Introduction

Citizenship plays a substantial role in the evolution of states—from antiquity to modern times. Core concepts of citizenship appear as having ‘flown’ from the Roman Empire and the Greek city-states and—signifying law and descent correspondingly—to the modern, liberal and democratic European idea of citizenship. In this article we turn to the dynamic nature of citizenship, both as an idea and in practice. This perspective provides insights into the shifting parameters and institutions through which citizenship is mediated across time and space. Furthermore, it highlights the role of many additional variables such as memory, visualization and social construction through which citizenship is constantly reimagined and renegotiated by the stakeholders themselves. This opens up space for a theory of citizenship to emerge, one yielded not simply from the experience of the older, liberal democracies, but also that of younger, postcolonial states. Furthermore, citizenship, seen through the transcultural lens of hybridity, extends the discussion far beyond the confinement of the modern nation-state.

To begin we discuss and propose the notion of hybridity as a heuristic device to assess the givens and problems in ‘mainstream’ political theories of citizenship. These include the inherent linearity of the historical narrative underpinning the storyline of citizenship; the implicit assumptions of
methodological nationalism in framing the unit of analysis, and finally, the challenge of
incorporating differentiation and variation in a concept that has been traditionally conceived as
watertight and fixed. Through our case study of citizenship in modern India, we argue that it is
important to understand the entanglement between concepts of citizenship and endogenous ideas
of self-hood, which we propose is the basis for a transcultural understanding of citizenship (see
Mitra 2013).

Citizenship is a crucial interface between state and society and the basic building block of political
order. To what extent was India more successful than other postcolonial states in providing the
political, legal and moral bases of citizenship? We argue that India’s comparative success in turning
subjects as well as rebels into citizens can be seen as a function of political institutions, processes
and memory. These institutional arrangements draw their inspiration both from the modern state
and traditional society, creating in the process, a ‘hybrid state’. We present our findings of an
empirical study on citizenship in India to argue that citizen-making is not a teleological process,
but rather a strategy from which hybrid categories emerge. These must be socially meaningful and
morally accessible to the individual if citizenship is to be resilient. Finally, in our concluding
section we discuss hybridization, as a process and product, which illuminates the strength of
indigenous ideas suitable to a particular society and their relation to national, regional and local
values and power structures.

Citizenship, the State and Hybridity

Within political science, citizenship has been compartmentalized into three different approaches:
the liberal (focusing on status and rights), communitarian (the social embeddedness of the citizen,
civic virtues) and civil republican (a combination of both). Much of the debate and discourse on
citizenship has been at the theoretical, philosophical level, discussing how best to separate and/or
combine the three approaches. It has primarily been the history of Europe and the rise (and ‘fall’)
of the Western nation-state that provides the canvas for this discussion. Using hybridity, we
challenge this narrative by drawing attention to the circulation and circularity of historical and
cultural flows. Our notion of hybridity draws from Homi K. Bhabha’s concept of ‘the third space’,
a space that becomes a mode of articulation—it is ‘interruptive, interrogative, and enunciative’
(Bhabha 1994). Citizenship is our third space, inter-linking state and society and innately
transcultural.
In the attempt to construct a ‘theory of citizenship’, there are at least two major perils. Given that most puzzles in political philosophy can be said to involve relations among citizens or between citizens and the state, the scope of such a theory is unlimited. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman point this challenge out and attempt to circumvent this difficulty by focusing on two broader questions, which, they argued, had been overlooked: namely that of identity and civic virtues (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 352–81). A second challenge lies in the problem of there being at least two separate notions which are sometimes confused. On the one hand, there is the conceptualization of citizenship defined exclusively as legal status and corresponding with a whole range of rights and obligations towards the state. On the other hand, citizenship is the active and full participation in a community’s public life. This differentiation plays an important role and helps in the construction of a scale to measure citizenship in places where a population does not only belong to distinct political communities, but furthermore feels that it belongs in different ways. Some may be incorporated as individuals and others through the privileges bestowed as members of a group. Rather than defining a universal pathway, the great variation in political, cultural and historical settings of individuals—for example across postcolonial contexts where, forming the state preceded the building of nation—has important implications in determining the parameters that defined status as citizens. In the case of India, like other transitional societies, the state issuing out of colonial or communist rule had to create nations with citizens as stakeholder.

Such an approach is also useful in answering the central question of whether citizenship is a universally applicable category, inherently and uniquely, a ‘Western’ invention. If it is universal, then the empirical puzzle of its variation in form has to be addressed, leading to two further queries. First, whether or not indigenous terminology for the notion of citizenship needs to be taken into account, and the variation in meanings this may generate according to a particular configuration of context, location and timing. The second pertains to the underlying conceptual flow that takes place across cultures, connecting the particular with the universal, the local with the global.\(^1\) This flow may be historical, but it remains a fact in motion, as much of relevance to the contemporary as it is to the study of the past. Furthermore, the impact of flows, through mediums such as trade and pilgrimage, may be very different in their effects of hybridization and interaction as compared to that of colonial rule and conquest.

If we turn to the British sociologist T.H. Marshall, whose seminal work on citizenship is considered a classic, we see an example of the problems mentioned above. Marshall traces the emergence of
citizenship rights in England as a sequential and cumulative process. For him the notion of citizenship carries a distinctly liberal orientation. Written during the reconstruction of post-war Britain, Marshall’s idea of citizenship refers to a broader political contention about the role of the welfare state. At the time, propositions for extending welfare entitlements were growing louder. One of Marshall’s contributions was the proposal that extending citizenship could be used as a policy tool for integration and to counter the contentious dynamics born from the vast inequalities between the social classes. Thus, Marshall developed his notion of citizenship around the central preposition that citizenship had emerged gradually and progressively, across the three dimensions of civil, political and social rights (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 T. H. Marshall’s Concept of Citizenship

Marshall argued that in the eighteenth century, civil rights developed in the form of an individual’s legal status—including liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, and the right to conclude valid contracts (as the basis for *possessive individualism* paving the way to a capitalist society). Overarching this was the right to defend these rights in a court of law. In the nineteenth century, Marshall goes on to describe the proliferation of political rights, due not least, to the successful working-class struggle for more political equality. These political successes included the right to vote and to contest a seat in parliament in secret elections, as well as the possibility to establish political parties. The twentieth century, according to Marshall, finally brought about ‘social rights’, including the right to a modicum of economic welfare and social security, the right to education, and the right to share the social heritage to live the life of a ‘civilized being’. Together with this sequential development in citizenship rights, Marshall also detected the appearance of a ‘hyphenated society’, by which he denoted a society that was beset with continuous struggles between the necessities of taxation, economic growth, and meeting the welfare demands of its citizens (Marshall 1981: 123).

Dean and Melrose (1999: 82) contend that the English society, on which Marshall’s concept of citizenship is based developed through the consecutive institutionalization of civil, political and social rights into a *democratic–welfare–capitalist* society. Marshall’s notion of citizenship is thus inherently interconnected with *democracy* (not least the right to vote and the freedom of speech), to *free-market economy* (the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts), and to a *welfare state* (for providing a measure of economic welfare and security). Figure 2 depicts these three dimensions of Marshall’s concept of citizenship, including the institutions, rights, central actors, and reference points such as power, status and class.
Figure 2 T. H. Marshall’s Hyphenated Society

However, Marshall’s concept of citizenship is not without its critics. Anthony Giddens (1982) argued against Marshall’s evolutionary perception of the historical development of citizenship, claiming that it becomes teleological. Furthermore, Giddens insists that citizenship rights are highly contested in themselves and not homogenous, as perceived in Marshall’s construction. It has also been argued that Marshall does not incorporate into his account the experience of postcolonial states, where there was no such sequence in the development of citizenship rights. Instead civil, political and social rights appeared simultaneously. Furthermore, over time these developed not in an incremental or linear fashion but rather through a constant process of renegotiation, at times compromising or favouring one set of rights over another. Citizenship conceived thus, draws attention to the politics of citizen-making and, as we argue below, leads towards a discussion of the transnational and transcultural dynamics of change.

The political process enables a process of hybridization, through mechanisms of representation, political rhetoric generated by political campaign, legislation as well as judicialization. These provide the crucial link between imported and actual concepts that underpin politics in India. In the judicialization of citizenship, for instance, courts play a central role in turning subjects into
citizens. This occurs through synchronizing the legal provisions with the emerging demands of society, and by creating institutional arrangements that safeguard a set of core values shared by all political actors. Thus, judicialization can work towards the creation of a level playing field whereby separate and conflicting identities can coexist. In India, the Supreme Court has enabled citizenship to emerge as a ‘layered’ concept—meaning the coexistence of different citizenship categories, which entail distinctive levels of rights and obligations, for instance the Overseas Citizenship of India, introduced in 2003.

Globalization is often regarded as making national boundaries and citizenship less relevant. However, it can be argued that globalization has also revived the importance of territory as the basis for political communities and membership. Without a system of global governance with compulsory power, nation-states continue to act as the political representation of their citizens and continue to be the central agents of enforcement and accountability. Eligibility to citizenship thus rests upon the competing norms of territoriability and ethnicity. Citizenship itself—caught in this double bind—has become a politicized and contested category, which, in the absence of a moral basis of ‘global’ citizenship, becomes a political challenge of severe importance.

As a result, citizenship has steadily developed as entitlement, legal status and a framework for recognition, leading to new ideas such as Aihwa Ong’s idea of ‘flexible citizenship’ (1999). Today’s world is comprised of nation-states, nations without states, states without nations, and people with a common history but with neither state nor nation to represent them. This highlights the point made by Saskia Sassen (2002) that we cannot assume there are mutually exclusive national and global realms. Furthermore, the present-day challenge of citizenship is to take into account the experience of societies that reached the modern world, not as a consequence of internal transformation as in Europe, but abruptly, as a consequence of decolonization or the end of military occupation. In the case of such transitional societies, a mere repetition of the concepts specific to liberal, democratic, industrial Western states will not be sufficient. To investigate this further, we turn to the case of India, propose the city as a window into state–society relations under conditions of transition, and apply the notion of hybridity to capture the transcultural dimension of citizenship.
The Case of India: A Transcultural Discussion of Citizenship

Sociologist T. K. Oommen argues that citizenship in India was ‘moulded by a long and tortuous history of 5,000 years’ (1997: 41). The connection between national identity and citizenship is problematized by him in terms of the competing constructions of nation and national identity in contemporary India. Religion, language and tribe are acknowledged as the most significant grounds for these constructions, standing in a continuously tense relationship with the more static notion of national identity. The Indian Constitution was designed to promote harmony among the diverse Indian population, transcending conflicts based on regional identity, language or religion. If religion is (ab)used as the foundation of national identity, those people not part of that specific religion run the risk of being subjected to an ‘ethnification’ process. It follows that even those nationals who identify with a particular geographical nation as their native land and who speak the, or one, of the nation’s languages might be regarded as ‘outsiders’. Oommen sees this leaning—which is common among Hindu, Muslim and Sikh ‘nationalists’ in India—as damaging the very foundations of the Indian political system.

While the Indian state does not give legitimacy to language or tribe as the basis for national identity, both language and tribe are acknowledged as criteria for administrative units. This leads to two fundamental ambiguities. First, it challenges the very idea of single citizenship for domiciliary requirements often prescribed by these units, leading to claims for civil and social citizenship entitlements. Second, such prescriptions often render those not sharing the related tribal and linguistic identities to be deemed outsiders in these areas. Therefore, an additional type of ethnie emerges—people who are nationals in their particular native land (such as Nagas in Nagaland and Maharashtrians in Maharashtra)—but who are considered ethnies in the rest of the Indian territory. Equal citizenship rights and obligations for all citizens, irrespective of their spatial location, can partly mitigate the tensions and conflicts between nationals and ethnies. The Indian Constitution has taken this on board through the concept of ‘differentiated citizenship’. This has been discussed in the literature as group-differentiated rights and triggered a widespread debate on whether it represents an illiberal deviation from the universalist notion and institution of citizenship as collective belonging.

However, if we are to examine differentiated citizenship as part and parcel of a historical process of contestation (Gopal 2013) and a hybrid solution to universal as well as particular needs, we reach
a more multifaceted picture of citizenship in India today. The Indian Constitution and the network of institutions, actors and political practices that have taken root in the political system have deeply affected the evolution of citizenship in India. In the Preamble to the Constitution, one can identify republican, liberal and communitarian traditions of citizenship, highlighting the competition and conflation of ideas and ideals that took place at the time of Independence and which continue to shape the debates on and politics of citizenship (Mitra 2013). Citizen-making highlights the role of elites and strategic reform and India’s attempt to generate differentiated and multi-level citizenship have emerged as categories germane to the political context. This makes citizenship an excellent case study for ‘conceptual flow’ where practices, notions, cultures and institutions of citizenship have been transferred, emulated and adapted successfully, and unsuccessfully, to meet local needs and constraints. To explore and illustrate this further we turn to an empirical study of citizenship at the level of the city.

A Macro and Microcosm of Citizenship: The City in India

The entwinement of cities and citizenship is quintessential to Western modernity in its formative phase. It was in metropolitan Paris, as we learn from the historian Simon Schama (1989), that the citoyens and the citoyennes had found their voice, and the necessary political space from which to launch their campaign for the new order. The battle against the ancient regime, and the un-citizen, had subsequently spread to the rural hinterland. (Tilly 1976a). Not all in revolutionary Paris, or its contemporary London, were given to the new creed of citizenship. But some were, and the number of these ‘citizens’ grew as the new norm, riding on the Revolutionary spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity, spread vertically down the social echelon to the less privileged in terms of class, gender and education, and horizontally, beyond city walls, to the countryside. The French story that Schama tells us, and as we learn from Tilly (1976a), was archetypical of Western Europe.

In the case of India, citizenship emerged as the great prize of Independence and was the much cherished ideal of the leaders of the freedom movement who saw this as an identity superior to the primordial notions of caste, religion or ethnicity. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru regarded the state as the lone patron of equality in a society of severe socio-economic differences and haunted by religious, ethnic and linguistic cleavages. The 1951 Congress Party manifesto, which Nehru
drafted, reflected this point with the following statement: ‘As India is a secular State, every citizen has the same duties, rights, privileges and obligations as any other. He has full freedom to profess and practice his religion.’ Secularism as guaranteed by the state was crucial to ensuring equal citizenship. Furthermore, in Nehru’s vision, redolent of the spirit of modernity, citizenship was to be the foundation stone of the new nation and the state (Schottli 2012). The first commitment to an economic programme was adopted by the Congress Party in the form of the Resolution on Fundamental Rights (also known as Karachi programme) in 1931. It is regarded as Nehru’s brainchild. It laid the basis for what he later, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, formulated as a ‘promise of food and opportunity for all’ and as ‘economic democracy’ (Tiwary 1967: 154). Following in the Fabian tradition, and like many postcolonial leaders of his time, Nehru promoted the Western model of modernization through industrialization and urbanization. These were seen to be the path towards successful nation- and state-building.

Six decades after Independence, as one surveys the full gamut of modern politics in India, one might ask, how ‘urban’ is the citizen in India? How far does contemporary urban India conform to the city-centric notion of citizenship that is so typical of Western Europe? We analyse this question here by exploring the rural–urban divide in the levels of citizenship, based on a national survey of the Indian electorate.\(^1\) The results, as we shall see, reveal differential patterns of urban citizenship on the one hand, and a surprising resilience of ‘rural’ citizenship on the other. These results provide further insights into the underlying structures and processes of Indian democracy as they impinge on the nature of citizen-making in India and suggest the need for a more detailed, and comparative in-depth analysis of the urban–rural divide at the multiple levels of citizenship.

Although, at 30 per cent, the level of urbanization of India is the lowest among the BRICS countries (see Figure 1), the city nevertheless plays a core role in the politics of the country. Commenting on the critical role of the city, Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal and Marie-Hélène Zérah write:

> Cities—especially large ones—are major sites of political, economic and cultural power: government offices, elected assemblies, courts, the main offices of large firms, television channels, newspaper offices, universities, all are usually located in cities. This concentration of power turns cities into a privileged theatre for different forms of demonstrative politics that are often—but not always—democratic. Cities are a foremost site for the performance of contentious politics—struggles whose object often goes much beyond the city itself.
Because of their size and their inherent social diversity, urban crowds can—and do—act as a metaphor of the whole nation. The city, as a synecdoche for the country, then becomes not only a site, but also an actor of political struggles…. (Tawa Lama-Rewal and Zérah 2011: paragraph 8).

The radical changes in the structure of India’s economy in the 1990s and advances in the technology of communication and direct air links with foreign cities have enabled many of India’s second tier cities to link urban India with its counterparts more effectively than ever before, making them a crucial element in citizenship in India. However, even before this development, Oldenburg (1976) and Rosenthal (1976) had already indicated the importance of the city in India’s politics as a whole.12

Figure 3 Urbanisation of BRICS-States


Nehruvian modernity, as we learn from Sunil Khilnani, took residence in the city and the plans ‘to modernize and develop Indian society was scripted and broadcast, radiating outwards across the villages’ (Khilnani 1997: 110). However, Nehru’s modernizing zeal had a gentle, malleable edge to it. The consequence for the urban landscape was thus a jumble of styles of architecture, lifestyles
and ideologies. The fact remains, however, that modern Indian politics was made in the city and spread out to the countryside. Mohandas K. (‘Mahatma’) Gandhi, who took the struggle for civil rights and independence to the villages and rural areas that had been neglected, remained connected to the city’s politics through his trusted followers like Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, while the Indian city might differ substantially from its Western counterpart, at the level of its collective self-consciousness as a city, it is the seat of elected political representatives, commerce and industry, art and intellect, and, most of all, engines of political intrigue and campaign. These constituent parts, even as they differ in wealth, power or education, are held together in a functional whole by networking, two-tracking political leaders. As we shall see below, their power originates from their capacity to interpret the parts to one another in terms of the whole, providing the dynamo for a constant process of contestation, renegotiation and hybridization.

**Empirical Results of the Survey: Village, Town, City and Metropolis**

Measuring self-perception of the individual as a citizen was at the heart of a 2009 survey that was conducted by CSDS, using our questions pertaining to citizenship. The following question was probed in the local language and in a neutral way: ‘*Some people think of themselves as Indian citizens, while some others do not think of themselves as citizens of India. Talking about yourself, do you consider yourself a citizen of India?*’. The vast majority of 89 per cent proclaimed their citizenship of India (see Table 1). The increase in numbers of self-definition as citizen is linear as we move up from the village to the metropolis, corresponding to what one might call the city-centric norm of European citizenship.
Table 1 Are you a Citizen of India? (N=7049)

“Some people think of themselves as Indian citizens, while some others do not think of themselves as citizens of India. Talking about yourself, do you consider yourself a citizen of India?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Metropolis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Additionally, we were interested in the perception of political empowerment as well as socio-economic capacities. Thus, we designed a question that applied established measures such as perceived equality of rights, freedom of expression, political efficacy (measured as the perceived power to change a government) and the fulfilment of basic needs like food, shelter and clothing. The question was formulated as, ‘Now I will read out a few statements about the state of things in India for people like you. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each one of them.’

Table 2 Perception of Political Empowerment and Socio-Economic Capacities (N=7049)

“Now I will read out a few statements about the state of things in India for people like you. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each one of them.” (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agrees or disagrees).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Fully disagree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyone enjoys equal rights.</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are free to speak their minds without fear.</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the power to change the government they do not like.</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people have basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter.</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The response, ‘fully agree’, was decomposed with regard to the four-fold stratification of the population of India: village, town, city and metropolis (see Table 3).

Table 3 Perception of Empowerment and Capacities, Comparison by Locality (N=7049)

“Now I will read out a few statements about the state of things in India for people like you. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each one of them.” (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agrees or disagrees).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Metropolis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyone enjoys equal rights.</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are free to speak their minds without fear.</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the power to change the government they do not like.</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people have basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter.</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Empowerment and socio-economic capacities tend to increase as one moves up from village to metropolis—however unevenly and with a clear metropolitan dip in each of the four items. This will be further explained and examined shortly.

Let us first look at the category of the ‘un-citizen’, to use Simon Schama’s term. This classification is central as the definition of the other seems to help to define oneself more clearly. The following question was raised: ‘And who in your opinion are not citizens of India?’ Rather than requesting the respondents to assess the given alternatives, a social rank ordering was attained. In order not to favour any specific response, the alternatives were read out from bottom to top and top to bottom.
interchangeably. The criterion of exclusion specified in the Constitution, i.e. those not born to Indian citizens or in India, got the highest support of 28 per cent (see Table 4). However, it is intriguing that large numbers of respondents chose principles of exclusion from the citizenship of India that have no legal ground but reflect current sentiments: 25 per cent of respondents see terrorism as a criterion of exclusion.

The two items measuring loyalty to India and sentiments (like respecting the flag as well as India’s unity) get 11 per cent and 12 per cent support, respectively. Only a negligible percentage (3 per cent) rejected the claim of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card holders. That is notwithstanding their legal entitlement to a form of ‘layered’ citizenship, which is a concept at odds with a dichotomous notion of citizenship where one is either a citizen, or a non-citizen.

Table 4 Who is an ‘Un-Citizen’? Comparison by Locality

“And who in your opinion are not citizens of India?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Metropolis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those who do not take part in elections and other affairs of the country.</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those not born in India, or to Indian parents, including illegal immigrants.</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/ separatists or those who help them.</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those with loyalties other than towards India.</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who do not have respect for the flag, or unity of India.</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRIs, PIO card holders.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: CSDS 2009 National Election Survey, Question E14. (N=7049)
Lastly, we are interested in the perception of citizenship duties. The interviewees were asked about their position on several duties, which have been held as essential to citizenship, and a variation of which were included in the Indian Constitution in the form of Article 51A at the height of the national emergency in 1976. The question was asked as follows: ‘Now I will read out a few statements. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them?’ There was substantial approval for what are considered common citizen obligations, like voting, respecting national symbols, as well as educating children, promoting religious harmony and safeguarding public property (see Table 5). The fact that not all of these citizen obligations can be seen as indigenous concepts speaks in favour of transcultural flow and hybridization. Nowadays, they appear to be ingrained in Indian public opinion and the self-understanding and pride of India’s democracy.

Table 5 No Metropolitan Dip regarding Citizen Duties (N=7049)

“Now I will read out few statements. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each one of them?” (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agrees or disagrees.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Metropolis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote regularly.</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect national symbols like the flag, the national anthem and the</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrity of the Indian territory.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send children to school.</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote harmonious relationship between all religions.</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard public property like roads, trains, buses, government buildings</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noteworthy that the four-fold stratification of the Indian population (by location—village, town, city and metropolis) does not appear to reveal any underlying patterns regarding the perception of ‘un-citizen’ (Table 4). In fact, the non-differentiation in this case resembles that of the first question regarding self-definition (Table 1), and with regard to citizen duties (Table 5). This suggests that when it comes to the cultural and conceptual diffusion of the idea of citizenship across the Indian population, the respondents live up to the city-centric norm. The positive appreciation of the notion of citizenship goes up as one moves out of the village into the metropolis. However, when it comes to the experience of citizenship in everyday life—implied in the questions on empowerment and capacities—the results are different: there is a clear metropolitan dip regarding the perceived equality of rights, the perceived freedom of speech, the perceived power of people to change the government, and the perceived provision of basic necessities for all (Table 3). By metropolitan dip we mean that the positive perception of these four indicators for empowerment and capacities steadily increases from rural to urban—more people in cities fully agree than in towns, and more people in towns fully agree than in villages—with the clear exception of metropolises—less people in metropolises agree than in cities (Table 3). In the case of the perceived freedom of speech and the perceived provision of basic necessities, people in metropolises agree less than in any other location, including villages. This distinction becomes even clearer when we combine these measures into a cumulative index and analyze the scores as before on a four-fold stratification of the Indian population, as shown in the following paragraph.

**A Cumulative Index of Citizenship**

A cumulative index is produced by merging the three characteristics of citizenship: self-definition, perception of own empowerment, and a positive appraisal of citizen responsibilities. All three components of citizenship were given equal weight. The index of citizenship was calculated as the sum of the three specific scales. Finally, we divided this index into three levels: low, medium and high citizenship. In our survey, every fifth respondent had a low level of citizenship (21.3 per cent), ever third a medium level (35.1 per cent), and most have a high level of citizenship (43.6 per cent) (see Table 6).
Table 6 Citizenship Index, Comparison by Socio-Demographic Background

National sample (N > 6000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Value labels</th>
<th>Low (21.3%)</th>
<th>Medium (35.1%)</th>
<th>High (43.6%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Up to 25 years</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 – 45</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46 - 55</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 and above</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Non-literate</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to primary</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to matriculation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>College and above</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste</td>
<td>Upper caste</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dalit</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>Himachal</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: CSDS 2009 National Election Survey.
The following graphs visualize how low, medium and high levels of citizenship are distributed with regard to five socio-demographic background variables—gender, residence, education, caste and class (see Figure 4). The way to read it, is that men have fewer low levels of citizenship and more high level of citizenship in comparison to women. Similarly, urban inhabitants (i.e. those not living in villages) appear to have higher levels of citizenship in comparison to rural inhabitants. The higher the educational level the higher the level of citizenship. Upper caste citizens have higher levels of citizenship than their Other Backward Class (OBC) peers and far higher than their Scheduled Tribe (ST) fellow citizens. Finally, the higher the socio-economic status (or class for that matter) the higher the level of citizenship.

*Figure 4 Citizenship Index, Comparison by Gender, Residence, Education, Caste and Class*

Source: Author’s Graphs, Data: CSDS 2009 National Election Survey.
The Metropolitan ‘Dip’

We find a significant metropolitan ‘dip’ in citizenship, i.e. the level of citizenship: while rising from the village via the town to the city, it decreases in metropolises. Interestingly, this metropolitan ‘dip’ (as visible in Figure 5a) disappears if the two major metropolitan areas of Gujarat and Delhi are excluded (see Figure 5b).

Figure 5a Metropolitan Dip in Citizenship

Figure 5b No Metropolitan Dip
when excluding Delhi & Gujarat

Figure 5c Metropolitan Dip in Delhi

Figure 5d Metropolitan & City Dip in Gujarat

Source: Author’s Graphs, Data: CSDS 2009 National Election Survey.

Gujarat and Delhi are different from the rest of India, but are they similar to each other? Here the answer is not as clear-cut as the dip in Delhi is at the metropolitan level (see Figure 5c); the dip in
Gujarat data starts at the city level (see Figure 5d). Clearly, there are different local and contextual patterns at work here. Cities in Gujarat tend to be riot-prone, and this considerably affects the sense of political efficacy of those sections of the population vulnerable to riots. This might explain part of the difference, but the absolute numbers of riots tell only a part of the story. When we look at riots per 100,000 inhabitants the picture is very clear. The *metropolises* of Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara and Rajkot have notably less riots per 100,000 than two of the three biggest cities, namely Bhavnagar and Junagarh, with Jamnagar being the positive exception (see Figure 6). These high levels of law and order challenges might be both a reason and an expression of the ‘dip’ in citizenship at the city level in Gujarat.

*The ‘City-ness’ of Citizenship in India*

Does ‘city-ness’ make an independent contribution to citizenship in India? Our final step in this set of statistical investigations is to examine the causal linkages of the various socio-demographic characteristics in terms of their cumulative effect. Multiple regression helps identify the contribution of specific underlying factors when the effect of other causal variables is taken into account, ‘controlling’ for ‘spurious’ effects. Thus, in the earlier analysis we have noticed that education and class both contribute positively to citizenship. However, we also know that the upper classes tend to be more educated. Does this mean that it is class, which is the real underlying route to citizenship, and that the contribution of education is merely an accessory to class?

For this particular analysis, we have generated a number of new variables by dichotomizing social status. Thus, new variables like ‘Upper Caste’, ‘Other Backward Castes’ (OBC), ‘Scheduled Tribes’ (ST), ‘Muslim’, help track down the independent contribution of the different factors to citizenship. Similarly, states such as Tripura and Jammu and Kashmir help identify the contribution that context makes to the strength of citizenship. For this analysis, quantitative variables like education, class and age have been left as they are. The gender and rural–urban divide are specified without further modification as quantitative variables in the sense that they can be thought of as a continuous scale that underpins each of the others. Both education and class make independent contributions to citizenship, with strong, significant beta coefficients (see Table 7). Gender emerges as important, with a negative and significant coefficient for women. ‘Upper-caste’
emerges as positive and significant; both residence in Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura come across as strongly negative contributors to citizenship of India, suggesting underlying contextual factors that need deeper investigation.

Table 7 Multiple Regression Analysis of Citizenship Index with Socio-Demographic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-1.119</td>
<td>.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-4.378</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>11.880</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic class</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>3.188</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>1.866</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper caste</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>3.839</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>3.321</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>1.834</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>-.425</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>-7.111</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-1.956</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R square .061 F=37.460 Significance of F change .000 df 6926

Source: Author’s Calculations, data: CSDS 2009 National Election Survey.

With regard to urban citizenship, the most important finding (in Table 7) is the non-emergence of urbanity as a significant coefficient of the citizenship index. Pending further analysis, several
conjectures can be made to the possible ‘rural bias’ in India’s democracy. The logic of competitive party-political mobilization and the process of the vertical deepening of India’s federalism has added a third tier to the standard form of the federal and the regional governments through the 73rd Amendment of the Indian Constitution in 1993. This has moved many new political initiatives to the village level. This, for example, has seen the passage of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2005. This statute creates a justiciable ‘right to work’ for all households in rural India. Adults in a household have a legal right to collectively claim at least 100 days of unskilled manual work in each financial year. Each state is by law obliged to provide work claimed by any worker or group of workers registered under NREGA.

This scheme provides the legal basis for implementation of the largest public works programme of its kind in the world, and in the process, NREGA extends rural citizenship. It signals an important moment in the relationship between law and democracy and offers the possibility of a ‘deepening’ of civil society (Corbridge 2007: 196) and democracy in India. Its enactment has directly contributed to expanding the ‘rights’ that can be claimed from the state and has thereby expanded the idea of citizenship. It offers critical tools for citizens’ claim-making in relation to the state. However, NREGA has not been the only mechanism to enable this. There are, for example, women’s self-help groups through which the state has brought microfinance to the doorstep of the rural resident (that is, in addition to and not seldom in competition with, market-based microfinance initiatives). This has arguably—despite its major setback through the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh in 2010—brought new vitality to the rural areas. The combined effect of this is that no major difference in citizenship is noticed between ‘rurality’ and ‘urbanity’ as coefficients of citizenship. In fact, it could be argued that rather than narrowly focusing on the city, it is necessary to examine the ongoing entanglement of rural and urban, the co-constitution of both through the process of citizen-making, and the ensuing hybrid outcomes.
Conclusion

Why, on the one hand, do Indian politicians depict cities as the springboards of modernity and use them to launch new political campaigns, and yet, on the other hand, why does urbanity appear to lose its salience with regard to citizenship? This is a complex question that takes us back to the formative stage of the modern Indian state as it emerged from a century and a half of critical engagement with the British Raj. Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the city became both the site of contestation and the object of contestation. Gandhi launched his campaigns against colonial rule and the evils of modernity from his theatrical engagement with the city and what it stood for. Khilnani states: ‘He [Gandhi] brought the nationalist idea from the city to the villages, and through the long foot marches he took across the countryside, his *padayatras* he constructed a new topography of India, defined not by the railway tracks that linked cities but by routes that connected the villages’ (Khilnani 1997: 125).

The most crucial contribution of Gandhi to citizenship with regard to the urban–rural divide was thus to join the two, as two halves of modern India. In the process of reconciling both, indigenous and imported categories were drawn upon and the postcolonial hybrid state generated a conceptualization of citizenship that aspired to be flexible, differentiated and unifying. The Indian case therefore provides significant insights for other changing societies and multicultural nations, as well as for Western countries. Renewed debates have emerged in Europe over the meaning and significance of the nation-state, triggered by unprecedented numbers of migrants and asylum seekers, a rise in populist political movements and sluggish economic growth. We caution against the use of seemingly watertight categories and their implicit dichotomies and argue in favour of citizenship politics that take into account local and regional notions and practices, as well as the embedded processes of historical and cultural entanglement.

By challenging the traditional nation-state narrative of citizenship, we have proposed two alternatives—examining the flow of ideas and practices across borders and cultures at transnational as well as sub-national levels. Furthermore, we hope to have demonstrated the possibility of combining the positivist impulse to ‘measure’ citizenship with an ontological investigation into its form, meaning and substance. Citizenship has thus been conceptualized as a hybrid concept, constantly evolving to the specific needs, challenges and constraints of its time. The need for interdisciplinary collaboration is highlighted when one regards citizenship as going beyond
something that is bestowed and lost, a politically charged concept and an instrument of inclusion and exclusion. For, it is only through a combination of sociology, history, politics, economics and anthropology that one can hope to attain a deeper and composite understanding of the meanings, ontology, symbolism and politics of citizenship. In fact, a truly transcultural analysis of citizenship will only be possible through a collaborative effort drawing on the range of technical skills and expertise of the humanities and social sciences. Such an endeavour gains ever more importance and urgency as the disciplines recognize not only their disciplinary limitations, but also their embedded Eurocentricity. Similarly, in the daily business of politics, citizenship continues to be a hotly debated issue between and inside nation-states, within institutions such as the European Union, or in terms of global challenges. It is in the underlying ideas and practices about empowerment, entitlement, legitimacy—common to all such debates and core to the most fundamental discussions about power in political science—that the transcultural quality and hybridizing impact of citizenship is revealed.
Bibliography


Mitra Schottli Pauli (2019) Citizenship, Hybridity & the Post-Colonial State in India (Accepted Manuscript)


Notes

1 Our understanding of ‘flow’ draws upon Arjun Appadurai’s 1996 work on global circulatory processes, but also upon critiques of flow. See, for example, Rockefeller (2011), who argues that ‘global flows’ are not smooth, apolitical processes but rather, ‘cobbled together by actors and observers from extremely heterogeneous actions, projects, and interactions that occur at many different scales.’ (p.567).

2 Engin Isin (2015) has dealt extensively with this problem in terms of discussing how to theorize citizenship after the postcolonial critique.

3 For more detail, see Mitra (2008).

4 On the de-territorialization of citizenship regimes, see, for example, discussions about the Kantian idea of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ in the wake of globalization in Linklater (1998).

5 For a discussion of this issue, see Dower (2003).

6 Discussing the meaning and practice of citizenship under the conditions of late capitalism, Ong conceptualises ‘flexible citizenship’ to refer to the ‘cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacements that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions’ (1999: 6).

7 Rajeev Bhargava, Interview by Clemens Spiess, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi, 20 December, 2008.

8 In his book (1989), which is set in the aftermath of the French Revolution, Schama describes who the ‘un-citizens’ were: ‘Suddenly, subjects were told they had become Citizens; an aggregate of subjects held in place by injustice and intimidation had become a Nation. From this new thing, this Nation of Citizens, justice, freedom and plenty could be not only expected but required. By the same token should it not materialize, only those who had spurned their citizenship, or who were by their birth or unrepentant beliefs incapable of exercising it, could be held responsible. Before the promise of 1789 could be realized, then, it was necessary to room out Uncitizens’ (Schama 1989: 859; see also Mitra 2012b).

9 For a discussion of what Tilly calls the ‘reluctant concession of political rights and guarantees of different mobilized segments of the general population’ (Tilly 1976b: 80), see Bendix (1964); Marshall (1950; and Schattschneider (1960).

10 Finer describes this as a process of nation-building: ‘...a nation can and has been defined as a population conscious of its common nationality—Englishness, Germanness and the like. The two concepts—citizenship with its implication of reciprocal rights and duties among the whole body of the associates or nationality in the sense of a community of ethnos and a sense of shared destiny—are mutually compatible and also self-supportive’ (Finer 1975); see also Tilly (1975: 88).

11 In the National Election Study (NES) by Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi, four questions on citizenship were posed to a representative sample of about 8,000 men and women during July–August 2009. The interviews were conducted in the local languages by trained investigators.

12 A spate of relatively new publications has taken this discussion the next mile. Important among these are: Hansen (2001); Harriss (2007); Kennedy (2009); and Roy (2011).

13 Khilnani (1997: 109, 110) shows how the city showcases many of modern India’s contradictions.

14 This was a form of identification which granted various travel, work and residency privileges, of late merged with the Overseas Citizen of India card scheme.
These duties, which are often overlooked by zealous social activists, need careful scrutiny. The ‘fundamental duties’ suggested by the Constitution under article 51A are worded as follows.

'It shall be the duty of every citizen of India—

(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem;
(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for freedom;
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
(d) to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so;
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women;
(f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture;
(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures;
(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform;
(i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence;
(j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.