THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION IN PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL IN ENGLAND

Timothy M. Healy

Dublin City University Business School

Supervised by Dr. John Connolly

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Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy, is entirely my own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the development of the management function in professional association football in England from the earliest days of codified and organised football to the present day. I have deployed the theoretical lens offigurational sociology, as formulated and described by Norbert Elias and his followers, notably Eric Dunning. This requires identification and analysis of the interdependencies and power relationships between the emergent function of football management and others forming the broader football figuration. As the game became a professional sport, the manager figure did not exist. Administrators eventually had their title changed from secretary to secretary-manager. In time this became simply ‘manager.’ The primary interdependencies were those of the manager with owners/directors and also with players. I divided the total timeframe for the function into five easily identifiable periods from the 1860s to the present time. My work, from a methodological perspective, was historical/documentary. My sources included existing socio-historical manuscripts, biographies, and autobiographies of former players, managers and directors as well as newspaper accounts and football magazines. I also carried out twelve interviews with former players and managers from the English professional game. The findings illustrate how the function developed from one with low level power chances to one in which there was substantial autonomy during a period when managers’ powers had increased relative to those with whom they shared interdependencies. More recent, wholly unplanned changes within the game led to changes in the management function, with more specific but more limited responsibilities and a loss of functions which had appeared embedded, principally control over transfer activity. In addition, I also illustrate and explain how the broader British habitus which was linked to Britain’s position in the figuration of nations, shaped and affected the management function in professional football.
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I will never be able to thank sufficiently Dr. John Connolly for providing the map to guide this mature student on a journey through previously unknown territory. His support and encouragement will not be forgotten. My sincere thanks also to Professor Barbara Flood who has been most supportive throughout this process. Professor Teresa Hogan was a guiding influence in the early days of this work when I was unsure of myself and the path on which I had embarked. Her calm and much valued advice helped me settle in to a project which has ultimately been very rewarding.

My daughters, Barbara and Clare, are to be thanked for their technical support and my son Patrick for his regular recommendations on potential data which he would come across. And not least, by any means, my wife Clare is due thanks and much more for providing me the time and space to indulge myself in this project, seeking to complete a worthwhile PhD document.

Without exception, those I interviewed from the world of football, were open and extremely generous with their time. In this regard, I must single out John Giles who provided me with significant advice and access to former colleagues and friends of his own. Liam Brady, too, was extremely generous and perceptive in knowing what I was seeking to discover, and in opening doors which, without his help, I would never have got through.

Finally, on a sad note, I interviewed Norman Hunter at his home in Leeds where he and his wife, made me as welcome as a long-lost friend. He was a gentleman, modest and open and as decent a man as one could hope to meet. Whoever said, one should not meet one’s heroes, hadn’t met Norman Hunter. RIP.
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1.1 Introduction

The objective of this thesis is to trace and explain the development of the management function in professional Association football in England. As Liverpool Manager, Bill Shankly, once noted: ‘Some people think football is a matter of life and death. I don’t like that attitude. I can assure them it’s much more serious than that’ (Daily Mail, 1 December 2009). The current Liverpool Manager, Jurgen Klopp, offers this opinion: ‘Football is the most important of the least important things’ (Guardian, 13 March 2020).

Perspective matters. Why conduct an academic study of one aspect of football? Why bother with the management function in what is, after all, only a sport? Whether one regards it as a serious or not-so-serious subject, football has an importance in the lives of many. Association football is a global sport that attracts millions of players and supporters, with the professional game at the top of the football pyramid and England where the professional game started. More than thirty years ago, Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning were asking themselves whether football would be considered a respectable subject for research in the social sciences. Their conclusion was positive: ‘We were very conscious that knowledge about sport was knowledge about society’ (Elias in Elias & Dunning, 1987: 1).

Before explaining what I am attempting in this study, it might be helpful to explain why I am undertaking the work. I have a deep personal interest in and experience of management in its broader sense. I was a director of a publicly quoted company at thirty, later leaving to set up and manage my own business for thirty years. I have managed Gaelic football teams at club, county, and university levels, managing under age and adult teams, both male and female. And as well as playing representative Gaelic football at both Minor and Senior grades, I played soccer at Munster Senior League and Leinster Senior League level. My academic qualification is an MBA degree and I have had two books published in which I look at management in sport from different perspectives. The first of these, Can You Manage?
(2011), remains the only published guide to managing club teams in Gaelic football and Hurling. The second, That’s Right. You’re Fired! (2017), is a study of some fifty managers from the world of Association football, or soccer as it is more commonly known. Working on the latter was what provoked an interest in pursuing this current study.

In doing so, I found myself submerged in a social science, sociology, which was totally alien to me, and this was despite the fact that I had gone to a university business and management school to undertake a PhD. It was a more difficult task than I had envisaged and I am quite sure it was even more difficult, especially in the early stages, for the person unfortunate enough to have had to supervise my work. The task was akin to breaking down my whole way of thinking and building it up again to a different design. It is certain that attempting that with someone set in their ways and embarking on this project while in their sixties does no favours to those supervising the exercise. I will always be as grateful for the patience shown to me, as I am glad to have persevered. One of the things I had to overcome and learn was the relationship between the characteristics of a manager and the wider social context in which he is enabled or constrained. I think this is best summed up by Lever and Swailes (2017: 159):

> It is far easier to explain performance in terms of dispositions and characteristics of a few key people in key positions than it is to think through the myriad of interacting processes and systems operating simultaneously across increasingly complex forms of organisation.

The subject of this thesis is the development of the management function in Association football in Britain, primarily in England, from the foundation of the modern game in the late nineteenth century. I attempt to trace and explain the development that has brought the role from that of club secretary to the modern-day manager/coach. In doing so, I look at the interdependencies involving this figure and others including directors, chairmen, trainers, players, and the media. The changing structure and number of those relationships and the inevitable adjustments in power ratios form part of the thesis.

While not dealing directly with the role of manager, studies such as those by Vamplew (1988) and Mason (1980) were of great assistance, as they took a more general look at football up to 1915. As I broadened my search, I was surprised at how little data was available on the management function in English professional football. There were quite a few biographies,
mostly fairly shallow in their description of individual managers, more hagiography than an attempt to provide real insight. The very fine writer on football matters, David Goldblatt (2006 & 2019), produced two well written and well researched studies of football across the globe but in close to fifteen hundred pages he does not, at any point, specifically address the management function. The academic work of Carter (2006) and Kelly (2010) appeared very present-oriented. Others such as Roderick (2006) concentrated on players, with those in managerial roles, incidental. Perry (2000) notes that little is known about the role of the contemporary manager. Similarly, Kelly (2010) notes that the lack of empirical based research on the contemporary football manager and the absence of any attempt to evaluate how recent changes had affected the role of that manager is the basis for his decision to pursue this task. Writing in 1998, King refers to the academic analysis of football during the preceding twenty-five years. He says that, in that era, there was excessive focus on hooliganism as a phenomenon, to the detriment of other aspects of the game which deserved more academic attention. Indeed, issues ‘such as administration of the game and its political economy have been wrongly relegated to a secondary position’ (King, 1998: 3). He might have included the management function as one other unattended area.

Throughout this PhD thesis, I use ‘him’ and ‘his’ when referring to the central figure, the manager. Football has been and still remains a male dominated game, notwithstanding changes in the power balance and the related progressive change in women’s football. In this particular study, it is the men’s professional game on which I focus (and I recognise that the management function in women’s football may have followed a different pattern to that of the men’s game). As part of this study, I tracked the governance of clubs, as well as that of the game itself. Changes occurred which led to the ‘football manager’ coming into existence. The development of the management function was uneven and shaped by various figurational changes at different levels of integration. These figurational changes particularly affected the terms under which players were employed by clubs. From the ‘retain and transfer’ system to the ‘maximum wage’ system, through the abolition of these pillars to the Bosman Ruling, players gained more freedom and more money, all of which affected the role of managers. I explain these topics and how management in football was affected by them.
A perfect illustration of the type of change which has occurred in football was presented to me in early 2015 when I met the former Celtic and Scotland International player, Danny McGrain, at Celtic Park. The primary purpose of the interview was to get his views on the former legendary Celtic manager, Jock Stein, who had also managed, briefly, at Leeds United. I got those views in an interview conducted in one of the boxes in the grandstand at Celtic’s ground, but it was what happened after the interview that provided a practical example of how power balances have changed over time and how functional specialisation has affected football, issues which are at the heart of this thesis. I should point out that while this example is from Scottish rather than English football, there are overlaps and parallels between football in these two parts of the United Kingdom.

The story involves McGrain himself, a man once rated the best right back in the world and his close friend, Kenny Dalglish, who went on to become a heroic figure for Celtic and Liverpool before managing Liverpool with great distinction, his record finally earning him a Knighthood in 2018. McGrain played for Celtic from 1970 until 1987, winning seven Scottish Championships and five Scottish Cups. He earned sixty-two international Caps and played at the World Cup Finals in 1974 and 1982, missing the Argentina Finals of 1978 through injury. His playing career over, he managed Arbroath for three years in the early nineties, before returning to Celtic in a coaching role.

The interview with Danny McGrain had been both pleasant and informative. McGrain is modest and engaging and has no difficulty telling stories against himself. The best of these was the tale of his first encounter with ‘Mr. Stein’ and of how, as young men, he and his friend with whom he shared the bus journey to and from training had sought to turn full-time. Danny had wanted to become an engineer while his friend, Kenny Dalglish, had begun an apprenticeship. Both had been signed to Celtic by Assistant Manager, Sean Fallon. Danny’s long-term goal to become an engineer was in some difficulty. He had passed his O levels, including maths, but the necessary higher-level maths was proving to be a problem.

Half way through my course and I knew I wouldn’t get this certificate because I couldn’t do higher maths and Kenny wasn’t enjoying being an apprentice joiner. So, we both decided to go and see Mr. Stein – which is fine when you are talking to each other after training or on
the bus on the way into town. So, we had to see who would go in first - as I’m the oldest, Kenny went in. This is the time before agents. There’s no negotiations. Just sign a contract. So Kenny goes in - comes out in five minutes – and I’m thinking Kenny will tell me what he’s got – and I’m thinking, what do I do – what do I ask for. I had no idea what to ask for – I was earning £5 a week part time. £5 a week was OK. We had no idea what to ask for – we had no idea what the first team wages were – not that we were looking for first team wages – but anyway Kenny came out and walked right by me. By the time Kenny passed me, Mr. Stein shunted me in so I had no time to talk to him so I was no wiser. I went in and this was the first time I had seen Mr. Stein. It was the first time I had seen him ‘live’ in the small room that Mr. Stein had. It was a small room and in my eyes Mr. Stein was just a big man, physically but mentally as well. Because they had just won the European Cup and to me he was up there. I saw this big man and he says ‘what do you want?’ I said ‘same as Kenny’. The contract was there so he threw it to me and said ‘just sign there and we’ll see you on 10th July at pre-season training.’ This was maybe March. So I signed it and came out and Kenny had buzzed off. His dad must have taken him home. Anyway, he wasn’t there. So, I jump on a bus and straight to my girlfriend’s house in a place called Scotstoun. I had phoned her to say ‘that’s me signed – I’m going full-time from next July’. So her mum and dad got a bottle of imitation champagne with four champagne glasses. So up the stairs – in the door – champagne, ‘all the best’. So Larraine says, ‘let’s go upstairs, (to get away from her mum and dad) and then she says ‘how much are you getting? – because I was on £5 a week and we were always hoping to get married three or four years down the line. You could never get married on a fiver a week. So she says, ‘how much are you getting? And I went – ‘fuckin no idea’. I had no idea what I had signed for. And Mr. Stein never said you’ll be getting this or that – he just threw the paper down for me to sign it. I thought – ‘oh no’. I had to wait ‘til the following morning and go to the Park to see Mr. Stein’s secretary and ask her how much I was getting. (Interview with Danny McGrain, Glasgow, 2015).

The interview complete, we made our way through the lobby at Celtic Park. As we did, one of two neatly dressed men greeted Danny like a long-lost friend. I hung back and let them have their conversation in which the other man also joined. Soon a secretary invited the two men to follow her into a nearby office where Mr. Lawwell would see them. As Danny and I walked into the carpark, he informed me that the two men were an agent and his assistant, representing a particular Celtic player. And as I had observed they were being met by the Celtic Chief Executive. Coming immediately after hearing the story of how two Celtic legends
got their first full-time contracts, I could not escape the shocking incongruity of how a current player, who, to borrow a line from George Best, wouldn’t be fit to lace the drinks of Danny McGrain or Kenny Dalglish, should have not one but two representatives meeting Peter Lawwell. Danny McGrain had seen the change from having a contract hurled across a desk by the manager to the day when a player had two agents being met by the Club Chief Executive. That evening the strapline on Sky Sports news declared that this player had agreed an extension of his contract with Celtic FC. Incidentally, the player and both agents are English.

New managerial appointments may surprise or disappoint. They may create irrational hope and expectation but, invariably, at the time they happen, they are considered seminal moments in the life of the professional club. It may be said with some certainty that every supporter has a view on the manager of his/her club. Some of the observations made over the years reflect differing views, some practical, some cynical, and some open to study and questioning. The following are two insights into how managers and management were perceived at different times and by different people.

One hears a great deal about interference from boards of directors in football and of managers not being allowed a free hand to run their teams. That charge certainly cannot be levelled at Arsenal. Our chairman, Mr. Dennis Hill-Wood put it succinctly when he discussed the board’s role with me a number of years ago. “Why pay experts to do a job if non-experts are going to be allowed to interfere?” he asked (Bob Wall, 1969, cited in Studd, 1981: 95)

Once again, public aspirations were directed by the local press towards the incoming manager: ‘CAN FRITH SUCCEED WHERE OTHERS HAVE FAILED?’ There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Coventry chairman Derrick Robbins when he described Frith in 1961 as one of the best six managers in the country, nor when a few months later he had sacked Frith and been asked if he still rated him in the top six he replied: ‘I like Bill tremendously. I was convinced he would make it. I really felt he would do it.’ More and more directors now genuinely did expect big things from a manager, and if he failed to produce them, they would expect big things from the next one (Wagg, 1984: 161).

These examples illustrate two aspects of how managers were perceived by those who employed them. The first shows an unusually enlightened and exceptional approach from
Arsenal in the 1930s. The second quotation was more indicative of the approach taken by boards from the late 1940s until the early 1960s. I have provided these quotations here to illustrate two contrasting examples of power relations between boards and managers, something which is at the heart of this study.

1.2 Theoretical Approach

Norbert Elias (1970), in his work, dealt with changing patterns of interdependence in relation to power-relations. He contended that processes which involve the thoughts, ideas, concepts, and actions of many, invariably emerge in a shape that was not intended by any single individual. He believed the process of social interweaving leads to these unintended and unplanned conclusions. This is as true of the French state in its current form as it is of professional football in England and the management function within that game.

Elias is often identified solely on the basis of his concept of the Civilising Process which essentially means a shift from social restraint to greater self-restraint. (A more detailed explanation is provided in section 3.4). However, it is his concepts of interdependence and process that are the primary ones deployed in this work.

According to Dunning & Hughes (2013: 50), the main distinctive features of figurational sociology are its emphasis on processes and relations. Quoting Elias (1970: 212a: 525), they note ‘the concept of figurations is predicated upon an understanding of the fundamental interdependence of human beings, first in their biology, and then through their socially developed reciprocal needs’ (Dunning & Hughes, 2013: 52). In his 1970 work, What is Sociology? Elias explained that the concept of figurations draws attention to people’s interdependencies. Figurations, as described by Elias, are networks of interdependent human beings, with shifting asymmetrical power-balances.

Mennell (1989: 252, cited in Goudsblom, 1977a: 105) summarises Elias’s theory of figurations and takes as his points of departure four principles from Elias’s work. They are, he suggests:
1. That sociology is about people in the plural – human beings who are interdependent with each other in a variety of ways, and whose lives evolve in and are significantly shaped by the social figurations they form together.
2. That these figurations are continually in flux, undergoing changes of many kinds – some rapid and ephemeral, others slower but perhaps more lasting.
3. That the long-term developments taking place in human figurations have been and continue to be largely unplanned and unforeseen.
4. That the development of human knowledge takes place within human figurations, and is one important aspect of their overall development.

The four principles are described as ‘deceptively simple’. Yet they form the basis of an argument by Elias (1970: 79) for a clearer way of thinking about describing the processes of ever-changing power relationships within human figurations over time. Elias stressed the need to recognise the processual nature of interdependencies, seeing this as a fundamental principle of his figurational approach:

All relationships between men, all their functional interdependencies, are processes. Today these concepts are often used in a manner which suggests that they refer to a stationary condition, in which any change is quite accidental. Terms like ‘interweaving’ point to the processual nature of such relationships.

1.3 Structure of the PhD

This Introduction chapter is followed by my literature review (Chapter Two). Chapter Three deals with the methodology and theory deployed in this study. The data chapter (Chapter Four) follows and Chapter Five consists of my conclusions. The approach I have taken in organising this thesis perhaps follows more closely that of Elias, in that much of the thesis is directed at addressing the empirical question which led, in the first place, to this thesis. While I have conducted a literature review, essentially directed at how the management function has been treated within the literature of football, I have not engaged with theories of management or business management literature, as that is not the focus of this study.
In the literature review (Chapter Two), I outline the books and academic works on various aspects of professional football that I used to discover information and data on my subject. I also confirm the publications that were used in study of theoretical concepts, the most helpful of which were Elias (1970), Elias & Scotson (1994), Elias & Dunning (1986), Dunning, Murphy & Williams (1988), Curry & Dunning (2015), and Royle (1987). A number of writers have tackled various aspects of football from a historical perspective, the most useful being Goldblatt (2006), Walvin (1994), Williams (2011), Sanders (2009), and Conn (1997). Autobiographies such as Buchan (2010), Guthrie (1976), and Giles (2010) provided data, as did biographies, including Imlach (2005), Fox (2003), Edgerton (2005), and Studd (1981).

As I have pointed out, biographies excluding the aforementioned, were the least useful of the categories of publication I examined. Some historical and academic works were actually quite helpful. These included Carter (2006), Wagg (1984), and Mason (1980). A feature that struck me when looking at the citations I have used is that the majority of books I researched were focused on limited time periods and, because my work covers the entire existence of professional football in England, it is noticeable that as I progress citations from certain works disappear and others arrive.

I found some academic works by Stephen Wagg (1984), Dave Russell (1997), and Martin Roderick (2006) most helpful, the first two on the game in general, and Roderick’s ethnographic study of football as a career for players, proving useful in assessing the interaction between the players and their managers. The encyclopaedic knowledge of football exhibited in David Goldblatt’s writing was also most helpful, even if management was not a central topic.

Chapter Three deals with the methodology and theory deployed in this work. Figurational Sociology is the theory through which this study has been carried out. Norbert Elias, the father of this concept, is the source for much of the applied theory I have used. The figurational concept is based on the idea of human interdependence and power balances and how they change or fluctuate over time. I found this fitted extremely well with the development of the management function in football, because it was possible to identify such movements. In this
chapter, I illustrate how figurational studies of other sports provided insight into how the theories of Norbert Elias had been successfully applied in a variety of different cases.

The methods I used for generation of data also included semi-structured interviews with eleven people, all of whom had played at the highest levels, ten in England, and one in Ireland, with two of the ten also winning Italian championships as players. All of the interviewees had some management experience, including at international level. In all, there were players from the 1960s through to the first decade of this century. Nine of them were established internationals and all except two had managerial experience at the top leagues in England, Scotland, and Europe while the exception had coached an international team. As players, they had experience of working with some of the most famous managers, including Matt Busby, Bill Shankly, Bob Paisley, Don Revie, Bertie Mee, Alf Ramsey, Jock Stein, Giovanni Trapattoni, and Brian Clough. As either managers or coaches, four had worked with international teams, providing another experience of dealing with club managers. My twelfth interview was with a much-respected football journalist of several decades’ experience and a deep knowledge of football management in England and Italy.

A feature of this type of research is that as one approaches the current time, books are less a source and newspapers and some well-developed websites become invaluable. Most noteworthy of these websites were Capology.com, the BBC website and BleacherReport.com. Newspaper archives proved helpful in tracing the coverage of managers in the long term. Reports down through the years illustrated how managers went from being ignored to becoming a central part of the story of the game. British daily and Sunday national papers were studied as well as local and regional papers, including papers from football strongholds such as Sheffield, Manchester, Preston, and Liverpool.

Chapter Four is the data chapter, which I have divided into five sections, over five specific time periods. The development of the manager figure in football is processual and it will be shown to have been a very uneven process. As to a reason for selecting these particular time periods, they stem from specific events. The World Wars each brought a hiatus to organised football. 1963 was a landmark year due to the ending of the ‘retain and transfer’ systems, just
two years after the abolition of the maximum wage rule. The next change with long-term impact was the establishment of the Premier League.

For each of the five periods of time, I have selected a manager who operated in the top league in English football (First Division, later Premier League). In addition, I have produced a one-page diagram or illustration showing the interdependencies to which such a manager was subject during that particular timeframe. This has been done in an effort to make it easier to observe how the function has changed, how it became more complicated over time, and how functional specialisation not only occurred but how that occurrence impacted on the person at the centre of it – the manager. It should be noted these illustrations are meant simply to be indicative of the increased relationships, interdependencies, and functions over the years.

As the role developed, we witnessed the build-up of personnel at football clubs. From the initial interdependencies with players, a trainer and a groundsman, clubs took on scouts to search out new prospects. They hired specialist coaches for goalkeepers. They engaged physiotherapists and, later, doctors. Later still, there were managers and coaches for youth teams and for reserve teams. Functional specialisation saw the allocation of specific responsibilities to specific individuals. The interdependencies increased leading to a process that Elias (1970: 68) described as ‘Functional Democratisation.’ He explains the concept as ‘certain social groups’ suffering ‘loss of function with the consequent loss of power potential’. It is, according to Elias, a ‘social distribution of power.’

The power of the manager had been amplified by the media attention he received. By the 1950s, newspapers had moved on from merely reporting games to seeking stories from within the football world. The manager was in a pivotal position to inform and update them on injuries and selections and to answer questions about transfers, actual or putative. This symbiotic relationship worked to the benefit of the manager whose every word was appearing in newsprint. Radio and later television further developed the notion of manager as club spokesman and as the source of wisdom when it came to football-related matters. This interdependency with media is one (key) example of the fact that not all such relationships were within the club. Once again, I have highlighted some of the
interdependencies with outside bodies or entities on the graphic for each timeline in Chapter Four.

I contend that the long-term processual change in the game of football, and in the management function within the game, can be explained by the process of functional democratisation at two levels of social integration.

The functional interdependencies between those in the role of ‘manager’ and others will be shown to have changed, with resultant fluctuations, some quite dramatic, in terms of power differentials. In Elias’s own words:

At the core of changing figurations – indeed the very hub of the figuration process – is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro, inclining first to one side and then to the other. This kind of fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration (Elias, 1970: 131).

In both Chapter Four and in my concluding Chapter Five, I make the connection between functional democratisation at two distinct levels. The first level is at the figuration of professional football in England. The second distinct but interconnected level is the figuration of Britain among other nation states. As functional specialisation became a feature of professional football, I explain how functional democratisation was an outcome that shaped the function of football manager. Britain’s place among nation states became more equal with a consequential change of habitus. The reduction in power chances of the nation and resultant effect on habitus, had, I believe, an influence over the development of professional football in Britain, including on the management function. These findings are the primary contribution of my PhD. They are outlined in detail in Chapter Five when I explain the term ‘Predictable Cultural Insularity’ and the ways in which it affected, the British nation, English football and the management function therein. Finally, I look at other events which may originate from the same or similar processes.

I should make it clear that the foregoing approach took some time and did not happen as easily it might have. Prior to embarking on this thesis, I had read widely about managers from the past. As I started out on this course, I think my supervisor was beginning to conclude that
I would soon advocate Herbert Chapman replacing God in the Catechism and that this might have been a more appropriate subject for my thesis. However, he persevered in trying to turn my attention to the function rather than the individuals, however great they may have been. I took his advice and concentrated on Elias rather than Chapman, so that eventually, the concept of ‘theory’ began to register. As it did, I became more focused on how to carry out analysis on the available data, bringing me to the path I describe above. I do believe the task became more manageable once I got a better understanding of Elias’s theoretical ideas and concepts. I focused on the interdependencies and the power relations between different people, different entities and different functions and how these changed over time, always bearing in mind that the process is over the long term. As a result, I was able to deal more completely with the matter in the final part of my data chapter. I believe the theoretical concepts become more tangible or more visual when seen against the backdrop of empirical data, in Chapter Four.
Chapter Two – The Development of the Management Function in Professional Association Football in England: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I review the existing literature on football management. However, I also found that several of these studies provided empirical data and, as such, they are also discussed, referenced, or cited in Chapter Four, my data analysis, and in Chapter Five, my conclusion. The most notable of these works were by Wagg (1984), King (1998), Roderick (2006), Mason (1980), and Carter (2006). While many of these writers don’t specifically deal with the management function, they do write about functions and broader social dynamics which relate to what became the management function.

Most of what is written, specifically about managers, tends to be biographical or autobiographical, the latter involving ghost writers and, to a large extent, displaying more hagiography than real analytical biography. It is also true that most of what is written about managers was written in relatively recent times. Notwithstanding my comments on the bulk of autobiographies of managers, there is a body of published work which provides useful, sometimes invaluable, insight into the function. This includes but is not limited to, The Football World (1984) by Stephen Wagg, My Father and other Working Class Heroes (2005) by Gary Imlach, Soccer Rebel (1976) by Jimmy Guthrie, Herbert Chapman on Football (1934), and The Ball is Round (2006) by David Goldblatt.

2.2 Football Management in the Literature

Kelly (2010), in his thesis on the role of ‘the contemporary football manager’ in England, refers to the lack of academic literature on the subject which, while it is growing, remains slim. He further decries the difficulty of gaining access to those within the football world which he describes as very closed, admitting that he felt his own position as a former professional player in English football was critical in this respect. Kelly’s work studies in detail the contemporary manager, describing his role in the game. What it does not do is explain how
and why that role developed over time. The body of his work deals with the very recent past or is more present oriented, whereas Elias consistently advocated a long-term view.

According to Wagg (1984), whose work is ‘a contemporary social history’ of English football, the type of book which normally purports to represent football is the biography or autobiography of a player, or the diary of a football person – in both cases these are personal accounts. Wagg pays tribute to what he terms ‘full scale accounts’ of the football world by such writers as Morris Marples, Percy Young, and James Walvin but declares their works lack a sociological dimension. His own book is an attempt to blend important elements of the history, sociology and politics of football. Certainly, part of his work is very relevant to this study and I draw upon his writings for empirical evidence and support in my analysis chapter. First though, I want to give some insight into aspects of his work, a work which I feel is relevant to the study of football management.

Wagg notes that the early professional clubs were run by boards of directors. They took care of every aspect of the running of the club from administration to finance, and from player recruitment to team selection. He suggests that some of the functions, which would later become the responsibility of the football manager, became problematic (a nuisance or chore) and the response during the 1880s and 1890s was to engage secretaries. He describes the secretary as having been charged with general administration and, as he puts it, they ‘were often involved with players without ever being the main arbiters in team affairs.’ Significantly, Wagg outlines how in a world where to receive payment was considered a symbol of inferiority, the secretary was seen as a relatively lowly position, one of whose main functions was to be a buffer between directors and players (Wagg, 1984: 8-9). Continuing, he asserts that at that time, directors would have seen it as beneath them, to have to deal with the working-class players. I think this may not have been entirely correct, as I believe it to have been a more complex social situation, something to which I return in Chapter Four. Even in this early stage of the involvement of the secretary, there was quite a variation between this functionary’s responsibilities from club to club. Wagg describes how, in 1899, Middlesbrough F.C. appointed Mr. J. Robson as team manager, at a salary of £156 p.a., on the specific understanding that the team was to be selected by the club’s directors and that he would not
travel to away matches (Wagg, 1984: 226). Sometimes, in those early years the person’s title included the word manager, as in secretary-manager or even team manager but what they actually did in relation to the team differed from club to club. According to Harry Berry, the chronicler of Blackburn Rovers history, the Blackburn Rovers secretary, as long ago as the 1880’s, was said to have a ‘shrewd eye’ for players (Berry, 1975: 35).

Wagg discusses how the secretary or secretary-manager was increasingly given responsibility for assessment of players and team-building. However, it was the overall state of health of the club that was his main responsibility. In the years leading up to the First World War, several secretaries resigned their posts because of the parlous state of the finances of their clubs. At this time, the role had a low profile. Wagg mentions that the secretary-manager was seldom referred to in the press who would report on a team change by way of writing that the directors had recalled a player to the team or that a particular player had been selected (without reference to who made that selection decision). Moving on to the period between the wars, he addresses the lack of appetite for ‘coaching’ which was being suggested in some quarters as a means of improvement. At the same time, while the number of managers was increasing, they were not seen as technicians but as ‘wheelers-and-dealers’ (Wagg, 1984: 31).

Wagg explains the anti-coaching mentality as follows:

For players, on the face of it, the matter was simple. They, like the managers, had almost all emerged from the urban working-classes, among whom is to be found, then as now, an ingrained suspicion of book learners, chalkers on blackboards and purveyors of purely theoretical knowledge. Moreover, they, like previous generations of professional footballers, had come to occupy positions of some eminence in public life – be it at local or national level – through their gifts in the ‘people’s game.’ These gifts were in their boots, not in books, and many footballers of the 1930’s were looking for more effective ways of trading commercially on them. Coaching was anathema because it undermined the hero, transferring his rightful credit to off-the-field boffins (1984: 31).

For Wagg, the period between the wars was a time of development among football managers. This development was extremely uneven. ‘There were signs by the 1930s, thanks largely to
the press, that the football manager was being more closely associated with performance on the field of play.’ Since before the First World War, the Secretary-Manager had become a fact of life at some though not all clubs. His duties tended to be more secretarial than managerial but, at some clubs, he began to assume more responsibilities around team matters.

King (1998) writes about what he calls ‘the end of the terraces.’ In this work, he looks at the organic origins of the new consumption of football in England. More specifically, he seeks an answer to the question of how the big city clubs became ‘increasingly financially autonomous of clubs in the lower divisions’ (King, 1998: 38). He looks at this change through exploration of a decline in attendances, combined with a transformation of labour relations between clubs and players, and states that these phenomena created the possibility of a Premier League, the creation of which delivered this new consumption of football about which he writes.

His argument is that from some time before the middle of the twentieth century, the regulation of football reflected the Keynesian economic consensus, which prevailed in the wider society and in business. Then, as the maximum wage was abolished, a decline in attendance coincided with higher wage bills. In these new circumstances, King contends, the regulation of football became ‘increasingly inadequate to the reality of League football’ (King, 1998: 38). This coincided with Keynesian philosophies becoming outdated. He believes that the abolition of the maximum wage had a more significant impact on clubs than did the establishment of freedom of contract in 1978. The latter had the effect of increasing transfer fees, but the economic impact of the former was manifested in a continuing increase in players’ wages, an outcome felt more severely in the lower divisions where attendances, and therefore incomes, were smaller.

He stresses the need to be historically specific about these rules and points out that they were introduced at the League’s inception in 1888 when there were just 12 professional clubs. They were less suitable to a League which grew first to two divisions and later to four. Their original objective of maintaining a degree of economic parity could not be applicable to a league of four divisions taking in 92 professional clubs.
King is writing at a time of great change in football in England. All-seater stadiums, unprecedented sums of money coming in to the game, primarily via Sky TV, and the deal which saw the creation of the Premier League, but also through a recovery in attendances prompted by the new better conditions in grounds, all amount to a transformation of the game. He asserts that at this very time of great change, the academic work around this change is either ‘inadequately theorised or, indeed, not theorised at all.’ His criticism is that the written texts amount to no more than journalism. They are informative but could not be described as sociological analysis because ‘they fail to link specific empirical observations with wider historical contexts or to employ sociological theory to raise interesting descriptions to the level of genuine and sustained sociological analysis’ (1998: 4).

It is my view that King has dealt very well with specific aspects of football’s development. His conclusion that the ‘corporatist’ approach to football governance which was adequate for a 12-team league but utterly unfit for a 92-team league appears perfectly reasonable. His analysis of how the Premier League came into being is excellent. His study, however, while it could not be described as a snapshot of football at a particular time, is more like a very short video of football during a major and important transition. This is not a book which takes the longer view, nor does it claim to be. In terms of my own thesis, it has some first-class data on specific and hugely important changes within the game. King has little to say about managers, instead concentrating on club ownership. In this, I found his reverence for some of the new owners of the nineties completely unsustainable. He came across as someone in awe of ‘businessmen’ but those whose praises he sang were far from being figures of real substance, as was later proven.

Roderick (2006) explores the working lives of professional footballers outside the elite levels of the game. Roderick’s work provides a valuable insight into life in professional football in England outside the Premier League at a particular time, the years around the turn of the 21st century. While the Premier League may be an exception, some aspects of the game explored by Roderick, are common to all levels in professional football. The author’s description of the manager’s need to arrive at a winning combination of players on the field while keeping a
much larger squad happy is a case in point. This is true of all levels and, indeed, of football outside of England and of other team sports.

Roderick describes the basis of his studies which result in this book. He interviewed 47 players in total, 37 of whom were still playing and 10 recently retired players. His search is for enlightenment on the factors which affect players and the life-changing occurrences such as injury, serious loss of form resulting in falling out of favour and transfers. In addition, he focused on how players’ own views changed as they grew older or as their personal circumstances changed. Further interviews were conducted with 12 club doctors and 10 club physiotherapists as part of a parallel study on how injuries are managed in the professional game. Three agents, one of whom worked for the PFA, were also interviewed.

He acknowledges the sample was not representative, as such a necessarily large sample would be virtually impossible to create within the closed world of professional football. The issue of uncertainty was strongly featured in the interviewing in order to get a feeling for the factors which caused such concerns in players, factors such as inactivity for whatever reason, a change of manager etc. A problem identified by Roderick, in terms of a succession of lengthy one-on-one interviews is the extent to which players would distort their responses or not wholly engage in the open and frank manner desired by the interviewer. The danger was that information would be selectively distorted representing the interviewee in a better light than was factual.

Roderick’s assessment of agents’ involvement is not particularly deep but the most relevant finding is that agents have less involvement with players who are outside the ‘star’ category. He does allude to certain clubs and agents being too close. This is an issue studied in greater depth by Bower (2003) in which he explores and highlights relationships between managers and agents and, in particular, the conflict of interests which arise where a manager and player are tied to the same agent. It is also revealing that the degree of contact between agent and player is not that frequent, something Roderick thinks may relate to the status of the players with whom he spoke. It does contrast with the image presented by the Swedish star, Zlatan Ibrahimović (2013), in his autobiography and even more so with that witnessed in the Ronald Reng biography of German goalkeeper, Robert Enke (2010); although in both cases, the
players and agents were based in continental Europe. Enke’s agent, aware of his battle with depression, appeared to do everything humanly possible to help his client.

As the world has changed, moving house and location may be perceived as less arduous an event than in previous times. Roderick captures the concerns and difficulties of players’ moves and the impact on the families and influence of wives/partners on prospective moves, at the time of his study. In summary, Roderick’s thesis provides a useful insight into the lives and emotions of a specific category of player at a particular time, the late 1990s and early 2000s. Helpfully, it looks at the manner in which players’ own perspectives change over time, a prime example of this being a player who would hide an injury and/or play while injured when young, but who would refuse to play in similar circumstances late in his career. The relationship between player and manager is not a central theme of this work, but what is revealed is helpful, in that the book describes the years either side of 2000 and Roderick provides some insight into player/manager relationships during that time, but very much from the player’s perspective. Roderick’s work is informative in many ways. For instance, he stresses the fact that the majority of players in the professional game are operating outside the most elite levels, as are the majority of managers, coaches and other functionaries. Despite the narrow window through which he looks at an aspect of the professional game, it is a most important aspect. As to the difficulty in obtaining a high number of interviews with a cross-section of players, Roderick admits this is virtually impossible. Within the limitations, he makes the most of the material he was able to mine from the 47 players and ex-players with whom he engaged. As with several other works on football, such as books by King (1998), Marples (1954), Russell (1997), and Carter (2006), it does not deal with the game or any facet of it in a processual way. Consequently, the era covered is a critical consideration in interpreting the findings and conclusions.

Mason (1980), like Wagg, has produced a work which looks at football through a sociological lens. In his case, he deals with football in English society from 1863 to 1915. He addresses the adoption of limited liability status by clubs and provides substantial detail on those who governed clubs and how they functioned. What I find most relevant to my own study in Mason’s work is the absence of any study of a management figure. Directors, players, the
clubs, and the crowd all come under scrutiny. It would seem all were more important and, based on the broader available literature, this view would appear to be correct. He does provide great detail and insight into those who governed professional football clubs up to 1915 as well as describing football’s place in society in that pre-war period. Other works which look at how boards of directors dealt with every aspect of club management, including team selection, are those of Wagg (1984) and Carter (2006).

The process of formalising football, the creation of the Football Association (FA) in 1863 is addressed in fine detail by a number of writers including Carter, (2006), Walvin, (1994), and Lanfranchi et al. (2004). The separation of Rugby Football and the Association game, and the creation of a unified code of rules, is also well documented by Dunning and Sheard (1979). I will return to this later in this chapter and address the significance of this for my study here. Carter (2006), whose work is a historical description of the football manager, outlines some of the changes but does not explain or consider why the function developed as it did. The early administration of the game, notably the imposition of a maximum wage and the ‘retain and transfer system,’ is widely described in the literature of Association football, with Walvin (1994) and Carter (2006) providing helpful data.

Walvin has written what is very much a historic document on football in England from the sixteenth century when it was still a wild and primitive activity, bearing little relation to the modern game, and long before it was codified and turned into a structured sport. He devotes considerable space to this period and to what followed as the public schools became the incubators for the new pastime. He takes time to compare the early twentieth century approach to management in industry and in football. His belief was that football simply reflected the experience of wide areas of British management which specifically eschewed the concept of professional managerial training and vocational education. Walvin (writing in 1975 as this was when the first edition of this book was published – second edition was 1994), offered the opinion that:

Nothing illustrates more precisely the peculiar weaknesses of football than the recent history of club management. Indeed, the history of management in this one small and rather unimportant industry is a

The comparisons, made by Walvin (1994), between industry and football are interesting, particularly regarding attitudes towards the management function. Management, per se, was not considered a profession but was subject to cultural and social traditions such as the class system. He explains how the early twentieth century saw developments and growth in indigenous industries. Family businesses became bigger, requiring more complex and more accomplished levels of management. As businesses grew, owners ceded control of those businesses to managers. These tended to be the bigger businesses but smaller family owned enterprises still remained in the majority and within owners’ control. Where managers were employed, their approach was taken from the business/industry in which they operated rather than from any general guiding principles which might be applied across the board, leading to a formal, structured type of function. Walvin is critical of this parallel approach to the management function in industry and football through the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century. He declares the upper (owner) classes, typically, had public school education which left them singularly unqualified to manage anything, let alone a business. The culture of management was that one learned the role by practising the role. There was a belief that management training/education did not lend itself to formal methods. ‘Learning by doing’ was the accepted philosophy. Where Walvin is especially informative is in tracking the huge social change that saw football surpass cricket as the national game before the end of the nineteenth century. He also outlines how football had been ‘transformed by public-school men from an undisciplined folk-game into a disciplined recreation’ (p. 52).

David Goldblatt (2006) has produced a remarkable global history of football in which he chronicles the rise of football in England and in virtually every country to which it was exported. As with most available material, it is not written from a figurational perspective. He examines, in some detail, how football was governed and the outcomes of that governance. This is something to which I will return in my data chapter.

The University of Michigan, Professor of Sports Management, Stefan Szymanski, has written widely on economic aspects of sports. Coming as he does from an economics background,
thoughts tend to feature economic determinism. He looked at the performance of managers in English football over a period of 37 years. The conclusions drawn from a study of financial data were that players’ wages determine results and consequently, everything else, including the manager, is just noise. The correlation between players’ wages and league position was about 90 per cent, when looking at each club’s average over about fifteen years. Szymanski analysed the financial accounts of 80% of English clubs from 1973 to 2010. Based on the premise that the wage bill should dictate how the team would perform, he then identified those whom he deemed the best managers in the game. He ranked 251 managers from a total of 699 who had served five full seasons or more over the period of the study. The question he posed was how each had performed relative to their players’ wage bills (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009: 115). Further writings on the football manager, include Perry (2000) stating that little is known about the role of the contemporary manager, Pawson (1973) looking at the job at club level, Rogan (1989) focusing on managerial ‘greats’, Carter (2006 & 2007) looking at the origins of football management and the changing relationships between managers and media. Carter (2006) also provides useful insights into the societal changes and improvements in standards of living and in leisure time in the context of the impact of these changes on the world of football.

Bolchever and Brady (2004) sought to identify that which made managers successful, Dawson et al (2000) and Dawson & Dobson (2002) looked at coaching efficiency. Audas et al. (1997, 1999, 2002) studied team performance and managerial turnover. Vamplew (1988) reported on professional sport in Britain up to 1914, with considerable emphasis on football and a focus mainly on the economics and finances of the sport. Fishwick (1989) studied club management in general without delving into the changing role of the manager. Russell (1997) provided a social history of association football from 1863 to 1995, again without providing much detail on this developing role. It appears to me that because the role itself was at an earlier stage of development in the early days of professional football, it tends not to appear of much importance when a historian sets out to describe the game and how it expanded and evolved.
2.3 Figurational Studies and Football

Much has been written from a figurational perspective on football but very little deals directly with the management function. Fortunately, Eric Dunning has written on sport, in general, and football, in particular, and, although the football manager has not been a character of fascination for him, there is much useful information in what he has written alone or with others. The more specific studies of football management from the figurational standpoint are those of Kelly (2010) and to a lesser degree Law and Bloyce (2017).

In Seamus Kelly’s study of the contemporary manager (2010), attention is drawn to the change in the role of the manager at some Premier League clubs where what he describes as the European Model has begun to be introduced. Typically, he declares, it removes some powers which previously rested with the manager, giving them to a Director of Football or General Manager and leaving the manager shorn of certain peripheral (but important) responsibilities such as scouting and youth development and mainly focused on the first team.

Kelly cites Alan Curbishly and Harry Redknapp, two experienced former managers in the Premier League, each stating that the art of managing, as they know it, is dying and that future managers will simply coach and select the team. He considers the change of direction to be largely restricted to the top division. Responsibility for transfer activity, he finds, is seen by British managers, such as the two quoted, as a primary part of their function while the European model devolves that power to others.

Two points are made by Kelly regarding the power of the manager. Firstly, as many aspects of the management of clubs became more professional and more bureaucratic, the manager’s role proved resistant to change. But as the power of some of those with whom managers are interdependent such as owners and agents has increased, the power of managers has come under threat due to this more recent shift in the balance of power.

Kelly cites the work of Martin Roderick (2006) in accessing the world of professional football players and exploring the problems they face over the span of their careers. He now proposes to carry out a similar exercise in looking at the role of managers; an area he believes has been largely neglected. By utilising the sociological writings of Elias and Weber, he makes a
significant sociological contribution to an understanding of the role of the contemporary manager.

Citing Elias (1987), Kelly states that it is ‘not possible adequately’ to understand contemporary structures without reference to how these have come into existence and developed. I fully agree with this statement but I’m not sure that his work explains how and why football management is where it is today.

Law and Bloyce, in their 2017 paper, illustrate the power ratios between players and managers, through interviews with players and former players. They suggest that, prior to the creation of the Premier League in 1992, it would appear the negotiations formed a two-player game between manager and player when most of the power rested with the former. Within that figuration, it was possible for players to seek more than was on offer, and on occasions to get more, but at the manager’s discretion.

Players strong enough to suggest they might do better elsewhere or players who had matured and become more assertive, were also better placed to improve their power chances in these negotiations, confirming that the power ratio is not fixed but is capable of adjustment over time. From the research and interviews, it appeared players were largely unaware of their own power chances or strengths while the writers contend that in their view, all players, because they are involved in interdependencies, always have some levels of power within the game and specifically within these manager/player negotiations. They provide examples of protracted negotiations, where power balances were more even, something unplanned by either party.

They cite examples of young inexperienced players confessing to signing contracts for substantially less than they were worth. In each case, they had brought a parent or parents with them and, even with three people on their side of the table, they were no match for an experienced manager when it came to contract negotiations. These examples provide evidence of an asymmetrical power ratio leading to what might be described as exploitation of the young player, although the writers refrain from using such a description. It is significant
that one player who had been treated in this manner said he had always sought representation by an agent in subsequent negotiations.

They further provide the argument made by a player that it is better to have his agent negotiate with the club executive(s) than to have the player and manager in a power struggle over a contract, as the player will need a good relationship with the manager throughout the duration of that contract. But ultimately, the player and manager end up signing what has been agreed between their proxies or, in what Law and Bloyce describe as, Elias’s (1978: 86) ‘two-tier’ game model. Elias is cited here as referring to a ‘two-level’ or ‘two-tier’ group of players, all of whom remain interdependent but not all of whom play directly against each other. The second-tier players (agents and club executives/directors) play against each other but are tied to the first tier, the players and managers.

Law and Bloyce conclude that, through the use of game models, it can be illustrated that contract negotiations in football are far more complex than media portrayal would indicate. Because power balances are processual and power is always in flux, when the power balances are less unequal neither participant can achieve every objective and the result of such negotiations is that unintended outcomes are common.

As I stated earlier there is a significant body of work on the subject of football, from a figurational perspective, which to a large degree is not specifically concerned about football management. Notwithstanding this, it would be a mistake I believe, not to see some of this work as relevant to explaining developments in the management function. First, these works explain developments in football in Britain (England is my focus). Furthermore, several of the broader social processes outlined did shape the function of management including the professional-amateur tension, the formation of a centralising body for the control of football as well as the wider social developments which changed the meaning and function of sport (football) for diverse groups in England. Sports and games, as social figurations, are organised and controlled as well as watched, played and managed. They are not socially detached but are interwoven with the fabric of society at large and with the manner in which that fabric is woven into the structure of international dependencies.
Dunning (1986: 203) referred to the growing competitiveness, seriousness of involvement and achievement-orientation of modern sport with particular focus on top-level sports. He described the ‘seemingly inexorable erosion of amateur attitudes, values and structure, and their correlative replacement by attitudes, values and structures that are professional in one sense or another of that term.’ Dunning described this as a world-wide development, a trend in which sport was, at that time, being transformed, from something peripheral to people’s lives, to something central and of great importance, ‘one of the central sources of identification, meaning and gratification in their lives’, almost of religious or quasi-religious importance.

It appears to me, in the intervening years, since the publication of Dunning’s work in the mid-1980s, there has been no evidence of a reversal of this movement towards increased competitiveness. Indeed, increased levels of competitiveness have become normalised. Furthermore, people’s identification with their chosen team has continued to provide meaning and gratification. Evidence of this is contained in the outpourings of grief at tragic events surrounding teams. This does appear to indicate an attachment and a desire for attachment on the part of followers of the team, whether it be Liverpool after Hillsborough, Juventus after Heysel or more recently, Leicester after the death of the owner in a helicopter crash at the ground, after a home game. The supporters’ attachment is to the club but, as I illustrate in my analysis, how the manager is seen to perform on a weekly basis, has become an increasing focus of those who support the team, over the decades.

Dunning’s (1979) essay explores the increasing competitiveness of modern sport. It addresses the growing trend away from the amateur approach and indeed from amateurism. Rugby Union in Britain is cited as an example of a sport where professionalism had, up to then, been resisted. Dunning cites growing seriousness and competitiveness, which are taking rugby towards professionalism, as a compelling social process.

Dunning explains that the tension-balance between polarities in a game determines how competitive or exciting the game becomes. These polarities include: opposing teams; attack/defence; co-operation and tension between the teams; co-operation and competition within each team etc. Dunning now refers to two further polarities which are important; the
polarity between the interests of players and those of spectators; the polarity between ‘seriousness’ and ‘play’. These he considers crucial because they have effects on the other interdependent polarities involved in the dynamics of a game. Players competing more aggressively can raise the tensions on and off the field ultimately leading to crowd trouble, according to Dunning.

As Dunning (1979) notes, the amateur ethos was initially the dominant sports ideology in modern Britain. The central component is playing games for fun. Fair play and voluntary adherence to rules are subordinate to that overarching ethos. He quotes Trollope from 1868 warning against sports beginning to be taken too seriously. Trollope was stressing amateur values at a time when professional sport hardly existed, so his criticism was of this change in amateur sport. Dunning believes one target of Trollope’s was the public-school games cult. This involved: a tendency to promote staff according to sporting rather than academic criteria; the selection of prefects based on their sporting abilities; the elevation of sport to a pre-eminent place on the curriculum; regarding team games as an instrument of character training and the participation by staff in the organisation and playing of games. Dunning argues that the amateur ethos was used by public schools as a defence against the advance of incipient professionalism into games which they had previously virtually ‘owned’ – such as soccer and rugby. Support for this notion comes from the fact that many of the abuses which public schools complained about, were also evident within their own schools. He believes they played to be recognised as successful at their chosen sports and did not wish to be beaten by professionals from the lower orders, nor for that matter by amateurs from that quarter (Dunning, 1979: 213-214).

Dunning describes how the arrival of industrialisation brought changes in power balances within and between groups – something that occurs with state formation and the lengthening of interdependency chains. Elias saw industrialisation as bringing about the long-term transformation of the total social structure. He saw a longer and more differentiated chain of interdependencies. As the power balance changes, the position of specialised groups changes if they become organised, as they are able to then disrupt the wider chain of interdependencies by collective action. This leads to greater reciprocal dependencies and to
an overall social figuration in which these groups are subject to increasingly effective pressure from others. Unlike in pre-industrial times, the modern demand is for inter-regional and representative sport. This process, in its turn leads to hierarchical grading of sportspeople and of teams, which leads to reciprocal pressures and controls that operate in industrialised societies and are replicated in sports. So top sports people cannot really play for fun anymore, as they are forced to be other-directed and serious, i.e. they cannot play for themselves now, but represent wider social units such as counties or countries (Dunning, 1979: 217).

According to Dunning, the changing balance between work and leisure (ideological as well as factual) has led to an increase in the social significance of leisure activities. There are three aspects of the emergent modern social figuration that have contributed to the growing social significance of sport:

1. Sport has become one of the principal mediums for generation of pleasurable excitement.
2. Sport has become one of the principal mediums for collective identification.
3. Sport has come to form a key source of meaning in the lives of many people.

Sport has become a social enclave within which both players and spectators can be part of the generation of pleasurable excitement in a socially limited and controlled fashion. It is the inherently oppositional characteristic of sport that accounts for its prominence as a focus for collective identification (Dunning, 1979: 219).

### 2.4 Figurational Studies in Other Sports

Quite a few sociologists have made studies of various aspects of the world of sport through the figurational lens. I looked at a sample of these with a view to seeing how others had approached a study of a specific sport or a facet of that sport through figurational sociology. I was especially keen to see how various academics had utilised figurational methods and explanations as I wanted to see how this route stood up against other possible means of exploration. The sample studies I choose had to be centred on sports other than soccer and had to be not entirely but for the most part related to the chosen sport in a British context.

The dynamics of the transformation of games into spectacle and the shift from amateurism to professionalism are complex processes that cannot be reduced either to the presence or absence of spectators or to the ownership of the means of sport production. Rather, the issue is more a question of establishing the patterns of interdependence among the groups involved.

Apart from the striking similarities in terms of key issues and concerns in the development of soccer, the Maguire study looks at interdependencies and shifting power in an evolving structure. Monetization, an over-dependence on sponsorship and restrictions on the number of imported players, and the playing of the game increasingly assuming work-like characteristics, are just some of the issues affecting Basketball in Britain at that time. The rules around the importation of players have their parallels in European football. English Basketball administrators appeared to see America as the one and only source of star players and the rules permitted just two Americans per team. There was another category of import which was any American who could claim dual nationality. This provided another opportunity to recruit further top professionals. Maguire describes the efforts to create a professional game, effectively from the top down. This became an issue for some involved in the game, who questioned the extent that resources were going into the new professional commercialised game rather than at youth, schools and local level. These tensions as well as tensions over well-paid imports and local amateurs on the same teams, are identified and examined. One structural change was that clubs became franchises and this manifested itself as teams were uprooted and moved hundreds of miles away, continuing in a new location and usually with a new name. The attempted transformation of basketball in Britain was quite successful for a time, but eventually differing objectives and changing power ratios would have an impact. The governing body and the clubs did not necessarily share the same objectives, not an uncommon feature in sport and an aspect of this study which has resonances in English football, which will be seen in my own work. The increasing commercialization of English Elite Basketball drew entrepreneurs towards ownership, as agents or as sponsors who expected a return for their investment. A simple question which arose in this scenario was whether individual clubs should seek promotional deals or if such
should be handled by the governing body. Inevitably, this question leads, and this case was no exception, to further tensions, with some club owners claiming they can achieve more lucrative individual deals. This has striking parallels in the history of deals with television companies in football. But the tensions were not all related to commercialisation and money. Because the imported players were mainly Black American, enticed into a new incarnation of what had been a white middle-class game in Britain, social issues of race and class arose. Maguire states that ‘a figurational approach sheds more complete light on the transformation in question’ (p. 321). I quite agree. Because of the complexity and fluidity of the relationships and tensions.

In another paper, Maguire looked at the advent of American Football on British television screens in the 1980s. In ‘More Than a Sporting Touchdown: The Making of American Football in England 1982 – 1990’, Maguire (1990) looks at the network of interdependencies in the introduction and promotion of the American game to an English audience via television. The arrival of this game in this manner is categorised as part of the Americanisation of English culture, a phenomenon that includes film, television, music and books, for example. Taking an Eliasian approach, Maguire identifies the long-term cultural interchanges between what was once an English colony and England. He describes Rugby football’s adoption at Harvard and Yale universities and the eventual adaptation of that game so that it became something unique in the form of American Football. In a fascinating exploration of this development, the American method of promotion of this alien game to a new audience is explained, with the critical interdependencies clarified as those involving the English television channel whose positioning and promotion of the coverage is considered critical, the British company responsible for re-editing and presentation of the packaged programmes, Cheerleader Productions, and the major sponsors of the project, the U.S. brewing giant, Anheuser-Busch.

This is a piece of work which not only takes the longer timeline to explain what has led to recent cultural movement but which also incorporates other social and political movements and changes for their important influence on human development at this time. It alludes to resistance from both left and right to different aspects of American culture’s invasion of not just Britain but Europe. It refers to the suspicion surrounding U.S. military bases in Britain and the requirement that the British government had to seek American approval for its war in the Falklands. Ultimately, Maguire declares that ‘Anglo-American relations need to be
understood in terms of interdependence and that America itself is caught up in a set of figurational power balances’ (p.233). He describes how people on both sides of the Atlantic are ‘caught up in long-term unintended interdependency chains.’ It should be noted he is writing in the shadow of the so-called ‘special relationship’ when Britain and the U.S. were closer politically that at any time in living memory as Reagan and Thatcher appeared at times to think as one individual. Also, the 1980s saw a great influx of U.S. television programmes including those named by Maguire, (Dallas, Falcon Crest and Dynasty) into Britain and Europe, something which brought higher viewing figures and much criticism for their perceived cultural content. I encountered similarities, both in the promotion of football and more significantly in the long-term social processes which I address in this thesis. The American game was to be sold to a new British audience, fundamentally, via television. Television would years later, become the key component in the promotion of The Premier League in what King (1998: 3) described as ‘the new consumption of football.’ Maguire’s study includes an examination of Britain’s position in relation to America. My own thesis, as may be seen in Chapters Four and Five, takes a broader look at Britain’s position among nations in terms of power and interdependency.

Lake (2011) took Elias and Scotson’s work, The Established and the Outsiders (1994 [1965]) as a theoretical framework which he then applied to a study of the impact on tennis clubs of decisions made by the Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) in England. Lake identified the figurational framework as particularly suitable to a study of a policy change by the governing body, whose impact would be felt by every tennis club within Britain. ‘The drive for voluntary-run tennis clubs to change their ‘culture’ and become less exclusive and more competition-oriented was pivotal to LTA strategy, yet their greatest challenge was the conflicting agendas of many voluntary-run tennis clubs (VTCs) that resisted change’ (Lake, 2010b cited on p.113) The governing body appears to have recognised a culture of social exclusion at local club level and formed the view that this was affecting the production of top-quality players in higher numbers. The consequences of a decision taken without sufficient consultation or without potential implications being considered, is the subject of the study. Lake carried out an ethnographic study, facilitated by his own immersion, for the duration of the study, in a tennis club, to which he has attributed the pseudonym West Regency Tennis Club (WRTC). Power
is a key aspect of the relationship between the governing body and the constituent members, as is interdependency. Lake writes that an aim of the study was to see whether and to what extent the club (WRTC) resembled an established-outsider figuration. He reports on a conflict in the objectives of the established members (Ems) who required financial assistance from the governing body to deal with a dilapidated clubhouse building. To qualify for funding, they were required to engage coaches and take on a large number of new members (NMs), including a cohort of child members. It would appear the club, WRTC, did represent an example of the established-outsiders figuration. Lake (p. 117) describes the collective pride or group charisma of the established group when confronted with new members who were unwelcome in a social context, only admitted in sufferance. A feature of the original Elias and Scotson study was the tendency of the established to present an isolated example of incorrect or objectionable behaviour by a member of the outsider group as indicative of the behaviour of entire group. The intolerance towards any slight deviation from rules by the NMs was very much in keeping with the findings in the original study. The Lake (2011) study reveals so many parallels and similarities of behaviour with the original Elias and Scotson (1965) study, it is difficult to imagine a more suitable means of examining the case. As will be seen, established-outsider issues also emerge in aspects of the development of the management function in football in England.

A 2004 study by Matthew Perry and Dominic Malcolm utilises figurational methods in a study of the emergence of a new and quite different group of cricket supporters. Titled ‘England’s Barmy Army’ Commercialization, Masculinity and Nationalism, the study explains this cultural phenomenon which came into existence in the winter of 1994/95 during the Ashes series in Australia. An Australian newspaper created the name for an unorthodox group of supporters, which in many ways had resembled a travelling contingent of English football supporters rather than the more sedate and subdued cricket followers. Perry and Malcolm explain the traditions of cricket: ‘Cricket came to be regarded not just as a game but, rather, a venerated symbol of the code of ethics of the English gentleman’. They liken the code of behaviour at cricket to that of the middle-class audience at a theatre or concert. Cricket was the civilised game of the village green. It was the game of restrained behaviour by its audience. It was the ‘quintessential English game’ (p. 77). Having come through some earlier interruptions to its
norms, ‘during the 19th century, cricket was reinvented as a timeless pastoral activity, as a forum for displays of moral worth and as a symbolic totem of Englishness’ (p. 77). The arrival in the late 20th century of something as alien to the cricket world as the ‘Barmy Army’ provides fertile ground for study and analysis. They were the antithesis of the restrained emotional character of the traditional cricket supporter who was unfailingly mannerly and respectful of all participants, applauding opponents for any notable achievements as well as politely acknowledging his own players performances. While the similarity to football supporters did not include acts of violence, this group indulged in loud singing and chanting and even ‘crudely abusive chants and songs directed at opposition fans and players’ (p. 80). Their establishment as a supporters’ body soon led to commercialisation, mainly through the registration of the name, complete with a logo, and sales of their branded clothing lines, but also via the organisation of travel, in a similar fashion to that of independent supporter groups in other sports. However, the development of a means for (new) cricket supporters to travel abroad en masse was entirely new to that game. Identification with the group, the we-image, and ‘the quest for pleasurable excitement and ego-enhancing prestige’ (Dunning, 1999: 174, cited in Perry and Malcolm, 2004: 84) are also new factors within the game of cricket, although long since identified in other contexts, within figurational sociology. An example of interdependency arising from the Barmy Army creation is the group attracting the attention of broadcasters seeking what are described as ‘animated sections of the crowd’ (p. 89). The members of the Barmy Army are by their very nature, attention-seeking, so they are happy to fulfil their side of the interdependency by providing television with colourful images. Parry and Malcolm explain how cricket’s governing body (ECB) adjusted its stance in relation to the Barmy Army.

The recent incorporation of the Barmy Army – after many years of exclusion and rebuttal – is part of the ECB’s policy of harnessing the commercial opportunities offered by the group and illustrates how rapidly the contingencies of a commercial operation can change the nature of the interdependencies between groups (p. 90).
As with the tensions and changing interdependencies witnessed here between cricket governing bodies and other entities, the football figuration has been similarly affected as I illustrate in my data chapter.

Malcolm’s (2006) study ‘Unprofessional Practice? The Status and Power of Sport Physicians’ looked at the role of club doctors in rugby union in Britain. More specifically, it examined the relationships between doctors and others such as coaches, players and physiotherapists at clubs. He references earlier studies which had been more focused on the pressures upon players to turn out and to play while enduring pain when carrying an injury. He cites the need to study the power balances between the various parties. Malcolm suggests there was a view, arising from previous research, that sports medicine was substandard. He seeks to examine the medicine in rugby clubs from the position of the medical practitioner. At the time of this study sports medicine was not a significant element within the sport. One finding was that many of the club doctors accepted that role only because they were supporters of the particular club. Rather than being seen as complementary to the role of the physiotherapist, the latter was a role which was achieving increased importance and power within rugby clubs at this time. Malcolm cites one club doctor expressing the view that he was seen as a marginal figure. Elsewhere a physiotherapist described how he was the first port of call for a player with an injury but also described his greater involvement in team matters including rehabilitation work and extending to setting up training sessions for players. Once more, tensions, power imbalances and interdependencies form a significant part of the study making it suited to a figurational examination. My own description of functional specialisation is aided by a paper like this, which deals with this one function in Rugby football.

Connolly and Dolan (2020) produced a book, ‘Gaelic Games in Society: Civilising Processes, Players, Administrators and Spectators. It is a figurational study of the GAA (Gaelic Athletic Association) the body which administers Gaelic games in Ireland. The work explains how many current and accepted aspects of Gaelic games today came about. Connolly and Dolan are quick to point out, quite correctly, that much of what has been published about Gaelic games and those who have populated the games, is written entirely from a historical perspective. One sentence sums up their approach: ‘We are less concerned with the lives and decisions of
prominent historical figures, and more with tracing, albeit briefly, the changes in the kind of social networks that both enabled and constrained Irish people generally (p. 33). Many facets of the GAA figuration are explored and explained. Violence among players and spectators is addressed. The response to player violence is detailed. We are told, ‘all forms of violence have become subject to greater scrutiny and also more pronounced moral repugnance and disgrace (p. 33). The concept of a Civilising Process explained by Norbert Elias is evident here. Another example is the amateur/professional dichotomy. The GAA has prided itself on being an amateur organisation in which players are not paid. However, the tensions between the players at the highest level, (inter-county teams), and governing bodies, have existed for a century. The interdependency is clear and well described as are the problems which have arisen as players sought better conditions, the granting of which was an uneven process. The figure of the manager is cited and the increasing power chances of this protagonist is described as are the growth in relative power of the higher profile inter-county players. It must be acknowledged that this application of a figurational approach provides far greater insight and explanation of sports and a sports organisation that has had a complex history than do any of the many historical works I have studied and found remarkably one-dimensional, with few exceptions. Players seeking better conditions is a long-running theme which is addressed in this thesis. As will be seen in my data chapter, the interdependencies and changing power balances also shaped the changes for professional footballers in England.

2.5 The Development of Professional Football: Explanations and Debates

A very significant work is that of Dunning and Sheard (1979). In making a sociological study of the development of rugby, they describe and explain the bifurcation of football which resulted in rugby and the Association game, more commonly called soccer. In doing so, they provide a valuable analysis of the people who established and ruled over both games. This, in turn, provides an insight to the critical and somewhat contrasting developments of both sports. As I describe in my data chapter, the first FA Cups from the competition’s inception in 1872 were won by Southern amateur teams of former public-school boys, until 1883 when Blackburn Olympic with a team widely believed to include at least two professionals, took the trophy to the North for the first time. The advent of professionalism and the response to it
would shape both rugby and soccer for ever. Dunning and Sheard explain that illegal payments to soccer players were rife in the North, where attendances were high, therefore providing income which enabled these payments.

Teams in the midlands and the North that had observed the amateur rules now found themselves unable to compete on the field against the professionals and they became a leading source of hostility towards professionalism. Attempts to outlaw the practice seemed a route to a split, according to Dunning and Sheard. They describe the leading figures in what they term ‘the fight for a conciliatory policy’ (p.187). These included C.W. Alcock, the Old Harrovian and Lord Kinnaird and Major Francis Marindin, both Old Etonians. Also included were N.L. Jackson of Cambridge University, E.S. Morley, a doctor, and R.P. Gregson, a photographer. There were key differences between the two sports bodies and Dunning and Sheard regard these as decisive. In their words: ‘The social, especially the educational and related differences between the principal actors in the struggle over professionalism in the two games appear to be of particular significance’ (p. 188). What is explained by Dunning and Sheard is how and why, in the late nineteenth century, Rugby split into the professional Rugby League and the amateur Rugby Union, while soccer adapted, accepting professionalism and avoiding a split.

Those who ruled over soccer had tended to be graduates of higher-status public schools in contrast to their counterparts in the governance of rugby. As far as the struggle over professionalism in soccer went, those opposed to professionalism were mainly people who had attended low-status non-public schools and worked in middle and lower-middle class occupations. The lack of representation at national level of soccer’s administration by members of the Northern clubs turned out, according to Dunning and Sheard, to be an advantage.

The amateur versus professional struggle in soccer was played out at national association level. In contrast, within Rugby, the battle was played out at regional level and a Lancashire–Yorkshire split had occurred before the national governing body could act. The inclusion in the Football Association of those who had attended high-status public schools, some of them
titled, was, we are told, critical. These people would have had far greater influence than their numbers might suggest, because of their social status. The writers contend:

They are likely to have been trendsetters in the formation of opinions, followed by others who did not have strong grounds for taking an opposite view. More importantly, they are likely to have been relatively secure in their identity and status, and therefore, less likely than their counterparts in the RFU to have perceived the working class as a threat (Dunning & Sheard, 1979: 189).

An important aspect of the professionalisation of both sports is the fact that soccer became more quickly established and more popular as a spectator sport than did Rugby. Soccer actually accepted professionalism ten years earlier than was the case with Rugby. And this timing too was crucial. The fact that soccer was forced to deal with this issue in mid 1880s meant it was at a time of ‘relatively harmonious class relations’ (p. 191). By the 1890s, when professionalism became a matter of conflict in Rugby, class conflict had also become an issue in society with the rise of the working class and what is described as ‘the maturation of the long-term changes taking place in the structure and social composition of the ruling class’ (p. 191). By the end of the 1880s, the aristocracy and gentry had ceased to be the dominant element in the British ruling class. Industrialisation had reached a point where Britain had what is referred to as ‘aristocratised’, ‘gentlemanly’ bourgeois, coupled with ‘bourgeoisified’ aristocrats and gentlemen. There was a levelling within society wherein the expanding number of social interdependencies led to more even power relations.

Dunning and Sheard (1979) deal at some length with the social positions and social class of those who controlled Rugby League, Rugby Union and soccer clubs. They examine how this shaped the struggles around amateurism and professionalism in Rugby and soccer. The legacy of these struggles contributed to tensions which pervaded soccer through the early twentieth century. I examine this issue in the context of the development of the football manager in Chapters Four and Five.

By strict definition, an exploration of the evolution of the secretary to secretary-manager to manager, deals with a subject whose course begins in the late nineteenth century. However, an understanding of how the game of football itself developed is important as will be
illustrated in Chapter Four. The advent of professionalism is a subject to which Dunning returns in the recent work of Curry and Dunning (2015: 138-152). They give the lie to the notion that modern football simply emerged from the wild folk-games which existed for centuries in England. In doing so, they argue for the contribution made to the creation of modern football by public school boys while forcefully defending this position against published counter arguments which they regard as being of little or no merit.

Curry and Dunning (2015) describe the decline in the folk-game’s popularity between 1780 and 1850 as resulting from what Norbert Elias would call a ‘civilising spurt’ – an advance in people’s ‘threshold of repugnance’ towards engaging in and witnessing violent acts (Dunning and Sheard, 1979: 40). The important role of the public schools and their graduates who brought the game to their universities, is the primary subject of their work. Their list of those who wrote about the game’s origins and the overwhelming influence of boys from the public schools on the game’s development includes Geoffrey Green (1953), Francis Peabody Magoun (1938), Morris Marples (1954), Montague Sherman (1888, 1889), and Percy Young (1968). These writers had the game’s origins almost entirely in the public schools.


The issue for Curry and Dunning is that a number of others, principally Goulstone and Harvey, have promoted a particular view of the social origins of football. The authors are in vehement disagreement with this view. They give some commentators the benefit for having not entirely denied the public-school involvement but the clear argument is that the public schools had an immeasurably greater influence than the lower social classes in the development of Association football.
Goulstone (2000) published a work titled ‘The Working-Class Origins of Modern Football.’ The very title explains why Curry and Dunning regard this work as a betrayal of newly uncovered evidence and more significantly, a confirmation of pre-conceived intentions.

Harvey’s book, *Football: The first Hundred Years*, is the focus of further critical scrutiny. Harvey considers that Sheffield should be allotted a more prominent place in the history of the game. Curry and Dunning agree but wish to take issue with a number of Harvey’s writings. ‘An organised football culture would have emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century even if there had been no public-school mode’ (Harvey, 1999: 93). It is the view of Curry and Dunning that such a presumption can hardly be substantiated. However, as Harvey’s book progresses, he strangely continues to credit the former pupils of the major public schools with diffusing and influencing the game’s growth. As Curry and Dunning see it, Harvey also ignores several important people/influences from the public-school background. Charles Alcock, an Old Harrovian, who was referred to by Keith Booth as ‘The Father of Modern Sport’ (2002), is especially noteworthy.

The FA based the second set of laws on the Cambridge Rules, a code which was framed by former public schoolboys, who were largely influenced by Old Etonians. Harvey almost concedes defeat of his own hypothesis when he states the Association variety of the game was of Eton, Harrow, Westminster, Winchester (Harvey 1999: 155) and that the public schools were extremely important nuclei for teams (Harvey 1999: 127). Harvey is then criticised by Curry and Dunning for documenting the number of games played outside a public-school context between the years 1815-1852 because he actually only lists 28 games over a 38-year period. Curry and Dunning make the case that both Goulstone and Harvey have based their theories on very little evidence and that, as a consequence, their conclusions (in the case of both writers) are overstated and misleading.

According to Curry and Dunning, Goulstone does present enough evidence to substantiate the claim that a footballing sub-culture did exist before 1860. He proves games took place between sides of equal numbers, that matches were played and unlike those of ‘folk-football’ they did involve more skilful and less brutish practices and finally that clubs were formed for the sole purpose of playing football. However, Curry and Dunning cast doubt upon
Goulstone’s argument as they point out that at least eight of the games took place on festival dates such as Shrove Tuesday, Christmas Day, and Easter Monday, which may suggest they had a connection to ‘folk’ football and hardly followed a profile of representing a vibrant football sub-culture. It was well established that ‘folk’ football was not widely practiced but featured on these specific feast-days.

Goulstone had referred to the Surrey FC data as an example of the organisation of early football outside of the public schools. However, in confirming that the rules in question were merely rules on operating the club and for ‘internal matches’ rather than laws of the game, he allows that argument fall flat. (Goulstone 2001: 40). The writers state that ‘this may be one of the difficulties with Goulstone’s and Harvey’s data – it has a limited amount of relevance beyond its specific area’, which interestingly, is listed as the fifteenth of Eric Dunning and Ken Sheard’s structural properties of ‘folk’ games, when they noted that such activities consist of ‘locally meaningful contests only’ (Dunning and Sheard, 2005: 31).

They then move on to Peter Swain’s work, and proceed to demolish his arguments, saying he repeats Goulstone and Harvey’s mistake of ‘citing’ newspaper reports of challenges for matches for which no evidence that they actually took place is provided. A previous work by Rob Lewis (2010) is quoted, specifically his description of Swain’s ‘endemic’ football sub-culture as simply ‘ad-hoc (sic) arrangements by a publican seeking to increase his takings by instigating a “pub-football” match with scanty organisation’, and likens these matches to ‘pig races, greasy pole climbing or ploughmen wrestling for a smock.’ The authors wholeheartedly concur with Lewis when he adds that ‘Swain’s attempts to ally himself with Harvey and Goulstone as a revisionist football historian rests on a very shaky foundation’ (Lewis, 2010: 486).

Curry and Dunning were also critical of some aspects of Kitching’s study (2011). However, they agree with a number of Kitching’s observations, such as:

1. The origins of the game are complex – ‘men-made’ rather than ‘man-made’ to accentuate the intricate interdependency chains created by many human beings.
2. Games called football or foot-ball existed in Britain and Ireland for centuries – Curry and Dunning date their initial appearance as being 1314.

3. A footballing sub-culture of pub-related matches and challenges heavily influenced by wagering existed in Victorian Britain outside public school settings.

4. Goulstone’s and Harvey’s data are sparse.

5. Public school matches were an amalgam of existing forms brought from boys’ home environments and codified for organisational or disciplinary reasons, and that status rivalry at first existed principally – but not solely – between the institutions of Eton and Rugby.

They revisit Harvey and state that he fails to understand the figurational standpoint and the writings of Norbert Elias in particular. He misses the point that figurational sociologists prefer to promote a multifaceted chain of interdependencies by which societies function, and support the view that human processes are men-made rather than man-made.

Curry and Dunning offer a summary of the facts:

1. The modern form of the game of football (Association Football) developed from the matrix of ‘folk’ and public-house related games that existed in England before the beginning of the nineteenth century.

2. These games were diffused into the public schools and were regulated there, primarily by the boys.

3. At Cambridge University in particular, former public schoolboys further codified football as a result of the need for a compromise between players who, although they preferred their own school’s form, realised the need for concessions in order to facilitate maximum involvement.

4. As the game spread to the wider society, it was subject to a plethora of influences – the former public schoolboys, ex-university students, urban sporting elites and proponents of local variants of the game.

Curry and Dunning believe it is crucial to note that the explosion in participation in football from the 1870s onwards, engendered by the issuing of national and local rules, might only
have occurred because the game itself was already deeply embedded in the social lives of the people of the United Kingdom. The game seemed to be accepted and to thrive in the areas where the folk tradition was more profoundly ingrained i.e. Sheffield and East Lancashire (Curry and Dunning, 2015: 175).

The argument is made that as with all interdependencies, the one between ex-public-school boys and state school educated individuals is best conceptualised in terms of the balance of power between the parties involved. There is also the issue of timing. By 1880, the game had been codified, the FA was recognised as the national governing body, and the final independence-minded association, Sheffield – had, by 1877, effectively accepted the hegemony of London. Old Harrovian, C.W. Alcock was both Honorary Secretary and Treasurer (Green, 1953: 84). By 1879, the President and Treasurer were Old Etonians and the Honorary Secretary was an Old Harrovian (Green, 1953: 86).

Curry and Dunning list those who in their opinion were the most significant influences on the early growth of Association football:

1. High status Old Etonians oppidans, who subsequently attended Trinity College, Cambridge.
2. Former pupils of other major English public schools such as Harrow and Shrewsbury, e.g. C.W. Alcock and J.C. Thring.
3. Members of local sporting elites, the best and most important example being those individuals from Sheffield Football Club and the Sheffield Football Association.
4. Participants in local, public-house based football sub-cultures connected to gambling.
5. Pupils and masters at Rugby School, especially Jem Mackie, Thomas Hughes and to a lesser extent, Thomas Arnold. It seems important that the development of the modern game of Rugby was entwined with Association football’s story prior to 1863, because in those early years the game was a plethora of forms known simply by the name, ‘football’.

Elias wrote about human societies consisting of individuals who are radically interdependent with others. In nineteenth century England, the struggle described as ‘status rivalry’ was
epitomised between the pupils of Rugby school representing the middle-classes and those at Eton symbolising the aristocracy. Power is a key. Elias said ‘power is a function of interdependency ties.’ The struggle for power, according to Curry and Dunning (2015) manifested itself in the creation of football rules and the administration of newly created controlling bodies which were formed to organise the game. The battle was ultimately won by the high-status Old Etonians which was one reason why Association football rather than Rugby Football became the dominant form.

2.6 Conclusion

Any study of one element within Association football requires a close look at the game itself and how it has developed. The existence and significance of interdependencies and power differentials are matters of importance to Norbert Elias. Not only is no man an island, but no function such as that of football secretary or manager is an island. The need is for the role to be studied in the context of all that has gone on around it. Consequently, even written works which neglect or omit the role of football manager but describe other aspects of the game’s development or of the game at a certain point in time, are extremely relevant to this study. While no work could be found which dealt specifically with the role’s development, a number of publications reflect on the management function at a specific time.

How the game graduated from an amateur activity to professionalism is important and can only be understood through a study of the sociological background to this momentous change.

The theoretical writings of Elias and Dunning form a body of work which enables the development process be better contextualised and understood. The arguments around the roles played by different social classes in the establishment of modern football are important, if only to illustrate as Curry and Dunning have done, the need accurately to interpret the available data and to question the validity of arguments made which may at first sight appear reasonable but which ultimately prove unsupportable.
Chapter Three – Theoretical Approach and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline my methodology. Regarding the theoretical approach of my work, I will describe the theoretical frame of figurational sociology developed by Norbert Elias. In doing so, I outline some of the main concepts and ideas from several of Elias’s works and his work with Eric Dunning. I also describe my data sources and how I applied theoretical concepts to the data. I detail the books, newspapers, magazines, and websites from which data was derived and I tabulate the biographies and autobiographies used. I conducted a number of interviews and I provide background information on the subjects of these interviews, as well as explaining the aspects of the study for which they were able to provide information.

3.2 Figurational Theory: Power, Process and Interdependencies.

As I explain in Chapter One, ‘Process’ and ‘Interdependence’ are two of the central concepts of Elias’s writings. Mennell (1989: 94-95) points out that interdependence is not to be confused with ‘interaction’, a more usual sociological term describing face-to-face behaviours. For Mennell, interdependence is a more wide-reaching term, as it goes beyond interaction to people who may never know or even meet each other but whose actions or inactions can impact others far down the lengthened chain of interdependencies. Quite simply, the briefest study of any aspect of society, taking politics as one example, confirms that, what applies today is not the outcome of some grand plan of any individual. As Mennell (1989: 94,95) suggests, if it is implausible to suppose, for example, ‘that the modern French state was the outcome of the long-term game plan of some early Capetian monarch, still less is it credible that the overall civilising process, composed of so many strands, is solely a product of human rationality.’

Power, power ratios, and power opportunities are addressed by Elias (1970: 74) within his concepts of human figurations and interdependence. He asserts that power is a structural characteristic of all human relationships. Elias also points out that where functional interdependence exists between people, balances of power are always present, whether the
power differentials are great or small, balanced or unbalanced. He also suggests ‘that power balances, like human relationships in general, are bi-polar at least, and usually multi-polar.’ According to Dunning & Hughes:

Elias went on to tie the concept of power more explicitly to that of interdependence. A solution to the problems of power more adequate than those on offer in sociology so far, he suggested: ‘depends on power being understood unequivocally as a structural characteristic of a relationship’...we depend on others; others depend on us. In so far as we are more dependent on others than they are on us, more reliant on others than they are on us, they have power over us, whether we have become dependent on them by their use of naked force, or by our need to be loved, our need for money, healing, status, a career or simply for excitement (Dunning & Hughes, 2013: 66).

The 1960s sociological study (Elias and Scotson 1965) is referenced with this work, ‘The Established and The Outsiders’ providing an example of how a neighbourhood group could monopolise power over a group from a similar social background, excluding and stigmatising members of the latter group. My own studies of this work found this most significant because the study provided an example of the subjugation of a group without the usual weapons of power such as control of resources or control of the instruments of violence.

Furthermore, in his collaborative work with John Scotson, Elias explained:

One could see the limitations of any theory which explains power differentials only in terms of a monopolistic possession of non-human objects such as weapons or means of production and disregards the figurational aspects of power differentials due purely to the differences in the degree of organisation of the human beings concerned. Exclusion and stigmatisation of the outsiders by the established group thus, were two powerful weapons used by the latter to maintain their identity, to assert their superiority, keeping the others firmly in their place (in Elias & Scotson, 1994: xviii).

Mennell (1989: 135-136) makes an observation which could quite easily have been written with professional football in mind. He notes that, at the start of each new round in a power struggle, the outsiders bring up certain issues which the established groups refuse to consider. They are unwilling to negotiate. Yet as the struggle proceeds, the balance of power very gradually tilts. Functional democratisation refers to the process of equalisation of power relations. One way in which power balances may shift is through greater interdependence
between the established and the outsider groups. We also know that in relations where the balance of power is more equal, there is likely to be a higher degree of mutual identification (Velija, 2018). Functional democratisation and changing power balances, as I illustrate in Chapter Four, are central in explaining developments in the management function in association football in England.

3.3 The ‘Figurational Method’

While Elias himself did not overtly discuss his methods or methodological approach, in recent years, a significant body of work has developed in this domain and it gives some insight into the issues that researchers must consider.

Bloyce (2004) describes how the figurational perspective relates to research methods in the more conventional sense of the word. He addresses Elias’s concept of Involvement and Detachment. The figurational sociologists’ view of the concept of ‘involvement and detachment’ is that while it may be impossible for researchers to be completely detached from their work it is not desirable that they be deeply involved. He cites Rojek who asserted that Elias figurational sociologists in general, promote ‘a methodology of self-consciously distancing oneself from the object of study.’ Bloyce declares this argument inadequate or perhaps a little inaccurate in that he asserts figurationalists actually actively seek to have sociologists strive for a balance or ‘appropriate blend’ between involvement and detachment. The objective of figurational sociologists is to, as far as possible, recognise the fact that they are involved and in doing so to distance themselves from their own values; to ensure as much as possible, a degree of detachment. The writer argues that there is a need for the researcher to bring an awareness of the potential issues around involvement and detachment and that such an awareness is sufficient to sensitisze the researcher. Bloyce refers to Maguire’s contention that research is not simply a matter of accumulating facts. It is more a matter of analysing the significance of specific events ‘and their conjunction with other events’ while interpreting and explaining the significance of such events in the context of the overall study.

An example of how a researcher may become engaged to the point of real emotional empathy and sympathy for an interviewee is provided by Sinclair (2016). He describes experiencing
such emotions when an interviewee informs him of some really bad news he has received about an underlying health problem of which the author was already aware. Sinclair provides another fine example of the danger of becoming emotionally affected as another interviewee expresses racist views about Jewish people. He uses such personal experiences to emphasise the need for detachment while illustrating some of the difficulties in achieving this. In his own words, ‘the researcher learned how to deal with such emotions and tried to separate them from the objectives that needed to be realised from the interviewing process’. He goes on to make the point that there is a need to develop an understanding of such issues, or potential pitfalls, so that a better balance is achieved between involvement and detachment.

Baur and Ernst take a more detailed look at modern social science research methods and figurational sociology. Beginning with the often-quoted words of Elias that ‘investigations without a theoretical framework are like sea voyages without a map or compass,’ they offer arguments for Elias’s methods, which they explain are insufficiently discussed or worse; criticised for their alleged inadequacy. Notwithstanding later criticism of this aspect of his work, they outline how Elias had made it clear that social research was very important to him. The writers contend that because Elias did not write at any great length on explicit methodology and methods, it cannot be argued that he was not interested in such matters. Instead of writing about social research he devoted his time to actually carrying out social research and in doing so he provided examples of good practice. They further point out that at the time Elias began his academic career, sociology had not yet been established as a university discipline. Elias views on research included criticism of survey research which he believed amounted to the idea of explaining social phenomena ‘by means of measurements’ which he considered led to the neglect of wide problem areas and to the neglect of questions of greater significance.

Baur and Ernst, in this paper, set out to illustrate the relationship between social theory and methods of social research and in doing so they discuss the link between theory and data as seen by Elias and also by modern methodologists. They write about the need to distinguish between detached and involved subjectivity and Elias’s discussion on the tension between involvement and detachment. They argue that there is a dilemma or a contradiction facing
social researchers. It amounts to the fact that they are required ‘to avoid partiality by adopting a particular theoretical perspective and disclosing their perspectivity.’ Simultaneously they need insider knowledge and are required to fully engage in the research process. Elias (1994) is cited as having written in his ‘own biography in a way that enabled him to identify his involvement in and detachment from the issues he researched over his lifetime.’ They further point out that Elias (2009c [1987]: 108-9) actually ‘advocated that sociological theory should be constructed in such a way that it guides empirical research.’ And they point out that figurational sociology was the social theory of Elias.

Baur and Ernst (2011) explain how analysing the sociogenesis of a figuration has become easier in recent decades because there have been advances both in methodology and in the availability of process -produced data especially that channelled through public administration. But as Elias pointed out the importance of looking at change over time cannot be understated. In this regard the writers outline Elias’s work on manners and his painstaking study of the development of human behaviour over centuries, from which he was able to illustrate the long-term behavioural changes.

A further examination of methods in figurational sociology has been published by Dolan and Connolly (2014). The writers outline how Elias tended not to be prescriptive regarding research methods, using whatever method he considered best suited to whatever task he had undertaken. Like Baur and Ernst, Dolan and Connolly refer to Elias’s mistrust of purely statistical data. They describe the importance of historical documents in their own study of Gaelic games. My own observation here is that such documents were essential to Elias in his studies, in particular in his work on manners. An important observation by Dolan and Connolly is that interdependence, a key theme in figurational sociology, is equally important in the research process. The distinction between a purely historical study and a figurational one is well described within the context of this study. The writers explain that ‘historians of Gaelic games in Ireland have tended to focus on origins, narrative and key individuals.’ They, on the other hand, have focused on ‘the changing structure of relations between Irish and British social groups.’ It would appear to me that the latter focus is on interdependencies and is also more likely to take a longer-term view of the changing nature and development of Gaelic
games. Elias is cited as declaring that history and sociology, while independent of one another, both focus on the same thing: societies.

In the introduction to my thesis I cite Lever and Swailes (2017: 159) as they explain how much easier it is to write ‘in terms of the dispositions and characteristics of a few key people in key positions’ than to undertake the task of taking a broader view of ‘interacting processes and systems operating simultaneously across increasingly complex forms of organisation.’ The concept resonated with me because I had gone from producing a book featuring key managers in the soccer world to attempting to trace the development of the management function, a study for which the latter above quotation might well have been written. Here Dolan and Connolly refer to an Elias’s *The Court Society* which also addresses this very point: ‘The former [historical perspective] throws light on particular individuals, in this case individual kings, while the latter [sociological perspective] illuminates social positions, in this case the development of the royal position’ (Elias, 2006: 4).

As in the cases of Bloyce (2004) and Baur and Ernst (2011), Dolan and Connolly deal with the Elias’s concept of ‘Involvement and Detachment.’ They stress the need to understand these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, as might be inferred from the title. What is important and challenging is the requirement for researchers to distance themselves from ‘preferred outcomes of research’ ensuring their personal beliefs and values do not inhibit the findings, a danger illustrated quite perfectly by Sinclair (2015) in his account of his personal experiences.

Dolan and Connolly provide another ideal example of how difficult but necessary it becomes to remain detached and objective when confronted with certain data, as they were in their quest for information about the social development of Gaelic games. They focused, at one point, on violence as indeed had Elias and Dunning in their studies of sporting developments in Britain. Dolan and Connolly found evidence of brutality, even death but realised the importance of avoidance of a moralising or judgemental perspective when describing and analysing such events and those who participated in them at the time. They point out that placing such events in perspective is not to excuse or condone the actions in question.
Ultimately Dolan and Connolly conclude, in line with Elias, that there is a need for a theory-informed approach to, not just data generation but its analysis and synthesis. Their approach, critically, has amounted to involved detachment in the exploration of historical documents.

In my own work I was conscious of the risks associated with not remaining sufficiently detached from a process where one has an involvement and while not confronted with challenges of the magnitude of those faced by Sinclair or by Dolan and Connolly, I believe I have achieved a balance. Apart from a formal interview, I became quite friendly with one interviewee and we met on several occasions. While he was very experienced and knowledgeable, I was conscious that his views had to be referenced against other available data.

3.4 The Civilising Process

Elias’s work, The Civilising Process, or as it was later titled, On the Process of Civilisation (Elias, 1994), deals with changes over time, over centuries. The changes are processual and uneven. They may be interrupted or an apparent change may temporarily reverse. The basis of this concept of a civilising process is that behaviours which are acceptable and treated as normal at one juncture, can become unacceptable or repugnant, as the process continues. Elias’s theory of ‘The Civilising Process’ provides an analysis of the historical development of emotions and psychological life and how these are connected to larger-scale social processes such as state formation and economic development (Van Krieken, 1998, cited in Velija & Malcolm, 2018).

For Mennell (1989: 96):

The basis of a Civilising Process is the movement, over time, towards stricter self-control, both emotional and physical. This self-control is not, of course, a matter only of conscious self-regulation. It is central to Elias’s argument that much deeper psychological changes occur in the long term. In the course of the civilising process, a more complex and stable control of behaviour is increasingly instilled in individuals through training from the earliest years of childhood as an automatism or self-compulsion.
A prime example is the development of parliamentary rules that enable the peaceful transference of political power, described by Elias as the ‘parliamentarisation of political conflict’ (Velija & Malcolm, 2018). This process was central to the emergence of modern sports in England, something I will discuss in more detail in the following pages.

Elias initially choose ‘manners’ as the vehicle or topic through which to illustrate the gradual but, in time, significant changes that were tracked via writings on the subject over several centuries. Commencing with a short treatise by Erasmus of Rotterdam, published around 1530, Elias was able to draw upon writings on manners (or Civilité). Through this method, he described a civilising process, an advancement in civility over the centuries (Elias, 1994: 48).

The civilising process takes in the monopoly mechanism, the decline in the number of competing states. This occurs throughout history in the annexation of weaker and smaller units and the increased power of the larger ones. The control of the means of violence gradually moved to fewer hands and eventually to the state. Over time, especially in Europe, violence and the daily fear of violence receded as the state authority took control. This was a very gradual process, something which needs to be viewed over centuries but nonetheless the changes to people’s exposure to violence can be seen despite valid argument that this change is still incomplete. What it all amounts to, according to Elias, is monopolization by governments of the free use of military weapons which, in turn, provides for the taxation of income and assets by those same governments (or central authorities). He concludes, logically it would seem, that if the first form of monopolisation disappears, the other immediately collapses too (Elias, 1994: 268).

Here, as in other aspects of civilising processes, there is no zero point. However, argues Elias, the character of leisure pursuits changes in the course of the process, along with the balance between external constraints and learned self-restraints. Close analysis of the long-term civilising process indicates that, ‘as restraints on people’s behaviour become more all-embracing, more even, and internalised as a more or less automatically operating self-control, counter-moves appear towards a balancing loosening of social and personal restraints’ (1986, 66, cited in Mennell, 1989: 144).
Elias explains a critical aspect of the civilising process, the shift from social restraint to self-restraint. An example he provides is the use of handkerchiefs in the early eighteenth century. This accoutrement had become fashionable among the upper classes, first in Italy, some two centuries before. The item had by then come into general usage but now more stress was being put upon the habit of children of ‘putting the fingers in the nose.’ Elias tells us, ‘as with other childish habits, the health warning now appeared alongside or in place of the social one as its instrument of conditioning, in reference to the harm that could be done by doing “such a thing” too often.’ Prior to this time, habits were considered in relation to other people and how they might be regarded as embarrassing or showing a lack of respect to others. Now, the introduction of ‘hygiene’ or ‘hygienic reasons’ was aimed at conditioning ‘children to a certain social standard.’ That standard was now predicated on greater self-restraint. Elias continues to inform us that the advent of this method of consolidating habits or conditioning, gained traction ‘with the rise of the middle classes’ (Elias, 1994: 126-127).

Mennell (1989: 96) elaborates on this explanation:

This self-control is not, of course, a matter only of conscious self-regulation. It is central to Elias’s argument that much deeper psychological changes occur in the long term. In the course of the civilising process, a more complex and stable control of behaviour is increasingly instilled in individuals through training from the earliest years of childhood as an automatism or self-compulsion.

A perfect illustration – and it is just one such example – of how this civilising process applies to a study of football management can be observed from a newspaper headline in October 2018: ‘Managers Would Be Arrested Now For What They Said In The 1980s.’ An interview in The Times (5 October 2018) with the former Chelsea and Southampton Dutch player, Ken Monkou, revealed bullying and racism in the 1980s on a scale which could hardly be imagined, let alone tolerated in 2018. Monkou, who is black, works today for the PFA (Professional Footballers Association) and has been part of the ‘Show Racism the Red Card’ campaign, a movement whose very existence indicates the problem has not been eradicated. However, his description of the prevailing behaviours of many managers, players, and supporters in the 1980s demonstrates that substantial attitudinal changes have occurred.
One significant part of Elias’s work is his concept of functional democratisation, a term he first used in *What is Sociology?* (1970). Elias created the concept of functional democratisation, a concept which describes power balances becoming more equal within a network of interdependencies. As functional specialisation increases and more and more specialists are allocated very specific roles, the numbers of interdependencies increase, which in turn leads to a process of functional democratisation. As Elias explains:

> In the course of social differentiation and corresponding integration, certain groups have suffered reductions in the scope of their functions, and even total loss of function; the consequence has been loss of power potential. But the overall trend of the transformation was to reduce all power potentials between different groups,--...this trend is referred to by the concept of ‘functional democratisation’ (1970: 67-68).

I draw upon and expand on functional democratisation, which is an important part of my work, in the next chapter.

### 3.5 Parliamentarisation, Sportisation & Habitus

I referred above to the emergence of parliamentary politics which I will address here again. Elias, with Eric Dunning, wrote much on the subject of sport, particularly in Britain. As the Eliasian academic Mennell put it:

> A number of sports first assumed their modern, internationally recognisable form in England’ but ‘only in the eighteenth century did (sport) acquire its specific modern connotations of a pleasurable pastime involving competitive physical exertion and skill, but with a relatively moderated use of violence (1989: 147).

It was in the eighteenth century that what Elias (1986: 17) described as ‘a telling example of a civilising spurt’ occurred. New degrees of self-restraint began to be witnessed upon the handing over of government from one party to the other. The change was conducted peacefully and the new governing party no longer chose to victimise those whom it had replaced, as had been the prevailing practice previous to this. The changeover was described as ‘a rather smooth rotation of rival groups according to agreed rules.’ The change was significant, in that it describes reasonably accurately the process of governmental handover
to this day, whereas such transitions had not previously been possible without bloodshed, rancour, and more bloodshed.

To be more specific, the thrust of Elias’s argument is that the civilisation process saw politics change quite dramatically from an age when those assuming power would be expected to deprive, punish, even kill those whom they had succeeded or usurped. Sport in its various forms evolved from the Roman Colosseum, where men fought beasts or men fought each other to the death, to a stage where the introduction of rules made sporting contests substitutions for the more barbaric events which had gone before.

While State formation was a critical factor in the trend away from utterly violent sports, Elias also alludes to the development of ‘conscience’ as a contributory factor. England was the first country where non-violent sports began to supersede the more savage types and Elias contends that ‘the development of parliamentary government, and thus of a more or less self-ruling aristocracy and gentry, played a decisive part in the development of sport’ (Elias, 1986: 18).

This manifestation of the civilising spurt was described by Elias (1986: 17) as the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the landlord/political classes of England. He described a contemporaneous decline in the acceptance of violence in sport as the ‘sportisation’ of those pastimes. He was not claiming that the latter change had flowed from the first but that their concomitant civilising advances were brought about because, essentially, the same people who governed the political clubs were also involved in the governance of various sports, with football/soccer one example.

The dominant class of English landowners formed both political clubs and sports clubs. It was no coincidence that the ideas which structured the way this emergent class organised their working lives similarly informed the way they structured their leisure time. These processes could be said to derive from a shift in habitus (Malcolm & Haut, 2018).

The acquiring of and practice of restraint is an important factor for Elias. He sees leisure activities, of which sport is an important one, as facilitating displays of emotion, albeit in a controlled fashion, allowing people a freedom of expression of emotions which would not be
allowed or allowable in their working or non-leisure lives. Personal self-control is a key theme as is the need for sports to be structured in such a way as to allow tension-excitement. For example, he cites the need for sporting contests to provide a certain level of tension. This need is not met if contests end too quickly or are too one-sided to hold the interest of spectators for very long. Regarding the acquiring of restraint, the fundamental change was in regard to the greater sensitivity to the use of violence which, reflected in the social habitus of individuals, and also found expression in their pastimes, notably in their sports. In summary, the parliamentarisation of the English landed classes had its counterpart in the ‘sportisation of their pastimes’ (Elias, 1986: 17).

Elias stresses that the steps which led to pacification or parliamentarisation in Britain did not form a pattern from which a similar pacification or series of civilising steps in relation to sport could have been regarded as inevitable, or ‘bound to emerge.’ He points out that ‘one can hardly say in that case that the parliamentarisation of England’s ancient House of Lords and House of Commons was the cause of which sport was the effect.’ However, his concluding argument is definitive, as he explains:

Sport and Parliament as they emerged in the eighteenth century were both characteristic of the same change in the power structure of England and in the social habitus of that class of people which emerged from the antecedent struggles as the ruling class (Elias, 1986: 23).

As Malcolm and Haut (2018) suggest, increasing controls over violence, emotions and spontaneous behaviours reflect both parliamentarisation and sportisation in the nineteenth century. The changes in behaviours were not merely a reduction or curtailment of violence. Figurational explanations emphasise the relevance of political processes of state formation, of industrialisation and bureaucratisation on parliamentarisation and sportisation.

3.6 The Social Significance of Sport

I referred in the previous chapter to the process which Elias and Dunning labelled the ‘social significance of sport’. It may appear self-evident that sport has an importance to society as something which provides a healthy recreational outlet, especially, but not exclusively, for
young people. The other facet of sports, other than as something in which to participate, is
sport as something to be viewed as a spectator, to be enjoyed by an audience of people.
Dunning (1986: 219) distinguishes between achievement sport and leisure sport but suggests
that achievement sport may retain its function as a leisure activity if the context is as a
spectator sport. He continues to describe how achievement sport may be seen as a spectator
sport which ‘can provide pleasurable mimetic excitement which may counterbalance the
normally unenjoyable stress-tensions of societies and provide a form of refreshment in
relation to them.’

Elias (1986: 42) describes the human need for enjoyment, emphasising the increased
importance of this in the context of increased amounts of leisure time as hours at work have
reduced over time. ‘Fulfilment of a human need for enjoyment and, in particular, for
enjoyable excitement which balances the even control of feelings in non-leisure life is, I
believe, one of the basic functions which human societies have to satisfy.’

Elias and Dunning (1986: 50) addressed the question of excitement and tension in human
beings, in particular within leisure activities. Comparisons are made with societies of old,
where excitement would rise in the face of what would today seem mundane events such as
crop failure or an excessively abundant crop. The modern equivalent would be economic
news, good or bad, and they make the point that, in today’s more advanced society, there is
little visible discernible public reaction. Similarly, individual excitement tends not to be
displayed in public as it was in ancient times or perhaps today in less mature or sophisticated
societies. Control – personal control – has become an in-built part of peoples’ personality
structure. But in advanced industrial society, leisure activities provide an outlet for socially
approved arousal of moderate excitement behaviour in public. Among the so-called mimetic
leisure activities are sports, music, drama, murder films, hunting, fishing, racing, painting,
chess, and many others. The quest for excitement in these types of leisure activities is, we are
told, complementary to the control and restraint of our emotions in everyday life.

Sport does have a social significance but, in Elias’s view, to fully explore this requires a deep
awareness of context on the part of the student. The underlying hypothesis is that the
distinguishing problems and characteristics of sport can best be understand (sic) as correlates
of wider problems and characteristics of specific societies; that to understand the characteristics of sport one cannot confine oneself to the study of sport or one’s enquiry to the particular stage of society in which pastimes assumed the character of sport’ (Elias, 1986: 40).

The changing balance between work and leisure (ideological as well as factual) has led to an increase in the social significance of leisure activities. There are three aspects of the emergent modern social figuration that have contributed to the growing social significance of sport:

1. Sport has become one of the principal media for generation of pleasurable excitement.
2. Sport has become one of the principal media for collective identification.
3. Sport has come to form a key source of meaning in the lives of many people.

Football, as a sport of the masses meets all of these criteria related to social significance. As I illustrate in Chapter Four, the management function developed over time so that it became a crucial element in terms of collective identification and as an instrument that facilitated the delivery of meaning to peoples’ lives.

As Dunning (1986) suggests sport has become a social enclave within which both players and spectators can be part of the generation of pleasurable excitement in a socially limited and controlled fashion. It is the inherently oppositional characteristic of sport that accounts for its prominence as a focus for collective identification.

Elias & Dunning (1986) contend that, within a work environment, people’s decisions are oriented towards others, while in leisure they are more centred towards self. The non-leisure part of spare-time is more likely to see decisions oriented towards others. Elias and Dunning argue that the primary area in which decisions tend to be entirely geared to one’s own personal pleasurable satisfaction is in the area of leisure. The authors express the desire for a more systematic enquiry into the question of internalised controls and external social constraints with a view to establishing which aspects of them have positive functions for the operation of society and which have not. They argue that non-leisure activities often require a high degree of emotional control because of the need for consideration for others where
there is a high degree of interdependence and that humans require stimulation in order to function satisfactorily, particularly stimulation through the company of other human beings. They had declared that in the sociological literature of that time, leisure appeared to be regarded ‘merely as an adjunct to work.’ Work was seen as the meaningful element in a human being’s life. ‘During the hours in which people do not need to work, they do things which are of lesser value or inherently valueless, and society makes allowance for their inclination to the pleasures of idleness.’ In essence, the function of leisure activities was to help recover from the strains of work. Elias & Dunning question this hypothesis, asking why, if recovery from the strains of work were the only function of leisure time, would people not simply retire to bed and rest. They express the view that, not only should activities such as sport be seen as of physical benefit to participants (the traditional singular value attributed to sport), it should be seen as a form of mimetic excitement and provider of healthy tensions, all of which have benefits beyond the mere physical. Through what was a breakdown of the elements of non-working hours and a better location of leisure within this framework Elias & Dunning were able to illustrate more lucidly than had previously been attempted, the importance of sport in society (Elias & Dunning, 1986: 74-80).

3.7 Data, Sources and Methodology

My research objective has been to track and explain the development of the management function in professional association football in England, from the codification and formalisation of that game in the second half of the eighteenth century to the current time, and to do this through the prism of figurational sociology.

In tracking a function such as this management process, I was tracking change. I was examining how this specific function came about and how it has developed over the years to arrive at the state in which we currently find it. The fact that I broke the study into time periods helped place developments or change into time context. The figurational approach meant exploration of the interdependencies to which the function was subject at each stage of the process of change. Books examined could be placed in a timeframe, providing data which could be compared to other works from the same time period, be they other books or academic studies or at specific times, newspapers. As Dolan (2009:185) declared, ‘Historians
traditionally have used documents as evidence of particular events, values, ideas and practices at specific times and places. These events can then be organised into a sequence over time, thereby, constituting a narrative of change.’ This reflects how I carried out my research and how I constructed the ‘narrative of change’ is best described by Sinclair (2015: 32), who wrote that ‘Elias encourages academics to take a historical approach in order to develop connections between specific social processes and understand the dynamics of complex figurations across generations.’

3.8 Secondary Sources

A number of academic works provide sources of information. I also covered some of these references in Chapter Two. The figurational approach to the management function in football does have some rich sources such as Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players, (1979), by Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard as well as Quest for Excitement (1986) – The collected works of Norbert Elias, edited by Eric Dunning. As I noted in the previous chapter, the 2015 publication of Association Football a collaboration between Eric Dunning and Graham Curry offers further assistance in understanding how and why the game itself has evolved. This latter work also explains how Norbert Elias developed the ideas around figurational sociology and the relevance of those ideas to the game of football. Anthony King’s The End of The Terraces (1998) is a wonderful academic study of how the modern game has changed and offers a breathtakingly brilliant destruction of the pretentious offerings of Richard Giulianotti, a piece so well written it alone makes the book worthwhile. If King is to be admired for his clarity of thought and expression, I do believe the fault with his work is the undue regard, almost reverence, in which he holds a cohort of businessmen who became involved in football at a particular time. Stephen Wagg’s The Football World (1984), Pay Up and Play the Game (Wray Vamplew, 1988) and The Roots of Football Hooliganism (Dunning, Murphy and Williams, 1988) all touch on figurational theory, as well as providing some references to managing at particular times during the evolutionary process. Tony Mason (1980) whose work looks at football and society up until 1915 describes club finances and the role of directors from that perspective. The study by Richard Sanders (2009) pays particular attention to the role of the public schools in the codification of football. He is also a source on football
during the period within which the game saw a radical change from amateur teams winning FA Cups to professionalism. Although it has been criticised by Graham Curry for a lack of references, *The People’s Game* (1994), by James Walvin, does provide some material as does the offering from Neil Carter, *The Football Manager* (2006), which I would contend, despite some useful paragraphs, has a vagueness about references, similar to Walvin’s work. John Williams’ history or biography of Liverpool Football Club provides data on football especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. David Goldblatt’s, *The Ball is Round* (2006), offers a detailed global history of football and is a source, as is the earlier publication *Football and The English* (A Social History of Association Football in England: 1863 – 1995) by Dave Russell.

### 3.9 Biographies and Autobiographies

Wagg (1984) indicates footballers’ biographies first appeared in the 1940s. It remains a difficult task to assess changes in their work philosophies. Wagg outlines how clubs impose restrictions on what a player may say in public or for print. He concludes whatever is said about the occupational values of League players in the 1920s and 1930s will be speculative. However, something can be said about their attitudes towards playing the game and secondly towards wages. Neither were unrelated to changes in club management nor indeed to developments in the wider society. That said, most autobiographies of managers date from the latter part of the twentieth century and are less useful than a Google search, telling only what the author and his ghost writer wish to tell. Biographies are, by and large, hagiographies, making them similarly only minutely helpful, with few exceptions. Gary Imlach’s Sports Book of the Year 2005, *My Father and other Working Class Heroes*, is one notable exception, as is the 1976 Jimmy Guthrie autobiography, *Soccer Rebel*. Below is a list of the autobiographies/biographies examined.
Table 1: List of the Autobiographies/Biographies Examined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Buchan</td>
<td>A Lifetime In Football</td>
<td>Charles Buchan</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[1955]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herbert Chapman</td>
<td>Herbert Chapman on Football</td>
<td>Herbert Chapman</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>William Garbutt</td>
<td>The Father of Italian Football</td>
<td>Paul Edgerton</td>
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<td>Jimmy Hogan</td>
<td>Prophet or Traitor–The Jimmy Hogan Story</td>
<td>Norman Fox</td>
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<td>John Giles</td>
<td>A Football Man</td>
<td>John Giles &amp; Declan Lynch</td>
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<td>Jimmy Guthrie</td>
<td>Soccer Rebel</td>
<td>Jimmy Guthrie</td>
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<td>Brian Clough</td>
<td>Provided you Don’t Kiss Me</td>
<td>Duncan Hamilton</td>
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<td>John Hughes</td>
<td>Yogi Bare</td>
<td>John Hughes &amp; Alex Gordon</td>
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<td>Stephen Imlach</td>
<td>My father &amp; Other Working Class Heroes</td>
<td>Gary Imlach</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>Roy Keane</td>
<td>The Autobiography</td>
<td>Roy Keane &amp; Eamon Dunphy</td>
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<td>Fabio Capello</td>
<td>Portrait of a Winner</td>
<td>Gabriele Marcotti</td>
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<td>Alf Ramsey</td>
<td>Sir Alf</td>
<td>Leo McKinstry</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>Ronnie Whelan</td>
<td>Walk On: My Life in Red</td>
<td>Ronnie Whelan</td>
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3.10 Newspapers, Magazines & Online Sources

The British Newspaper Archive (online) has been an important source of data, even if it sometimes proved difficult to navigate. It provided access to newspapers, national and regional, from the earliest days of professional football. Regional papers such as the Birmingham Mail, the Yorkshire Post, the Lancashire Evening Post, the Liverpool Echo, and the
Liverpool Mercury were sources of data. Some of these papers are long defunct but they were among the principal sources for data, especially in the late nineteenth century through to the late 1920s or early 1930s. Similarly, specialist publications, such as the Athletic News and The Sporting Life, provided data from specific times. By the 1930s, many of today’s papers, e.g. the Mirror, the People and the Times were allocating more space to football coverage and describing football managers and their purpose in the game. As I describe in more detail in Chapter Four, contemporary reportage proved a resource in assessing the management function at various stages of its development. Initially, reports on football failed to mention any such figure as a manager, later making only occasional passing references to such a role and eventually focusing more on the notion of the manager as a figure of influence. I provide an example of an amplification of the importance of the function as a local Liverpool newspaper carries news on the activities of three managers, none of whom has ever had any connection to a local club. I believe this highlights a moment when newspapers perceived a broader interest in the function that extended beyond the narrow view where supporters cared only about their own club and its appointees. I found the availability of such data as match reports from the late 1800s to the 1930s helpful in enabling the formation of a view of how the game was seen and reported in those years. In this respect, newspapers of the time provided something that no book or other publication could do and access to this historical data complemented the other sources available to me.

In Chapter four, I utilise newspaper reportage over time to illustrate the development of the relationship between managers and this element of media and how the function assumed greater importance, aided and facilitated by more detailed newspaper coverage.

Magazines, in particular those published in the past thirty years, are a further source of material on managers and managing. I had access to more than twenty years of the monthly football publication, When Saturday Comes and to five years output of the more recent addition, The Blizzard, a quarterly magazine, produced and edited by author and football journalist, Jonathan Wilson.

The website capology.com, a multi-million pound enterprise, is an invaluable source of financial data across all professional sports including football, in all the main centres
(countries) of activity, enabling comparisons between earnings in England and other European Leagues. Other websites such as soccerbase.com and bleacherreport.com contain data on professional football in England and elsewhere. Newspapers’ websites and the Premier League website provided additional information, as may be seen in Chapter Four.

3.11 Interviews

Carter (2006, cited in Kelly, 2010) makes the point that football is a closed business and that outsiders have great difficulty obtaining access to meaningful numbers of participants prepared to discuss their world. Referring to works that have been undertaken, Kelly includes, Parker (1996), Magee (1998), Richardson (2003), Littlewood (2005), and Roderick (2006) as examples of some who have managed to penetrate the football world sufficiently to produce useful works. His own route to access is facilitated by the fact that he has played professionally in both Ireland and England and, therefore, has contacts prepared to speak with him or recommend others to do so.

My opportunities to interview some former professional footballers and managers have provided further insight into the practice, as well as answering questions which arise and explaining some of the relationships which affect or constrain the football manager. In several cases, the interviewee, as well as having played at the highest levels, had managed in professional football. Consequently, they were in a position to provide insight into the relationship between players and managers, sometimes from both perspectives. Three of those interviewed had experience in operating as agents and although it was not the primary reason for the interviews, I was provided with further insights, in these examples into agent-player relationships and agent-manager negotiations. My choice of subjects was very much based on access. I relied on two contacts and, in three cases, I got interviewees as a result of direct approaches. In general, I was seeking to discuss their experiences of playing for certain high-profile managers while also establishing their own views on management, especially where they had personal experience of managing. The following is a description of each of the eleven former players interviewed. In providing these details I have tried to strike a balance between providing an explanation of each man’s experience and exposure to management and to managers as well as, where applicable, their own experience of
managing, while all the time keeping in mind the question of anonymity. As to the location and duration of each interview, three including that with the journalist were conducted by telephone with the shortest running to 18 minutes while the other two with a former manager and the journalist ran to 23 and 25 minutes. Three interviews were conducted at the homes of the interviewees in England and all lasted for over 40 minutes. Four were conducted in hotels, in Dublin, County Wicklow and Brugges. The durations varied but all were between 30 and 40 minutes. The remaining two interviews took place at a Box in the Main Stand at Celtic Park, Glasgow and at the offices in the Youth Centre of A.C. Milan to the south of that city. Again, both of these meetings were relaxed and lasted 50 and 40 minutes respectively.

1. His full playing career was in the English First Division in the 1970s and 1980s where he won seven English Leagues, as well as League Cups and an FA Cup plus European Cups (Champions League) and UEFA Cups, and made over forty International appearances for England. He played under two of the most successful and iconic managers in English football. He then managed for several years, including in the Premier League.

2. He played in the English First Division, winning Leagues and the FA Cup, as well as a World Cup medal when he was part of England’s 1966 squad. He was named Players’ Player of the Year. He spent eight years in management, between the First and Second Divisions in England, having himself played under some of the most successful managers of the time.

3. His playing career in the English First Division ran from 1960 to the early 1980s, with two of England’s most successful clubs of that period. He won, among other trophies, two First Division and two FA Cup medals. His club career saw him play under three of the best-known managers of that era. He went into management, in the old First Division of English Football as well as managing in the U.S.A. and, having played more than fifty times for the Republic of Ireland, he managed the Irish international team for eight years.

4. He spent his entire playing career in the English First Division from the 1960s to the 1980s, winning English Leagues and an FA Cup and European Fairs Cups. A Scottish International, he played under two of the most successful managers of his era. He managed in the 1980s in the First and Second Divisions in England and briefly returned
to management, in England’s second tier, in the 2000s. As well as the similar experiences to other interviewees, he had first-hand knowledge of club ownership and club takeovers.

5. He played in the English First Division at the top level for almost 20 years from the 1960s into the 1980s. Won Leagues and the FA Cup. Played more than twenty times for Scotland. Did not enter management, but was informative on managers under whom he had worked, as well as on a club takeover on which he had advised.

6. In a career that ran from the late 1970s until the 1990s, he played at in the English First Division and the Italian equivalent, Serie ‘A’, winning an FA Cup medal and two Serie ‘A’ winners medals. In addition, he was named Players’ Player of the Year in England. He played more than seventy times for his country. He managed also at the highest level in Scotland, headed a youth academy at a Premier League club and was part of the Republic of Ireland management team for several years. His wide and diverse experience and awareness of the business of football makes him a very important source from my perspective. Immediately between the end of his playing career and a return to active involvement in coaching and managing, he operated as a players’ agent, which was a further helpful element in our interview.

7. His playing career ran from 1979 to 1998 in Netherlands, Italy, and England, always in the First Division or equivalent. He played under several of the best-known managers, and won Dutch and Italian Leagues, as well as European Cups while in Italy. He made over sixty caps for Netherlands which included his part in a European Championship winning team. He has won the Ballon d’Or as Europe’s best player and came second on another occasion. He managed from the late 1990s until 2018, in the Netherlands, the U.S.A. and in England where he managed two Premier League teams winning the F.A. Cup during that time.

8. Played in the Scottish First Division for seventeen years, beginning 1970, winning seven League Championship medals, a Footballer of the Year Award and over sixty international caps, under well-known and respected managers. Managed in the Scottish Second tier for three years but concentrated on coaching in the Scottish First division, (later Premier League) for most of his post-playing career. Was informative about managers past and present, with whom he had worked.
9. In a playing career that began in 1982 and ended in 2002, he played most of his football in Italy finishing his career in the English Premier League. He won five Serie ‘A’ medals and three European Cups (Champions League), under two of Italy’s most successful club managers, both of whom later managed International teams. His post-playing career has been spent in coaching and youth development but he also spent some time as an assistant manager in Serie ‘A’. He was very helpful in comparing football and football management in Italy and England. The relevance of this will be seen in Chapter Four, where the European Model of football club structure and management is described and discussed.

10. This interviewee acted as an agent in several transfer deals involving English Premier League clubs over the past fifteen years. He played semi-professionally in Ireland in the First Division for seventeen years from the 1970s to the 1990s. He then managed, again in Ireland for thirty years, winning the FAI Cup twice before becoming part of the national team’s coaching staff in the 2000’s. He was well placed to describe the type of negotiations in which he was a part.

11. The subject has acted as an agent in transfer deals in Belgium, Netherlands, and France. He is a former Belgian international player who won Belgian Cup and League medals as well as a European Cup winner’s medal with Club Brugges, the only Belgian club ever to win that competition, under one of the most successful European managers. His playing career began in the late 1960s and ended in the 1980s. In his post playing career, he has managed a Belgian club with unprecedented success as well as working as a Club Chief Executive and later as a players’ agent. He was able to explain several roles from his own experience and to also provide opinions on management structures, again from his direct experience.

The twelfth interview was with a journalist with decades of experience covering football across Europe, including investigative reporting, while now in his eighties, still covering the English Premier League for a British broadsheet newspaper. I drew from extracts of these interviews but not to the extent that would be seen in many conventional studies based solely on qualitative interviews. These interviews acted as a form of collaborative data source or as a means to source other data. I was conscious also of the conventional focus on individual
managers and how their individual stories might take from the broader picture which is the management function rather than the personalities.

3.12 Data Analysis

My data analysis was carried out through a process of empirical and theoretical comparative work. Elias stressed the need for combining theory with research, arguing that ‘theory without research is liable to be abstract and meaningless (while) research without theory will be arid and descriptive’ (Curry & Dunning, 2015: 5).

The collection of data was partly driven by engagement with Elias’s work. As I read the writings of Elias, I got a better awareness of what he meant by figurations, leaving me the task of attempting to ensure I omitted nothing which would help explain interdependencies involving the management function. Having collected data and allocated it to its appropriate timeframe, based on the five sections into which I had divided this segment of my thesis, I undertook analysis to establish what might have relevance and what needed to be dismissed. I then sketched out initial outlines showing the key aspects of each time segment, endeavouring to ensure any events or wider developments I was describing were matters of significance to the task of explaining the development of this function. A study such as this does require the student to have regard for the wider world and the game of football beyond this one function. Consequently, I also focused on wider figurations, in terms of both football and society.

As I began assembling and reading data, I was focused on what Eric Dunning called the Figuration of football. It incorporated all those who might be described, in modern parlance, as stakeholders. In terms of coding, the initial key words included: secretary, director, board, player, team, club, secretary-manager, trainer, scout, association, league. Later, other entities arrived and I was focused on words like: manager, agent and owner. I began to label references under these headings. I then began to code their relationships and the structure of these relationships. In doing so, I was mapping changes to the football figuration. Figurational concepts meant terms like, power relations, time periods, change, behaviour, interdependency. My thesis centred on the management function, a function whose changes
are reflected in the titles employed over the years as secretary became secretary-manager, later manager, later still, head coach. While studying the data, I had to take into account such key issues as time-period, power relations and interdependency. An example is contained in the anecdote I provided about my meeting with Danny McGrain in Glasgow. His description of receiving a first contract provided evidence of power relations between manager and player at a particular time. I had to assess the interdependence between the two principles in the story. I would later encounter examples of how such events were conducted at different times. Seeking, noting and evaluating changes in the relationship was critical to my study. ‘Time’ was a part of my coding but also a means through which I organised the data. And an important element of process is time. As Dunning and Hughes (2013: 50) note, ‘The stress of Elias’s sociology is centrally upon the explanatory importance of time. It correspondingly emphasises the importance of long-term as opposed to short-term processes, although Elias did not neglect the latter.’ That explanatory importance of time is a critical aspect of my study which takes in a period from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the end of the second decade of the twenty first century.

As I noted relationships and behaviours in the early part of the twentieth century, I perceived a recurring theme, a rejection by the English football authorities of any thought of formal involvement with football officialdom in other countries. It was matched by a similar rejection of English coaches who had achieved success abroad. I noticed a pattern that appeared to continue into the 1940s. David Goldblatt (2006) had actually coined the phrase, ‘Predictable Cultural Insularity’ and I began to use this to code such data. I had noted the various instances and incidents which might come under that heading. The origin of the term was Goldblatt’s (2006) description of a decision by the English football authorities, to prohibit Chelsea playing in the newly created European Cup in 1956, which he described as an expression of ‘predictable cultural insularity’. He referenced several other examples and as I read more writers including Walvin (1994), Fox (2003), and Edgerton (2009), the term ‘insularity’ began to recur, always describing the football authorities and not at just one period of time. Unsure how to classify this thread of thought, shared by several writers, I eventually came upon a description by Elias (cited in Elias & Scotson, 1994) which appeared to explain this phenomenon in other areas of life and society. Elias described a certain habitus, which
informed me how this cultural insularity may have come about. I had advanced some distance in my research and data analysis before I realised the ubiquity of this characteristic and its importance to my study which I had coded it as ‘predictable cultural insularity.’ But as I went back to Elias’s work, I began to realise what I was dealing with was ‘functional democratisation.’

3.13 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined some of the theoretical ideas of Elias as well as my sources of data and how I dealt with that data. Given the scale of Elias’s work, I accept it is difficult to capture the depth of his work with all the nuances, in a short section such as this. However, some of these concepts and ideas are addressed in more detail in my data analysis chapter where they perhaps become more tangible when framed against the empirical data which I use. The next chapter is my data analysis chapter, which is the core of this thesis.
Chapter Four – Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

I have divided the study into specific time periods. Looking at how figurations change, how established interdependencies adjust, and how new ones arise may also be facilitated by studying these processes over specific blocks of time. As I look at the management function in each time period, I describe the interdependencies and the power relations between managers of the particular era and those fulfilling other functions such as director or player. The interdependence between players and managers will be a recurring theme in each of these five sections. It will also be seen that over time, players’ power opportunities changed and that those changes contributed to the shaping of the management function. The other highly significant interdependency affecting football managers has been that involving club directors or owners. I have described this relationship at various times over this chapter because club owners proved highly influential in the development of the function of football management. The power balance, over the years, between managers and owners is important to this study.

I regard the relationship between the management function and the media as having an importance in how the former was shaped over the years. Consequently, in this chapter I look at how the power balance between the two developed at various stages. It is also the case, as I will demonstrate, that the relevance of a function at a specific point in time may be informed to some extent by the media coverage or lack thereof.

As to a reason for selecting these time periods, they stem from particular events. The World Wars each brought a hiatus to organised football. 1963 was an important year due to the abolition of the maximum wage and the ending of the ‘retain and transfer’ system. Football players were subject to a maximum wage rule from the late nineteenth century while their contracts were based on a system which heavily favoured the clubs. The next change with long-term impact was the establishment of the Premier League. It is important to keep in mind that I am not suggesting that at the end of each of the chosen periods there was some concluding development or that the opening of the next period saw a new dawn in the
development process. The development of the management function has been processual. Undoubtedly, there were other possible ways to track the story. The later blocks of time may reflect events in the wider world of football but they are only relevant in this work, in so far as they shaped and influenced what happened to the football manager. I end the description of each era with a graphic illustration which gives an indication of the interdependencies of a manager in this time period. A comparison of these illustrations over the five phases of time provides evidence of the increased numbers of interdependencies and the changes in the development and complexity of the function. The sixth section in this data analysis chapter deals with a phenomenon which, I argue, also shaped the development of the game in England through the twentieth century. In doing so, it had an impact on how football management developed.

1. 1863 – 1915 - This period commences with the foundation of the Football Association (FA) and ends with the outbreak of World War I.

2 1919– 1939 - The years between the wars form a natural time boundary in terms of the progress of football and the functionaries within the game.

3 1946 – 1963 - The next period runs from the resumption of activity after the Second World War to the key moment when the maximum wage rule was overcome.

4 1963 – 1992 - This is the period from the ending of the maximum wage and retain and transfer system up to the commencement of the Premier League.

5 1992 – 2020 - The latest period of development for English football and football managers brings us from the commencement of the Premier League up to date.

6 ‘Predictable Cultural Insularity’. The term was coined by David Goldblatt (2006) but he was by no means the only chronicler of football and politics to use the term ‘insularity’ in describing attitudes of those who governed the nation and its football.

4.2 The Development of Professional Clubs and Centralisation Processes

I will begin by outlining how the game of football itself came into being, in the form in which we now know it. This, in turn, may help better understand how the management function developed. Football developed from the many folk versions that existed (Elias & Dunning,
2008), but by the 1860s it had become more organised and centralised. The Football Association (FA) was formed in 1863 by a small number of southern clubs, with the primary objective of playing each other under an agreed set of rules. Within five years, the membership had grown to thirty clubs. By that time, another group of clubs had formed an association in Sheffield and played by their code of rules. It took until 1877 for a single set of rules to be agreed, with elements of those applied in Sheffield incorporated into the FA rules providing what became known as ‘the laws of football.’ The number of clubs affiliated to the FA grew from 50 in 1871 to around a thousand by the late 1880s, of which 200 were directly affiliated to the Football Association (Mason, 1980). The remainder were registered with their local associations which in turn were affiliated to the FA, by then the ultimate authority for all football, both professional and amateur. By 1905, the number of affiliated clubs reached ten thousand (Mason, 1980: 31).

The FA Cup was first contested in 1872. It was an annual competition among amateur football teams, with professionalism not having yet emerged in any significant way. For some ten years, the competition would continue to be dominated by the gentlemen amateurs of the south. The participating teams in the first ten Cup finals were all drawn from southern amateurs, the product of the public schools and the universities. Indeed, the ‘administration of the FA was to continue in such hands long after the social composition of football had changed beyond recognition’ (Dunning & Sheard, 1979). The last amateur team to win the FA Cup was Old Etonians in the 1882 final. By then, the game had spread from its southern English and upper-class strongholds into middle and working-class neighbourhoods in the north of the country. The fact that Blackburn Rovers reached that 1882 final reflected an underlying trend, the participation in the FA Cup of growing numbers of teams from the Midlands and the North of England (Dunning & Sheard, 1979). In 1883, Blackburn Olympic won the cup with what was widely recognised as a team containing professional players. The composition of the Blackburn Olympic team provided a stark contrast to Lord Kinnaird’s Old Etonian opposition, their occupations heralding a transformative change in what was described as ‘the social composition of the game.’ The team contained weavers, spinners, a cotton operative, a picture framer, an iron worker, a plumber, and a couple of players
believed to be disguised professionals. By 1885, the FA accepted that players, in limited circumstances, could be paid (Dunning & Sheard, 1979: 184).

This change was another accelerant in the growth in popularity of the game but there were other reasons. In addition to the practical or physical changes – more time off – better transport options, there is another aspect to the increase in popularity of football as a leisure activity for participation and for spectating. It is summarised in the very title of the Elias and Dunning work, ‘Quest for Excitement.’ Here, it is argued that, ‘in a society in which the propensities for serious and threatening forms of excitement have diminished, the compensatory function of play-excitement has increased.’ It could be said that the prospect of playing and more especially watching organised football, offered excitement in keeping with this theory (Elias & Dunning, 1986: 53).

An activity that easily satisfied the new demand, was football – playing or watching. Football was easy to play because a relatively small number was needed to put out two teams of eleven or sometimes fewer. It required minimal equipment, was inexpensive and could be played on grass or on streets or vacant lots. All of these factors contributed to the growth in popularity of the game, especially among the working classes, as they sought an outlet for their newly acquired free time. As playing became more popular, it was natural that watching the professional teams would also become more popular (Mason, 1980: 3). As to the growth of the game from the latter part of the nineteenth century, it would appear that vastly improved transport systems were the greatest facilitators. Some scholars have suggested that the transport revolution may have been the most important development of the entire nineteenth century in Britain. The benefit to football was that a game previously played locally could now be contested by teams from much greater distances apart and this was key to both the FA Cup’s development and the success of the Football League (Curry & Dunning, 2015).

The 1885 acceptance of professionalism was not universal, however. Those opposed to this development in football were drawn from the upper-middle class and upper-classes. As for the FA, the acceptance of professionalism was a most reluctant one on the part of an organisation whose members had been quite hostile to the notion of players being paid (Russell, 1997). Dunning and Sheard (1979) addressed the social context of the advent of professionalism and how it was important because it reflected changes which were occurring
at that time in society at large. Previously, payment to play a sport was based on ‘aristocratic and gentry patronage.’ An example was cricket where aristocrats employed, in their businesses or on their farms, cricketers from the lower classes who would then play for their village or estate team against teams of other wealthy members of their own class. This new professionalism in football involved a more complex impersonal relationship between employers and employees. Financially, it was less dependent on a certain class, instead being based on ‘exploiting the commercial opportunities presented by the crowds who flocked to the game in urban centres.’ The relationship between players and the hordes who paid to see them play was described as a ‘diffuse’ one which was mediated by those who could gain control of the gate money from which the players were paid. And those who managed to achieve this control were by-and-large local businessmen (Dunning & Sheard, 1979: 182). I will return to this topic later in this chapter.

One consequence of the growth in popularity of professional football as a spectator sport was the need to ensure those spectators paid their entrance fee and the need to accommodate them in ever-increasing numbers. Professional football was becoming more commercialised. It was a business wherein gate money was the primary, if not the only, source of income. Ensuring this money was collected was essential if a club was to develop, to provide better spectator facilities and, in time, new players. The basic requirements for collecting gate money were a fenced perimeter and turnstiles. The advent of turnstiles created another job and another functionary; the turnstile operator, which while it may have been part-time was nonetheless important. The creation of this role, in turn, produced a new series of interdependencies, as the operators depended on the work and the club on their reliability and honesty (Russell, 1997; Goldblatt, 2006).

Other tasks arose. Making fixtures and travel arrangements, sorting out which players to bring or how to cater for home attendances and gate receipts were all matters of importance requiring administration. The number of interdependencies was increasing, as was the need for a functionary to take care of administration and of this ever-increasing number of interdependencies.
As a direct result of the movement towards professionalism, the Football League was created (Dunning & Sheard, 1979). Within three years of the FA’s 1885 agreement to allow professionalism, it became clear to William McGregor, an Aston Villa committee member, that there was a need for an organised fixture programme that would lead to more regular and sustained income.

Up to then, teams would enter themselves in a multiplicity of cup competitions at every level, national, county, city and local, often with resultant fixture confusion (Russell, 1997: 32). A meeting in April 1888 in Manchester led to the commencement of league football in September of that year. Six clubs from the midlands and six from Lancashire formed the initial Football League (Carter, 2006). The League was basically a mechanism designed by leading clubs to protect their considerable investment in terms of both capital and labour costs (Russell, 1997). With the arrival of the Football League, there were now two bodies overseeing professional soccer in England. Immediately, the power relationship between the League and the FA became complex. William McGregor, the League founding member, was soon advocating that the League and not the FA should govern football across the nation. The FA, unsurprisingly, held a contrary view and regarded the League as a purely selfish organisation in pursuit of gate money above everything. The Football Association was established by public school old boys and had its blue riband competition, the FA Cup, dominated, as I have pointed out, in the early years by southern teams. The original League members were Preston North End, Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, Everton, Burnley, West Bromwich Albion, Aston Villa, Wolverhampton Wanderers, Accrington, Derby County, Notts County, and Stoke. Despite some initial teething troubles such as teams arriving late or, in the case of Stoke, a player defecting to another club while in transit to a game, leaving Stoke without a full complement for the game, the League soon proved a great success (Russell, 1997; Carter, 2006). The advent of a league structure with regular games created a need for organisation and co-ordination which, in turn, generated a management requirement in each club. With a proper fixture calendar, the clubs were on the way now to becoming businesses.
4.2.1 The Organisation of Clubs and Functional Specialisation

Having started life as voluntary organisations run by committees, the need for clubs to become limited companies stemmed from the growth of gate-taking and professionalism. Small Heath (later renamed Birmingham City) was probably the first club to change status in 1888. By 1921, only Northampton Town and Nottingham Forest, of eighty-six league clubs, had not followed suit (Russell, 1997). In the context of the development of both the game of football and key functions such as management, it is worth noting the backgrounds of those who took control of clubs in their formative years. Once more, an understanding of the structure of the interdependency between owners and those who became managers will provide some insight into the long-term developments within the game, not least that of management. An analysis of the boards of 46 professional clubs between 1888 and 1915 provided a breakdown of the categories of people who became football club directors. 76 per cent were classified under, Gentlemen, Professionals, Manufacturers, Managers, Builders & Contractors, Wholesale & Retail Employers, Publicans and Hotel Keepers. Because of factors such as a 5 per cent restriction on dividends and a ban on payment of directors’ fees, both imposed by the FA, and the fact that not many clubs could be considered profitable enterprises, it is unlikely most directors were there to make money from their involvement. From the breakdown, it would appear that the majority of directors came from the middle classes, with only 0.5 per cent listed as Unskilled Manual (Mason, 1980; Goldblatt, 2006). Establishing a professional football club did not guarantee success or even long-term survival. Profitability and viability were issues for the early members of the football league. Sunderland Albion was owned by business people in the form of a corn-miller, an accountant, a glass manufacturer and a brewer but after three consecutive years of losses and an acknowledgement that it could not compete with Sunderland F.C. it was wound up in 1892 (Mason, 1980: 41). Yet another example of a club collapse at this early stage is Newton Heath, which went into receivership in 1902, its shareholders mainly drawn from working class backgrounds and trades. Manchester United was created out of the ashes of Newton Heath and, by 1908, it was run by the managing director of a brewery, J.H. Davies, whose shareholding exceeded the combined holdings of the other six directors (Mason, 1980).
The question of the motivation of people who became club directors is addressed by several writers and academics (Wagg, 1984; Russell, 1997; Goldblatt, 2006). The view that the majority of directors were not in the role to gain directly from their position is the dominant one. There were exceptions such as John Houlding who had profited from his directorship at Everton, going on to become a founder of Liverpool with financial gain never far from his mind as he owned a hotel in the area and saw football crowds as a target customer group (Williams, 2010). However, it appears Houlding was an exception.

Mason (1980) describes the situation at Aston Villa in 1889. The club had 382 members, a management committee of nine, plus the secretary, and this committee took care of all matters relating to the team including selection, transport arrangements etc. The motivation of those who became directors of clubs is examined in detail and, given the lack of profitability of professional clubs, prestige in the community rather than pecuniary gain was seen as the predominant motivator (Mason, 1980: 35).

Russell (1997: 42) also suggests that many directors were motivated by ‘no desire to obtain any reward beyond the success of the club’ and that the motive was therefore essentially an ‘innocent’ one. Ensuring the success of the club frequently was viewed as provision of a civic service. While sharing the widely held view of historians that financial gain was not a motivation for most investors/directors, he warns it would be naïve to believe that every director was motivated purely by altruism. Newcastle United was the only club to ban directors from any tendering process involving the club. Elsewhere directors were known to have gained building contracts or to have awarded themselves catering or drinks related contracts. In 1903, Manchester City’s board voted against relocation which would take business away from their own drinking establishments. However, these directors were a small minority and, in general, profit maximisation, for individual or for club, was not the primary objective for the football directors in Victorian and Edwardian England (Russel, 1997: 44). In reality, financial gain could not have been a primary objective of the great majority of those who invested in football clubs. There were the small shareholders with a handful of shares bought as a token of their support for their local club. Others had invested greater amounts but if financial gain was the motivation, there were innumerable better ways to invest one’s
capital. As Goldblatt (2006: 66) put it, ‘when faced with a choice between a bigger dividend and a better centre forward, there was little option’. The desire for team improvement and success was apparently greater than that for monetary gain. He further posits the view that, for many of the higher-level investors who would become club directors, ‘the most plausible return on these investments was the immense local kudos and status that would inevitably arise from occupying such a hallowed position in a hallowed institution’ (Goldblatt, 2006: 66). In 1909, The Athletic News revealed that, of the top sixty-two clubs, only six had paid a 5 per cent dividend, evidence that not many directors or shareholders were getting fat on the profits of football clubs (Mason, 1980).

4.2.2 The Secretary-Manager

This section describes the creation of the function, the central point of this thesis, which will be shown to have developed and changed quite considerably over time. Most clubs that had become professional, and which then become limited companies in the late 1880s and 1890s, appointed secretaries as the function of manager had yet to be established within football clubs. As the professional game developed over the last decade of the nineteenth century, directors at many clubs sought to avoid becoming involved in day-to-day management. Consequently, club secretaries were called upon to become the point of contact for players and to deal with issues as they arose. An example was the role of secretary at Aston Villa in 1889 who took care of all matters relating to the team including selection, transport arrangements and so on (Mason, 1980:35).

Wagg (1984) identifies some of the functions which later would become the responsibility of the football manager. He suggests directors would have seen it as a chore beneath their standing to have to deal with working class players. He argues that the response during the 1880s and 1890s was to engage secretaries. Initially, the secretaries were charged with general administration and, as Wagg puts it, ‘were often involved with players without ever being the main arbiters in team affairs.’ In a world where to receive payment was considered a symbol of inferiority, the secretary was seen as a relatively lowly position, one of whose main functions was to be a buffer between directors and players (Wagg, 1984: 8). Wagg may not be correct in this latter assumption. A comparison may be made with the period of
nascent professionalism in Rugby League where the clubs were run by people of similar social class and standing to those operating football clubs. It appears they had no such difficulty in dealing with Rugby League professional players of a similar social class to those playing professional soccer (Dunning & Sheard, 1979). These writers contend that Rugby League ‘was forged for Northern industrial workers by members of the middle classes with essentially middle-class interests in mind.’ It appears unlikely that people from the same middle-class business and industrial background, and from the same geographical region, would have had no problem dealing with players at Rugby League clubs but would adopt an entirely different attitude at Association Football clubs. Even in this early stage of the involvement of the secretary, there was quite a variation between this functionary’s responsibilities at different clubs. Sometimes, the person’s title included the word manager, as in secretary-manager or even team manager, but what they actually did in relation to the team differed from club to club. Some such as the Blackburn Rovers Secretary in the 1880’s was said to have a ‘shrewd eye’ for players (Berry, 1975: 35). Meanwhile, in 1899 Middlesbrough F.C. appointed Mr. J. Robson as team manager, at what was considered a low salary of £156 p.a., on the specific understanding that the team was to be selected by the club’s directors and that he would not travel to away matches (Wagg, 1984: 226).

Soon the job title had changed to secretary-manager, and in the first decades of professional football, the position was filled, principally, by people who had been employed for the secretarial role more so than that of team manager (Wagg, 1984:8). These secretaries were hired to perform clerical and accounting duties, so they would have had some education or training in what amounted to office work, a step above a factory job. Meanwhile, up to 1914, directors charged themselves with certain aspects of club administration including, finance, recruitment of players and team selection. Between the transition to professionalism and the beginning of World War One in 1914, team selection was a function which directors saw as their prerogative, something they were slow to relinquish (Wagg, 1984; Carter, 2006). Clearly, they saw their role in team selection as providing them with increased power opportunity and status. Following the earliest days of competitive football, as the players reached retirement age, ex-players began to be engaged as secretary-managers (Goldblatt, 2006).
Those who fell into the role of secretary-manager or early manager did not receive training. It was a new field of endeavour and there was no prescribed way to manage a football team. So they applied whatever methods they could use, drawing from any experience they may previously have had, whether from commerce or military (Carter, 2006). Carter outlines how it had been for the first people charged with responsibilities for managing football clubs. ‘Despite some responsibilities for the team, the job of those early managerial figures was largely administrative. They dealt with the ticketing and fixture arrangements, and the club correspondence, and took minutes of meetings’ (Carter, 2006: 36). It would appear a degree of personnel management might have been added to that description. Even when on a rare occasion the word ‘manager’ rather than ‘secretary’ was deployed, the person appointed did not always have a role which the title might tempt us to understand. The change from collective responsibility/authority of a board or committee to having one person charged with taking care of team affairs was a slow and uneven process. This step towards greater functional specialisation took decades in the case of many clubs and even longer for the English national team as I illustrate in this chapter.

4.2.3 Players

The secretary or secretary-manager had become the administrator between Board and players. The Board devolved a degree of power to this new figure and they now depended on him to perform his various clerical functions while, in many cases, also seeing that all was trouble-free in terms of the playing staff, as they had now become. One of the difficulties of the relations between Board and secretary-manager was the fact that the Board picked the team. This is where the interdependence between the secretary-manager and the players becomes an issue. Unhappy (or unselected) players would have dealt with an individual who could not be held responsible for their non-selection. We can only surmise that he depended on players accepting decisions in which he was not involved while players could only hope and trust that if their dissatisfaction were to be conveyed to the selectors, the middle-man would do this in the same tone the player would have chosen. It would seem then, some of the secretary-manager figures had influence when it came to player recruitment. Others did
not. The authority vested in these individuals was quite uneven from club to club, and this would continue to be the case in the years that followed.

Changes to the game itself may not appear relevant to the subject of this thesis but I will show how an advance in sophistication of the game of football, had inevitable influence on players and therefore on managers as they performed their jobs. In those early years of organised football, some radical changes had occurred in how football was played. In the game of the public-school boys’ era, football involved individualistic play. Dribbling with the ball until it was either lost or a score was achieved appears to have been the norm. Indeed, in the early stages of the game after the bi-furcation of football and rugby (Dunning and Sheard, 1979), football was frequently described as ‘the dribbling game’ to distinguish it from the rugby code. Walvin (1994:74) explains:

Eight men out of eleven formed the attack: by 1874 they had been reduced to seven, three of whom were centre forwards. In the late 1870s this was reduced still further, to six attackers and finally, in 1883, Cambridge University resorted to five, pulling back one of the centre forwards to fill the newly created position of centre-half.

Apart from the adjustment to the way in which teams were populated and structured, with the game seeing new patterns of play as a consequence, there was another more basic change to football in this period. Russell outlined the changes. Crossbars had replaced pieces of rope. The earliest football games had each side naming an umpire. In 1871, a referee became part of each game from a position on the side-line. In 1892 goal nets were introduced. In 1894, the referee was given full control and moved into the field of play, the umpires now becoming linesmen, another step in functional specialisation. The penalty kick was introduced in 1891. No decision better exemplified the habitus difference between the elite amateurs and their successors from the lower social classes, the ones who deemed the penalty necessary. The amateurs were opposed and indignant at this move, holding that this new legislation assumed the unthinkable, that footballers could be capable of cheating (Russell, 1997: 31).

As professionalism took hold, despite the antipathy of the southern gentlemen, it attracted working class players, who saw a pastime could become a career. In the new age of professionalism, players, almost entirely from working-class backgrounds, were attracted by
the chance to be paid for doing something they already did for recreation. Their working hours were considerably shorter than those of their fellow workers in commerce and industry (Dixon & Garnham, 2005). In addition, as the game developed there was the attraction of playing before large attendances, with social recognition and attention if not outright fame.

Players were subject to maximum wage structures from the late nineteenth century. The players, in so far as they had dealings with the club, had these through the secretary-manager, directors having placed that barrier between themselves and their footballing employees. The ‘retain and transfer’ system had been in place since 1893 while the maximum wage was introduced in 1893 and refined in 1901 (Greenfield & Osborn, 1998). The ‘retain and transfer’ system requires elaboration. In an attempt to prevent stronger clubs luring players from weaker ones, a system was introduced wherein the club held the player’s registration. Contracts had to be renewed annually. A player unhappy with the newly offered contract could find the club refusing to allow him leave while also refusing to pick him in the team and not having to pay him. Clubs could place the player on the transfer list while retaining his registration but at a price which would prove prohibitive so that the player’s options were limited to accepting an unsatisfactory new contract or quitting and finding some other form of employment, an option taken by some players. A piece of football legislation introduced ostensibly to prevent poaching had the effect of granting the club a significant power advantage over the player (Guthrie, 1976; Imlach, 2005).

There was one serious attempt by a players’ representative body to challenge the ‘retain and transfer system.’ This involved a player called Harry Kingaby who was seeking and being refused, a free transfer from Aston Villa whom he had joined in 1906. However, the judge ruled the club had no case to answer because the action had been taken against the wrong entity, the club rather than football’s governing body, the F.A. (Greenfield & Osborn, 2007). Maximum wages, a cap on transfer fees and formulas for sharing of gate money, became matters of contention for players. Players’ attempts to become unionised began as early as 1893. According to Greenfield & Osborn (2007: 2), the Lancashire Evening Post in 1897 reported, ‘Football Professionals Form a Union.’ By 1898, the body was known as the Association Footballers Union (AFU). It lasted a mere four years before closing down in 1901.
An early example of the rising tension between players and their employers was a form of industrial action involving Stockport County players who bypassed their club’s committee and picked the team themselves in 1902, after their wages had not been paid for over a week. The Union was revived in 1907. The Professional Footballers Association (PFA), as it was to be known, was better organised than previous such bodies, and ‘claimed to count the majority of players in league football as members’ (Greenfield and Osborn, 1998: 2). In the same year, players for the first time ever, threatened strike action and clubs reluctantly accepted that players needed more time and attention. This, in turn, became a catalyst for the appointment of intermediaries between board and players. The reluctance of directors to involve themselves in such matters saw secretaries take on the role and saw the increase in the appointment of what were called secretary-managers (Carter, 2006: 41). The players’ attempts to become organised reflected their concerns at the power imbalance which saw them bound to clubs, able to leave only at the club’s discretion, and often forced to accept wages or even wage reductions with which they were unhappy. It may have been better organised than previous iterations but it remained relatively ineffective when tested. The failure of players to form a sufficiently strong trade union was to tell against them in their efforts for contractual improvements and a generally better working arrangement with their employers. This failure reduced their negotiating power considerably. The fact that they as a workforce were geographically scattered was one factor which impeded their efforts and helped maintain their lower power position relative to directors and to a lesser degree secretary-managers.

A significant event in the world of football in the early twentieth century provided an example of the power chances of certain players as well as the power devolved to a secretary-manager. In 1906, Manchester City were found to have made illegal payments to some of their players. As the FA punished the club, the defence offered was that breaking this rule was virtually standard practice at the time (James, 2012). However valid the accusation, it was claimed that the London based FA was more than willing to punish a northern team, while the Lancashire based Football League was sympathetic to Manchester City’s cause, but helpless to intervene as the evidence was overwhelming with players openly admitting having received more than the permitted wages. The FA was still administered by the product of
public schools and universities while the League was made up of club delegates. The underlying tensions between the two bodies continued with this case highlighting those tensions (Sanders, 2009: 244-247). Clubs were interdependent with both FA and Football League. The secretary or secretary-manager would have been the club contact point for both bodies. The tensions between these bodies will have made his role more difficult. The episode illustrated the greater power chances of better players, who had been treated more favourably, secretly given extra money albeit in contravention of the rules. This reflected the greater complexity of the figuration involving players, the secretary-manager and the board in their mutual interdependencies. Manchester City were fined and their players were suspended from representing the club. They were forced to hold an auction to sell players, no longer of immediate use. Ernest Mangnall moved ahead of a player auction to secure the four best players, transforming his Manchester United club. It appeared he had been empowered by his own Board to make the necessary expenditure (Ponting & Butler, 2003).

4.2.4 Media

While the press had a role to play in how the secretary, later secretary-manager, was perceived, its contribution was every bit as uneven as was the development of the function itself. Certainly, media coverage of sports and sporting events was somewhat restricted in the nineteenth century. ‘The Sporting Chronicle’ and ‘The Field’ devoted pages to hunting, fishing, racing, and cricket. The earliest coverage of football amounted to pieces written by the participants which often generated angry responses from opponents disputing their version of events, sometimes even disputing the final score (Sanders, 2009). There followed the arrival of what became known as ‘pink uns’ and ‘green uns’ across England. These were special editions of the local evening newspaper, printed on coloured paper to distinguish them from the regular editions. Their feature was the provision of final scores from all the day’s league games. These ‘football specials’ would hit the streets on a Saturday evening as soon as was practicable after the scores had been received (Goldblatt, 2006: 64).

The publication which would dominate football reportage into the first quarter of the twentieth century was ‘The Athletic News,’ edited by one of the first sports journalists, Londoner, Jimmy Catton. The paper had a circulation of close to 200,000 by the mid-1890s
I analysed ten newspapers containing references to ‘football’ from each of the decades, 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s. The papers selected for study included: The Sheffield Daily Telegraph, The London Evening Standard, Athletic News, Sporting Life, Lancashire Evening Post, The Liverpool Mercury, and The Preston Herald. While there were few references to secretary-managers, the exceptions reveal some awareness existed of instances where an individual did have responsibility for ‘success.’

It was not unusual to find a grand heading ‘Football’ with two sub-headings for ‘Rugby’ and ‘Association’ which appear still to have been regarded at that time as two sides of the same coin.

An example comes from The Sporting Life, (31 March, 1887) which carries two references to football. The first of these was a preview of the forthcoming Cup Final. Beginning in a matter-of-fact vein, to state that the following Saturday (two days later) would see the first ever Cup Final between two Midlands teams, Aston Villa and West Bromwich Albion. The piece goes on:

As the rivals are undergoing a strict preparation, a very hotly-contested game will undoubtedly ensue, for the decision of the final is looked forward as settling – at least, for the time being – which of the twain shall be hailed not only holders of the trophy, but champions of the Midlands, the latter having long been a disputed question.

Reference is then made, briefly, to the railway companies providing trains to carry supporters south for the game and how this ought to help produce a satisfactory financial outcome for the Football Association. The concluding line reads simply: ‘We append the rival teams.’ In all, the ‘preview’ takes up ten lines in single column, does not reference any player or secretary-manager, nor does it provide any real information about how the teams reached the final or how that game might actually turn out.

The second piece concerns a March 1887 newspaper report on the recent Lancashire Cup Final.
The brilliant victory of the Preston North End team over their great rivals the Bolton Wanderers, on Saturday last at Bolton, in the final tie for the handsome cup given by the Lancashire Association, will be gratifying for those who know what a succession of bad luck Mr. Suddell’s boys experienced in their later appearances in the National Competition. Mr. Suddell, the guiding spirit of Preston North End, has too many friends all over England that the success of his team will be very gratifying to all who can appreciate a genuine sportsman.

The single-column article, running to no more than fifty lines concludes by describing which teams had participated in the previous finals. With hardly a pause, it proceeds to the next paragraph which actually deals with an entirely different sport. ‘There was no small consternation in Wigan on Saturday last when the intelligence arrived that the local club had been unsuccessful in the final tie for the West Lancashire Cup, played under Rugby Union rules’ (The Sporting Life, 31 March, 1887). What is most revealing is that, as early as 1887, we have a newspaper writing about the most successful team of the time, not as Preston North End, but as Mr. Suddell’s boys. This was a year before the Football league was created. The first two League Championships would be won by Preston North End in 1888-89 and 1889-90. The FA Cup win in 1889 made Preston the first team to win what would become known as ‘The Double’ (First Division and FA Cup). While the ‘manager’ as we know him was a long way off here was an example of an individual being strongly associated with a club and receiving credit for that club’s success. Major William Suddell, whose official title was Chairman of Preston North End, had certainly shown ambition, both for that club and for his own association with it. The manager of a cotton mill, he filled the team with Scottish players while professionalism had not yet been approved north of the border. Based on my research and analysis I found it difficult to identify any other publication from this era in which an individual is singled out as the instrument of success in a professional football club. However, it reflects a desire, at least on behalf of one newspaper, to find an off-field leader figure to tie in with playing success. In this respect, the article must be considered a forerunner to what would follow in later years.

By the 1890s, newspapers were providing results of games, with reports which were very basic but which mentioned players by surname. It is difficult to find any reference to either secretary-managers or directors. We do know that Tom Watson in his role as Liverpool
secretary-manager, a role he took up in 1896 having been recruited after achieving success at Sunderland, received some criticism in *The Liverpool Review*, after a 0 - 0 draw with West Bromwich Albion (Williams, 2010). There is some evidence (Sanders, 2009; Williams, 2010) that the nineteenth century exceptions such as Suddell at Preston and Watson at Sunderland and Liverpool, actively courted publicity both for their teams and for themselves. At that time, they were very much in the minority in doing so.

Moving to the early twentieth century, the match reports are more detailed as are the references to those off-the-field, if only slightly so. The *Athletic News* of March 27 1905 provides an example, with its final sentence in a report on a game between Blackburn Rovers and Sheffield United. Having bemoaned the fact that both of these teams with excellent Cup records had failed to reach the semi-finals, and that to witness them in action meant watching an end-of-season League game, the concluding line went thus: ‘United’s directorate were evidently satisfied with the combination tried at Villa Park, and reverted to the line-up that had earlier proved a comparative success.’ The clear understanding was that the Sheffield United directorate were the ones selecting the team, in this case reverting to a line-up that had proven adequate in a prior game. By 1905, they still retained the function of team selection. In 1906, upon Manchester United’s promotion to the First Division the *Manchester Evening News* paid tribute to Ernest Mangnall, their secretary-manager. While his responsibilities did not include team selection, the positive coverage provided a basis for believing he was influential when it came to team performance (Green, 1953, cited in Wagg, 1984). The *Athletic News* of 10 October 1913 provides a series of reports on the full programme of games from the previous Saturday. These range in length from half a single column down to around a fifth of such a column. All reporters are given pseudonyms. They describe the games, especially the goals and tell who played well or badly. Referees are invariably assessed, their every error highlighted. More often than not, attendance figures are provided. The only reference to a manager is an oblique one while the observation on the directors is revealing. The reporter on the game between Burnley and Manchester United opens his report thus:

Looking around Turf Moor on Saturday at the four thousand season ticket holders and the thirty thousand people who had paid £800 to
see a splendid game I could not help reflecting on the great change that enterprising directors have brought about since the days when seven thousand people was a big crowd at Burnley, and when Mr. Ernest Mangnall the then manager, himself cut the grass to save expense, or visited the bank on a begging errand.

This account provides some insight, suggesting that while managing Burnley, Mangnall found it necessary to carry out fairly menial tasks to save money. It would appear that he rather than the directors had to deal with the club’s bankers, indicating that even if in difficult circumstances, the secretary manager had some responsibility and a degree of power or authority in the matter of bank arrangements. Two further match reports refer to team selection. The report on Middlesbrough versus West Bromwich Albion told us that,

Jackson, Carr (J) and Elliot had not sufficiently recovered from injuries they received in the Sunderland match a fortnight before, and the directors had to make the experiment of playing Malcolm, the left half-back, at centre forward, and bring Carr (W) into the middle line.

In the Aston Villa versus Sheffield Wednesday report, we read the following:

The Villa had their best side out, but the Wednesday have been unfortunate of late. It was decided to put Brelsford at right back in place of Worrall; Brittleton was still away, and Burkinshaw was given another trial in the centre.

These reports indicate that many directors were making team selection decisions. In other cases, where no directors are mentioned, no particular functionary is identified with such decisions. Significantly, there is no mention of the role of secretary-manager or manager. Reportage on a full series of Second Division games is provided in the Sheffield Daily Telegraph of 10 November 1913. One reference to a manager is made among the set of reports which, again, concern themselves almost exclusively with players and referees. The exception is an account of the game between Leeds City and Huddersfield Town:

Leeds obtained a point at Huddersfield, and all things considered, the team which is now under Mr. Herbert Chapman’s management is as well placed in the race for promotion as any other side, and more likely than most to be in at the death.
While Chapman was exceptional, he had yet to make his reputation at this point but the reference to him in this 1913 paper is the only reference to a manager of any team covered in a total of some thirty match reports checked for this period. It seems reasonable to state that the papers had not quite begun to focus on the manager figure in the run-up to the hiatus in football brought by the outbreak of war in 1914. The occasional references indicate an incipient awareness of some guiding hand in team affairs or successes but it would be in the next period in the development of football that the relationship between newspapers and the management figure would reach a whole new level.

4.2.5 Trainers & Coaching

The following is an early example of functional specialisation in football with the arrival of new functionaries with whom the manager would be interdependent. Players were in the charge of another functionary, a trainer, on a day-to-day basis, probably from the late nineteenth century but certainly from the first decade of the twentieth century. This person was charged with the fitness of the players and was also expected to monitor their behaviour. This description ‘trainer’ occurs irregularly in writings on early professional football. There are references to teams being in the hands of trainers during the working week with, in some cases, descriptions of their fitness preparation being somewhat short of onerous and not especially physically demanding. We have had reference to a trainer at Wolverhampton Wanderers in their early years. It is also reported that in his first managerial role at Northampton in 1907, Herbert Chapman had a trainer called Dick Murrell (Studd, 1981). In 1897, Everton FC were being urged, in the local Liverpool press, to appoint a ‘team manager’ who should ‘with the trainer, have full charge of the team’ (Williams, 2010: 69). Billy Jones, a Tottenham player in 1906, described the workings of a football club at that time, saying the manager was aloof, remaining in his office most of the time and sitting in the stand on match days. ‘We hardly ever saw him. His name was McWilliam. I can’t even remember his Christian name.’ Jones went on to state that the trainer took daily charge of the team, casting some light on the functions of both trainer and secretary/manager in that period (cited in Studd, 1981: 87).

Describing the professional game, as it was in 1902, Sanders (2009: 233) wrote the following:
Trainers, generally pictured in team photos in shirt-sleeves and waistcoats with a towel over their arm, were responsible only for fitness. The secretary, a more middle-class figure, took responsibility for organising fixtures and the day-to-day running of the club.

Trainers, in many cases, had come from the world of athletics where their experience was usually with individual athletes, which did not necessarily qualify them to deal with a group of perhaps fifteen to twenty young men. Others had an army background, one example being Hubert Dillon who had worked as a chief physical instructor in an educational college after the army and before joining Birmingham City in 1910. As well as having responsibility for players’ fitness, there is evidence that trainers had another function which was to keep an eye on the players, to ensure they were behaving as ‘professionals’. The Middlesbrough trainer regularly reported directly to the board and was questioned on the players’ condition (Carter, 2006). This latter arrangement would suggest that, at least in this instance, the trainer may not have reported to the secretary-manager.

The function of trainer and its origins in football are summarised by Wagg who concludes that, by the 1890s, most clubs had acknowledged the need for the promotion of physical fitness in their players, and, as a result, trainers were recruited. These trainers were accorded the same low status afforded to players. While this function was now established, the notion of coaching was viewed somewhat differently. In 1904 England and Derby County’s best player, Steve Bloomer, was expressing the view, widely held among players, that it was not possible to impart to others what was essentially a gift; a natural gift which could not be shared via tuition (Wagg, 1984). This view clearly was widespread, as Paul Edgerton described the prevailing view of coaching in 1911:

The English professional game was littered with ex-players forced out prematurely through injury. Looking for employment as a coach in the English game was not a viable option either. The role was not seen as particularly important, perhaps something to be carried out on a part-time basis along with secretarial duties (Edgerton, 2009: 24).

The significance of this is at that stage the function of secretary manager or manager did not involve nor was it generally considered relevant to ‘on-field’ preparation or tactics – the playing side of the sport. As this period came to a close, team selection was still a privilege
the various boards of directors wished to monopolise. Boards of directors held the balance of power in the early days. The interdependence between board and secretary-manager left the balance of power with the board.

This diagram below depicts the interdependencies affecting a manager in the era 1863 – 1914. Tom Watson is chosen as an example of a successful manager at an established club in these years.

![Diagram showing interdependencies involving Tom Watson as Liverpool Manager 1904]

**Figure 1: Interdependencies 1863 - 1915**

### 4.3 Between the wars  1919 – 1939

In this section, I focus again on the interdependencies involving the management function, those between managers and directors and between managers and players. I also describe the role of the trainer. And again, an assessment of media coverage is considered relevant in
tracking the development of the management function. Before that, I deal with an important change to the game itself with ramifications for all those forming the football figuration. The cessation of organised football during not just the 1914-18 war but also during World War II reflects the need for a relatively pacified social space for the ‘production and consumption’ of games as a leisure pursuit (Elias, 1986, cited in Dolan and Connolly, 2009: 198-199). The next League season after World War One would be that of 1919–1920. It would see twenty-two teams in both First and Second Divisions. The Southern League had a further twenty-two. Expansion in the number of League teams and increased ambition in many clubs generated a social context that heralded opportunities for the figure of secretary-manager whose role would further change before the next break in activities. The years 1919 to 1939 represented a period of growth for professional football in England. Average attendances at league games in the 1913-14 season had been 23,115. By 1938-39, this figure had risen to 30,659. This increase is more significant than it might at first seem, because the higher numbers of teams in the Leagues meant many more games were taking place in 1939 than in 1914. In the same period, the number of clubs affiliated to the Football Association rose from 12,000 to 37,000 (Goldblatt, 2006). The increase in the number of league teams and some extraordinary Cup Final attendance figures indicate a growth in popularity of professional football in this period. The opportunities for players and secretary-managers were increasing.

4.3.1 The Game of Football

Here is an example of how an adjustment to the rules of the game affected the management function in an unintended way. As I have previously described, a number of changes to the game itself had been implemented in the period ending in 1914, so much so that the structure of the game had been settled by then with only minor adjustments in the decades that followed - with one exception. A significant change in the offside law in 1925 was exploited, most notably and successfully by Herbert Chapman, but also by others, as the new rules provided for a more attack-minded approach. It was argued by Taylor that this change in rule prompted a change in training as players were now expected to sprint much more and that this in turn, led to greater susceptibility to injuries from knocks, strains etc. (Taylor, 2002). The change was significant in making a more attack-oriented, and therefore more attractive
game. League goals scored in the season following this change totalled 6,373 compared to 4,700 the previous year (Russell, 1997). The change could be seen as an attempt to bring greater excitement by way of more goals, which in turn could be expected to lead to more decisive results, i.e. fewer draws (Elias and Dunning, 1986: 33). The rule change amounted to a reduction from three to two in the number of players who had to be nearer the opposition goal-line than the most forward attacking player, when the final attacking pass was played. It brought about such a significant change that the impact was recognised by managers and players for whom a new tactical approach was now required. Managers would have needed to convey the new requirements to players and to have adjusted their methods of playing. This development provides an example of the interdependence between managers and players as an agreed tactical response was demanded by the change. It also meant the manager assumed greater importance as his function now included the need to communicate to players the new rule and its significance.

A further change to the structure of the league is explained here. It is a change whose most obvious influence on the management function is the provision of more opportunities for aspirant managers. The creation of two league divisions with promotion and relegation sought to bring a degree of equilibrium in contests, with teams of similar standards pitted against one another. It reduced the chances of mismatches. The change to the league structure calls to mind the observations of Elias and Dunning; ‘A sport-game may lose its function if, in too many cases, victory is attained rather quickly. In that case, the enjoyable tension-excitement is missing or too short’ (Elias and Dunning, 1986:33). The Football League and FA were consistent in seeking to create equilibrium or to avoid a situation where a team became too powerful and dominant. Taylor (2001) explained how as far back as the 1900 annual meeting of the FA council, actions were taken that reflect this. Elias and Dunning suggest, ‘If too many games end in a draw, that is, without tension-resolving victory, the rules of the game require adjustment’ (Elias and Dunning: 1986: 33).

4.3.2 Directors, Secretary-Managers and Managers

As I have stated, the relationship and interdependence between directors and managers is one of the most enduring and important in the figuration of professional football. The
continuing unwillingness of directors at many football clubs to forego selecting the team was proving problematic. The concept was gradually challenged. In the early 1930s, Herbert Chapman in his *Sunday Express* column suggested:

So far as clubs are concerned, in a good many cases they seem fettered by tradition. Thirty years ago all the directors joined in picking the team, and no-one today seems to be bold enough to suggest that the system is out of date and should be scrapped. In my opinion the club manager ought to pick the team. I would go further and say he is the only official qualified to do so. If I were a director, I should take this view, and if a manager were not prepared to accept the responsibility, I should have no option but to decide he was not worthy of the job (Chapman, 1934: 5).

The management function in football continued to develop somewhat unevenly. Although we begin to find managers with higher levels of autonomy, these were exceptional and very much a minority. It would be decades, rather than years, before it became more widespread in football. The secretary-manager was becoming the manager and increasingly, the role was filled by former players. The media too would demonstrate a changed approach during these years. Newspapers were still the dominant medium but radio had arrived and had taken to covering football (Wagg, 1984; Carter, 2006; Walvin, 1994).

The job of managing up until 1939 has been likened by Carter (2006) to that of a personnel manager in industry. He further claimed that increasingly, the greatest requirement in a manager was the ability to judge players, and thereby spend the clubs resources to good effect when entering the transfer market. He also suggests that, in terms of management techniques, a football manager's personality was still his most important tool, something he shared with foremen in industry. In the absence of anything remotely resembling a job specification for the football manager, we see Carter (2006) attempting to liken the task to that of an industrial foreman, but with stronger personality traits and specialised knowledge and judgement in the matter of signing players.

Today, the function of team selection is assumed to be held by the manager. However, fewer activities or entitlements can have generated as much dissatisfaction over the years as the reluctance to hand over this function to the manager. Boards had the power to withhold the
privilege and would do so for as long as possible. I explain the uneven change as this function shifted to the manager at various clubs over a wide time-span. Tom Watson had succeeded at Liverpool, despite never wresting control over team selection from his directors (Williams, 2011). Clarity around the manager’s role at Liverpool is provided in the minute book of 21 August 1921. ‘It was decided that the duties of the manager be to have the full charge of all players and trainers on the books of the club and that all matters appertaining to the players be under his control’ (cited in Williams, 2011: 144-145). This might be seen as a clear illustration of the level of the manager’s power chances, but even then this power resource stopped short of one critical issue, selecting the team. This privilege, according to Williams (2011), did not pass to the manager at Liverpool until Bill Shankly was appointed in late 1959. By January 1922 as Liverpool led the League, a letter to the local Evening Express, from a supporter included a question. ‘I would like to ask the directors are they making the best use of the talent at their disposal.’ The same newspaper’s own correspondent wrote as follows some weeks later as the club were beaten in an FA Cup game: ‘I don’t expect the directors to agree with me in that, but competition is so keen nowadays that it is well-nigh impossible to win the Cup and head the League in the same season’ (cited in Williams, 2011: 151).

The position of directors as decision-makers on team selection, clearly was widely recognised by club followers and reporters. The club minutes would appear to indicate a willingness by directors to make the manager responsible for an increasing number of tasks within the club, all the while ensuring for themselves the pleasure of holding on to the very significant act of team selection. In the 1920s, there was a continuation of the subservience of managers to their boards, apart from the exceptional minority. However, not every football club board had become convinced of the need for a manager. Stephen Wagg (1984) describes how several clubs operated. Preston North End had a head trainer but no manager in 1933. The club was run by a chairman, James Taylor, who among other responsibilities, had the main say in team selection. It would be 1948 before the West Bromwich Albion board devolved this function to a manager. Meanwhile, the team was selected by the board in consultation with the secretary. Aston Villa was run by a committee and later by the board. A manager was not appointed until 1958 which was also the year the Newcastle United board finally ceased to pick their team, appointing a manager to do so. Everton did not have a manager and upon
their relegation in 1930 the chairman who had made all key decisions responded to supporter criticism by simply blaming the players. Blackburn Rovers appointed a manager in 1922, dispensing with him shortly after, with the board resuming their control over team matters. Having hired and fired three managers in succession, Blackpool football club was run by a director on a voluntary basis from 1928. Coventry City had six managers in the years between the wars and this included three in one twelve-month period, 1919-20. Leyton Orient had been early in appointing a manager in the 1900s but between the wars they had a total of ten managers including one who came and went three times. These clubs, however, were in the minority and some early stability was evident in those twenty years between the wars when Manchester City had only two managers, Birmingham City three, and Crystal Palace four. The football managers of the 1920s and 1930s apart from the couple of exceptions which will be described, were very much beholden to their boards and chairmen and despite being former players in virtually all cases, identified upwards to their proprietors rather than downwards to their players (Wagg, 1984).

Historian, Morris Marples, referring to this period between the wars, had the following to say about managers:

A good manager meant a happy team in which players were glad to remain for long periods and which accordingly developed a real esprit de corps, which had no relation to the amount of money spent on transfers; and such teams were successful, as example South Shields and Portsmouth successively under the guidance of Jack Tinn (Marples, 1954: 207).

Meanwhile, Jimmy Guthrie, Jack Tinn’s captain as Portsmouth won the 1939 Cup Final, had this observation on his manager:

Not all managers can do everything. For instance, Jack Tinn knew very little about playing form or tactics, but he was not afraid to delegate. Trainer Jimmy Stewart and I looked after team affairs at Portsmouth, Tinn’s value was in administration (Guthrie, 1976: 138).

Guthrie’s book is an historic account of a particular period in English football. Because he went from playing to heading up the players’ union in the 1950s, he is a figure who, in this book, has provided insight and evidence around the efforts to end the maximum wage and the
‘retain and transfer’ systems which had been massively restrictive weapons used against players from the early twentieth century until the 1960s. It would appear someone with Tinn’s alleged deficiencies in terms of football knowledge would have been interdependent with trainers and others in which relationships he had the lower level of power opportunity. We may also conclude that a deep knowledge of the game was not an essential requirement in a manager. Taking Tinn as an example, the clerical side of the role appears to have retained a high degree of importance at Portsmouth but the evidence elsewhere is that change was occurring in this facet of the job. Guthrie also refers to Tinn’s ability to deal with the press, providing them with valued quotes (Guthrie, 1976).

Throughout this thesis, I make few references to specific managers, as it is the function rather than the personalities on which I focus. This section is an exception as I consider these examples may make it easier to understand power balances between managers and (especially) players at this time. One of the exceptions to which I referred earlier, was Major Frank Buckley, a man who based his methods on those acquired during his military service. Buckley, appointed in 1927, was Wolverhampton Wanderer’s fifth manager of the 1920s (Soccerbase.com). Buckley’s methods included domination of his players, ruling by fear. Famously, he once forced his players to march through the streets of Wolverhampton in their football kit on a Monday morning after a shock defeat to Mansfield in a Cup game (Wagg, 1984; Carter, 2006). The board had prioritised financial performance over winning trophies, leaving Buckley in a position of comparative strength in his power relationship with that board. While failing to achieve the ultimate on-field success, Buckley kept the club’s board happy with the extraordinary financial performance during his tenure, which ended in the early 1940s in a period of friendlies and exhibition games when no League or Cup competitions could be played. The manager had established a scouting network through his ex-military contacts and it was this network that gave Wolves and their manager access to so many promising players whom they developed and sold on at a profit (Marples, 1954: 205). Buckley did not have a monopoly on such an approach to the treatment of players. Harry Storer who took an impoverished Coventry City to the Third Division South title in 1936 was notorious for his treatment of players. On one occasion he berated a player for a poor performance only for the player to point out he had not even been playing in the game under
discussion. Storer’s response was to tell the player he must be useless if he couldn’t get into that team (Guthrie, 1976: 142; Wagg, 1984: 52). That managers were permitted to behave in this way while players were forced to accept such treatment is reflective of their respective power chances in their interdependency. The fact that players were prepared to accept these conditions provides evidence of their lower power chances when it came to their dealings with clubs and managers. For instance, in the same era, England centre-forward Tommy Lawton, was seeking to ask his Everton manager, Theo Kelly, for a transfer. Having finally got an appointment to see the manager, and before a word was spoken, Lawton was instructed to go back out of the office and to knock this time before entering. Kelly then informed the player that he should get out and stop wasting the manager’s time as he had been trying unsuccessfully to give the player away for several months (Carter, 2006). Approaches taken by these managers in the 1930s once more illustrate Elias’s argument that, what is at one time acceptable or even normal, can become repugnant over time. The power differential favoured managers when it came to shaming or punitive social practices and it is evident that there was a less advanced threshold of repugnance towards these behaviours than was the case in later decades.

In this thesis, as I have pointed out, I have been looking at the management function. In doing so, it was never my intention to dismiss the notion that certain individual managers had specific qualities and abilities that contributed to the success of their teams. Rather what I have tried to illustrate is how they were enabled or constricted by broader figurations. Here, I provide some background detail on Herbert Chapman, a notable exception among managers of this era. Chapman was a Yorkshireman whose peripatetic and largely uneventful playing career was nearing an end at Tottenham Hotspur in 1907 when he was offered a role as player-manager at Northampton Town (Studd, 1981). The offer of the dual role reflected that club’s pursuit of value for extremely scarce resources as they loitered at the very foot of English professional football’s rankings. Chapman undertook the combined role until 1909 and remained as manager until 1912, having led the club to win the Southern League in 1909 while achieving a profit in each year of his tenure (Studd, 1981: 36). Chapman moved to Leeds City where between the wartime hiatus and the surfacing of problems at the club relating to an earlier period, it proved an unsatisfactory experience. His long-term objective of working
as a mining engineer, a career for which he had trained, saw him pursue this work until 1921 when he was lured to manage Huddersfield Town until departing for Arsenal in 1925 where he remained until his untimely death from pneumonia in 1934. It was at Huddersfield and Arsenal that he enjoyed unprecedented success, setting one record that has never been matched. He is frequently cited as one of only four managers to win League titles with two different clubs. He is the only one also to have won FA Cups with two clubs. There is an inherent danger in using Herbert Chapman’s work as an example of any aspect of football management in the 1920s and 1930s.

Dave Russell cites Nicholas Fishwick and credits him with perception in his observation that at both Huddersfield and Arsenal Chapman was walking in to a situation heavily weighted towards the manager having unusual authority. Huddersfield had come close to extinction only weeks before Chapman’s arrival while Arsenal’s high-profile chairman, Sir Henry Norris, had been handed a life ban in 1928 for financial irregularities, making the board less likely to interfere with a manager who had already demonstrated exceptional abilities elsewhere (Russell, 1997: 89).

Bob Wall who held the position of secretary at Arsenal during Chapman’s time in charge (1925 - 1934), referring to that time, wrote:

One hears a great deal about interference from boards of directors in football and of managers not being allowed a free hand to run their teams. That charge certainly cannot be levelled at Arsenal. Our chairman, Mr. Denis Hill-Wood, put it succinctly when he discussed the board’s role with me a number of years ago. “Why pay experts to do a job if non-experts are going to be allowed to interfere?” he asked (Studd, 1981: 95).

This level of authority in decision-making was something unique in football at that time. Because he was successful, because he had unique management skills, some developed from his experience managing outside football, and because the removal of Sir Henry Norris left a void at Arsenal, Chapman had assumed and been permitted a greater degree of power than any other manager of that time.
It was to the 1930s Wagg referred when he declared; ‘the League football manager can be said to have commenced the transition from sacrificial clerk to tactician-horse trader’ (Wagg, 1984: 57). Wagg explains that the transition was facilitated because it was demanded by players, by the press and by managers themselves. In that period leading up to 1939, more managers were actively involved in running various aspects of the football clubs, such as signing players, selecting the team, and giving tactical instruction. Club proprietors were, albeit slowly, beginning to recognise the importance of securing a ‘good manager’, as well as the negative aspect of sacking a manager in times of difficulty (Wagg, 1984: 57, 58). I could not argue with Wagg’s claim of an increase in the power chances of managers relative to their boards of directors and their players in the 1930s nor with his assertion that the social importance of football had increased. It does appear that the number of interdependencies had increased, reflected in greater functional specialisation. The changes did accelerate the need for managers to become more specialised in their attention to on-field activities. Directly related to this is the fact that the managers who succeeded in gaining team selection as a function, will have increased their power chances relative to players. All changes to the management function were gradual and have to be looked at over a long timeframe. They were most uneven. Changes were almost always confined to a minority of managers. Chapman had been a tactician in the 1920s but others such as Jack Tinn, manager of the Cup winners Portsmouth in 1939 would never become a tactical expert (Guthrie, 1976: 138). Where my explanation differs slightly from that of Wagg, is that I attribute the changes to a trend towards greater functional democratisation over a longer period of time.

4.3.3 Players

The position of players, at all stages in the broader football figuration, needs to be explained, as it always has an influence on the management function and the power balances between managers and players.

Connolly (2018) in explaining doping in cycling, refers to the social opportunities and work conditions of cyclists as part of a wider set of intertwined processes in which the balance of power in the world of cycling was very much with the team owners and race organisers as opposed to the cyclists. Professional football partly mirrored this particular set of conditions
where the balance of power was very much with the employers and football’s governing bodies to the detriment of the players.

In 1920, the maximum wage for professional footballers was doubled to £9. By 1922, it had been lowered to £8 with the introduction of performance related payments of £2 for a win and £1 for a draw. It is estimated that at most, 25% of all players were actually on the maximum rate. The game had continued to grow in popularity and, by the 1930s, the star players received much press coverage, in some cases becoming household names. It was claimed that ‘Dixie’ Dean, the famous Everton goal-scorer could earn as much as £50 a session for advertising or endorsing products (Russell, 1997). There was apparently a significant difference in relative power chances between average players and their more famous highly rated colleagues. This, in turn, led to more multi-polar power relationships. An individual manager was now faced with a need for greater social skills and self-restraint in dealing with players where there was a distinction in status, where players were a more heterogeneous group. However, the majority of players were unable to earn extra money and the rate of pay for footballers remained a concern for players. Jimmy Guthrie, who captained Portsmouth to win the 1939 FA Cup observed that members of the massed bands playing at Wembley earned more than the footballers playing in the game (Guthrie, 1976).

The retain and transfer system coupled with the fact that so many players were not paid the maximum wage, continued to be issues for the players. An example of how the system could be applied to the disadvantage of a player is provided by what happened in 1924 to Harold Gough, a Sheffield United player. In that year, Gough took a public house in preparation for his retirement. This was in breach of a condition in his contract from a club which was ‘temperance-oriented’. The player was asked to return all wages received from the day he had acquired the licence. He was then placed on the transfer list at an artificially high fee, leaving one option only, which he duly took – immediate retirement (Russell, 1997: 93-94). As Wagg (1984: 107) notes:

Through the ‘retain and transfer’ system clubs could still decide for themselves whether players stayed with them or went elsewhere and, if they stayed on what terms and, if they moved, to which club. It was the instrument of numerous arbitrary wage reductions, the
players concerned being given the choice either of accepting lower wages or of picking up their cards on the way out, with no prospect of plying their trade elsewhere.

The power chances of a player as an employee is an aspect of football on which studies have been carried out. Taylor (2002) questioned the concept of work and play in the case of footballers. Was playing the game professionally work or play? Or were play and work two different things? Various Acts governing Employers’ Liability and Workers’ Compensation had classified professional footballers as workmen in the late nineteenth century with further confirmation in 1912. However, in 1934 this changed. Arising from a judicial decision, footballers were re-classified, legally, alongside acrobats, cricketers and pugilists as ‘players’ rather than ‘workers.’ This ruling appears to have disadvantaged players who would, as a result, no longer be covered by the National Insurance Act or the Workmen’s Compensation Act, both of which applied to manual labour (Taylor, 2002: 18). Taylor declares there seems to have been general agreement that training really was ‘work’. The fact that it was tedious and repetitive, in many cases, helped this argument. Some clubs were said to have players lapping the pitch perimeter fifty or sixty times a day as an exercise in building stamina. Before 1914, the accounts of training sessions indicate the predominance of running, sprinting, skipping and some work with weights and little work with the football. By 1933, this appears not to have changed dramatically but by now these methods had their critics, who sought a more imaginative approach to include more football games, passing and shooting practice and perhaps the replacement of much lapping with competitive relays among teams of players (Taylor, 2002: 21).

Control over players while they were away from the club, during their free-time or leisure activities had been an issue before 1914 but appears to have reached new levels of concern among club directors in the years between the wars. Numerous examples exist of curfews. Many clubs vetted landlords and landladies of their younger players, often dictating where the player must reside while expecting reports from the home-owner as to the timekeeping and behaviour of their young lodgers. Clubs began to buy houses in which they would place their married players and their families, an idea that would be used as a form of trap in some
cases as it created a dependency which placed considerable control in the hands of the club directors or manager (Wagg, 1984).

### 4.3.4 Trainers

In this era, many managers still left the day-to-day work in the hands of their trainers. Where managers had not been appointed the trainer remained in this role and reported to the secretary or to the board. At Wolves where Major Buckley ruled, trainers were every bit as fearful of him as were the players. At Middlesbrough, Charlie Cole was trainer throughout the inter-war period. One of their most famous players of that era, George Hardwick, later said: ‘He had little or no authority. The players ruled him rather than him ruling the players’ (Carter, 2010: 72). During these years, there is more evidence of trainers being appointed and usually having responsibility for much of the preparatory work while the managers, at least through the 1920s, still tended towards the clerical side of the function. Tom Whittaker at Arsenal was well regarded but he worked to Chapman who took responsibility for the players. At Portsmouth, the trainer with some assistance from the team captain, took responsibility for the players other than on match days (Guthrie, 1976). Although trainers had been in place at a few clubs from before 1900, it was in this period that the function appears to have gained universal recognition in English professional football. The establishment of the function meant the manager now had one more functionary with whom he was interdependent. The trainer, even if he was not universally respected, as evidenced at Middlesbrough, was interdependent with the players as well as with the manager. His ability or lack of ability would impact on how the team performed. Not only did this functionary (the trainer) take responsibility for the physical preparation of the team, but by the 1920s we have evidence that the role had now expanded into that of physiotherapist. Herbert Chapman showered praise on Tom Whittaker, the Arsenal trainer, for his expertise in treating players, even referring to how, when called upon to do so, Whittaker provided services to other injured sportsmen. In 1934, he wrote:

*It was a special satisfaction to us that Gadney, the Leicester half-back, was able to play against Ireland in the 1933 Rugby International at Twickenham. He attended the Arsenal ground just before Christmas with a badly injured ankle. One report he had received was that he*
would not be able to play again, and another that he would have to rest for two months. But in about a fortnight his ankle was mended, and he started to play again (Chapman, 1934: 89).

Chapman went on to explain he was highlighting this incident to demonstrate how a badly injured player could be helped by the ‘expert treatment’ provided by Tom Whittaker or other trainers of football teams. Having described his trainer as ‘beyond price’, he declared ‘I know from what I have been told that other managers place the same high value on their trainers’ (Chapman, 1934: 88-89). Although Chapman never referred to a specific qualification held by Whittaker, Carter wrote that ‘Jimmy Trotter at Charlton (Charlton Athletic Football Club) followed Tom Whittaker’s lead, and also qualified as a masseuse and physiotherapist’ (Carter, 2006: 74).

Despite the fact that now there was a greater number of functional specialists involved in the preparation of a team, managers were still, increasingly, identified as the central character for success or failure. Managers’ dependency on trainers increased. The trainers did their work but the praise or criticism went the way of the manager. The skill of identifying and directing good trainers was a further need.

4.3.5 Coaching

There was a noteworthy attempt in the 1930s at the promulgation of coaching. Herbert Chapman appears to have been the only manager in English football engaged in anything approaching coaching, as it is known today. In 1934, the year in which Chapman died prematurely, Stanley Rous took over from Frederick Wall at the head of the Football Association. Rous was a modernising Secretary and soon attempted to introduce coaching courses, knowing such courses were by now commonplace in Europe. He met with hostility from players and the concept of awarding certificates did not achieve the desired results. Instead, it was felt by those within the game that outsiders could be awarded such certification without ever having played professionally, enabling ‘hated amateurs from public schools or graduates of physical education colleges’, to compete against ex-professionals for scarce and valued management jobs. In this atmosphere the first FA coaching course was held in 1936 but no real progress in developing coaching was reached before the war or in the
years after, with Wagg contending the acceptance of coaching in professional football was still an issue as late as the 1970s (Wagg, 1984: 32-34).

4.3.6 Scouts

Carter outlines how the concept of scouting had become more popular in the late 1920s. Jimmy Seed who managed Charlton Athletic from 1933 until 1956 found it necessary to recruit young players because the club owners refused to make funds available for the purchase of players. Seed established a nationwide scouting structure. Clubs such as Charlton and Middlesbrough also forged links with junior clubs on the basis of mutual assistance which included the professional club having first call on any promising junior players (Carter, 2006). Scouts began to be appointed introducing another functionary to football. Apart from the interdependency between the managers and his scouts, the players being scouted were interdependent with the scout as it was of mutual interest and benefit to have players unearthed and for those players to fulfil their promise, to meet the expectation of the man who had recommended them.

4.3.7 Media

This section illustrates the developing relationship between the media and football functionaries and how and why the manager’s power resources increased within this figuration. The popular press showed an increasingly keen interest in the world of football after the professional game resumed in 1919. A number of circumstances came into play at this time. Football’s growth in popularity created demand for information so that newspapers wanted and needed more football-related stories. The daily papers were published six days a week but the football coverage had been limited to Saturdays for previews and Mondays for match reports. Transfers for example, real and speculative, were an aspect of the game which could excite interest during the weekdays. Club directors and administrators (secretaries) were deemed uncommunicative and hostile towards newsmen whom they regarded as prying into their business. Wagg confirms players were precluded within their contracts from engaging with the press, a practice which he declares to have survived at some clubs right through to the 1980s. The only potential source of information at a club was the manager. It
was very much ‘in the interests of football reporters to have managers unambiguously in
charge of team affairs’ (Wagg, 1984: 54). The more the power balance lay in favour of the
manager the greater the prospect of that manager becoming a source for the newspaper who
would present his side of every story in return for newfound access. This symbiotic
relationship developed in those years. Journalists were advocating for specialist managers,
stripped of secretarial duties and focused on on-field matters (Wagg, 1984: 54). It was one
more element of pressure for greater functional specialisation. Football’s increasingly
prominent place within English society was both reflected and reinforced, especially in the
1930s, in the much-enhanced attention it received in many elements of the national media.
Circulation was growing and circulation battles were intensifying (Russell, 1997: 103). In this
interdependence between newspapers and football, it is also true that football news and
general coverage helped greatly in the sale of newspapers.

In my analysis of newspaper reports, I found some notable differences from previous decades.
For example, in the Athletic News in 1924, the reports (on the FA Cup quarter finals) were on
the front page of this sports paper, more prominently placed than in previous earlier editions
inspected. The account of each game was quite detailed with opinions proffered on how the
semi-finals might turn out with emphasis on the presence of two Lancashire clubs and
speculation that it might be an all Lancashire final. The quarter final in which Burnley
confirmed predictions by easily beating Swindon Town by 3 - 1, draws a comment on
Swindon’s secretary-manager: ‘There were 34,089 spectators, and the revenue £2,301, so
that Mr. Sam Allen, genial as ever, had something more substantial than a goal to help his
struggling club on the way towards next season’ (Athletic News, 17th March, 1924). Allen was
Swindon secretary-manager from 1902 to 1933.

By April 1931, the Athletic News was devoting eight pages of its twenty-page publication to
football. The coverage of games was more comprehensive and the reports more detailed.
Articles of a more general nature were now appearing in the publication. Snippets of football
news were also appearing such as the eight lines under the heading ‘The Knockout’ (Athletic
News, 6th April, 1931). In 1920, only the Daily Mail had a circulation in excess of one million.
By 1940, this figure had grown to 1.45 million but, by now, the Mail had been overtaken in
sales by the Express (2.6 million), Herald (1.75 million) and the Mirror (1.65 million). Sales of Sunday papers had also exploded. The combined sales of The People and News of The World had soared from six million to double that figure between 1925 and 1947. By the late 1930s these two Sunday papers were allocating ten per cent of their space to football, doubling what it had been in the early 1920s (Russell, 1997: 104).

Newspaper journalists were increasingly portraying managers as the key figures behind success in football. The tone of the press coverage may be understood from a glimpse of a Daily Express article in December 1925 in which the directors of Millwall are criticised as ‘falling down on the job.’ The report claims the directors have expressed confidence in their own ability to manage the team, rejecting the criticism from fans and this newspaper alike. The telling piece of journalism is the concluding part of the article which reads:

The directors have replied that they are quite capable of looking after the team themselves and seem to resent the action of supporters of tendering constructive criticism. No doubt much can be said on both sides but we think that some consideration is due to the many thousands who supply the club’s revenue (Daily Express, 7 December, 1925).

To compound matters for the Millwall directors, the next column in this paper takes the reader across London and is headed in large typeface: ‘SECRET OF ARSENAL’S SUCCESS’, with a subheading leaving no reader in doubt as to the paper’s preferences when it came to team management; ‘Miracle worked by Mr. Herbert Chapman at Highbury’ (Wagg, 1984. 55). Nonetheless, coverage of managers was limited. For instance, in early 1924 as the League reached its final weeks and the FA Cup final had Newcastle United play Aston Villa, a full programme of games was covered on 20 April without one mention of a manager or a director. One week later, similar reports appeared for the previous day’s programme of League games. The Cup Final was covered in more detail in what amounted to a very pedestrian blow-by-blow report. The Sportsman of 5 May declared Huddersfield champions upon their win over Nottingham Forest. Brief reports made no reference to managers or directors.
Carter (2006) concludes while there had been some indications of an emerging relationship between football managers and newspapers in the years up to 1914, the years between the wars saw this relationship firmly established. By 1939, dealing with the press had become an important part of the manager’s job. The way in which managers’ thoughts and opinions were now reported helped shape the supporters’ views of the manager. In fact, by the 1930s through newspaper coverage, the manager was becoming increasingly associated with the team’s success or failure. Relations between press and club (in the person of the manager) were becoming institutionalised and managerial activity was now a feature of reporting on football (Carter, 2006: 76).

By the late 1920s, coverage of sport, and specifically football, was no longer restricted to the printed media. In 1927, the first live radio commentary on a football game was carried out by BBC when Arsenal played Sheffield United. The BBC had applied directly to clubs for broadcasting rights. Arsenal, in the person of Herbert Chapman saw this as an opportunity and provided full cooperation. In the same year, the FA Cup Final was broadcast by BBC for the first time (Carter, 2006).

As David Goldblatt put it:

In Britain the game was being broadcast by the new technology of radio as far as the drawing rooms of suburbia and the haute-bourgeoisie. It was acclaimed across the social scale from the man on the Clapham omnibus to feminist novelists on the fringe of the Bloomsbury group (Goldblatt, 2006: 177).

The reference to feminist novelists was specific to what was described as an ecstatic piece in the Radio Times, in which Winifred Holtsby described hearing a commentary on a football game for the very first time and being transported through hearing something which was completely new, on a subject which she did not understand, and in which she had no prior interest. The piece also speaks to the Elias and Dunning (1986) contention on the need for excitement:

I was excited. I had not, I have not to this day, the remotest notion of what they were doing. But I know that I was excited. No one could listen with cold blood or sluggish pulses to the quickening crescendo
of the roar preceding the final shout of ‘goal’. I wanted more goals. I didn’t care who shot them. I didn’t know who was playing or what they were playing, or where or why. But I wanted to feel my spine tickle and my pulses beat, and my hair stir gently at the roots with suspense as that voice cried out from somewhere near our drawing-room curtains (Winifred Holtsby, cited in Goldblatt, 2006, 177).

This descriptive piece provides a reaction to an early commentary of a football match. It is also a further example of the amplification of the roles of those involved, not least the managers.

The first experimental TV broadcasts of football games took place in 1937 but it was film and cinema which made an even bigger impact. The weekly newsreels shown in cinemas devoted 30 per cent of their time to football coverage but they could never compete with the excitement of live radio broadcasts (Walvin, 1994: 142). This represents a further advance in the social significance of football and illustrates a new competitiveness in the coverage of the game and further amplification of those involved in the sport.

Towards the latter stages of this period, the administrative side of the role began to disappear. The secretary manager was becoming the manager, pulled towards on-field matters and away from clerical work, while secretaries were clerks who remained tied to the paperwork. There were increased psychological demands because managers had to exercise greater levels of judgement and foresight while addressing an increasingly diverse range of functions. Overall, by 1939, by and large, boards of directors were the dominant figures in the running of the clubs. Exceptions such as Chapman and Buckley had generated positions of greater individual power in their relations with their boards, but they were very much just that; exceptions. The role, increasingly being filled by former players, had not changed dramatically. The balance of power remained with the boards of directors. The lot of players had not improved significantly and the player had lower power ratios in his relationship with his manager.

It must be stressed that changes in how clubs were run were uneven. This is best understood through looking at the function of team selection, which ties in with the position of manager. In this period, clubs had moved towards having a manager with greater responsibilities
especially as far as football progress and success were concerned. His role in some cases was now better defined and, in some cases, he got to select the team. However, there still were clubs where the manager was more a clerk than a football expert, where the board picked the team and where they would go on doing so long after the current manager or secretary-manager had been replaced.

Figure 2: Interdependencies 1919 -1939
4.4 The Post-War Years 1946 – 1963

In this section, I focus on the manager-player relationship and separately on the manager-media relationship, as I saw these differing interdependencies providing the greatest insight into how the management function advanced during these years. Yet again, the unevenness of the development of the management function is evident from the examples I cite. I also describe the transformational change in players’ conditions, as towards the end of this period, both the maximum wage rule and the ‘retain and transfer’ system were abolished.

The Second World War brought with it the cancellation of professional football in England from the autumn of 1939 until 1946. The FA Cup resumed for the 1945-46 season but the League did not get under way again until the 1946-47 season (Inglis, 1988). There appeared to be little change in the FA, in the Football League or in most clubs during the immediate post-war years. Boards retained control, with chairmen and directors holding the balance of power over the managers they employed. Matt Busby, at Manchester United, was an exception whose circumstances I explain later. As the 1950s progressed, there was an increasingly-heard argument in favour of a manager having greater control at a football club. The point of view is epitomised in the words of former England player, Tom Finney, at that time: ‘Appoint the right man. Give him full control. If his team fails, then let him take the consequences. If his team succeeds, give him the credit’ (Finney, cited in Wagg, 1984: 89). Finney never went into management, but in two interviews I conducted with former managers of the 1970s and 1980s, Finney’s words were echoed virtually verbatim.

The relationship between boards of directors, more specifically chairmen, and their managers, remained one in which the balance of power lay firmly with the boards and the chairmen. However, from the mid-1950s there was more focus on managers, something which I will explain shortly.

Meanwhile, as with virtually all developments within the game, the changes were uneven – some changes in practices arriving much later at some clubs. For instance, when it came to the question of who picked the team, it was a most uneven progression from committees or boards making the selection, to managers having control over this aspect. Chapman at
Arsenal could, not only pick the team, but ban directors and chairmen from the dressing rooms before matches. Newcastle United functioned until the mid-1950s, thirty years after Chapman had arrived at Arsenal, with the board still selecting the team. A committee chose the England national team until the early 1960s when Alf Ramsey insisted he would accept the job only on condition that he alone selected the squad and the team (Goldblatt, 2006: 191).

The managers who came to the fore in this era included Matt Busby, a Scot who had played for Manchester City and Liverpool, and who was enticed to become manager of Manchester United upon his demobilisation from the army in 1945 (Grant & Robertson, 2011: 40). What were described as vast post-war attendances removed financial worries at the club and the new circumstances led to an important moment in the history of football management. In a reversal of a common situation in football clubs, the Chairman, Mr. James Gibson, demanded star players be signed. Busby, the manager, refused, in what was regarded as ‘a significant episode for the club and for football in general, constituting a subtle but important shift in the balance of power between chairman and manager’ (Grant & Robertson, 2011: 41). Indicative of this power balance was Busby’s capacity to have created an extensive scouting system, combining it with the development of young players (Grant & Robertson, 2011). In an interview with a former player (later a manager) who had played for Manchester United in the 1950s and 1960s, I was offered a suggestion as to how Busby’s youth policy worked so well. The interviewee said there were limits on the number of apprentices a club was allowed, but Busby circumvented this rule by signing significantly more young players but classifying the additional apprentices as part of the ground maintenance staff or other categories as occurred to him. Busby, because of the nature of what he was attempting, put Youth Team Management in place. He also had the authority to take the unusual step of appointing an Assistant Manager who would take responsibility for certain functions within the club. This appointment has significance in the development of the manager’s role because we now witness a club with an ambitious manager and great plans, recognising he could not possibly handle all the interdependencies, many of which he was creating through the establishment of new functions. A club secretary dealt with much of the administration, and coaches were allocated to youth and adult teams, working to and supporting the managers of these teams.
Busby’s power was reflective of the increasing importance and power chances of managers but will have been enhanced by the improved results and the success of Manchester United following his appointment.

In contrast to the devolution of responsibility and power chances experienced by Busby, the West Ham manager, Ted Fenton, described how in 1952 he attended a weekly meeting at which he advised the Directors who they might select for that week’s match. He claimed his title might have been more accurately described as Technical Advisor rather than Manager (Carter, 2006). Once again, we observe an uneven pattern and differing pace in the development of the management function; change taking much longer at some clubs; increased functional specialisation at some but certainly not at all clubs and consequent differences in how interdependencies developed.

It would appear the process of devolving functions from boardroom to manager gathered pace from the early or mid-1950s. However, with this increased power came increased responsibility and expectation. The press had begun to make the manager a more important figure than his predecessor, the secretary-manager, but in doing so they made him the focal point and the figure most associated with success and failure. Managers were subject to both direct (press criticism) and indirect pressures (supporters’ dissatisfaction). The latter was an increasingly significant interdependency.

The early 1960s would bring dramatic changes in the lives of professional footballers, their rights, and their entitlements. And although the players were the beneficiaries of the new regime, of course such changes impacted on everyone who was interdependent with players. Consequently, the ending of the maximum wage and ‘retain and transfer’ system had ramifications for virtually everyone involved in the game, but especially for boards of directors and managers.

Much of the thinking behind the Football League’s position in their initial implementation of the maximum wage rule and the ‘retain and transfer’ system was about maintaining a power balance between clubs. They did not wish to see any club in a position to use financial
resources to dominate, something they believed a possibility without a wage restriction applicable to all clubs.

In 1888 when the League was inaugurated, there were only twelve professional clubs. These rules, which were originally drawn up to administer twelve clubs of reasonable economic parity, were maintained into the next century, even though the League expanded into two and eventually four divisions (King, 2002: 40).

The Football League was not an independent body when it came, for example, to issues between clubs and players representatives. The League was the sum total of the clubs. It was made up of representatives of the owners of professional clubs who were willing to fight tooth and nail to prevent the advancement of the players’ causes, the primary causes being their battles to end the ‘retain and transfer’ system and the maximum wage.

In this section, I will also illustrate and explain how changes of ownership and the control of football clubs both directly and indirectly shape the development of the management function. The period beginning after the Second World War through to 1963 brought no significant change to the ownership or control of football clubs in England. Clubs and indeed the Football League were led by such men as Bob Lord, ‘The Burnley Butcher’ and chairman of that club, the archetypical 1960s self-made man, he would go as far as advising the Football League, on whose committee he sat, to ignore a court order because he did not agree with the decision (Inglis, 1988). Alderman William McKeag, a Newcastle United director, was another authoritarian individual, with a penchant for publicly criticising players and managers (Wagg, 1984). Stephen Wagg provides an example, from 1961, which illustrates perfectly the manner in which some chairmen went about their business, hiring and firing managers, as the situation, in their view, demanded, but also illustrating this new focus on the manager. ‘More and more directors now genuinely did expect big things from a manager, and he if he failed to produce them, they would expect big things from the next one’ (Wagg, 1984: 161).

However, managing was no easy task in the 1950s. George Kay had managed Liverpool for fifteen years before retiring due to illness in January 1951. ‘He had been in hospital for some time, suffering from stress and nervous exhaustion caused by the job.’ George Kay died in April 1954 and the Liverpool Echo told his tale in one sentence: ‘Bitter irony that he should
lose his zest for living, and finally his life, through strain and worry imposed by his association with the game he loved’ (cited in Williams, 2011: 270). Nor was Kay the only casualty in this period. The very experienced Arthur Rowe suffered a nervous breakdown in 1954 while managing Tottenham Hotspur. In addition, Tom Whittaker, a similarly experienced manager, was in charge of Arsenal in 1956 when nervous exhaustion was the stated cause of his death in office (Carter, 2006). The increased focus on managers had another effect: they began to be better paid for the extra responsibility foisted upon them. Matt Busby had earned £750 per annum when his reign at Manchester United had begun after the war. By 1963, his salary was approximately £6,000. Alf Ramsey had earned £1,500 in 1955 while managing Ipswich Town. He was appointed England manager on £4,500, taking up that job in 1963 (Carter, 2006).

4.4.1 The Player – Manager Relationship

Once again, I describe specific managers to provide context to the development of the management process in these years. The methods employed by managers of a particular era can provide insight into the management function at that time, while highlighting a manager’s habitus and his relationships with other key entities such as players or owners. Both Matt Busby and Stan Cullis were said to have ‘hitherto unknown levels of daily contact with the players and with their training (Russell, 1997). In effect, they were early examples of what became known as tracksuit managers. It was hardly coincidental that Cullis and Wolves were the other manager and club, apart from Busby and Manchester United, that achieved success in the 1950s. Appointed in 1947, Cullis would remain manager until 1964. Leading the club to three League Championships, while coming second on three further occasions and winning the FA Cup twice. Cullis had played under Major Frank Buckley and, as a manager, he appears to have been similar in approach and attitude to Buckley. He was a relatively authoritarian, uncompromising character. But players could distinguish between the person and the manager as evidenced by the following quote from a Wolves player of that time, in a comment to the former Leeds United player, John Giles: ‘He was the biggest cunt I have ever met in my life’ he said. And then added, with genuine warmth, ‘great manager though’ (Giles, 2010: 127). In a 1950s league game, a player found he was urinating blood at half-time. Cullis
instructed the doctor who examined him to ‘Wait until it comes through his backside before you take him off.’ It later transpired the player had damage to the wall of his bladder which required hospitalisation for five days (Carter, 2006: 91). This was reflective of the manager-player power relation and the relatively authoritarian approach it facilitated. There are many examples. Wagg (1984: 165) describes the Crystal Palace manager (an ex-army PT instructor), George Smith’s style as ‘sergeant majorly.’ The club then choose another military man, Dick Graham, a manager whose approach ‘provoked a players petition’ to the board in 1963 complaining about managerial methods. But the board rejected the complaint and Graham remained at the club for three more years. In the same year, the West Bromwich Albion manager, the strict disciplinarian, Jimmy Hagan, refused to allow players wear track suit bottoms in below freezing training conditions prompting seven transfer requests and the manager’s dismissal (Wagg, 1984: 165). The approach of managers such as Cullis, Graham, and Hagan indicates club authorities were accepting of such behaviour until, in Hagan’s case, it brought the wrong type of consequences. It seems players for the most part saw little option but to tolerate such treatment. The reaction to Hagan was the exception but it was an exception which indicated players had greater power chances than they realised.

Managers continued to exercise considerable control over players who were poorly paid and still subject to the inequitable ‘retain and transfer’ system. These two issues, the maximum wage and the transfer system had survived two wars and several iterations of players’ unions and they would again be the source of contention until 1963. Jimmy Guthrie, because he was Chairman of the Players’ Union from 1946 until 1957 would have had interaction with many managers. He had a clear view of what qualities he felt were important in a football manager. These were man-control coupled with an ability to spot new talent, all combined with tactical insight and revealingly, ‘an ability to handle the press’ (Guthrie, 1976: 138). By the end of the 1950s, if the general populace had achieved better living standards, the same could not be said of professional footballers. Players remained imprisoned in the maximum wage – retain and transfer bondage which had existed since what could be described in a football context as ‘the beginning of time’. Evidence of how a manager could treat a player is provided quite graphically through the publication, in a book by the player’s son, of the letter sent to Stephen

The Letter 29th May, 1959

S. Imlach Esq.

In accordance with the rules of the Football Association and Football League we now have pleasure in advising you of the terms for the 1959/60 season which we are prepared to offer you when your present contract runs out on 30th June 1959.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>1st team</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£15</td>
<td>£20</td>
<td>£15</td>
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As we mention, the present agreement ends on 30th June and your acceptance (or non-acceptance) of the terms offered to you must be in my hands at least seven days before then. Failure to return the forms enclosed properly signed where marked (or non-acceptance) will result in your getting no wages from this club after that date. Sign the forms, in ink, in all those spaces marked X before returning. By the way, details of the date for commencement of training for the 1959/60 season will be posted to you around the end of June so make sure that we have the appropriate address to which we can send this notice.

Yours sincerely, W.H. Walker  Manager

This letter, written in such impersonal terms was sent to a player who, earlier in that same month, had played a key role in the club’s crowning achievement in winning the FA Cup at Wembley. The Cup win led directly to a short early summer tour to South Africa. Imlach senior shared the view, widespread among the players, that their manager had made it a lucrative tour for himself based on some evidence they accumulated while away. This was supported by the manager’s effort to get Stephen Imlach to carry a mysterious parcel through customs during the return to England. The parcel turned out to contain currency for illegal importation. The episode, followed by so stark a letter, provides an insight into how this manager was prepared to treat his loyal players (Imlach, 2005).
Wagg claims that there was an assumption from the mid-1950s that ‘the managerial hand alone guided team performance’ (Wagg, 1984: 159) and that this belief gained acceptance among supporters and more significantly among directors and managers themselves. Press coverage contributed by increasingly alluding to the role of the manager. Other processes too were intertwined with this all of which contributed to greater functional importance being attributed to the manager. As match attendances fell, and players became increasingly militant in seeking changes to the maximum wage and the ‘retain and transfer’ system, and while transfer prices for players were rising rapidly, directors were desperate to identify the ‘right person’ to deal with these issues – namely the manager. The power ratios of managers increased as additional responsibility was willingly handed to them. On one hand, the maximum wage was an upper limit and many players were not paid the maximum allowable, even though the figure could never be described as generous. On the other hand, clubs breached the rule, meaning greater financial incentives were on offer to some players and teams. Within those conditions, managers had the advantage over players in any assessment of their relative positions within the power ratio. All the indications are that, during every era, the maximum wage rule was abused in a form of collusion between the clubs on one side, as represented by chairmen, boards of directors and secretary/managers (later managers) and the players on the other side. While there are many examples of the maximum wage rule being broken, it was the ‘retain and transfer’ system which provided clubs and managers with substantial power resources over players. The widespread breaches of the maximum wage rule also illustrate an element where players did have a degree of power in this context. Clubs saw merit in breaking the rules to retain their top players and have them better motivated. They did this notwithstanding the ‘retain and transfer’ system which tied players to clubs, effectively for as long as the clubs choose to hold onto them. By 1955, as Jimmy Guthrie led the players union in efforts to change their conditions, he reported:

The average wage for the profession is £8 a week (average wage for men in April £10. 17s. 5d. Ministry of Labour figures,) and average playing life approximately seven years. Players can be retained for as little as £3 a week. They are so shackled and hamstrung by this iniquitous transfer system that they are rarely in a position to bargain. In fact no British footballer, whatever his status, can bargain to improve his lot (Guthrie, 1976: 72).
Coincidentally, Gary Imlach, when writing about his father’s career, refers also to 1955 in his criticism of players’ wages:

The maximum-wage system had been in effect since 1901, and by 1955 it had nudged up to £15 a week by negotiation and government arbitration, usually in the face of opposition from the League; the £10 signing-on fee was as old as the maximum wage and hadn’t increased in over half a century. Bonuses were the same £2 for a win and £1 for a draw that players had earned in 1920, the year they were introduced (Imlach, 2005: 56-57).

In 1957, Jimmy Hill was voted chairman of the footballers’ union, in succession to Jimmy Guthrie (Goldblatt, 2006). Hill soon changed the name of the union to the Professional Footballers Association (PFA). From the mid-1950s, it had become apparent that the maximum wage rule increasingly was being broken on a wider scale than before. The Football League then charged six Sunderland players with breach of the rule. Their punishment would be expulsion from professional football. Jimmy Hill visited every club in the top division collecting 250 signatures from players who confirmed they too were in breach of the very same rule. He presented the signatures to the League authorities who could not now take action against a mere six players when they had admissions from 250. To prosecute that number would have brought chaos. The irony was that a league representing the clubs and led by senior figures from those clubs was minded to prosecute the very same clubs’ players (and by definition the clubs themselves) for breaking their own rules (King, 1998). It was the autumn of 1960 before matters came to a head. Jimmy Hill had, in a most professional manner, presented the players’ case to the public, to the press and to the Houses of Parliament, making the League’s position difficult to defend (Inglis, 1988; Goldblatt, 2006). Faced with the threat of a strike organised by Hill and scheduled for 21 January 1961 and overwhelming hostile public opinion, the chairmen were forced to agree to the PFA’s demands and rescinded the maximum wage on 19 January 1961 (King, 2002: 46). Connolly and Dolan (2020) had referred to the social changes that ‘enabled or constrained’ and in this case, public opinion was an enabling factor for Jimmy Hill’s campaign. Now the power ratio had changed in favour of Hill and those he represented and away from the Football League who had stubbornly resisted all reasonable efforts to end the maximum wage (King, 2002). The power balance had favoured managers (in relation to players). The abolition of the
maximum wage would have increased their control over players, as long as the ‘retain and transfer’ system remained in place. A player in dispute with his club had few options, as long as that system remained in place. As will be seen, he could be retained against his will, with serious financial implications, where his power chances were significantly lower than those of his club employers and the club’s agent, his manager.

As to the controversial ‘retain and transfer system, this is how Jimmy Guthrie explained it:

When a professional footballer signs a contract to play for a club the period of service ends on June 30th each year. At the end of that period the player may be retained and offered terms for a further 12 months. He may be placed on the Open-to-Transfer list or he may be given a free transfer. In the latter case he is unemployed and receives no wages but is free to join a club of his own choice. Now, here is where the iniquity of the British transfer system appears. Should a player who has been retained refuse to accept the terms offered, he can be prevented from ever earning his livelihood as that of a professional footballer. A player on the Open-to-Transfer list is prevented from joining a club of his own choice, until his former club, his ex-employer who does not pay him a penny, is paid a fee for his services (Guthrie, 1976: 70).

One example from that time was that of Frank Brennan, a Scot who played for Newcastle United. He refused Newcastle’s offer of £8 per week, a reduction from £15. Faced with the club’s wish to place him on the ‘retained’ list, without pay, Brennan did what he considered the only thing possible in these circumstances. He quit football (Guthrie, 1976). Gary Imlach wrote of Derby announcing across-the-board wage cuts at the end of the 1954-55 season. His father’s name then appeared on the list of retained players, putting him in the position of having to achieve a transfer out of the club before 30 June or at that point having to sign a new contract with lower wages (Imlach, 2005).

A more prosaic explanation of the captivation of players by clubs was Gary Imlach’s sadder, if more profound, considered opinion:

The reason so many men of that era stayed in the game is because they had nowhere else to go. Playing football for a living is famously poor preparation for doing anything else, and the stories are legion of players who found that once the exoskeleton of the game had been
removed, their lives were as shapeless and vulnerable as some sea-
jelly without its shell (Imlach, 2005: 182).

Guthrie described the issue quite succinctly:

Fear of the dole queue sapped at the will of those with families to
nourish, and the ‘retain and transfer’ system was the safeguard of the
clubs. As long as the player was offered any wage, say £2, he was a
prisoner. The old gag of knocking a couple of quid off the weekly wage
was used to save summer wages as indignant men refused to re-sign
for less pay (Guthrie, 1976: 32).

These references provide an insight into the minds of players and must go some way towards
illustrating their weaker power position in their dealings with clubs and managers.

With regard to the ‘retain and transfer’ system, Gary Imlach exposed the extent to which
power balance rested with the club owners and the manager when the matter of ending a
player’s time at that club came up. He described his father’s transfer from Bury to Derby
County:

Whatever the reason behind it, the fact was that my father
hadn’t been offered a transfer so much as a done deal. Once
the club decided to sell, he was given no chance to discover who
else might be interested. He’d simply been summoned after
terms between the two parties had already been agreed. My
mother’s parents had no telephone and the only conversation
she was able to have with him about the proposed deal was
during a call from Dave Russell’s house, with the manager
standing beside her. And so, he signed. No private discussion
with his fiancée, no face-to-face meeting with his manager. No
trip to Derby to see the place or his prospective club. He simply
signed….if he had resisted, Bury could simply have offered
unacceptable terms for the following season and put him on the
transfer list without the obligation to pay him (Imlach, 2005:
56-57).

Elaborating on the ‘retain and transfer’ system, Imlach illustrated a means used by clubs to
exercise their greater power resources over an uncooperative player, unhappy with the new
terms he had been offered. It should be added here that since managers at this time, when
Gary Imlach’s father played (the 1950s) had significant involvement in, if not complete
control, over transfers, those managers would have been the principle characters in the following example

And if you were in a club house, they’d always be coming round with players they were wanting to sign, coming to have a look at your house. I threw them out. I said, ‘Sod off, I’m still here. Come back when I’m not here’ (Imlach, 2005: 52).

The quote was from an interview conducted by Imlach with a surviving member of his late father’s team. Even when much sought-after players went through the process of transferring, or being sold, to another club, they were entitled to paltry amounts as compensation. Guthrie cited the contrasting financial outcomes between an internal transfer between Football League clubs and a transfer overseas of which there were very few at that time, 1955. Jackie Sewell was remarkable for having played for England and some ten years later for Zambia. His transfer in 1955 for £34,500 was from Notts County to Aston Villa. All he was entitled to from the transfer was a £10 signing on fee and a weekly wage of up to £15. In the same year, Charlton Athletic sold Eddie Firmani for £35,000 to the Italian club, Sampdoria. Firmani got a lump sum of £5,000, a salary of £100 a week, a luxury flat and other benefits. In addition, he was free to sign for whom he liked after two years (Guthrie, 1976: 72-73). Clearly conditions for players were significantly different in the two countries with players having substantially fewer opportunities for earning more in England. While the financial comparisons are perfectly valid, Goldblatt points out the cultural difficulty faced by English players moving abroad at that time, citing failure to adapt and rapid returns to England by Neil Franklin and Charlie Mitten who had moved to Colombia with pretty much identical experiences for Denis Law and Jimmy Greaves who had moved to Italy. He claims only John Charles who moved to Juventus could be considered a successful export (Goldblatt, 2006). These experiences illustrate the extent to which players were tied in to the English system with the obvious adverse power chances resulting from such limitations.

Aside from the previous attempt, decades earlier, by a players’ representative body to challenge the ‘retain and transfer’ system involving the failed Harry Kingaby court case (Greenfield & Osborn, 2007), which I already described, no further such action had been taken despite concern and occasional unrest. Since then, all efforts to bring an end to the system
had proved futile. Now, more than fifty years later, George Eastham would head the next challenge as he endeavoured to free himself from his contract with Newcastle United. The background was this:

George Eastham began playing for the Ards club in Northern Ireland in 1952 and after turning professional in 1956 accepted a transfer to Newcastle United for a fee of £9,000. In December 1959 Eastham asked to be placed on the transfer list. Some four months later in April 1960 the club informed him that it had decided to retain him for the 1960/61 season at his current wage and the club gave the Football League notice of his retention on 3 May 1960 (Greenfield & Osborn, 2007).

Eastham refused to re-sign and, unable to move clubs, was assisted with employment in a business unrelated to football. He made efforts to have the Football League adjudicate on a dispute between player and club, but this proved fruitless as the League, in line with all previous form, appeared to side with the club. It took until 22 July for the League to declare Eastham’s appeal rejected. Having failed to receive a reply from the club to a request that their client be placed on the transfer list at a fee which was ‘not prohibitive’, Eastham’s solicitors issued a writ on 13 October. The PFA decided to support the action, using it as a test case in their struggle to end the ‘retain and transfer’ system.

Legal proceedings, by their nature are slow, and this case was no exception because it was 11 June 1963 before it finally reached court. Mr. Justice Wilberforce, in his judgement given 4 July 1963, concluded that ‘the combined retention and transfer system as existing at the date of the writ is in unjustifiable restraint of trade’. Although, the judge was not prepared to go further in his findings, he did open the door to the changes to the ‘retain and transfer’ system, bringing to an end the situation wherein a player could be held without payment, after a contract had run out (Wagg, 1984: 119-120).

Plainly, and particularly in view of the subsequent transformation of the relationships between players and their employers and the earning capability of players, the ending of both the maximum wage and ‘retain and transfer’ system were significant events. The power imbalance between players on one side and the clubs and managers on the other, was reduced. With an end to the maximum wage clubs were now having to pay much more, in
particular to their better players. Determining how much and what represented value for money was a new task which appears largely to have been entrusted to managers, providing them with a gain in function. Interviews I conducted with players from this era all involved references to wage negotiations with the managers, although chairmen were occasionally cited as having more than a passing interest in these player-manager discussions.

The managers input into on-field preparation and the performance of players had increased relative to the past. Yet, as before, the functional importance of what could be termed ‘player learning’ or the coaching of players remained as before. Player skill was seen as an innate gift as opposed to something which might be developed. One departing English coach in 1923 declared the young players did not wish to be taught. This resistance to coaching or teaching of football skills continued into the late 1940s when George Raynor, an exile managing the Sweden national team, was quoted as saying, ‘no one in England – or Britain for that matter – was interested in coaching’ (Taylor, 2010: 155). As noted elsewhere, Matt Busby appointed coaches to his first team and youth sector in the early 1950s but the coaching function, clearly, had not received universal acceptance in the early years after the war. Resistance to coaching had long been a fact of life in English football. Former referee, Stanley Rous, became secretary of the FA in 1934. Determined to follow the lead set by Herbert Chapman whose death occurred in 1934, Rous made approaches to several League figures seeking to set up a coaching course. The only previous course had been arranged by Chapman in conjunction with the amateur club, Corinthians (Wagg, 1984: 33). The first Rous/FA course was held in 1936. Wagg outlines how, instead of a universal welcome, the concept of coaching courses with resultant certification, proved anathema to the league players who were a prime target for this new phase of formal education. The concern was that anyone regardless of football playing experience could enrol and ‘qualify.’ This would create the prospect of qualified ‘outsiders’ applying and possibly obtaining future managerial or trainers’ jobs at league clubs (Wagg, 1984: 33). Jimmy Hogan, an Englishman who had departed to a life in football in continental Europe some twenty years earlier also returned in 1934 to take up the post of manager at Fulham. Devoted to coaching and hugely successful in Austria and Hungary he lasted only months at Fulham where his insistence on coaching was met with such player resistance that his role became untenable (Fox, 2003: 124). While the
manager may have held the balance of power, it was still possible for players to exert pressures reflecting their power chances. On the broader issue of players’ rejection of formalised, accredited coaching, the unintended consequences would be a twenty-year delay in the establishment of coaching across English football. Italy had seen the introduction of football management courses in 1946 with a diploma introduced two years later (Carter, 2006).

Twenty years would pass until a recognition of the need for coaching emerged in English football in the 1950s (Wagg, 1984; Fox, 2003). The catalyst for change was England’s defeat to Hungary at Wembley in 1953. I will return to this later in this chapter.

4.4.2 The Media - Manager Relationship

By the 1950s, most clubs had a reporter from the local newspaper allocated to cover club activities. The reporter largely depended on the manager for access. As a consequence, local coverage tended to be benign and uncritical. Meanwhile national papers were more concerned at that time with exploiting footballers as personalities and they were less reliant on the goodwill of any one team (Imlach, 2005: 141).

The Sunday People of 4 March 1951 held match reports which were not hugely dissimilar to those we read today. They contained more detail than would have been evident in the 1930’s and better descriptions of the standard of play and of the key incidents. A News/Gossip column which appeared on the important back page contained two pieces with references to a manager, in this case Matt Busby. The first was a comment on how the League Championship race might eventually turn out: Don’t forget Manchester United either. I’ve an idea that Matt Busby’s “young men” will stand the end-of-the-season pace better than some of the others.

The second was a weekly spot containing a photo of the player of the week along with the following comment on why he was selected (Besides these two comments, there was no other reference to a manager).

My Man of the Day - best switch Matt Busby ever made. That’s Old Trafford’s view of Johnny Aston’s move to centre-forward. Two first
half goals against Arsenal make him my choice today. And, maybe England’s leader against Scotland at Wembley next month.

A year later, on 2 March 1952, there appears to be no difference in the reportage with match reports still not referencing managers and how they might affect their teams’ performances. ‘Tann tipped for Saints Manager’ is a headline over a piece in which the writer claims to have been told by Southampton’s (The Saints) directors that they are about to appoint Bristol Rovers manager, Bert Tann, to their vacancy. The article names two other managers who have turned down the job, one whose reason was that his current team was still in the FA Cup. The Daily Mirror of 4 February 1952 provides evidence of the increasing interest in managerial decisions. Under a heading ‘His Boss Makes Right Move’, we learn the following:

When told by Don Welsh, the Liverpool manager, before the cup tie against Wolves, that he would be at centre forward, Billy Liddell, Scottish International outside left, replied: ‘I don’t like playing centre.’ ‘Try it for ten minutes,’ said Don. Billy agreed and inside nine minutes Liverpool were two goals up through Paisley and Done.

Elsewhere in the same newspaper in a report on an FA Cup game between Arsenal and Barnsley, we are informed that: Manager Tom Whittaker had made a surprise but wise move in replacing Peter Gering for Lewis. Finally, the decisions of managers were becoming acknowledged in the football pages.

The process had begun in the 1930s but by the mid-1950s, it was becoming an accepted fact that the manager was the ‘hub’ of the football club. The Daily Express in the first week of December 1955 mentions managers in five of the six days of publication. Football had moved into an era where, as far as the popular press is concerned, players no longer simply sign for a club but they sign for a named manager. On 31 March, 1957, The People refers to Chelsea manager, Ted Drake, in a report on the team’s win at Luton. However, it is in the news/gossip pieces that a change may be observed. In the usual series of random pieces about football matters, players, clubs etc. the manager is now very much to the fore. Within newspapers, there is now a very clear amplification of the function of manager. Matt Busby is mentioned in two separate pieces about the forthcoming Cup Final. Neil McBain of Watford is similarly cited in two unrelated comments, while Harry Warren of Coventry and Jimmy Adamson of Spurs, are other managers featured in this Sunday paper of 31 March 1957. Moving forward
to March 1961 and continuing to look at the *People* and *Sunday Mirror*, it becomes clear the manager has become the key source for the journalists writing what amount to sketches on the world of football. In *The People*, managers are quoted in several cases and a further piece refers to the rumour that a London club manager is about to lose his job. In all, six managers are mentioned in relation to their team’s current performances or possible transfer acquisitions. A local newspaper, the *Liverpool Echo* of 25 March 1961, features Bill Nicholson (Tottenham), Jimmy Hagan (Peterborough) and Leeds new manager, Don Revie. None of the three was ever involved with a Liverpool club but the indications are managers are important now. In addition, if managers were becoming important to the press, an important interdependency was in creation. The press was happy to be given information by managers and managers would not be slow in seeing the benefits of trading information for publicity, something which could be filtered to show the manager in a positive light.

Wagg (1984: 158) quotes Bill Shankly describing, in 1956, the press reaction to his first game in charge of Huddersfield Town. The team beat Barnsley 5 – 0 and one paper described the new manager as a ‘miracle worker’ based on a single game. Other examples of the new reverence for managers include a photo of Jimmy Seed the Charlton manager in the 1950s, with a caption asking if he could be plotting the club’s rise from the third to the first division in record time.

Radio broadcasts of League games resumed after the war. The Football league ordained that while commentaries could take place, no advance notice could be given of which games would be broadcast. Highlight packages of league games were shown in cinemas and while these were popular, affording many their only sight of League football, they lacked the immediacy of live coverage. In 1950, television broadcast the Cup Final for the first time, managing to attract an audience of over one million while the medium was very much in its infancy and prohibitively expensive for the majority. By 1953, the television audience for the Cup Final had grown to over ten million (Goldblatt, 2006). The resistance to televising of games possibly made some sense in an environment where attendances were already declining and the fear was that televised games would do further damage in this direction. However, as Walvin explains, the decline had more than one reason and was a factor of
rapidly changing social circumstances in which alternative forms of entertainment, especially television sets landing in ever increasing numbers in English homes, provided other perhaps more comfortable options. This was coupled with the advent of a generation of females who had more influence over their male counterparts when it came to male-only forms of recreation such as attending football matches (Walvin, 1994). This was indicative of a wider power shift between the genders which had the longer-term effect of increasing female involvement in and attendance at football.

Figure 3: Interdependencies 1946-1963
4.5 The Beginning of the Modern Era 1963 – 1992

In this section, all three of the manager’s most important interdependencies, those with players, with directors/owners and with media are discussed. I also deal with the social phenomenon called football hooliganism. It is a subject more than comprehensively covered by others. I discuss it only because its consequences impacted on the management function in the long-term and it was one of the contributory factors to a longer-term serious drop in attendances, something I explain here. Beyond hooliganism, deaths in football stadiums, specifically in Hillsborough, Sheffield in 1989 had a lasting and unanticipated impact on English football and on every element of the English football figuration. I outline in some detail the principal developments and wider social processes in the years between 1963 and 1992 and their part in the eventual transformation of English football and the shaping of the management function.

As Elias (1994: 365) explained such processes: ‘Nothing in history indicates that this change was brought about “rationally” through any purposive education of individual people or groups. It happened by and large unplanned; but it did not happen, nevertheless, without a specific type of order’.

4.5.1 Developments in the Wider Organisation of Football

Spectator violence or ‘Hooliganism’ which it came to be labelled became a regular and well reported feature of football from the early 1960s to the extent that a joint FA/Football League enquiry in late 1964, identified ‘soccer rowdyism’ on and off the field as the game’s greatest problem (Dunning et al., 1988). It was a problem which would continue and worsen, drawing increased media coverage and contributing to declining attendances. Total League attendances stood at 28,619,754 in season 1960-61 but had declined by 1985-86 to an all-time low of 16,488,577 (Russell, 1997: 182). The early response to hooliganism, circa 1967, was increased police presence, segregation of rival supporters and the erection of barriers and fences. The outcome was rising numbers of battles between rival hooligans on the streets and away from the stadiums while the problems inside the stadiums continued (Dunning et al., 1988). In their analysis of the hooliganism phenomenon in the late 1960s, Dunning et al.
(1988: 133-134) suggest a substantial part of the blame for the increased levels of such behaviour was connected to the activities of the tabloid press. The ‘emergence of a more sensationalising media’ in which a growing use of military rhetoric was used in reports on matches and on crowd behaviour, advertised ‘football as a context where fights regularly take place’, with ‘large-scale fracas between opposing fan-groups outside as well as inside football stadia’. A related study noted that newspapers were involved in ‘predictive reporting’. This judgement was based on the court evidence of a Chelsea fan convicted of carrying a weapon to a game. He declared that he had read in a newspaper that the West Ham fans were set to cause trouble at the particular game (Murphy et al., 1990: 120). By 1974, newspapers such as the Daily Mirror were running league tables of hooligans or ‘League of Violence’ tables. Dunning et al. cite an Observer piece commenting on the installation of fencing around the Stretford End at Old Trafford, an area noted for having some of the worst perpetrators of violence in English football – table-toppers in ‘The League of Violence’.

The Stretford End.....is a kind of academy of violence, where promising young fans can study the arts of intimidation. This season the club installed a metal barrier between the fans and the ground. It resembles the sort of cage, formidable and expensive, that is put up by a zoo to contain the animals it needs but slightly fears. Its effect has been to make the Stretford terraces even more exclusive and to turn the occupants into an elite (Observer, 1 December 1974, cited in Dunning et al., 1988: 175).

‘The greater levels of planning, organisation, tactical sophistication and simple force of numbers’ employed by the police to deal with the problem in the 1960s and 1970s, simply drew new levels of planning, organisation etc. from the hooligan gangs identified with many of the top clubs (Dunning et al., 1988: 178). Szymanski and Kuypers argue that the severe social problems of the time such as violence, the breakdown of traditional authority and inner-city poverty, could hardly be blamed on football clubs. However, they insist that crowd violence and fear of this behaviour were key factors in reduced attendance figures and the resultant loss of revenue (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999).

In attributing reasons for the drop in attendances, it is necessary to look as Russell (1997) did at the social conditions in the country over these years. In addition to the societal issues
referenced by Szymanski and Kuypers, he includes reasons such as an increase in people’s leisure options as well as rising levels of car ownership which provided more possibilities including the option for followers of smaller clubs to switch their allegiance to the bigger city clubs. He believes rising unemployment from the late 1970s was a further factor in the decline. Increased television coverage combined with less than ideal conditions at football grounds were other considerations. It must be noted that attendances had begun to decline some time before television coverage was increasing but the option of watching from an armchair did affect support through the turnstiles. And of course, hooliganism and the media coverage of the phenomenon could have a negative impact on many supporters more interested in football than fighting (Russell, 1970; Conn, 1997; King, 1998). Yet, as Russell also points out, the bigger clubs while experiencing a drop in attendances, were far less affected than those in the lower divisions of the Football League. This latter phenomenon may also be attributed to a broadening of the scope of identification among football followers.

In the early 1980s, the FA and League appointed Sir Norman Chester to compile a report in which he recommended reforms to the structure of the League. Chester’s report advocated a change from twenty-two to twenty clubs in the top division and generally showed little sympathy towards the smaller clubs, many of which he implied were in difficulties because they were badly managed. He saw no reason to fund them and believed funding should go to make the strong stronger in the ‘interests of English football’. Among other proposals, such as changes to the distribution of TV income, he recommended retention of gate receipts by the home club (King, 1998). These recommendations were a direct and favourable response to what King calls ‘The Big Five’ (clubs). They had already begun to adopt a hard line in terms of issues such as the split of gate receipts and television income. The five clubs were Manchester United, Liverpool, Everton, Arsenal, and Tottenham Hotspur. Their bigger ground capacity and support meant splitting gate receipts worked to their disadvantage, as the share given to their visitors would never be matched by the share they received from gates at the smaller club grounds where capacity and consequently income, was much lower (King, 1998). The five clubs used the greater power chances deriving from their superior levels of support and, in particular, their popularity with the television companies who had shown increasing bias towards games involving those five clubs. They managed to persuade five other clubs to
support them and then threatened a breakaway from the League. King described the opposing group of clubs, who had rejected all aspects of the Chester Report as the ‘Bates-Noades axis’, a reference to Ken Bates and Ron Noades, the two club chairmen who led that group. Eventually, an uneasy peace was reached as just one of Chester’s recommendations was adopted – the retention of gate income by the home club (King, 1998). Shortly thereafter, a new substantially more lucrative television deal was available because of a new entrant, BSkyB, into that field. The League was forced to provide First Division clubs with 80% of the new revenues as opposed to the 50% they had previously enjoyed (King, 1998: 62). The so-called big-five clubs while claiming to plan a breakaway, exploited the dependence of the League on their games for television income. The League still had a level of power within this interdependent relationship; power is always a balance (Elias, 1970).

Meanwhile, entirely unexpected and unrelated events would unintentionally and in a completely unplanned way, start a long-term process of change.

On 11 May 1985, the main stand at Bradford City’s Valley Parade ground was incinerated during the course of the last home game of the season; 55 people died. On the same afternoon, there was a riot at a game between Birmingham City and Leeds United, in which one innocent teenage boy was fatally crushed by a falling wall. On 29 May, before the European Cup Final at the Heysel Stadium in Belgium, thirty-nine Juventus fans were killed when Liverpool fans charged them. They were crushed to death when a wall collapsed as they tried to escape (King, 1998: 74).

As a direct result of the Heysel Stadium deaths, the European Football authorities banned all English clubs from their competitions for five years with Liverpool banned for ten years (later reduced to six). In response to the events at Bradford and Birmingham, the Thatcher government sponsored the Popplewell Report in which the Justice of that name would examine both occurrences. As King (1998) points out, the events were a death resulting from crowd misbehaviour and fifty-five deaths where there was no crowd trouble whatsoever but ‘negligent management of the ground’ (King, 1998: 80). The conflation of the two problems was unhelpful in that it sought to apply a common solution to diverse problems. The Popplewell solutions tended towards disciplinarian action aimed at supporters. The media
devoted substantial space to coverage of the topic of hooliganism. In doing so, they sought
to dramatize and sensationalise the problem.

On 15 April 1989, ninety-six Liverpool supporters were crushed to death at the Leppings Lane
End of Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield. They were there to attend an FA Cup semi-final in
which their team played Nottingham Forest. The reverberations from that incident continue
to this day as police officers face courts in 2019 arising from that disaster. In terms of how
this tragedy made a long-term impact on football, the resultant Taylor Report became the
blueprint for how English League football would look if it wanted to survive (King, 1998).
Taylor listed football’s squalid conditions, edging into degradation (Conn, 1997: 122). Prior
to the Hillsborough disaster the Thatcher government had sought to introduce identity cards,
an idea that had been rejected by every football body and by the police, who contended it
would not prevent violence outside grounds and was unwieldy, unworkable and unnecessary.
A variation on the scheme was tried temporarily by a few clubs but with no lasting effect. Lord
Justice Taylor dismissed the identity card notion and recommended all seater stadiums with
vastly improved facilities for those attending games. Clubs in the two top divisions were
obliged to phase out terraces with their metal barriers, by 1994. With money diverted from
pools into the Football Trust and dispersed to clubs for structural improvements, the pace of
constituted a vital conjunctural moment in the transformation of the game’. But the
unplanned arrival of a television company, a new player in the bidding for the rights to English
League football was the next major step in the transformation of the game. In 1992, BSkyB,
the new satellite TV arrival, paid £304 million for a five-year deal for the rights to football, an
amount which raised the bar significantly and which would continue to increase in the years
that followed. Critically, it would also enable the building of the grounds envisaged by Mr.
Justice Taylor in his report. BSkyB increased the media coverage of football and expanded the
range of clubs who would be shown live on television, in contrast with the terrestrial
broadcasters who had concentrated on the few top clubs. Giulianotti explains one benefit for
clubs outside the big five in having more games televised. Clubs such as Liverpool and Arsenal
had been able to earn £1 million annually from pitch-side advertising, a revenue stream which
was not available to others because of their infrequent appearances on television. The
prospect of much greater coverage and such new revenue generation opportunities was one reason why a cohort of clubs supported the big five and the FA in the establishment of the Premier League (Giulianotti, 1999: 92). The increased income, would lead to increased expenditure. The priority was the establishment of new facilities, or as King (1998) described it, ‘The End of the Terraces.’ However, the very existence of additional funds prompted managers, always seeking to build and improve their playing squads, to step up demands for player acquisition. The return of English clubs to European competition in season 1991-1992 as the ban ended, restored a meaningful target for the top clubs. The possibility to compete for on-field success and more financial rewards provided renewed incentives for clubs and for managers to strive for success. Managers, still the key figures in transfer market dealing, had new resources. As the Premier League took off, the demands for success saw the beginning of a trend towards buying foreign players. It was felt better value could be had by going this route. However, it was a new direction and managers were having to act with perhaps less data on their target players than would have been available on home-grown footballers. There was intensification of competitive interdependencies on all functionaries, directors, managers, and players.

4.5.2 Directors – Manager Relations

In this section and in the next, I deal with ownership changes in English football clubs. The arrival of new owners would significantly lead to the re-shaping of the management function. There was little or no change in the ownership of most clubs from their earliest days through to and beyond the 1960s. Writing in 1976, Malcolm Wilders referred to the ‘Report of the Committee on Football’ published in 1967. He noted that the available evidence indicates little change since 1967 in the distribution of shares in football clubs. The figures quoted from the 1968 report show that twenty-two clubs functioned with more than half their shares in the hands of the directors while fifty-five clubs had over a quarter of their shares so owned. He further explains that shares in over one third of all clubs are not freely transferable without the approval of the directors (Wilders, 1976). In the 1960s, as managers became the increased focus of media attention they were regarded as the primary source of a club’s success and the focus of blame for failure. Boards frantically searched for fresh managerial
talent and the number of new managers who entered football increased to an average of seventeen every year between 1971 and 1993, while average tenure per club fell from 2.05 to 1.5 years. One in three football managers, on average, lost their jobs every year (Carter, 2006: 106). There is a perception that once the position became that of manager as opposed to secretary-manager, the incumbent assumed total control over team affairs. However, this was not the case. Once again, the pace and extent of change was very uneven. ‘Even in 1962, West Bromwich Albion manager, Archie Macaulay, could only recommend the team he wanted to his directors’ (Carter, 2006: 87). The extraordinarily short average tenure of managers is indicative of the short-term thinking of club boards. It indicates managers were under pressure from the moment they took the job. It made managers prone to short-term thinking. With few exceptions, they were not allowed the time to build a team through a predominance of youth development. The tendency towards buying a ready-made solution rather than fostering a young player who would be a star in maybe three years was the logical outcome if a manager was unlikely to be in the job in three years. Patience was a handicap in a manager.

We begin to see a hierarchy of managers because at this time, the early 1960s, as football received increasing media coverage, a select band of managers of the bigger clubs got increasing attention in newsprint and on television. A discordant note on managers was struck when they were accused of failing to strengthen the security of their positions or to develop some form of bulwark against the short-term approach of club boards.

The turnover in Football League managers is notoriously heavy, and tells its own story. This reflects the tensions in professional football, the anxiety for success which grips directors. But it reflects too the failure of the managers, as a group, to establish their authority in the sport (Hopcraft, 2006: 96).

Hopcraft’s original text was written in 1968. Seeing the insecurity of tenure as a matter needing attention, he believed managers might have greater power chances as a collective. However, managers already had a collective voice at this point as the League Managers Association (LMA) had been formed in 1962 to represent the views of managers in (eventually) the Premier League as well as those engaged in the other lower leagues. There
had been a trade union for secretary managers and managers since 1919 but its effectiveness may be gauged by the perceived need to set up the LMA (Marsh et al., 1994).

The removal of the maximum wage affected clubs with quite a degree of variation.

The abolition of the maximum wage affected a provincial club like Wolves more than those from the big cities, and also created problems for Stan Cullis as manager. Until then the club had prospered through a mixture of careful husbandry and nurturing home-grown players. Other clubs, however, were able to offer markedly better wages. Everton, for example, offered a lucrative bonus system linked to league position and crowd size, potentially earning some players over £100 per week. When Everton won the League in 1963 there was a fifty per cent increase in their wage bill (Carter, 2006: 92).

With the end of the ‘retain and transfer’ system, it might have been expected that there would be a surge in transfers. Surprisingly, this was not the case. Table 1 which tracks transfers at ten-year intervals, indicates no real change between 1960 and 1970. Indeed, 1980 still saw no significant difference apart from a very temporary situation where there was some activity involving a relatively small number of players moving between England and the U.S. league, as the latter was going through one of its periodic efforts to establish the game in America (Wangerin, 2006). Players, it would appear were, by and large, satisfied with the ending of the maximum wage and no more inclined to seek a transfer now that doing so no longer had the negative ramifications of the previous era. However, the very removal of the restriction will have strengthened the players’ power chances, as clubs could no longer ‘imprison’ them at the end of a contract. The consequences for managers would have made wage negotiations quite significant. While transfer activity showed little change in terms of the number or frequency of transfers, the significant difference was in the transfer fees paid, which as shown on Table 1, escalated at an increasing rate between 1960 and 1990. This was another expansion in the responsibility of the manager who was now charged with achieving the best deals in inflationary conditions, when buying or selling players. As I have explained, directors had come under pressure and had suffered criticism for their collective inadequacies.
Here, I provide examples of managers who achieved high profiles and success in these years. Their power relations with their boards are explained. Bill Shankly started work as Liverpool manager on 14 December 1959. He had first been interviewed for the job some eight years earlier but was disinclined to take it without the facility to select his own team. Having done well elsewhere, most notably and at that time most recently at Huddersfield Town, Shankly was seen as the solution to Liverpool’s problem which was how to get back to the First Division after a five-year absence, and on scarce resources.

The Scot was beginning to develop the kind of reputation the Liverpool board liked: he was a man known for capably running and reviving football clubs on shoestring budgets. Growing media criticism of football directors was also paving the way for the independent modern football manager (Williams, 2011: 292).

Managers were increasingly the centre of attraction by virtue of their own television appearances, press coverage and ghosted newspaper columns which several enjoyed. Managers would continue as the focal point for media, through the 1970s and 1980s but the continuing reduction in their term in office indicates their power chances were not as great as they themselves might have believed. The contradiction was having the manager become the central figure, but a central figure at real risk of a very short career at his club.

Brian Clough, in 1973, informed a local reporter that club chairmen should neither be seen nor heard. He famously conducted transfer negotiations, sometimes going to the target player’s house at unearthly hours and persuading his way to a signature. However, one thing is clear – Clough bought players when he managed Derby County, without reference to chairman or board. His lack of consultation would contribute to his eventual departure when to his great surprise a letter of resignation, really an attempt to prise a salary increase, was accepted without discussion (Clough, 2002; Wilson, 2011). However, Shankly and Clough were not unique in having the authority to conduct transfer business. By the 1960s, virtually all transfer activity had become a function left to the club manager. In 1962, a newspaper report was carried from Turin quoting Matt Busby on his dealings with the Torino club from whom he was attempting to buy Denis Law for Manchester United. The manager, clearly was acting for the English club in the proposed transaction (Coventry Telegraph, 22 May 1962).
When Tony Kay moved from Sheffield Wednesday to Everton, a newspaper report informed readers that he was re-joining his former manager for an English record fee of £50,000 and that ‘the man to complete the deal was Catterick himself, now manager at Goodison Park (Newcastle Journal, 28 December 1962). Describing Liverpool in the era of Shankly’s successor, Bob Paisley, John Williams makes it clear that transfer activity and decisions were all the responsibility of the manager (Williams, 2010).

From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, the publicity around transfers invariably had photos of the new player and his manager, inside the stadium with a team shirt and/or scarf or posed at a table signing a contract. They may have been smiling or shaking hands for the camera, but what was clear to the viewer was that the manager had secured his man. An example of how transfers were reported is contained in a headline in 1988 as Paul Gascoigne was transferred for a new British record fee of over £2.0 million, from Newcastle United to Tottenham, the latter then managed by Terry Venables: ‘Record-breaker Tel Lands His Man’ (Liverpool Echo, 7 July 1988). This concentration on managers as the architects and engineers of all transfers would affect the development of the management function, something which I will explain in the next section.

As I have described, this period from the 1960s through to the early 1990s would prove a time when the performance of directors of football clubs came into focus. The report from Sir Norman Chester in 1968 did not spare directors in their inadequacies. Sir Norman Chester concluded:

The final responsibility for the good management of clubs lies with their Boards. It has been frequently represented to us that the calibre of club directors is today not sufficiently high to meet the challenge of an increasingly competitive leisure business. Our experience, despite outstanding exceptions does not conflict with this view (The Report of the Committee on Football, 1968: 62).

King cites the Sunday Times scathing criticism of football club directors in June 1985. The newspaper described them as ‘pompous worthies who were concerned only with their own status but, more importantly, they were essentially incompetent and amateurish’ (King, 1998: 90). Nor would the Board members escape severe criticism when Lord Justice Taylor reported
on the state of football in 1990. The repeated criticisms of football club directors damaged their standing.

4.5.3 Players – Manager Relations

The ending of both maximum wage and ‘retain and transfer’ rules were hugely significant and beneficial to players. I outline how the change impacted on players and on the management function. The abolition of the maximum wage transformed the lives of footballers, especially the better footballers. The ending of the ‘retain and transfer’ system brought an end to the notion of footballers as ‘indentured slaves’. Their newly acquired wealth made them more socially mobile and in the early 1960s the changes to their life styles mirrored other changes in wider society (Dunning et al., 1988: 147). In explaining how players of an earlier era had accepted what could sometimes be described as near-intolerable conditions, Gary Imlach (2006) wrote about the other side of that coin – the attraction of playing before 47,000 people at Old Trafford. As the maximum wage rule was gone, the bigger clubs with the bigger followings would of course be able to afford higher wages. Higher wages attracted better players and higher gate money was still a critical element in a club’s income. Better players meant potentially a more successful team, leading to more full houses on a Saturday afternoon, and increased income for the club. Assessing these changes to the lives of footballers arising from the ending of the maximum wage and the ‘retain and transfer’ systems, Dunning et al. (1988) declared: ‘Footballers became celebrities and they mixed increasingly with celebrities from other walks of life’. They refer to what was becoming ‘football’s supposedly classless image’ and outline how footballers’ new much-improved conditions ‘thrust at least some of them into a social milieu that had as one of its defining qualities a veneer of classlessness.’ Football was being redefined as part of the entertainment industry and was becoming ‘fashionable among members of the newly-emerging cultural elites and some sections of the older ones’ (Dunning, Murphy & Williams, 1988: 147).

Players, as they became identified as part of the entertainment industry and better known from televised games, found other sources of income. By the 1970s, players were benefitting from commercial and sponsorship deals. In 1951, Stanley Matthews received £20 a week for wearing a particular brand of football boot. By 1970, the going rate for such an arrangement
with a top player was £2,000 per week (Walvin, 1994: 177). Higher levels of income for
footballers and the inability of clubs to hold players against their will were new factors in the
player-manager relationship and interdependency. Managers maintained a position of
strength in their dealings with players as these dealings included wage negotiations. However,
it is necessary to realise that players were not a homogenous group. Critcher (1979, cited in
Roderick, 2006) ‘identified a sequence of four typologies or styles of player identity in the
post-1963 era: traditional/located player, the transitional/mobile player, the
incorporated/embourgeoised player and, finally the superstar/dislocated player.’ Critcher
references the influential bearing certain players now possessed off the field. Roderick (2006:
27) credits his study with having made the first attempt ‘to examine the economic
emancipation of players as well as attempting to understand the widening gap between the
celebrity elite and the journeymen.’ One of the outcomes for managers was the need to make
this differentiation. The differences between players were always a factor but now those
differences were much greater, requiring more subtlety in dealing with them.

Aspects of club management, especially its relative complexity, change according to the
division in which the club plays, something highlighted by Wilders (1976). At that time
(1960s), a First Division manager had responsibility for more than thirty professional players
with non-playing staff of up to twenty-seven people also under his care. These numbers
dropped at clubs in lower divisions down to the Fourth Division where the number of
professional players averaged nineteen and the number of non-playing staff might be as low
as three or four (Wilders, 1976).

Virtually all football managers from the 1960s onwards were former players. They would have
joined professional clubs as teenagers with a resultant ending of full-time formal education. Of
forty-five managers studied in the 1970s, only five had any full-time education over the age of
seventeen and of the forty-five only sixteen had received any formal training (Wilders, 1976).

Despite the change in maximum wage and the shift in the power balance it facilitated, this too
was far from an even development, enveloping all players and managers. For instance, I
conducted an interview with a player whose time at the top of English Football was the 1960s
and 1970s. His overarching feeling in terms of negotiations was that there was little negotiating
and a feeling on the player’s part that he held little or no power. Starting out as a young man, he had nobody to assist him when it came to discussing money. He described being on £7 or £8 per week at 17 years of age. A game for the first team meant £18 but this reverted to the lower figure on his return to the second team the following week. There were bonuses for the first team players of £2 for a draw and £4 for a win. There was no question of negotiating or even discussing what was being offered until the player was 19 years of age. Then there would be a meeting with the manager, in line with the descriptions by Martin Roderick (2006) of similar meetings. The real difficulty was the ‘retain and transfer system’ which prevented an unhappy player from earning sufficient money or from leaving the club in circumstances where he had much power over that transfer. Hughes (2013) similarly describes being forced, in the 1970s, to sit in the stand at Celtic, missing out in the appearance money and win bonus elements of his income, until such time as he was forced into accepting a transfer to Crystal Palace.

Managers had to adapt to working without this intimidatory tool in their dealings with players seeking to leave the club or seeking a new contract. They still held a balance of power over players who depended on the manager to effectively argue their case for wage increases or for a contract extension. In interviews I conducted with former Leeds United and Liverpool players of that era, it was clear that they recognised their managers, Shankly and Paisley at Liverpool and Revie at Leeds, as having had some success in getting their boards to agree satisfactory rates of pay.

### 4.5.4 Media – Manager Interdependencies

In this section, I explain how managers made substantial gains in their power relations with the media. The 1960s were the years when television affected football in Great Britain, with the 1966 World Cup win followed by European Cup final victories in 1967 and 1968 all attracting huge viewing figures and enhancing the televised game (Dominghetti, 2014). The 1966 World Cup, held in England was famous for more new developments than England’s ultimate victory. It was the first time a football television audience experienced action replays and it was the first-time panels of ‘experts’ were assembled in television studios to discuss and analyse the games and to enlighten the viewers. The studio panels included former
England manager, Walter Winterbottom as well as contemporary managers such as Bill Shankly and Malcolm Allison (Carter, 2006; Domenghetti, 2014). So successful was the experiment that it quickly became a part of all football television coverage. The presence of Brian Clough who became a pundit a few years later, and Malcolm Allison, amplified the role of football manager further. They became even better known to a wider audience. They were, in effect, representing their fellow managers and bringing the role into greater focus or in the words of Stephen Wagg, they had become ‘national celebrities’ (Wagg, 2007). At a time when managers were assuming new levels of prominence, their public demeanour was now of great importance. As the face of the club, the manager was expected to project a positive image of that club. This was not an entirely new function. After all Herbert Chapman had been an expert at promoting Arsenal in the 1920s and 1930s. However, in the television age, it became an ever more important aspect of the managerial role. Managers who could come across as knowledgeable or charismatic were very much in demand.

A one-year agreement was signed in August 1964 between the Football League and the BBC under which the BBC would use their new BBC2 channel to show Match-of-the-Day on Saturday nights, a programme in which up to 55 minutes of one match would be shown. As television became a factor, clubs saw a need to use the medium to promote themselves at a time of falling attendances. In the early days of T.V. coverage, it was the managers who were doing the promoting and it was usually themselves rather than their club which was in the spotlight. By 1970, with attendances in decline, the ability to provide public relations coverage, to feature in the media, had become a prerequisite of the job (Carter, 2006: 95). In 1979, Liverpool became the first team to wear a sponsored shirt in a League game but it would take until 1983 for sponsored shirts to be permitted by the BBC. The ability to sell shirt sponsorship in a new era of live televised games offered a new source of income to clubs (Domenghetti, 2014).

Newspapers continued to cover more and more aspects of the game. The often unfortunate reporting of hooliganism continued. The amplification of the management function was inherent in newspaper reporting. In 1964 when Wolves sacked Stan Cullis, he was immediately paid £14,000 by a national daily paper, for an exclusive feature. This was roughly
twice his annual salary at Wolves. Managers themselves were the news and papers wanted as much of them as they could buy. Brian Clough, Malcolm Allison, and several others who were sought after for their roles in the newly developed TV punditry, had weekly newspaper columns under their names during the 60s and 70s (Carter, 2006: 98). The importance of television in the promotion of football cannot be understated and by 1970 viewers were able to see a series of World Cup games from Mexico with full colour replacing the black and white of 1966 (Domenghetti, 2014).

Managers reached the peak of their collective powers from the 1960s as they assumed increased function, the most important being the task of buying and selling players in a competitive and inflationary market. Despite their apparent position of strength as the face of their club, their average tenure was quite short, and becoming even shorter. Through all the off-field travails which beset football in this period, managers still needed to put winning teams on the field. They still shared an interdependency with directors in one direction and players in the other. These remained the two most vital interdependencies for every manager and how they dealt with each was a determining factor in their careers. All three of the managers to which I refer here (Shankly, Paisley, and Revie) had tenures far in excess of the average. Indeed, according to Carter (2006) by the 1970s and 1980s football managers enjoyed more autonomy than ever before.

As I have described the increasing control during this time period by managers over transfers, it may be opportune to provide some historical data on the subject (Table 2). This table below illustrates how transfer activity and fee size has changed over the history of the professional game in England. The table was compiled by analysing a single season in the top division of English football, every ten years, to determine the number of transfers in and out during that season. It also shows how many of the transfers saw players move to/from countries outside the home base of United Kingdom and Ireland. The final column shows the highest transfer fee involving a top division club, which had been paid up to the year in question.
### Table 2: Club Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Clubs in top Division</th>
<th>Transfers Out</th>
<th>Transfers In</th>
<th>No. of Clubs that were outside UK &amp; IRL (Transfer Out)</th>
<th>No. of Clubs that were outside UK &amp; IRL (Transfer In)</th>
<th>Highest Fee to Date £ (stg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.9K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.5K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>*17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.469M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22.5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*14 of 17 out to USA. 1 of 7 in from USA
4.6 The Premier League years 1992-2020

Once more I focus on managers’ relationships with players and with owners. I discuss the growing involvement of agents who while they had existed before this period, de-regulation of their role by the world governing body for football, opened the door to a much greater involvement and increased functional power. In this section, I deal with many of the broader social changes that have occurred since 1992, and how they have, in an unplanned and unintended way, shaped the development of the management function in English football in
quite a dramatic manner. The most significant change, affecting the management function in football within these years, has been that of club ownership. I explain how this affected the management function and the power relations and interdependencies around that changing role. The Bosman ruling by European Courts is also explained here. It brought unprecedented change to the power opportunities of players and how they would be rewarded. Consequently, it was a watershed moment in the history of European professional football. Nevertheless, in the context of the subject of this thesis I regard ownership changes as more significant. It is opportune to refer, at this point, to the work of Eric Dunning in reference to what Clarke (1992) called ‘the ‘English football figuration.’ Dunning writes that this figuration involves, at the highest levels, the following interlocking groups and organisations: the owners, sales, administrative and other non-playing personnel of clubs; overall controlling organisations such as the FA, the FA Premier League and the Football League; players, managers and coaches; the mass media, increasingly in recent years, television, both terrestrial and satellite; and finally, the fans (Dunning, 1999: 126). It is this broader figuration and figurations within that have shaped the management function.

The final First Division Championship was won by Leeds United in May of 1992. That autumn would herald the arrival of The Premier league. It was a new era in English football, certainly in terms of television exposure (King, 1998: 114). It was fast becoming a different experience for spectators as new or refurbished all-seater stadiums were coming on stream. It would also eventually prove a new era for club ownership and for managers. The power ratio within that interdependency would adjust, as would the functions of the manager. As for players, their lives were about to change quite dramatically once the European Court of Justice issued a ruling in late 1995 on a case brought by a virtually unknown Belgian footballer called Jean-Marc Bosman. In a 2013 Guardian newspaper article, the journalist, Owen Gibson, summed up much of what had changed since the 1980s. He describes how a government with a somewhat hostile view of the football world, which wanted identity cards for all as a solution to what was a very serious law and order problem, accidently set in motion the changes that would transform football. Gibson cites Prime Minister Thatcher’s lack of empathy with all sports but with football in particular.
Yet away from the bleak images of Heysel and Valley Parade and the twisted metal fences of Hillsborough, it should not be overlooked that Thatcher’s policies also—almost by accident—laid the blueprint for today’s Premier League, for good or ill.

Gibson then cites Professor Rogan Taylor (University of Liverpool), writing in 2009 on the twentieth anniversary of Hillsborough describing Lord Justice Taylor’s report as having saved football from Thatcher. Continuing, Gibson goes on to describe the formation of the Premier League as the equivalent of the ‘big bang’ deregulation of the financial markets in the mid-1980s. This development was enabled by the ‘media revolution’ Margaret Thatcher ushered in by granting a satellite licence to one of her biggest supporters, Rupert Murdoch. Lord Taylor had made it clear; stadiums would have to be replaced or transformed into modern comfortable places with all seating and proper facilities. The government was prepared to assist with funding, to the tune of 25% from a levy on the pools betting duty. However, it was the arrival of television companies with a vision that included pay-per-view channelling of football that ultimately made the change possible.

The most significant enabler of the transformation of football grounds and indeed of English football was the willingness of BskyB to pay unprecedented fees for the rights to televised football. In 1992, BskyB and BBC agreed a deal worth £304 million over five years. The following contract was worth £607 million (Carter, 2006: 123). The longer-term effect of the newly competitive market for media rights was an increase in the price of the rights to top flight English football to £5.5 billion over twenty years (The Guardian, 9 April 2013). This new money enabled the renovation of football grounds. The demand for such renovation implied a further transformation which was the marketing potential for football played in safe clean attractive stadiums, before larger audiences of what would become customers rather than football fans. Football could truly become a part of the leisure industry (King, 2002: 91). This crucial television deal was not without some initial difficulties and disagreements. Some club owners were minded to attempt individual television deals for their clubs. This echoes what Maguire (1988) described in relation to basketball in Britain.

Two points from an important report on football provide valuable insight into the changes, their origins, and their nature.
Point 14 of the *House of Commons Report on Football Governance* (May, 2011) explains some of the changes that were occurring in football.

Change was also occurring from within the game. In 1981, the FA raised the dividend threshold to 15% and relaxed the prohibition on directors being paid; they could now receive a salary as long as they were working full-time for their clubs. Following the Chester Report, in 1983 Football League clubs decided to allow home clubs to keep all the revenue from League matches. All these measures were taken to encourage a new commercially-minded approach that would deliver more investment into the game. For professor Szymanski, the fact that attendances were on the rise from 1986, before the Taylor Report, can be attributed to this internal reform. Recovery from deep 1980/81 recession, and subsequent increase in the availability of money for leisure pursuits, may also have been a factor. The performance of the England team in reaching the semi-final of the 1990 World Cup - Gazza’s tears and Gary Lineker’s goals - also helped the new groundswell of interest in the national game (House of Commons Report on Football Governance, 2011: 14).

Point 15 of the same report is also helpful and this is the part of that point which I consider most instructive:

From 1992 four factors came together to create a perfect storm for football. First of all, stadia were being modernised with a 25% subsidy over 1992 to 1997 from a levy on the pools betting duty. English teams had just re-entered European football in 1990. The pay TV revolution had just started, and we had just started 15 years of uninterrupted growth through to 2007 and, as we all know, as growth rises, a disproportionate amount is spent on leisure (House of Commons Report on Football Governance, 2011: 15).

In summary, these largely unplanned changes had several causes, sources, and effects. I will explain how they affected English football and more specifically how they led to changes in the management function.

The most dramatic change in the statutory relationship between clubs and players occurred in 1995, with the Bosman ruling. It proved a pivotal moment for European football. Bosman challenged the rules on transfers of players whose contract had been completed. He further challenged UEFA on the validity of restricting a club to a limited number of foreign, EU citizen, players. The European Court ruled that ‘both internal payments between clubs for players
who were out of contract and nationality limits on squads, were in contravention of European law’ (Goldblatt, 2006: 692). The effects were that players could allow their contracts run down and move to another club without a fee being paid to the club they were leaving, while limits could not be placed on the number of European players in a squad. Non-Europeans still needed to deal with immigration rules as before. In practice, players were rewarded with vastly superior contracts and if they allowed their contract to run out, what would previously have been a transfer fee between clubs was now available to the player. The response to this development was, in most cases, the renewal of players’ contracts before they got to the final year or the sale of the player within that timeframe so that a transfer fee could be realised. Meanwhile the effect on the Premier League of the infusion of vast sums of television money, providing higher transfer fees and wages, was the arrival of more foreign players, from Europe and beyond. There came a complete change in the profile of players, by nationality, in English football. In 1992–3 there were eleven overseas players in the Premiership; by 1998-9 this figure had increased to 166 (Carter, 2006: 126).

4.6.1 Agents, Players & Managers

Much has been written in recent times about agents, more often than not alleging malign influence over players and excessive rewards for their efforts. Because of the relatively recent change wherein responsibility for such dealings has moved from the manager to others I have not dealt with agents in as broad and detailed a manner as would have been the case had this structural change at club level not occurred. The consequences of the Bosman ruling included a surge in international transfer activity and the increased involvement of agents, initially as representatives of players but also acting on behalf of clubs.

Having come from a time when they were outlawed, by the 1980s and 1990s, agents were accepted with some reluctance. The relatively recent history of agents’ involvement in transfers included some unsavoury episodes. Tom Bower (2003) wrote about named managers who, in the early 1990s, were known to have received illicit payments. He recounted one instance of large sums of cash being handed over at a motorway services station. He further described a named manager who was dismissed in 1995, for receiving what
he had called ‘unsolicited gifts’ amounting to hundreds of thousands of pounds, from an agent.

Bower cites specific clubs discovering that the amount they had paid in transfer fees differed greatly from the amount eventually received by the selling club. He provides details of a conversation involving Premier League CEO, Rick Parry, who was exasperated that an agent found to have paid enormous bribes to managers had his life ban reduced to two years. Why’, he asked Bobby Charlton, ‘do the managers take bungs?’ ‘Because,’ replied Charlton, ‘managers get abused; they’ll be unfairly dismissed; and so they’ll take while they have the chance’ (Bower, 2003: 88). Charlton’s understanding is confirmed in quotes from Harry Redknapp who managed Bournemouth, West Ham, and Tottenham Hotspur.

‘At the end of the day, no one gives a monkey’s about you once your career’s over so in my view you should make the bucks while you can. Do your best, don’t rip anyone off along the way, but if there’s a chance to earn a few quid, take it because it doesn’t last for ever’ (Bower, 2003:232).

In a 2008 interview, Ken Monkou described the aftermath of his 1992 transfer from Chelsea to Southampton:’ At one point the taxman came knocking at my door.’ ‘Mr. Monkou, we’ve been checking the books. You went to Southampton for £1 million, but the records mention only £750,000, we’re missing £250,000 – did it end up in your pocket?’ ‘I said, take a look at my payslips and my transfer fee.’ ‘I had everything on file. Of that transfer money, £250,000 simply vanished. Where did it wind up? Not in my pocket” (WSC, May 2008: 23). This particular example compares directly with several outlined in detail by Tom Bower in his investigative work (Bower, 2003).

By the late 2010s, they had become such a part of transfer activity that clubs sought to rein in the enormous costs of fees paid to these once unwanted entities. In April 2018, the FA revealed that Premier League clubs paid a total of £211 million to agents in 2017. In 2015, FIFA deregulated the governance of agents resulting in a surge in new entrants to the field, with the number of licensed agents increasing from 518 in 2015 to 1,800 in 2018.
The growth in activity and involvement of agents in transfer deals has come at a time when clubs are moving away from the traditional way of conducting transfer business. However, in the context of the management function and the interdependencies involving the manager, the relationship with agents is one of the changes we are witnessing as the management function itself undergoes change. The agents’ contact at top clubs is no longer the manager, in most if not all cases. The function has been moved away and agents deal with a transfer manager or a Sports Director/Director of Football. The process now appears to involve more people at a club than in the past. The scouting function seems to have more input and to be represented where committees are set up. It is unclear how significant a role the revelations of irregularities had in this change but on balance it would appear that the growing adoption of the continental management model was progressing regardless and this model places transfer activity elsewhere in the club structure.

An illustration of how agent representation and, an associated function, wage negotiations, have changed, came about in two interviews I conducted as part of the work on this thesis. On the first occasion, the interviewee, a head of youth development, apologised for delaying me, even though the person he saw before me was a mere five minutes in his office. I was told the other visitor was an agent representing a young player – a player too young to have an agent, in reality. However, my interviewee said he had to give him a few minutes ‘because the club chief executive wants these people entertained as you never know when we might need them.’ The second is the previously described encounter following an interview with Danny McGrain at Celtic’s ground in Glasgow, where two agents were meeting the club CEO to negotiate a player’s contract extension.

4.6.2 Players - Managers

The manager whose position strengthened from the 1960s onwards, is now finding his role defined rather differently. The position is becoming that of ‘head coach’ with responsibility restricted to first team preparation and performance. The first team is still the flagship, all-important team but the manager or head coach is no longer deciding how much players get paid. He is no longer deciding which players will be purchased and for how much or for that matter, which players may be sold and when. There are other people to take care of the
business of football. The head coach is restricted to taking care of the football. Decisions taken by others dictate, to a higher degree than before, the strength of the squad of players available to the coach. The data-based transfer decisions include the age of the transfer target and his likely sell-on value, a factor which hardly arose in bygone days. The arrival of new owners with successful backgrounds, acquiring clubs with a view to profit rather than for some vainglorious reason has led to increased functional specialisation. In such a structure, the coach is one important element whose job is to lead and develop the team while acting as the club representative in the day-to-day communications with the outside world. Notwithstanding the reduction of functions, the role is still considered important by club owners. The importance of the function is reflected in the pay rates of those in the role as shown in Table 10 with the employment of foreign coaches a feature of the bigger clubs.

Before further describing the extent of this change in the management function I want to outline how circumstances have developed for players and what this means. Table 3 illustrates the wages of top players over the decades. The increase from the 1990s where Paul Gascoigne would have earned £25K per week to Alexis Sanchez in the 2010s on £400K + per week is indicative of the huge jump in earnings. (Gascoigne was widely regarded as the most talented English footballer of his era, while Sanchez is a Chilean international who had played in a successful Barcelona team before moving to Manchester United via Arsenal, and for whom there were huge unfulfilled expectations of him in Manchester). While Sanchez has been a failure at Manchester United and was despatched on loan to Inter Milan for the 2019-20 season, the club’s French international, Paul Pogba, is paid £375,000 per week (Forbes, June 2019). This table illustrates how the earnings of footballers have grown in relation to the national average industrial wage. The £12 per week paid to Stanley Matthews, widely regarded as the best player in England in the 1950s, was a multiple of 1.1 times the average industrial wage. After the removal of football’s maximum wage, World Cup winning England captain, Bobby Moore, was paid a multiple of almost eight times the industrial average. Today, in the post Bosman era the multiple is 586. It is an extraordinary figure and is a measure of how much a club’s wage bill has grown with implications for everyone involved, not least the manager. And the Premier League surpasses the other key European leagues in terms of wealth and in terms of just how much its clubs are prepared to pay their players.
This, in turn, makes it easier to attract the top players from around the world and that is what has occurred.

Table 3: Top Players Weekly Earnings through the Decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Player Name</td>
<td>Stanley Matthews</td>
<td>Bobby Moore</td>
<td>Kevin Keegan</td>
<td>John Barnes</td>
<td>Paul Gascoigne</td>
<td>David Beckham</td>
<td>Alexis Sanchez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Income</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>£150</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
<td>£100,000</td>
<td>£400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple of Avg Industrial Wage</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: Average Industrial Weekly Wage at Mid-decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg Industrial Weekly Income</td>
<td>£11</td>
<td>£19</td>
<td>£61</td>
<td>£192</td>
<td>£374</td>
<td>£570</td>
<td>£683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.K. Office for National Statistics / ons.gov.uk

A comparison of player earnings at the highest levels in the top European leagues confirms this wider power of money in the Premier League (Table 5). The figures are distorted at the top because of Lionel Messi in Spain, Cristiano Ronaldo in Italy, and Philippe Coutinho in
Germany, the highest paid in these leagues. In Spain, the top fifty earners list contains thirty-one players from either Barcelona or Real Madrid. Consequently, one has to drill down to what are still very high ratings, and look at players who rank outside the top fifty highest paid players in their respective leagues. The picture this provides is one in which the Premier League is seen to have much greater depth to its high pay levels. Put another way, a player does not have to be among the fifty or hundred top earners to achieve much higher wages in England than in the other leagues studied. The wages, while still substantial, taper off much earlier in the rankings in the other major European leagues, so that we find the 100th highest paid player in England earning more than double that of the 100th highest paid players in Spain and Germany and 50% more than the 100th highest paid in Italy. At the 200th highest paid the Premier League player’s wages are three times those of his corresponding number in Spain and Germany and still 50% above his opposite number in Italy.

**Table 5:** Wage Comparisons European Leagues 2019-2020 Season (Weekly Wage GB£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player Ranking In Wage Terms Within League</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>10th</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>60th</th>
<th>80th</th>
<th>100th</th>
<th>200th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>£375k</td>
<td>£200k</td>
<td>£110k</td>
<td>£100k</td>
<td>£100k</td>
<td>£80k</td>
<td>£45k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>£1.2M</td>
<td>£340k</td>
<td>£90k</td>
<td>£75k</td>
<td>£52k</td>
<td>£36k</td>
<td>£15k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>£472k</td>
<td>£170k</td>
<td>£60k</td>
<td>£76k</td>
<td>£42k</td>
<td>£34k</td>
<td>£13k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>£970k</td>
<td>£173k</td>
<td>£87k</td>
<td>£78k</td>
<td>£63k</td>
<td>£53k</td>
<td>£30k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: capology.com

The Bosman ruling led to huge increases in earnings for footballers from the first decade of this century. Such were the earnings that a player could conceivably lose track of his assets. The Metro newspaper of 19 January 2011 reported that the English footballer Jermaine Pennant was contacted five months after his transfer from Real Zaragoza to Stoke City, by his Spanish former employers to inform him his Porsche car remained parked at the local train
station. The player had forgotten he even owned the £100,000 vehicle which bore his personalised number plates. It is an extreme example but illustrates the riches enjoyed by footballers in the post Bosman era. And this example is a player who was deemed to have performed poorly in the Spanish League, being released less than a year into a three-year contract and who was far from a success on his return to English football.

The money flowing into English Football, coupled with the removal of restrictions on the nationalities of potential signings, also had the effect of making that football ‘less English’ as foreign players in large numbers were signed by the leading teams. This was noted after Manchester United won the Champions League in 1999 but, in truth, it had been happening since the creation of the Premier League.

But even (Manchester) United must give credit to the most potent accelerant in the English game: the arrival of foreigners or, perhaps – one foreigner. Without Rupert Murdoch’s millions the Premiership would have been unable to import the vast number of overseas players whose attendant skills have changed the face of domestic football. Who better to teach the English a foreign language than the practitioners – at United, Peter Schmeichel, Eric Cantona, Jaap Stam, at Arsenal, half a team, at Chelsea, a full team (*The Guardian*, 25 March 2000).

Writing shortly after the Bosman ruling was finally ratified and accepted by all parties, Eric Dunning had an observation on how it would impact on the world of football:

Internationalisation, however, is likely to entail an increase in competition in the global market for places in the club teams of particular countries, a process which will have been intensified by the recent judgement of the European Court of Justices in the Bosman case that UEFA’s stipulation that clubs can field no more than three non-national and two ‘naturalised’ players in European matches constitutes a restriction on freedom of movement and violates European Community law (Dunning, 1999: 123).

The accuracy of this assessment is evidenced in the surge in numbers of foreign players in English football since that time. A Sky Sports report in January 2017 claims 69.2 per cent of Premier League players are foreign, the highest level of any of the seven European leagues with a majority of foreign players. The English Championship (second tier) is among the other
six. What we are witnessing in cases such as George Eastham’s in the early 1960s and the Bosman decision in 1995 is a movement in the power balance between the club owners and the managers and the players in the direction of the latter. This has been a long and slow process but the ultimate transformation is significant.

Players have come from being paid at levels similar to factory workers, less than the members of the massed bands playing at Wembley Stadium on Cup Final day. They have come from living in club houses and having that tenancy used as a weapon against them, to freedom of contract and untold riches. Managers have gone from a position of holding the balance of power over players, of being able to tell them, at season’s end, how much less they would be paid in the coming year, and of being able to march them through their own town-centre in full kit for maximum humiliation. Today they are dealing with multi-millionaire footballers whose priorities have changed. And dealing with a group of mixed nationalities with several different cultures and languages is a further complexity in modern day English football. It is a complexity that directly affects the manager/head coach, with communication difficulty just one new unintended outcome of the new diversity in English football.

The significance of this element of management is described in a 2009 paper:

The research project has been based, among others, on the premise that the successful linguistic integration of foreign players in a team may, to a significant degree, contribute to the successful achievement of a team’s coordinated activities on the pitch. By extension, the multilingual composition of a team has been believed to result in potential miscommunication (possibly foiling the goal of purposeful coordinated team activity on the pitch) Chovanec & Podhorna-Policka, 2009).

For all the changes in footballers’ conditions and despite notable adjustments in the power balance in their relationships with managers, some of the same interdependencies of previous generations remain. Managers who lose the confidence of their players are said to ‘have lost the dressing room.’ Any such manager is guaranteed to lose his job pretty quickly. His need not to allow that happen is a primary need. So the fact that managers need players to perform has not changed. Nor has the fact that players still depend on the manager to select them, to put them on the field for their club when not playing will almost certainly have
long-term economic and status consequences, just one of which is likely to be loss of a place on the player’s international team. Not being a regular first-team player may well have no impact on the contract between club and player but loss of club and international place will inevitably curtail the player’s value to sponsors and to potential new employers. The individual player’s self-worth and self-image will also suffer from such rejection. In this relationship, we see functional democratisation, as the positions of players and managers/coaches relative to each other become less unequal. I will explain how the relationship between players and managers has changed within this period. It may be partly understood by reference to an Elias observation, which is that ‘people’s interdependencies change as societies become increasingly differentiated and stratified’ (Elias, 1970: 134).

In 1992, the man in charge of the football club was the manager. This continued into the new century in many cases. The manager figure had substantial powers and many functions. The trend which had begun after World War II of managers having responsibility for the whole club, peaked during the 1960s and 1970s. The functions lost since then are those involving anything other than that directly to do with the first team. Day-to-day club operations, ticketing, finance, hiring and firing, human relations, public relations, ground improvement or development, health and safety and every other miscellaneous function is handled by others. Nor is transfer activity any longer a function over which the manager figure has total control. It is the reduction of those functions and powers that represents the change that has occurred. Alex Ferguson is frequently described as the last manager to enjoy substantial control over all aspects of a football club. The extent of his authority is notable in that his retirement marked a break with a time when managers could claim to run a club, as Ferguson claimed, rather than simply a team. New owners with changed approaches, some with experience in professional sports clubs elsewhere, would alter the role in English Football. Upon retiring, he made some telling points about his time as manager of Manchester United.

In my early years, the backing of the board, and Bobby Charlton in particular, gave me the confidence and time to build a football club, rather than just a football team. Over the past decade, the Glazer family have provided me with the platform to manage Manchester United to the best of my ability and I have been extremely fortunate
to have worked with a talented and trustworthy chief executive in David Gill. I am truly grateful to all of them (Irish Times, 8 May 2013).

By early 1990, Ferguson was in his fourth year as Manchester United manager, without a trophy and with his imminent dismissal a constant rumour. A one-goal victory over Nottingham Forest in the F.A. Cup provided a stay of execution but his position was not secure until the 1990 FA Cup was finally won in a replay (Crick, 2002: 318). Bobby Charlton, an iconic figure who had been a World Cup winner and someone who had never played for another club, was a director whose support for Ferguson at that time was critical. The manager’s interdependency with the board was played out in his relationship with Charlton at a time when supporters, in protest at the manager’s perceived failure, were raising posters reading ‘three years of excuses.’

An investigative programme titled ‘Fergie and Son’ aired on BBC on 27 May 2004. The programme looked at transfers involving Manchester United and the sports agency of which Jason Ferguson was a principal. The club was forced to carry out an internal investigation into transfer dealings. The conclusion was exoneration for Alex Ferguson and for his son, Jason. However, the club determined that Jason Ferguson would never again be engaged to act on its behalf. They could not stop him representing the several club players already on his books. The manager then banned the broadcaster, refusing to speak to the BBC despite contractual obligations via the Premier League, to do so. The ban lasted all of seven years, indicating how much power Alex Ferguson had within Manchester United (The Independent, 26 August 2011).

The Sunday Times (13 October 2019) reported some highlights from a newly published book, by former England manager, Sven-Goran Eriksson. Before the 2006 World Cup Finals, Wayne Rooney had suffered a foot injury. Eriksson selected him to go to the tournament but Ferguson was adamant the player would not have sufficiently recovered and should not be included in the England squad. After a heated meeting between the managers and doctors from Manchester United and the England teams, within days Ferguson sacked the club doctor because he was unhappy with how the argument over Wayne Rooney’s fitness had gone.
This level of managerial power at Premier League clubs was already changing. This club appeared to accept the manager’s right to act in this way, it was widely believed because he was winning titles with unprecedented regularity. Ferguson’s successors and their contemporaries would not enjoy such unbridled authority.

Roy Keane was in the later stage of his career as a footballer at Manchester United but he continued to captain the team which he had led to numerous successes under the managership of Alex Ferguson. While injured, Keane was asked to review and comment from that week’s League game in November 2005. His criticism prompted Ferguson to end the player’s time at the club. The manager had built a reputation for dispensing with players who displeased him because of their performance, their behaviour or in the case of Jaap Stam, because he offered what were generally viewed as some relatively innocuous criticisms of the club in an autobiography. Ferguson was empowered to remove any player, no matter how famous or successful or valuable to the club his retention might be, the latter being the case with Stam who was at the peak of his career with years of top-level football ahead. David Beckham, another player in his prime, was sold after Ferguson had kicked a boot across the dressing room, injuring Beckham whose face required stitches (Keane, 2014).

In September 2011, Manchester City played a European fixture in Munich. In the second half as the English team trailed by two goals, their manager, Roberto Mancini, summoned Carlos Tevez to go on as a substitute. Tevez refused, later saying he had been warming up for an hour at the manager’s request and that he should have been on much earlier. Mancini was furious and said the player would never again play for the club (Guardian, 28 September, 2011). In early 2012, Tevez returned from a voluntary exile in Argentina to play again under Mancini. Clearly, Mancini was not empowered to dispense with the player and actually had to select him in the team in direct contradiction to everything he had said up to then (Premier League Website, 13 February, 2012). It was the most high-profile example of a manager being unable to deal with a player as he had publicly declared he would.

In their (2007) study of ‘intimidation and violence as aspects of managerial control in English football’, Kelly and Waddington provide evidence of bullying, claiming that ‘the use of physical violence as a means of intimidating young players’ was not unusual. The writers go further in
stating that some of the violent behaviours they came across would have led to industrial tribunals or even criminal prosecutions had they occurred outside of the football world. Included among the responses to interviews conducted by the authors were descriptions of managers punching and head-butting players. Frequent answers from players indicated fear of managers as an inherent part of the player-manager relationship (Kelly & Waddington, 2007: 152-155). The period their study covered would have been approximately from the early 1990s to 2006. It would appear unlikely that such a degree of physical or psychological intimidation of players by managers could continue in a sphere where the disparity in power chances has reduced, where players are now less unequal with their managers/head coaches.

One issue which affects managers in their relationship with players is discipline. Disciplinary action such as being dropped from a team when the base rate of pay was nearer the average industrial wage deprived a player of appearance money or perhaps a win bonus. Someone with a weekly income in high five figures or even in six figures, is less likely to be upset, and will certainly not suffer serious economic hardship. Chelsea manager, Frank Lampard, in 2019, appears to have taken the view that fines commensurate with earnings are a deterrent (Image 1). Meanwhile, Nuno Espirito Santo, the Head Coach of Wolverhampton Wanderers, wrestled with the same problem of how to deal with indiscipline, specifically bad timekeeping, among his players. He arrived at a more nuanced solution, which uses shame or embarrassment rather than a monetary penalty for offenders. The players are moved onto the training ground in time for the training session. However, the session does not commence until everyone is on the field, so one late player results in everyone else standing around without footballs, often in very cold weather, awaiting the offender. The use of the collective against the bad timekeeper works. It appears a clever use of the players’ power against a player in a scenario where the coach is not seen to be exercising power over the players (Sunday Times, 1 March 2020). This also illustrates a manager using greater levels of self-restraint in his relations with players.

Kelly & Waddington (2007) liken attitudes of football managers towards relatively minor matters of discipline, in which they include timekeeping, as redolent of a factory floor approach to which working classes were subjected. They contrast this with modern
management methods in business and industry which would instead deploy ‘less arbitrary measures such as a system of informal and formal warnings, often by agreement with the relevant trade union, [and] are more normally used to deal with workers who are persistently late’ (Kelly & Waddington, 2007: 156).
CHELSEA FC 1st TEAM INTERNAL PLAYER FINES SEASON
2019-20

1. Late for Match day/1st Team departure                      £2,500
2. Late for Report Time for Training
   (plus £2,500 for every 15 minutes thereafter)                  £2,500
3. Late in gym for pre activation                             £1,000
4. Late for treatment                                          £2,500
5. Late for Team Meetings                                      500 per minute
6. Late for start of Training                                  £20,000
7. Phone ringing during Team meal or meeting                    £1,000
8. Reporting in the wrong attire/kit for Team Travel and Match days £1,000
9. Not travelling back on Team coach post match, without giving
   48 hours notice to the Manager or an Assistant manager      £5,000
10. Refusal or not turning up for corporate/community duties    £5,000
11. Not reporting illness or injury before day off or 1 hour 30 minutes before training £10,000
12. Late for medical appointments                              £2,500

ALL FINES TO BE PAID WITHIN 14 DAYS. AFTER WHICH ANY FINE OUTSTANDING
WILL BE DOUBLED.

All fines subject to manager's discretion, with all fines monies going towards team activities
and charitable bodies.

All Players must also adhere to the following internal Rules:-

- Body composition targets to be met, fines for failure to be in target range.
- Players family/guests need to be authorised by the manager at least 24 hours prior to the day that they would like to watch training.
- Agents are not allowed to be in the Training Ground, unless visiting in official capacity.
- On a daily basis breakfast service to close 1 hour prior to training, with no exceptions made for food provision before training.
- For doping purposes players must inform management if they want to travel abroad on scheduled days off on the calendar.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CLUB RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IT SEES
NECESSARY IF AT THE DISCRETION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS A PLAYER HAS BROKEN
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR PLAYING CONTRACT, AND APPLICABLE CODE OF
CONDUCT OR CODE OF PRACTICE IN ADDITION TO THESE RULES

DATE: 27/09/19
FRANK LAMPARD
4.6.3 Club Ownership - Management

As I have previously stated, I consider the changes of club ownership in recent years a crucial factor in the development of the management function. The changes within the football figuration affect many aspects of the game but, arguably, the greatest impact is on this function. An understanding of how clubs were structured from the earliest days, enables one to grasp the extent of the change that occurred following the publication of the Taylor Report. King describes the approach of traditional directors towards their local club. He suggests that those directors ‘did not regard the football club as an appropriate or possible site of capitalist accumulation’ (Inglis, 1991: 12, cited in King, 2002: 192). This thought process is exemplified in the opinions expressed by Peter Hill-Wood, the second-generation Arsenal Chairman, when he spoke about fellow director, David Dein, acquiring additional shares in the club: ‘I’m delighted he is but I still think he’s crazy. To all intents and purposes, it’s dead money (The Sunday Times, 8 August 1991, cited in King, 2002: 122).’ King offers this statement as an example of the divide between the old and new directors of football clubs, Dein being one of the new breed (King, 2002: 122). David Conn wrote of the culture within which directors set up their clubs and supporters watched their teams. He is very much describing a time before the Premier League, before supporters became ‘customers’ (Conn, 1997: 158).

Although it is acknowledged that especially in the years leading up to World War One that although some football clubs did enjoy profitability (Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999: 142), money was not the motivating factor for board involvement. Dividends were restricted by the football authorities and as David Goldblatt explained, as I have previously noted, for those with money there were many better ways to invest and besides when the choice lay between paying a dividend and buying a new centre forward, there was little option (Goldblatt, 2007: 66).

The ownership of clubs changed little until the rule limiting dividends was rescinded in 1982. This made ownership more attractive to what King describes as the ‘new directors’ (King, 1998: 123). Arising from this decision, a handful of businessmen set about acquiring shares in their respective clubs, sometimes tracking down a multitude of small shareholders. According to King, Louis Edwards (Manchester United), David Dein (Arsenal), Ken Bates (Chelsea), and
Irving Scholar (Tottenham Hotspur) were the principle actors in this exercise aimed at gaining a controlling interest in the clubs (King, 1998: 124). However, Edwards’ move to acquire control of Manchester United was carried out, not in the 1980s, but in 1960s, as Matt Busby encouraged him. The Manchester United example is well described by Crick & Smith (1989) as they outline the lengths to which Louis Edwards went to find shareholders or more often, their descendants, to build a majority stake in the club. Edwards’ son would eventually make tens of millions from shares which had cost an aggregate of £35,000 in the early 1960s (Crick & Smith, 1989: 53-55). One sale of just 6.5% of the company’s stock yielded Martin Edwards £40.9million in 1999 (Guardian, 9 October 2009). Three of the four named had their shares sold at enormous personal gain, in Edwards’ case for the personal gain of his son. There may well have been an interest in or affection for the club but there was certainly an attraction in the investment for its own sake. Ken Bates acquired Chelsea from the family which had controlled the club since its foundation. The price was £1 and responsibility for debts of £1.5million. Twenty years later, in 2003, he sold his shares for £17.5million. Irving Scholar was Chairman of Tottenham Hotspur when they became the first football club to float on the UK stock market in 1983. The shares had been suspended and the club was in debt when he exited less than ten years later (McArdle, 2000: xxiii). He had attempted to diversify Tottenham into sports clothing and fashion, with a predictably disastrous outcome, so much that he departed leaving the club in a financial mess. Later, when Scholar attempted to take over Nottingham Forest, the company he was using became subject to a court hearing. Mr. Justice Hart declared, ‘the board were seen as a collection of out-of-town investors who invested for narrow financial motives’ (Conn, 2005). However, the infinitely more dramatic change in club ownership was yet to come. The arrival of a handful of opportunistic business people with mixed reputations was not the transformative change. In 2020, it can be stated that every club in the Premier League has changed hands this century, while fourteen of the twenty current league teams have had two changes of ownership since the introduction of the Premier League in 1992. Only six of the twenty teams remain under British control (Table 5). Foreign owners have also acquired clubs who have fallen from the Premier League or of whom it is believed they have potential to compete (again) at that level. These include Blackburn Rovers, owned by Venky’s, an Indian food company, QPR owned by Tony Fernandes.
of AirAsia, a budget airline, Cardiff City owned by Malaysian, Vincent Tan, and Reading which was acquired by Thai owners.

A look at where the current (2019-20) Premier League members were in the early 1990s and who owned them, is helpful in illustrating how far many of them were from new investment, local or foreign. Bournemouth were relegated to Division 3 in May 1990. Brighton were relegated to the same League in 1992 by which time it had been rebranded Division 2, upon the creation of the Premier League and the resultant re-structuring of the lower leagues. Burnley were the final winners of the old Fourth Division in season 1991-92. Leicester were relegated to the Third Division in May 1991. Watford were playing in the second tier and would slip further before making a recovery. Founding members of the Premier League included Arsenal, Aston Villa, Chelsea, Crystal Palace, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Norwich City, Sheffield United, Southampton, and Tottenham. Wolves were bought in 1990 by local wealthy developer and supporter, Jack Hayward. West Ham had been controlled by the Cearns family where successive members had been in the chair up to 1990. Terry Brown came onto the board in 1990, became chairman in 1992 and presided over the sale of West Ham in 2006. Newcastle United were under the control of local developer, John Hall, from 1992 when he bought out the families in which the shares had rested for decades. Liverpool Football club was owned by the Moores family (Littlewoods) until 2004. Chelsea FC was owned by the Mears family until Ken Bates bought the club for £1 in 1982. He floated it on the AIM in 1996. The lengthy unchanged position of virtually all clubs from their foundation until the late twentieth century bears out the widely held view that football ownership in those times was not about profits (Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999: 4; Goldblatt, 2006: 65). Nor is there any evidence of foreign investment or interest in English football clubs, until the reorganisation of football as a response to the Taylor Report of 1990.

In 2020, seven, or 35% of, Premier League clubs are controlled by people or companies who already own sports clubs in other countries, providing them with first-hand knowledge and experience of how professional sports functions as a business (Premier League Website). A further seven clubs are also in overseas ownership with only six Premier League clubs under British control. Of these, Newcastle United has been for sale for several years and the most
likely outcome is an eventual sale to a foreign entity. Norwich, another of the six may remain British owned but is less likely to remain in the Premier League as it sits firmly in the relegation zone after half of the 2019-2020 season.

The revenue generated by the Premier League and the opportunity for increased global activities make it unsurprising that Premier League teams have attracted outside investors (Flint, Plumley & Wilson, 2014). Premier League football clubs exist as businesses unlike their previous existence as Football League clubs. As explained, they are, in the majority of cases, foreign owned by entities, some of whom have experience of operating sports clubs as businesses. Clubs such as Chelsea and Manchester City are owned by billionaires, people who bear no comparison to the owners and boards of old. All of this inevitably affects the role of manager, a role now carried out in most cases within a structure which differs greatly from the past. The ownership changes are detailed here in Table 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Nationality of Controlling Shareholder(s)</th>
<th>Year of Acquisition</th>
<th>Name of Owner</th>
<th>Other Sports Interests</th>
<th>Year of Previous Ownership Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bournemouth</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Maxim Demin</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Tony Bloom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Mike Garlick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Roman Abramovich</td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal Palace</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Private Equity</td>
<td>New Jersey Devils Philadelphia 76ers</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>King Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mike Ashley</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich City</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Delia Smith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield United</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Abdullah bin Mosaad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>E.N.I.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watford</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Pozzo Family</td>
<td>Udinese F.C.</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ham</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>D.Sullivan D Gold</td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolves</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Fosun</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.6.4 Developments in the Management Function

I have described the changes in the make-up of the nationalities of players at the top of English football. The changes in ownership have also made the league more cosmopolitan. Similar changes to the nationalities of those managing/coaching in the Premier League are contrasted in Tables 7 and 8.

**Table 7: First Division Final League Table 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leeds United</td>
<td>Howard Wilkinson</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester United</td>
<td>Alex Ferguson</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Wednesday</td>
<td>Trevor Francis</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenal</td>
<td>George Graham</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>Peter Reid</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Graeme Souness</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston Villa</td>
<td>Ron Atkinson</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham Forest</td>
<td>Brian Clough</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield United</td>
<td>Dave Bassett</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal Palace</td>
<td>Steve Coppell</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens Park Rangers</td>
<td>Gerry Francis</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>Howard Kendall</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wimbledon</td>
<td>Joe Kinnear</td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>Ian Porterfield</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham Hotspur</td>
<td>Terry Venables</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Ian Branfoot</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>Joe Royle</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich City</td>
<td>Dave Stringer</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry City</td>
<td>Terry Butcher</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luton Town</td>
<td>Ray Harford</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notts County</td>
<td>Neil Warnock</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ham United</td>
<td>Billy Bonds</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I believe Table 8 provides evidence of a management trend in English football at the highest level. The figures, showing the level of pay of each club’s highest paid player, also illustrate the divergence in rates between the top clubs and those who form a second league within a league. In this chapter I refer to the influx of new owners and I highlight the change in nationality of managers/coaches and players in the English game since the introduction of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>Pep Guardiola</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester United</td>
<td>Jose Mourinho</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham Hotspur</td>
<td>Mauricio Pochetino</td>
<td>Argentinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Jurgen Klopp</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>Antonio Conte</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenal</td>
<td>Arsene Conte</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>Sean Dyche</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>*Sam Allardyce</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester City</td>
<td>Claude Puel</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>Rafa Benitez</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal Palace</td>
<td>Roy Hodgson</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournemouth</td>
<td>Eddie Howe</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ham United</td>
<td>*David Moyes</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watford</td>
<td>Marco Silva</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton &amp; H.A.</td>
<td>Chris Hughton</td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huddersfield Town</td>
<td>David Wagner</td>
<td>American/German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Mauricio Pelligrino</td>
<td>Argentinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea City</td>
<td>Carlos Carvahal</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke City</td>
<td>Paul Lambert</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bromwich Albion</td>
<td>Darren Moore</td>
<td>Jamaican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Both Allardyce and Moyes were replaced by foreign coaches at season's end.*
Premier League. Although this data is from 2016, at that time, and since then, the five clubs that could pay a top player more than £150K per week are all managed by foreign coaches. Of the seven clubs that, per this table, paid their top player a maximum of £70k per week, five are coached by British coaches. As well as a two-tier club structure within the Premier League, there would seem to be a two-tier managing/coaching structure wherein foreign coaches are the preferred choice of the wealthier clubs. They are perceived by owners as worthy of higher pay and responsibility for clubs with substantially higher payrolls. They command higher power chances than their native fellow coaches. It is a complete reversal of the prevailing views of club boards in the early twentieth century, when success abroad counted for nothing.

Table 9: Weekly payment to top-paid player at Premier League clubs 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club Name</th>
<th>£'000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arsenal</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston Villa</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournemouth</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal Palace</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man City</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Utd</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheff Utd</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tottenham</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watford</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ham</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolves</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Club websites & Capology.com
4.6.5 The European-Style of Management or the ‘Continental Model’

In this section, I deal with the impact on the management function of changes to club ownership as well as increased functional specialisation. I explain here how the change affects the power chances of the football manager as his role becomes Head Coach amid a process of functional democratisation.

A 2010 study titled ‘Managers, directors and trust in professional football opens as follows:

The growing influence of directors and owners of professional football clubs in England is currently attracting considerable media attention. In recent years, the influx of foreign owners has had important implications for both the role and security of the football manager. With experience of the (non-football) business world and a new attitude to the financing of the game, some club owners with wealth and ownership rights are seeking to make many of the critical decisions at football clubs (Kelly & Harris, 2010: 489).

They go on to write the following:

A number of Premiership (sic) clubs have moved towards a more ‘European-style’ of management. Within this European-style management structure it is common practice for owners and directors of football clubs to sign and release players without much input from the manager (Kelly & Harris, 2010: 489). (Note, the Premier League competition was originally named the Premiership).

The ‘continental model’ was a term which came into use in the 1990s in English football. It was used to describe a management structure that prevailed in football clubs across Europe but not in Britain. The person described as the manager in English football had considerable authority and many functions. In European football, his equivalent was called a head coach whose functions were almost always limited to responsibility for the club’s first team. There are explanations as to how the European model or structure, finally, began to be adopted in English football in the twenty first century. Managers such as Alex Ferguson and the others from the 1960s to the 1990s through whom clubs were identified, enjoyed substantial autonomy within their clubs. Alex Ferguson’s actions were neither unique nor unprecedented. Brian Clough, in the 1980s, had banned the journalist from the local newspaper whose job it was to report on Nottingham Forest. Clough was responding to an
unfavourable report on his team’s performance. Across Europe where clubs employed coaches rather than managers, they had Directors of Football whose responsibilities included player recruitment. In England, this was the single area which drew the highest level of resistance. A change to player recruitment or the management of the transfer process in English football was anathema to the beliefs of indigenous managers (Kelly & Harris, 2010).

As new owners took control of the top clubs like Chelsea, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Aston Villa, Sunderland and Manchester United, (later, Manchester City & Bournemouth), the manager’s role changed as he became part of a wider management structure. The change was not the same for every manager as some clubs moved more quickly than others towards the continental model for football club management but despite the unevenness, the process was underway because changed structures were desirable to new owners in an environment where clubs were now profitable businesses and where stricter controls needed to apply.

In 2010, after the club was acquired by Fenway Sports Group, Liverpool introduced a new system for assessing and buying players, wherein the manager had a much-reduced input. It was the most publicised example of a fundamental change in how transfers were conducted. Manager Brendan Rodgers was one of five members of this transfer committee that worked together identifying transfer targets (The Independent, 20 February 2016). The Liverpool Echo in 2019 took a retrospective look at the innovation. ‘How Liverpool’s transfer committee went from laughing stock to most respected in Europe’ is the headline for an article which describes the chaotic relationship between Rodgers and the committee. Allowing the manager insist on the signing of Christian Benteke from Aston Villa for £32.5m was a mistake. The committee, chaired by Sporting Director, Michael Edwards, purchased another forward around the same time, spending £29m to bring Brazilian, Roberto Firmino, from Hoffenheim. The Liverpool Echo describes a period of confusion, with Benteke a failure who contributed to Rodgers sacking in October 2015, while Firmino who was not a choice of the manager went on to huge success. The relationship between the manager and the committee was described as fractious and only changed with the appointment of Jurgen Klopp to replace Rodgers. Klopp showed greater understanding and belief in a system in which he was a part but which the Sporting Director would control. The committee included the key scouting figures at Liverpool. The
transfer targets would now be identified through the use of data as opposed to the time-worn English system which mostly consisted of the manager’s hunch or judgement. The Echo argues Liverpool have made a series of successful purchases under the guidance of Sporting Director, Michael Edwards, and with Jurgen Klopp declaring he has a veto over purchases, which he has not used as there has been accord in relation to the committee’s decisions. The model was new to England. Brendan Rodgers clearly was not enamoured of the concept. By season 2019-20, the majority of clubs in the Premier League had appointed Sporting Directors or Directors of Football or Technical Directors, all of which amounted to the same thing. The only exceptions are Newcastle United and Manchester United. At the Manchester club, Ed Woodward is Executive Vice-Chairman and Matt Judge is Chief of Corporate Development. The Mail Online described Judge as the club’s de facto chief negotiator. He is described as having joined United in 2012 and having been entrusted by Woodward with all transfer and contract negotiations since 2016. He deals with contract renewals from the multi-million earners at the top to academy prospects signing their first professional terms (mailonline.co.uk, 17 June 2019). In September 2019, in an interview with Swedish newspaper, Aftonbladet, the agent for Victor Lindelof, Manchester United’s Swedish player, described Judge as the ‘transfer manager’ of the English club (The 42.ie). The agent may have had the incorrect title but he did know at least one of the functions carried out by the club executive.

The question most frequently asked at their regular press conferences of managers/coaches of clubs deemed to be underperforming, is whether certain rumours of transfer targets are correct. In 2019, this was frequently followed by the question of who decides. In nine of the twenty clubs, the person who would have previously been described as the manager is now called Head Coach (Independent.co.uk, 14 August 2019).

The manager/head coach figure remains the focal point for much of the reportage and general media attention. But new owners at the most expensively funded clubs have taken away some of the functions which had become embedded in the football manager’s life, and devolved specific aspects to others in the hierarchy or to committees of which the manager/head coach may be just one member. The process of change is not yet complete
but, clearly, it is underway. It is a process in which some loss of function has affected the manager/head coach. Once again, the change is uneven with some clubs moving ahead of others.

There is an explanation for why Liverpool F.C. may have been a leader in this trend towards change. The Club is owned by FSG (Fenway Sports Group) owners of the Boston Red Sox Baseball Club. The shared ownership places both clubs under the control of John Henry, a man who featured in the Michael Lewis (2004) book, Moneyball, as Mr. Henry sought a more data-based approach to the recruitment of baseball players, an approach which required consultation and debate before each new signing was agreed. Lewis’s book featuring the overachievement of the Oakland ‘A’s baseball team was influential in changes in player assessment and recruiting across U.S. baseball and other sports. As may be seen in Table 6, three owners also own football clubs in other countries while five of the current Premier League owners have involvement in professional American Sports clubs of one type or another. It should also be noted that American Sports organisations have always taken a different approach to the business of player trading from that in English football. Lewis (2004) and Payton & Yaeger (2000) are just two books in which the practice in the U.S. is made clear. The General Manager hires the head coach and, in consultation with the coach, he decides which players he will seek to acquire or move out. The General Manager is, however, the one carrying out the function. As an example, the New York Post describes a General Manager, Dave Gettleman, of the New York Giants American Football team and formerly of the Carolina Panthers, and explores his history in what amounts to their transfer market (New York Post, 17 April 2020).

The powerful Alex Ferguson-type figure is no more. The new structure removes or reduces power and function from what is becoming the ‘head coach’ figure. A look at precisely how the continental model looks in a continental club may be had via the organisation chart of a top Italian football club (Image 2). This image is the organisation chart for Serie ‘A’ club Fiorentina, from the 2018-2019 season. It is an example of the ‘continental model,’ Vincenzo Montella is the first team coach or manager. He reports to Daniele Prade the Sporting Director as do Chief Scout, Roberto Ripa and Enzo Vergine who is responsible for the Youth and
Women’s sectors. It is significant that the Chief Scout reports to Prade and not to Montella. The scouting function would traditionally have come under the manager in England. It is also significant that Montella’s functions are limited and that his position is where it is rather than much higher up the chart. Joe Barone, the Operations Manager of the club, appears to have no involvement with Montella, something which would suggest Montella is working in a ‘silo’ structure, with no involvement or no perceived need for such in the general operations of the club.

The following are examples of how the change has been made in some English clubs. The takeover of Chelsea by Roman Abramovich in 2003 was the most significant acquisition at that time, of a top English club. Goldblatt (2006) describes what happened. The Russian oligarch ‘cleared the club’s debts, covered its losses to give it an annual income in effect twice that of Manchester United, and unleashed a transfer budget of almost £300 million over three years’. Chelsea’s most recent managerial appointment was Frank Lampard in 2019. Club director Marina Granovskaia said; ‘It gives us great pleasure to welcome Frank back to Chelsea as head coach’ (Telegraph, 4 July, 2019). Granovskaia is responsible for all transfer negotiations and is regarded within football as an extremely capable negotiator, having taken on that role shortly after Abramovich acquired the club in 2003 (Bleacher Report 2018). (Note: Bleacher Report is a website that focuses on sports and sports culture. Founded in 2005, it was acquired by Turner Broadcasting System in 2012 for $175m).

Arsene Wenger was Arsenal manager from 1996 until 2018. He was replaced by Unai Emery whose title was Head Coach, the same title given to Mikel Arteta who replaced Emery in late 2019 (Guardian, 19 December, 2019). Arsenal’s ownership changed in August 2018 when Stan Kroenke, the billionaire owner of several U.S. sports franchises, most notably the L.A. Rams and the Denver Nuggets, bought out his rival shareholder to take control of Arsenal (Guardian, 8 August, 2018).

ENIC took Tottenham private in 2011 having previously acquired control of the listed company. The company also owns football clubs in Italy and Switzerland and has followed the European model in recent years with Head Coaches replacing what was once the manager. The Telegraph (26 October 2008) confirmed Harry Redknapp as Tottenham’s choice as new
manager. By the time he was replaced in 2012, the title had changed to Head Coach as Andre Villas Boas was appointed (Irish Times, 3 July 2012). The title Head Coach has now been established at the club as the following appointees all carried that title: Tim Sherwood, (Telegraph, 24 December 2013); Mauricio Pochettino, (Tottenham Hotspur Website, 27 May, 2014), and Jose Mourinho, (Tottenham Hotspur Website, 20 November, 2019).

Watford Football Club was acquired in 2012 by the Pozzo family that already owned the top level Italian club, Udinese Calcio, based in the north eastern city of Udine. The previous year it had been reported that Sean Dyche was taking up the role of manager at Watford (Independent, 21 June 2011). In July 2012, the club appointed Gianfranco Zola to replace Dyche but the title now became Head Coach (watfordfc.com, 7 July, 2012) and the job has remained Head Coach through the several changes in personnel up to and including Nigel Pearson, appointed in late 2019 (Telegraph, 6 December, 2019).

Wolverhampton Wanderers (Wolves) first introduced a Head Coach rather than a manager in 2013, encouraged, it would appear, to make this structural change after unsuccessful managerial appointments:

Terry Connor (128 days), Stale Solbakken (190 Days) and Dean Saunders (121 days) all had short stints as manager as the club suffered successive relegations before Wolves followed neighbours West Bromwich Albion’s lead by switching to a head coach model. Kenny Jackett was appointed as the club’s first Head Coach in June 2013, working with head of football development and recruitment, Kevin Thelwell (BBC Sport, 5 May, 2020).

Apart from West Bromwich Albion, Leeds United is probably the most high-profile club in the second tier of English football. The club is owned by the Italian Aser Group Holdings (90%) and 49ers Enterprises (10%), the latter being the owners of the San Francisco 49ers American Football Team. Leeds United also operates the European model with a Director of Football, Victor Orta, and a Head Coach, the veteran, vastly experienced Argentinian coach, Marcello Bielsa (Leeds United website). With nine of the twenty Premier league teams having switched from appointing a ‘manager’ to having a ‘Head Coach’ with a Director of Football, the change has progressed through the 2010s. Clubs that still use the term ‘manager’ include Liverpool and Manchester United. I have already explained in some detail how the business of player
trading is conducted at those two clubs and it is very much the European model, notwithstanding what appears to be a mere delay in the use of the term Head Coach. Manchester City, similarly, appears committed to having manager, Pep Guardiola, concentrated on preparation and performance of the first team while the Director of Football deals with broader matters including player transfers (*Manchester City website*).

![Image 2: Organisation Chart for Serie ‘A’ club Fiorentina](La Gazettal Dello Sport)

Note: The chart shows Signor Comisso, the Chairman, at the top with Gandini the CEO reporting to him. On the left side are Barone, the Operations Director reporting directly to Gandini and below Barone is the former star player, Batistuta, who reports to Barone and whose function is that of Club Ambassador. Antognoni is described as having responsibility for all matters sporting while he has Prade (The Sporting Director) reporting to him. It may be inferred that Prade deals with playing matters while Antognoni’s responsibilities extend beyond that to other areas such as facilities. Prade has three people reporting to him, the Head Coach, Montella, Vergine who has responsibility for youth football and women's football and the Chief Scout Ripa. The latter would always have reported to the Manger/Head Coach in the traditional British structure.
Explaining the Changes in the Management Function: Functional Democratisation

The role began as one with limited functions and responsibilities, as the incumbent was called the ‘secretary’. It became ‘secretary-manager’ of necessity. As the job developed to become ‘manager’, the power chances of the protagonist improved substantially. Having reached a peak in the 1960s and 1970s, it took a series of unpredictable, some tragic, developments in the game of football, to create the movement of recent years, still incomplete, with Head Coaches operating in a narrower and arguably a better-defined role. However, it is a role in which this functionary’s power chances relative to both owners and players have declined. The process, as always, is an uneven one, but it appears to be growing as part of a wider change in the figuration of professional football. The management model, to which clubs have moved, has undoubtedly altered the role. Within the figuration of English professional football, a process of functional democratisation has occurred. The manager/head coach has become more interdependent with other functionaries. The Director of Football position has a high level of interdependency with the head coach. The head coach continues to have to control and interact with a team of experts in specific roles such as Post Match Video Analyst and Opposition Analyst, two of the newer specialist functions listed on the Liverpool FC website. Functional specialisation continues to develop with ever increasing interdependencies and growing functional democratisation. This is the modern professional football club in England in 2020. Having looked at the function from its inception in the nineteenth century, it would appear that the change during the most recent decade is indicative of what Elias called a civilising spurt. On that subject, he had the following to say: ‘What determines the nature and degree of such civilising spurts is always the extent of interdependencies, the level of the division of functions, and within it, the structure of these functions themselves (Elias, 1994: 379).
Table 10: Highest Paid Premier League Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Club</th>
<th>£m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardiola</td>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pochettino</td>
<td>Tottenham Hotspur</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solskjaer</td>
<td>Manchester United</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klopp</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellegrini</td>
<td>West Ham United</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasenhuttl</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emery</td>
<td>Arsenal</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampard</td>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodgers</td>
<td>Leicester City</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howe</td>
<td>Bournemouth</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.sportbible.com
4.7 Conclusion: Functional Democratisation Processes and the Management Function

In this chapter, I have documented how the management function in professional football developed. As I explained, two social processes which have shaped this function are functional democratisation at the figuration of football and at the level of nation states.

Again, as I have illustrated, this has been an uneven and fragmented process. Nonetheless, the overall direction, despite counter-spurts, has been towards greater functional democratisation. I discuss this in more detail in my concluding chapter.

When football was first codified and when the earliest games were played, no such figure as ‘the manager’ existed. The advent of professionalism and the astonishing rise in popularity of football brought new challenges for the committees who ran clubs. They needed to become...
limited liability companies in order to raise money for the newly required stadiums while they
needed someone to take responsibility for the day-to-day operations. For the latter
requirement, secretaries were appointed based on their assumed ability to deal with the
administrative aspects. The secretaries, while better educated than many of the footballers
were nevertheless held in low esteem and their power chances relative to boards of the clubs
were most unfavourable.

The illustrations I have inserted at the end of each time-period in Chapter Four show the
relatively low number of interdependencies at the early stages of the function’s development.
The most important interdependencies for secretaries as they became secretary-managers
were with the players and with the owners, their employers. It is the extent to which power
shifts within these figurations, the extent to which the manager’s power chances relative to
others changed, that has been at the core of this study.

In the first part of my data chapter (1863 – 1915), I explain how the function of looking after
professional players was allocated to club secretaries, people who had been employed for
their clerical or administrative capabilities. While there are diverse suggestions as to why
responsibility for the team was allocated to the secretary it would appear the most likely
reason is the middle-class directors had to prioritise their own businesses and professions and
consequently needed someone, effectively to take responsibility for certain club matters. In
the literature on this period, we read how the great majority of these secretaries had little
real input or even involvement in team matters. The exceptions were usually described as
having either an ability akin to personnel management or on the rare occasion, a knowledge
of football and footballers, something which proved useful in the earliest days of constructing
teams. We also learn that in a new business, virtually all those involved and in particular the
secretary, (later the secretary-manager) were not subject to any form of training programme
but had to learn as they went along. Their power chances were limited in relation to the
boards that appointed them. Their interdependencies were relatively few, the principal ones
being with the board, the players, and perhaps a trainer. The fact that almost universally they
did not have control over team selection meant they had not yet developed a favourable
power balance relative to the players.
As we look at the second period of this study (1919 – 1939), we learn a little more about how the function developed. In a small minority of cases, team selection was devolved to what was now being called the secretary-manager. The role, increasingly, was being filled by former players. The function shifted towards player management. The continuing unevenness of the process was evident as certain clubs appointed secretary-managers and then dispensed with the role entirely reverting to having a board member take responsibility. However, in this period, we observe some increases in functional specialisation. The first coaches appear. Groundsmen assume some importance and physiotherapists and team doctors join those with whom the secretary-manager is interdependent. Boards of directors represented by Club Chairmen, continue to hold a power advantage over the secretary-manager. Players are restricted in their power chances by virtue of the maximum wage rule as well as the ‘retain and transfer system’ which restricts their freedom of movement. Secretary-managers and in some cases, those now titled managers, held a power advantage over the players. Football was receiving more media, principally newspaper, coverage and the manager was gaining a slightly higher profile in the 1930s. This higher profile and the perception of greater knowledge enhanced the power chances of the manager, relative to players in particular.

The third time period in this study is from 1946 – 1963 and we witness increased interdependencies and more media focus on managers. In the example in my graphic at the end of that section (page 130), we see a youth team manager and scouts as additions to the number of specialists in a club. Clubs were, in many cases, fielding second teams and these would also have required managers and coaches. The role was becoming more complex, the interdependencies more numerous. Boards continued to hold a power balance over managers as did managers over players. Managers were increasingly allocated media space and as I have identified, increasingly they were being shown as the people responsible for new signings, especially high-profile signings. The converse of this is seen in the example I provided in the Introduction chapter to this thesis: A chairman has hired a manager believing he will bring success and not long afterwards he is being questioned by journalists after he has fired the manager. The precariousness of the role was never more evident in this period as boards regularly dispensed with managers, once success seemed unlikely. We see a higher profile, an increase in power balance with players but a slight decrease in power chances with
boards and chairmen, where there is a growing emphasis on success and lack of patience by those in control, coupled with increasing functional specialisation.

The period from the early 1960s through to the early 1990s marks the time when managers appeared to reach peak power in relation to boards and players. The 1960s and 1970s saw an increase in the prominence of the manager figure. The manager became the conduit between the club and the media. Managers became the first TV pundits and developed ghosted newspaper columns as a means of enhancing their profiles as well as their incomes. Increasingly they were running more functions within clubs rather than simply the first team, but the latter was the most critical part of the job. In this era, two of the most successful managers publicly declared boards to be unimportant. But careers still depended on success of the first team as boards continued to hold a power balance over managers. The process of functional specialisation continued with ever increasing interdependencies. It had taken until 1963 for the England team manager to have full control over team selection. Club managers were, by now, in control of this function. They also had considerable power when it came to player transfers, in and out of the club. This was seen by managers as a very important function with the view expressed more than once that managers should be given complete control over all matters related to the team and then held responsible.

In the period commencing in 1992, changes in the structure of professional football would have a significant influence over the management function, as would the continued increase in interdependencies with the advance of functional specialisation. Management of a football club or of a Premier League team had become more complex. There was more functional specialisation in coaching, in analysis, in medicine and previously unheard-of areas such as nutrition. Ownership changes at all of the top clubs brought greater intricacy to the management function. Owners with knowledge of sports businesses or franchises in other countries meant there would likely be change in how English clubs were run. The activity of buying and selling players had become much more complex. More complex technological systems were introduced in assessing players. The profiles of target purchases became more detailed as owners wanted a more scientific approach to selection and an age profile of target players. They sought to increase the chances of having a long-term investment or a high re-
sale value. This contrasts with the manager’s ‘gut-feeling and instinct’ described by Kelly (2010: 235), which at that time had been the dominant ‘method’ for assessing players. Agents had come centre stage and negotiation with them proved time consuming. All of these changes represent more functional specialisation, more interdependencies and an advance in functional democratisation. One outcome of this is that the role of manager became increasingly the role of head coach. This involved a process of de-functionalisation as aspects of the job are re-allocated away from the manager. A new function, Director of Football or Sporting Director was created in line with the practice in European countries where the head coach becomes responsible for the preparation and performance of the first team in a significantly more focused role.

In addition to the processual changes within football, a broader process of functional democratisation in British society has also shaped the management function, something which I will now explain.
Chapter Five - Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

In my introduction to this thesis, I referred to what I considered a strange discovery that, amid the biographies, histories and various academic papers written on association football, it appears no one has attempted to track and explain how the management function has developed from its early creation to its current iteration. Managers were described. Football, as a game, as a business, as a job of work, was described and in some instances also explained. However, what I found written about this one central and important function was either present-oriented or merely tangential. Now through the application of figurational sociology, I have endeavoured to make a contribution to the knowledge of the management function in soccer and its long-term processual development. I believe I have illustrated how functional democratisation at the level of the football figuration shaped the management function in football over a hundred and fifty years. In this final chapter, I link this development to what I consider a parallel process which saw functional democratisation at the level of nations. In doing so I use a term coined in relation to football matters, ‘predictable cultural insularity’ and I consider this phenomenon in a much broader context. I examine the thoughts and behaviours which reflect this idea both in the development of football and the functions within the game but also at the level of the state, Great Britain, and its place in the world. Citing Norbert Elias from 1965, I explain the lag between the demise both of football in its homeland and the demise of the British Empire, and the realisation on the part of those directly affected, that this fall has occurred. Finally, I address another development which has mystified some but which becomes easier to understand when considered beside the explanation for functional democratisation within football and at state levels. That development is Brexit.

In dealing with change over such a relatively long period, it is worth keeping in mind Elias’s reminder that at a particular time, during particular events, those involved were unaware or unsure of the outcome. He contends that we tend to review points in history as if the opposite applied and everyone knew what will (and did) happen next. It is worth reminding ourselves
that key decisions quite frequently led to unforeseen outcomes. Often looking retrospectively at long-term developments, we tend to reason that the developments followed a logical and intended path. Elias warns us that this is not the case. I would argue that the function of management in football, as it is today, provides an example of long-term change. Clearly, it is not the outcome of a singular plan by any one person but is rather the unintended and unplanned outcome of the intentions and interests of many.

The interdependencies in which this figure is concerned are critical in that it is how they change over time that explains the subject of this work. Elias (1994) set out to explain how the structure of society, especially Western society, continuously changes and how within that structure the behaviours, the habitus of people also changes. To conduct this study, I found it necessary to view the function of management within the context both of the football world and of the wider society. Elias has explained with considerable clarity the importance of the need for human beings to understand interdependency and power structures within human relations.

5.2. Predictable cultural insularity

5.2.1. Background

In discussing the work of Perry and Malcolm (2004) I wrote that their description of tensions between governing bodies and other entities in cricket were not unique to that sport but could also be seen in a study of association football, particularly as some English clubs began to see the need to develop relationships outside of Britain. These tensions were interwoven with a wider process involving Britain’s power relations with other nation states.

David Goldblatt (2006) has written a hugely ambitious history of world football in which he both explores and explains much about the game, its origins, its development, and its growth around the world. He reports the FA’s unwillingness to become part of the world body (FIFA) and various wider international involvement opportunities which he believes were spurned to the ultimate detriment of English football. In describing the advent of the European Cup competition for clubs in 1956 he decries Chelsea’s non-participation in the inaugural contest as an expression of ‘predictable cultural insularity’ (Goldblatt, 2006: 443). He is not alone in
identifying insularity as a problem. Others including Walvin (1994), Wagg (1984), and Fox (2003) use similar terms to describe what they viewed as the mentality of those who ruled English football for much of its history.

In many ways, they mirror the ideas presented by Martin Wiener in his influential, if not controversial work, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980*. I refer to, and address, Wiener’s work in detail for two reasons: first, as I suggested, due to certain empirical observations that have symmetries with Wiener: second, the potential overlap and differences with Elias and Dunning’s (1986) analysis. Although not referencing football, Wiener’s (1981) work reveals some key societal developments which in themselves are worth contemplating when considering developments in English football. In addition, while there are some symmetries with Eliasian ideas about the relationship between the position of a state, in respect to other states with which it is interdependent, and the thinking and attitudes of its people, Elias’s approach appears more developed and nuanced. Elias declared, ‘An essential phase of the civilising process was concluded at exactly the time when the consciousness of civilisation, the consciousness of their own behaviour and its embodiments in science, technology or art began to spread over the whole nations of the West (2000:43).

Wiener’s thesis is based on both the contemporaneous and the retrospective view of the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century where England led the world in industrialisation, in manufacturing, in urbanisation and in economic dynamism. His book ‘explores sentiments, attitudes, and values among the English elite, though that elite is very broadly defined, in the conviction that here lies the most important key to unlocking the puzzles of modern British history’ (Wiener, 1981: x).

In essence, what Wiener was doing was bringing together in one study, attitudes, sentiments and social developments, all of which, he accepts, have been identified separately in studies on literature, art and architecture, society, politics and economics. He makes no reference to such attitudes and sentiments prevailing in sport but my analysis suggests some elements may be witnessed in a study of English football, though as I argue Elias’s approach provides a more convincing explanation for this. Elias himself described the importance of sport in the
earlier eighteenth century ‘as it formed part and parcel of the pacification of the English upper classes’ (Elias, 1986: 14). His thoughts in relation to the civilising process are also relevant:

An essential phase of the civilising process was concluded at exactly the time when the consciousness of civilisation, the consciousness of their own behaviour and its embodiments in science, technology or art began to spread over the whole nations of the West (Elias, 2000: 43).

The substance of Weiner’s argument is that ‘in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a cultural reaction against the disruptive force of the industrial revolution “inoculated” the rapidly growing middle and upper middle-classes with values and attitudes resistant to economic innovation and growth’ (pp. xv-xvi). There is no shortage of evidence that such values and attitudes existed. There was suspicion and unease with economic development, even when such development was bringing riches to Britain, the then leader among nations in successful manufacturing and exporting. Wiener declares it ‘a historic irony that the nation that gave birth to the industrial revolution, and exported it throughout the world, should have become embarrassed at the measure of its success’ (Wiener, 1981: 5).

Wiener addresses what he saw as the antipathy towards modernisation in the form of industrial development and the urbanisation that it spawned. He describes the domestic history of a nineteenth century England as ‘a nation, or at least an elite, at war with itself’ (Wiener, 1981: 7). In Britain, there was what amounted to an encounter between industry and aristocracy. The nobility and landed gentry believed in an English way of life which included a reverence for old buildings, for the village life, for the idyllic countryside.

The consolidation of a “gentrified” bourgeois culture, particularly the rooting of pseudo aristocratic attitudes and values in upper middle-class educated opinion, shaped an unfavourable context for economic endeavour………Industrialists themselves were crucially affected in developing their view of the world and their role in it. They too gravitated toward what they saw as aristocratic values and styles of life, to the detriment more often or not, of their economic effectiveness (Wiener, 1981: 10).

Wiener claims the importance of the Victorian period in shaping social life and beliefs in Britain cannot be overstated. The public school and its social importance became firmly established in this period. The traditional upper classes of nobility and landed gentry were
joined by the successful business owners who aspired to be their equals, purchasing country
estates and frequently spending more time on rural pursuits than on their businesses, their
sources of wealth.

At the moment of its triumph, the entrepreneurial class turned its
energies to reshaping itself in the image of the class it was
supplanting......The gentrification of the Victorian middle-classes
proceeded as well through a second social trend of the period: the
rise of the modern professions. Professional men – lawyers, doctors,
public officials, journalists, professors, and men of letters – came into
their own during the reign of Victoria (Wiener, 1981: 14).

The growth of the professions was striking, as was the willingness of their number to detach
themselves from what was described as ‘the rule of the marketplace.’ Different categories
became formally organised; civil engineers in 1818, architects in 1834, pharmacists in 1841
and actuaries in 1858. Wiener cites the historian, Harold Perkin who argued, ‘once
established, the professional man could generally rely on a steady income not subject to the
same mutual competition as rent, profit and wages’ (Wiener, 1981: 15). Most importantly, in
the context of an explanation for the decline of the industrial spirit, these people formed a
professional category that expanded quite rapidly, well ahead of general population growth.
The expansion of this educated professional category contributed to the reduction among
this cohort entering industry.

The hankering for a traditional English way of life became more established and widespread.
Factories and production for profit increasingly were disparaged. Meanwhile, education
focused on the classics to the exclusion (where at all possible) of science related subjects.
Science was ‘linked in the public mind with industry and this damaged its respectability in
upper-class eyes.’ This belief that the Greek and Roman classics were essential elements of
the education of young gentlemen, while science related subjects were unimportant or
peripheral, was pervasive (Wiener, 1981: 18). In referencing this work by Wiener, I am striving
to highlight an English mentality, a pervasive characteristic or habitus which helps explain the
development of English football as it does the loss of the industrial spirit. The symmetries with
both Elias and Dunning’s work and Dunning and Sheard’s are interesting.
For instance, Wiener suggests that, not only did the public schools cultivate a culture in which industry was looked down upon, but that the important universities also perpetuated this culture. ‘The ethos of later-Victorian Oxbridge, a fusion of aristocratic and professional values, stood self-consciously in opposition to the spirit of Victorian business and industry.’ The antipathy towards commerce and industry seems to have been pervasive. Those who ran the universities were said to have evaluated any subject by assessing its usefulness to business. ‘In their view almost no subject which could be turned to the benefit of business deserved university recognition’ (Wiener, 1981: 23). There are patterns which Wiener observed which are supported by social histories of British society. For example, Royle, describing the 1902 Education Act, says it enshrined the idea of a liberal education for everyone. This sanctification of the liberal education was done at the expense of applied science which Royle describes as being ‘for those who could not understand Latin.’ He continues, emphasising that he sees this approach as a grave error: ‘Technology was devalued in schools among teachers, pupils and parents. Upward social mobility meant movement into professions and public service, away from the dirt and commercialism of industry’ (Royle, 1997: 400). As late as 1997, he confirms his agreement with the argument put forward by Professor Wiener. This argument is that:

The British educational system in its entirety – and not just Oxbridge and the public schools – has remained infused with a value system which has percolated down from the public schools and continues to accept a traditional liberal education as the ideal (Royle, 1997: 400).

One may look at English society as described by Wiener and see a yearning for the past, for an idyllic rural rather than a ghastly urban way of life. However, one may also see an unwillingness to adapt to change, to dismiss rather than explore the changes in the wider world:

England in the later nineteenth century presented the striking picture of an immensely powerful and wealthy landed elite presiding over a waning rural economy. It was an elite powerful and wealthy enough not to feel critically menaced by the decline of agriculture (Wiener, 1981: 48).
An example of a focal point for the preservation of the ‘old’ and antipathy towards the ‘new’ is seen in the published views on architecture. This is something identified by Norbert Elias in a 1960s publication, to which I will return. A typical opinion was that of the designer, William Morris, who in 1877 was appealing for the formation of a preservation society whose role would be the preservation of old buildings and the protection against that which Morris hated; innovative constructions that foreshadowed twentieth-century architecture. The entity which delivered Morris’s wishes was The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB), from which in time would come the Georgian Group and the Victorian Society with ‘the protectionist sentiment eventually reaching the Edwardian period’ (Wiener, 1981: 69).

Wiener has described the belief in their collective superiority among the upper classes, the nobility and landed gentry, as well as among a cohort of the most popular writers, over those who pursued a life in industry and business. He has explained the antipathy bordering on hatred of urbanisation and the longing for the countryside, for the villages and of course, for the old buildings to which nothing new could possibly compare. The dismissal of industry and manufacturing carried into the twentieth century. The Poet Laureate of 1929-30, Robert Southey declared: ‘The immediate and home effect of the manufacturing system, carried on as it now is upon the great scale, is to produce physical and moral evil, in proportion to the wealth it creates’ (Wiener, 1981: 28-29).

The problem with Wiener’s analysis is that he locks in to a particular attitude and thought process that prevailed in England at a certain time and he treats these conditions as if they were permanent. The processual nature of behaviours, as noted by Elias, requires us to look at how both the country and the prevailing thought processes changed over time.

5.2.2 Britain, the World and Football Management

Dunning (1999: 126) argued that,

The English football figuration has to be seen as located both within the wider (and changing) figurations which constitute British society and an international football figuration which is rapidly becoming increasingly global in scope. The club owners, for example, are either directly, or indirectly via sponsorship arrangements, locked
increasingly into the global operations of powerful multinational companies.

Indeed, Elias goes further in declaring that studies of sport which are not studies of society are studies out of context (Elias, 1986; 10).

We should also see this football figuration as constituting a higher tier figuration involving Britain and other nation-states. This, and Dunning’s argument which informs it, is important because the management function and any explanation of how it has developed cannot be taken in isolation from the wider society or the context of the football world and how both developed. I believe it is reasonable to contend that the nation that gave birth to modern professional football, more specifically those charged with the game’s administration, developed attitudes which would prove unhelpful in terms of the game’s evolution and progress in that very nation. And in line with Wiener’s description of the source of such attitudes, it is noteworthy that, of the original Football Association committee, seven members were former public-school boys.

Many of today’s sports and professional football in particular had their origins in England, to such an extent that when a governing body was being established it could be called, and is to this day called, The Football Association. Other nations would add their own country’s name as they created similar associations such as The Scottish Football Association or The Football Association of Ireland but because they were the first, there is only one Football Association. Such was this unquestioned leadership in the invention and codification of various sports that Norbert Elias could state:

As is well known, England was the cradle and the loving ‘mother’ of sport......It appears that English technical terms referring to this field might become the common possession of all nations in the same way as Italian technical terms in the field of music. It is probably rare that a piece of culture has migrated with so few changes from one country to another (Elias, 1986: 107).

There are a number of examples of how those who ruled football demonstrated similar attitudes to the attitudes of those who ruled wider society. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of national football associations in Europe believed it was time to form an
international federation. The primary reasons were to enable more international games and to tidy up some still minor discrepancies in the rules being applied across different countries. They also wanted to ensure there would be just one recognised association in each country. The initial informal dialogue had involved Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, and Denmark. They also wished to have England as part of any new international federation or association. When the call from Europe came in May 1902 to attend a meeting to discuss the formation of an international body, it was in the form of a letter to FA secretary, Frederick Wall, from the secretary of the Dutch football association (NVB). Wall’s reply was dated 14th November 1904. It was a firm rejection of any involvement by the FA and questioned the need for any such international body. The Federation International de Football Associations (FIFA) was founded in 1904 in Paris without English participation (Lanfranchi et al., 2004: 59-61).

The FA held distinct views on involvement with other countries. Wagg described their disagreements with Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) as stemming from ‘the highhanded distaste of the FA for discussing with foreigners any aspect of a game they believed Britain to have invented’ (Wagg, 1984: 13). Wagg makes an interesting observation, later echoed by Wiener, as he describes the circumstances in England around the time FIFA was rejected. There was a continuing commitment to Free Trade by the English ruling class. As a result, no protective agreements were forged with other countries. Wagg believes international football matches might have been a helpful cultural accompaniment to such trade arrangements.

He continues: Moreover, the countries where football was popular were generally Britain’s trading partners outside the Empire – in Europe and Latin America – and ‘trade’ in the blinkered perceptions of the FA, as in the elite circles of late Victorian and Edwardian England, was a pejorative term (Wagg, 1984: 14).

However, it must be remembered that in the early years of the twentieth century, the British Empire was at its peak and Britain was in a position of power relative to its trading partners across the globe. Those governing English football are likely to have seen foreign involvement as a nuisance. This is understandable as I will later illustrate, considering the habitus of those governing English football at the time. And that habitus of the leading figures in the English
football world changed little from the early twentieth century when participation in FIFA was rejected, through the 1930s when England choose not to participate in three successive World Cups. Goldblatt (2006) identifies a failure on the part of the FA from the late nineteenth century, to look outward and links it to the politics of the time.

Goldblatt writes:

The great wave of adventurous, outward-looking Britons who took football all over the world in the late nineteenth century were not complemented at home by an adventurous outward-looking football hierarchy. Indeed, the peculiar conditions of Britain’s early football development and the nation’s relationship with the international politics of Europe produced quite the opposite: an elite that tended towards isolationism and a barely masked but overweening arrogance (Goldblatt, 2006: 230).

Those who governed English football followed this ‘closed mind’ syndrome when it came to participating in international competition or in acknowledging achievements by English coaches and managers who succeeded on foreign fields.

Jimmy Hogan is the best known of the English football figures to succeed overseas – the most famous of Goldblatt’s ‘outward-looking Britons’. Hogan was born in 1882 in Nelson, Lancashire. He played professional football for several clubs most notably Burnley, Fulham and Bolton Wanderers where his career was ended by injury in 1913. The injury which finally defeated him had been a problem for several years during which time Hogan took breaks from playing to concentrate on the little-known practice of coaching, initially for two years at FC Dordrecht in the Netherlands. During his two years in that country, he was asked to step up and take control of the national team in a game against Germany and he did so, leading them to a 2 – 1 victory. He would later achieve legendary status as a coach in Hungary, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.

He was certainly on the receiving end of the overweening arrogance, described by Goldblatt, when he returned to England after the Great War. Hogan was interned in Austria and later in Hungary, during that War. Upon his release he returned to England, penniless but determined to coach and manage football teams. He was advised to go to the Football Association...
headquarters in London to apply for help from a special fund that had been set up to give relief to professionals who had suffered financially during the war years. He borrowed £5 for the train fare and hoped to be given the £200 which he heard was available to players and former players, in his predicament. He was met by the FA Secretary, Frederick Wall, who sneered that the fund was intended to assist men who had gone to war. Hogan protested he had never had the opportunity, having been interned in Austria once war had been declared. Wall pulled three pairs of khaki woollen socks from a cupboard and ended the meeting with the words, “These will help you Hogan. We used to send them to the boys at the front and I know they were very grateful.” It would appear, choosing to work among foreigners, was every bit as bad as actually being foreign. According to his biographer, Hogan was lost for words, interpreting Wall’s insult as an accusation that he had been a traitor who had conveniently avoided the war through getting himself interned. An excuse is offered for Wall’s treatment of Hogan, in that he had lost close relatives in the war and, as a result, had developed a disliking and distrust of all things Continental. However, he is the same man who wrote in 1904 dismissing the notion of England becoming involved in FIFA. He served as FA Secretary from 1895 until 1934. Tellingly, he is described as believing FIFA needed England more than England needed FIFA, a factor in England’s refusal to participate in the first three World Cup tournaments (Fox, 2003: 86). Hogan’s influence on the game in Hungary would come back to haunt English football years later.

Hogan was not the only Englishman achieving success abroad. William Garbutt had his career ended prematurely while playing as a winger for Blackburn Rovers in 1911. Having gone to Genoa seeking work outside of football, he found himself managing the Genoa football team, with whom he achieved success. The unfinished (due to the war) Italian Championship of 1914-15 was eventually awarded to Garbutt’s Genoa team. He would lead them to two further League titles in 1923 and 1924, the first of these an undefeated run from start to finish, something not equalled for a further seventy years. Garbutt was hardly recognised or acknowledged in his native England. He would later spend a single year in Spain, managing Athletic Bilbao to the 1936 League Championship (Edgerton, 2009). He was not the first Englishman to lead Bilbao. Another player whose career had ended through injury, this time an England international called Fred Pentland, managed Bilbao from 1922-1925 and again
from 1929 -1933. Athletic Bilbao won the Copa del Rey (Spanish Cup) under his guidance during his first spell in charge. His second spell of four years brought four more cups and the double twice as two League Titles were also won by a team he was said to have coached in a short-passing and completely un-British style of playing. Pentland helped manage the Spain team, notably when England suffered their first ever defeat, 4 – 3 in Madrid in 1929. On his eventual return to England, the only club prepared to employ him was lowly Barrow (Ball, 2001).

There was one home-based manager whose ideas ran into the same rejection experienced by these managers abroad. Herbert Chapman, the only football manager to win both FA Cup and League with two different clubs, was known for his success and particularly for his leadership qualities. Multiple League Championships in the 1920s with Huddersfield Town and in the 1930s with Arsenal were testament to his ability. However, Chapman was by far the most innovative person in English football at that time. Among his suggestions via his Sunday Express column were: floodlit football, the use of white balls, the development of artificial pitch surfaces, numbered jerseys and stadium clocks so the spectators could see how much time was left. He also advocated for an additional official to be positioned on the goal-line something trialled by the European Football Union some seventy-five years later. All his suggestions were progressive, aimed at improving the spectacle for the attendance. All would come to pass in due course. All were summarily dismissed by the Football Association at the time of their proposal by Chapman (Goldblatt, 2006: 190).

Elias has explained that ‘the standard of what is socially demanded and prohibited, changes’ (Elias, 1994: x). I believe this to be an important consideration when making judgements of historic events or publications. An example of this is a publication some twenty years after the FA’s rejection of international co-operation. This piece of writing indicates how the footballers of other nationalities may have been perceived in people’s imaginations at that time.

Williams (2011) describes a series of fictional football stories published in the Liverpool Evening Express in the early 1920s. The extent to which they are openly xenophobic and racist provides an exemplar of Elias’s theory of a Civilising Process. What was acceptable at one
juncture in time may be considered repugnant at a later stage. What passed for an entertaining piece of publishing in 1922 would have that publisher charged in court in modern times and would in all probability lead to several diplomatic incidents. In the fictional story, a British ex-serviceman tries to bring people of different nations together in post-war harmony by way of forming a football team. His team had unreliable Swedes and Egyptians and a Spanish goalkeeper who ‘you could smell a mile off’. On the wing was a man called Mass Tull Dixon, described as ‘a coal-black coon’ who was psychologically destroyed when teammates smashed his banjo.

In a further illustration of what was at that time acceptable but could today be repugnantly insulting to at least two more categories of human being, an effeminate French player called Hyacinth Bourget was depicted challenging a love rival to a duel. Williams asks ‘what was the moral of this mess drawn out for the Liverpool readers of the Evening Express’ and declares the message was that ‘football’s essentially a game for Britishers and that these foreigners ain’t got the right temperament’ (Williams, 2011: 162). Cultural insularity was not restricted to holding the view that foreigners were in no position to run an international body overseeing football. Between the wars, its most notorious contribution was England’s refusal to participate in the inaugural World Cup in 1930, in Uruguay or in the successive tournaments in Italy and France in 1934 and 1938. Nor did this insularity, in both football and the broader nation, go unnoticed by others who have written on the history of English football. The letter rejecting the invitation from the Uruguayan Football Federation to participate in the first World Cup, ended with the line, ‘I am instructed to express regret at our inability to accept the invitation’ (Walvin, 1994: 129).

Throughout the interwar years, football in the British Isles never questioned the belief in inherited superiority; an attitude compounded by administrative isolationism and shored up by domestic buoyancy. It was to be many years before the reality of football abroad and the relative decline of the domestic game were fully appreciated. It was simply assumed by the British that the continuing health of their insular game would forever guarantee the superiority which had existed before 1914. In the inter-war years, the English national team won thirty-four, drew four and lost only seven games, none of the losses on home soil, all of which enforced the pervasive complacency. England’s non-participation in the World Cup symbolised an insularity which was part of an even wider isolationist malaise within
the country as a whole (Walvin, 1994: 128 & 143). (Note: Ironically, Walvin’s use of the term ‘British Isles’ is in itself indicative of a thought process).

Football was held up by those who administered it in the years between the wars, as an English game for English players and English spectators according to Norman Fox, football writer and Hogan’s biographer. He referred to a game between England and an Austrian national team, led in the early 1930s, by Hugo Meisl and his close friend and colleague, Jimmy Hogan. Fox declared that the Austrians gave a ‘previously self-assured England and the domestic game’s insular leaders what should have been the fright of their lives.’ (Fox, 2003: 10). He continues to offer further comment on Hogan and the effects of the insularity:

Many of football’s most trusted names, past and present, have said he could have put England on a path that would have avoided so many of her national teams being left behind and sometimes humiliated. In his prime, when he was one of the Continent’s most successful trainer-coaches, he was never offered the opportunity to come back home on a permanent basis and use his talents to prepare English football at international level for the challenge of a changing game. As a result, he spent most of his career making foreign countries and clubs ready for the time when they would leave England languishing in the second division of international football (Fox, 2003: 10).

Once more the FA stand indicted with Fox (2003) joining Goldblatt (2006) and Walvin (1998) in condemning an organisation which clearly was very inward-looking. By the 1930s, English industry was nowhere near as dominant as it had been, but decline is not always recognised or accepted immediately. Those who governed English football, it would appear, were oblivious to the advances made by other countries’ football teams and to the fact that help in the form of such as Jimmy Hogan was either available or required. The British Empire still existed and it would do so until the period commencing after World War II (McIntyre, 1998). As for the reduction in British influence, Elias has described the phenomenon of nations losing power without being able to acknowledge or even recognise that this has occurred. Clearly, in the years following the Second World War, The British Empire contracted and became less powerful as Britain became preoccupied with trying to facilitate and adapt to the changes which were occurring in a period of decolonisation. In November 1951, Winston Churchill (now in opposition) outlined his view of how Britain might proceed in the world. He wanted the ‘unity and consolidation of the British Commonwealths and what is left of the British
Empire.’ He also advocated a closer relationship with a United Europe’. The decline of the British Empire left the nation with a reduced power position requiring eventual affiliation, in 1973, to the European Union and the need to accommodate the values of those with whom new alliances and interdependencies were being created (McIntyre, 1998: 38).

McIntyre points out the 1950s proved a difficult time for England in terms of the world stage and loss of influence. A catalogue of issues across the globe beset the Government. Revolts in Malaya and Kenya were put down in 1952. Military intervention also was required in British Guiana and Uganda. A spate of terrorism in Cyprus brought further need for military action. The largest British occupied country in Africa, Sudan, became independent in 1956. The Gold Coast and Malaya got independence in 1957. After much debate and negotiation, the West Indies followed in 1958. In 1957, the parliamentary counsel to the Treasury said:

*I think we have never yet had to do so many contradictory things simultaneously. Within the last ten years we have seen a part of Her Majesty’s dominions turned into a foreign country without frills (Burma); a part of these dominions converted into two separate Dominions, and subsequently recognised as independent Republics within the Commonwealth (India and Pakistan); a colony converted into a Dominion without frills (Ceylon); an association of a colony, a protectorate and a trust territory converted into a Dominion, in this case involving an element of annexation (Gold Coast); a colony and two protectorates federated without annexation (Rhodesia); and other operations in respect of Southern Ireland and Palestine. In the present case (Malaya) we are running together the operation of federating two colonies and nine protected states, ceding sovereignty over the colonies and jurisdiction over the States, treating the end product simultaneously as an independent sovereign country and a self-governing Dominion (McIntyre, 1998: 41-42).*

The perpetuation, in the era post World War II, of an attitude and particular approach is found in the story of an English manager abroad. George Raynor was a miner’s son from Barnsley whose professional playing career began in 1930 at Sheffield United where his stay was brief before his career took him through several clubs in the lower divisions of English football. As World War II broke out, he was in Baghdad working as a training instructor for the British Army. He assisted in the formation of an Iraqi representative team which he coached with some success. Stanley Rous at the FA was asked by the Swedish FA to recommend a coach.
Based on the favourable despatches from Iraq he recommended Raynor who took up the post in 1946. He led Sweden to Olympic Soccer Gold in 1948 and Olympic Bronze in 1952 followed by short spells managing Juventus, Lazio, and Coventry City in the early 1950’s before he returned to Sweden. He presided over their World Cup campaign in 1958 when as hosts they went all the way to the final before losing to a Brazil team featuring a young Pele.

Another writer identifies the moment when English football’s misplaced belief in its enduring charisma and superiority was shattered. Tchir (2018) describes the humiliation of the defeat to Hungary at Wembley in 1953 and writes that this result ‘shattered the myth sustained by a highly selective use of evidence...of the superiority of English football at international level’. He then asserts that subsequent literature ‘came to acknowledge the England–Hungary match as one of the defining moments in the nation’s sporting history’. His continuing study claims a certain degree of inevitability about this footballing setback because of the long-term refusal by England to integrate improvements in tactics leaving it vulnerable to such a catastrophe (Tchir, 2018: 154).

The event is succinctly described and summarised by journalist and author, Jonathan Wilson: ‘Hungary’s 6 - 3 victory was not the moment at which English decline began, but it was the moment at which it was recognised.’ ‘Tom Finney, watching from the press-box, said; “It was like cart horses against race horses”’ (Wilson, 2008: 87). (Note: Tom Finney played for England 76 times but missed this particular game. Famous for remaining loyal, through a long career, to his hometown club Preston North End, he was named Footballer of the Year in England on two occasions, 1954 and 1957).

In the aftermath of the devastating defeat, Tchir offered his opinion on how it had come to this: ‘Scholars were quick to acknowledge that Britain’s decline owed much to the nation’s unwillingness to innovate playing styles alongside other European nations, as well as its desire to isolate itself in order to maintain an illusion of superiority’ (Tchir, 2018: 154).

The failure by the England manager, Walter Winterbottom, to heed the warning and advice about Hungary’s ability, is explained, I believe, in the words of Elias:
But the discrepancy between the actual and the imagined position of one’s group among others can also entail a mistaken assessment of one’s power resources and, as a consequence, suggest a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one’s own greatness that may lead to self-destruction (Elias, 1965: xiv).

The question of how the football community and its leaders did not react more immediately to the landmark, embarrassing defeat by Hungary is explained in the words of Elias. Describing shame and embarrassment, Elias writes about a conflict within an individual subjected to these emotions. He says it is a conflict within the personality which causes the subject to recognise himself as inferior. The fear within is that of loss of the respect of others, a respect which he has valued. He becomes defenceless against gestures of superiority by others which trigger this reaction within him (Elias, 1994: 415). I believe if a collective such as the leaders of a nation or of a football association are afflicted in this manner, it must take time for these thoughts to be overcome. Change and developments need to be studied over a period of time. The political evolution in Britain was processual as was the development of association football and the functions within.

After the 1958 World Cup, Raynor was keen to return to England where he expected no difficulty in securing a job managing a top club. Instead, he found himself virtually ignored as he had to settle for managing Skegness Town in the Midland league. During a break from Skegness he took charge of the Swedish team for their game against England at Wembley, a game Sweden won 3-2. A year later he wrote his autobiography, ‘Football Ambassador At Large’, which he hoped would serve as one last attempt to gain the England job. It is indicative of his foresight that he wrote about introducing three points for a win, about a slimmed-down ‘premier’ league and about youth development programmes. He explained why he’d been so successful with Sweden and why England hadn’t been. In his book, he also panned both the England selectors and Winterbottom, which outraged the FA. Instead of courting them for a role, it did quite the opposite; his book was withdrawn from the country (Rainbow, 2012). George Raynor’s death went unrecorded by the local and national press and he is still a largely forgotten man in English football circles.
This attitude did not just apply to one hugely successful English manager. Goldblatt (2006) suggested the approach to the governance of English football in the 1950s and 1960s bore a remarkable resemblance to what he described as ‘the antiquated, self-importance of the Macmillan and Home administrations’ of that period. Here, once again, we had comparisons between a political regime or climate and the contemporaneous governance of football. The Football League and FA remained suspicious of many key innovations including the pools industry which was resisted for three decades, until the 1950s, floodlit league football, kept in abeyance until 1956, television coverage opposed and resisted and then severely restricted. It would appear that, quite frequently, the thinking of those charged with the governance of football mirrored that of societal and national leadership.

By 1955, the French publication, L’Equipe, was calling for a European competition for clubs. They assembled representatives from the prominent European clubs and the European Cup (later to become The Champions League) was the outcome of their discussions. Walvin observed:

> True to form, however, the English were prominent by their absence, for the Football League had persuaded Chelsea, not to enter, for fear of interfering with their home commitments’. He continues to describe what he calls the ‘Ruritanian quality of missives’ issuing from League headquarters, designed to keep English clubs out of Europe (Walvin, 1994: 169-170).

Chelsea, as League Champions, were invited into the newly created European Cup of 1956. The Football League instructed the club to decline the offer, a decision the club itself seemed to accept without question (Goldblatt, 2006: 442-423).

The country experienced what Elias (1970) termed functional democratisation as its power relative to other states declined, while other states improved their power chances relative to Britain – they became less unequal. As Wouters (2019: 126) explains, ‘functional democratisation refers to a shift in the social distribution of power.’ Elias has described how a fluctuating balance of power is a structure characteristic of the flow of every figuration (Elias, 1970: 131). As decolonisation occurred, Britain as a nation saw a decline in its power chances relative to those over whom it had governed and indeed in the overall figuration of
nations. Ultimately, Britain applied to join another figuration, the EC, one of whose objectives might well be described as functional democratisation. The EC (now the EU) is a trading and political block in which smaller nations like Ireland, for example, have a voice beyond the scale of their power chances, were they to stay outside the block.

All of these decisions by the English football establishment, confirm Elias’s theory on once-powerful nations and their we-image and we-ideal. It is my contention that this explains the attitudes and behaviours of England’s football hierarchy for most of the twentieth century.

The unwillingness to associate with the governing bodies of other football playing nations, the refusal to participate in World Cups and the failure to recognise any need for coaching, all shaped English football. The administration of football appears to have changed little up to and beyond the first half of the twentieth century.

I suggest the explanation is contained in the words of Norbert Elias:

> The radiance of their collective life as a nation has gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally understood as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior value of these others, is irretrievably lost. For a time, the fantasy shield of their imagined charisma, as a leading established group may give a declining nation the strength to carry on. In that sense it can have a survival value (Elias, 1965: xvi)

England had taken part in the 1950 World Cup finals and the unexpectedly bad outcome was written off as an exception. The defeat to Hungary, while creating an awareness that a problem existed, did not bring about an immediate change. As with virtually all such developments, it took time for agreement on a new approach; in this case nearly ten years. Walter Winterbottom’s long reign at the helm of the national team came to an end with his resignation five months after World Cup quarter final elimination in Chile in 1962. The most obvious candidate was a former England international player who had achieved extraordinary success with rural Ipswich Town’s football team, having led them to Second Division success in 1961 before leading them to become the only team to win a First Division Championship in their first year in the top division. Alf Ramsey was appointed England Manager in 1962 to take up the post in 1963. The greatest change in structure would mean Ramsey had complete
control over team selection. He had made this a condition of his acceptance of the role. Under his leadership, England achieved the ultimate success, World Cup victory on home soil in 1966 (McKinstry, 2006). Having followed Chelsea as League Champions, Manchester United were offered entry to the European Cup and, unlike Chelsea, they choose to participate and, in doing so, in 1957 they established the position of English clubs in this competition for ever more. The 1966 World Cup success by the English national team was followed by further British success for clubs as first Celtic and then Manchester United won European Cups in 1967 and 1968. These successes and particularly the World Cup win may appear to contradict what has gone before. However, Elias (1994) states that a process must be taken over a long time-frame and there will be interruptions or reversals along the way. As I have described elsewhere the process is uneven. Just as the nation had to find new means of effecting economic improvement, the football authorities and those who controlled the big clubs, had to similarly change. The national team returned to producing indifferent results with 1966 appearing an isolated moment of glory. The clubs, as they became more involved in European competition, found a need to adopt some practices such as hiring managers and players from overseas.

The 1960s and 1970s saw the aforementioned changes, wherein English football adopted a more outward looking perspective, while by the 1970s, Britain had moved from having an Empire on which the sun never set to joining the EC or European Community.

It is interesting that a politically and militarily powerful Britain that dominated world trade in the nineteenth century should find itself with reduced powers in the years after World War II. As it was subjected to functional democratisation, the nation that had been so dominant was seeking membership of a European political and trading partnership.

It is similarly interesting that English football, having abstained from interaction with others for so long, became, in the later twentieth century, World Champions, members of FIFA, the world governing body, members of UEFA, the European governing body, with the national team and club teams participating in every international competition available. Meanwhile, the function of management in football became subjected to the same functional
democratisation leading to significant changes in the power balances among those in club management in the English professional game.

In the course of the last part of my data chapter, I have quoted parts of a piece written by Norbert Elias in 1965. I have done so because I believe the piece to be both prescient and explanatory of the thought processes of many of those who presided over the British nation as well as those who governed Association football in twentieth century England. Herewith the full quotation:

In 1965, Norbert Elias wrote the following:

A striking example in our time is that of the we-image and we-ideal of once-powerful nations whose superiority in relation to others has declined. Their members may suffer for centuries because the group charismatic we-ideal, modelled on an idealised image of themselves in the days of their greatness, lingers on for many generations as a model they feel they ought to live up to, without being able to do so. The radiance of their collective life as a nation has gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally understood as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior value of these others, is irretrievably lost. Yet, the dream of their special charisma is kept alive in a variety of ways – through the teaching of history, the old buildings, masterpieces of the nation in the time of its glory, or through new achievements which seemingly confirm the greatness of the past. For a time, the fantasy shield of their imagined charisma, as a leading established group may give a declining nation the strength to carry on. In that sense it can have a survival value. But the discrepancy between the actual and the imagined position of one’s group among others can also entail a mistaken assessment of one’s power resources and, as a consequence, suggest a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one’s own greatness that may lead to self-destruction as well as to destruction of other independent groups. The dreams of nations (as of other groups) are dangerous (Elias in Elias & Scotson, 1965: xiv).

In a later work in which Elias writes about Germany, he again addresses this issue: ‘The central question is how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members’ (Elias, 1996: 19). It would appear that much of what Wiener described and critiqued related to the habitus of individuals as described by Elias. Those who
ruled over English football for more than half the last century appear to have been similarly affected.

Within the past decade, a journalist wrote at some length about George Raynor, describing his successes in Sweden. Once again, the story focused on England’s 1953 defeat to Hungary but this time relating a tale of what occurred in the run-up to that game. Although there have been substantial changes in English football, as I have described, what fascinates is that a journalist who is most unlikely to have any personal recollection of the event, nevertheless uses a term ‘famously embarrassing’ in describing it. There still remain elements as Elias suggested within the habitus connected to the past experiences of a nation.

The Coventry Telegraph article contains the following:

Raynor had done his homework and recognised the danger of Hidegkuti, the deep-lying centre forward. He played a zonal marking system to counter Hidegkuti and instructed his forwards to close down their markers when they were in possession (in modern parlance, a pressing game). The plan worked and Sweden got a creditable 2 – 2 draw. The arrogant English press saw the result and said England had little to fear from the Hungarians at Wembley. After the Sweden-Hungary match Raynor met up with England manager Walter Winterbottom and gave him advice on how to play the Hungarians. Sadly, Winterbottom ignored the advice, gave Hidegkuti the freedom of the pitch and England suffered their first home loss to continental opposition in a famously embarrassing 6 – 3 defeat (Coventry Telegraph, 17 October, 2014).

An understanding of the thought processes of those charged with the governance of English football may be gleaned from the non-reaction to the defeat at The Empire Stadium, Wembley, or the 7 – 1 defeat in the return game in Budapest six months later. As I have pointed out, the manager and the selection committee continued through to 1962.

5.3 Connecting changes

In the final part of my data chapter, I deal with what I consider an important sociological development in Britain over the time in which professional football has existed. In my introduction to this thesis, I wrote and cited as follows:
More than thirty years ago, Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning were asking themselves whether football would be considered a respectable subject for research in the social sciences. Their conclusion was; ‘We were very conscious that knowledge about sport was knowledge about society’ (Elias, cited in Elias & Dunning, 1987: 1).

I have cited the work of Wiener (1981) who provides examples of the effect on the habitus of people in Britain, after the nation’s power relative to others had gone into decline. Elias helps in providing a better explanation of this phenomenon. In another context, he wrote: ‘The central question is how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members’ (Elias, 1996: 19).

Elias (1970: 68) created the phrase ‘functional democracy.’ The process of functional democritisation is explained by Wouters (2019: 118) as ‘diminishing contrasts’ or the ‘reduction of power differentials, the result of increasing interdependencies. This final part of Chapter Four describes functional democratisation in terms of Britain’s place among other nation states. From the 1920s onwards, Britain had declined from its centuries old position of world dominance. The acceptance by its people of a less powerful nation took longer. It is this time-lag that Elias describes.

Britain’s power relative to other nations had declined through the 1930s and through the post-war era to the point where the late 1960s saw a more open approach, leading, as I have pointed out, to membership of the then European Community, English football would too become more open.

The perception of those governing English football of their position in relation to others, especially other footballing nations, illustrates a lack of awareness of how real was the reduction of power differentials. It could be said, England’s position of superiority was ‘sedimented’ into the habitus of those in charge of English football. However, as I have described in Chapter Four, it was also evident across the game, in directors and managers. The piece of fictional writing which had all foreign players as inferior may have originated in the first quarter of the twentieth century but this mind-set languished well beyond that time, more comprehensively evaporating towards the end of that century as clubs gradually
introduced foreign players and later, foreign managers. The once derided foreign players arrived in increasing numbers and to wide acceptance. Foreign coaches followed to the point where I have highlighted the fact that the wealthier clubs today, all appear to favour non-nationals as their Head Coaches. And the defined roles of those Head Coaches have fewer functions than had been the case previously. A more equal set of power relations has developed as the function mirrors the development of football and the nation’s place in the world. My conclusion is that functional democratisation, the reduction of power differentials, has shaped the management function in football as it is today. The function has moved through phases of few functions or interdependencies to a multitude of both, to its more streamlined and latest iteration, with substantial loss of function, as I have outlined. Over the history of the professional game in England, the management function has gained and lost power chances relative to others such as owners and players. However, the route to where it is today was a parallel road to that taken by both the sport of football and the nation.

5.4 Functional Democratisation – Some Further Thoughts

In the previous chapter, I have documented how the management function in professional football developed. As I explained, two social processes which have shaped this function are functional democratisation at the figuration of football and at the level of nation states.

Again, as I have illustrated, this has been an uneven and fragmented process. Nonetheless, the overall direction, despite counter-spurts, has been towards greater functional democratisation. Whether the focal point of the discussion is a nation or a football head coach, this process means a reduction in power for the subject and an increase in interdependencies. The process of change continues both for the management function in football and of course, for the nation.

Many people in Britain may find themselves unable or unwilling to accept the new role of the nation in the world. Some may continue to behave and function as if the empire on which the sun never set, is still real. Others may accept Britain’s place among nations, and seek that the country form new alliances within new structures, and strive to make a contribution to world affairs, in the best interests of its citizens. Similarly, football managers may reject their new order, reacting as did Harry Redknapp and Alan Curbishly, both of whom I referenced
stating how dreadful it was that managers no longer had full control over player trading. Or they may accept that the days of managers running the entire club have gone and that the role today is that of head coach with a much narrower set of responsibilities and much greater numbers of interdependencies.

The reality is that in football the increase in interdependencies had been underway for some time as functional specialisation had become a feature of how clubs were run and how professional teams were prepared. What we are witnessing in English football is a broad acceptance, without conflict or upheaval, that the role has to change and that the head coach of today does not have the same role as the manager of yesterday. The role is better defined, has undergone a reduction in power opportunities with far higher levels of interdependency. It has experienced functional democratisation.

In my data chapter I referenced the defeat suffered by England at Wembley at the hands of Hungary in 1953. My point was that this defeat had an effect beyond football, that it heralded a point where realisation dawned not just on many in the football figuration, but on a much wider national scale. In their book explaining Brexit, Dorling and Tomlinson (2019: 198) write: ‘they say that for many, the glories of empire vanished in the trenches of the Great War, in the Great Depression and, more prosaically, when England lost to Hungary at the Empire Stadium on 25 November 1953.’ My finding related very much to loss of empire and the inability or unwillingness to recognise it. Functional democratisation gave countries like Ireland, Malta and Cyprus the same voting power as the United Kingdom within the EU. Black (2018; 16) echoes Weiner (1981) when he asserts that while ‘Britain’s political power across the globe’ had weakened, ‘it’s imperial legacies would continue to dominate British politics throughout the twentieth-century,’ most notably in the relationship with the EU.

It seems to me that the Elias quote about the sedimentation of beliefs of a nation’s exalted place in the world long after the glory days have passed, is perfectly descriptive of Britain’s most recent political saga, Brexit. To the neutral observer, if such a creature even exists, Brexit appeared a hugely ill-conceived idea. It appeared illogical at every level, a harking back to a mystical past which may or may not have existed, but whose return is most likely not possible by going down this route. In a world in which interdependence and functional
democratisation have increased at the level of nations, to pursue such a policy appears to make little sense. To do so using immigration as a weapon can hardly be termed more ‘civilised’. And it is clear that immigration was the headline factor (literally) in the run-up to the vote. A study in May 2017 of the 14,779 newspaper and magazine articles that had mentioned the referendum provided conclusions that immigration, with 91 front page appearances, was the single most prominent referendum issue, outscoring the economy which had featured on 82 front pages. The subject had experienced a tripling of coverage during the campaign and this coverage was overwhelmingly negative (Dorling and Tomlinson, 2018: 35).

In my own exploration, beyond football, I had some unspoken reservations about what I was writing. I had serious concerns that in describing some of the ‘predictable cultural insularity’ of Britain, I may have been doing that nation an injustice. I would not have been the first Irish person to have been unfair to our neighbour. I worried that in quoting Williams (2011) describing a fictional piece from the 1920s about foreign footballers I was doing Britain an injustice by perhaps being selective in citing some of the racism and jingoism on display in those years. Those reservations were eased by some of the rhetoric around Brexit.

Dorling and Tomlinson (2019) are to be commended for their analysis of Brexit, citing among other matters, racism and jingoism of more recent origins. They describe and explain much of what led to Brexit. Once more, loss of Empire and a mistaken belief in the position of the nation among other nations, echoes some of the teachings of Elias.

One aspect of Brexit which should be of particular interest to students of Elias is the different voting outcomes in the individual countries which form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain while Northern Ireland also voted that way. Black (2018: 11) provides an explanation which he describes as ‘the long-term monopolisation of the British state by the English, [which] would indicate the emergence of an established-outsider dynamic between an ‘established’ English and an ‘outsider’ Celtic periphery. The relative independence of Scotland and the potential of a second Independence referendum, arising from Brexit, could be described as indicative of an increase in functional democratisation. Scotland’s position appears stronger as a result of Brexit. Northern Ireland,
though not directly comparable to Scotland has also become somewhat more independent, since the Good Friday Peace Agreement, with Brexit regarded by many as having the potential to bring further change to the relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom in which it is positioned. While nowhere near as imminent as the possible Scottish transformation, it is an inescapable fact that Brexit has brought change to the relationship between Northern Ireland and The United Kingdom, something which may well have longer term implications. Dorling and Tomlinson suggest that in the near future the EU referendum will become widely recognised and understood as part of ‘the last throes of empire thinking working its way out of the British psyche’ (41). Their work, although founded on fact and research, has as one of its features the most scathing criticism of politicians who supported Brexit and of those in the background who either orchestrated or funded the project.

Nations and their relationships with one another are certainly increasingly complex. In the age of the internet, social media and unprecedented levels of international tax planning, there is increased complexity. The Premier League has clubs whose position in the football figuration is certainly more complex than in previous times. Company structures, foreign ownerships, a club owned by a billionaire who has difficulty getting a renewed visa to remain in the country, a club which is effectively owned by a nation state not all of whose practices have drawn universal approval, illustrate just some of the challenges football must face. The fact that both of these clubs are recent Premier League winners and virtually permanent representatives of the league in the European Champions League, increases the seriousness of these issues.

We cannot yet say definitively how Great Britain’s changed position will affect professional football but it is clear the future will be quite different from that which has applied for several decades. The Bosman ruling which changed the position of professional footballers was handed down by a European Court. In the new paradigm, decisions of the European Court systems are unlikely to be recognised in Britain, this being one of the key platforms of those who brought Brexit to fruition. It remains unclear how divisive and effective will be the issue of immigration and the attempts by a Conservative government with a five-year mandate from 2019 to continue misrepresenting the position of immigrants. There appears to be a
strange double standard to the anti-immigrant thought process. There is an objection to asylum seekers and economic immigrants who are frequently described in disparaging terms with words such as ‘spongers’ thrown around. The implication is that these people benefit from the state and are ‘takers.’ If they find a route to employment they are ‘taking’ again, this time the job which should have gone to a British citizen. There has been no noticeable objection to foreign footballers who are paid in tens of thousands of pounds per week, in some cases hundreds of thousands. And those immigrants are definitely taking positions which would in previous times have been occupied by citizens of the home countries of the United Kingdom.

While Dorling and Tomlinson (2019) spare no politicians and indeed exhibit a ruthlessness in attributing blame for Brexit, it must be acknowledged that attribution of blame in this case is not difficult. However, as Lever and Swailes appear to advocate, and as Elias taught, ‘the myriad of interacting processes’ must be considered. The wider and longer-term view must be taken. The explanation for Brexit lies not with a few twenty-first century politicians, but with a wider and more complex set of beliefs sadly mistaken for reality. The mismatch in habitus between how people feel and think and the actual true position is a perfectly valid explanation for Brexit. The inability to recognise functional democratisation among nations for what it is, has led to what many, including Dorling and Tomlinson believe to be a profound setback, but as Elias put it: ‘The dreams of nations (as of other groups) are dangerous (Elias in Elias & Scotson, 1965: xiv).

Once the process of ‘taking back control’ has been completed, the rules around employment, around immigration, around company ownership and repatriation of funds out of Britain, are just some which are susceptible to changes which could impact professional football. If football is impacted, head coaches will be impacted. I have described the preference for foreign coaches by the wealthier clubs. There are potential problems for such policies by football club owners. But as Elias also has pointed out it is necessary to take a long-term view and even Brexit itself may well prove to have been a temporary reversal, a counter-spurt in the history of a nation.
As I write, the role of head coach in English football is becoming more accepted and more established. I previously pointed out that such a structure has been the norm in most if not all European countries for many years. It would seem it will be the norm for some time to come in England too, as it appears to herald a sense of stability in the management structure and process at English football clubs. A similar sense of structural stability would appear to be most unlikely in a divided nation. However, taken over the long-term the changes brought about by Brexit may either be less damaging than predicted or perhaps capable of being adjusted or mitigated, once some of the unintended outcomes manifest themselves.

5.5 Future Studies

With regard to potential future studies through a figurational method, there are several possibilities for exploring critical aspects of football management and of football as a business. Racism in sport and movements like Black Lives Matter have been in the spotlight across the globe in recent times. The treatment of black players has had some attention but I believe the absence of black managers raises difficult questions which need to be addressed. The positive action, attempted in American Football, and whether it was effective would provide some context. White managers appear to be ‘the established.’ The ‘outsiders’ need to studied as part of a wider study of the recruitment processes, so that their exclusion might be explained.

It would appear unlikely the ownership of clubs in a capitalist environment like that in England will undergo a forced change. Although they have not been sufficiently highlighted, in my view, there have been changes in ownership of English clubs that should be of great concern to supporters, to the football authorities and to national government. Comparisons between the ownership models in Spain and Germany, both of which are quite different to each other and to the English model, would make a very interesting study. The interdependencies between owners, managers, players and particularly supporters, in different jurisdictions, would, I believe, form the basis of such a study.

The recent changes, which this thesis identifies, amount to a reduction in function for the person charged with ‘managing’ a professional football team in England. As functional specialisation increases, it might be asked if this is the end of that process. If not, where does it go from here? This may be a subject worth watching over the coming years.
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