Stretching the IR theoretical spectrum of debate on Irish neutrality: arguments and evidence in favor of a critical social constructivist framework of understanding.

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Abstract. In a 2006 IPRS article, entitled Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, Neal G. Jesse argues that Irish neutrality is best understood through a neoliberal rather than a neorealist IR theory framework. This article posits an alternative ‘critical social constructivist’ framework of understanding of Irish neutrality. The first part of the article considers the differences between neoliberalism and social constructivism and argues why critical social constructivism’s emphasis on beliefs, identity and the agency of the public in foreign policy are key factors explaining Irish neutrality today. Using public opinion data, the second part of the paper tests whether national identity, independence, ethnocentrism, attitudes to Northern Ireland and efficacy are factors driving public support for Irish neutrality. The results show that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are structured along the dimensions of independence and identity, indicating empirical support for a critical social constructivist framework understanding of Irish neutrality.

Key words: • critical social constructivism • neutrality • Ireland • public opinion
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Introduction

‘Critical’ social constructivism promises a significant research agenda beyond that of its ‘conventional’ counterpart. This article seeks to build upon Neal G. Jesse’s theoretical and empirical findings on Irish neutrality in his 2006 IPSR article entitled Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective and argues that critical social constructivism provides a more nuanced understanding of Irish neutrality than the neoliberal framework suggested in Neal G. Jesse’s article. The differences between the ‘neo-neo’ synthesis of realist and liberal theories and social constructivist theory are briefly explored after a fuller discussion of the differences within social constructivism(s) and how they relate to the central argument of this article. Critical social constructivism can be distinguished from conventional social constructivism (and neoliberalism) through its anti-essentialist ontology and qualified-foundationalist epistemology, the use of poststructuralist approaches and a concern with ‘omitted variable bias’ in mainstream IR theorizing, e.g. mass publics in terms of ‘levels-of-analysis’ and the consideration of ‘identity’ as a driver of foreign policy. These characteristics underpin the approach used in this article that supports alternative findings to the ‘neo-neo’ story of the drivers of Irish neutrality.

The first half of this article evaluates the factors Jesse has identified as drivers of Irish neutrality that are understood as neoliberal, i.e. “public opinion, party politics, political institutions, leaders, and interest groups” (2006: 23) and cites a number of situations where the agency and identity of the public arguably provide a stronger impulse to the maintenance of Irish neutrality. Jesse cites an examination of public concepts of neutrality in a discussion on the trajectory of the public’s view on continued neutrality (2006: 20). The ‘perspectivist’ element of critical social constructivism is employed in a re-examination of this data; it suggests the literature has mis-interpreted public concepts of neutrality, possibly due to elite, neorealist biases. The re-evaluation shows that the public has a reasonably stable and coherent concept of neutrality; it is a more ‘active’ and broader concept than the Irish government’s realist concept that amounts to staying out of military alliances. These two important points have implications for the debate over the fit of a social constructivist approach with explanations of the maintenance of Irish neutrality.

Jesse identifies the issues of independence and sovereignty (2006: 19, 20), the continuing separation of Northern Ireland (2006: 8) and anti-British sentiment
as factors in Irish neutrality, and notes “that in no instance do the domestic sources consider the balance of power in the international environment to be a key to the neutrality policy” (2006: 23). Thus, he argues that realism is not the basis of sub-state actors’ support for Irish neutrality and posits neoliberalism as an alternative framework of understanding. However, Jesse also cites the illumination of a concept of “security identity” as a consequence of his research (2006: 24) and theorises it will contribute to the continuation of neutrality (2006: 25); this variable fits nicely into a critical social constructivist framework of understanding. Using a recent Irish political attitudes survey, the second half of this article analyzes the results of a structural equation model that indicates which factors underpin public adherence to Irish neutrality. The model incorporates the three issues identified by Jesse (with anti-British sentiment broadened to ethnocentrism), including constructivist ‘identity’ and realist ‘efficacy’. Critical social constructivism contributes to an understanding of the identity issue in Irish foreign policy and the unmediated role of the public in this realm of international relations, as the results confirm Jesse’s hypotheses of independence and identity as factors driving public support for Irish neutrality.

**IR theories and understandings of Irish neutrality**

Jesse concludes by calling for (1) “comparative studies to investigate and examine our long-held theories of international relations” and (2) ways to understand “a ‘security identity’ in Ireland that is tied to nationalism and independence from British hegemony” (2006: 24). These are interdependent academic objectives because a critical review of long-held IR theories must be undertaken in order to understand the notion of identity as a dynamic of Irish neutrality. The review must acknowledge that theories identify and prioritise the agents and variables considered in explanations and understandings of foreign policy. The state-centric, materialist focus of neorealism, neoliberalism and ‘conventional’ social constructivism does not recognise the identity of the public as a dynamic of foreign policy; thus it is unlikely to be included in empirical FPA models. Theories also guide discourses and conclusions on Irish neutrality. For example, a deconstruction (see Devine, 2006) demonstrated that two differing interpretations of Irish neutrality (including public opinion) are implicitly or explicitly underpinned by disparate sets of assumptions: a neorealist discourse concluded that Ireland is “unneutral” whilst a constructivist discourse that afforded agency to the public concluded otherwise. This evidence drives the re-evaluation of the analysis of public concepts of Irish neutrality cited by Jesse (2006: 20), to check whether the dominance of elite realist conceptions of neutrality has obscured any non-realist public perspectives on neutrality. The re-examination could yield a clearer indication of the values underpinning the concept of neutrality supported by the Irish public. This investigation is important because public opinion is one of the “internal forces” that Jesse identifies (2006: 20) as a
driver of Irish neutrality that is more powerful than neorealist “external” forces. The nature and consistency of this internal force must be properly understood in order to explain why Irish neutrality persists over time, despite realist hypotheses (Everts, 2000: 179; Jesse: 2006: 23) of Irish neutrality’s demise in the post-Cold War era.

**IR theories and public opinion**

Realists like Hans Morgenthau ignored the public as a variable of foreign policy, believing the public to be ill-informed, inattentive and generally lacking the qualities needed to formulate ‘rational’ foreign policy preferences (Morgenthau, 1978: 558; Rosenau, 1961: 35; Althaus, 2003: 31). This Realist view was also held by public opinion analysts such as Gabriel Almond (1950) and Walter Lipmann (1955), who argued that public opinion threatens the normal course of rational foreign policy (Almond, 1960: 53, 69; Knopf, 1998: 546; Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 504; Holsti, 1992: 442; Marquis et al., 1999: 454). Neither school took the process of opinion formation seriously (Marquis et al. 1999: 454) and their negative view of the public has since been refuted (Page and Barabas, 2000: 347; Isernia, 2001: 263).

Empirical analyses have found public opinion to be structured, ‘reflecting underlying values and beliefs’ (Holsti, 1996: 47; Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 872; Barde and Oldendick, 1978: 497; Wittkopf, 1990: 14, 21; Chittick et al., 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105; Sniderman, 1993: 228) and collectively rational (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 281; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004: 291). Normative democratic theory supports the view that citizens are a wise source of foreign policy, preventing foreign policy designed solely in the interests of elites and even restraining leaders’ war-making proclivities (Holsti, 1992: 440; Marquis et al., 1999: 454). Gaps between the policy preferences of leaders and citizens are seen as problematic (Page and Barabas, 2000: 339) and reflecting different values and interests rather than levels of attention or information (Page and Barabas, 2000: 360). Where public opinion is structured and informed, democratic theory calls for responsiveness by policymakers (Page and Barabas, 2000: 352). These points raise issues with the “Innenpolitik” and “Second Image” international relations literature. The Innenpolitik debate centres on which aspect of the domestic structure matters most in determining a state’s response to international relations, e.g. pressure of the masses on policy, the autonomy of the state, etc. It is a focus on process and institutional arrangement that is divorced from politics (Gourevitch, 1978: 901 - 903). The content of relations among groups and decisions is ignored, rather their formal properties or the character of decisions are considered: Waltz favors an emphasis on the “container”, rather than the “contents” (1959: 80) and with that, “somehow politics disappears” (Gourevitch, 1978: 901). Critical social constructivism considers the content of what drives foreign policy preferences and unlike conventional social
constructivism, takes account of the politics involved in the construction of that content and its effect on policy.

Studies have indicated a growing influence of public opinion on national policymakers, EU institutions and the course of European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 507-508; Anderson, 1998: 570). A major re-statement of neofunctionalist theory has explicitly assigned a substantial role to public opinion (Sinnott, 1995: 20, 23). In short, the public and their opinions matter, despite mainstream theories’ practice of omitting this variable from the study of IR.

**Social Constructivism(s)**

Several types of social constructivisms have been identified, e.g. Maja Zehfuss (2002) identifies three types in a spectrum of work from Kratchowil to Wendt; Emanuel Adler (2002: 96) identifies four types: modernist, modernist linguistic, radical and critical; “there are many constructivists, and thus perhaps, many constructivisms” (Price, 2000: 1811). The various approaches labelled social constructivism reflect different ontological and epistemological positions and are so ardently debated, “we still lack clarity on what constructivism is” (Zehfuss, 2002: 6).

The origins and character of ‘critical’ social constructivism and its differences from conventional social constructivism are also disputed. Many suggest the “critical strand of social constructivism” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398) is derived from international “Critical Theory” associated with the work of Habermas and Foucault (Adler, 2002: 97) (although others argue that conventional constructivism also has its intellectual roots in critical theory (Farrell, 2002: 59)). Ted Hopf outlines the similarities between conventional and critical constructivism, seeing both on the same side of Yosef Lapid’s Battle Zone barricades (1998: 181) and differentiates them thus: “to the degree that constructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes ‘conventional’ constructivism”. Conventional constructivists like Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein and Ronald Jepperson label critical constructivism “radical constructivism”, reflecting the work of David Campbell, Richard Ashley and Cynthia Weber. Categorizations by mainstream IR theorists tend to miss the differences between postmodernist and poststructuralist work, e.g. John Mearsheimer lumps together the work of “constructivism, reflectivism, postmodernism and poststructuralism” (Hopf, 1998: 181; Farrell, 2002: 56).

This problem of definition masks the underlying and more pressing issues that are revealed when distinguishing conventional from critical social constructivism through their respective research objectives, methods and output. For example, Reus-Smit divides constructivism “between those who
remain cognisant of the critical origins and potentiality of their sociological explorations and those who have embraced constructivism simply as an explanatory or interpretive tool” (2001: 224). The division is reflected in the assertion that critical social constructivists don’t build or test new causal theories (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 398). Hopf designates the illumination of new understandings and the production of knowledge to the conventional realm of constructivism (1998: 185), implying that critical constructivist analyses of power relations and political constraints cannot do the same.

These distinctions are unhelpful for illuminating the potential of critical social constructivism as research approach in IR and FPA – critical social constructivists can be both cognizant of their critical origins and use so-called “explanatory” or “theory-testing” research tools. As Bill McSweeney argues, “To restrict the characterization of social theory to a choice over problem-solving versus critical is unhelpful, since some analyses of the social and political order are uncritical in Cox’s sense of critical (being that critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about”), and some problem-solving ones are critical” (1999: 112). Critical constructivists’ emancipatory analyses of power relations produce new knowledge that can be hypothesized and tested empirically. Empirical testing can elaborate intangible or omitted variables of power relations and ideational values in IR. These possibilities are obscured by conventional understandings of what an emancipatory research approach produces and the dogged yet illogical disciplinary association of particular methods with essentialist ontology and foundationalist epistemology.

**Differences between conventional and critical social constructivism**

The main differences between conventional and critical social constructivisms of concern here are: (1) different understandings of identity and different emphasis on the role of domestic versus international factors in the production of that identity (Hopf, 1998: 183-185; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 399); (2) a concern on behalf of critical constructivism for missing variables and levels of analysis (Jacobsen, 2003: 59) and (3) different views on the acceptance and use of so-called ‘emancipatory’ or ‘dissenting’ traditions in constructivism (Houghton, 2007: 41; Farrell, 2002: 59; Checkel, 2004: 230). These differences also illustrate the qualities of critical constructivism that enhance understandings of the dynamics of Irish neutrality compared with conventional constructivism or neoliberalism.

Critical constructivists seek to understand the origins of identity; conventional constructivists assume state identity. (Zehfuss, 2002: 89) “For Wendt, a key distinction is between the corporate and social identity of states, with the former de-emphasized because “its roots [are] in domestic politics”…the result
is that social construction at the level of individual agents or, more generally, at any domestic level is neglected”. (Checkel, 1998: 341) Critical constructivism is a preferred approach because it affords the public agency in the foreign policy process (McSweeney, 1985a: 202) and considers their identity as constituting Irish neutrality (McSweeney, 1985b: 118). This ontological position allows the critical distinction between governmental ‘state/foreign policy’ identity and public ‘national/foreign policy’ identity to be made and facilitates consideration of the role of power and alienation in the construction of competing foreign policy identities. In this paradigm, the exclusion of the public as a level of analysis in IR is political and a key point in attempts to understand the characteristics of Irish neutrality beyond those commonly identified in state and academic foreign policy discourses.

Hopf suggests “perhaps where constructivism is most conventional is in the area of methodology and epistemology”; for example, he points to the authors of the theoretical introduction to *The Culture of National Security* who vigorously, and perhaps defensively, deny that their authors use “any special interpretivist methodology”. (1998: 182) Thus, “The concern of Wendt to avoid a break with the explanatory model of neorealism…has left its mark on the constructivist project” (McSweeney, 1999: 123). Conventional or mainstream academics tend to reject analytical modes or forms of analysis that challenge the scholarly status quo (Jacobsen, 2003: 39) and it is argued that the positioning of conventional constructivism as the ‘middle ground’ of IR theory (Adler, 1997) excludes critical poststructuralist perspectives (Zehfuss 2002: 260). A growing number of academics (Larsen, 2004: 66-67; Zehfuss, 2002; Checkel, 2004: 239) are advocating poststructuralist ‘methods’ as part of the social constructivist approach to IR and FPA. This critical approach facilitates consideration of Irish national identity as a postcolonial phenomenon, which may explain why particular values are adhered to by the public and embodied in neutrality e.g. the values of non-aggression and anti-imperialism that can lead to opposition to perceived ideological or resource wars waged by ‘great powers’.

Choosing Frameworks: Neoliberalism vs Critical Social Constructivism

The differences between critical and conventional constructivisms are similar to the differences between critical constructivism and the neoliberal paradigm. There are several reasons why critical constructivism is a better framework for understanding the internal dynamics of Irish neutrality rather than neoliberalism. Constructivism argues that the study of international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them (Jackson and Sørensen, 2006), directing analysis towards the consideration of public concepts of and attitudes towards neutrality, whereas neorealism considers only the governmental concept and policy (ignoring the sub-state level of the
and neoliberalism only considers public opinion in so far as it influences government. The latter paradigms reject the premise that the public has agency in international relations in and of itself, outside of the structural powers of the ‘intermediary’ of the government. Empirical manifestations of this agency in the case of Irish foreign policy include voting in referendums, engaging in discourses through state and media channels and taking action, e.g. protest marches and bringing the state to court in support of neutrality. Although the effects of these public activities are difficult to isolate and measure, they can directly influence international politics, including institutions, peoples, governments and agencies in other states.

Neoliberal institutionalism and conventional constructivism hold domestic politics constant and explore variance in the international arena (Gourevitch, 2002: 309); this shared systemic theorizing flattens the role of domestic politics to zero in order to see whether changes in states’ environment alter their behavior. This is also the central premise of realism: assuming a unitary, rational state in order to examine the variance within the international system. Conventional constructivists and neoliberals follow the neorealists in adopting a ‘third image’ perspective, focusing solely on interactions between unitary states. Everything that exists or occurs within the domestic realm is ignored (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219). As a result, the neo-neo theories and conventional constructivism are theoretically inadequate for understanding the dynamics of public agency and identity in the maintenance of Irish neutrality. Thus, “we must venture outside of the orthodox” to analyse these variables because “the questions raised by our concern about identity, nationalism and the state cannot be responded to from within the current mainstream of IR theory”. (Tooze, 1996: xvi-xx)

**Neoliberal factors: governmental political institutions, interest groups, leaders and party politics**

Jesse argues that political parties, political institutions, leaders and interest groups are drivers of Irish neutrality rather than external factors such as the balance of power, therefore, neoliberalism is a superior framework to neorealism for understanding Irish neutrality. Considering the relative strength of these internal factors vis-à-vis the agency of the public, does critical social constructivism provide a superior framework to neoliberalism? Firstly, some examples of the agency and behavior of these actors in situations where Irish neutrality was perceived to be at stake are examined. Having established the relatively strong agency of the public, the second task is to look at whether the values, beliefs and identity of the public are significant drivers of their attitudes towards (and by extension their behaviour in support of) the maintenance of Irish neutrality.
Governmental decision-making political institutions and interest groups

Political parties, governmental decision-making political institutions, leaders and a majority of interest groups supported a ‘yes’ vote in the European Union (EU) Nice Treaty referendum held in Ireland on 7th June 2001. The referendum proposal was defeated, in part because the voters who turned out perceived threats to Irish neutrality arising from the Treaty (Sinnott, 2001: v). In response, the Irish government asked the EU Heads of State to declare that the Nice Treaty does not affect Irish ‘military’ neutrality, and the government added a protocol promising to hold a referendum on joining a European military alliance in the future. In this instance, the public had a direct influence on international affairs in an attempt to maintain their conception of Irish neutrality, as the strength of public opinion forced neutrality onto the EU agenda, despite the efforts of well-funded pro-EU interest groups, employers groups, labour unions, major political parties and the government. Neoliberal’s hypothesis that these actors have a definitive influence in the maintenance of active neutrality is weaker than social constructivism’s hypothesis that the public has an equally significant role that is independent from these actors.

Social constructivism’s emphasis on the level of cognition and ideas as the medium and propellant of social action (Adler, 2002: 325) and its goal of identifying the intersubjective context within which deeds of one kind or another appear to be reasonable and therefore justifiable (Kubálková, 2001: 75) suggests the need to investigate governmental and public concepts of neutrality in order to explain the public’s behavior (as a reflection of their opinion on the maintenance of neutrality) vis-à-vis that of governmental and sub-state actors. The ‘divergence of concepts’ hypothesis is alluded to in a broadsheet newspaper editorial noting that Ireland’s involvement in EU security and defence developments, such as participation in EU Battlegroups, does not affect the concept of neutrality “defined minimalistically by the Government as non-participation in military alliances” (Irish Times, 10th February 2006).

Leaders

The difficulty in isolating the effect of public opinion as a direct determinant of the foreign policy process is compounded in the Irish case with a lack of research (Keatinge, 1973: 184), nonetheless, it is possible to identify times when the Irish public constituency effectively controlled the capacity of Irish political leaders to participate in and influence international politics. During the 1970s and 1980s, Irish Taoisigh avoided participating in European Community post-summit leaders’ discussions on the military aspects of European Political Cooperation because of public support for neutrality in Ireland. For example, despite his own deeply-held personal convictions against Irish neutrality, the then Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, felt he had
to absent himself from such discussions due to pressure to uphold neutrality (FitzGerald, 1988: 29; Irish Times, 14-15 April 1995). Furthermore, in the 1990s, Irish political elites have claimed that the public would determine the ‘pace and nature’ of further European integration (Mitchell in Sinnott, 1995: v) and successive governments have promised to leave the decision to abandon Irish neutrality and join an EU military alliance to the Irish people (Government of Ireland, 1996: 16; Seville Declaration 2002), effectively casting the public as decision-makers on this aspect of neutrality and international politics and absenting themselves from their position, as designated by Robert Putnam (1988), between international negotiation and domestic political forces. This agency of the public reflects a social constructivist theoretical framework of understanding more than a neoliberal one.

**Party Politics**

Neoliberalism posits that party politics is a significant internal factor supporting Irish neutrality. Consistency is held as an important basis of an actor’s power in the realm of foreign policy (Hill, 1992: 324-325). Irish neutrality was argued to be at stake during the debate over Ireland’s membership of Partnership for Peace (PfP) between 1995 and 1999. This era illustrates the questionable influence and consistency of party political actors, in particular, Fianna Fáil, the largest political party in the state that has held power for fifty-seven of the last 75 years, commanding the support of between four to five out of ten of the electorate, and claiming the title of ‘chief architect and defender of neutrality’ (Irish Times, 16th April 1997).

Before assuming the role of Taoiseach in July 1997, party leader Mr. Bertie Ahern committed Fianna Fáil to holding a referendum on PfP membership (Fianna Fáil Election Manifesto, 1997). Mr. Ahern conceived of Ireland’s membership of PfP as “seen by other countries as a gratuitous signal that Ireland is moving away from its neutrality and towards gradual incorporation into NATO and WEU in due course” and that any attempt to join without a referendum would be “a serious breach of faith and fundamentally undemocratic” (Irish Times, 29th March 1996). Nonetheless, shortly after regaining office, on 5th October 1999 the Fianna Fáil-led Government implemented a decision to join PfP without a referendum, marking a U-turn in party’s position (Irish Times, 5 October 1999). This example points to the inconsistency of the neutrality concept of the largest political party when in power (a limited/negative concept) and when in opposition (a comprehensive/positive concept) and raises the question of whether the government is less consistent than the public in its views on neutrality. An analysis of public concepts of neutrality from 1985 through to 1992 cited by Jesse (2006: 20) argues that Irish public concepts of neutrality are ‘inconsistent’ and ‘limited’, indicating there may be little to choose between
the public and governments on that score. Attention now turns to the evaluation of this hypothesis.

**Re-analysing public concepts of Irish neutrality**

The critical element of constructivism demands cognisance of the theoretical assumptions underpinning academic analyses. Knud Erik Jørgensen argues that the realism of many academics means that “much tends to remain unexamined because implicit assumptions and deeply held beliefs among analysts tend to replace analysis. What is considered to be of minor or major importance tends to be identified *ex post*, rather than *a priori* and by means of theory-derived hypotheses” (1999: 113). With respect to reporting on survey data, Ole Holsti and James Rosenau admit, “there are ways in which the patterns uncovered can be shaped by the premises and preconceptions of the researcher” (1986: 478). There are three issues that hinder the analysis of public concepts of neutrality. Firstly the majority of academic and government discourses on Irish neutrality define it narrowly as non-participation in a military alliance. Government elites have also claimed that this narrow definition is the concept held by the Irish public (Minister for State Mr. Tom Kitt declared in the Dáil that “the central and defining characteristic of Irish people in this area…is our non-participation in military alliances” (*Irish Times*, 19th February 2003)). This dominant discourse may channel researchers’ perspectives to see this narrow concept rather than a broader, active concept of Irish neutrality.

Two other difficulties contribute to differences in interpretations of the data. The 1985 and 1992 data used in Karin Gilland’s (2001) analysis were opinion polls undertaken on behalf of a newspaper and the responses to the open-ended questions on the meaning of Irish neutrality had to be coded in a matter of hours. The Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS) carried out in 2001/2002 presented the first academic opportunity to code verbatim responses to this question, with the benefit of a more favourable timescale. In addition, the 1985 and 1992 surveys were based on a quota sample of the population, whereas the 2001/2002 ISPAS survey was based on a random sample of the electorate (those aged over eighteen and registered to vote). The lack of academic access to the 1985 and 1992 verbatim responses and codeframes and the differing samples may contribute to a divergence in findings.

*“Inconsistent” and “limited”?*

There are two bases for an assumption of concept stability across the three decades of data collected on the meaning of Irish neutrality. Recalling the premise that Irish foreign policy “is a statement of the kind of people we are,”
(Government of Ireland, 1996: 55), the first is that deeply-held personal values underpinning public concepts of neutrality and foreign policy identities are slow to change, in part because these values are a function of cultural and historical experience. The second basis concerns the stability of state foreign policy activity: “One could argue for a greater stability of public opinion in countries where a relative exclusion from the vagaries and tensions of the international environment results in a less active foreign policy” (Isernia et al., 2002: 204). Ireland does not engage in wars, nuclear posturing, and other ‘active’ variables identified by Isernia et al.; Ireland was not affected by an international upheaval (2002: 205) or major new events (2002: 216) in the time period preceding or during the conduct of the surveys. Theoretically, therefore, one should not expect capricious change in public attitudes or concepts.

Gilland characterises the public view of neutrality as inconsistent because “the response category ‘no military alliance, not in NATO’ lost 12 percentage points and went from 23 percent in 1985 to 11 percent in 1992” (2001: 150-151). The people “who associated it [neutrality] with military alliances” were outnumbered by those “who did not know what neutrality meant to them” (2001: 151). A pluralist perspective of the original response category data in Table 1 (see http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/IOPA/) offers an alternative interpretation. Gilland’s figure of 23 percent is derived from collapsing together two very distinct categories of meaning: 5 percent of respondents who said Irish neutrality means “not part of NATO” and 18 percent of respondents who said Irish neutrality means “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides”. In the context of the ISPAS verbatims, these ‘no side taken/no alliance with other nations’ codes signify impartiality, i.e. not being seen to be allied with or supporting a nation at war. The corresponding response category in the 1992 data that allegedly amounts to 11 percent is a total of 9 percent of respondents that said “we don’t take sides, no alliances” and 2 percent of respondents mentioning “we are not part of NATO”.

| TABLE 1 Original response category data ‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you?’ |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Survey: MRBI 22-23 April 1985** | **Survey: MRBI 8 June 1992**    |
| **Response category** | **%** | **Response category** | **%** |
| We don’t get involved in wars | 21 | We don’t get involved in wars | 35 |
| Should stay as we are | 12 | We should stay independent/as we are | 17 |
| No alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides | 18 | No alliances, we don’t take sides | 9 |
| Not part of NATO | 5 | We are not part of NATO | 2 |
| A free/independent state | 4 | We are a free/independent country | 8 |
| Don’t know | 31 | Don’t know | 21 |
The breakdown of the 2001/2002 ISPAS data in Table 2 shows the most strongly-supported public concepts closely resemble the wider, ‘active’ concept of neutrality that embodies characteristics such as peace-promotion, non-aggression, the primacy of the UN and the confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not being involved in wars, and maintaining Ireland’s independence, identity and independent foreign policy decision-making (in the context of ‘big power’ pressure). Adding the 2001/2002 data code 18, “not involved in a defence alliance” to code 11, “no NATO involvement” gives a total figure of 1.4% for the super-category ‘not in a military alliance’. This is roughly equivalent to the “not part of NATO” 1985 and 1992 figures of 5 percent and 2 percent of the population, respectively. Impartiality-related codes in the 2001/2002 data include code 40, “no side taken in war/non-partisan” and code 26, “Ireland standing alone/minding own business”, accounting for 6% of mentions (including code 2, “being neutral [between aggressors]” brings total impartiality sentiment to 11%).

**Table 2 ISPAS 2001/2002 selected response category data for the question ‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you?’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>N=</th>
<th>Definition of Irish Neutrality (first mentions)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Peaceful/promotes peace/mediator</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>No enemies/free from war/conscription</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>Good thing</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Important/means a lot</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Not involved in other countries’ war</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>Not involved in war/no war</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Being neutral</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>UN involvement/ peacekeeping only</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Independence/make own decisions</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Ireland standing alone/minding own business</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Irish Identity</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>No side taken in war/non-partisan</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Right to decide to go to war</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Not in defence alliance*</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Military neutrality</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>No NATO involvement*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Disagree with it</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fence-sitting</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>614</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2512</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*government definition.
In Gilland’s analysis, themes relating to non-partisanship/impartiality were coded into the categories “no alliances, we don’t take sides” and “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides” and subsequently written up as part of a super-category labelled ‘membership of a military alliance’. Creating a “military alliance” super-category from the two “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides” and “not part of NATO” codes effectively quadruples the number people alleged to associate Irish neutrality with military alliances, but the two response categories are arguably too distinct in meaning to be collapsed together. Having the membership of military alliance meaning (that has significantly less mentions than the impartiality codes) take precedence in the written presentation of these collapsed response categories is misleading, to the extent that elements of public concepts of neutrality are at best ignored and at worst, are subsumed into a limited, realist concept of neutrality. If the above arguments are accepted, Gilland’s claim that the meaning of Irish neutrality that is “associated with military alliances” has dropped from 25 percent to 11 percent between the 1985 and 1992 surveys cannot be sustained; the difference is between the 1985 figure of 5 percent and the 1992 figure of 2 percent, amounting to just 3 percent and as a result, the “inconsistency” claim (2001: 150) regarding public concepts of Irish neutrality is not sustained. In fact, significant elements of the public concepts of neutrality, such as the sovereignty and independence variables Jesse identifies as catalyzing Irish neutrality, are consistent over time. Table 3 shows the rank order of the response categories and points to reasonable stability in the range of meanings of public concepts of Irish neutrality: the top four definitions of neutrality are ‘not getting involved in war’, ‘independence/staying independent’ and ‘not possible/means nothing’ (MRBI April 1985; MRBI May 1992; MRBI June 1992, ISPAS 2001/2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Rank order of neutrality definitions offered by the Irish public, 1985-2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved in wars</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence/staying independent</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t take sides in wars/non-partisan/neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means nothing/not possible</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying out of NATO/military alliances</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most frequently mentioned meaning, “don’t get involved in wars” correlates strongly with academic concepts of neutrality. For example, Jessup claims, “the primary objective of a neutrality policy should be to keep out of war” (1936: 156); for Goetschel, “being neutral means not taking part in military conflict” (1999: 119) and according to Calvocoressi, “neutrality was a general declaration of intent to remain out of any war which might occur” (1996: 172). The second and third most popular public concepts, “independence/staying as we are” and “not taking sides”, are methods to achieve the objective of staying out of wars and constitute important elements of neutrality.

**Linking values and identity of the public in foreign policy**

Understanding the public’s concept of neutrality is central to explaining the role of identity as a driver of public opinion because there is theoretical and empirical evidence favoring the hypothesis of a relationship between the values embodied in the strongly-supported public concept of Irish neutrality and the national identity of the Irish people portrayed internationally. In Ireland’s first and only White Paper on Foreign Policy, the Irish Government acknowledged that “Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are” (Ireland, 1996: 55) and that “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as time of war” (Ireland, 1996: 15). The Paper states, “the values that underlie Ireland’s policy of neutrality have therefore informed almost every aspect of our foreign policy” (Ireland, 1996: 119) and cites an example of this using impartiality, an important element of the public concept of neutrality: “our international reputation for impartiality has enabled us to play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in the world” (Ireland, 1996: 119).

Theorists have argued that national interest depends on national identity, which is a construct in our minds describing and prescribing what we should think, feel, value and ultimately behave in group-relevant situations. This identity has an internal (how groups imagine themselves) and external dimension and is a function of values. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 95) Values and identity are interlinked, as Poole argues, “an identity is a form of inscription: as such, it embodies a specific evaluative point of view. All identities involve values and commitment, and the acquisition of identity means coming to accept these values and commitments” (1999: 46). In effect, the concept of Irish neutrality as understood by the Irish people is a reflection of their values and a projection of their national identity in international affairs. Ireland is not a unique case in this respect, as this phenomenon is identified as a dynamic in other European neutral states populations and also in alliance states. This theoretical move reflects the social constructivist
emphasis on identity as a driver of foreign policy: this understanding of Irish
neutrality will be evaluated in the next half of this article.

Evaluating the drivers of public opinion on neutrality

Before discussing the results of the structural equation model, it is worth
noting the issues raised by the use of statistical models within the critical
strand of social constructivism. Because constructivist scholarship has taken
on the metatheoretical challenges issued during The Third Debate (Price,
2000: 1786), some critical constructivists have been associated with
poststructuralist approaches and work within the school of Critical Theory. As
regards testing theoretical hypotheses empirically, just as poststructuralist
decomposition is not anti-empirical (Der Derian, 1997: 57), neither is critical
social constructivism – it has a qualified foundationalist approach to the
empirical, acknowledging the shifting notion of ‘reality’ and the politicisation
of identifying what is ‘real’ and what is possible. This foundationalism, in a
Derridian sense, rejects the notion of a value-neutral reality (Zehfuss, 2002:
207). There is a need to emphasize the fact that using statistical methods to
evaluate data capturing political concepts does not render the concepts
epistemologically incontestable (Jupille, 2005: 216). The structural equation
model technique employed in this article uses a number of different but related
statements to measure the values that are hypothesised to drive attitudes to
neutrality; these multiple indicators are translated into an operationalized
latent variable that is interpreted as an orientation. Theoretically, this is a less
essentialized operationalisation than other techniques such as multiple
regression analysis that use one single measurement to represent a variable.
The meaning is a little more open to interpretation – although hardcore
positivists might see this as merely introducing more error. Whilst the
language used is different to that of the interpretative camp of critical
constructivism, nevertheless, the findings are important to understand as they
build on the results of prior interpretative analyses. This cognitive empirical
approach to understanding neutrality fits into the concept of social
constructivism as a substantive theory of politics: “The cognitivists, especially
in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), are told that their studies…are a coherent
constructivist approach (ISA Panel 1995)”. (Wæver, 1997: 23-24)

Variables and Hypotheses

Jesse identifies factors such as hostile relations with Britain, the continuing
separation of Northern Ireland and notions of independence and sovereignty as
drivers of Irish neutrality (2006: 8). There is plenty of support in the literature
for the independence (Fanning, 1996: 14; Fisk, 1983: 39; Keatinge, 1984:
108), anti-British sentiment (Andrén, 1978: 174; Fanning, 1996: 145; Fisk,
1983: 76; Keatinge, 1989: 68; Kux, 1986: 36; Sundelius, 1987: 8) and
Northern Ireland hypotheses (Karsh, 1988: 192; Keatinge, 1978: 112; Salmon,
In this model, an “ethnocentrism” latent variable is substituted for anti-British sentiment due to data limitations. In addition to these factors, the literature supports testing the notions of patriotism/identity, (Fanning, 1996: 146; Keatinge, 1984: 6-7; McSweeney, 1985b: 119) and efficacy (Keatinge, 1978: 93) as drivers of neutrality, associated with social constructivist and realist dimensions of neutrality, respectively. The dependent latent variable comprising a zero to ten-point scale captures whether Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances or give up its neutrality and whether neutrality is not at all important or very important. The data is derived from the ISPAS survey carried out during the winter of 2001 and spring of 2002, based on a random sample of the electorate (those aged over eighteen and registered to vote).

**National identity/Patriotism**

William Chittick has been trying to get the academic community to accept an identity dimension in models of public opinion on foreign policy (POFP) since the mid-1980s (Hart, 1995). Part of the difficulty is probably due to the lack of a theoretical framework supporting the introduction of an identity dimension. Although many POFP analysts have linked dimensions to “venerable IR theories of realism and liberalism” (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 515), to date, social constructivism has not featured in the POFP literature as a suitable theoretical avenue, probably because it only became influential as a tradition in IR in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Weber, 2001: 60), compounded by the fact that “IR constructivism is at a preliminary stage only; much work still remains before it becomes a normal and taken-for-granted way of doing IR theory and research” (Adler, 2002: 111). Outside of the POFP literature, the relationship between neutrality and national identity has been identified by Irish history and politics academics, e.g. Ronan Fanning notes that, “no Irish government would be so foolhardy as to underestimate the fierce hold on the popular imagination of the historic bond between Irish neutrality and Irish identity”. (1996: 146) This literature, combined with the theoretical reasons discussed earlier, supports the proposed hypothesis that attachment to Irish national identity is related to attachment to neutrality.10

Notably, identity is a factor in analyses of European neutrality, i.e. Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland. In the Swedish case, Annical Kronsell and Erika Svedberg (2001: 154) argue that: “A collective identity was shaped by the neutrality doctrine…the neutrality doctrine can be seen as ‘the state’s external projection of itself into the world’ (Wæver, forthcoming)”. Ann-Sofie Dahl claims “it is important to understand the position which neutrality has occupied generally in Swedish society. Neutrality evolved over the years from merely the security doctrine of the country to become a central tenet of Swedish national identity. (1997: 19-22) The former President of the Swiss Confederation, Max Petitpierre argued that Swiss “neutrality’s justification
does not lie in foreign opinion, even though this is important to us and we must seek to inform it and influence it. Justification lies above all in our own conviction that in breaking away from neutrality we would lose our national character” (Ogley, 1970: 180). Furthermore, Jean Freymond explains that “neutrality became and remains the guiding principle of Swiss foreign policy, not only in the eyes of the authorities, but even more for public opinion, to the extent that it has become one of the components of Swiss identity”. (1990: 181) Analysing Austrian neutrality, Hans Thalberg surmised that, “neutrality has to reflect the general character and temperament of a nation” (1989: 236). In a discussion of Finnish neutrality, Pertti Joenniemi argues that “neutrality is not only a role or status; it also connotes a more general foreign-policy profile or identity”. (1989: 58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other country in the world</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud</td>
<td>Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be Irish?</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>import’nt</td>
<td>Overall, how important is it to you that you are ‘Irish’ or [other nationality]</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independence/sovereignty**

The modern history and politics literatures on Irish neutrality posit independence and sovereignty as key factors underpinning Ireland’s neutrality; the former also makes explicit reference to public attitudes in this respect. Robert Fisk dubbed Ireland’s neutrality in the Second World War, “a publicly non-aligned independence that finally demonstrated the sovereignty of de Valera’s state and her break with the Empire”. (Fisk, 1983: 39) (See also Fanning (1996: 139) Vukadinovic (1989: 41-42) and Karsh (1988: 192)). Patrick Keatinge notes a “psychological need” in Irish people “for a dramatic manifestation of independence”, a factor, he argues, that underpinned people’s reluctance to question the doctrine of neutrality. (1978: 73) Due to the strong association of neutrality with independence, it is hypothesised that independence should be a significant factor structuring attitudes to Irish neutrality - the more an individual favours Irish independence, the more that person should favour the maintenance of Irish neutrality.11
TABLE 5. Independence Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU unifica</td>
<td>European Unification has gone too far -&gt; not far enough</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unite/Indep</td>
<td>Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the EU -&gt; protect independence</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU memb</td>
<td>Ireland’s membership of the European Union is a bad thing -&gt; a good thing</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice I</td>
<td>I would like you to imagine you are voting on the next referendum on the Nice Treaty [Nice II]. Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 7? [1 -&gt; definitely in favour; 7 -&gt; definitely against]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Northern Ireland

The comparative literature cites Northern Ireland as an important dynamic of Irish neutrality; e.g. Bengt Sundelius declares Irish neutrality “is intimately linked to the unsettled question of Northern Ireland” (1987: 8) and Keatinge posits Irish neutrality as “a symbol of two of the most emotionally charged Irish national aspirations”, independence and unification of the island (1972: 439). Efraim Karsh argues “neutrality has been both a product of the painful question of Partition and a means for its solution”. (1988: 192) Many academics recall the British government’s attempts to involve Ireland in the Second World War by floating re-unification proposals (Keatinge, 1978: 110-111), which Eamon de Valera consistently refused. Although Róisín Doherty acknowledges that “partition was not the primary motivation for neutrality, sovereignty was more important to de Valera”, she maintains that “the impression among the general public was different”. (2002: 41) As academic discussions of the links between Northern Ireland and neutrality refer only to the level of statesmanship and there has been no convincing evidence that the issue embedded itself in the public mind, it is hypothesised that attitudes to the Northern Ireland question should have little bearing on attitudes to Irish neutrality.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>united/sep</td>
<td>It is essential that all of Ireland becomes united in one state-&gt; the different parts of Ireland are best left as separate states</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reunify</td>
<td>The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to reunify with the rest of Ireland [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brit say</td>
<td>The British government should continue to have a lot of say in the way Northern Ireland is run [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>withdraw</td>
<td>The British government should declare its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethnocentrism**

With only one indicator to estimate an anti-British latent construct, a wider theoretical perspective was taken in relation to this issue: rather than focus on one specific “outgroup”, such as “the British” or the “English”, an international and widely used “ethnocentrism” latent orientation is employed in the model. Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987: 1108) define ethnocentrism as “the belief that one’s country is superior to all others” and make a link between ethnocentrism’s fostering of a self-centred and parochial view of the world and a tendency towards isolationism. Peter Schmidt and Aribert Heyder (2000) identify two dimensions of ethnocentrism: a phenomenon of cultural narrowness and the over-evaluation or idealization of the ingroup. The cultural effect of Ireland’s postcolonial legacy and the notable persistence of a self-critical discourse in the media indicate the small likelihood of “national superiority” and “blind nationalist” tendencies among the Irish population; that said, several realist academics (Doherty, 2002: 30; Fanning, 1996: 142-143; FitzGerald, 1995; Salmon, 1989) who maintain that Irish neutrality is a myth have alleged pietistic inclinations among some neutrality supporters, emboldened by an image of neutrality as a morally superior foreign policy option. As realist thinking drives the hypothesized link, ethnocentrism is not expected to be a significant dynamic of Irish public opinion on neutrality.
Table 7. Ethnocentrism Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interests</td>
<td>Ireland should always follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>Irish people should support their country even when it is wrong</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ire better</td>
<td>Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most countries</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like Irish</td>
<td>The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Irish</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Efficacy

Another dynamic of neutrality that frequently appears in the foreign policy literature is the realist notion of efficacy, reflecting perceived levels of power. Neutrality violates the realist power assumption because “neutrality is the opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state”. (Karsh, 1988: 4) The neorealist paradigm expects “small” states to seek security with other states in a military alliance because their low levels of efficacy hamper survival in an anarchic world. The Irish government believes that “Ireland is a small country with a limited capacity to influence its external environment” (Ireland, 2000: 3.2.1) and the public may share this view. The efficacy latent variable in this model comprises a personal concept of efficacy (defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” (Acock, Clarke and Stewart, 1985: 1063)), a measure concerning the government’s ability to influence factors affecting Ireland given the pressure of external factors and a third concerning the influence of political parties. Given the link between neutrality and efficacy is a realist-based “costs and benefits” hypothesis existing at the state-government level, it is hypothesized that efficacy is not a significant determinant of attitudes to neutrality.

Table 8. Efficacy Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>govt</td>
<td>In today’s world, an Irish government can’t really influence what happens in this country. [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>The ordinary person has no influence on politics. [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party</td>
<td>It doesn’t really matter which political party is in power, in the end things go on much the same. [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluation of the measurement model concerns the extent to which the observed variables are actually measuring the hypothesized latent variables. The relationship between the observed variables and the latent variables are indicated by the factor loadings. Factor loadings are interpreted as unstandardized regression coefficients that estimate the direct effects of the factors on the indicators (Kline, 1998: 207); they indicate expected change in the indicator given a 1-point increase in the factor (Kline, 1998: 215). In this model (n=1855), all of the unstandardized loadings that are not fixed to 1.0 to scale factors, are significant at the .01 level and all of the error variances are different from zero and significant at the .01 level. Overall, the measurement model appears to perform well, helped by the fact that each latent variable is represented by at least three indicators that are psychometrically sound.

The evaluation of the structural model concerns the relationship between the neutrality, independence, patriotism, efficacy, ethnocentrism and Northern Ireland latent variables. The statistical significance of parameter estimates (magnitude) and the direction (positive or negative coefficients) are required to provide a meaningful interpretation of the results. The use of a correlation matrix results in more conservative estimates of parameter statistical significance (Kelloway, 1998: 19). Another important measure is the assessment of the ‘fit’ of the data to the model, specifically, the comparative fit of the default model to the data vis-à-vis the null model (Kelloway, 1998: 29). The goodness-of-fit statistics that evaluate the overall fit of the model are included. The rmsea figure should be above .04 and the pclose should approximate 1.00.
Figure 1. The Structural Equation Model of Public Opinion

Unstandardized estimates
chi-square=681.508 df=160 p-value=.000
rmsea=.042 pclose=1.00
Looking at the regression weights of the five latent variables shown in Table 9, only the two hypothesized determinants of public support for Irish neutrality, independence and patriotism, show statistically significant parameter estimates and positive relationships (.6 and .8 respectively) with the neutrality latent variable. In comparison, the efficacy (.04), Northern Ireland (-.01) and ethnocentrism (-.15) parameters are weak and are not statistically significant. Many public opinion researchers connect these types of “domain beliefs to international relations theory – realism and idealism (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1990; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Wittkopf 1990, 1994; Maggiotto 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Russett, Hartley, and Murray 1994; Holsti 1996; Murray, Cowden and Russett 1999; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Page and Barabas 2000)” (Jenkins-Smith, 2004: 291). The relative strength of the independence and patriotism factors in the model confirms the importance of these two drivers in the maintenance of Irish neutrality and the theoretical relevance of the social constructivist framework that considers the identity factor in foreign policy analysis. Jesse calls for ways to understand both sovereignty and identity as two central dynamics of Irish neutrality: arguably, there is a dynamic of interdependence between these two factors (see Keatinge (1984: 6-7) and Fanning (1996: 137) who theorise interaction at the level of the state). Fanning (1996: 140) sees the interplay at work at the level of the public: “by the end of the Second World War neutrality had become what it largely remains in the popular mind until today: the hallmark of independence, a badge of patriotic honour inextricably linked with the popular perception of Irish national identity”. The relationship between independence and patriotism is symbiotic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 9. Regression Weights of the Structural Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality ← Ethnocentrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality ← Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality ← Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality ← Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality ← Efficacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

For Jesse (2006: 8) “it is obvious that realist theory grossly underestimates the contributions of domestic factors to the establishment and maintenance of Irish neutrality”. Neoliberalism is not the best alternative framework because it accords public opinion agency in foreign policy only through governments; as the Irish government’s concept of neutrality does not reflect or capture public concepts of neutrality, government, in this case, is an unlikely representative intermediary. Jesse’s argument that the development of a security identity that is tied to nationalism and independence contributes to the continuation of neutrality (2006: 23, 25) is supported, but is inconsistent with claims that liberal theories give a better understanding of continued Irish neutrality (2006: 23) because identity and independence are the drivers underpinning the agency of the Irish public in maintaining Irish neutrality and liberal theories, unlike critical constructivism, do not seriously consider identity as a variable in state foreign policy or as a driver of public support for foreign policy. This identity-based neutrality dynamic suggests there will be stability in the Irish population’s support for Irish neutrality, as radical short-term change in the identity (and values) of mass publics is rare. This has implications for the future referendum on Irish neutrality in the context of governments’ agreement to create a European Union military alliance.

David Dessler (1999: 123) has speculated on the contribution of constructivism to FPA and IR, asking whether constructivists would introduce new methods and new epistemological standards to empirical enquiry. The employment of a critical perspectivist approach to the analysis of public concepts of neutrality in this article has contributed to this task, demonstrating that the study of neutrality as a phenomenon of IR and FPA required “new forms of theoretical and historical analysis”. (Dessler, 1999: 123) Dessler also asked whether constructivism would turn attention to long-ignored causal factors and effects in world politics; the validation of a critical constructivist decision to include an identity variable in the analysis of the drivers of public attitudes to neutrality points to a long ignored causal factor of foreign policy that deserves further empirical attention.

Liberals like Andrew Moravscik (1997) want a synthesis of liberal and constructivist theory, the conventional constructivist Alexander Wendt (1992: 425) wants strong liberals and constructivists to engage, and a sympathetic critical constructivist wants “a serious dialogue by both mainstream scholars and conventional constructivists with critical constructivists” (Jacobsen, 2003: 60). Others want constructivism to build bridges with particular sub-disciplines: Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 396) see constructivism building bridges with comparative politics and David Patrick Houghton (2007: 33, 42) advocates bridges with comparative FPA. Whilst the constructivist project has
sought to open up the relatively narrow theoretical fields in IR (Ruggie, 1998: 862), given its concerns with emancipation, methodological plurality, and the origins, nature and politics of identity, arguably the critical strand of constructivism is better equipped to achieve that goal than conventional constructivism. Critical social constructivism should collaborate with the sub-discipline of public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) to further theorize the mass public as an agent in FPA and IR.

Notes

1 Strictly speaking, neorealism is classified as a “theory” by its adherents, although sympathetic critics have argued for neorealism to be understood as a philosophical orientation or a research programme (Donnelly, 2000: 75) rather than a theory defined by an explicit set of assumptions (Donnelly, 2000: 6). Kenneth Waltz’s employment of “theory” as the term for neorealism (1995: 71) indicates a hierarchy of variables and the notion of rigour and regularities; ‘theory’ is attractive to neorealists because the latter indicate a commitment to positivist science. Critical constructivist adherents see social constructivism as an “approach”, not a theory (Hopf, 2000: 1772) because they deny the worthiness of ‘grand theories’ and that their own contribution to the study of world politics constitutes a ‘school’ or even a unified theoretical approach (Burchill, 2001: 8). Others use the term “theory” but interpret it differently to neoliberals and neorealists, e.g. Adler argues that constructivism, unlike realism and liberalism, is not a theory of politics but “rather, it is a social theory on which constructivist theories of international politics – for example, about war, cooperation and international community – are based” (1997: 323). Thus, different strands of constructivism are associated with the adoption of either “approach” or “theory”.

2 The neorealist accounts of world politics emphasizing ‘structure’ over ‘agency’ tend to draw deep distinctions between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics, with the interrelationship between the two effectively ignored. Developments in domestic civil society or at the individual level are perceived as having little or no meaning at the international level (Rengger, 1990: 131). Neorealism presents hierarchic domestic and anarchic international politics as qualitatively different realms that must be studied with logically incompatible theoretical frameworks (Donnelly, 2000: 12).

3 Although many elites see their task as trying to persuade the public to follow their leaders in this respect and track public opinion using private party polls.

4 Garret FitzGerald asserts “Irish neutrality is, of course, as the main political parties have made clear, military neutrality viz. non participation in a military alliance” (1988: 28). Only Sinn Fein and the Green Party advocate a broader concept of active neutrality.

5 Not all fifty categories of verbatim responses are shown or discussed here, mainly the categories of responses comparable to Gilland’s supercodes. Little-mentioned or irrelevant codes comprise the ‘other’ category.

6 Rank order is shown instead of percentages because of differences in the samples and coding frames across the surveys.

7 Christine Agius’s social constructivist analysis of Swedish neutrality incorporates discursive aspects of identity in arguments concerning the maintenance of a state’s neutrality. She argues active internationalism, as a cornerstone of neutrality practice, constitutes Swedish political identity (2006: 156-157). Anti-neutrality discourses during the Swedish referendum on EU membership tried to reinvent national ideals for people to identify with, because neutrality, along with other issues, “was still part of the public memory of self” (Aguis, 2006: 159). Laurent Goetschel argues that values, interests and identity converge in the concept of neutrality because “neutrality has a role as an identity-provider for the population” (1999: 121).
There is also a link between people’s support for alliances and their values and identity: “citizen support for alliance structures and international institutions contains a substantial ‘diffuse’, or affective, element that captures their sense of common values and identification in addition to assessments of security policy choices (Eichenberg 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991)” (Eichenberg, 2000: 171).

The post-positivist issue is not with the methods used, but the unacknowledged IR theoretical assumptions brought to bear on data analysis that effectively exclude post-realist conceptions of neutrality and role of the public in constituting neutrality.

Patriotism/national identity latent variable indicators are separated from the more “negative” embodiments of blind nationalism or national superiority: see Thomas Blank et al. (2001) and Hurwitz and Peffley (1990: 8).

The independence indicators are constructed in a binary with deeper EU integration (not Jesse’s suggestion of a “British” other) reflecting the importance of European integration for the government, academics’ frequent use of EU referendum voting indicators, and the fact that elusive concepts such as independence are constructed and sustained in relation to perceived binary opposites.

References


Schmidt, Peter and Heyder, Aribert (2000). Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism in East and West Germany draft paper.


