Browse DORAS
Browse Theses
Search
Latest Additions
Creative Commons License
Except where otherwise noted, content on this site is licensed for use under a:

The perils of semi-presidentialism. Are they exaggerated?

Elgie, Robert (2008) The perils of semi-presidentialism. Are they exaggerated? Democratization, 15 (1). pp. 49-66. ISSN 1351-0347

Full text available as:

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
169Kb

Abstract

There is a standard academic consensus that semi-presidentialism is perilous for new democracies. In particular, this is because semi-presidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of ‘cohabitation’ between a president and a prime minister who are opposed to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and subvert the rule of law. This article examines the evidence to support these two arguments. We find very few cases of cohabitation in young democracies and only one case where cohabitation has directly led to democratic collapse. By contrast, we find more cases of divided minority government and more cases where it has been associated with democratic failure. However, we also find that young democracies have survived divided minority government. We conclude that, to date, there is insufficient evidence to support the long-standing and highly intuitive argument that cohabitation is dangerous for new democracies. There is more evidence to support the much newer argument about the dangers of divided minority government. Even so, more work is needed in this area before we can conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently perilous.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Routledge
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340701768125
Copyright Information:© 2008 Taylor and Francis
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:4514
Deposited On:20 Apr 2009 11:31 by Robert Elgie. Last Modified 01 Aug 2009 04:02

Download statistics

Archive Staff Only: edit this record