organisation in the analysed sample was found to be able to engage with the military and directly complaint about human rights violations. Institutions such as the Commission for Inquiry of Enforced Disappearances, set up

thanks to the work of some CSOs, are weak and non-independent. Very few organisations were found to train officials and workers in civilian state institutions, including police, and provide them with an element of empowerment, which is still far from democratic oversight or exerting sanctioning functions in relation to the military. Research on key developments, such as the state of civil-military relations, root causes of insecurity and violence represent one way through which CSOs can increase institutional capacity, indirectly. CSOs were found to be much more successful in awareness building and creating a participatory democratic political culture. Via awareness campaigns, advocacy and media engagement, non-governmental organisations were perceived to have contributed to empowering citizens by changing their perceptions towards more democratic governance and positive understandings of peace. Empowerment of key participants, such as women and children, and general empowerment through providing basic needs and thus foster citizens' development are, in addition to knowledge-production through awareness building, *sine qua non* for the development of a democratic political culture. A democratic political culture is an important determinant of democratisation of security governance, as depending on the political culture of citizens, institutions or political parties, the military will be allowed to intervene or not. A democratic political culture can empower citizens and institutions to internalise certain redlines in relation to the military's intervention in politics. While the level of domestic political culture is still not sufficiently high to compel full accountability of the military and civilian control, it is estimated to have reached a level in which direct military rule and governance are not accepted or tolerated. This in turn puts pressure on the military to adapt and find new ways to exert power.

5.5 Role in Elite Pacting

As discussed in the theoretical framework and literature review, in transitional environments (such as Pakistan) civil society organisations are anticipated to play a role in 'elite pacting' processes. Elite pacting refers to a controlled transfer of power and authority as well as agreement about new models of governance between the old and new nomenclatures, and can be an important determinant of a successful transition, in which civil society actors, including academics and international organisations can play a crucial role, as previous findings on the case of South Africa showed (Cawthra and

Luckham 2003: 309). A "strong civil society" and actors from the international community can play a significant role in facilitating dialogue, capacity and negotiation between the two "orders" (Cawthra 2003: 35; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). CSOs were anticipated to play a role in elite pacting by establishing a liaison, through formal and informal connections between the two political orders and through linking military and civilian government institutions. The role of CSOs in elite pacting, as revealed by the data of this research, is highlighted below:

- *'When elections happen, we invited leaders of various political parties, we had people from MQM, Muslim League, PPP, Jamaat Islamiyah, AL, two days training with these diverse people who are not comfortable with one another. Our first focus was trust building. We tried to build trust. They were sharing numbers, male and females, with beard, without, doing group work. Another best example, if you talk appropriate, neutral and transparent.' (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'(...) We play a role in facilitating dialogue – intellectual dialogue between people involved in policy formulation/implementation in order to reconcile positions, find compromises and solutions.' (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We facilitate interaction and convergence between military scholars, civilian policy makers and academic scholars; (...) try to bridge knowledge gap by inviting military as well, because they always know more. (...) Our mandate is political development, which is done through direct interaction with military and state institutions; (...) we attempted to link civilian decision makers with military officers.' (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'We attempt to increase the impact of our work by inviting retired military officials, we have two, because there will be some transfer, because they still have some influence.' (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative)*
- *'[C]onferences and seminars inviting, inter alia SDG, integrating the message in a widely accepted message might be a strategy to achieve greater acceptance.' (Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative)*

Civil society actors were found to attempt to liaise and build trust between civilian and military institutions by inviting them to conferences, seminar or other relevant events. They believe that integrating representatives from decision-making institutions into their work can optimise the transfer of their findings and recommendations at policy level. At

intra-institutional level, some organisations were found to attempt to bring together leaders from different political parties with various, if not contradictory views and ideologies. Similar to CSOs' contribution to direct diagonal accountability and civilian oversight (through empowerment of institutions), only few associations were found to have the capacity to exercise elite pacting functions.

Some intriguing issues emerging from this combination of findings on CSOs' role in elite pacting relate specifically to CSOs' capacity and strategy, which are discussed in detail in the next chapter. While elite pacting is essential in transitional societies for enabling negotiations between the old and new orders and the transfer of power and authority from military to civilians, CSOs were found to be rarely considerate of this aspect. This can be either because they were not sufficiently aware of the importance of bridging the civil-military gap and building the way for the transfer of power, or because they consider that liaising with the military is associated with acquiescence of its role and importance, which will contribute to the perpetuation of its power; or, just because CSOs might not be sure about the public impact of engaging with or co-opting the military in their activities and prefer thus to rather not take steps which might jeopardise their funding or acceptance.

5.6 Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter suggest a relatively widespread view among respondents that non-governmental organisations can play a role in stimulating democratic reforms of security and defence institutions. While CSOs seem to be perceived as a silver bullet by international organisations aiming to promote peacebuilding and to democratise governance in fragile states, their impact on advancing democratic security governance in insecure environments of limited statehood, in transition, was found to be much more complicated. As the data presented in this chapter show, some organisations were successful in co-opting the military into "emerging landscapes" of democratic "authority and governance" (Stepputat 2018: 399), while others were not.

Most of the respondents evaluated the impact of CSOs on security governance processes as mixed, i.e. sometimes positive, sometimes negative, or weak. Many participants in the study were of opinion that non-governmental organisations often do not design their

projects based on primary needs, can be disengaged and more interested about funding than having a positive impact or that they limit themselves to activities which would not endanger them or their funding sources. With regards to projects and personnel, a peculiar risk was found for CSOs to be labelled as 'anti-state' or 'anti-establishment' if their activities might be perceived as being directed against state institutions. Such a label can seriously endanger them. "When you start questioning the narrative and raise the issue of transparency and highlight the need for information or clarity, the state feels you are questioning the state", said one respondent (Interview Participant #38, Senior CSO Representative). Receiving the label 'anti-state' is not a formal institutionalised practice, but rather an informal mechanism which many respondents claimed that is used by the military. Repercussions of being labelled 'anti-state' might vary from organisation closure to 'tremendous observation' or delays in the procession of requests for permission to work in conflict-affected or otherwise sensitive areas and can even sometimes result in the non-extension of visa for INGO personnel. With regards to funding, this was found to constitute the greatest challenge (even greater than the challenge which military itself can pose) for CSOs. 87.5% of CSOs in the analysed sample stated that funding represents the greatest challenge, while only 33% of them perceive the military as the greatest constraint for their work (based on survey-data, N=25, Question: *What is the greatest challenge for your organisation?* Multiple choice answer). The funding difficulty might explain why so many CSOs (half of the organisation in the analysed sample) consider themselves mainly accountable to their donor. The accountability structure of non-state organisations is further elaborated in Chapter 7.

Many respondents perceived the impact of non-state actors on policy or their ability to influence the military or the civilian government as being weak. One example was that CSOs failed to relax visa policy between India and Pakistan. Moreover, suspicion for non-state organisations can additionally emerge if they have foreign sources of funding – which is the case for most of the NGOs operating in Pakistan. The perception that the organisations' normative framework of action relies on Western paradigms and schools of thought constitutes a considerable source of mistrust and it can result in rejection from both community and policy/military level. Organisations receiving funding from countries of key relevance for Pakistan's foreign policy, such as India or Saudi Arabia, can be especially perceived with reluctance and suspicion of representing elements of foreign interference or even espionage. Thus, foreign funding is genuinely associated

with a negative connotation, even though the real impact of CSOs, including those receiving funding from abroad, has been insufficiently assessed.

When testing the impact of local actors on specific components of democratic oversight and SSR, the results reveal interesting insights.

It was found that civil society organisations can enhance **input legitimacy** (citizens' participation) by increasing social cohesion, interpersonal trust and by eliminating root causes of non-participation, such as insecurity, poverty, injustice, lack of awareness or education. With regards to **output legitimacy**, CSOs can increase the quality of political outcomes and the utility of the decisions for citizens through contributing inputs to security and foreign policy projects and helping generating ownership of democratic security processes, which can increment the commitment to democratic values at both society and institutional level. Nonetheless, CSOs' role in generating output legitimacy is perceived to be moderate, and while their work is visible, it is perceived to have failed to reach major tangible outcomes. One tangible CSOs impact is claimed to be in awareness building in relation to human security issues as well as regarding the impact of military operations and policy. CSOs' public interventions were found to be helpful to set redlines about how far the military can go when it comes to power. For example, political parties were not ready to accept a military intervention after 2008 and this was arguably mainly through the awareness and political culture created by CSOs. Some of the non-state organisations' contribution to strengthening input and output legitimacy functions, particularly in awareness building and providing basic needs, were found to be often overlapping with their contribution to diagonal accountability.

CSOs were stated to play a considerable role in strengthening **indirect diagonal accountability** (i.e. citizens' empowerment) through changing perceptions towards positive understandings of peace and human security, empowerment of key participants as well as general empowerment through addressing basic needs and building trust.

In contrast, CSOs were perceived to have only a moderate impact on carrying out institutional monitoring and oversight functions through **direct diagonal accountability** mechanisms, in particular with regards to the institution of the military. There is currently no organisation or body in Pakistan responsible for democratic oversight of the military and no significant institutional mechanism in place to legally hold the military accountable for its actions or policies. CSOs' role in establishing channels for holding

the military accountable for its operations and impact represents rather an exception than the rule. Only few organisations were found to be able to boost public institutions' expertise and capacity to exert their oversight functions.

A few organisations were found to pro-actively aim at **'elite pacting'** through seeking to bridge the gap and build trust between civil and military institutions by, for example, bringing (active) military and civilian actors together and fostering dialogue and conversation between them during seminars or conference on security relevant issues which some CSOs organised. Through activities aimed at changing perceptions and empowerment of key participants and 'sanctioners' and general empowerment of citizens through developmental projects, CSOs were found to have greater potential to strengthen citizens' capacity to exert accountability and oversight functions. Media reports and public information campaigns or rallies were found to represent main instruments to enable the 'sanctioning' function by signalising, condemning or commenting on military abuses or inappropriate strategy, *inter alia*, alleged human rights violations, enforced disappearances, security operations or military strategy.

CSOs have a limited impact despite civil society (organisations) possessing *de jure* an active responsibility in monitoring the democracy process. In a political reform from 2000, Musharraf formally acknowledged the role of civil society organisations and attributed them a role in the check and balances system which he adopted in that year (Geiser 2007: 2). However, in practice, CSOs and other civil society actors had to deal with several impediments and limitations, mainly related to the registration policy and restrictive or non-transparent procedures for operating outside their offices, in particular in volatile areas exposed to the risk of armed conflict or terrorism. CSOs' capacity and political culture was found to be a significant factor influencing their role in exerting accountability functions. Traditionally, the political culture in Pakistan was mostly inspired by pro-establishment and conservative elites who envisaged the perpetuation of the status-quo, but this has started to change. Pakistan is in a state of transformation, but as civilian institutions and organisations have a short history, they have limited experience and governance capacity. More critical voices and a fragile opposition culture started to develop with the emergence of the new media as well as of the political thought propagated by Imran Khan. The lack of formal institutional mechanisms prevents CSOs from strengthening accountability of state institutions and of the military. While theories of civil-military relations argue that military control and oversight can be exerted by

parliamentary or executive structures, there is currently no entity at institutional level responsible for democratic oversight of the military in Pakistan which could support CSOs' efforts to strengthen control and accountability of the military institution.

In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed the impact of non-state actors on democratic institutional change of security and defence institutions in insecure environments of limited statehood by looking specifically at their impact on strengthening democratic oversight and accountability, which constitute two major components of hybrid, multi-agency security and SSR approaches. It did so by assessing the organisations': a. impact on peace and security in general; b. role in strengthening input and output legitimacy; c. role in enhancing diagonal accountability and d. role in 'elite pacting'. It also discussed the implications of the presented evidence. The most striking result to emerge from the data was that *a few* organisations were indeed able to contribute to civilian oversight and democratic empowerment. Some intellectuals seem to be able to speak loud and clear about the problems of the country, criticise the military's security strategy, address the issue of enforced disappearances and human rights violation, but other representatives of civil society are not. When several bloggers posted critical material against the military on the web, they were taken into custody for several days, revealing significant variation in military's behaviour towards non-governmental actors. What explains the variation in military's response towards civil society representatives? To address this question, the next chapter provides insights into the major determinants of the relation between military and civilian actors, such as CSOs.

6 Key Determinants of Civil-Military Relations

A main update of the post-liberal peace and security normative framework was the replacement of the exclusively top-down (liberal) approaches with a hybrid model of governance (Luckham and Kirk 2013: 7; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011) underpinned by 'normative pluralism' (Riches 2017), as discussed in-depth in the theoretical framework chapter of this dissertation. 'Normative pluralism' is operationalised as the variety of multidimensional processes involving a multitude of interdependent actors, mechanisms, dynamics and relationships and both formal and informal types of interactions between them. These hybrid interactions are assumed to take place between "rational actors motivated by claims to power, justice, entitlements and welfare" and result in "dynamic change and transformation" (Visoka 2017: 308, 319). The outcomes of these interactions are strongly influenced by "contextual dynamics of negotiation, co-optation, domination, resistance, assimilation and coexistence" as well as "everyday practice" (Visoka 2017: 308). Hybridity, with its sensitivity for complexity and the multi-layered structure of social and political systems, is also advocated by theories of institutional change (Redmond 2005: 501-3), which argue that change and transformation can occur through processes of emulation and diffusion during interaction between diverse actors. Interaction between actors becomes thus important, as "if an important institution undergoes changes, other institutions are subject to realignment", "adjustment", "adaption" or "integration". Interaction thus matters and needs to be examined closely, particularly in processes of democratisation of security and defence institutions in fragile and insecure countries, which are more exposed to uncertainty, instability and asymmetric information. The previous chapter assessed the impact of non-state actors on democratic security reform processes. To grasp the dynamics of interaction and interplay between civilian and military actors in difficult security environments, the present chapter examines the variables and determinants which can influence these hybrid processes, as stated in the third research question of this thesis. Identifying the conditions under which a positive impact can be achieved is directly linked to the objective of this study, as knowing the factors which influence civil-military cooperation is relevant for both military institutional change and transformation (the first

research question) as well as on the impact of non-state actors on these processes (the second research question).

The nature of civil-military is the result of a complexity of factors and intervening variables and the interaction between them. Without claiming to have exhaustively studied the multitude of factors and variables, this chapter presents the determinants (drivers) of civil-military relations which emerged as significant, based on survey responses and coded interview-data. The following factors were found to seemingly influence the nature of hybrid instances of interaction and civil-military relations. While this thesis does not claim causation in a Hempelian covering law or Popperian hypothetico-deductive sense, it seeks to uncover the main factors which can influence the nature and circumstances of civil-military interaction and civil-military relations more generally. As discussed in this chapter, the evidence revealed a systematic pattern of perceptions of behaviour in relation to the determinants below:

- Strategy;
- Funding type;
- Government and institutional capacity;
- Political parties;
- Media.

Political parties and media were found to play key intervening roles in civil-military relations in general. Foreign funding was found to be both a facilitator and an impediment of CSO-military cooperation.

6.1 Strategy

Whether or not civil organisations had a strategy of engagement with the military was found to be strongly related to their ability to establish cooperation or dialogue with the military. Table 6.1 summarises the link between CSO-military interaction (1=yes, 0=no) and whether CSOs have a strategy in place to engage with the military or not.

Interaction	Strategy		Total
	No	Yes	
No	7	2	9
	77.78%	15.38%	40.91%
Yes	2	11	13
	22.22%	84.62%	59.09%
Total	9	13	22
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson chi2(1) = 8.5644 Pr = 0.003

likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 9.0700 Pr = 0.003

Cramér's V = 0.6239

gamma = 0.9012 ASE = 0.104

Kendall's tau-b = 0.6239 ASE = 0.170

Fisher's exact = 0.007

1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.006

Table 6.1 CSO-Military Interaction and CSO Strategy
[Data based on coding of qualitative interviews with CSOs in the four sample regions; N=22]

The results show that more than half (59.09%) of the analysed organisations have a strategy in place to engage the institution of the military in their work, while 40.91% have not adopted such strategies. While CSOs were anticipated to develop strategies of engagement with the military, slightly more half of them are found to do so. This could indicate an association between the adoption of an engagement strategy and CSO-military interaction, also confirmed by the 8.5644 value of chi2 and the p value. Over 80% of those organisations having a strategy in place to integrate members of the Pakistan Army in their activities do interact with the military, suggesting that the existence of a coordinated and planned approach to enter dialogue with the military can be associated with a higher probability of synergy and dialogue. Confirmatory support is also provided for the reciprocal hypothesis, with most organisations without a strategy

found to have no interaction with the military. While this might not necessarily tell us that a strategy in place will lead to interaction with the military (as the direction of causality can also be the other way around), it certainly demonstrates that there is a link between non-state organisations having a strategy to co-opt the military and interaction with the military in practice.

6.1.1 Typologies of Strategies

Most common strategies of engagement (informally) implemented by CSOs are: a. inviting military personnel (active or retired, active rarely attends) to discussions, seminars and other events and b. maintaining a good reputation. Both types of strategy aim at establishing inclusive (policy) dialogues and increasing trust relations between civilian and military actors. Some CSOs, particularly those operating at policy level have databases with contacts from the military, from which they select invitees depending on the topic of discussion. It is mostly retired personnel, ranging from Colonel to Lieutenant General, who join the discussion, with active personnel, mainly close to retirement, attending at times. Informal peer or multilateral meetings between active and inactive personnel are believed to represent a channel for the transfer of inputs from retired to active military level (Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative). The probability of military personnel's attendance to CSO events is likely to depend on the location of the seminars or conferences, with institutions familiar to the Pakistan Army, such as the National Defence University or National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), being more likely to attract armed forces personnel than others, e.g. NGOs' offices or premises, or hotels. Contacts are carefully maintained on both informal and, when possible, on formal basis, and in case of unavailability of the first contacted partner, the procedure continues with the next options on the list. One respondent considered that informal interaction between a CSO and military is worth being envisaged, as it might open a different type of environment (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative), which is more likely to facilitate dialogue and peer-discussions. In addition, engagement at informal level might increase institutional pressure and thus the likelihood of having formal interaction, in the form of dialogue or projects. The military is more likely to support and follow-up on policy outcomes in whose design they have been involved at formal or informal level or in relation to which they have otherwise been invited to provide feedback.

The military's responsivity is found to depend on the calibre of the organisation, its societal and political support as well as its domestic and/or international outlook. Perseverance and even insistence from the side of CSOs might be interpreted as an indicator of their commitment and could result in greater rates of cooperation with the military, though military personnel in higher ranks and with greater level of influence might be more difficult to be approached. The potential of dialogue with the military might also depend on the extent to which the envisaged project could jeopardise military's position at local, regional or international level. A cooperative rather than dissenting CSO approach as well as flexibility in the implementation phase is more likely to get the support of the armed forces, in particular at grassroots level. CSOs' leadership structure, e.g. having one retired military personnel in the board of expert advisers, can be likely to facilitate the liaison with the relevant authorities within the institutions of the military (Interview Participants #7, Senior Media Representative, Participant #36, Senior CSO Representative and Participant #44, Senior Military Representative). Contact with an 'insider' bears the potential to streamline authorisation processes and to use approaches which avoid conflicts of interest or insurmountable contradictions with the military's doctrine, thus possibly resulting into greater net coordination with the military headquarter in Rawalpindi. Formal integration of ex-military personnel into civilian organisations is nonetheless usually avoided by some CSOs, which believe that an affiliation with the military might be rejected by both society and government.

Inclusion of the military in CSOs' projects can decrease the level of information asymmetry by facilitating the estimation of each participant's policy position. Mutual understanding between stakeholders does not only facilitate dialogue and interaction, but it can increase the sustainability of decisions by integrating the military's preferences into the policy outcome resulting from a particular discussion (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative). This can boost the chances of acceptability and support for that particular policy outcome and promote convergence between CSOs and the military organisations. This type of convergence strongly depends on the nature of framing of the conceptual models used by CSOs in their projects and the link with the Pakistani society. One respondent perceives that foreign funded CSOs or INGOs sometimes generate polarisation within the society through the creation of a "foreign-type" of environment (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative). This perception might be neutralised if CSOs have appropriate strategies in place to adjust their message and

impact depending on the needs and demands on the ground. A demand-driven, non-interventionary approach (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative) is more likely to be accepted by both the military and community actors. Inclusion and integration of the masses can enhance general acceptability. Support for solutions that emerge from local level is usually higher than imposed approaches, based on rationales which do not resonate or are not sufficiently intermingled with the reality on the ground. On the contrary, operations which do not resonate with the reality on the ground are likely to be met with rejection and opposition and be thus counterproductive. Projects unequivocally facilitating the people of Pakistan are more likely to be supported by the military. Compatibility with the general discourse and "mindset of the people" (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative) will generate a connection with the society, aiding CSOs to fulfil their functions as generators of legitimacy and accountability and bridges between polity and society. Thus, a more inclusive and participatory approach is more likely to achieve social learning and transformative aims at both local and policy level.

Some CSOs opt for implementing a strategy of not entering in conflict with state institutions and thus maintaining a good reputation by attempting to address their message through refraining from being explicitly critical about them. However, this strategy might be less impactful. It is ignoring state institutions, in the sense that CSOs opt to not work "against them" (Interview Participant #22, Senior CSO Representative), but they do also not work *with* them. Harmonic CSO-military relations are dependent on effective engagement and coordination at institutional level. While not engaging (military) institutions or officers might not expose CSOs to the risk of coming under scrutiny or getting the label of 'anti-establishment', it also prevents a substantive impact of CSOs in institutional change, transformation and democratisation. Monitoring, demanding delivery and good governance as well as effective implementation of policies are main gaps in the administrative apparatus of Pakistan. Addressing these issues requires discussion and debate as well as getting in contact with state institutions.

Many CSOs deliberately work on establishing a good reputation (Interview Participants #5 and #18, Senior CSO Representatives) in order to increase their chances to engage with the military. While media reporting, (past) project work and network affiliations can be indicators of their commitment, CSOs reputation can also be assessed through their level of dedication to having a positive and substantive domestic contribution to

democracy and security. Rigorous project evaluation and impact assessment are likely to increase transparency about their activities and facilitate trust. Strong assessment mechanisms, which enable a frank and accurate analysis of their impact might increase the likelihood of cooperation with military institutions. “Few individuals have certainly impressed me by their hard, deep, work, sustainable over time”, claimed the ex-military intelligence chief.

However, many organisations do not have a strategy in place to enhance dialogue with the military.

6.1.2 No Strategy

Circa 40.9% of the analysed CSOs do not have a specific strategy to engage with the military (see Table 6.1). This can be mainly due to three reasons: a. CSOs consider that the military should initiate dialogue and partnership, due to its higher position of authority; b. they oppose partnership with the military due to their ontologically different positions on security; or c. they have not thought about working together with the military before. First, many CSOs consider that dialogue should be initiated by the military: “It is very easy for them to connect with all CSOs, organise a conference on CVE and invite all CSOs, what prevents them from doing this?” (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). While military-initiated dialogue occurs with some policy and research think tanks, a public call by Pakistan Army towards a general formal cooperation with NGOs seems rather unlikely, considering the high level of mistrust. Second, a couple of organisations consider that a lack of common ground between their and military’s philosophies and approaches in terms of security, defence and counterterrorism do genuinely impede partnership. Organisations in this category usually reject collaboration with the military, mainly due to the commitment to different normative understandings and schools of thought. Some CSOs might be discouraged to collaborate with the military based on some previous experience: “I tried and my experience was terrible. They do not agree, they say this is not the right thing, do this. This authoritative mindset does not go with me. (…) Why to connect with them, fundamentally is not the army's role to tell me what to do”, said one respondent (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). The military’s support for groups which are assumed to be linked to terrorist organisations as well as its inability to stop enforced disappearances prevents many CSOs from engaging with them. Third, a sub-set of CSOs in the analysed sample

do not consider that armed forces are relevant for their activities or have never thought about the possibility of coordinating their work with the military before. However, while many organisations might consider that the involvement of Pakistan Army is not relevant for their work (Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative), the facts suggest that involving the military, often in terms of providing security, might boost the safety and effectiveness of civil society's activities. For example, a request to military or local authorities to provide heightened security to the Christians celebrating Easter in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park in Lahore on 27 March 2016, could have saved the lived of 75 persons. Moreover, lack of interorganisational coordination between civil society actors at both grassroots and political level represents another major impediment for developing effective strategies for co-opting the military in democratisation processes.

6.1.3 Types of Strategy Towards Institutional Change

Based on the propositions presented in the theoretical framework chapter, it is examined whether exogenously-induced change of security and defence institutions (e.g. military) can occur during processes of interaction with institution-external actors, such as civil society/non-state actors. To test how different strategies of institutional change can impact on the likelihood of civil-military interaction, the organisations' approaches to institutional change were coded into two categories: 1) displacement or layering and 2) drift or conversion (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) (see. Table 2.1 in the Theoretical Framework Chapter). Displacement and layering strategies involve the introduction of new rules (i.e. norms, institutions), while drift and conversion do not. Neither drift nor conversion strategies imply the removal of old rules or the introduction of new rules, but instead, the changed enactment or impact of existing norms and institutions. Strategies of CSOs envisioning 'some change' or 'radical change' were coded into the category 'displacement/layering', while the strategies of CSOs not explicitly aiming at change were coded into the category 'conversion or drift'. The data used for coding were references from the qualitative interviews, corroborated with data related to the mission statements and projects of the CSO, available on their websites. The results are showed in Table 6.2:

Interaction	Strategy Towards Change		Total
	No explicit change envisioned	Some change/Radical change	
No	3	6	9
	20.00%	85.71%	40.91%
Yes	12	1	13
	80.00%	14.29%	59.09%
Total	15	7	22
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson chi2(1) = 8.5260 Pr = 0.004

likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 9.0134 Pr = 0.003

Cramér's V = -0.6225

gamma = -0.9200 ASE = 0.097

Kendall's tau-b = -0.6225 ASE = 0.167

Fisher's exact = 0.007

1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.007

Table 6.2 CSO-Military Interaction and Vision Towards Institutional Change
[Data based on coded references from the expert interviews, corroborated with data related to the mission statements and projects of the CSO, available on their websites; N=25]

The results show that CSOs adopting strategies of conversion/drift, i.e. not explicitly envisaging change (though some of them are working on political development) are approx. five times more likely to engage with the military than organisations explicitly advocating change, sometimes, through radical reforms. 80% of those organisations refraining from having an explicit position towards change are found to have interaction with the military, in contrast to only 20% of those groups explicitly advocating 'some' or 'radical' change. The vast majority (ca. 86%) of organisations advocating change failed to have interaction with the military. These results suggest that civilian actors adopting strategies of institutional change of 'displacement' or 'layering' are less likely to have interaction with the military than actors adopting strategies of 'conversion or 'drift'. In substantive terms, this means that actors aiming explicitly at the institutionalisation of the values they propagate could be less likely to enter collaboration with the military. While it might seem impossible to achieve institutional change without processes of institutionalisation, the data suggest that this is not the case. Moderate

processes of 'layering' or 'drifting' do not involve the elimination, but eventually the transformation of old norms and principles, being thus more acceptable at domestic level than more radical forms of change, such as 'displacement'. Supporting existing theoretical observations related to the process of institutional change presented in the theoretical framework chapter (Chapter 2), the research in this chapter finds that change can occur as a by-product and does not necessarily have to "emerge from actors with [explicit] transformational motives" (Mahoney and Thelen 2020: 22-3). Being "too overzealous" (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative) about transformation might be counterproductive. "Chang[ing] social [and institutional] norms gradually and through careful policy rather than shock therapy" (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative) might have higher expediency.

Another significant finding was the generalised perception by respondents that CSOs as agents of change are willing to introduce new things and change norms or traditions, particularly in regard to religion. Ten out of fifty participants (20% of the analysed sample) from all three main categories of participants (CSOs, media/academia/government and military) in the semi-structured expert interview unpromptedly stated that the general public opinion about CSOs in Pakistan is that they 'want to change' or 'introduce new things'. In particular in conservative communities, such as Swat or tribal areas, non-governmental organisations are predominantly perceived as challengers of local customs and traditions. This perception is strongly enabled by CSOs' vision towards institutional change and particularly towards religion. "CSOs take sometimes very fundamental approaches to religion. Most of Pakistan is religious, some CSOs go very harsh about things and criticise" (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative). This might have a polarising effect, at both local and policy level, where new divisions might be created between supporters and opponents of the new, democratic norms. Through a federal system and a genuine model of devolution (e.g. in Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan promotes an image of unity, despite its cultural and ethnical heterogeneity (Rabbani 2016). The Pakistani citizenship and attribute is considered a meta-articulator of the national identity, pertaining to all citizens of the country, disregarding their ethnicity, tribe or religion. Discourses and models of action which can match this integrity, and purposefully avoiding to introduce new lines of polarisation by advocating for example 'how bad religious is', are likely to enhance the positive impact of CSOs working on peace and

security. One respondent emphasised how a strategy of avoiding to 'unnecessarily' talk about sensitive issues might increase trust in CSOs:

> *'Unnecessary they will take issues. When they talk about peace, tolerance. They can talk about these things and people will have no objection. But if you are treating those issues, which you could easily be avoided, then the perception is that they are implementing certain agendas.' (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative)*

Pakistan's colonial past and conservative outlook are found to be two important factors impacting on people's and state's perceptions or lack of trust vis-à-vis CSOs' objectives. In this context, challenging deep-rooted issues such as the blasphemy law could raise a lot of suspicion, particularly in conservative regions. The Pakistan state and society are in a compound state, in which old and new values co-exist. Practices of good governance or democratic decisions of the state's judiciary are often overshadowed by conservative hardliners – as emphasised by the development in November 2017, when the Justice Minister resigned at the demand of hardliner protesters of an Islamic movement (France 24 2017) over blasphemy allegations; the killing of the State Minister of Punjab for opposing blasphemy laws in 2011; or the protesting of the 2018 court decision setting free Asia Bibi, who was previously accused of blasphemy. These examples show that Islamic religious movements continue to maintain substantial influence and power on decision-making processes in Pakistan. People in conservative regions such as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas or Interior Sindh might be more reluctant towards Western models and values, even if these are regarded as democratic, wealth-catalysing and sustainable. Alleged interferences from neighbouring India (e.g. in Baluchistan) and the country's colonial past amplifies the general suspicion regarding the role and scope of internationally funded CSOs and think tanks. This suspicion was put by one respondent in the following words: "Colonialisers earlier claimed that it is in the interest of the colonialised nations, but academics deconstructed later and founded that things were quite different" (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative).

Exogenous sources of funding and support can be both a facilitator and an impediment of CSO-military cooperation, as the next sub-section shows.

6.2 Foreign Funding – Both Impediment and Facilitator of CSO-Military Cooperation

Non-governmental organisations benefitting from foreign sources of funding were found to be particularly perceived with suspicion by the military, government, society, academia and media (particularly Urdu media). While it is acknowledged that some of the CSOs benefitting from foreign funding are doing good work, one participant highlighted that many ordinary citizens and even high-level politicians believe that "CSOs aided by foreign money are very insidious, undermining, subversive" (Interview Participant #26, Senior Government Representative). The prevalent attitudes are that in some cases, foreign funding is a channel of foreign influence, possibly with a hidden purpose, aimed at benefitting the donor or Western countries. One military correspondent explicitly expressed concerns that foreign funded CSOs might work for intelligence agencies abroad (Interview Participant #44, Senior Military Representative). This assumption has fortified in the public opinion after the CIA operation in Abbottabad to apprehend Osama bin Laden with the alleged support of the US-funded organisation Save the Children.

The mixed attitudes towards CSOs were also aided by the lack of thorough evidence related to their impact. While the generalised opinion is that CSOs have a mixed impact on peace and security, there are no robust studies analysing the effects of specific CSO projects. In the absence of robust studies analysing the impact of foreign funding on security, peace and development in Pakistan, it is felt that foreign funding can influence the work and impact of CSOs in a rather negative way. This is because the "international community and Western countries have different mechanisms" and values (e.g. women empowerment) which are believed to clash with local culture (Interview Participant #11, Senior Media Representative). Framing the issue in European-like models and terminology might be aversive to both local and security institutions. "They perceive, if they are foreign-injected, they have Western perspectives and not thinking in nationalistic perspective", considers one interview participant (Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative), which might constitute an impediment in policy formulation. INGOs and CSOs receiving foreign funding are perceived to create a "foreign type of environment" or even "division" (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative) within the predominantly conservative Pakistan society. One senior military respondent

reckoned that due to corruption at donor level, between 40% and 90% of the funding returns to the donor (Interview Participant #46, Senior Military Representative).

On the other side, funding is found to be a catalyser of CSOs' expertise, capacity and impact. In 2015, Pakistan was the fourth greatest receiver of official development assistance after the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Ethiopia (OECD 2019a), and among top-ten ODA recipients in other years. Figure 6.1 shows the correlation between net official development assistance (ODA) (in US dollars) and annual gross domestic product growth in Pakistan (measured as GDP per capita, in billion US dollars) from 1990 to 2016. ODA is usually complemented by a series of other funding sources, e.g. from international governments, political parties and agencies of international organisations.



Figure 6.1 Net Official Development Assistance and GDP Per Capita (1990-2015)

[Data: World Bank. Author's own illustration]

There seems to be a link between the net ODA amount received by Pakistan between 1990 and 2015 and economic growth, operationalised as GDP per capita, in the same period. The selected period of time (25 years) is likely to capture any lagged effects. When the amount of ODA increased, the GDP per capita also increased, suggesting that

donor funding could be correlated with a positive effect on the economic growth in Pakistan. In 2017, circa 57% of the financial assistance was allocated in the social sector, while 21% went to the (economic) development sector (OECD 2019a: 13). This implies that foreign funding can provide capacity, despite the perceived negative or mixed impact. Funding can be essential for project sustainability, as one respondent emphasised: "The CSO can only bring a minimal impact, but everything is finished when funding is finished" (Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative).

The negative perception towards foreign funding can be amplified by trust deficiencies between the military and CSOs, which can be owed to both CSO- and military-related factors. Among CSO-related factors, the level of substantiveness and commitment of CSOs is found to play an important role. In order to increase the potential of collaboration with the military and local communities, CSOs must provide "mature", "non-contradictory, not duplicated, not-flawed" input (Interview Participants #5, Senior CSO Representative and Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative). CSOs are in many cases viewed by the military, politicians and public opinion as "lazy, corrupt, interested in own welfare", argues one participant (Interview Participant #46, Senior Military Representative). Moreover, CSOs' approach needs to fit with the general discourse and mindset of people, which is a narrative of unity, despite diversity in Pakistan, affirms another respondent (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative). This finding is in line with existing literature on institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 16) arguing that resonance with existing norms, practices and believes is more likely to bring about the transformation which agents of change (such as CSO) envisage than a rigid approach embracing radical change or removal of old norms and the introduction of new ones. Failure to comply with the 'mood of the masses' would likely have polarising effects and CSOs could be perceived as interferers with this unity, if they attempted to introduce new, alien things. INGOs are found to have greater operational capacity and higher levels of substantiveness and professionalism than (most) domestic CSOs, having thus greater potential to establish trust relations with the military. Public engagement and communication strategies as well as project management expertise facilitate INGOs to understand the importance of integrating the military in their work. The level of cooperation might vary in function of the country of the donor or with which the INGO is affiliated. Good diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the donor country, e.g. Japan or Germany, is likely to facilitate CSOs or think tanks from those countries in

entering collaborative partnerships with the military. Nonetheless, there have recently been cases in which INGOs or think tanks from countries with which Pakistan has good foreign relations were subject to non-extension of visa for some of their staff or non-allocation of permission (NOC) to work in certain areas in Pakistan, outlining once again the variation in military responses. Transparency about the objectives and approaches of non-government organisations as well as the impact of their projects could increase military's preference to enter partnerships.

Interestingly, negative perception or opposition against foreign funding was found to diminish significantly in cases of activities conducted in the development sector, particularly when the military is involved, e.g. through providing local security or as a stakeholder in the implementation phase of the project. In one case, the military accepted donor funding for the construction of the Kurram Tangi Dam in North Waziristan Agency of FATA (which is one of the regions particularly restricted for CSOs projects), under the condition that the funding is contracted to a military organisation, such as Frontier Works Organization (FWO) (Daily Times 2017), which is a military construction engineering organisation founded in 1966. The Kurram Tangi Dam project was implemented in cooperation with the government-owned Water and Power Development Authority and constitutes an example of civil-military interoperability.

In conclusion, funding and capacity seem to be often interrelated, with staff training and transparent project assessment and management strategies being a major determinant of project outputs. Conversely, lack of appropriate approaches or resources to engage with local communities might even have the opposite effects.

The next sub-section analyses the government and institutional capacity as a determinant of civil-military relations.

6.3 Weak Government Control and Lack of Effective Institutional Environment

The lack of institutional performance and governmental authority can acerbate the mistrust in CSOs and thus negatively affect their ability to enter cooperative partnerships with the military. One military participant explained how the regulative and institutional framework relates to civil-military relations:

> *'Since government control is weak, law is not there, many people are doing unlawful things. For example, if some CSO says that I am doing work for education, we are not going to trust it. We do not know whether they are telling the truth or have a hidden agenda.' (Interview Participant #27, Senior Military Representative)*

The lack of effective monitoring and a system of formal regulations to assess the background and potential impact of CSOs seemed to have favoured the generation of suspicion and mistrust from both military and society. Some common monitoring procedures, such as surveillance and unannounced office visits, seem to be implemented by intelligence agencies, but they are not formally institutionalised and are applied heterogeneously, with many CSOs in the analysed sample perceiving to be permanently exposed to the risk of crackdown, harassment or closure. Most analysed CSOs were of opinion that these practices would be more effective if they were implemented by civilian agencies and the results of such audits as well as potential consequences would be clearly and formally communicated. Many respondents in the analysed sample were of opinion that the military should not be in charge of assessing permission for CSOs to operate, due to their lack of training in exercising such types of roles: "They are trained for something else, e.g. killing, shooting, et cetera" said one respondent (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative). Intelligence agencies' queries, surveillance or monitoring practices can have intimidating effects on CSOs. Arrests or enforced disappearance represent another procedure which the military was argued to apply as deterrence or intimidation tactic against actors attempting to hold them accountable, make a "radical statement against the military" or engage in an action which would considerably jeopardise military's position (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative), as one respondent related:

> *'[T]here have been cases in which internet bloggers have been picked up, because of blasphemy, there have been cases in which corrupt politicians have been picked up because they were corrupt. There have been cases in which land mafia has been picked up. The pretext they will use is national security and security operations.' (Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative)*

These intimidating practices can have a discouraging effect on CSOs as they can result in the cancellation of projects, for example, projects about security and human rights in Baluchistan.

Procedural and institutional incertitude due to the application of these operational practices can vary depending on the policy sector, type of conflict on which CSOs are working or the level of operation (policy level or grassroots). Projects advocating rights or institutional change implemented by grassroots CSOs were found to be particularly prone to closer scrutiny and monitoring and can be (theoretically) stopped at any time. "ISI is stopping projects, e.g. stopped a project called The Right for Peace and Development, it was for the development of this locality, but ISI did not permit", affirms one participant (Interview Participant #3, Senior CSO Representative). "[W]e are happy to answer questions and share information, but there is no system in place" (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative) for CSO operations or CSO-military interoperability, claimed a CSO representative, highlighting the government's failure to provide an efficient and transparent framework. Transparency can be ensured by a better communication strategy and increased diplomacy: "More diplomacy is needed. There is a communication problem. The state should communicate why it closes CSOs, why NOC is required, is it a counterterrorism measure? Say it!", stated another respondent (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative).

For non-governmental actors to become effective, the government needs to create an effective and sustainable environment. There is currently no formal (civilian) monitoring mechanism in place to assess the activity of the non-governmental and non-profit sector on policy and society in Pakistan. The civil society sector, which encompasses CSOs, madrassas, think tanks, foundations and other non-governmental, non-profit organisations is operating under the 1860 Societies Act, which is considered to have obsolete provisions. New regulations introduced in connection with the country's counterterrorism strategy in 2014 made it more difficult for NGOs (both domestic and INGOs) to operate, in particular in conflict, sensitive or otherwise restricted areas.

Another aspect highlighting the poorly coordinated regulatory framework in which CSOs work is related to the No Objection Certificate. As per the latest regulations at the time of this analysis, all non-profit organisations, both domestic and international, aiming to implement projects in areas defined as 'restricted' or 'prohibited' by the Ministry of Interior had to apply for permission at provincial disaster management agencies and the Ministry of Interior. In particular, access to areas which are under military control, e.g. FATA and 'restricted' or 'prohibited' areas (Government of Pakistan 2011) are particularly restricted to CSOs. The procedure of obtaining a NOC is found to be as

follows: civilian disaster management institutions and the Ministry of Interior are mainly involved in the process of issuing NOCs, while the intelligence record and clearance by intelligence agencies are also part of the procedure. One shortcoming is that the lack of a transparent procedure and criteria for the allocation of the NOC can open space for errors and abuses. The institutional responsibilities, implementation procedures as well as coordination between the military and civilian institutions are largely unclear.

> *'Technically, it is supposed to go through the ministries, but eventually it comes from the local military camps based in the area. (...) When the military is on the front, everything is under their control. E.g. if you want to work with IDPs in Bannu, you need to contact military offices there, is not under civilian government.' (Interview Participant #38, Senior CSO Representative)*

The possession of NOC by CSOs seemed to increase the likelihood of getting support from the armed forces operating on the ground, in terms of security or implementation assistance. But a further source of incertitude relates to the terms and conditions of cancellation of the NOC. It is found that the NOC can be cancelled at any time (Interview Participants #4 and #18, Senior CSO Representatives), with higher probability of cancellation for operations in conflict affected areas, or areas which are under the control of the military: "Access to FATA is restricted, NOC has been revoked for 50% of CSOs" (Interview Participant #41, Senior CSO Representative) operating there. This can constitute a source of demotivation for organisations planning to operate in areas or domains for which a NOC is required.

The conclusion which can be drawn from these data is that institutional gaps are likely to obstruct reforms and transparency in relation to the procedures involved in the assessment methods for CSO operations. While security measures have been heightened after the Taliban attack on the Peshawar school in 2014, the military's solid involvement in NOC procedures and monitoring of CSOs is perceived as deterring and intimidating by most organisations. While CSOs acknowledged the need for elevated security to stabilise Pakistan and prevent terrorist attacks, the closure of many CSOs or revocation of NOC was perceived to be somewhat exaggerated. The revocation of NOC was often related with the military's mistrust in funding from external actors, even though in many instances it has been a recipient of external support (in terms of military technology and training) itself. CSO-military relations are often acerbated by the genuine lack of transparency or effective communication, when it comes to the reasons why the NOC

was revoked or a particular organisation admonished to close operations. If the monitoring was implemented by civilian institutions and if there was an effective regulatory and institutional framework in place, which could increase transparency and follow-up on the CSOs' operational impact, this would not only make civil society actors feel less intimidated, but it might enhance their positive impact. This is because it might encourage CSOs to be more aware and critical about the implications and impact of their work and would thus be more motivated to have a positive contribution.

Political parties and leadership were found to be important factors related to the level of institutional capacity and processes of institutional reform. I now move on to discuss these aspects in detail.

6.4 Role of Political Parties and Leadership in Processes of Military Change

The findings suggest that civil-military relations can depend on the political leadership of the civilian government (party or coalition in power) or the military, i.e. COAS in power. A visible role of the individual agency in security governance and institutional decision-making was also found.

As argued in the theoretical part, political parties can be an important intervening factor in processes of change, transitional and political reform in fragile and insecure countries, anticipated to push for reforms in each of the intermediary stages of transition to democracy (s. Chapter 2): a. 'preparatory' ("one of struggle and conflict over power between different social forces"); b. 'decision-making' ("an act of explicit consensus in which (…) political leaders accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, agree to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedures") and c. 'habituation' ("politicians and citizens alike apply the new rules to other issues and adjust to the new democratic structure") (Rustow 1970: 346; Serra 2008: 10).

Advancing these theoretical propositions, the present dissertation argues that the political parties' ability to effectively trigger change and transformation can depend on their leadership, capacity and ideology. One respondent emphasised: "Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) is comparatively more supportive to CSOs and civil society, because of its origins in traders and farmers and civil. PPP are more liberal in outlook. When PPP was in power NGOs did spoke" (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative). PPP's

propensity towards supporting CSOs was found to be comparatively higher than that of other political parties. This has been endorsed by several respondents: "PPP period was very good" (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). Another interview participant highlighted:

> *'In the PPP government, former Prime Minister Gilani said that we do not "accept state within a state". That was a very open categorical statement. It was the headline in the media that day. I also remember a statement by the co-chairperson of PPP, "you [the COAS] are here for three years, we are for longer".' (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative)*

Processes of ideological modernisation were also observed in the Pakistan Muslim League (PMN) party, as the same respondent claimed:

> *'I wrote a paper on political manifestos of political parties in Pakistan. I took all excerpts related to different foreign affairs, from all mainstream parties. The title is [anonymised]; I was developing it on defence and foreign policy, particularly on Kashmir. In PMN-L, my finding was that since 2002, this language incorporated in the manifesto, which was overwhelmingly pro-military. Because, since their genealogy is also rooted in the military, they were openly pro-military. In one of the manifestos, the idea was, whatever kind of assistance, financial or other, whatever we can, as civilian government, will do to give assistance to the military. But then read manifesto from 2008 and 2013, this argument becomes very neutral, there was not closely attached emotionally with the military. There was one sentence. That every institution should work within its habit. So, they have changed.' (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative)*

However, in general, political parties were perceived to often view CSOs as competitors and to a lesser extent as partners, with many political parties generally portraying CSOs as "agencies of foreign government" and "anti-state" (Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative). This can have tremendous implications in relation to the perception of CSOs at societal, government and military level.

One significant aspect in civil-military relations and the process of transition in Pakistan is the ontological link between the military institution and political structures. Some political parties were created by the military and many maintain connections with the current military establishment, which can constitute a structural impediment to institutional change. Another issue can be related to the parties' ideological commitment to peace and democratic values. One political party (Muhajir Qaumi Movement, MQM

in Karachi) is considered to be responsible for identity-based conflict and violence (Verlaaik 2016), making democratic progress rather difficult.

At military institutional level, the hierarchical organisational structure as well as the lack of supportive political culture towards CSOs seemed to have prevented the military from integrating civil society on its agenda, contends one participant (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative). A process of transition to democracy can be estimated to be procedurally ongoing in Pakistan, but neither the military nor the civil society nor political parties have been able to establish a permanent and formal role in optimising and democratising the policy-making process.

The importance of the agency of the individual was also emphasised by respondents, with different intensity of civil-military cooperation perceived at institutional versus personal level of interaction. The quality, intensity and type of CSO-military interaction can be different when it occurs at interpersonal level of interaction. Improvements might occur when interaction takes place in personal capacity (Interview Participant #33, Senior Military Representative). One respondent highlighted the importance of change in military leadership: "Discourses are not institutional, but individualistic and can change with the change in command", the respondent said (Interview Participant #37, Senior Academia Representative). The more liberal the personal programmatic vision of the military, government or political party, the more likely it is to engage CSOs in their work. "NGOs can provide work on a think tank basis and lobby, but it is basically the political parties who have to take the lead", asserted one participant (Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative).

Along strategy, funding, institutional framework, leadership and political parties, *the media* was found to be another significant factor (determinant) influencing the development of a democratic political culture, which is discussed below.

6.5 The Role of the Media

Technological advancements and the rise of new (social) media were found to represent an important variable of institutional change. Through strategic communication and media engagement, CSOs can influence public opinion and liaise with the society, but also with the government and military. Media can be a powerful channel of opinion-building and can influence "people's perceptions" (Mathews 1997: 51), therefore media

engagement can indirectly impact on CSOs' relationship with state institutions, particularly with the government and parties in power, as they are anticipated to "follow the general mood of the masses" (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative) in order to increase the stock of political capital. The way in which actors, institutions and relationships are framed in the media is very important. A supporting, complementing or harmonic tone is likely to result in greater support from the military, government and community. While Urdu media is perceived to have a more conservative and hawkish tone and rather non-critical of the state institutions or political developments (Interview Participant #29, Senior Academia Representative), in general, there seems to be a rising freedom of expression, including more critical opinions. After the end of the military regime of Pervez Musharraf, many participants perceived that there was a military shift towards more liberal democratic values, such as freedom of expression, and that the military has exhibited an increased propensity towards being acquiescent of moderately critical media reports (Interview Participants #11, Senior Media Representative and Participant #12, Senior CSO Representative), as discussed in-depth in Chapter 4 Military Change, Democratisation and Transformation. After 2008, media reports and public information campaigns or protest actions became important instruments to signalise, condemn or comment on actions of the military, *inter alia*, alleged human rights violations, enforced disappearances, security operations or the military peace strategy.

While it might be overstretched to interpret these practices as quasi-accountability mechanisms, they had a tangible impact on informing the public opinion and instil diagonal accountability (as outlined in Chapter 5 The Impact of Civil Society Organisations on Democratic Reforms of Security and Defence Institutions and Governance), possibly having implications for military responses and policy. Thus, media engagement can be seen as a channel of indirect conversation with the military (Interview Participants #34, Senior CSO Representative). Raising awareness about how to increase the efficiency of security and counterterrorism operations, on one side, or about the failure of the military to prevent enforced disappearances, on the other side, might have determined the military to review their policy and eventually initiate dialogues with civilians. Nonetheless, the military propensity to cooperate with civil society actors and non-governmental organisations can strongly vary, as the arrest of several bloggers who published criticising posts against the military has shown,

suggesting that civilian actors' engagement strategy can result in invitations to collaboration to some organisations or civil society representatives and the intimidation or harassment of others.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has studied factors and determinants which can influence civil-military relations. First, the presented data suggested that *strategy* can be a significant factor influencing the nature of hybrid interaction and processes of cooperation between civil organisations, such as CSOs, and the military. While the causal direction remains open to interpretation, certainly those CSOs who have a strategy of engagement with the military are much more likely to co-opt the military in their work and establish dialogues. At the very least, this indicates that these CSOs do think about their engagement strategy. Organisations that are very critical of the military are of course less likely to elaborate that in a strategy. The organisations' strategies of engagement with the military took many forms. Maintaining a good reputation and inviting military personnel (mostly retired) into their projects were found to be the most common strategies which CSOs apply to enhance dialogue and cooperation. CSOs with a good reputation, adopting high levels of professionalism and willing to have substantive, high-quality contribution to peace and security in Pakistan, seem to be more likely to have a harmonic and constructive interaction with the military. Open strategies of communication are likely to find greater appreciation by the military than 'back-doors' channels, i.e. attempts to criticise the military or intelligence agencies on the web.

The type of strategy towards institutional change was also found to be a significant determinant of CSO-military relations, and in this case the causal direction is more likely to start from the CSO's strategic view. Radical approaches to change, advocating rapid transformation and abrupt shifts of social and political norms might amplify resistance and opposition from the military and thus prevent partnerships. CSOs which do not explicitly preach change can be more successful in establishing dialogue and collaboration with military institutions, notably ISPR and academic institutions or state institutions working closely with the military on security-related issues, such as the National Counterterrorism Agency (Interview Participants #12, #17, #35 and #36), while other civil society groups have failed in establishing such synergies, even at informal

level. Organisations embracing more critical approaches to peace and direct resistance towards the current leadership were found to be less likely to engage constructively with the military. Rationales of removing existing rules and institutions and introduction of new rules might be interpreted at military level as a source of instability and direct existential threat. Military or state institutions willing to collaborate with CSOs are more likely to opt for groups having a moderate, non-interventionary vision, which can be accommodated in the military's general narrative. Resonating with the general discourse can serve as an entry point for partnerships with the military and other institutional actors, which are generally less likely to engage groups with explicitly opposing and contrasting strategies. One participant highlights a possible explanation why the military is aversive towards cooperation with more critical groups: "If you want to reach effective implementation of anything, you always choose the path of at least resistance" (Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative). Some CSOs genuinely oppose the military and their governing style: "I do not listen to my father, why should I listen to a colonel? This authoritarian behaviour does not go with me" (Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative). A significant number of respondents, from all three main analysed groups (academia/media/government, military and non-state organisations), were of opinion that CSOs need to be more moderate, if they wish to engage with the military. Adopting a strategy of facilitation and non-intervention will likely increase the probability of collaboration with the military. Soft, diplomatic ways of engagement might be more efficient than resistance approaches advocating radical change. The reason for which some civil society actors opt not to directly work or involve the military in their work is because they believe that cooperating with the military would simply give them more credibility and postpones the day when the military can be removed from control of politics and society, and thus fail to achieve long-term objectives of the security sector reform and democratic security governance. Incremental reform of the security sector through "conversion" practices instead of radical "displacement" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15-6) of existing (security) institutions could be more effective and sustainable for the establishment of a democratic security governance model. In this sense, the results corroborate existing theoretical propositions according to which "institutional change need not to emerge from actors with transformational motives", but it "can be an unintended by-product that grows out of distributional struggles in which no party explicitly sought the changes that eventually occurred" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 22-3).

Second, *weak government capacity and the lack of an effective institutional environment* can influence the military's and society's perceptions of CSOs. Weak government control and limited institutional performance, with a lack of capacity to establish a transparent and effective framework in which CSOs can operate and have a positive impact, amplifies the pre-conceptions about CSOs' impact. While some monitoring procedures exist, these are informal and are applied rather heterogeneously by military intelligence agencies. These operational practices were found to induce a sense of harassment and hazard, with formal and transparent procedures of assessment and monitoring of non-state actors' work and impact, implemented by non-military institutions, being perceived (by CSO respondents) as more appropriate to enable an environment which would enhance the possibility of a positive impact. Third, *foreign funding* was found to be both an impediment and a facilitator of CSO-military cooperation. While exogenous sources of funding and support can enhance civilian organisations' capacity to design strategies of cooperation and co-optation of the military, they can simultaneously raise reluctance or suspicion in relation to the 'motive' behind the donor funding. Fourth, *political parties and leadership* was found to be another significant factor influencing the environment in which CSOs operate, and thus indirectly impacting on civil-military relations. The PPP party was perceived to have an ideology which is more supportive towards CSOs' projects and assistance in societal and political development, and that while political parties show evidence of ideological modernisation, political parties are likely to perceive domestic NGOs as competitors for funding rather than partners in peacebuilding and democratic security governance projects. In addition, the 'individual' agency was found to be an important factor of variation in civil-military relations, suggesting that processes of change occurring at individual leadership level can then diffuse at institutional-organisational level. Fifth, *the media* was found to be a powerful channel of opinion-building and determinant of change of peoples' perceptions, and thus an indirect determinant of how CSOs and their ability to enter collaborations with the military are perceived.

The next chapter will put together the major pieces of the puzzle studied so far, i.e. processes of military change and transformation (Chapter 4), the impact of civilian non-state organisations on security sector reforms and democratic oversight (Chapter 5) and the determinants of civil-military relations (Chapter 6, current). One striking aspect emerging from the findings presented hitherto is the importance of strategic choices in

processes of normative change envisioned in the framework of hybrid peace and security approaches promoted by international actors and organisations, such as the EU, in fragile and insecure states with limited statehood.

7 Conclusion. Towards a Theory of Civil-Military Adaptation in Insecure Orders of Limited Statehood

7.1 Introduction

This dissertation provides the basis for a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation and democratic oversight (which in orders of limited statehood rather takes the form of civilian influence) in insecure states with limited institutional capacity. It examined the following research questions: *1) How is the role of the security and defence institutions in insecure states perceived to change during periods of transition? 2) What is the perceived impact of civil society actors, funded by international organisations, on democratic security governance in transitional environments?* and *3) What kind of determinants can influence the civil-military interaction in security governance and peacebuilding domain?* To answer these questions, the dissertation first investigated the perceived change of the military institution; second it studied the perceived impact of civil society actors on the democratisation of security governance; third, it analysed the main conditions and determinants of civil-military relations. The dissertation applied a case-oriented research design, using Pakistan as case study and a multi-method epistemological approach combining process tracing and content analysis. Survey responses and semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in four sample regions in Pakistan were employed as data sources. This concluding chapter summarises briefly the content of the dissertation, emphasising the key findings and the argument; it also articulates some key elements of a theory of civil-military adaptation in insecure environments of limited statehood; finally, it discusses the contribution and implications of the findings for the academic and the policy community, highlighting avenues for future research.

7.2 Chapters Summary

Chapter 1 highlighted the relevance of the research questions and elaborated the research gap which this dissertation devotes to. The dissertation examined civil-military relations

and civilian oversight in insecure and fragile environments with limited institutional capacity, which was under-researched hitherto. International organisations, such as the EU and the UN, spend billions of euro annually in development cooperation and democratisation projects in fragile states, very often through funding and engaging local actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs) – think tanks, NGOs and other non-state, not-for-profit associations, which can constitute alternative tracks of diplomacy. Reforms of the security sector and the democratisation of security governance to enable domestic actors to 'deliver security within the rule of law' was one goal of the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy 2016. This dissertation argued that in insecure states, affected by complex insecurities and with a history of military intervention, processes of change and transformation of security and defence institutions might be lengthier and more complex, as the continuous exposure to risks and security threats could allow military institutions to legitimise and perpetuate their power and exert political influence. A military intervening in politics would be the exact opposite of democratic civil-military relations and oversight that are envisaged under international actors' democratisation strategies, including the EU Global Strategy. Effective and democratic control of the armed forces is an essential condition not only for sustainable peace approaches (Gaub 2016: 7; European Commission 2016: 5), but also for the consolidation of 'new democracies' (Croissant *et al.* 2013: 212).

Chapter 2 presented the conceptual framework of analysis and provided a comprehensive literature review relevant for the puzzle studied in this dissertation, by linking two conceptual clusters: theories of civil-military relations and military change and hybrid peace and security approaches, such as the security sector reform (SSR). What both have in common is the concept of democratic civilian control and oversight. This dissertation argued that IOs' attempts to democratise security governance in fragile states of limited statehood, *inter alia*, via local actors such CSOs, facilitated a certain element of increased civilian monitoring capacity and a partial democratisation of civil-military relations, but the balance of power, in the post-military regime studied in this thesis, was perceived to continue to be inclined towards the military. By facilitating input legitimacy (citizens participation) and indirect diagonal accountability through awareness building, civil society organisations had an impact on increasing citizens' and institutions' (political parties, judiciary, Prime Minister, et cetera) sanctioning capacity and helped re-calibrate their acceptability of military influence in civilian affairs. The military's role is

'defending the borders, not to rule the country or meet with heads of state' claimed several respondents (Interview Participants #49 and #24, CSO Representatives; Participant #13, Senior Academia Representative). Simultaneously, due to utility gains and incentives, the armed forces were found to undergo processes of normative endogenous change, which allowed them to perpetuate their influence and maintain the balance of power inclined in their favour.

Chapter 3 discussed the research design and methodology. Process tracing and content analysis were applied as research methods. The analysis was informed by 40 survey responses and 54 semi-structured in-depth interviews with retired high-ranking military officers, local actors (NGOs, think tanks, associations and other non-state or not-for-profit organisations) in four sample regions in Pakistan (Islamabad, Karachi, Peshawar and Lahore), conducted by the author of this dissertation during field research. Ethical approval for the field research was obtained from the DCU Ethics Committee and highest anonymity standards under EU legislation were applied to protect the respondents and not endanger them at any time. The major benefit of using both interviews and survey responses was the increased robustness of the findings through complementarity and the possibility of double-checking the validity of the provided answers. For this purpose, the survey responses and interviews contained some overlapping questions. The survey responses allowed for the automated standardisation of questions and thus generation of answers which could be quantified. This was done partially for the interviews, particularly for the structured part – which was coded to relevant categories, e.g. sources of military change, indicators for non-state actors' impact on peace and security reform and determinants of civil-military relations. The non-structured part of the interviews allowed to double-check information but also to go more in-depth into significant issues. A major utility of the interviews was the unprompted nature of answers, which served as an additional validity check. Protection of participants' privacy and conduction of the field research under highest ethical standards, respondent validation and test-re-test techniques were used to limit the effects of bias in respondents' answers. This range of techniques helped to overcome the possible limitation of organisations feeling compelled to provide certain answers due to fear of possible military retaliation, but also any limitations in relation to the answers by military respondents, who, in the presence of a Western researcher might have wanted to display more modern and democratic visions. The computer applications NVivo and Stata were used for the data analysis. For coding

in NVivo, an intercoder reliability test was conducted with my co-supervisor on a sub-sample, which ensured reliability of the coded values.

Chapter 4 studied the processes of democratic military change and transformation. There was a perceived tangible improvement in civil-military relations, with civilian institutions being formally in charge of national policy and decision-making, although retired military officers continued to be part of some civilian political structures. Strong variation and mixed signals were found with regards to military's support of processes of democratic security governance. In some instances, the military demonstrated that it can still be very powerful and influent in political decisions, for example when it asked the civilian government to remove some officials after they were alleged to have 'leaked' information to the media suggesting military's acquiescence of domestic terrorism groups. On other occasions, however, the military took actions against groups affiliated with terrorist organisations, as it was the case when they arrested Hafiz Saeed, the alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attacks and senior JuD leader in 2017, or when they banned 70 terrorist organisations (including JuD), many based in Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and FATA, in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack in India in 2019 (The Economic Times 2019). The extent to which these actions were perseverant remains unknown, as the evidence from this research suggested some military support for JuD in the studied framework. There was a perception that the armed forces' preferences for security approaches shifted from purely militaristic operations to more integrated and hybrid approaches. The data revealed that, on several occasions, the military were involved in projects of rehabilitation or re-integration of ex-militants, and it showed affinity for countering violent extremism (CVE) (which is envisioned in EU and other IOs' strategies in fragile and insecure states) as well as for security approaches based on both human security and national security understandings.

Chapter 5 presented the findings related to respondents' perceived impact on democratic reforms of security and defence institutions, and governance. Non-state organisations, such as (I)NGOs, think tanks and other CSOs, the majority of which were funded by IOs and donors, were found to only partially be able to influence or change the 'preferences' (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 7) of key players, but to a greater extent to have a positive impact in the creation of 'hybrid orders' and 'infrastructures' (Richmond 2016; Luckham and Kirk 2013; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016) of security governance. Due to uneven power relations and limited institutional capacity of civilian institutions, CSOs were found to have very

limited capacity to exert formal or institutionalised monitoring and sanctioning functions (checking power) on the military. Only on some rare occasions, non-state organisations were found to be able to bridge the civil-military gap through 'elite pacting' functions, for example, by bringing civilian and military leaders together at scientific seminars with security implications. The data suggested that CSOs can be more successful in processes of building power. By fostering input legitimacy (citizens participations), social and institutional development through human security and training activities, but also through building awareness of (from a democratic perspective) non-acceptable military operations, policy or choices, non-state actors influence the political culture of the society, political parties and institutions.

Chapter 6 investigated the nature of determinants which can have a degree of influence on civil-military relations and the interaction between armed forces personnel and non-state organisations such as NGOs or think tanks. The adoption of a specific strategy of engagement with the military was found to be conducive to higher rates of success in pursuing (on some occasions formal) cooperation or partnerships with the military. Organisations without a strategy of co-opting the military in their democratisation work were found to be significantly less likely to enter synergies with military officers. The CSOs' strategy towards institutional change was also found to influence the level of civil-military cooperation, with organisations adopting a developmental approach being more likely to collaborate with the military than those pursuing objectives of radical or rapid institutional transformation. Radical institutional transformation here refers to organisations being explicit challengers of local customs and traditions, which was found to hinder them to get acceptability from the society, government or military. One respondent explained that some organisations "unnecessarily take issues when they talk about peace, tolerance" (Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative). Interestingly, the results suggested that democratisation of security governance can also occur as a 'by-product' (Mahoney and Thelen 2010), from actors of change without explicit transformational motives, but which focus on processes of societal and political development and training/learning instead. Foreign funding was found to be both a facilitator and an impediment of CSO-military cooperation: a facilitator, because it empowered CSOs with capacity; and an impediment because it was perceived as being linked to foreign models of knowledge, visions and perspectives and to generate a "foreign-type" of environment (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative).

Western values can largely overlap with local values, while a values conflict are rather linked to the agenda of conservative hardliners, who are still very influential and can embrace quite radical actions, as the assassination of the Punjab Governor for his liberal views on blasphemy laws showed. There is also a generalised suspicion that CSOs might be funded from abroad with the purpose of foreign interference in domestic affairs and this suspicion was deepened by the CIA operation to apprehend Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 with the alleged support of the US NGO Save the Children. Weak government capacity and lack of effective institutional environment were found to impede more democratic civil-military relations. The quality and political views of the leadership (both civilian and military, i.e. Chief of Army Staff), but also of political parties can influence the nature of civil-military relations and processes of democratisation of security governance. They can influence the public opinion in setting the 'redlines' for military's interference in politics. The media, which became substantially freer after Musharraf, can play an important role in CSOs' work in awareness building. At the same time, it needs to be emphasised that media can and does constitute a channel which can be used in equal measure by the military institutions for PR purposes, and which, despite tangible improvements post-Musharraf, remains overall at a relatively low rank in international comparison.

7.3 Elements of a Theory of Civil-Military Adaptation in Insecure Orders of Limited Statehood

This section puts together the pieces of the puzzle researched in this dissertation by outlining the elements of a theory of civil-military adaptation and democratic oversight in insecure and fragile states with limited institutional capacity. First, it is argued that, under the auspices of international support and pressure from IOs and donors, via CSOs, trade and diplomacy, the institution of the military might adopt a pragmatic approach and undergo to a certain degree processes of normative endogenous change or transformation, incentivised by absolute and relative utility gains. Absolute gains and incentives here refer to the military's decisions to behave pseudo-democratic for direct structural benefits (e.g. economic, military training or infrastructure) from IOs or other international actors. The military might accept to be co-opted in civil-military partnerships when its branch

organisations also receive funding, as it was the case in the Kurram Tangi Dam project, in whose implementation the Frontier Corps Organization was also involved. Relative gains refer to the possibility to perpetuate power through acceptability at domestic and international level and through remaining relevant as an essential security actor able to defend the country from internal (e.g. terrorism) and external threats (e.g. Afghanistan). By 'formally' not intervening in politics, the military was found to be in an advantageous position, more acceptable to both domestic and international actors. This becomes an immense source of legitimacy for the military, as acceptability of a (formally) non-interferent military at domestic and international level allows the men in uniform to perpetuate their economic activities and infrastructure, which are vital for their institutional survival. At the same time, they can continue to maintain a 'hidden' role in politics through intimidation (e.g. monitoring procedures of CSOs), which allows them to *de facto* exert power. Figure 4.6 on the perception of the civil-military balance of power has indicated that the armed forces were predominantly perceived as the most powerful actor. The adoption of new, traditionally non-military roles, such as the rehabilitation of captured militants might have facilitated the military to maintain this soft, but nonetheless powerful position. Endogenous processes of a voluntary, pragmatic change and transformation in the military doctrine and strategy to project a more democratic institution imply nonetheless the acquiescence of democratic values, such as freedom of expression. While the data revealed that there are still taboo topics, which the media and public opinion have difficulties to address, such as military operations and human rights in FATA and Baluchistan, the majority of the respondents acknowledged a tangible shift in military attitudes towards allowing greater freedom of expression post-Musharraf. This was an important development, which can contribute to democratisation, as through media engagement and awareness building campaigns, CSOs and other actors were able to foster a more democratic political culture and the empowerment of citizens, and (to a lesser extent) of institutions to exert their sanctioning and accountability functions. To speed up the process of democratisation, institutional oversight capacity and effective implementation of formal oversight mechanisms constitutes a further step. Thus, as Chapter 4 highlighted, transparency and mechanisms of 'checking power' facilitated, *inter alia*, through effective (often foreign funded) local actors' (CSOs, think tanks, et cetera) contributions to 'building power' and will for democratic change, is a further dimension of a middle-range theory of strategic civil-military adaptation and democratic oversight in insecure and fragile states with limited institutional capacity.

The key elements proposed for the generation of a middle-range theory of strategic military change and civilian oversight (influence) in insecure orders are summarised in Figure 7.1 and explained in detail below:

1. Endogenous Military Change	**4. Checking Power and Transparency**
· Constraints: Domestic and international · Incentives: Absolute and relative gains · Caveat: Credibility	· Essential for ensuring civilian oversight in peace and security approaches based on synergies between social and political actors · Best achieved via building power
2. Transformation of Military Roles	**5. Role of Non-State Actors in Building Power and Will for Change**
· Define new, non-military roles for the military, e.g. in human development or security	· Foster input legitimacy, diagonal accountability – empower citizens and institutions to exert their monitoring and sanctioning functions · Can build democratic political culture · Media as significant determinant
3. Informality and Institutionalisation	**6. Limitation of Local Actors' Approach**
· Informality, often reflected in the level of interaction, can be conducive and possibly precede more formal ways of cooperation · Institutionalisation caveat: Lack of formal oversight mechanisms impedes democratisation at macro-level	· Complexity of factors · Local actors can lack expertise · Could be overcome through appropriate strategy and training

Figure 7.1 Elements of a Theory of Civil-Military Adaptation and Civilian Oversight (Influence) in Insecure Orders

First, the military can voluntarily undergo processes of change, strategic adaptation and transformation in its choices and doctrine due to domestic or international (geopolitical) incentives or constraints and to maximise its absolute or relative gains. A formal *coup d'état* bears an immense potential of sanctioning by both domestic and international actors. Incentives by international actors, such as the EU (e.g. through GSP+ or other strategic instruments), or foreign governments (e.g. Germany, which is among the

biggest donors in Pakistan[6]) can, through diplomatic and trade cooperation mechanisms, be likely to determine the military to genuinely pursue doctrinal and strategical shifts. Processes of 'adjustment', 'adaptation' and 'integration' are to a great extent due to changes in the political culture of the society, general public opinion, media, political parties and government. Refraining from formally taking power while maintaining a 'hidden' veto in key policy areas such as security and foreign policy was found to be associated with greater absolute and relative gains for the defence forces. In absolute terms, the military can perpetuate its economic infrastructure, and also benefit from direct aid from IOs or foreign governments. In relative terms, the military can legitimise and perpetuate its existence. One difficulty with regards to these processes of strategic military change and democratisation is its credibility. In the case of Pakistan, insincerity with regards to counterterrorism was found to be the major source of doubt for military's democratic change. *Second,* in insecure and fragile environments, defining new, non-traditional roles for the military, e.g. in human development and human security could intensify relations with civilians and also alter the military focus on traditional sources of power. *Third,* institutionalisation is argued to be necessary to create formal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, as lack of such formal mechanisms is likely to impede democratisation at macro-level. SSR activities could be a precursor of civilian democratic oversight. While formal institutionalisation might be difficult, mostly due to resistance from traditional actors, informal channels can provide the foundation or serve as entry points for more formalised ways of engagement. *Fourth*, in insecure environments of limited statehood, checking power is essential for ensuring civilian control in hybrid peace and security approaches, such as SSR, which advocates synergies between all stakeholders. Local actors and institutions usually lack the capacity to formally check power through monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, therefore, checking power is much dependent on building power, defined as the political capacity of actors to understand and exert their constitutional roles.

[6] Germany was the fourth largest donor in Pakistan in 2018 (Conrad 2018). Since the begin of German-Pakistan development cooperation, Germany donated 3.5 billion euro to project work in Pakistan (German Foreign Office 2019). Diplomatic relations between the two countries intensified since the launch of the Pak-Germany Strategic Dialogue in 2011. Other special institutional arrangements between the two countries have been made in specific sectors, such as trade and investment (Pakistan German Business Forum), energy (Pakistan-German Renewable Energy Forum) or education (Germany-Pakistan Training Initiative).

Fifth, non-state actors, such as CSOs, can have a role in building will for change. One difficulty when studying processes of institutional change is to assess the specific impact which CSO-military interaction directly has on processes of military change. The indirect impact of CSOs' work on societal and political development was less difficult to ascertain from the data. Through fostering input legitimacy (citizens' participation) and diagonal accountability (in particular indirect, i.e. citizens' empowerment) and building awareness and alternative narratives, non-state actors can empower citizens and (to a limited extent) institutions to exert their monitoring and sanctioning functions. Media constitutes a significant determinant in this regard. The institutional framework in which CSOs and other local actors operate in fragile orders is rather difficult and fragmented. Lack of transparency in procedures, e.g. related to the approval for getting the permission to operate or to how the military monitors the (I)NGOs' work, can inhibit non-state organisations to behave and react. These instances can likely perpetuate the asymmetric power relations, which genuinely disadvantage the CSOs (which are in a weaker position).

Sixth, one aspect which needs to be given particular attention in hybrid security and SSR approaches is the limitation of local actors' capacity. This can refer to the inability of local actors to deal with the complexity of causal factors (Hoffmann *et al.* 2018), intervening variables from both micro- and macro-level, and the interaction between them, which can cause the risk of counterproductive effects. An appropriate strategy of how to contribute to peace and security and engage with relevant actors, as well as training and expertise, might help overcome this limitation. This would involve a synchronicity, alternation or exchange between top-down and bottom-up approaches of democratisation of peace and security institutions.

The following sub-section sheds more light on each element in the middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation proposed above.

7.3.1 Endogenous Military Change and Its Unintended Consequences for Democratisation of Security Governance

The evidence presented in the previous chapters invite us to make the assumption that the military in Pakistan adopts a tactic of a pragmatic partial change and transformation

while attempting to normalise its decision-making veto in an environment of insecurity and limited institutional capacity, which Pakistan is. The army adopts a strategy of partnering with both governmental and (some) non-state institutions, e.g. CSOs. One military respondent very suggestively described the way the armed forces attempt to co-opt civilian organisations into their activities and how the transfer of power to civilians could take place:

> *'The military contacts those CSOs who work in the area, or are known to have worked in [a] certain area. There will be a roundtable in Islamabad, inviting them, identifying them to partner with the military. After having seen that, [the military] will grow and do their own thing and come back to us to that focal person. Once that commitment comes, that platform is provided in that area by the military. Because civil society is still in the process of finding its feet. And that platform is provided and then protected by the military, allowing that space to function. Once they build up that area, it starts building trust into the people. And it is a complementary area to the establishment for the political government also. So there will be different choice, not only one platform. E.g. de-radicalisation school, seed distribution to restart agriculture to reintroduce new types, like strawberries in Swat, to be done in [a] secure environment. Initially, it relies entirely on the military for a number of years, but this is reducing, while the political government start finding its feet there. So it is a collaborative mode, in which military's responsibility reduces and civil responsibility starts increasing. Civil society and INGO would then work with the military and they remain in place. Gradually, military channels start closing and CSOs and INGOs would work entirely with the civilian government.' (Interview Participant #21, Senior Military Representative)*

The re-institution of the National Security Council in 2013 and the invitation of key government institutions, such as NACTA, but also local actors such as NGOs, including those working on gender empowerment, to contribute to the design of the 2015 national security and counterterrorism strategy, represent some examples of instances in which the military included civilian actors in the security policy-making processes. In another example, key civilians and military high-level representatives are both part of the National Command Authority which, *inter alia*, is the supervisory and policy-making authority controlling the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and their use (The Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016). When the military includes or co-opts civilians, preferences are given to those actors which through their strategic vision and level of ambition do not seek to

jeopardise or radically challenge the military's 'hidden' role in politics and decision-making.

The evidence presented in this dissertation – see Figures 4.1-4.5 showing military's preferences on security governance as well as respondents' statements explaining the change in the Pakistan Army in Chapter 4 – suggests that there was a perceived tangible shift in the military doctrine post-Musharraf, with a Pakistan Army more inclined towards showing greater willingness to allow civilian institutions to have a limited say in some decisions in a genuine form of an asymmetric power-sharing mechanism, and allowing greater freedom of expression (including of more critical voices by established intellectuals) vis-à-vis national security policies. The military's (partial) acquiescence of civilian government's agenda as well as of an independent judiciary on some important occasions – recently seen in their acquiescence of the 2018 and 2019 court rulings to acquit Asia Bibi of previous blasphemy charges and allow her to leave the country; but also in the submission to Prime Minister Imran Khan's decision to repatriate the captured Indian pilot in the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack – suggests a military 'allowing' democratic changes in the political culture of state institutions.

To balance this statement, I discuss now another crucial observation which transpired from this study. While instances of consultation or power-sharing can contribute to a change in the civil-military balance of power, the civilian oversight is far from being consolidated. This was blatantly shown by the Pakistan Army's request to the government to remove high-ranking officials (see Chapter 4) after the latter have allegedly provided information to the media disclosing the military's reluctance to stop aiding so-called good Taliban.

The mixed signals by the military institution were associated by many of the respondents with what they have called 'façade democracy':

- *'In Pakistan, there is only one agency. That is the military, which is powerful. The rest, the government, it is powerless. Democracy is with the name only. Every decision is taken by the military establishment. Once the army decides something, the government cannot intervene, is very weak. Every decision, especially foreign policy, towards India, Afghanistan, Europe, US, China, Saudi Arabia. These are taken by the military. Only Somalia, Lebanon or Senegal, they have asked the government if you want to intervene there. The rest is our business, you will not interfere in it.' (Interview Participant #3, Senior CSO Representative)*

- *'They have a system of civil governance protected by the military. Democracy, elections, are only in name.' (Interview Participant #26, Senior Government Representative)*
- *'Military dictators were welcomed, but once they are in power, people start demanding, so they've learned. (...) They do not want to step in but they want to control from outside on major policies on which they want to be on driver seat, like foreign policy, nuclear issues, as far as domestic things are concerned, particularly CPEC, in Baluchistan and Karachi. They overstretch themselves.' (Interview Participant #29, Senior Academia Representative)*

The respondents argued that while there were tangible shifts, the men in uniform continued to remain the highest perceived authority, even though this was formally not the case. This suggests that, a possible *coup* fatigue, but also new opportunity structures determined the military to embrace a tactic of pseudo-democratisation, showing off more genuine preferences for a more democratic military doctrine. As discussed in the theoretical framework, endogenous change can occur due to changes in the distributional power dynamics, which *de facto* means "shifts in the balance of power" (Knight 1992: 145, 184; Thelen 1999). The presented evidence indicated that military's strategy was to re-structure civil-military relations while attempting to maintain its political autonomy, corroborating thus the findings from previous research on the case of Egypt (Roll 2015). There are at least two major implications related specifically to endogenous military change as a key element of the proposed theory of civil-military adaptation in transitional environments: the role of absolute and relative utility gains and the military's credibility of having changed.

7.3.1.1 Absolute and Relative Utility Gains and Power Dynamics. A Pragmatic Military

The changes in security governance and the institution of the armed forces show that the military is concerned with maximising both absolute and relative utility gains. The military pursues an approach of pseudo-democracy (close to O'Donnell's model of delegative democracy or Diamond's subtype of illiberal democracy, see section 2.2.3 Mechanisms of Change in Security Governance) through allowing multi-party elections (approximatively seven political parties could be counted on the political arena since the 1988 elections) (Azfar 2013) and power-sharing with civilians because this choice puts

the military in a better position. Putting game theoretical lenses on, it can be interpreted that the armed forces' endogenous preferences for change were the result of power calculations based on the available options and anticipated consequences of those options. The externalities associated with a position of non-intervention are estimated to be much higher than those associated with direct rule through the institution of a military regime. A position of non-intervention (at least formally) is linked to greater acceptability at both domestic and international level. At domestic level, processes of social learning and development, facilitated, *inter alia*, by actors supported by IOs such as CSOs and INGOs, can trigger changes in the social capital and political culture of the society. As a result of this progressive development, people will be less ready to accept non-democratic regimes such as military rule. "We support operations of the army, because there is no option left, but we do not support martial law", stated one respondent (Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative). The institution of the defence forces is thus constrained to adapt to the new context and take the doctrinal and organisational form which would be acceptable and perceived as legitimate by the domestic population.

The findings of this study corroborate partially the results of Singh and Bailey (2013: 103-4) who define Pakistan's system of governance as a "Pretorian democracy" in the sense that the "military allows multiparty elections to determine who will staff the formal machinery of government", while simultaneously "maintain[ing] paramountcy over all national institutions". Conceptually, Pretorian democracy represents a subtype of "illiberal democracy" (Diamond, 1999: 18; Zakaria 2003: 99), considered a 'precursor of a consolidated democracy' (Diamond 1999). In contrast with Singh and Bailey's (2013: 103) claim that the system of Pretorian democracy in Pakistan is "not a transitional phase in a democracy consolidation, but an end-state", the results presented in this dissertation suggest that tangible changes in the military (e.g. in civil-military relations and in allowing a quasi-democratisation space to unfold) can have an emancipatory effect on the military's vision. A Pretorian democracy as an end state will not only prove to be insufficient for the military's evolutionary stable strategy (a strategy which remains stable over time), but the changes occurring as a result of exogenous factors (e.g. geopolitics, domestic politics or interaction with civilian actors) as well as endogenous determinants (the military's own motivation to change) will have irreversible effects on the institutional structure and doctrine.

The army's endogenous processes of change and strategic adaptation stemming from its voluntary motivational decision to alter its traditional organisational and doctrinal structure can thus be attributed to its strategic choice to reform for power incentives, in both absolute and relative terms. This would correspondent to the type of a pragmatic military, presented in Janowitz' (1960) model of civil-military relations. According to Janowitz (1960: 343), the pragmatic military acts as a "pressure group" which aims at justifying its role and importance in domestic and international affairs. This corresponds to a large extent to the findings of this dissertation. The Pakistan Army is considerate of the consequences of its actions at both domestic and geopolitical level. The motivation to adapt to this new reality also stems from external incentives. Processes of adaptation are conditioned by dynamics of integration 'with civilian values' (Janowitz 1960: 343, 349, 420, 440). In its choices to co-exist with the civilian government, the military can be interpreted to take the identity of a 'pressure group' (with big powers), having as major interest survival, i.e. the perpetuation of its organisational structure and guaranteed existence in the future. Reinforcing the principle that 'viable international relations' are better 'than victory' (Lambert 2011: 161-2; Boëne 1990: 22), the military reveals an important geopolitical dimension of its post-2008 doctrine and policy strategy.

It needs to be emphasised that much of the military's absolute power can also be linked to its powerful economic situation. The Pakistan Army, which comprises the navy, land and air forces, along with intelligence agencies, is in possession of entire industries and sectors, including in the oil, banking, airline and health domains. Revenues from these sectors are considerable and very important to maintain its institution self-reliant. Retired military officials have extensive benefits, such as housing in privileged quartiers and very good health insurance plans, which makes the military institution a very attractive employer in a country in which possibilities of employment are difficult due to the increasing young population. Moreover, the considerable revenues have direct implications on the civil-military balance of power, which is obviously weakened in the favour of the military. Poor financing and sources of revenues is likely to be linked to poor institutional and government performance.

7.3.1.2 Maintaining the Balance Between Credibility and Threat Imperative

Another important aspect which invites us to interpret the findings of endogenous processes of change of the Pakistan military is the little credibility which the military and

the ISPR have at international level. A constellation of high internal threats (e.g. terrorism) and perceived external threats (e.g. from neighbouring India) allows the military to legitimise its actions and develop its conventional and unconventional capabilities and infrastructure. The military was perceived to be involved in the re-animation of the threat imperative. If this is the case, it will substantially weaken its cause. Pakistan's continued need to address counterterrorism was expressed on numerous occasions, including in the recent Statement by the EU High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini in relation to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan (EEAS 2019). Doubts regarding military's counterterrorism approach were increased by non-transparent procedures involved in the security operations in Waziristan and FATA, but also by the military's presence and objectives in Baluchistan, along with allegations of a proxy policy towards India. Another source of weak credibility was the Pakistan Army's alleged support for domestic groups linked to terrorism. The evidence presented in this research also reveals that the military has failed to indiscriminately counter terrorism in the studied period, with many statements, including from military representatives, mentioning the military's affinity towards aiding JuD societal relief activities. What stands out here is the indiscriminate responses vis-à-vis JuD on one side and other movements, such as Pashtun movements on the other side. The 2019 escalation with neighbouring India in the aftermath of the Jaish-e-Mohammed-claimed terrorist attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir raised once again doubts in the civil-military balance of power in the National Security Council and in foreign and security policy in general. However, in a rare example of civilian power exercise, Prime Minister Imran Khan announced the repatriation of the captured Indian pilot in the aftermath of the 2019 Pulwama attack as a 'gesture of peace'. He also mentioned, in a much discussed public statement: "History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is that given the weapons we have can we afford miscalculation. (…). We should sit down and talk" (Sanyal 2019). This was a rare occasion when a civilian leader openly called for talks with neighbouring India and the military's reactions on this, if any, will be very interesting to observe. If transparent inquiries into the Pulwama attack, conducted by a neutral (e.g. international) commission, would proof the non-involvement of ISPR into the incident, this could significantly improve the military's international credibility. If ISPR wants to increase its international credibility, it shall allow transparent assessments of the situation in Baluchistan, the Pulwama attack in India and JuD presence in Pakistan by neutral commissions.

7.3.1.3 International Politics/Geopolitics as Constraining Factor of Strategic Adaptation

A second key element of a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation is international politics/geopolitics as a constraining factor, which can put pressure on the military to not exceed certain redlines. Processes of global interdependence and norms diffusion by IOs can influence the mindset and normative thought of individual officers or leaders, which can indirectly impact on the military chain of command.

In the case of Pakistan, the EU's and EU states' support of economic and social development as well as external relations have intensified significantly since the rift in US-Pakistan cooperation after the CIA operation in Abbottabad 2011 and US UAV strikes in Pakistan. The enhancement in strategic relations was marked by net funding under the EU global strategy (a significant share of the total EU funding to Pakistan occurred via CSOs) and an intensification of diplomatic and trade relations. Since 2010, joint Pakistan-EU commissions are held annually and a Strategic Engagement Plan is envisioned for the near future (EEAS 2018). The strategic political partnership between Pakistan and the EU was also emphasised by the EU's Partnership Instrument projects under the EUGS, under which Pakistan benefitted of EU funding in two projects: the civilian aviation projects and the research and advice network project (European Commission 2019). In 2015, the EU accounted for 23% of the Pakistan external trade, with EU imports from Pakistan almost doubling between 2006 and 2016 (European Commission 2018). Between 2014-2019, EU funded a 49 million euros project aiming at eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and consolidating democracy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (EEAS 2019). Comparatively, in the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Chinese government committed to invest over 60 billion US dollars in Pakistan (Wolf 2019). However, it needs to be differentiated between development aid and foreign direct investment in the form of loans or directed to commercial (and not social development) purposes, which many of the CPEC projects are. A significant difference between EU and Chinese sponsored projects is that the EU vision in Pakistan has a long-term perspective and seeks to promote social and political development, democratic values and good governance.

From 2014 onwards, Pakistan has been beneficiary of the updated tariff agreement of the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+), in return to which Pakistan has agreed to ratify and implement 27 international legal items aimed at strengthening development

and good governance (European Commission 2018). While, in the case of the EU, conditionality was relatively soft and no sanctions were taken for improper implementation, the existing arrangements and agreements have likely put leverage on the military to not exceed certain redlines. Foreign heads of states or ministers were many times met by the COAS himself, a factor which might be on one side considered to decrease the risk of free-riding, but which on the other side is likely to perpetuate the position of the military as a legitimate actor to pursue and decide country's foreign policy.

The COAS and ISPR's 'overstretched' role in foreign policy was condemned by many participants in the study. But if this is the case and the military is responsible for the country's foreign policy, the choice for intensifying the partnership with the EU shows, once again, an inclination for readiness to cooperate with democratic actors. Legitimacy and acknowledgement from both international and societal level are important for the military to continue its existence as an institution with extensive political powers. It is interesting that much of this power is not associated with a formal position (e.g. governing through military rule), but is manifested through everyday practices and reinforced as such in the collective perceptions and public opinion. Refraining from formally staging a *coup d'état* can thus serve as a sustainable source of power. This new form of existence does involve co-existence and interaction and even cooperation with others, including democratic actors. The diversity of actors and political parties is a form of pluralism in itself.

7.3.2 New Military Roles and Civil-Military Complementarity

A pragmatic shift was ascertained with regards to the military taking of new, non-military roles, such as de-radicalisation and rehabilitation projects like Sabawoon in FATA, in which the military sought to re-integrate previously captured militants. The data used in this dissertation also showed that military organisations were increasingly involved in development projects and interested in civil-military partnerships (e.g. Kurram Tangi Dam). Following the SSR line of reasoning, this result could lead us infer that an adaptation of the security and defence sector is taking place, with the military taking new, non-combat, non-military roles. What is missing from the equation of civil-military

relations is a 'coherent system of complementarity', which is important for promoting a hybrid and democratic model of security governance.

Failing to sustain the claim in the literature that "demilitarization" and "democratization" are mutually reinforcing (Johansen 1992: 115), the presented evidence rather suggests that demilitarisation is not necessarily on the agenda when it comes to processes of military change in insecure environments of limited statehood. Multi-agency approaches of security, such as SSR and integrated/comprehensive security approaches, promote the constabularisation of armed forces and a "gradual decrease of the projected military force" (Oliveira 2010: 53), demanding the armed forces to get the "ability to adapt" (Tauxe 2000: 3) and enter a coherent system of complementarity in multi-actor operations. The dynamics in the case study under analysis in this dissertation suggested that 'demilitarisation' and 'democratisation' are not necessarily mutually reinforcing, particularly in insecure environments exposed to multiple risks, but, in contrast with claims of classical literature on a pragmatic military, dynamics of constabularisation seem to be obstructed by the insecure context and multitude of threats.

Capitalisation of projects in human security and development could constitute possible avenues of action after the security operations will end, but they would require stronger coherency and complementarity with civilian institutions, including CSOs. Such extended roles (e.g. in development, crises management, et cetera) will however require the military to undertake appropriate training and learning in order to deal with the new situations. Such roles could be similar to the role of militaries in full democracies.

Both military and non-military respondents consider that CSO-military operations can be complementary, with almost three quarters of the respondents having been of the opinion that operations and activities conducted by the military and civilians, specifically NGOs, can be complementary. Applying a comprehensive definition of security, understood as human security and building on the development-security nexus, both military and NGOs are perceived to work towards the same end, i.e. security and peace. Complementarity implies "distinct actions" (Jenny 2001: 23) and might thus be more suitable than cooperation or coordination in operational environments with different priorities and mandates (Grünewald and de Geoffroy 2002: 462). Complementarity might not only solve the problem of independence, but also neutralise the risk of defection, which cannot be guaranteed by cooperation, coordination or collaboration strategies (Holzinger 2003: 26). As participants perceived that the actions of the military and CSOs can be

complementary, it means that there is a perceived common goal, which is an important step towards more cooperative civil-military designs.

7.3.3 Informality and Institutionalisation

One aspect which SSR-based approaches largely fail to account for is that processes of change and transformation can occur in different forms and intensities at different levels: personal, organisational/institutional and operational. This is corroborated by the presented evidence which suggests that there can be a variation in the cooperative choices at institutional, operational or personal level. Civil-military interaction between two individuals (one civilian, one from the military) is likely to be underpinned by different dynamics than an instance of interaction between a civilian and a military agency or institution. This is because the two types of actors, i.e. individual versus institution, are influenced by different variables. One military officer narrated during the interview that he was travelling regularly to the US to visit his daughter, who is established there since a long time (Interview Participant #44, Senior Military Representative). Now, this officer had an obviously more open and liberal view than others, and this might not be reflected at the level of institutions. Active military officers in Pakistan are subject to a strict conduct etiquette, which often inhibits contact with civilians. Constraints might be set off when interaction is occurring in difficult areas, such as zones of conflict. In such contexts, the presented evidence showed that the military would be inclined to informally offer help and support for government or NGOs operations, under the condition that the respective CSOs have the NOC and have not been under the military's 'radar' before. Thus, civil-military cooperation is not one-sided, in the sense that it resembles a win-win situation for both military and civilian actors. What CSOs can learn from synergies or partnerships with the military is insights into the way in which the military thinks and acts.

This conceptual distinction is important because transformation at one level (e.g. personal) can have spillover or diffusion effects at other levels (e.g. institutional). For example, changes of the individual human agency can manifest in changes in the chain of command. Links with military research institutions, such as the National Defence University or NUST, can facilitate the emergence of more liberal views within the military organisation. This would provide corroboratory support for Farrell's acculturation thesis which suggests that "intersubjective beliefs about the social and

natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of their actions" (Farrell 2002: 49) can be one determinant of military change and adaptation. While currently unlikely, a future COAS with liberal views, which was trained abroad and is knowledgeable of the importance of civilian control might possibly have a revolutionising impact on the democratisation of the military.

Thus, informality, often reflected at the individual level of interaction, can be conducive and possibly precede more formal ways of cooperation. Although the lack of formal oversight mechanisms impedes democratisation at macro-level, this seems difficult and almost unrealistic to be achieved in insecure, post-military environments without a clear strategy of engagement and progress assessments. However, informal interactions between civilians and the military can sometimes lead to more formalised or institutionalised ways of cooperation. Presenting an idea and approaching the idea of a project of civil-military cooperation during a seminar in which military officers are also invited can lead to concrete projects between non-state actors, such as CSOs, think tanks or international organisations and the armed forces. Development projects but also research on key security challenges were found to be thematic areas in which the military and ISPR might be more inclined to enter partnerships with civilians.

7.3.4 The Role of CSOs in Building Power and Will for Positive Change

Findings in Chapter 5 showed that civil society organisations such as think tanks and NGOs can build power and will for positive change, even though they are perceived to boost civilian monitoring capacity only to a limited extent. They were grasped by the respondents to have a mixed or weak impact on peace and security. Civilian non-state organisations were found to provide input legitimacy by enhancing civic participation at grassroots and middle level. The data suggested that they had a moderate contribution to output legitimacy, only a small one towards diagonal accountability and rare interventions in elite pacting (bridging the civil-military gap). One significant contribution was in awareness building, which conceptually can be attributed to indirect diagonal accountability, via empowerment of citizens and key participants. One reason for which CSOs were perceived by many respondents to have a mixed or weak impact might be that the final result of their work is not immediately visible and often difficult to operationalise. Organisations working in areas of human security such as development,

education, training or service-delivery are usually perceived as being more beneficial. A link was found between the respondents' perception of CSOs' utility or value-added for peace and security and their perception of domestic needs. Thus, organisations working on areas which the participants perceived as being a priority were conceived in a more positive way, suggesting that the respondents (including military representatives) had fewer difficulties in legitimising those types of NGOs. Non-state actors working in the advocacy and political development domains are not necessarily less successful, even though their impact is more complicated to assess.

7.3.5 Checking Power (Accountability) and Transparency

One aspect which deserves closer attention is the link between post-modern civilian control or oversight and multi-agency approaches of peace and security. Postmodern civilian oversight can be understood as the superiority of democratically elected civilian actors in decision- and policy-making. Hybrid, multi-agency approaches of peace and security involving a plurality of actors and hybrid interactions, such as SSR, advocate processes of change and the establishment of a sense of ownership for all stakeholders. Aiming to overcome dichotomies and binary relations that are prone to exclusion of certain groups, theories of multi-agency security advocate hybrid models of governance (Luckham and Kirk 2013: 7; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011) underpinned by "normative pluralism" (Riches 2017: 309). But how are *an active role of the military in politics* and *civilian oversight* reconcilable, was one dilemma which I raised in the theoretical framework chapter of this thesis. I argue that, particularly in insecure societies, affected by multiple insecurities and with a strong tradition of military governance, a special focus needs to be put on the second axis, i.e. checking power.

Checking power, i.e. democratic civilian control and accountability of security and defence institutions, is a *sine qua non* component to ensure that the military does not exceed the level of authority set by democratic standards. As we will learn in this sub-section, checking power, or the civilian monitoring capacity, depends to a great extent on the other SSR structural axis, i.e. building power. The empowerment of political institutions, citizens, but also of CSOs to constructively contribute to these goals becomes thus a condition for the second SSR component.

Checking power (accountability) is related to knowledge, trust (social capital) and civil-military interdependence. This dissertation argues that checking power (accountability) can be enforced directly, via institutions (horizontal accountability) or indirectly, by citizens (vertical accountability), through processes of monitoring and sanctioning. It was found that processes of social learning and awareness building, generated, for example, via media or direct participation and training, can facilitate the generation of knowledge and capacity to monitor or sanction. Knowledge and capacity can strengthen the agency of societal actors and enable them to challenge military's policies and thus enable moving from a 'low-intensity democracy' (weak or fragmented) (O'Donnell 1994, 2001; Arce and Bellinger 2007: 118) to a more advanced and consolidated democratic system. The existence of vertical accountability (the possibility of citizens to vote and exert their political preferences) might suggest, as I previously argued, a phase of 'delegative democracy' (O'Donnell 1994). Applying Rustow's (1970: 346) and Serra's (2008: 10) scales of democracy, it transpires that Pakistan might be in an elevated 'preparatory' phase, i.e. one of power struggle between different actors, moving towards a not yet fully achieved 'decision-making' phase understood as a form of political consensus and acceptance of diversity and institutionalisation of democratic procedures.

As the presented evidence showed, instances of formal institutional monitoring or sanctioning of the military are rare and institutions to formally exert such functions do not exist. The hearing of the military intelligence chief by the Parliament in relation to the CIA operation of capturing Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad was a rare example of the civilian government exerting its oversight functions. A few CSOs were found to conduct activities of political development of civilian institutions through training of politicians and civil servants, but the possibilities to assess the direct effects on the institutional capacity to exert oversight are very limited. Although there is currently no formal institutional oversight mechanism, some element of 'soft' oversight can emerge out of the cumulative pressure coming from the public opinion, society and political parties, particularly in times of crisis.

Interorganisational theories argue that "interorganisational interactions become progressively more institutionalised" (Gray 1989: 240) and can range "from exploratory to contractual forms" (Williams 2015: 31). So far, interactions between military and civilian institutions or actors have certainly not resulted in any form of institutionalisation of democratic civil-military relations or democratic oversight of the military. As per

constitutional provisions (Art. 243 of the Constitution), the armed forces shall operate under the command of the federal government. However, the government does not have the power to exert the authority to implement this provision. As the results of this analysis have shown, while civil-military relations have improved significantly post-Musharraf (see Figure 4.4), three quarters of the respondents considered that the balance of power is *de facto* inclined towards the military (Figure 4.6). The level of civilian oversight was found to be perceived to be low, with governments' sanctioning capacity estimated by the respondents at zero (see Figure 4.6). Most respondents considered that civilian institutions' lack of capacity to exert democratic oversight opened a vacuum which determined the military to 'compulsive intervention'. The government is considered to be acquiescent when the military exceeds its constitutional power and to have only very little capacity to set incentives for the armed forces to refrain from interfering in the political decision-making realm.

What remained unclear from the findings is the relationship between CSO-military interaction and norms diffusion (spillover) or processes of interdependence. Over 75% of the CSOs in the analysed sample claimed that they are involved in interaction with the armed forces in the form of cooperation (informal level), coordination (formal level) or collaboration (both formal and informal interactions). The data from the qualitative interviews suggested that these processes of interaction, while creating informal links between certain cells of the military institution and civilian structures, have not yet created strong interdependence dynamics in the sense of one actor (e.g. military) being dependent on another (e.g. civilians). If sufficiently strong, such interdependences could enact a system of checks and balances and can result in a form of distribution of power. Interactions at interpersonal level or in difficult areas, e.g. of high security risks, can be more likely to foster interaction and could be used as entry points to access formal institutional structures or fora.

It is also difficult to estimate to what extent the interaction between civil society actors and the military induced norms diffusion processes put pressure on the military to change. While the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate the direct norm diffusion effects from CSO-military interaction, the data showed that CSOs' activities and interventions were perceived to be helpful in the development of a democratic political culture and, specifically, to re-calibrate the acceptability of the society and political parties vis-à-vis

military actions, which is directly linked to checking power: what are the redlines and how far can the men in uniform go?

7.3.6 Limitations of Local Actors' Approach

To substantively understand the dynamics of non-state actors' impact on SSR and the democratic transformation of security and defence institutions in insecure and fragile states one aspect requires more in-depth consideration: the limitations of local actors.

As Chapter 6 (on determinants of civil-military interaction) has revealed, the lack of an efficient strategy of how to reform the security sector, engage with key actors, such as the military, or how to enable effective democratic institutional change can have counterproductive effects for CSOs' approaches on the ground. This might be because, as previous literature finds (Hoffmann *et al.* 2018), drivers of change are "too complex for localized bottom-up approaches to significantly change the *status quo*" in security governance and CSOs often lack the expertise or an efficient strategy. The failure to anticipate the interactions between the projects' objective or the financial support by international organisations (of which most CSOs benefit) on one side and the local features on the other side, was found to possibly result in rejection and suspicion by the local community. CSOs can be significantly more impactful and local resentments might be partly overcome when there is a strategy in place, which is considerate of the sensitivities of the local context. By strategy I mean a vision of the future, a plan for action, which necessarily involves a counterfactual analysis of the anticipated impact of a project or activity, but also of the overall identity of a certain organisation. Carefully reviewing the effects of actions and estimating the anticipated dynamics, the effects of the intervening factors at micro- and macro-level and the interaction between them can help non-state actors to gain expertise about how to design projects which would enable more effective empowerment of the society and institutions.

Foreign sources of funding and attempts by the international community to stimulate democratic security governance through local actors was found to be genuinely associated with a negative impact, as CSOs benefitting from foreign funding were found to be perceived with particular suspicion and mistrust. Non-governmental organisations financed by the EU, the US or other international actors were perceived by many to propagate a 'foreign' system of values, which clashes with local values. However,

foreign investment and support by international organisations can stimulate the betterment of the society. As Figure 6.1 showed, GDP per capita in Pakistan increased with the increase in net official development assistance, suggesting that there might be a positive association between foreign assistance or funding and human security and development. The genuine negative perception of the impact of foreign support might be due to other factors. The country's colonial past was found to be a possible explanation for the generalised mistrust in the support and intentions of foreign nations or organisations.

One last thing to consider before moving on to discuss the implications of the findings for theory is the relationship between foreign funding, legitimacy and accountability. One reason for which international organisations, such as the EU, are working together with (local) CSOs in fragile and insecure states is the belief that they can enhance legitimacy by representing or bringing together the views of societal groups. Legitimacy in this sense is not understood as political legitimacy in a Weberian sense, which would confer CSOs the power to exert coercion or authority on the groups they represent. This is not something which CSOs claim. Legitimacy here is understood more as appropriateness to represent certain groups and receive, on their behalf, support from international organisations, to contribute to the advancement of the society and governance, as one CSO respondent explained:

> *'NGO[s] are not elected, they cannot replace state institutions, which are primary actors in policy making, as per constitution. (…) NGOs cannot replace that role; Expertise does not mean that they should be given authority. Through their expertise, they can contribute (…) it is an input towards better policy making and towards better governance.' (Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative)*

Survey-based evidence generated by this research suggested that NGO projects can be influenced by donor funding and that funding constitutes one issue of concern for many organisations.

Half of the organisations in the analysed sample claimed that that they feel mainly accountable to the donor, underlining the CSOs' link with the source of their funding. The donor is perceived as the agency to which they shall be accountable, because their obligation to report to the donor organisations. Being more analytical about this finding, it follows that, in their projects, CSOs will primarily seek to converge around the objectives and guidelines of the international organisation which is funding them. This

should not be equated whatsoever with the ignorance of the project's impact on the local population, its needs and interests. In case of a conflict of interests between the guidelines from the supporting international agency and the local community, local organisations would likely seek arbitration in the favour of the local population. In one example mentioned by an interview participant (Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative), during one instance of a discrepancy between a local CSO and a funding INGO at the level of recommendations, the position and opinions of the local organisation prevailed and the INGO unconditionally compromised. The CSOs' concern with their funding source is thus rather related to their objective of survival and stability in their projects and impact. Survey-data from this dissertation revealed that funding was the major challenge for most CSOs (87.5% of the analysed organisations mentioned it as the primary challenge, N=25), even greater than the military, which was claimed to be the primary challenge by only 33% of the analysed organisations.

Although many CSOs felt primarily accountable to the funding organisations, they fulfil a series of other functions, such as practicing direct representation, shaping counternarratives, giving voice to the powerless, which constitute direct sources of civil society legitimacy.

7.4 Implications of the Findings for Theory

The findings of this PhD thesis have several implications for advancing theoretical debates in the specialist literature.

First, the dissertation added a theoretical distinction for theories of civil-military relations and military change (Farrell and Terrif 2002; Bruneau and Matei 2013; Croissant 2014; Croissant *et al.* 2013) in insecure states affected by multiple security threats and with limited statehood (institutional capacity). Particularly in insecure and fragile states with limited institutional capacity, deficiencies in the performance of transition governments can generate "autocratic nostalgia" (Huntington 1995: 10) linked to increased support for the military. The dissertation fills an important gap in theories of civil-military relations and military transformation, namely the lack of specific propositions dealing to democratic control of the military and civilian oversights in insecure and fragile states, which are particularly vulnerable to weak institutions and security threats, being thus more prone to military interference in politics. Advancing existing literature arguing that

processes of military adaptation refer to the "adjustment of existent military means and methods, generally, under the demand of an [armed] conflict" (Schmitt 2015: 152), the findings have a contribution for understanding the processes of military adaptation in post-conflict contexts. Thus, processes of change in security and defence institutions do not necessarily occur due to conflict, but due to endogenous decisions to change in order to maximise the legitimacy basis and perpetuate power. This type of change would correspond to what the literature on institutional change calls "normative isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell 1993: 151). 'Normative isomorphism', understood as military's voluntary processes of change and transformation, would be linked to 'military professionalisation', a key component in traditional civil-military relations; military professionalisation both in its meaning of a specialised military which would not stage *coup d'états* or interfere in politics due to professionalism and military ethic (Huntington 1957), but also professionalisation in its meaning of "cognitive base" of legitimation (Larson 1977: 40). In insecure environments, processes of military professionalisation are more likely to match Larson's market-inspired definition of professionalisation. Endogenous or normative change, out of self-motivation, can enable the armed forces in insecure states to establish a 'cognitive base', a "mode of cognition (…) which is taken for granted in the society" (Larson 1977: 41). By adopting a doctrine and a strategy which are acceptable for the society and the international community, the military is in a better position to maintain a legitimacy basis. Internal and external threats usually require a strong and capable military, which, in fragile environments with limited statehood, might result in a difficulty to establish civilian oversight. Particularly in states with a historical legacy of military institutions and infrastructure, such as Pakistan or Egypt (which was not studied in-depth in this research, but to which some of the findings can be generalised), strong legacies of power imbalances are even more difficult to overcome.

Classical literature on military change and transformation argues that due to military's "institutional resistance" (IISS 2001: 24) to change the "military organizations are intrinsically inflexible, prone to stagnation, and fearful of change" (Grissom 2007: 919). Specifically, the results of this thesis progress the propositions of the acculturalisation model of military change (Farrell and Terriff 2002; Grissom 2007), which argue that "senior leaders" or civilians can take the roles of "agents of innovation" (Grissom 2007: 920) and thus be major sources of triggering change. The cultural model of military innovation claims that culture is the major determinant of military change, in contrast to

the other three models of military change – which argue that the decisive factors which can trigger military transformation are primarily civil-military relations (Posen 1984), interservice politics, i.e. the "relationship between military services" (Grissom 2007: 910-1) or intra-service competition, i.e. the competition between different (domestic) military departments (Rosen 1991). By providing insights into the dynamics and conditions which facilitate processes of endogenous change, this dissertation addressed a major research gap related to the processes of normative military change, with the nature and various aspects of the addressed gap being discussed in detail in Section 2.4. Through bridging the literature of military change and adaptation with theories of hybrid security governance, it showed that the military can voluntary change and strategically adapt due to changes in the domestic political culture and legitimation potential on one side and diplomatic 'redlines' induced by the international community on the other side, if changes are associated with greater utility gains. The thesis demonstrated that endogenous military change, motivated by the re-establishment or enhancement of the legitimacy and thus power basis, can be due to changes in the political and societal culture, triggered via empowerment dynamics sustained by exogenous sources (e.g foreign funding).

A further theoretical distinction added by this dissertation is the democratisation of civil-military relations and civilian oversight as part of hybrid theories and approaches of peace and security (Schroeder *et al.* 2014; Borchert and Thiele 2012; Luckham and Kirk 2013: 7; Bagayoko *et al.* 2016; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond 2014; Visoka 2017; Wittkowsky 2012). The findings indicated that more explicit propositions need to be generated about the mechanism of democratic oversight of the military advocated by SSR, comprehensive security and whole-of-government approaches, which are conceptually underpinned by these theories. The distinction added here is with regards to the civilian oversight component of hybrid, multi-agency peace and security approaches, such as SSR. The caveat of these models is that they argue that the way to achieve democratic civilian control is through the professionalisation of armed forces, in Huntington's 'objective' civilian control sense (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder 2004). In Huntington's objective control, military professionalism is based on a dichotomist understanding of civil-military relations, i.e. military non-interference in political affairs and vice versa, the argument being that a professional, politically neutral and autonomous military prevents military *coups* and guarantees civilian oversight. Huntington's model

of civilian control is based on a Clausewitzian understanding of war, according to which 'war is the continuation of politics by other means'. While Huntington's approach emerged as a constitutional arrangement in the American domestic post-Second World War context, its propositions might be partly outdated for the contemporary (much more complex and interdependent) international security environment. This involves a transition from an understanding of an autonomous military to a military *involved*, taking new non-military, human security roles. Comprehensive security mechanisms need thus be conceptually reflective of these developments. I argue that there is a mismatch between a divergent (autonomous armed forces) understanding of civil-military relations and multidimensional, multifunctional operations in a complex, increasingly interdependent domestic and international order. To overcome these shortcomings, I proposed a model of civil-military adaptation and civilian influence (explained in detail in Section 7.3) based on interdependent relations between military, political institutions and societal actors.

The results also advance the literature on CSOs' role in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) (Yalçinkaya 2013) as well as CSOs' role in peacebuilding (Paffenholz 2010) and democratic security governance (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). Specifically, based on a small sample, the dissertation assessed the impact of civil society organisations such as think tanks, (I)NGO and local non-state associations on a. input legitimacy, b. output legitimacy, c. diagonal accountability and d. elite pacting, and significant variation was found for the four types of functions.

7.5 Implications of the Findings for Policy

The results of this dissertation have implications for policy approaches based on comprehensive security and SSR such as the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy or NATO's Projecting Stability Initiative, and on international organisations or donors aiming to democratise security governance in insecure states in general.

SSR and similar approaches of comprehensive security governance – in general implemented by the United Nations, European Union and their partner agencies – argue that the way to achieve democratic civilian control is through the professionalisation of armed forces, in Huntington's institutionalist sense. Military professionalism is based on a dichotomist understanding of civil-military relations, i.e. military non-interference in

political affairs and vice versa, the argument being that a professional, politically neutral and autonomous military prevents military *coups* and guarantees civilian oversight. Not only has the nature of conflicts changed to more hybrid types of confrontations, but the role of military has also expanded towards development and human security sectors since the 1990s. SSR mechanisms need thus be conceptually reflective of these developments. I argued that 1) military professionalisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of oversight and 2) a politically neutral and autonomous soldier might misfit collaborative and hybrid approaches to peace and security, and I explain the implications of this below.

First, as seen in practice, an autonomous and professional military in the institutionalist sense does not necessarily result in greater civilian control. For example, in the case of Pakistan, high levels of military professionalisation and discipline have not prevented armed forces from taking political power – there were three successful *coups d'état* since the country's independence in 1947, with the military being in government for several decades – or from interfering in politics during periods of civilian regime. Thus, a highly professional and autonomous military in Huntington's institutionalist sense does not preclude the risk of intervention.

Second, the proposed model of civil-military adaptation emphasises the importance of checking power and argues that in insecure orders of limited statehood, the capacity of checking power is a function of another important component, i.e. building power. The model also highlights the roles of civil society in building power of both citizens and institutions to exert their 'checking power' and civilian oversight functions. Security sector reforms in transitional countries need to focus on local ownership and encompass both formal and informal processes, actors and institutions. It shall be expected that during implementation, security reform processes and standards might result in "adoption, adaptation or rejection by domestic actors" (Schroeder *et al.* 2014). Input legitimacy and support from local communities represent major prerequisites for security sector reforms aiming at democratic state-building through strengthening accountability and governance capacity. While preferences at individual or communal level might generate tensions between the SSR logics and local norms, international actors should focus on knowledge production and building the power of local communities and institutions to exert their accountability and sanctioning functions. Insufficient involvement of local actors and military in the design of SSR milestones and activities might have negative effects on its implementation.

Dialogue, mediation and negotiation of democratic security governance outputs at various institutional levels (e.g. local, national, et cetera) are likely to increase the probability of sustainable implementation. Empathy for local context can increase the sense of ownership at community level and the likelihood that the institutional reforms will be accepted and durable. Processes of hybridisation facilitate the management of anticipated frictions between importing (local) and exported (SSR) values and standards. This is where a rift between SSR's recent affinity for hybrid approaches of security and peace, and purely institutionalist understandings of civilian oversight – claiming non-interference and separation between military and civilian affairs – might emerge. While the principle of civilian control should be institutionally guaranteed under constitution, armed forces and political institutions need to permanently exchange expertise during interactive processes. Networks, multi-actor communication and expert debate represent prerequisites of comprehensive approaches to security, to which democratic security governance approaches also subscribe. I argue that a hybrid understanding of civilian oversight, corresponding to interdependent (not divergent) civil-military relations would better fit strategic exigency, coherence and multidimensional demands characterising comprehensive security and security sector reform operational environments.

Thus, in SSR environments, hybridity involves a mechanism of civilian control based on a logic of interdependence. A 'targeted partnership' and inclusive interaction between 'military, political elites, and citizenry' (Schiff 2012) in the political decision-making process increases information symmetry as well as the prospects for endurance of the decisions taken. The type of partnership proposed refers to effective and interactive dialogue between military, civilian institutions and society (e.g. non-governmental organisations, think tanks, academia, media). This would imply the inclusion of representatives (both formal and informal) from all relevant sectors into regular consultations and their meaningful integration in democratisation processes at policy formulation and implementation levels. Such pluralist and interactive models are likely to be more reflective of cultural and local institutional peculiarities and decrease the risk of defection given the coordinated and intermingled oversight structure. A meaningful engagement of militaries in stabilisation and democracy-support processes might decrease their propensity to *coups* or intervention in politics (unsolicited by civilian institutions). Overall, a model based on interdependent relationships, which would give all relevant stakeholders a sense of ownership in the participatory sense, is likely to

strengthen the aims of the modern democracy – guarantee of security, crisis prevention, and the sustainable safeguard of the society (Foster 2005) – and optimise domestic decision-making outcomes regarding state capacity to cope with (internal and external) security threats (Brooks and Stanley 2007). Greater interdependence between state, military and society are not only of strategic importance, but can also increase accountability and legitimacy and thus sustainability of democratic political decisions.

In addition, particularly in countries with previous military regimes, such as Pakistan, a re-orientation of armed forces' roles towards human security and development activities might ensure a sustainable democratic transition process. This would involve creative ways by international and domestic actors to promote a sustainable transfer of power from military to civilian institutions, also at economic level. *De facto*, such a move would imply the transfer of military-owned companies, e.g. oil fabrics, banks and airlines to civilians, which could produce additional revenues for increasing government capacity and re-balance the power asymmetry. As the military is not expected to easily give these up, it would require a creative design of incentives and positive conditionality, along with awareness raising in the society and public opinion about the need to transfer these assets to civilians, for the well-being of the society.

Another main conclusion which can be traced from the analysis is that in insecure and fragile states with limited institutional capacity and a traditional society, the impact of CSOs and INGOs funded by the EU or other international organisations and donors requires a differentiated assessment. The dynamics and impact of NGOs in developing democracies undergoing systemic transition are different than in consolidated democracies with an 'autonomous' civil society. International organisations and donors need thus to consider this aspect when funding local organisations in transitional states. NGOs and other civil society representatives can become important pillars during periods of transition in fragile countries under the condition of adopting suitable strategies of engagement with key actors, including the military, as well as effective strategies of institutional change. IOs could give particular attention to 'elite pacting', in the sense of bridging the civil-military gap and encouraging elites/leaders of the two orders (military and civilian) to reach agreements or pacts, and direct diagonal accountability, i.e. the empowerment of institutions to exert monitoring, oversight and sanctioning functions, which are crucial functions for more formalised and institutionalised processes, and in which CSOs might be less impactful due to lack of appropriate expertise and resources.

Thus, the implications of this research for policy can be summarised as follows. *First*, the EUGS and other international organisations' strategies to democratise security governance in environments of limited statehood should be more explicit about how to achieve democratic oversight in transitional states. *Second*, the EU's and international organisations'/donors' policy-making should consider in their strategy of engagement and political development in insecure states that, unlike in advanced democracies, where political parties and institutions have an established democratic outlook, the operational environment in transition and insecure states is different. *Third*, the EU, in conjunction with other international organisations and donors must better monitor and follow-up on the implementation of the arrangements with partner countries, including human rights conventions as part of GSP+ which offer access to the European market. Failure to do so can decrease the international organisations' credibility and local support in the partner country. *Fourth*, in post-military states, international organisations such the EU need to re-think their strategies to ensure that they are efficiently ensuring a transfer of power from the armed forces to civilian institutional structures. As the case under investigation revealed, while the military can be entrapped towards some manifestations of democratic elements (multi-party elections, freedom of expression), it can simultaneously continue to perpetuate its power and infrastructure in a system of co-evolution with civilian structures, which is manifested in both continuity and change and with a balance of power inclined towards the more powerful actor. *Fifth*, particularly in the case of Pakistan, while the strategic partnership with the EU intensified dramatically, particularly after the break in relations with the US and the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, special attention needs to be accorded to avoid that the South Asian country might become a playground for EU-China competition, in relation to norms and trade relations. While China's direct investment in Pakistan is significantly higher than that of the EU, China is not listed among the top ten donors of gross ODA for Pakistan (OECD 2019b). Thus, the leverage which the EU has is that most of its assistance is in the form of development aid (rather than loans) and is guided by a long-term vision which has in centre social and political development, human rights, equality, social justice and democratic values.

7.5 Future Research and Conclusion

Future research could thus examine the dynamics of such possible proxy competitions in countries in which both the EU and China have an interest. Through its Road and Belt Strategy, China has made investments in infrastructure networks in over 150 countries in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe and Latin America. How this will impact on the recipient countries and what implications this will have on the EU strategy and foreign policy in those countries deserves special academic attention. Such research would also be vital to be incorporated in Europe's strategy in Asia and towards China and ensure that 1) their strategies do not cancel out each other and 2) offers are made which correspond to European interests on one side and do not harm Chinese interests on the other side and vice-versa. Future research could study the options to strengthen capacity of the judiciary and constitutional courts in insecure and fragile states. Implementation of constitutional provisions is key to progressing the rule of law, statehood and democratic security governance in transitional states. As the case studied in this research uncovered, civilian oversight of the armed forces is stipulated in constitutional provisions (Art. 243), but the federal government lacks capacity to implement it and the military found ways to introduce exceptions which would allow it to exceed its constitutional powers. How could CSOs and think tanks have a positive impact on breaking the institutional *status quo* and power asymmetry between civilians and armed forces deserves further scholarly attention and could be the subject of future research.

In conclusion, it is both continuity and change which characterise security orders in post-military environments. Civil-military cooperation represents one major component of hybrid approaches of peace, security and defence, which emerged to effectively counter conventional and less conventional security threats through coherence and 'strategic coordination' between a multitude of actors. While hybrid approaches of peace, security and defence are playing an increasing role, e.g. in EU and NATO global strategies, hitherto, little research has analysed the impact of hybrid mechanisms. This doctoral project fills a crucial gap in the field of change of security and defence institutions and democratic security governance by analysing instances of civil-military interactions and military transition in Pakistan, as well as the determinants and strategies which can influence them. The findings are relevant for international organisations and donors, and can inform the EU Global Strategy about mechanisms promoting democratic security governance and societal resilience in fragile countries, affected by multiple insecurities.

The results of this PhD dissertation advanced theories of hybrid security, civil-military relations and military change.

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Annex 1

List of the Interview Participants

		Reference	Year	Interview Type	Location
1	Military	Interview Participant #1, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Rawalpindi
2		Interview participant #6, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
3		Interview Participant #8, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Rawalpindi
4		Interview Participant #15, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
5		Interview Participant #19, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
6		Interview Participant #20, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
7		Interview Participant #21, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
8		Interview Participant #27, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
9		Interview Participant #28, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
10		Interview Participant #29, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
11		Interview Participant #33, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
12		Interview Participant #44, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Rawalpindi
14		Interview Participant #46, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
15		Interview Participant #48, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
16		Interview Participant #50, Senior Military Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi

17	Civil society actors (NGOs, think tanks, INGOs, other non-state not-for-profit organisations)	Interview Participant #2, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
18		Interview Participant #3, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
19		Interview Participant #4, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
20		Interview Participant #5, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
21		Interview Participant #9a, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
22		Interview Participant #9b, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
23		Interview Participant #10, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
24		Interview Participant #14, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Rawalpindi
25		Interview Participant #16, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
26		Interview Participant #17, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
27		Interview Participant #18, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
28		Interview Participant #22, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
29		Interview Participant #24, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
30		Interview Participant #25, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
31		Interview Participant #30, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
32		Interview Participant #31, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
33		Interview Participant #34, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
34		Interview Participant #35, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
35		Interview Participant #36, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad

36		Interview Participant #37, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
37		Interview Participant #38, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
38		Interview Participant #39, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
39		Interview Participant #41, Senior CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
40		Interview Participant #49, CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Peshawar
41		Interview Participant #50, CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
42		Interview Participant #51, CSO Representative	2017	Personal	Peshawar

43	Academia	Interview Participant #7, Senior Academia Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
44		Interview Participant #13, Senior Academia Representative	2017	Personal	Rawalpindi
45		Interview Participant #23, Senior Academia Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
46		Interview Participant #42, Senior Academia Representative	2017	Personal	Peshawar

47	Media	Interview Participant #11, Senior Media Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
48		Interview Participant #12, Senior Media Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
49		Interview Participant #32, Senior Media Representative	2017	Personal	Karachi
50		Interview Participant #40, Senior Media Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad

51	Government/Political Party	Interview Participant #45, Senior Government Representative	2017	Personal	Islamabad
52		Interview Participant #26, Senior Government Representative	2017	Personal	Lahore
53		Interview Participant #43, Senior Government Representative	2017	Personal	Peshawar
54		Interview Participant #47, Senior Government Representative	2017	Personal	Missing data

Annex 2

Codebook for the Inter-Coder Reliability Test

Military change post-Musharraf

Refers to the process of military transition and transformation. To what extent is there any observable change in the military institution, in terms of military strategy, doctrine, policy or at institutional, organisational or operational level? How has this change manifested, was it a positive or negative change? How does the trajectory of this change look like and what are possible determinants of this change?

Area of operation (policy sectors or geographic area)

Refers to the policy sector (e.g. development, education, health, CVE, security research) on which NGOs operation. Area of operation refers to the geographic in which NGOs conduct project – is a province / area with an instable, volatile security environment, which has a sensitive status, as per government regulations in place? Zones of conflict and high risk of terrorism activity or areas with conservative (tribal) communities are usually defined as sensitive areas.

Civil society organisations' capacity / impact

Refers to CSOs':

- Capacity to conduct work which would improve security in Pakistan. Security here is understood broadly, encompassing both human security and national security notions. Capacity can refer to their funding capacity, expertise, professionalism, substantively of the project. Capacity also refers to NGOs' ability to assess their impact.
- Impact on improving security, understood broadly as human security and national security. The impact can be positive, negative, mixed, neutral or weak.
- NGOs capacity and impact are highly dependent on trust relationships with other actors and NGOs' credibility.

Result of the Inter-Coder Reliability Test

Node	Source	Source Size	Kappa	Agreement (%)	A and B (%)	Not A and Not B (%)	Disagreement (%)	A and Not B (%)	B and Not A (%)
Area of operation (policy sectors or geographic area)	Coding units	8579 chars	0,7747	95,62	8,67	86,94	4,38	4,31	0,07
Military change post Musharraf	Coding units	8579 chars	0,7202	86,42	33,99	52,43	13,58	3,33	10,25
CSO capacity or impact	Coding units	8579 chars	0,6421	82,13	38,91	43,22	17,87	9,83	8,04

Annex 3

Anonymised Survey Academia / Media / Government Experts

Many thanks for your availability to participate in this survey!

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Personal Introduction

1.1. In the last ten years, you have been mainly based in:

Mark only one oval.

- o Punjab
- o Sindh
- o Gilgit Baltistan
- o Baluchistan
- o Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- o FATA
- o Azad Jammu and Kashmir
- o Islamabad Capital Territory
- o Other:

1.2. In which countries have you been/travelled in the last ten years:

Civil-Military Interaction

2.1. How would you describe the government's monitoring capacity over the military at the moment?

Mark only one oval.

- o Sanctioning – the government punishes military disobedience and hold the military accountable or even "deprive military officers of benefits" for "military defeat, political or economic failures or human rights abuses"
- o Counterbalancing – the civilian government attempts to restrict and control armed forces' ability for organizing themselves and threaten the democratic establishment
- o Monitoring – the civilian government has mechanisms in place to 'detect' military
- o misconduct
- o Political socialization – the civilian government have strategies in place to "strengthening the acceptance of civilian control by transforming the professional norms and mindset of the military officer corps through political education, the reform of officer training programs"
- o Appeasement – civilian state institutions set "incentives for the armed forces to refrain from politics"
- o Acquiescence – civilian government "refrains from intruding on military prerogatives and the institutional autonomy of the military"
- o "Compulsive intervention" – limited efficiency of government institutions offers a window of opportunity (and necessity) for the military to intervene in governance issues.
- o Other:

2.2. (Optional) Please provide further details:

2.3. What type of interaction would you say better describes your relationship with NGO-military interaction?

Mark only one oval.

- o mainly cooperation (informal agreement)
- o mainly coordination (formal agreement)

- mainly collaboration (formal and informal agreement)
- Other:

2.4. (Optional) Please provide details:

2.5. In Pakistan (at the moment), do you think the balance of power is inclined more towards:

Mark only one oval.

- military
- government
- Other:

2.6. (Optional) Please provide details:

2.7. How would you describe NGO-military relations:

Mark only one oval.

- mainly collaborative (repeated interaction)
- mainly less collaborative
- sometimes collaborative, sometimes less collaborative
- Other:

2.8. Why? Please provide details regarding your choice.

2.9. Do you think that the activities conducted by NGOs and military for the advancement of peace and security in Pakistan are/could be complementary?

Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- Other:

2.10. Please explain your choice:

Peace Strategy

3.1. What approach(es) you think is/are most appropriate in order to achieve sustainable peace:

Tick all that apply.

- Eliminate militants/insurgents
- Capture them
- 'Out-govern' them
- Integrate them
- Other:

3.2. (Optional) Please explain the selected answer here.

3.3. (Optional) Please provide additional comments or remarks:

Anonymised Survey Civil Society Experts

Many thanks for your availability to participate in this survey!

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About your Organisation

Your organisation is:

1.1. Your organisation is (please tick one option):

- o Domestic
- o International
- o Other:

1.2. Your organisation conducts activities in:

Tick all that apply.

- o Punjab
- o Sindh
- o Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- o Azad Jammu and Kashmir
- o Gilgit Baltistan
- o Baluchistan
- o Islamabad Capital Territory
- o FATA

- Other:

1.3. Funding for your organisation comes from:

Tick all that apply.

- Domestic donors
- International donors
- Both
- Works with volunteers
- No funding
- Other:

1.4. What policy area are you working on?

Tick all that apply.

- Human rights
- Peace education
- (Economic) development
- Democratisation
- Good governance
- Women rights
- Youth empowerment
- Research on policy making
- Rights of minorities/disadvantaged groups
- Other:

1.5. Your organisation operates at:

Tick all that apply.

- City/district level
- Province level
- National level
- International level
- Other:

1.6. Conflicts which your organisation is addressing:

Tick all that apply.

- Sectarian violence
- Pakistani government (and society) - Tehreek-e-Taliban
- India-Pakistan
- Pakistan-Afghanistan

- Pakistan-Afghanistan Taliban
- Separatist insurgency Baluchistan
- Other:

1.7. In the last ten years, you interacted with:

Tick all that apply.

- Local government
- National government
- Military
- Domestic NGOs
- Police
- International organisations (e.g. United Nations, European Union)
- Political parties
- Mosque
- Church
- International foundations or INGOs
- Other:

Cooperation and Partners

2.1. How would you assess cooperation with following actors:

Mark only one oval per row.

	Very easy	Easy	Fairly Easy	Sometimes easy, sometimes difficult	Fairly difficult	Difficult	Very difficult	No interaction
Mosque								
Civil population								
Church								
International organisations (NATO, UN, EU)								
NGOs								
INGOs								
Other military staff								
Central government								
Political parties								
Local authorities								

2.2. (Optional) Please provide details:

2.3. Who should participate in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Pakistan?

Tick all that apply.

- o Domestic government
- o Mosque
- o NGOs
- o INGOs
- o International Organisations (e.g. United Nations, European Union)
- o Civil society activists
- o Military
- o Foreign governments
- o Other:

2.4. Do your programmes have a link to a country strategy?

Mark only one oval.

- o Yes
- o No
- o Other:

2.5. (Optional) Please provide details:

2.6. What do you think is (should be) Pakistan's priority at the moment?

Mark only one oval.

- o Human security
- o National security
- o Both equally
- o Other:

2.7. To whom is your organisation primarily accountable?

Mark only one oval.

- o Local population
- o Donor
- o Government
- o Other:

Civil-Military Interaction

3.1. Do you have the contact details of any military liaison officers/staff who are available to you for queries related to the development of your project work in any of these areas?

Tick all that apply.

- o Information-exchange
- o De-radicalisation / integration / conflict resolution or peace programme
- o Decision-making
- o Monitoring
- o Implementation of policy in the security sector
- o Research
- o Policy assistance
- o Other:

3.2. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.3. What type of interaction would you say better describes your relation with the military?

Mark only one oval.

- o Mainly cooperation (informal agreement)
- o Mainly coordination (formal agreement)
- o Mainly collaboration (formal and informal agreement)
- o Other:

3.4. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.5. How would you describe the government's monitoring capacity over the military at the moment?

Tick all that apply.

- o Sanctioning – the government punishes military disobedience and hold the military accountable or even "deprive military officers of benefits" for "military defeat, political or economic failures or human rights abuses"
- o Counterbalancing – the civilian government attempts to restrict and control armed forces' ability for organizing themselves and threaten the democratic establishment
- o Monitoring – the civilian government has mechanisms in place to 'detect' military misconduct
- o Political socialization – the civilian government have strategies in place to "strengthening the acceptance of civilian control by transforming the professional norms and mindset of the military officer corps through political education, the reform of officer training programs"
- o Appeasement – civilian state institutions set "incentives for the armed forces to refrain from politics"
- o Acquiescence – civilian government "refrains from intruding on military prerogatives and the institutional autonomy of the military"
- o "Compulsive intervention" – limited efficiency of government institutions offers a window of opportunity (and necessity) for the military to intervene in governance issues.
- o Other:

3.6. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.7. In Pakistan (at the moment), do you think the balance of power is inclined more towards:

Mark only one oval.

- o Military
- o Government
- o Other:

3.8. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.9. You would describe your interaction with the military as:

Mark only one oval.

- o Mainly collaborative (repeated interaction)
- o Mainly less collaborative
- o Sometimes collaborative, sometimes less collaborative
- o Other:

3.10. Why? Please provide details regarding your choice.

3.11. Do you think that the activities conducted by civil society representatives and military for the advancement of peace and security in Pakistan could be/are complementary?

Mark only one oval.

- o Yes
- o No
- o Other:

3.12. Please explain your choice:

Peace Strategy

4.1. What approach you think is/should be most appropriate in order to achieve sustainable peace:

Tick all that apply.

- o Eliminate militants/insurgents
- o Capture them
- o 'Out-govern' them
- o Integrate them
- o Other:

4.2. (Optional) Please explain the selected answer here.

4.3. What is the greatest challenge for your work at the moment?

Tick all that apply.

- o Funding
- o Partners
- o Government policy
- o Military
- o Other:

Anonymised Survey Military Experts

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Professional Experience

1.1. Please state the number of total years of professional experience you have in the Pakistan Army:

1.2. Your current rank is:

Mark only one oval.

- o General
- o Lieutenant General
- o Major General
- o Brigadier
- o Colonel
- o Lieutenant Colonel

- Major
- Captain
- Lieutenant
- 2nd Lieutenant
- Other:

1.3. You would describe your work (previous work if retired) as:

Tick all that apply.

- Primarily at operational level
- Primarily at strategic level
- Primarily at instructional level
- Other:

1.4. What thematic areas are you working/worked on?

1.5. You mainly operate(d) in:

Tick all that apply.

- Punjab
- Sindh
- Gilgit Baltistan
- Baluchistan
- Azad Jammu and Kashmir
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- FATA
- Islamabad Capital Territory
- Other:

1.6. Are you retired personnel?

Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No

1.7. In your work, you interact with:

Tick all that apply.

- Local government
- National government
- NGOs
- Police

- International agencies (e.g. United Nations, European Union, international foundations or NGOs)
- Political parties
- Mosque
- Church
- Other:

Cooperation and Partners

2.1. How would you assess cooperation with following actors:

	Very easy	**Easy**	**Fairly Easy**	**Sometimes easy, sometimes difficult**	**Fairly difficult**	**Difficult**	**Very difficult**	**No interaction**
Mosque								
Civil population								
Church								
International organisations (NATO, UN, EU)								
NGOs								
INGOs								
Other military staff								
Central government								
Political parties								
Local authorities								

2.2. (Optional) Please provide details:

2.3. Who should participate in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Pakistan?

Tick all that apply.

- State government
- Mosque
- NGOs
- INGOs
- International Organisations (e.g. UN, EU, NATO)
- Civil society representatives

- Foreign governments
- Other:

2.4. What do you think is (should be) Pakistan's priority at the moment?

Tick all that apply.

- Human security
- National security
- Both equally
- Other:

2.5. (Optional) Please provide details or comments:

The Impact of Civil Society on Stability

3.1. Do you have the contact details of any civil society representatives who are available to you for queries related to the development of your project work in any of the areas below?

Tick all that apply.

- Information-exchange
- De-radicalisation / integration / conflict resolution or peace programme
- Decision-making
- Monitoring of the progress of security missions
- Implementation of policy in the security sector
- Assistance in strategy/policy development
- Other:

3.2. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.3. What is the impact of civil-society representatives on peace and security (please select one option)?

- Mainly positive
- Mainly negative
- Mixed
- Other:

3.4. (Optional) Please provide details:

3.5. You would describe your interaction with civil society representatives (please tick one option):

- Mainly collaborative (repeated interaction)
- Interaction with civil society is difficult
- Sometimes collaborative, sometimes less collaborative

- Other:

3.6. Why? Please provide details regarding your choice.

3.7. Do you think that the activities conducted by the military and civil society (e.g. peace NGOs, research think tanks, et cetera) for the advancement of peace and security in Pakistan are/could be complementary?

Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- Other:

3.8. Please explain your choice:

3.9. What type of NGOs or other representatives of civil society you have been more successful to cooperate with:

Mark only one oval.

- Local
- International
- Both in equal measure
- Other:

3.10. (Optional) Please explain why:

3.11. In terms of policy field, with what kind of civil society representatives / NGOs do you tend to cooperate more often with.

Tick all that apply.

- (Economic) development
- Peace education
- Human rights
- Democratisation
- Good governance
- Women rights
- Youth empowerment
- Research
- Rights of minorities
- Other:

Peace Strategy

4.1. What approaches you think are the most appropriate in order to achieve sustainable peace:

Tick all that apply.

- o Eliminate militants/insurgents
- o Capture them
- o 'Out-govern' them
- o Integrate them
- o Other:

4.2. (Optional) Please explain the selected answer here.

4.3. Would you like to make any final comments or remarks?