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Parliamentary parties in the British House of Commons tend to experience high levels of voting unity with individual MPs only occasionally dissenting from party policy. Although constituency influence has been used extensively to predict legislative behaviour in candidate-centred electoral environments, it is argued here that constituency preferences can, under certain circumstances, shape parliamentary behaviour in a strong-party, weak personal-vote, electoral environment such as the United Kingdom. To empirically test this argument, the interest representation of British Muslims in the British House of Commons and specifically the voting record of MPs on proposed domestic anti-terrorism legislation seen to target British Muslims is investigated. The data shows that Labour MPs with certain constituency characteristics (relatively large Muslim, ethnic minority and migrant populations) were more likely to vote against the leadership position on anti-terrorism proposals perceived to target certain minorities.

Introduction

Parliamentary parties in the British House of Commons tend to experience high levels of voting unity, with individual MPs seldom, if ever, dissenting from party policy. The party centred nature of voting in the chamber mirrors the party-centred nature of British elections (Cox 1987). In contrast to other legislative settings, research into British MPs' voting behaviour has generally downplayed the possibility of a link between how MPs vote and the preferences of voters in their constituencies. Because of the party-centred nature of the electoral system, the assumption is that British MPs are unresponsive to constituents' preferences, leading scholars to discount constituency influences as an explanation for legislative behaviour. The perspective is in keeping with the comparative literature on legislative voting behaviour which suggests that personal-vote electoral systems induce party disunity in the legislative arena while party-centred electoral rules induce unified party voting (see, for example, Carey 2007; Depauw and Martin 2009).

Rejecting the universalism of this claim, this study argues an alternative view which suggests that party centred electoral environments, can, under certain circumstances, be associated with dissent and party disunity within the parliamentary arena. It is argued that the preferences of local voters may cause legislators to vote against their parties in a legislative division, even in the absence of clear incentives to cultivate personal votes.¹ To empirically test this argument, the interest representation of British Muslims in the British House of Commons and specifically the voting record of MPs on proposed domestic anti-terrorism legislation seen to target British Muslims is explored. The evidence suggests a link between constituency characteristics and MPs' voting behaviour.

The next section reviews the existing research that seeks to explain cases of legislative voting disunity in the British House of Commons. A detailed explanation of why and under what circumstances constituency characteristics should help predict patterns of parliamentary voting in a strong-party environment is then presented. Votes on the *2005 Terrorism Bill* supply the data to test the congruence theory of MP behaviour. The concluding section considers the broader consequences of this research for our understanding of parliamentary behaviour and minority-group representation in British politics.

Conventional Views on Voting Unity

A number of distinctive approaches to explaining cases of parliamentary party disunity can be seen in the existing literature on the British House of Commons. From one perspective, parliamentary party voting *unity* is explained on the basis of the ideological cohesiveness within each parliamentary party. Put simply, members of the same party vote the same way because they think the same way. Evidence of such ideological cohesion comes in particular from free-votes, where, despite the lack of pressure to vote strictly along party lines, most MPs nevertheless do (see, for example, Cowley 1998, Baughman 2004). The implication of this approach for understanding dissent is clear: Where an MP disagrees ideologically with the stance of the party leadership, that

¹ Throughout this paper the words "constituency" refers to the geographical constituency which an MP represents. British MPs are elected by the single member plurality ballot structure.

MP will dissent (Cowley and Norton 1999). Cowley (2002) finds a relationship between ideology and patterns of dissent, with left-leaning Labour MPs more likely to revolt.

Yet, while confirming an important role for preferences in shaping MPs' voting behaviour, Kam (2001: 115) noted that "An MP's party affiliation provides vastly more information about his or her behaviour than do his or her preferences." Such a perspective highlights the role of party in shaping voting behaviour (Garner and Letki 2005). Cowley (2005), while also acknowledging the obvious propensity of like-minded MPs to vote with each other, notes the importance of the legislative party leadership's role to "persuade, compromise, induce and sanction." Piper (1991) pointed to the importance of party loyalty for promotion. Building on this perspective, Benedetto and Hix (2007) showed that MPs who stand little chance of future promotion are more likely to vote against the party leadership. More generally, Kam (2001) sees breaches in party voting unity as resulting from breakdowns in party leadership.

In British politics, typically the local party organization plays an important role in selecting and re-selecting a candidate. The power to deselect is likely to strongly influence the behaviour of parliamentarians (Strøm 1997). Observing the local party punishment of anti-Suez Conservatives MPs, Epstein (1960) was among the first to show that the preferences of the constituency-level party organisation could influence an MP to dissent from the national party leadership (Epstein: 384). Rasmussen (1966) found a similar constituency party-MP link for the Profumo affair. Later, however, Schwarz and Lambert (1971) questioned the influence of local party organisations in motivating dissent or loyalty, finding only a weak relationship between the threat of deselection by the local party and loyalty to the party among Conservative MPs. Likewise, Norton (see, for example, Norton 1978, 1980) has questioned the extent to which MPs who dissent do so to please local party organizations. Norton (2003) noted that some Labour MPs successfully confronted pressure from their local party for not dissenting from support of the Labour Government's Iraq policy.

For the sake of clarity, a careful differentiation between the constituency-level party and the constituency electorate is necessary. In British politics the selectorate (local party) and electorate differ greatly in composition and size, with only a small proportion of the electorate forming the selectorate. Clearly indeed, the preferences of the two groups may be very different. In addition to being more actively engaged in partisan affairs, the median selectorate is likely to have more extreme views than the median voter (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Hence, the need to differentiate between constituency party and constituency (voter). Thus, much of the research branded as exploring constituency influence on MP behaviour is more appropriately branded an exploration of constituency-party influence. But what precisely is the known influence of constituency voters on MPs' voting behaviour?

The role of constituents in shaping the voting behaviour of British MPs has been most researched with regard to free-votes. While the evidence is not always strong, the consensus is that a link exists between constituents and MPs. Notably of course, by definition, free votes cannot engender dissent, as MPs are free to vote as they choose. Looking at a selection of votes on social issues, Hibbing and Marsh (1987: 291) concluded that "The more Roman Catholics there are in a constituency, the more likely the person representing that constituency is to vote in a socially conservative fashion." Considering un-whipped votes on abortion, by linking the religiosity of a

constituency to MPs' voting records on abortion during the 1990s, Baughman (2004) found evidence that members voted in accord with the preferences of their constituents.² Thus, while an analysis of free votes provides some evidence of constituency effect, the obvious selection bias in dealing with unmanaged votes prevents weighing the competing pressures of national party and constituency interests.

The literature on constituency effect in the presence of managed votes is relatively sparse and not entirely conclusive. In her work on the repeal of Corn Laws in the mid 1840s, Schonhardt-Bailey (1994) found that MPs from (pro-protectionist) agricultural constituencies were more likely to vote to maintain protection, and in the overall assessment, constituency interests took precedence over MPs' personal ideologies. Arguing that MPs face potentially competing pressures from three different sources (national party, local party and constituents), Gaines and Garrett (1993) found evidence that government backbench rebellions in the mid- to late 1970s could be at least partly explained by constituency characteristics (in particular the economic and social constituency characteristics such as percentage of council housing dwellers and the occupational backgrounds of voters). Exploring revolts between 1992-1997, Depauw (2003) discounts the impact of constituency interests, discovering in his data analysis that constituency-level variables such as population density, owner-occupier rates, public housing rates, proportion of non-nationals, occupations, and unemployment rates are not easily related to an MP's decision to dissent. Thus, while some evidence exists for constituency effect in the British parliamentary case, the research is rather limited and not always conclusive. The next section explores the theoretical basis for such a constituency effect, even in the presence of strong parties and little incentive to cultivate personal votes.

Congruence and Strong Parties

In a representative system of government, voters delegate decision-making tasks to elected officials who may be more or less in accord with the preferences and attitudes of the constituents who elected their representatives. At the same time, legislators may behave in such a way as to reflect the preferences and opinions of constituents, or they may choose to discount or ignore such preferences. Throughout their careers in parliament, members have a number of opportunities to express congruence with constituents, but perhaps nowhere more significantly than when voting in the chamber on proposed legislation of interest to the electorate in their geographical constituency.

When choosing how to vote in legislative divisions, members recognise that their behaviour may be observed by constituents and may later influence voters' decisions at election time. When members vote in line with the preferences of constituents, they are more likely to hold favour with those constituents, which will help maximize their personal vote at a general election. Thus, representatives elected under candidate-centred ballot structures may at times vote against their party's policy in parliament to ensure continued electoral support in their districts. A large body of research has sought to test empirically these claims of a connection between voter preferences and legislators' actions. One of the earliest studies (Miller and Stokes 1963) quantified the degree of control constituents exert on the voting behaviour of members

² Due to the lack of data on constituency characteristics, Baughman (2004) relies on a relatively crude, regional-based, measure of constituency preferences.

of the United States House of Representatives, concluding that members of Congress deviate from the party line based on local pressure to vote for local interests. As discussed above, this approach has enjoyed some success explaining the limited cross-party voting on free (unmanaged) votes in the House of Commons.

Yet, in the United Kingdom, where the electorate votes on the basis of a candidate's party label (Denver 2007), the electoral benefits accruing to a dissenting legislator have been assumed to be little or none. Pattie, Fieldhouse and Johnston (1994) found that the direction of government backbenchers' votes has little impact on their subsequent electoral popularity. Congruence, then, is typically regarded as a phenomenon present only in personal-vote electoral environments in which individual candidates gain or lose support based on their personal performances. The phenomenon is considered of little use for explaining the legislative voting behaviour of British MPs.

Despite this, Kam (2009: 116-141) notes that dissent provides MPs with two valuable resources: Increased name recognition and higher approval ratings. In surveys of voters, Carman (2006) finds that the British electorate expects their MP to vote on the basis of constituency preference even when it conflicts with an MP's own judgement by a margin of 76 to 18 percent. In the same survey, just 10 percent of respondents felt that an MP should vote along party lines when the position of the party is in conflict with the preference of constituents.

Spirling (2007) found that when important government business is disrupted by an MP's revolt, that MP is punished at election time. Contrarily, MPs tend to be rewarded at election time for rebelling on less important matters. Cowley (2005) found that Labour MPs who supported the Government's Iraq War policy and who represented constituencies with a significant Muslim population did disproportionately worse in the 2005 election than their Labour colleagues who dissented from Government policy (see also Cowley and Stuart 2005). This result provides some evidence of an electoral effect for voting behaviour in the British case, despite the near-consensus that the behaviour of individual MPs has little impact on their electoral fortunes because of the assumed strong-party nature of the British electoral system.

But congruence theory can help explain legislative behaviour even in a strong party system such as that of the United Kingdom (Gaines and Garrett 1993). Key to this argument is recognising that in a party-centred electoral environment, an MP *may*, under certain circumstances, have an electoral incentive to vote against the party leadership, as discussed next.

An MP's electoral fortune in the next general election is, by conventional accounts, tied directly to the electoral fortunes of the MP's party. Hence, an MP has a vested interest in the electoral standing of the party. More precisely, an MP is concerned about the electoral popularity of the MP's party in the MP's constituency. Building on the median-voter theory (Downs 1957), the assumption is that a political party's standing within any constituency directly relates to the policy of each party and the congruence between the preferences of the median local voter and the political party. If a political party is to win in a given constituency, it must have policies closely congruent to the preferences of that electoral segment. This situation, in a single-constituency, strong party environment, is analogous to the need of legislators in a candidate-centred electoral environment to maintain policy congruence with their constituents. In a candidate-centred environment, such as the United States, a legislator

will vote to maximize the chances of re-election. In a party-centred environment, a legislator votes to ensure party policy is as congruent as possible with the preferences of constituents. By doing so, legislators attempt to effect party policy to ensure continued electoral support for the party within their constituencies. The difference of course, is that in the US, an incumbent wins re-election by cultivating personal support, in the UK, an incumbent wins re-election not by cultivating personal support but by ensuring support for his or her party, or at the very least highlighting a tension between the representative's views and party policy.

This perspective provides for a very different understanding of legislators' rebellions in party-centred electoral systems than normal accounts provide. While existing studies discount constituency-legislator congruence because of the absence of personal vote incentives, the perspective presented here exposes the strategic interest that MPs have in party-constituency congruence.

For dissent to occur, the preferences of the legislator and her constituents must be at odds with the policy proposal of the legislator's party. Only under this condition is a legislator's dissent to be expected. Why, then, would the party's leadership make policy proposals that would have electoral costs? Perhaps a trade-off occurs because of the heterogeneity of policy preferences across geographical constituencies. A party in government will propose a policy that appeals to the median national voter, and an individual MP will prefer a policy that appeals to the median voter in their constituency. Where a gap exists between the constituency's preferences and the proposed government policy (determined by the preferences of the national median voter) the expectation is that an MP will dissent in the legislative vote either in an attempt to bring government policy into accord with his or her constituents' preferences or to signal to constituents that he or she is personally at odds with party policy.

Empirical Analysis

Research on domestic anti-terrorism votes in the United States Congress found that both Democrat and Republican members were positively responsive in their roll-call behaviour to the presence of Muslim voters in their districts (Martin 2009). To test for such constituency-legislator congruence in British politics, the empirical focus here is on a series of legislative votes in the House of Commons on proposed domestic anti-terrorism legislation.

The passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (hereafter, the Terrorism Bill) through the House of Commons in 2005 and 2006 included a number of parliamentary votes in which a relatively large group of Labour backbenchers revolted against their party's leadership, and, on two occasions, resulted in defeat for the government's policy. Opposition to the legislation came from the British Muslim community who felt that the proposed legislation unjustly targeted them. Hence, members of the House of Commons faced a policy proposal that was perceived to be targeting specific groups in British society.

Islam is the second most common faith in Britain with just under 3 percent of census respondents self-identifying themselves as Muslim (Office for National Statistics, nd). Table 1 reports the percentage of Muslims per constituency in England and Wales. Just fewer than 60 percent of electoral constituencies in England and Wales have a Muslim population of less than 1 percent (331 out of 569 constituencies).

Approximately 7 per cent of constituencies have Muslim populations greater than 10 percent (39 out of 569 constituencies). While no constituency in England or Wales has a majority Muslim population, one constituency (Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small Heath) is 48.8 percent Muslim. The picture that emerges is of a geographical concentration and a significant inter-constituency variation in the proportion of Muslim voters. This variation allows for the possibility of finding a relationship between MPs' voting records and constituents' religious characteristics.

[Table 1 around here]

Evidence exists to suggest that the British Muslim population feels strongly that much of the anti-terrorism legislation was targeted toward their community. As one human rights watch-group reported: "Muslims in particular have felt targeted and under general suspicion, perceptions reinforced by government announcements and policies" (Amnesty International, 2005). The British Islamic Human Rights Commission, for example, strongly criticized many of the provisions of the Terrorism Bill, arguing that it disproportionately targeted Muslims. The Terrorism Bill provides a good example of proposed legislation for which certain segments of the population have strong preferences that are possibly at odds with the preferences of the general population. Because Muslim and minority communities tend to be geographically concentrated in particular electoral constituencies, these votes provide an ideal opportunity to test for a constituency basis for MPs' rebellion against the party's leadership. For an MP representing a constituency with a relatively large proportion of Muslims, that legislator will know that Muslim constituents will hold the party in government electorally accountable for the content of the Terrorism Act, providing an incentive for that government MP to vote against the party leadership.

The roll-call analysis is limited to the votes of members of the government's party. The real interest lies in explaining the voting behaviour of Labour MPs faced with either voting with their party or taking an independent position.³ Opposition MPs enjoyed a high degree of voting cohesion for the votes being explored here. Voting by the opposition parties was in favour of minorities and this lack of variation provides further reasons for focusing only on Labour MPs. Religious data limitations require including only Labour MPs from England and Wales.

A summary of the content, proposals and results of each of five different divisions explored in this paper appears in Table 2. The rationales for including these votes are twofold: First, in each of these divisions, 15 or more Labour backbenchers voted against their party's leadership. Second, the selected divisions represent the votes most reported in the national media, both before and after the vote. The result of each vote was a lower than normal government majority, and, on two occasions, an actual government defeat. The votes include both Opposition and Government proposals. For this reason, each vote by each Labour MP is coded as favouring or opposing the

³ As Spirling (2007: 6) noted, "[A]s with other scholars in the field, our work here will concentrate on the behaviour of *government* (i.e. Labour) party MPs: the 'power' of the government relative to other parties in a Westminster system means that these representatives receive more media attention, and are more likely to be held accountable for the state of the polity at election time. Thus, these are the members for whom the stakes are highest—for whom party unity and/or independence matter most."

preferences of minority electors. Thus, a pro-minority stance is the one which Muslim voters would be most likely to support.

[Table 2 around here]

While abstentions could be an intermediate form of dissent in the sense that an abstaining MP is voting neither for nor against the government, refraining from voting could also represent a member who was unable to be in the chamber to vote and who may have had a *pairing* arrangement by agreement with the party whip. Even in the presence of a three-line whip, the indefiniteness of the motivation for abstentions requires their exclusion from analytical consideration.

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a Logit regression model is employed to estimate the constituency effects on votes. This estimation technique is frequently used in roll-call vote analyses and is theoretically appropriate here. Each of the five votes is estimated separately, rather than being pooled - as is increasingly the standard practice in roll-call analyses. Pooling votes violates the independence assumption, and legislators' positions are likely similar across related votes. Because I expect the explanatory variable to have similar effects on each of the five votes, each vote is analysed separately in order to maintain the independence condition.

The independent variables are the characteristics of the given constituency. Data on constituency characteristics comes from the 2001 Census of Population, unless otherwise noted. Of most interest is the proportion of the population in each constituency that is Muslim, given that the Muslim community felt themselves to be the particular target of much of the proposed legislation. The variable, *Muslim*, is the percentage of the population in a constituency that are Muslim. I include the effect of two other measures of inter-constituency diversity of preferences: the percentage migrants (*Migrant*) and the percentage non-white (*Ethnic*). Perhaps both these communities share similar preferences with the Muslim community on policing matters and fear being targeted because of race or nationality, or have historically been the target of minority profiling. Both these measures positively correlate with *Muslim*, as demonstrated in Table 3. However, one might reasonably expect the effect of *Muslim* to be different and strongest. Given this circumstance, I the estimates of the effect of each of these three measures occur separately.

[Table 3 around here]

Controls for a number of other factors that could explain a Labour MP's decision to defect from the leadership position are included. The data for control variables comes from *The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005*.⁴ The variable *MP Race* captures whether or not the voting MP belongs to an ethnic minority, with white MPs coded 0 and ethnic-minority MP coded 1. The expectation is for a positive relationship; an ethnic minority Labour MP is more likely than a white MP to vote according to pro-minority interest, all else being equal. This variable helps capture the *personal* preferences of the MP which may serve as an alternative explanation of MP voting behaviour to the constituency congruence theory.

I include the variable *Candidate race* to capture whether or not the sitting MP faced a minority candidate in the 2005 election. Evidence from the United States indicates that electoral campaigning and the preferences and policies of non-successful

⁴ *The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005*, Release 1.1 compiled by Pippa Norris.

candidates can often influence the subsequent attitude and voting behaviour of the successful candidate (Sulkin, 2005). Included also is the variable *Electoral Majority* which reflects the electoral security of the MP at the 2005 election. MPs in marginal seats are more likely to want their party's label to be in congruence with constituent preferences, and thus, are more willing to defect from the party's leadership. The variable, *Freshman*, measures whether or not the MP was first elected or returned as an incumbent in the 2005 election. Given their lack of parliamentary experience, newer MPs may be more reluctant to stray from the party leadership, regardless of constituents' preferences.

Results

The results of the relationship between the percentage of Muslim and Labour MPs voting on terrorism legislation are reported in Table Four. As expected, Labour Party MPs voting on anti-terrorist legislation is strongly related to the proportion of their constituency population that is Muslim. Members are more likely to support the pro-minority position on anti-terrorist legislation, as the proportion of Muslims increases in their constituencies. This holds for all five votes. No other explanatory variable is a robust predictor of Labour MPs' legislative voting on the selected divisions.

[Table 4 around here]

Table Five estimates the effect of *Migrant*. Labour Party members' voting on anti-terrorist legislation is strongly related to the proportion of their constituents who are migrants. Members are more likely to support the pro-minority position on anti-terrorist legislation, as the proportion of migrants increases in their constituencies. This holds for all five votes analyzed. A similar pattern is observed in Table 6 which reports the effect of *Ethnic*. Again, *Ethnic* is a robust predictor of Labour members' votes on anti-terrorist legislation. Members are more likely to support the pro-minority position on anti-terrorist legislation, as the proportion of constituents who are ethnic increases.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

Because the reported coefficients in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are generated using the natural log of the odds ratio, difficulty arises in directly interpreting the substantive effects of constituency characteristics. Table 7 provides a more intuitive interpretation of the Logit results, reporting the estimated substantive effect of the key variables of interest: *Muslim*, *Migrant*, and *Ethnic*. Using simulations performed with *CLARIFY* software, I simulate the predicted probability of observing a pro-minority vote (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001; King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). I then examined how the probabilities change as the key variables increase by one standard deviation above their means, holding all other explanatory variables constant.

The effects of constituency diversity are substantively large and highly significant. Increasing *Migrant* by one standard deviation (from 6 percent to 8 percent) increases the probability that a Labour Party member will support the minority preference by 5.7 points, on average. *Migrant* has the largest effect on Vote 85 and the smallest effect on Vote 186. Increasing *Muslim* by one standard deviation (from 4 percent to 10 percent) increases the probability that a Labour Party member will deviate from the leadership position towards the preferred minority position by 6.2 points, on average. *Muslim* has the largest effect on Vote 85 (9.5 points) and the smallest effect on Vote 168 (3 points). Increasing *Ethnic* by one standard deviation (from 11 percent to 25 percent) increases the probability that a Labour Party member will deviate from the party position towards the minority preference by five points, on average (2.6 points on

Vote 168; 3.8 points on Vote 74.). *Ethnic* had the largest effect on Vote 85 (7.6 points) and smallest effect on Vote 168 (2.6 points). Of the three measures of district diversity, *Muslim* has the largest average substantive effect on the probability that a Labour Party member will vote against anti-terror proposals perceived to target minorities.

[Table 7 around here]

Overall, these results provide evidence of a link between constituency characteristics and how Labour MPs voted on proposed anti-terrorism legislation. Given this, the data provides support for the expected congruence between constituents and parliamentarians even in Britain's party-centred electoral and legislative environments.

Conclusion

An MP's party affiliation is typically a strong predictor of voting intentions in legislative divisions in the British House of Commons. Existing accounts of MPs' voting behaviour has tended to explain party voting by reference to the party-centred nature of the electoral system, intra-party ideological cohesion, and the ability of the party leadership and local party organisation to reward loyalty and sanction disloyalty. Absent from much of the roll-call literature on parliamentary politics in the United Kingdom is the idea that constituency characteristics beyond the local party organisation may cause an MP to vote against the proposals of the party leadership.

This paper argued that, under certain circumstances, government MPs would dissent from proposed government policy for the electoral purpose of maintaining congruence with their constituents even in a strong-party electoral environment. This perspective differs from the existing literature linking electoral systems and legislators' behaviour which tends to associate party disunity with candidate-centred electoral rules and party unity with strong-party electoral environments (Depauw and Martin 2009).

The core of the argument tested here is that in a party-centred environment, legislators have a personal, strategic, and electoral interest in securing the electoral popularity of their party's label within the constituency. This will cause a government MP to act either in an attempt to bring party policy into congruence with the preferences of constituents or to disassociate themselves from party policy— even if this means voting against proposed government policy. In a strong party environment, where cultivating personal votes provides an incumbent with few electoral rewards, establishing congruence with constituents aims to ensure national party-local constituency congruence. Given the electoral significance of party-constituency congruence in a strong party environment, rational government MPs should dissent from proposed policies of the government that would be electorally disadvantageous to the party label in their constituency, even where proposed government policy is electorally advantageous at the national level.

The results of the roll-call analysis of votes on anti-terrorism measures during the 2005 and 2006 legislative terms suggest that classical congruence theory of legislative representation helps explain patterns of defections even in the presence of strong parties. The more Muslims, ethnic minorities and migrants in a Labour MP's district, the more likely that the MP's vote would be at odds with the party's leadership on the Terrorism Bill and in favour of the position preferred by minority constituents.

While this finding alone should be of substantive interest to scholars of British politics, the results have broader significance for our understanding of congruence and

representation in strong party environments. While the conventional wisdom is that legislators are responsive to constituents when elected under personal vote electoral rules, this evidence suggests that individual legislators must be responsive to their constituents even under a party-centred electoral system. Indeed, whether or not the electorate votes on the basis of individual candidates' personal characteristics or on the basis of party label, an incumbent may have a functionally equivalent incentive to *behave* as if cultivating personal votes. This is particularly true in single member districts where the electoral fortunes of the candidate directly relate to the electoral popularity of their political party. Even under a strong party system, geographically concentrated minorities can still have their preferences represented by their local MP, even where party policy incongruence with local preferences in minority constituencies. In future research I plan to test the validity and broader application of this argument in other party-centred electoral systems with different ballot structures.

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Table 1: Percentage Muslim Per Constituency in England and Wales

<i>Range (% Muslim)</i>	<i>No. of constituencies</i>
<1%	331
1-2%	66
2-5%	71
5-7%	30
7-10%	32
10-20%	30
20-30%	6
30-40%	2
40-50	1
>50	0

Source: Calculated from Census 2001.

Table 2: Summary of Votes Included in This Study

<i>Division</i>	<i>Vote 74</i>	<i>Vote 75</i>	<i>Vote 84</i>	<i>Vote 85</i>	<i>Vote 168</i>
Date	2 November 2005	2 November 2005	9 November 2005	9 November 2005	15 February 2006
Summary	Proposal that evidence of intent must be shown for encouragement of terrorism to be an offence.	Proposal to remove glorification of terrorism as an offence from the bill.	Proposal to reaffirm the extension of detention without charge for terrorist suspects to 90 days.	Proposal to change the period of detention without charge for terrorist suspects to 28 days.	Proposal to affirm glorification of terrorism as an offence, even where the action has no effect and is not intended to have an effect on anyone's physical activity.
Leadership support	Supported by the Opposition, opposed by the Government.	Supported by the Opposition, opposed by the Government.	Supported by the Government, opposed by the Opposition.	Supported by the Opposition, opposed by the Government	Supported by the Government, opposed by the Opposition.
Outcome	Government majority of 1 (amendment rejected).	Government majority of 5 (amendment rejected).	Government defeat of 31 (amendment rejected).	Government defeat of 33 (amendment carried).	Government majority of 38 (amendment carried).
Labour Party Unity	With Party = 301 Against Party = 34 Absent = 19	With Party = 306 Against Party = 27 Absent = 21	With Party = 291 Against Party = 49 Absent = 14	With Party = 289 Against Party = 51 Absent = 14	With Party = 316 Against Party = 17 Absent = 20

Table 3: Pairwise Correlations for Key Constituency Characteristics

	<i>Ethnic</i>	<i>Migrant</i>	<i>Muslim</i>
Ethnic	1.00	-	-
Migrant	0.44	1.00	-
Muslim	0.84	0.30	1.00

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Labour Members' Votes

	1	2	3	4	5
	Vote74	Vote75	Vote84	Vote85	Vote168
Muslim	0.088 (0.030)** *	0.095 (0.032)** *	0.106 (0.029)** *	0.117 (0.030)** *	0.082 (0.037)**
MP Race	-1.778 (1.754)	-1.609 (1.905)	-0.816 (1.072)	-0.485 (0.876)	-1.247 (1.868)
Candidate Race	0.087 (0.472)	0.077 (0.539)	-0.268 (0.472)	-0.169 (0.465)	0.154 (0.646)
Electoral Majority	0.014 (0.013)	0.012 (0.016)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.018 (0.018)
Freshman	-1.642 (1.056)	-1.335 (1.068)	-0.431 (0.593)	-0.551 (0.59)	
Constant	-2.55 (0.407)** *	-2.862 (0.441)** *	-2.126 (0.344)** *	-1.971 (0.328)** *	-3.357 (0.522)** *
Observations	278	278	282	285	246
Pseudo R ²	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.

Table 5: Logit Analysis of Labour Members' Votes

	1 Vote74	2 Vote75	3 Vote84	4 Vote85	5 Vote168
Migrant	0.164 (0.063)** *	0.239 (0.069)** *	0.188 (0.053)** *	0.201 (0.052)** *	0.233 (0.078)** *
MP Race	-0.617 (1.073)	-0.34 (1.115)	0.29 (0.701)	0.329 (0.702)	0.212 (1.117)
Candidate Race	0.244 (0.448)	0.155 (0.533)	0.083 (0.422)	0.184 (0.408)	0.182 (0.608)
Electoral Majority	0.019 (0.014)	0.021 (0.018)	0.008 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.025 (0.022)
Freshman	-1.624 (1.077)	-1.367 (1.139)	-0.484 (0.561)	-0.572 (0.564)	
Constant	-3.349 (0.636)** *	-4.267 (0.755)** *	-3.032 (0.538)** *	-2.949 (0.514)** *	-4.78 (0.934)** *
Observations	278	278	282	285	246
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.1	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.

Table 6: Logit Analysis of Labour Members' Votes

	1 Vote74	2 Vote75	3 Vote84	4 Vote85	5 Vote168
Ethnic	0.028 (0.012)**	0.039 (0.013)** *	0.034 (0.011)** *	0.039 (0.011)** *	0.034 (0.014)**
MP Race	-1.262 (1.173)	-1.241 (1.216)	-0.42 (0.802)	-0.481 (0.824)	-0.741 (1.221)
Candidate Race	0.202 (0.462)	0.114 (0.524)	-0.077 (0.448)	0.001 (0.43)	0.173 (0.604)
Electoral Majority	0.011 (0.013)	0.008 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.013 (0.019)
Freshman	-1.65 (1.068)	-1.394 (1.113)	-0.451 (0.586)	-0.561 (0.595)	
Constant	-2.451 (0.399)** *	-2.851 (0.446)** *	-1.999 (0.329)** *	-1.875 (0.317)** *	-3.357 (0.539)** *
Observations	278	278	282	285	246
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.

Table 7: Substantive Effects of Constituency Characteristics

	<i>Ethnic</i>	<i>Migrant</i>	<i>Muslim</i>
Vote 74	0.038**	0.047***	0.052**
Vote 75	0.044***	0.055***	0.046***
Vote 84	0.063***	0.07***	0.086***
Vote 85	0.076***	0.079***	0.095***
Vote 168	0.026**	0.035***	0.03**

Note: Values represent the *change* in the predicted probability of voting for minority-favoured views as each variable of interest is increased by one standard deviation over its mean, holding other variables constant (*MP Race* is set to 0; *Candidate Race* is set to 0; *Electoral Majority* is set to its median value). *Freshman* is excluded from all estimated models in order to ensure comparability with Vote 168 for which *Freshman* is dropped because it predicts the outcome variable.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>
Ethnic	569	8.31	11.98	0.48	66.27
Migrant	569	6.23	2.73	1.46	19.17
Muslim	569	2.82	5.27	.05	48.81
Candidate	569	0.14	0.35	0	1
Race					
Electoral	569	18.91	12.31	.1	63.8
Majority					
Freshman	569	0.18	0.39	0	1