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Strategic targeting: the effect of institutions and interests on distributive transfers

Rickard, Stephanie J. (2009) Strategic targeting: the effect of institutions and interests on distributive transfers. Comparative Political Studies, 42 (5). pp. 670-695. ISSN 0010-4140

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Abstract

Virtually every government provides distributive transfers for electoral purposes. However, the level and form of such transfers vary dramatically across countries. Although transfers take many forms, they can generally be characterized as being either broad (providing benefits to large segments of the electorate) or narrow (targeting benefits only to select groups of voters). Variation in the form of distributive transfers across countries can be explained by voters’ economic interests and domestic institutions. Voters’ preferences over transfer form, shaped in part by the mobility of their assets, together with a country’s electoral rules determine the benefits politicians gain from providing either broad or narrow transfers. Using new measures of transfer form, I find that although majoritarian systems are more prone to narrow transfers, proportional systems are more responsive to increases in voter demand for narrow transfers, all else equal.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:distribution; electoral rules; subsidies; labor mobility;
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:SAGE Publications
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414008328643
Copyright Information:Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:4551
Deposited On:06 May 2009 12:32 by Dr Stephanie J Rickard. Last Modified 01 May 2010 04:02

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