Latin America's Left Turn: El Factor Indígena

The Role of Indigenous Social Movements in Latin America's Left Turn

Gemma Mc Nulty BA, MA

School of Law and Government,

Dublin City University

Supervisors: Dr. David Doyle & Dr. Eoin O'Malley

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List of Abbreviations

ADN	Acción Democrática Nacionalista
	Nationalist Democratic Action
AF	Alianza por el Futuro
	Alliance for the Future
AIDESEP	Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana
	The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest
AP	Alianza PAIS
	PAIS Alliance
AP	Acción Popular
	Popular Action
APCOB	Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano
	Support for the Indigenous Campesino of the Bolivian Oriente
APRA	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
	Popular Revolutionary American Party
ASP	Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos
	Assembly for the Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples
CAN	Consejo Consultivo de Pueblos Indígenas, de la Comunidad Andina
	Advisory Council of Indigenous Peoples of the Andean Community
CCP	Confederación Campesina del Perú
	Campesino Confederation of Peru
CENDOC	Centro de Documentación sobre la mujer
	Centre for Documentation for Women
Chirapaq	Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú
	Centre of Indigenous Cultures of Peru
CIDOB	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia
	The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
CNA	Confederación Nacional Agraria
	National Agrarian Confederation
CNMCIOB-BS	Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia "Bartolina Sisa" (also known as FNMCB)

	National Confederation of Campesina, Indigenous and Original women of Bolivia
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana
	The Bolivian Workers' Central
COICA	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica
	Coordinator of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin
CONACAMI	Confederation National de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por la Minera
	National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining
CONAP	Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú
	Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru
CONAMAQ	Proyecto Fortalecimiento Organizacional del Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu
	Project Organisational strengthening of the Council of Markas and Qullasuyu Ayllus
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
	Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
COPPIP	Conference of the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples of Peru
	Conferencia de la Conferencia Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas del Perú
COPPIP	Coordinadora Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas del Perú
	Permanent Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples of Peru
CPIB	Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni
	Centre of Indigenous Peoples of Beni
CSCIB	Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia
	Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia
	The Unified Sindical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia
CTV	Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela
	Confederation of Workers of Venezuela
ECUARUNARI	Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador

	Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa Nationality
EGTK	Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katarí
	The Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army
FAOI-NP	Federación de Ayllus Originarios Indígenas del Norte de Potosí
	Federation of the Communities of Original Indigenous of North Potosí
FASOR	Federación de Ayllus Originarios Indígenas del Sur de Oruro
	Federation of the Communities of Original Indigenous of South of Oruro
FC	Frente de Centro
	Front Centre
FPIC	Right to free prior and informed consent
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
	The Sandinista National Liberation Front
FSUTCC	Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba
	The Unified Sindical Confederation of Rural Workers of Cochabamba
FTC	Federación de Trabajadores del Cuzco
	Workers Federation of Cuzco
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INRA	Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria
	The National Institute for Agrarian Reform
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
IU	Izquierda Unida (IU)
	United Left
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
LPP	Law of popular participation (Bolivia)
	Ley de participación popular
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo

	Movement for Socialism
MBL	Movimiento Bolivia Libre
	Free Bolivia Movement
MIP	Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti
	Indian Movement Pachakuti
MIR	Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria
	Movement of the Revolutionary Left
MKN	Movimiento Katarista Nacional
	National Movement Katarista
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
	Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
MST	Movimiento Sin Tierra
	Movement without Land (Landless Movement)
NCDRG	Coordinadora Nacional para la Defensa y Recuperación del Gas
	National Coordinator for the Defence and Recovery of Gas
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NEP	Nueva Política Económica
	New Economic Policy
NFR	Nueva Fuerza Republicana
	The New Republican Force
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional
	The National Action Party
PCB	Partido Comunista de Bolivia
	Bolivian Communist Party
PDA	Polo Democrático Alternativo
	The Alternative Democratic Pole
PDD	Partido Socialista (Perú)
	Socialist Party (Peru)
PDBA	Political Database of the Americas
PLD	Partido de la Liberación Dominicana
	The Dominican Liberation Party

PNND	Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament	
PNP	Partido Nacionalista Peruano	
	The Peruvian Nationalist Party	
Podemos	Poder Democrático y Social	
	Social and Democratic Power	
PP	Perú Posible	
	Peru Possible	
PPB-CN	Plan Progreso para Bolivia- Convergencia Nacional	
	Progress Plan for Bolivia-National Convergence	
PPC	Partido Popular Cristiano (Perú)	
	Popular Christian Party (Peru)	
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (México)	
	The Party of the Democratic Revolution (Mexico)	
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazil)	
	Workers Party (Brazil)	
RN	Partido Restauración Nacional (Colombia)	
	The National Restoration Party (Colombia)	
SER	Asociación de Servicios Educativos Rurales (Perú)	
	Association of Rural Educational Services (Peru)	
SINAMOS	Sistema de Apoyo Nacional de Movilización Social	
	National Social Mobilisation Support System	
SOBCE	Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento	
	Bolivian Cement Society	
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure	
	Indigenous Territory of the National Park of Isiboro-Sécure	
UN	Unidad Nacional (Bolivia)	
	National Unity (Bolivia)	
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations	
UPP	Unión por el Perú	
	Union for Peru	

Latin America's Left Turn: El Factor Indígena

The Role of Indigenous Social Movements in Latin America's Left Turn

Abstract

This thesis examines the emergence of the left in Latin America at the turn of the century. In particular, it examines Latin America's 'left turn' in light of the mobilisation of indigenous social movements in the region during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is argued that indigenous movements entered into a political alliance with leftist parties in the lead up to the left turn in their respective countries. This alliance was predicated on the agreement that indigenous movements would mobilise support for the left within their social bases in return for prospective compensation from the left. This compensation came in the form of a promise by the parties to implement policies addressing indigenous demands if elected. It is argued that indigenous movements were ideologically compatible with the left based on other policies too, such as the redistribution of wealth and alleviation of inequality.

Ultimately, the thesis finds that indigenous movements provided a valuable base of support for the left in Bolivia and Peru in particular. This can help to explain the electoral success of the left in some cases, thereby contributing to the scholarship on Latin America' Left Turn. It is also suggested indigenous movements are more likely to support the extreme or 'contestatory' variants of the left rather than moderate forms which are less likely to implement radical redistributive policies and constitutional reform. In this way, the research contributes to the secondary puzzle that has emerged within the literature on Latin America's left turn concerning the variation in the types of left which have emerged.

Although the support by movements does not exclusively explain the emergence of the parties studied here, it was nonetheless an important contribution to their success. It is in this way that the thesis provides a missing piece of the puzzle of Latin America's left turn. I term this missing piece '*el factor indígena*', or the indigenous factor.

Map of Latin America

Source: http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/resource/newlatam.htm

Introduction
Latin America's Left Turn: El Factor Indígena

The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant participation in [traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of conducting politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalized majorities.

— Juan del Granado, Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia[1]

Introduction

At the turn of the century Latin America underwent an electoral shift to the left. In 1997, James Petras wrote that the left in Latin America was "staging a major comeback" (Petras, 1997: 1). By 2009 almost two-thirds of the region was under some form of left-leaning government (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). The 'left turn' was "unprecedented" and "striking" in terms of its breadth and depth across the region (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 1; Weyland et al., 2010: 1). The electoral success of the left has stimulated much interest in the region, resulting in a significant body of work exploring its emergence and performance (see Blanco and Grier, 2013; Flores-Macías, 2012; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010; Weyland et al., 2010; Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009; Barrett et al., 2008; Seligson, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Cleary, 2006; Castañeda, 2006; Schamis, 2006; Panizza, 2005). Although diverse in their analysis, these scholars agree that the rise of the left in Latin America since the turn of the century is "incontrovertible" (Beasley-Murray et al., 2010: 2).

The left turn is important because it signalled not only a change in government in the region, but also a change in *how the region would be governed* (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). While neoliberal reforms implemented by conservative regimes dominated the region during the 1980s and 1990s, the left turn "ushered in a new era of policy experimentation in which governments expanded their developmental, redistributive, and social welfare roles" (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 2). The extent to which leftist governments pursue these policies depends on 'how left' the respective government is. Indeed, much of the more recent debate on the left is centred on understanding the

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[1]Vanden (2007: 17). Juan del Granado was Mayor of Bolivia from 2001 to 2010.

variation in the types of left which have emerged there (see Wiesehomeier, 2010; Weyland et al., 2010; Cameron, 2009; Weyland, 2009; Vargas-Llosa, 2007; Lynch, 2007; Leiras, 2007; Castañeda 2006). This discussion was sparked by Castañeda's (2006) seminal piece 'Latin Americas Left Turn: The Tale of Two Lefts' in which he distinguishes between a radical left, henceforth termed the contestatory left, and a moderate left. Consequently, explaining the variation in the types of left which have emerged during this time has become somewhat of a secondary puzzle within the literature on the left turn. Accordingly, my central research question is; *what explains the emergence of the left in Latin America at the turn of the Century?* In addition, a secondary research question is; *what explains the variation in the types of left which have emerged during the left turn?*

This study hypothesises that the mobilisation of indigenous social movements during the late 1980s and early 1990s may explain support for the left at the turn of the century.[2] Specifically, it is argued that these movements acted as a central base of support for the left in the region, and that the variation in the level of their mobilisation may, in turn, explain the variation in electoral support for the left. The reasoning here is that the more mobilised a movement the more effective it is at mobilising its social base in support of a party. Therefore, we expect to see that the higher the level of mobilisation, the more electoral support for the left. This is especially the case where indigenous populations represent a substantial proportion of the population, and thereby providing a considerable base of support for the left. Therefore, while the principal independent variable is indigenous movement mobilisation, it is interacted with levels of indigenous population. It is anticipated that support for the left is highest where indigenous movement mobilisation and population are also high. It should be noted however that a key component of the argument is that high population alone does not guarantee support for the left; rather it is the mobilisation of the movements which is central.

The thesis investigates the central research question by exploring the role of indigenous movements in the left turn, termed here as 'el *factor indígena'* (the indigenous factor). Moreover, it is argued that if given the choice between the moderate and contestatory left, indigenous movements are more likely to support the

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[2] As will be addressed in Chapter 1, the left turn is considered to have begun with the election of President Hugo Chávez in 1998.

latter with which they have a strong ideological congruence. It is suggested then, that variation in indigenous movement mobilisation may also help to explain the variation in the types of left which have emerged during the left turn.

The argument is tested using a mixed-method approach in which both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. Firstly, a quantitative study is used to explore the general relationship between the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation and variation in electoral success of the left across the region. This is supplemented by in-depth comparative case studies which focus on the Andean region of Latin America and the countries of Bolivia and Peru in particular. The case studies investigate the relationship between indigenous social movements and leftist parties through original field interviews with movement and party members. The goal of this dissertation is to address the central research question, and indeed the secondary question regarding the type of lefts which have emerged in a way that provides an original contribution to the literature on the left in Latin America. More generally however, the research seeks to provide a more comprehensive understanding of movement-party relations which although explored in a Latin American context here, can be applied more generally in other regions.

The puzzle: 'The Left Turn'

The left turn began with the election of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998 (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). During the 2000s there was a surge of leftist presidents elected across the region from Ricardo Lagos in Chile, elected in 2000, to Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, elected in 2009 (see Table 1 below for full list of elected leftist leaders since 1998). Indeed, the percentage of right-wing Latin American presidents dropped from 64 per cent during the 1990s to 33 per cent from 2005 to 2008 (Blanco and Grier, 2013). While leftist governments certainly existed prior to this 'turn', for example the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua held power from 1979-1990, "never before in Latin America have so many countries been governed by the presidents of the left" (Seligson, 2007: 81). The re-election of leftist presidents such as Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva in Brazil (2006), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2009) and more recently Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2013) and Michelle Bachelet demonstrates the continued support for the left in some cases.

Table 1: Leftist Presidents of Latin America (1998-2013)

Country	Party	President	Year Elected (re-elected)
Venezuela	Fifth Republic Movement/United Socialist Party of Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	1998; re-elected in 2000, 2006, 2012
	Gran Polo Patriótico (GPP)	Nicolás Maduro	2013
Chile	Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh)	Ricardo Lagos	2000
		Michelle Bachelet	2006
Brazil	Workers party (PT)	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	2002; re-elected in 2006
		Dilma Rousseff	2010
Argentina	Justicialista Party (PJ)	Néstor Kirchner	2003
		Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	2007; re-elected in 2011
Uruguay	Broad Front (FA)	Tabaré Vázquez	2004
		José Mujica	2009
Bolivia	Movement toward Socialism (MAS)	Evo Morales	2005; re-elected in 2009
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberal Front (FSLN)	Daniel Ortega	2006; re-elected in 2012
Ecuador	Country Alliance	Rafael Correa	2006; re-elected in 2009 and 2013
Paraguay	Patriotic Alliance for Change	Fernando Lugo	2008
El Salvador	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Mauricio Funes	2009
Peru	Gana Perú	Ollanta Humala Tasso	2011

Source: Adapted from Levitsky and Roberts (2011:2)

The left has also gained substantial political ground in unlikely places such as the archetypally conservative Mexico and Colombia where continued conflicts with leftist insurgencies act as a deterrent to leftist politics.[3] The 2006 presidential elections in Mexico are considered among the "most contested" in the country's history and resulted in the defeat of the leftist candidate López Obrador of Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) to the right-wing candidate Felipe Calderón of Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) by less than one per cent (IDEA, September 2006). Obrador's defeat occurred amid allegations of electoral fraud which sparked a mass demonstration organised by Obrador and his supporting social movements to demand a recount (BBC, 2006). This illustrated the willingness of movements to mobilise in support of their chosen candidate even post-election. In Colombia, the left made significant progress by forming viable leftist opposition parties such as Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA). In 2006, PDA candidate Carlos Gaviria Díaz came second in the presidential elections with 22 per cent of the vote (Pachón and Hoskin, 2011). Ultimately, increased support for the left across Latin America in both presidential and congressional elections spurred a wide body of literature aimed at explaining the left turn. As previously mentioned, a subsequent body of literature has also emerged with the purpose of explaining the variation in the types of left which have emerged ranging from extreme to moderate left.

In his seminal piece on the 'Two Lefts' Castañeda (2006) labelled the contestatory left as the 'wrong left' and the moderate left as the 'right left'. The 'right left' is a reconstructed version of the socialist or "Castroist" left of the 1960s and 1970s which reinvented itself as a moderate left with "sincere" respect for and commitment to, democratic rules and institutions (Castañeda, 2006: 35). Leaders such as former president Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva (known henceforth as 'Lula') of Brazil typically represent this social democratic left. The "wrong" left on the other hand, is based on "good old-fashioned populism" (Castañeda, 2006: 31). Like its predecessors, such as Juan Perón in 1950s Argentina, leaders of the 'wrong left' use nationalistic rhetoric to mobilise the masses, appealing especially to the poor and marginalised (Castañeda,

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[3]Conflicts with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo) or 'FARC' continue in Colombia. In Peru a conflict is considered as on-going with Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) despite the capture of the guerrilla movements' leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992 which de-capacitated the organisation.

2006). Former Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez and Ollanta Humala of Peru[4] embody this 'wrong left' (according to Castañeda, 2006: 31). Since Castañeda's (2006) article more authors have adopted labels to distinguish between the 'two lefts'. These range from; the 'vegetarian' versus 'carnivorous' left, 'moderate' versus 'radical', 'social democratic' versus 'populist' and 'moderate' versus 'contestatory' (Vargas Llosa, 2007; Weyland, 2009;Panizza, 2005, Weyland et al.,2010).

This study adopts the labels 'moderate' and 'contestatory' whilst recognising that variation exists between and within these groupings. The binary categorisation of the left however is the subject of much debate within the literature. For many, such strict dichotomies imply that there are "good" and "bad" countries which can potentially discolour analyses of the performance of these governments (Cameron, 2009:23). Understanding the left in stringent dichotomies can "make blunt instruments for analysis" and it is therefore more accurate to understand the left in the region along a broad ideological scale ranging from extreme left to centre left such as that devised by Wiesehomeier (2010) (Cameron 2009: 5). The author uses expert surveys to indicate the policy positions of Latin American presidents demonstrating their ideological variation from extreme left (1), to extreme right (20), as displayed on Figure 1 below. She illustrates how, when examined more closely, that those typically "lumped together" as either radicals or as moderates actually vary greatly within their categories of contestatory or moderate groups (Wiesehomeier, 2010: 6). For example, the governments of Evo Morales, Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez are typically classified as the 'wrong' or 'radical' left yet Wiesehomeier's results indicate that there is variation between the ideological positioning of these leaders. Understanding the variation within the left in the region is important for any study interested in examining the left turn. It is particularly important for this research because it directly relates to the secondary question as to whether indigenous movement mobilisation can also help to explain the variation in kind of left which emerged during the left turn. In this research I adopt the terms 'contestatory' and 'moderate left' but acknowledge the variation which exists across and within these types of left in the region.

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[4] Ollanta Humala was considered part of the contestatory left during his 2006 campaign. By his 2011 campaign however, he positioned himself as a center-left candidate and since his election is considered to have moved even closer to the center.

Figure 3: Latin American Presidents on a scale of Left-Right

Source: Wiesehomeier (2010)

The argument

I argue that the mobilisation of these movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s is "intimately related" to the emergence of the left because they were a central political ally for the left at the turn of the century (Van Cott, 2007: 2). As a political ally, indigenous movements mobilised their social bases in support of the left in return for the implementation of policies addressing indigenous demands if elected. The movements are vital for the party because distrust towards institutionalised politics and parties within indigenous communities means that the party could not mobilise this base themselves. Rather, they rely on the movements and their leaders, who are trusted, to legitimise support for the party and mobilise their bases. In this way the movement acts as a necessary intermediary between indigenous constituencies and the leftist party which can generate support by legitimising the party within the community. Variation in levels of motivation matter because the more mobilised the movement the more effective it is in generating support within its base. Therefore, where movements are highly mobilised they have a greater capacity to mobilise their bases in support of a party and so we should expect to see higher support for the left in these cases. Conversely, where mobilisation of indigenous movements is low, they do not have the same capacity to mobilise their bases. In such cases we should see less support for the left.

In conjunction with levels of mobilisation the size of indigenous population of the country also matters. There must be a substantial population so that, if mobilised it

can provide significant support for the party. Importantly, even where populations are low indigenous movements may still provide a base of support for the left, but primarily in local level elections. Ultimately, if we are to explain the variation in the emergence of the left at a national level we should fix the analysis on cases in which indigenous populations are substantial[5], therefore holding this variable constant. This allows us to assess the impact of variation in indigenous movement mobilisation on the emergence of the leftist governments in the region. This argument is demonstrated on Figure 2 below.

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[5] Substantial population is considered in this study as those exceeding ten per cent of the total population.

Figure 4: The argument

Indigenous movement mobilisation

	High	**Low**
High **Indigenous population**	**Highest support for the left.** High levels of movement mobilisation in conjunction with a high population means movements have the capacity to mobilise a substantial base of support for the left. Where the party fulfils its promises to the movement once in power, we might even expect the re-election of these candidates through continued support from the movements. *E.G. Bolivia and Ecuador. (Re-election Bolivia and Ecuador)*	**Potentially high support for the left.** If movements mobilise they could potentially provide a substantial base of support for the left because there is a substantial indigenous population. However, without the mobilisation of the movements it is likely that the indigenous base will remain demobilised. *E.g. Peru*
Low	**Low Support for the left.** Despite high levels of mobilisation, a low population means that the movements cannot generate a substantial base of support for the left. In such cases it is unlikely the left will enter into an alliance with the movements for national elections. However, we may see some relationship during local or municipal elections particularly in constituencies where indigenous populations are higher. *E.g. Chile*	**Lowest support for the left.** With a low indigenous population and low mobilisation, indigenous movements are not likely to explain support for the left should it emerge in these cases. *E.g. Colombia*

The first quadrant represents the first qualitative case study included in this research, Bolivia. In such cases, highly mobilised movements can generate substantial support for a party. Therefore we are likely to see movement-party alliances emerge here, in which a movement mobilises support in return for the implementation of policies relating to indigenous issues once in power. Moreover, where the party fulfils the promise of these policies we are likely to see continued support but where they do not we are likely to see the withdrawal of support for the party in future elections.

The second quadrant represents the second case study explored in this research, Peru. In cases where indigenous population is high but mobilisation is low it is likely that the indigenous social base, without an intermediary between them and the party, will not mobilise in favour of a party. In such cases we are more likely to see clientelistic linkages between traditional parties, with more resources, and indigenous communities. However, given that the level of movement mobilisation can increase over time, and even between successive elections, support for the left is potentially high in these cases if mobilisation increases.

The third quadrant represents a case in which the population is low yet movements mobilised to represent this base. For example, just 4.6 per cent of the Chilean population self-identified as indigenous in 2002, yet indigenous communities such as the Mapuche[6] have formed movements and mobilised to resist neoliberalism and tourism polices which affect their territories (Funk, 2013). Despite high levels of mobilisation by the Mapuche the small size of their social base means they are unlikely to gain attention from parties looking for electoral support, particularly at a national level. However, relationships may emerge at the local level between party and the movement especially in constituencies where indigenous populations are higher. Alliances in these cases are more likely to be with contestatory leftist or indigenous candidates who are more ideologically congruent with the movement. Contestatory left parties are also more likely to support the indigenous cause than moderate candidates who may be concerned about isolating non-indigenous voters who represent a larger base of support. [7]

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[6] The Mapuche people represent over 90 per cent of the total indigenous people in Chile (Funk, 2013).
[7] For example, the Mapuche movement in Chile has been in conflict with former President of the moderate left, Michelle Bachelet, and current conservative president Sebastián Piñera (Dudenhoefer, 2010).

Finally, the fourth quadrant represents cases in which indigenous population and movement mobilisation are both low. Unlike the case of the Mapuche in Chile who are highly mobilised, this quadrant represents cases where populations are low and no movements have emerged. Therefore, it is unlikely that a movement-party alliance would emerge here because the indigenous social base does not represent a potential source of party support in terms of population size. Moreover, without a movement pushing indigenous issues, we are unlikely to see even local level support because indigenous issues are not politicised. For instance, in Colombia the indigenous population represents just two per cent of the total population, movement mobilisation is low and there is little support for the left (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006).

The case of Venezuela presents an outlier. The indigenous population is low in Venezuela (less than two per cent of the total population) and indigenous movement mobilisation is also low, therefore it should sit in the fourth quadrant with Colombia (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). Venezuela however was ruled for over fifteen years[8] by former President Hugo Chávez who embodied the contestatory left in the region. As stated in the fourth quadrant of Figure 2, indigenous movement mobilisation cannot explain support for the left in these cases because the population is too small and movements are not mobilised enough to politicise indigenous issues, even at the local level. Rather, the small indigenous movements and communities which do exist in Venezuela assimilate into the category of the poor, who were an integral base of support for Chávez. In this way indigenous movements in Venezuela mobilise along class rather ethnic lines and are a component of support for the left in Venezuela. Ciccariello-Maher (2013: 139) explains that peasant self-defence movements and indigenous people are among those who "have thrown themselves into the struggle not against Chávez but against the state he inherited".

Interestingly, this support is not predicated on a charismatic linkage centred upon a dedication to Chávez 'the leader'. Rather it is based upon the ideals of his Bolivarian Revolution which is very much a class-based revolution. Part of the Revolution is the condemnation of the right, and neoliberalism in particular, as well as a focus on the reintegration of the poorer classes into politics and society. Given that indigenous

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[8] President Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela successively from 1998 until his death in 2013.

people are among the "revolutionaries"[9] rather than the "Chávistas" of Venezuela we can say that their support is also based upon an ideological congruence rather than simply the leadership of Chávez (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013: 139). Therefore, indigenous communities in Venezuela are supporters of the left but they assimilate into the broader category of the poor and are less mobilised along ethnic lines than movements found in the cases of Bolivia, Peru or Chile discussed above.

The relevancy of the study

There are varying explanations for the left turn in Latin America. The one most relevant to this research is the suggestion that the mobilisation of social movements more generally provided a base of support for the left which contributed to their success. In Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador, social movements "brought down unpopular governments" through mass protest which in turn created a political opportunity for the left (Boron, 2008: 234). The left "came to power on the back of these protests" and made electoral promises to address the core grievances of the movements, such as tackling the crisis of legitimacy, to implement bureaucratic reforms, to generate revenue and to increase transparency and accountability (Boron, 2008: 234, Beasley-Murray et al., 2010).

Indigenous social movements, while considered part of this broader category of movements, represent a particularly interesting stratum of support. In some cases, indigenous movements and their bases are considered as "the lifeline of the Latin American Left" and one of the strongest supporters of these parties (Vergara-Camus, 2013: 1; see also Madrid, 2011; Lupu, 2009; Van Cott, 2007). However, there remains relatively little known about the nature of the relationship between the left and indigenous movements. With little empirical investigation into the relationship between indigenous movements and the left there remains a gap within the literature that is worthy of exploration. This research seeks to fill this gap by empirically investigating the role of indigenous movements in the left turn therefore contributing to the literature on the left. In addition, because I argue that indigenous movements are more likely to support the contestatory left I hope to contribute to the discussion on the variation within the types of left in the region, which acts as a secondary puzzle within the literature on the left turn.

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[9] The "revolutionaries" are those who believe in the Bolivarian revolution rather than the "Chávistas" who are dedicated followers of Chávez 'the leader' specifically (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013).

Studies which contribute to our understanding of the left in Latin America hold some 'real-world' importance in terms of the alleviation of inequality and democratic consolidation in Latin America. The focus of the left in the region is centred on the redistribution of wealth, alleviation of poverty and inequality and in some cases experimentation with more direct forms of democracy. The policies adopted by the contestatory left in particular have been the subject of much criticism yet their 'radical experiments in social democracy' also present an alternative route to tackling inequality and development (Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009). For instance, upon his death the United Nations commended Hugo Chávez, the embodiment of the contestatory left, for his "progressive policies" and "commitment to social justice" throughout his political career (United Nations News Centre 2013). By the same token, the persistent referenda held by these leaders to increase their powers jeopardises the already weak institutional foundations of many of these countries (Ellner 2012; Madrid et al., 2010). Interestingly, Luna (2010: 23), referring to the contestatory left in particular, claims that;

> "there is a lack of fieldwork on how these [leftist] parties and leaders built their electoral coalitions over time, how these coalitions are structured today, and what means were employed and challenges faced".

This study helps to fill the gap highlighted above by providing empirical evidence through field interviews that indigenous social movements were central political allies for the left in Bolivia and Peru. Furthermore, the research finds that in both cases these movements supported the contestatory left in particular, thereby offering insight into this puzzle. In doing so it provides an empirical contribution into the building of electoral coalitions by the left. The case studies also reveal the nature of these alliances today, thus highlighting the challenges facing the left in upcoming elections.[10] The results indicate that where the left has failed to fulfil its promises to indigenous movements, their support is withdrawn and the party loses a central base of support for subsequent elections. This, in turn, presents an opportunity for

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[10] Leftist Presidents face (re)elections in the following countries; Bolivia (2014), Brazil (2014), Uruguay (2014), Argentina (2015) and Peru (2016). Some leftist leaders have already been successfully reelected for a third term such as President Rafael Correa in Ecuador 2013 while others are in the process of (or have successfully) made constitutional amendments to allow for their reelection for a third term such as Evo Morales in Bolivia and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina.

opposition parties of the right who since the mid-2000s have recognised the advantages of movement-party alliances. The right has intentionally harnessed the mobilisation capacity of other social movements. Since the late 2000s some of the "most powerful and organised civil society movements are organised by right-wing urban big business, agribusiness elites backed by substantial numbers in the private sector middle class farmers, retailers, civic associations, transport owners and professional organisations" (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 22).

Indeed, the election of President Sebastián Piñera of Chile in the 2009 highlighted that the "right has by no means disappeared" in the region (Beasley-Murray et al., 2010: 3). Since then, some argue that a 'new right'[11] is (re)emerging in the region, which threatens the longevity of the left (see Bowen, 2011: Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009). The increase in support for the right demonstrates the fragility of the left in the region, particularly as many leftist leaders approach the end of their terms in office. This study argues that the survival of the left depends on their ability to fulfil their electoral promises to the various social movements that helped bring them to power.

Beyond the scope of the Latin American left, the study also seeks to contribute to the field of electoral politics more generally by investigating the role that movements can play in generating support for parties. Highlighting the mass mobilising capacity of movements for political parties offers an alternative electoral strategy for parties who might consider a movement-party alliance as a way to increase their vote share in elections. Indeed, providing evidence that social movements can be useful political allies may have some policy implications for parties wishing to ally with them. For instance, parties would need to incorporate the demands of these movements into their policy agenda in order to solidify the alliance. While some authors have explored the relationship between parties and 'extra-parliamentary' organisations such as social movements or trade unions, this remains a relatively understudied subject (please see Strøm, 1990; Rucht, 2004, Koelble, 1987 discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis). This research contributes to the literature on movement-party relations by providing insight into the nature of the relationship between indigenous movements and the left in Latin America in a way that is applicable to other cases with similar contexts.

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[11] Bowen (2011: 106) loosely classifies the new right as those who associate with the "upper social and economic strata of society" and who pursue "pro-business" or "pro-market" political agendas.

Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006:178) note that the "contemporary literature on political parties pays insufficient attention to informal organisations" and the role it can play in politics more generally. The authors claim that in non-western party systems such as those found in Latin America for example, informal organisations such as movements can constitute the "meat" of party organisations by mobilising bases and delivering votes (Freidenberg and Levitsky, 2006:178). Party literature however tends to focus more on highly formalised party organisation in the West and consequently the role of movements as 'extra-parliamentary' organisers goes understudied. By providing an empirical investigation into informal organisations and political parties in a non-western context this research, may in turn be relevant for other cases within developing regions.

Finally, an examination of movement-party relations also contributes to our understanding of party-society linkages. This is particularly pertinent for the case of Latin America where high levels of inequality and poverty have facilitated the dominance of clientelistic relations which greatly impact the quality of democracy in the region (Hilgers, 2012). I argue that the political alliance between the left and indigenous movements is based upon a strong ideological congruence on policy issues, and therefore has the potential to break down clientelistic relationships between party and society. This may have implications for other cases where the poorest sectors of society are traditionally engaged in clientelistic relationships with parties by providing a way to develop more programmatic relations which may in turn help to enhance the quality of democracy in such cases.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 outlines prevailing explanations for the left and places my argument within this body of work. This chapter also outlines the theoretical framework upon which the argument that indigenous social movements can provide a base of support for the left is grounded. The chapter concludes with a summary of where my argument is situated within the literature and the way my research contributes to this body of work.

Chapter 2 presents the causal mechanism and the research design employed in order to test the argument. The chapter firstly outlines the causal mechanism and the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables. The mixed-method

approach used in this research is then discussed with particular attention given to case selection for the qualitative case studies. Finally, a brief discussion on the suitability of fieldwork for the study is addressed before offering expected outcomes.

Chapter 3 presents the quantitative study in which the relationship between the support for the left and variation in movement mobilisation over the period 1990-2011 is tested. Descriptive statistics on the central variables are also presented here. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the general relationship between these two variables before focusing on the qualitative comparative case study of Bolivia and Peru in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

The case study chapters examine the relationship between indigenous social movements and the contestatory left in more detail and in the context of each country. In each case, a background to the country and the elections selected for study is outlined. Indigenous movements specific to each country are then discussed in terms of mobilisation levels and respective social bases. Finally, original field interviews conducted with both the movements and the left in each country provide the empirical evidence that the movements supported these parties in the respective elections. The results detail the ways in which the movements mobilised their bases in support of the party and the impact of this support. Each chapter concludes by outlining relations between the movements and parties discussed as they stand today.

In the conclusion the results are discussed in light of the research question. The findings offer an original insight into the support of leftist leaders in Latin America whilst also highlighting the role social movements can play in electoral politics more generally. These implications will hopefully contribute to the field by challenging some of the traditional assumptions present in political party literature and social movement theory. The implications of the research reach beyond the literature however and the democratising role of movements is also revealed. Finally, the concluding chapter presents areas for further research in light of the findings.

Chapter 1: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter outlines the literature in relation to the left turn in Latin America. The prevailing explanations for the left turn are addressed and I situate my argument within it this body of literature. I argue that indigenous movement mobilisation can help to explain the left turn because the movements provided a central base of support for the left. Accordingly, the second section of the chapter outlines the key literature used as a theoretical framework for this argument. The chapter concludes by situating this study within the body of literature addressed.

1.1 Literature review

Prevailing explanations for the left

While there is no "single cause" for the left turn, many explanations are rooted in the economic, social and political failings of predominantly neoliberal incumbents, which became apparent in the early 1990s (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 7). These failings generated a discontent with the right, which the left used to their electoral advantage at the turn of the century. The discontent with incumbent regimes is considered the "lowest common denominator" in explaining the rise of the left in the region as it led to a backlash against the right in the late 1990s and a trend of retrospective voting emerged (Luna, 2010: 24: see Murillo et al., 2008; Panizza, 2005; Castañeda, 2006; Boron, 2008; Arditi, 2008). Disillusionment coincided with democratic consolidation and the institutionalisation of electoral competition in the region, which allowed the left to legally organise and compete elections for the first time since its repression by right-wing dictatorships beginning in the late 1970s[12] (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 8). It is argued then that "the surge of left-wing electoral success, have their roots in earlier failures of right-wing politics and in the violent repression of the left in mid-twentieth century Latin America" (Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009: 10). Ultimately, the combination of democratisation and the failure of the right in the late 1980s and early

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[12]The case of Chile in 1973 offers such an example. General Pinochet ousted leftist President Salvador Allende in a bloody military coup. Pinochet implemented a series of neoliberal reforms and the country became synonymous with the 'Chicago Boys' and the Washington Consensus.

1990s, created a political opportunity for the left at the turn of the century which explains the timing of the left turn.

By the late 1990s the left in Latin America had reinvented itself as a 'new' left which distinguished itself from the old revolutionary left associated with Fidel Castro's armed revolution in Cuba (1959), or Maoist insurgent movements like the Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). This 'new left' was more concerned with the "ballot box" than with armed revolution and could therefore assert itself as a viable electoral alternative to the right (Petras, 1997: 22). Furthermore, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the geopolitical stigma of the left allowing the new left to emerge independently and without being labelled as another "Soviet beachhead" (Castañeda, 2006: 29). By the late 1990s, the left prepared to take electoral advantage of their newfound creditability and tapped into the prevailing dissatisfaction of the electorate by developing a "persuasive critique of the failures of democracy and neoliberalism in Latin America" (Luna, 2010; Panizza, 2005: 729). In this section of the chapter I outline three aspects of the 'discontent' explanation. The literature highlights that people were driven left by economic, social and political discontent with neoliberal incumbents. Importantly, these factors are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap and intertwine depending on the context of each country. More generally, they are the three key components of this central explanation for the left turn.

Before outlining the roots of discontent it is important to clarify where I situate my argument within this explanation. The goal is to add to this explanation by providing insight into the indigenous perspective on discontent in particular. More specifically, I argue that indigenous people were among the most dissatisfied with neoliberal incumbents which drove them to support the left. For example, during the neoliberal era indigenous rights were often unrealised and their access to health, education and social assistance was limited (Hall et al., 2006). Moreover, indigenous people remained the subject of labour market discrimination and unequal earnings with non-indigenous people (Hall et al., 2006). The privatisation of land resulted in a significant loss of traditional indigenous territories due to the lack of constitutional

protection (Yashar, 2005).[13] However, I also argue that the distrust felt by indigenous communities towards institutionalised politics meant that the parties relied on the movements to mobilise the indigenous bases in support of the left. Therefore, the movements were central in translating this discontent to electoral support. We now turn to the basis for economic, social and political discontent more generally and how it explains support for the left at the turn of the century.

Economic discontent

Neoliberal reforms were implemented throughout the region during the 1980s in response to the debt crisis when governments were forced to turn to international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for relief (Vanden and Prevost, 2009). This placed "unprecedented power in the Fund's hand which it used to implement a rapid neoliberal market reform programme across the region" during the 1980s and early 1990s (Green, 1996: 109). Latin American governments began to implement structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) as a condition of their loans in the hope that it would control government costs and inflation (Vanden and Prevost, 2009). In some cases the pressure to control inflation caused countries such as Argentina and Mexico to overvalue their currencies (Kirby, 2003). By the late 1990s another economic crisis hit the region and countries found it increasingly difficult to repay their external debt, forcing them to once again negotiate with economic institutions. The Mexican Peso Crisis[14] in 1994 provided the first indication of the regions instability. During the early 1990s, Mexico was viewed as a "model reformer" in the region by the international market (Kirby, 2003: 62). It was the main recipient of foreign direct investment in Latin America at this time, and the economy was growing at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent (Griffith Jones, 2000; Martin, 2000). In December 1994 however, the overvaluation of the peso by the conservative Carlos Salinas de Gortari government[15] (1988-1994) resulted in an economic crisis in Mexico that forced the government to devalue the peso (Green, 1996). Within a year, GDP fell by seven per cent, foreign direct investment also "fell dramatically", and the "banking system was severely weakened" (Griffith Jones, 2002). Similar crises ensued in other countries across the region in the late 1990s as a result of the failure

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[13]Indigenous land was sold to those within the logging industry, cattle ranchers and those exploring natural resources in the region.
[14]The peso crisis is also known as the 'Tequila Crisis'
[15] President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)

of SAPS and the impact of the Asian crisis in 1997 on the region (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011).

Neoliberal governments also failed to deliver on promises of increased growth, investment and employment. Growth rates remained unpredictable throughout the era of neoliberal consensus in Latin America. In most countries, economic growth remained below the six per cent level deemed necessary to tackle stark poverty and unemployment (which was rapidly increasing during this time) (O'Toole, 2011). Trade liberalisation led to a flood of imports into the region, which greatly affected local producers who could not compete in this market (O'Toole, 2011). This had a direct effect on indigenous people and campesinos[16] that predominantly worked within the agricultural sector (O'Toole, 2011). Ultimately, where neoliberalism failed, support for the free-market model and those who implemented it dissolved (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). In some cases however, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru, neoliberal policies increased growth and stabilised hyperinflationary economies and neoliberal governments were re-elected during the 1990s (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). This was more the exception than the rule and by the close of the century it had become abundantly clear that neoliberalism had failed in many countries across the region.

The Argentine economic crisis of 2001 provides an example how the failure of neoliberalism, and ensuing discontent, contributed to the electoral success of the left there. President Fernando de la Rúa came to power in 1999 on a platform of change after the ten-year rule of Carlos Menem. Menem had borrowed extensively during his successive terms acquiring over $90billion in foreign debt alone (Katel, 2001, Kirby, 2003). In addition Menem's neoliberal policies such as the privatisation of public utilities, including electricity and telecommunications, had increased unemployment within these sectors (Katel, 2001). The economy began to stagnate within the first year of the de la Rúa presidency and revenues began to fall dramatically (Powell, 2002). In 2000, the government was forced to negotiate a $40 billion lending package

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[16] Campesino means 'farm-worker' or in some cases it is translated to 'peasant'. However, the campesino identity is often intertwined with indigenous identity because the majority of farm workers in the highlands are indigenous. These highland workers will often identify as campesino in which an ethnic component is implied. Campesino is a term widely used within the literature (see Van Cott, 2002; Yashar, 2005).

with the IMF (Powell, 2002). The government introduced a series of austerity measures including significant tax increases and £649million in spending cuts (Powell, 2002; Katel, 2001). In 2001, Argentina negotiated a further $30 billion debt exchange with the IMF and introduced a 'zero deficit' austerity bill which would drastically cut pensions and salaries (Powell, 2002). In April that year a political crisis led to the breakdown of the ruling UCR-FREPASO coalition, further jeopardising political stability (Dinerstein, 2003).[17] Finally, in November 2001, $1.3 billion "fled the banks" and the central bank was left with a net reserve of just $1.7billion (Dinerstein, 2003: 191). The government restricted cash withdrawals to no more than $250 dollars per week and limited the transfers of funds abroad to $1,000 per month (Dinerstein, 2003).

Under increased hardship, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Buenos Aires in December 2001, proclaiming that they had "Enough!" of these reforms and called for the resignation of the President and dissolution of government (Dinerstein, 2003). The feeling of discontent is best expressed through the demonstrators slogan "Que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo" ("all of them [politicians] must go, not a single one can stay") which they chanted outside the Presidential Palace in December 2001. President de la Rúa reacted to the protests by declaring a state of siege, which only encouraged more people to take to the streets and demand his resignation (Dinerstein, 2003). On December 21st 2001, state forces and demonstrators clashed in what is known as the "Battle of Buenos Aires" and President de la Rúa fled Argentina by helicopter (Dinerstein, 2003). The "spectacular collapse of the neoliberal experiment" in Argentina in 2001 led to the mass protests which are considered as "the iconic moment of this backlash against politics and politicians associated with the failures of neoliberal adjustment policies" (Boron, 2008: 234; Arditi, 2008: 65). The case of Argentina demonstrates how discontent with neoliberal incumbents resulted in a desire by the electorate to throw the 'rascals' out of government (Murillo et al., 2008).

By the turn of the century then, Latin America was "swerving left" due to a series of "distinct backlashes" against dominant trends such as free-market reforms and the

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[17] President De la Rúa came to power in 1999 under a collation made up of his political party Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO).

failure of the incumbents to deliver on their promises (Castañeda, 2006: 8; 30). In this way discontent with free-market policies "paved the way for leftist leaders' electoral victories" (Luna and Filgueira, 2009: 377). Accordingly, electoral volatility in the region is "driven by retrospective economic voting" (Panizza, 2005: 725; Arnold and Samuels, 2011). For example, Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2010: 15) use public opinion surveys from Latinobarómetro to measure the dissatisfaction of Latin American voters from 1997 to 2008 and find that there is "strong temporal coincidence" between the steady increase in unsatisfied voters and support for left-leaning candidates. The election of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva in Brazil in 2002 provides an example of how neoliberal reforms under incumbents drove support for the left. For example, the privatisation of public services and state-owned enterprises by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso resulted in high unemployment and in turn, "swelling of support" for Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 10).

This argument of retrospective voting builds on the work of Panizza (2005: 725) who believes that support for the left can be best understood in terms of "loser alliances". These alliances are comprised of a heterogeneous electoral base made up of traditional support along with some newer elements like the impoverished, the self-employed and informal or unemployed workers (Panizza, 2005). It is the opposition to neoliberal incumbents which unites this heterogeneous base of support for the left. I argue that indigenous people and their movements are part of this base of support who feel aggrieved by the economic failings of neoliberalism. In particular, the neoliberal reforms failed to address issues of poverty and inequality which directly impacted indigenous communities already among the most marginalised in society. This is best understood by the societal discontent generated under neoliberal incumbents.

Social discontent

Neoliberal economic policies severely impacted poverty and inequality levels in the region. Huber and Solt (2004) find that countries which radically liberalised during

neoliberalism are associated with higher levels of poverty and inequality.[18] Specifically, more liberalised countries such as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Peru had higher levels of inequality by 1995 than the less liberalised economies (Huber and Solt, 2004). Countries that underwent episodes of drastic reform[19] increased their Gini index nine times more than those who did not[20] (Huber and Solt, 2004). Additionally, countries that underwent radical reforms are also associated with higher levels of poverty (Huber and Solt, 2004).

Stokes (2009) argues that it is not simply neoliberal incumbents and the free-market model which motivated support for the left but the failure of these governments to appropriately 'compensate' the losers of this model which led to their downfall. That is, neoliberal incumbents failed to match the increase in trade liberalisation with an increase in public spending in areas such as social welfare and redistribution of wealth. Her argument is based on the assumption that globalisation creates losers and winners and that the State must keep the losers happy by redistributing benefits from the winners (Stokes, 2009). When neoliberal incumbents failed to redistribute the wealth to the 'losers' they reinforced inequality and generated a discontent with social policies. Interestingly, Stokes (2009) explains that while many moderate leftist governments continue to pursue some elements of the free-market model, most notably trade liberalisation, they do not suffer the same backlash because they compensate the losers through social policies. It was the proposal to implement such policies that "helped bring the left to power" (Stokes, 2009: 29). The new left took electoral advantage of the failure of the right to compensate the losers by re-politicising inequality and poverty, using this as a central issue in their platform for change (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011).

Castañeda (2006) also argues that inequality was a driver of support for the left who campaigned on this issue. However, he argues that inequality is an inherent characteristic of the region since colonisation and therefore we cannot say it alone explains the left turn. Rather the combination of continued inequality and democratisation through which the new left emerged as a viable political alternative

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[18]The authors use the General Reform Index (GRI) compiled by Morley et al. (1999) to measure the level of neoliberal reform in each country across the region from 1982-1995.
[19]These countries include; Peru, Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala and Brazil, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and El Salvador
[20] Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Honduras, Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica

explains the left turn. He argues that "impoverished masses" will inevitably vote for policies that will make them less poor when given the opportunity (Castañeda, 2006: 30). In Latin America, this opportunity arose when the left emerged as a viable opposition following democratic consolidation. Therefore, the left turn was an inevitable consequence of democratic consolidation because the "social, demographic, and ethnic configuration" of the region increases the likelihood of high levels of poverty and inequality and these issues are naturally congruent with left-wing politics (Castañeda, 2006: 30). This is a somewhat tautological argument for it implies that once voting for a viable left alternative emerged (under democratic consolidation) the region was always going to swing left. While the author highlights the ideological congruence between the poor (such as indigenous people) and leftist politics, Castañeda fails to capture the casual complexities involved in the left turn. That is, if we assume that democratisation was the sole catalyst for the left turn then how can we explain the variation in support for the left, and indeed they types of left across a region? In this research I propose that the mobilisation of indigenous movements can explain this variation.

For example, Debs and Helmke (2010: 232) find that while "inequality under democracy shapes the electoral fortunes of the Left", mass mobilisation also has a positive effect on the left's vote share. Furthermore, Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 8) explain that poverty and inequality created a new "potential constituency for the Left" which was made up of "a large pool of voters who are likely to be receptive to redistributive appeals" (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 8). I contribute to this explanation by proposing that indigenous people were among this new constituency motivated by the lefts policies to alleviate inequality and poverty. However, I also argue that this constituency was mobilised in favour of the left by indigenous movements rather than party members and for this reason mobilisation of movements also matters for explaining the left turn.

While Latin America continues to have the highest level of inequality in the world Lustig (2009) finds that inequality is declining. Since 2002 inequality has decreased in twelve out of seventeen countries and extreme poverty has also fallen faster than in the past. The author claims that the declination of poverty and inequality has "coincided with the rise of leftist regimes in a growing number of countries (Lustig, 2009: 1). Interestingly however, Arnold and Samuels (2011) find that at the micro

level, the number of Latin Americans who believe the distribution of wealth to be unfair or very unfair decreased by just three per cent between 1997 and 2007. The implication then, according to these authors is that, "leftist leader's redistributive rhetoric has failed to resonate with citizens" (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 32). The work of these authors provides an interesting insight into the potential endurance of the left as discussed in the introduction because it begs the question; if the perception among Latin Americans is that inequality remains high, will the electorate punish the left as they did the right in subsequent elections? I argue that, as indigenous people are among the most impoverished stratum of society, improved levels of equality matter to them and therefore to the movements which represent them. If we find that these movements are dissatisfied with equality levels they might withdraw their support for the left. Such questions will be addressed in the qualitative case study chapters.

Political discontent

Political discontent is rooted in weak democratic institutions and the failure of incumbent parties to provide representative democracy (Luna, 2010). High levels of political corruption during this time compounded political discontent. For instance, in 2000 the head of Peru's central intelligence service, Vladimiro Montesinos was filmed bribing an elected congressman from the opposition party to join the right-wing governing party of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). The ensuing scandal further revealed the level of corruption within President Fujimori's administration, who was forced to resign over the incident. Such levels of corruption were not limited to Peru. Findings from a Latinobarómetro survey in 2002 revealed that 31.4 per cent of respondents were aware of one or more cases of patronage[21] (UNDP, 2004). The poor performance of political parties is even recognised by political leaders themselves. For instance, in an elite survey with over 231 current and former leaders in Latin America conducted by the UNDP (2004) respondents did not feel that political parties fulfilled their roles in the region[22]. Not surprisingly, political

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[21] Countries with a low level of awareness include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador. Countries with moderate levels include of awareness of examples of cronyism; Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and the two qualitative cases of this dissertation, Bolivia and Peru. Finally, cases where there is a high level of awareness of examples of cronyism include Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Mexico.

[22] The survey included 41 presidents and vice-presidents across the region and was conducted between 2002 and 2003. There were two exceptions Uruguay and Honduras.

discontent and the failure of incumbent parties to convert popular will into policies paved the way for "new leaders" who promised political renewal (Luna and Filgueira, 2009: 377; Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2008).

Weak institutions contributed to the decline and in some cases the collapse of incumbents who in most cases represented the traditional parties in their respective countries. This created a power vacuum and political space for the left to emerge (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). A general phenomenon of voter detachment from traditional parties in the late 1990s "reflected a deep-seated crisis of political representation" in the region (Roberts, 2007: 11). As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, economic, social and political discontent comprise the lowest common denominator in explaining the left turn and therefore these factors are often intertwined. This is true for the political crisis because it was intimately related to the "political fallout from the economic crisis which produced widespread anti-incumbent vote swings" and in turn "vacated" space for other political leaders such as populists and outsiders (Roberts, 2007: 11- 12). In Bolivia for example "the virtual collapse of the country's traditional political parties created an institutional vacuum" that was "largely filled" by the left at the turn of the century (Bowen, 2011: 110). The attitude of external actors such as the US also contributed to the emergence of the left. For instance the "aloofness" of the US in the region post 9/11 created a power vacuum that provided a favourable setting for the left turn (Arditi, 2008: 67).

Regardless of how this political space was created, the left occupied it by channelling economic, social and political discontent into their policies and translating it to electoral success. The politicisation of inequality, poverty and marginalisation were particularly effective weapons in the policy repertoire of the left. For instance, Blanco and Grier (2013: 78) explain that the left were able to "tap into widespread and deep discontent over voters' feelings of political marginalisation" (Blanco and Grier, 2013: 78). I contribute to this literature by arguing that indigenous people were among those most discontented with politics and therefore provided a base of support for the left. For instance, representation of indigenous people in parliament remains generally limited[23] and according to indigenous activist and former Minister for Culture in

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[23] The number of indigenous people in the lower or single chamber of the legislature in 2001–2002 stood at: around 0.8 percent in Peru (one out of 120); 3.3 percent (four out of 121) in Ecuador; 12.4 percent (14 out of 113) in Guatemala; and 26.2 percent (34 out of 130) in Bolivia (UNDP, 2004).

Guatemala, Otilia Lux de Cojti, democracy in Latin America is incomplete because it is mono-cultural in that indigenous people are not recognised by the state (UNDP, 2004). Furthermore, political discontent is central to my argument because I contend that indigenous communities were so disillusioned with and marginalised by traditional politics that it took the work of indigenous movements to legitimise support for leftist parties and in turn provide a base of support for the left.

In relation to the polices proposed by the left some authors are keen to highlight that the left turn is not only a backlash against neoliberal incumbents but is based upon the appeal of the policies of the new left beyond the marginalised. That is, the left, and the moderate left in particular offer appealing policies to the more general moderate voters in the region. Baker and Greene (2011) argue that Latin Americans are themselves becoming more moderate and the policies offered by the moderate left directly appeal to this section of the electorate (Baker and Greene, 2011). Such policies offer voters a chance to reject some neo-liberal reforms while maintaining others such as free trade agreements and therefore it only "partially" reverses market reforms rather than eliminate them which is unappealing to the moderates (Baker and Greene, 2011: 73). The implication of this argument is that support for the left in the region reflects a mass ideological shift to the left. Such a shift would mean that the left could maintain a core of group of voters "anchored on the left" upon which they could rely for future elections (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 31).

Seligson (2007: 87) finds however, that while there was a mass ideological shift to the left in the region between from 1996 to 2006 the "magnitude of the shift is small". Other authors find that there was a substantial ideological swing to the left at the mass level in some countries[24] between 1996 and 2008, but there was a decrease in identification with the left in others[25], thus highlighting the variation in support for the left across the region (Arnold and Samuels, 2011). Indeed, Arnold and Samuels (2011) claim that because there is no evidence of a "dramatic ideological realignment" to the left at the mass level, the electoral swing to the left may be more "hype than substance" (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 37-49). Rather, because the authors find that few Latin Americans identify as leftists, they claim that the left turn

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[24]Countries, which experienced an ideological swing to the left at the mass level, include Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
[25] Countries, which experienced a decrease, include Brazil and Mexico.

simply signals the maturation of democracy in the region in which the electoral rotation of parties reflects the "normal workings of representative democracy" (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 49). Discontent towards incumbents was the driver of this electoral rotation and indeed this has more to do with the failure of incumbents generally that would occur regardless of ideology.

I argue that the simple rotation of parties and maturation of democracy does not sufficiently capture the complexities and variation involved with Latin America's left turn and that the electoral shift to the left deserves further exploration in order to uncover these nuances. Moreover, the argument by Baker and Greene (2011) that Latin Americans are for the most part moderate and the success of the moderate left is rooted in their ability to appeal to them is based on general trends across the region, which fails to capture important distinctions across countries. More explicitly it fails to explain variation in support for the left (if most Latin Americans are moderate then why do we see variation within support for the moderate left?) and more pertinently the variation in the type of left which has emerged in different cases (from moderate to contestatory). Accordingly, the chapter will now turn to literature relating to the secondary puzzle, namely, *what explains the variation in the types of left which have emerged during the left turn?*

Prevailing explanations for the 'Two Lefts'

The current literature addressing the variation in the type of left which emerged is not very diverse but rather centres on the work of one author in particular. Weyland (2009; 2010) proposes two, non-mutually exclusive, explanations for the variation in the left. The first explanation is based on commodity booms which Weyland (2009: 146) claims is a "crucial factor" in explaining the emergence of the contestatory left in some cases and not in others. This argument is based on rentier state theory in which the "bust-boom cycle of rentier states, especially in natural resource bonanza" such as oil or gas can help to explain the emergence of the contestatory left. Specifically, the sudden boost in revenue generated by the bonanza allows contestatory left governments to increase public spending and win mass support. Contestatory and populist leaders are more likely to incur bust-boom cycles than moderate leaders because they are greater 'risk takers' (Weyland, 2009). Where strong institutions do not control these leaders, they increase public spending thus

satisfying the electorate who will re-elect them (Weyland, 2009). The author explicitly states that "[i]t is not a coincidence that the contestatory left emerged in countries and time periods when there happened to be a greater economic latitude for pursuing ambitious goals" (Weyland, 2010: 21). He refers to the oil industry in Venezuela and the gas deposits discovered in Bolivia, which increased revenue in both countries[26] (Weyland, 2010). Conversely, in cases of the moderate left, such as Chile and Brazil, there was no resource bonanza and these governments faced more economic constraints, which limited their capacity to make radical transformations (Weyland, 2010).

Indeed, high growth rates in the mid-2000s allowed leftist presidents to redistribute wealth and increase public spending on new social programs allowing them to "govern" by delivering on their promises for increased spending in these areas Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 11). Those however, who have not experienced commodity booms must be more careful with their expenditure, thus restricting their ability to govern in the same way as those with natural resources (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Blanco and Grier (2011) find some support for this argument in their quantitative study where commodity booms in areas such as agriculture, mining and oil positively correlate with the probability of a leftist candidate winning the presidential elections.

I argue however that commodity booms do more to explain the endurance of the contestatory left once in power, than how this left come to power in the first instance. Commodity booms generate enough revenue for the extreme left to implement their radical policies, often including redistribution of wealth, which appeases voters who re-elect them. This argument however only applies to those who are in power in the first place and have the power to implement redistributive policies using this extra revenue. Moreover, the commodity boom is not exclusive to ideological divides and we can assume that the right would take equal advantage of this revenue when in power. That is, while the contestatory left are more likely to rely on these commodity booms to implement their ambitious redistributive plans, there is no evidence to suggest that the right would not also use this surplus revenue to further their own policy agenda, and consolidate support among their own social bases. Furthermore,

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[26] Especially during an energy price boom in the mid-2000s.

the case of Brazil offers an example in which a state with large oil reserves has been governed by a moderate left since the left turn there in 2002 (The Economist, 2011). Perhaps the existence of these resources poses an opportunity for the contestatory left in Brazil if it were to emerge and gain power, though current Brazilian politics remains dominated by the moderate left and the centre. Ultimately, what the left might do if in power and indeed how electoral support may be increased or sustained is not the central concern of this research. Rather, the primary focus of this research is to provide an explanation for the variation in the type of left when it first emerged.

The second explanation posited by Weyland (2010) is related to the previous discussion regarding discontent. The author argues that in cases of higher market reform failure, a stronger sense of discontent emerged that fostered an environment for extreme policies proposed by the contestatory left (Weyland, 2010). In Bolivia for instance, the continuing failure of market reforms by the late 1990s resulted in mounting criticism of neoliberalism and made way for contestatory leftist President Evo Morales in 2006 (Weyland, 2010). The contestatory left, which arose in both Bolivia and Venezuela "was born out of discontent with market economics" (Weyland, 2010: 20). Conversely, the moderate left emerged in Brazil and Chile because market reforms experienced some initial success which had a "de-radicalising effect" on the electorate (Weyland, 2010: 20).

The level of discount however should be understood in conjunction with the level of party system institutionalisation (Weyland, 2010). For instance, discontent with economic reforms in the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela was compounded by poor governance, weak state functioning and growing corruption. In both cases, poor institutional structure and weak party systems disintegrated in the late 1990s resulting in the deterioration of the party system (Weyland, 2010). The combination of discontent with weak party systems provided the opportunity for new leaders and movements to emerge and use "fiery rhetoric and ambitious promises" to garner support (Weyland, 2010: 20). The emergence of the contestatory left was made more difficult in cases where strong and well-institutionalised party systems because such systems make it more difficult for new parties to emerge. The party system in Brazil for example, had stabilised by the early 1990s and existing parties such as the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) have established close ties with labour unions and civil

society organisations since their inception, making it difficult for a new contestatory left party to capture that support base (Weyland, 2010).

Flores-Macías (2012) also highlights the importance of party system institutionalisation for controlling contestatory leftist candidates. He argues that the "type of economic policy conducted by leftist governments in the region is best explained by the degree to which the party system is institutionalised" (Flores-Macías, 2012: 60). Where weakly institutionalised party systems are in "disarray", anti-system candidates who espouse contentious politics, such as contestatory leftist leaders, are able to undertake more "drastic transformations" in economic policies (Flores-Macías, 2012: 63). Where systems are more strongly institutionalised insider candidates are more concerned with consensus-building politics and therefore do not adopt radical economic reforms but rather stick with the "status quo" (Flores-Macías, 2012: 63). As with Weyland's (2009) commodity boom argument however, Flores-Macías (2012) explains more about the variation in the leftist leaders once in power than describing how they came to power in the first instance.

The cases of Bolivia and Brazil used by Weyland (2010) above are illustrative of the argument that the weaker the party system the more likely the contestatory left will take power. However, if party system institutionalisation is what matters, the comparative case study used in this research poses an interesting question. For instance, when we measure the strength of the respective party systems using the Pederson Index of electoral volatility, we find that between 1980-1997 Peru was substantially more volatile than Bolivia yet the contestatory left emerged there later (2011) than in Bolivia (2006).[27] Moreover, since coming to power the contestatory leftist President of Peru, Ollanta Humala, has moderated considerably and rather than implementing radical leftist economic reforms as Flores-Macías' argument suggests he might, Humala has been criticised for following a policy of neoliberalism. Therefore, Peru represents a case in which despite a weak, and highly volatile party system the contestatory left did not emerge until much later than other cases and once in power this left moderated substantially and was more concerned with keeping the status quo. Admittedly, Humala who had campaigned as a contestatory leftist candidate in 2006 and lost had shifted to the moderate left by 2011 when he was

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[27] Bolivia scored 28.65 and Peru scored 49.86 (Madrid, 2005).

elected. This explains why Humala has not pursued radical reforms since taking office. Nevertheless, the argument remains that Peru is a case in which the party system is highly volatile yet the contestatory left has not been successful.

Party system institutionalisation alone cannot explain the variation in the type of lefts that emerged at the beginning of the left turn. Rather it should only be considered in conjunction with other factors such as levels of discontent as posited by Weyland (2010). Even within this argument however there is a failure to recognise that where there are high levels of discontent the masses are likely to be disillusioned with political parties and so rely on non-institutionalised actors to mobilise their bases in support of the party such as social movements. Therefore this study seeks to contribute to the secondary puzzle regarding the types of left which emerged in the region by highlighting the role played by movements, and indigenous movements in particular. The chapter will now turn to the theoretical framework through which the variation in the mobilisation of indigenous social movements can be argued to firstly help explain support for the left in the region, and secondly the variation in the types of left which emerged.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Blanco and Grier (2011: 8) note that "leftist political movements may have been sparked by increased mobilisation of indigenous populations". I empirically investigate this claim by analysing the role of indigenous movements in particular. In order to justify how such an assertion can be made, we must consider the role social movements can play in providing a base of support for a party. The literature discussed here provides the theoretical foundation for the argument. In the second part of the theoretical framework I provide an overview of the literature which provides a basis for the argument that indigenous movements in particular provided a base of support for the left in Latin America.

Social movements provide a base of support for a party

The fundamental starting point for the theoretical framework is a discussion of social cleavage structure in Latin America. All societies divide or ''cleave' the electorate by gathering individuals into groups according to their different preferences (Roberts, 2002: 9). Such preferences are informed by sociological factors, such as class, or in other cases, they are "constructed within the political arena through the competitive

interaction of alternative party organizations, programs, or leaderships without reference to pre-existing social divisions" (Roberts, 2002: 9). Social cleavages can provide a stable social base of support that parties depend upon for election (Dalton, 1996). Dalton (1996: 321) explains how "[S]urvey research found that social cleavages exerted a potent effect on voting, especially class and religious differences". In their work Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 320) explain that; "Differences between competing social groups provided the potential basis for political conflict, furnishing both a possible base of voter support and a set of political interests that parties vied to represent". The class cleavage in particular is "one of the most pervasive bases of party support" (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 32). This cleavage represents the losers and winners of society and is reinforced by issues such as un/employment, "inflation, social services, tax policies and government management of the economy" (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 32).

This research argues that indigenous people form a base of voter support for the left by 'cleaving' along both ethnic (indigenous) and class (poor) lines. Indigenous social movements are important because they mobilise this base of support for the left. Dalton (1996) argues that ethnic cleavages are less prevalent in Latin America. That is, while ethnicity has "the potential to be a highly polarised cleavage", because many Latin American societies are ethnically homogenous "the effect of ethnicity as overall predictor of vote choice is limited" (Dalton, 1996: 329). It can be argued however in cases where ethnicity is more heterogeneous and indigenous population high that ethnic cleavages can become prevalent. That is, the higher the indigenous population the more likely ethnic cleavages will matter. Lupu (2009) provides evidence that ethnicity is a "significant political cleavage" in the more ethnically heterogeneous countries in the region and Madrid (2004) claims that this cleavage can be a valuable source of support for the left in particular.

Moreover, this research argues that there is often an overlap between class and ethnic identities among indigenous people in Latin America and consequently they can cleave along both lines, sometimes simultaneously. It is important to situate this assertion within the literature on social cleavage and party systems in Latin America, which is distinct from European systems, discussed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their seminal article 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments'. Dix

(1989: 25) for example, outlines the contrast between party system emergence in the West and Latin America. In the West party systems evolved more or less incrementally:

> "with parties based on newly salient cleavages being added to the existing system, in time shunting aside parties founded on previously prominent cleavages, reducing them to minor party status, or interacting with them in complex ways, this has been the case only exceptionally in Latin America."

In Latin America, emergence of the party system can be described as "discontinuous". It emerged more or less "de novo, usually after a revolution or long period of dictatorial rule, with few perceptible links to the pre-revolutionary or pre-dictatorial past" (Dix, 1989: 25). In this post-revolutionary era, most traditional conservative or liberal parties ceased to exist, "leaving no visible progeny" (Dix, 1989: 25). Ultimately, Dix (1989: 25) claims that:

> "rather than the European model of party development suggested by Lipset and Rokkan, whereby the principal differences among contemporary party systems can be traced to distinctive configurations of early cleavages (centre-periphery, church–state, and landowners-commercial/industrial interests), variations among many of Latin Americas party system reflect divergent responses to the expanded political mobilisation of the last several decades."

Roberts (2002) also highlights the need to address the difference in cleavage formation between the West and Latin America. The author explains that while the foundation for cleavages existed, particularly in the sense of class cleavages, they did not consolidate the way they did in Europe. For this reason, we must understand cleavages in Latin America distinctively from other cases. The history of Latin America, such as the impact of neo-liberalism on the party system organisation for example should be considered when discussing cleavages in the region (Roberts, 2002). The difference in cleavage structure in the region has, in turn, moulded party-society linkages there. A discussion of party-society linkages is useful here because through them it is "possible to identify the different ways in which parties mobilise support and how these evolve in response to societal change" (Roberts, 2002: 15). I posit that because of distrust towards parties they could not mobilise support without

the movements, who acted as intermediaries between society and the party. Therefore it is important to understand party-society linkages in the region in order to observe how they changed over time and, in turn, how movements mobilised support in place of parties.

There are a number of party-society linkages worth discussing here. The first is programmatic linkages which are historically weaker in Latin America than in Europe precisely because of the frailty of social cleavages structures (Roberts, 2002). For instance, socialist parties in Europe were able to articulate the interests of their base, the working class, in order to "build mass organisations to encapsulate their supporters" however without the same cleavage structures, Latin American parties did not emerge along programmatic lines, thus weakening this linkage. Patron-clientelism linkages are also important for this study, particularly given the persistence of clientelism in the region, especially within poor communities such as indigenous people.[28] Such linkages are most likely to occur where there are "machine politics or parties" whereby a party has the resources to exchange material benefits for political support (Roberts, 2002: 15). In the case of Latin America, and Bolivia in particular, the "machine" was traditionally right-wing parties which had more resources to distribute gifts (Roberts, 2002). Linkages can also be personalistic or charismatic in nature which occur when leaders demonstrate a "special gift" inspiring the popular masses to place their confidence in this "messiah figure to direct a process of radical change or resolve a national crisis" (Roberts, 2002:19).

Collective-based linkages are also important for this study because they occur when citizens become associated with a party through "membership in a party-affiliated social group or organisations, such as a labour union, peasant federation, or ethnic group" (Roberts, 2002: 15). In this way those affiliated with indigenous social movements establish a linkage with the party through the movement, which is useful for understanding the nature of party-society linkages in this study. Encapsulating, or participatory linkages are closely related to this because they "incorporate the masses directly into the political process beyond the act of voting" which "entails the construction of a party organisation with local branches or grassroots units that

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[28] For a more comprehensive understanding of clientelism in Latin America and in poorer communities please see the work Hilgers, T. (Ed.). (2012). *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

provide activism" (Roberts, 2002:16). These "party organs" are supplemented by "close bonds to mass secondary associations of workers or peasants, creating collective modes of association among groups defined by pertinent social cleavages or identities" (Roberts, 2002:16). Importantly, these linkages are more horizontal in structure with the parties relying greatly on the political labour of committed members (Roberts, 2002). This research demonstrates that some indigenous movements in Bolivia have established this kind of linkage with the left. Moreover, just as Roberts (2002:17) claims that in this linkage "parties thus help integrate society and socialise citizens to political life", this research postulates that indigenous social movements fulfilled this role where the parties could not.

The mobilisation of citizens by movements leads to a key component of this research, the role of social cleavages in the formation of social bases of support for a party (Roberts, 2002). These bases form social groups that enable parties "to formalise a basis of support" (Dalton, 1996:321). It is argued in this study that indigenous people, represented by indigenous social movements form a basis of support for the contestatory left. Explicitly, "[S]ocial groups could provide a political and an organisational basis for a party, furnishing members, funds, and the necessary votes at election times."(Dalton, 1996: 321). For example, Christian democrats recruit supporters at Sunday Mass and social democrats use labour unions to muster up workers and support for the party (Dalton, 1996:321). This study adopts the literature on social cleavages and social groups as a basis for party support to argue that indigenous social movements represent a base of support for the left, thereby justifying an empirical investigation into whether the emergence of the left in the region was indeed "sparked" by the increased mobilisation of indigenous people (Blanco and Grier, 2011: 8).

Cleary (2006: 39) argues that social movements in general can indeed provide a "structural base of support" for the left in Latin America. Furthermore he argues that such a base is crucial to the success of the left because "the left needs a mass-mobilising capacity to translate latent and diffuse support into electoral success" (Cleary, 2006: 39). While this mass mobilising capacity was historically provided from within the labour sector, "in a few cases leftist parties have also relied on social movements, *indigenous organisations*, and other popular groups for mass support" "[emphasis added]". I argue that in some cases leftist parties have relied on

indigenous social movements to provide this mass mobilising capacity and translate latent support into electoral success for the left. The case of Ecuador illustrates the role of indigenous organisations in providing this mass mobilising capacity where the "rapid growth of indigenous movements and their incorporation into the party system" has given Ecuador the "type of mass-mobilising capacity that is necessary for leftist victories" (Cleary, 2006: 39). The importance of these structural bases of support is exemplified by Cleary's (2006: 39) assertion that while the exact form of mobilisation is different in each country, "the common theme is that leftist victories in the current wave have been built on pre-existing organisational structures that facilitate class-based mobilisation". The term, 'pre-existing' is important to note here because it implies that the left's success depends on whether organisational structures existed in the country before the left turn. That is, in cases where these organisational structures pre-existed the left is more likely to be successful because they have better access to a mass mobilising capacity.

This assertion is based on the work of Roberts (2002) who distinguishes between labour mobilising and elitist party systems in Latin America. Roberts (2002) argues that two different types of party systems emerged in Latin America which drove the emergence of two different types of cleavage structure. The first is an elite party system, which led to a segmented cleavage structure in which the electorate divided across lines such as religion (Roberts, 2002). In this system parties do not mobilise voters based on social distinctions but rather they "structure electoral competition by generating organisational identities, articulating alternative policy agendas, and/or constructing rival patronage networks" (Roberts, 2002: 9). The second party system is labour-mobilising in which the electorate was divided along class lines resulting in a 'stratified cleavage' structure. Until the 20th century, Latin American party systems were elite and driven by the oligarchy. For this reason segmented cleavage structures dominated the region and reflected "intra-élite divisions" centred on church-state relations (Roberts, 2002: 10). At the turn of the 19th century however, new parties emerged in the southern cone and began to demand more political inclusion for the middle class such as the Partido Liberal, established in Chile in 1849. At the same time blue-collar workers organised into labour unions and became "significant political actors" (Roberts, 2002: 10). "The rise of the proletariat signalled the dawning of a new era of mass politics" (Roberts, 2002: 10). As a result, stratified, or class

cleavage, structures emerged in some Latin American countries which Roberts categorises as labour mobilising. Others remained dominated by the oligarchy and elite driven as class cleavages remained too weak, and therefore segmented cleavage structures remained. Table 1.1 below lists each country according to Roberts (2002) classification.

Table 1.1: Roberts' (2002) party system classification by country

Elite Party System	Labour Mobilising Party System
Colombia	Argentina
Costa Rica	Bolivia
Dominican Republic	Brazil
Ecuador	Chile
Honduras	Mexico
Panama	Nicaragua
Paraguay	Peru
Uruguay	Venezuela

Source: Roberts (2002)

These stratified or class-based cleavages, first emerged during the 19th century, but became particularly pronounced during the 20th Century when the manufacturing sector grew rapidly in the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) era of the 1930s-1980s. The growth in the sector resulted in higher levels of unionisation. The emergence of a mobilised labour movement was met with the formation of mass-based labour mobilising political parties. These parties usually left or populist in nature, developed stronger organisational structures within this union sector and encouraged mobilisation. Aware that a mobilised labour movement could be an effective base of support for the party, it began to encourage further mobilisation by placing "party cadres" into labour unions and civic associations in order to "activate and organise civil society" (Roberts 2002: 12). Labour mobilising parties "developed stronger base level organisational structures than traditional parties" (Roberts, 2002:

12). As a result, these parties encapsulated voters within labour and peasant[29] organisations and so in countries that were 'labour –mobilising' there was a rise in mass politics which "spawned the emergence of new collective actors, ideologies and mobilising strategies" (Roberts, 2002: 12). Ultimately, in labour-mobilising party systems such as those listed in Table 1.1 above, leftist and populist parties emerged which sought to tap into the organisational structures of labour unions and peasant organisations for support.

While Roberts (2002) argues that these cleavages were greatly weakened during the neoliberal era, it can be contended that by re-politicising inequality at the turn of the century, the new left revived these cleavages. For example, Handlin (2012: 3) explains that contestatory leftist leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia "actively shape and institutionalise a new organisational foundation for class cleavages" which is centred on "community-based organisations created through social policy rather than formal sector labour unions" (Handlin, 2012: 3). Therefore, just as the unionisation of the labour presented an opportunity for the left during the ISI era, the mobilisation of anti-neoliberal social movements during the 1990s[30] presented a novel potential social base of support for the new left. As noted earlier, continued inequality and poverty created a "potential constituency for the Left" at the turn of the century, therefore the movements which emerged to tackle these issues represented a new organisational base of support for the left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011:8). Cleary (2006: 37) argues that continuing inequality acted as the catalyst for remobilising social bases and states that "the electoral dominance of the left has an obvious explanation: The left succeeds because most Latin Americans are poor and a small minority is quite wealthy". Crucially however, while inequality may have acted as catalyst for mobilisation, the variation in support for the left is explained by variation in structural bases of support which exists in each case (Cleary, 2006). This is fundamental to my argument that inequality and discontent with incumbents provided the motivation for mobilisation of indigenous movements but it is the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation which can explain the variation in support for the type of left in the region.

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[29] Indigenous people are among the group considered as peasants at this time but they organised along class rather than ethnic lines.

[30] Anti-neoliberal movements include, among others, the mobilisation of indigenous social movements, or the 1994 Zapatista Uprising in Mexico.

Ultimately, labour mobilising party systems are more likely to facilitate mobilisation than elitist party systems because pre-existing organisational structures exist in these cases. For example, in the 2002 Brazilian Presidential election Lula benefitted from the pre-existing structural base through the support of the labour and social movements. Conversely, in Bolivia and Ecuador, the structural base of support came in the form of indigenous organisations. In these cases, Cleary (2006: 38) explains that the left "draws support from indigenous political parties that grew out of unusually strong social movements in the 1990s".The work of these authors provides a basis for the argument that indigenous social movements, where they exist and are mobilised, can provide a structural base of support for the left by acting as the 'mass-mobiliser' of their base.

In his earlier work, Roberts (1998) refers to the role of social movements in providing a structural base of support to the new left. He explains that the left in the late 1990s built on "the creative political energy of grassroots social organisations" (Roberts, 1998: 23). These organisations which include peasant organisations, acted as "organs of political power" for the creation of a new cultural and political hegemony envisioned by the left (Roberts, 1998; 25). For instance, by the late 1990s the left had "reconceptualised" itself and was building on the "creative political energy of grass-roots social organisations such as neighbourhood associations, Christian base communities, and women's groups" (Roberts, 1998; 23). Such organisations were viewed by the left as a "breeding ground for a new cultural and political hegemony with a more radically democratic ethos based on equality, direct participation and community solidarity" (Roberts, 1998; 23). Ultimately, these organisations helped to revive a leftist ideology whilst providing a structural base of support for the new left. This relationship was possible because of an ideological congruence between these groups and the left in which socialism became more of national rather than a class project. A "vision of a deeper, more profound process of democratisation became the rallying cry for leftist groups" (Roberts, 1998; 23). The foundation of this ideology rested on a "diverse and pluralistic social bloc" of groups (Roberts, 1998; 23). I argue that indigenous social movements were an integral part of this new social bloc which provided support for the left.

Rodríguez-Garavito et al. (2008) also highlight the role of social movements in providing support for the new left. The authors explain that "the emergence of new political actors that have served to compensate for the decline of trade unions" was central to the success of the left at the turn of the century (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 10). They specifically include indigenous movements as part of this base of support, claiming that:

> "a large part of the left's organisational and ideological novelty comes from recent indigenous movements, campesino organisations, movements of the underemployed, mobilisations of landless rural workers ...and other forms of social mobilisation" (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 11).

Rodríguez-Garavito et al. (2008) are the first to provide insight into the ways in which these organisations provided support for the left. They explain that these organisations form "coalitions" or "networks" with each other and "contribute to common political purposes" (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 12). Such 'common political purposes' can include a cycle of protest or electoral campaigns. The authors include indigenous social movements as part of the "new social base" which works in coalition with the left "without losing their organisational autonomy" (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 14). This is especially important for indigenous social movements who are reluctant to lose their autonomy and merge with political parties. These movements form the main social base for political parties in the region such as Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia and President Rafael Correa's political party Alianza PAIS (AP) in Ecuador (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). Interestingly, both these parties are considered part of the contestatory left in the region, thus justifying the argument that the mobilisation of movements may explain the variation in support for the types of left that emerged during the left turn.

Indigenous movements provide a base of support for the left
Luna and Filgueira (2009: 376) state that the ability of the left to "bring together a broad socially heterogeneous electoral constituency in the context of fragmented civil societies" was a key component in the success of the left at the turn of the century. The role of the indigenous constituency is of special concern to this study and has been the subject of some empirical research. Lupu (2009) for instance, finds that ethnic minorities, particularly indigenous people, are most likely to vote for the left.

The author uses cross-national surveys to investigate individual voting behaviour to ascertain 'who' is voting left. He finds that class voting does occur in labour-based party systems which imply that socioeconomic cleavages are important in these systems, thereby supporting the argument that class cleavages re-emerged after the neoliberal era. This is important because indigenous people divide along both ethnic and socioeconomic lines, sometimes simultaneously. Specifically because indigenous people are "overwhelmingly" poor, "leftist parties, which appeal to lower-class voters, should attract indigenous votes" (Van Cott, 2005: 35). Crucially, Lupu (2009) finds that of all the ethnic groups in his study[31] indigenous people are most likely to vote for the left.

This finding is further substantiated by Madrid (2005) who found that the failure of the traditional parties to represent indigenous people caused indigenous voters to support left or populist parties. In this way, Madrid (2005) supports the earlier discussion that the failure of traditional parties to represent indigenous people generated a discontent with politics within this sector of society. Indeed, Madrid (2007) argues that indigenous voters have provided much support for minor parties such as the left, particularly in states where indigenous people are highly politically mobilised. The author uses the case of Bolivia to illustrate how a substantial indigenous population, once mobilised, can provide an important vote share for the left (Madrid, 2012). Specifically, he provides an overview of the ethnic composition of the vote share of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in 2005 according to Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2006. Respondents, who self-identified as indigenous, comprised 28 per cent of the MAS vote in the Presidential elections (Madrid, 2012: 62). Those who identified as Mestizos who spoke an indigenous language[32] comprised over 43 per cent of the total MAS vote in the 2005 presidential elections (Madrid, 2012). Together these identities make up the indigenous base. Therefore, according to survey data, indigenous people composed over 70 per cent of the vote for MAS in 2005 (Madrid, 2012). The remaining 29 per cent of the vote was divided between Mestizo who spoke Spanish only (19 per cent), white people (7 per cent) and 'other' (3 per cent) (Madrid, 2012 b).

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[31] Lupu (2009) also includes Black, mixed and 'other ethnicity' groups in his study.

[32] Mestizo is the term commonly used to describe the ethnic group made up of both indigenous and Spanish descendants, or mixed ethnicity. Mestizos who speak an indigenous language are considered part of the indigenous base.

The work of Madrid (2012) illustrates how a mobilised indigenous constituency can provide a valuable vote share for a party in cases where the population is substantial and mobilised. In addition, Korovkin (2006) explains that divisions within indigenous movements in Ecuador led many indigenous voters to support left, rather than indigenous parties, further illustrating the compatibility between indigenous people and the left. Ultimately, if the work of Cleary (2006) and Roberts (1998; 2002) explicates that the left depend on a social base of support for electoral success, then the work of Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) implies that indigenous voters are acting as this base. However, neither Madrid (2012) nor Lupu (2009) explicitly investigate the relationship between indigenous social movements and leftist parties. This research provides such an investigation, thereby filling the empirical gap.

The work of Van Cott (2005; 2007) is useful for understanding this relationship. Van Cott (2007: 2) claims that "the electoral resurgence of the leftist political parties is intimately related to the rise of indigenous movements in the 1980s". Specifically she argues that the "political resurgence of leftist parties after 1998 *follows* the partially successful efforts of indigenous movements to articulate opposition to neoliberalism in the public sphere and to gain a foothold in formal politics" "[emphasis in the original]" (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This provides a firm basis for my argument that support for the left can be explained by the mobilisation of indigenous social movements who shared a common enemy in neoliberal incumbents. Importantly, indigenous movements were the first to articulate opposition to neoliberalism in the public sphere and the left were able to build upon the strength of this opposition (Van Cott, 2007). The left were, therefore, able to tap into this discontent and build upon the organisational strength of these anti-neoliberal movements.

The relationship between indigenous movements and the left however, predates the left turn. It dates back to peasant revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s when leftist parties incorporated indigenous communities into their own organisations and fought alongside them for agrarian reform (Van Cott, 2005: 35). Later, and preceding the political mobilisation of independent indigenous movements in the 1990s, indigenous organisations relied on the left to express many of their socioeconomic demands and consequently, "indigenous peoples first gained access to the political arena through relations with the left" (albeit as subordinate partners under the leftist umbrella) (Van

Cott, 2007:1). Peeler (2003) notes that the left supported indigenous and peasantry mobilisation at this time because they viewed them as a potential political ally. This implies that the left recognised the potential of indigenous communities and movements to provide a structural base of support from early in their relationship. Arguably, only with the combination of democratisation, and the growing discontent with failed reforms in the 1990s, did the left have the opportunity to use the mobilisation capacity of these movements. For example, by the beginning of the 1990s, indigenous people mobilised and formed movements which rejected "dependent alliances with the left", choosing instead to become independent organisations (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This changed the dynamic of the relationship as the left began to rely on indigenous movements for political legitimacy. Van Cott (2007: 40) explains that indigenous social movements "revitalised a moribund left by injecting more content and legitimacy into a sterile socialist discourse".

Ultimately however, Van Cott does not investigate the relationship between the left and indigenous movements in terms of the role of the movements in the left turn at the turn of the century. Rather her work is more concerned with the role played by the left in helping indigenous movements mobilise before and during the 1990s. I recognise the mutually beneficial relationship between the left and movements over time, but I am centrally concerned with the role played by the movements in generating support for the left at the turn of the century. In other words, I am exclusively interested in how this relationship benefits the left.

Van Cott (2007) does however, provide a typology of indigenous organisation-leftist party 'linkages' which can be used as a framework for analysing indigenous movement-left relations at the turn of the century. As displayed in Table 1.2 below, Van Cott (2007) organises these linkages into three categories based on who is the dominant player in each linkage, the left or the indigenous organisation. These categories include; indigenous dominant, balance of power between indigenous and leftist movements, and finally left dominant. In her work, Van Cott (2007) not only provides a list of possible interactions as displayed in the Table 1.2 below, but she also provides the context in which each linkage is likely to take place. I will now briefly outline each of these linkages before discussing the relevance of this typology to the research.

The first linkage listed above is likely to occur when the left remains weak on its own or where indigenous militants need experienced political advice or financial resources. The second linkage occurs where indigenous movements or parties are sought-after electoral partners for the left who lack organisational resources in rural areas. The third occurs where there is a need to block neoliberal polices or to secure rights and so indigenous parties form "conjunctural alliances" with ideologically compatible left parties (Van Cott, 2007: 4). The fourth occurred mostly in the 1990s when indigenous movements participated in anti-neoliberal protests sponsored by diverse popular movements in Mexico, Chile and Ecuador. The fifth occurs when indigenous and leftist movements are weak and so form joint electoral vehicles. The sixth is likely to occur where indigenous parties are unable to win alone or indigenous movements want to maintain their social movement status and avoid the taint of formal electoral competition. The seventh linkage occurs when a candidate or electoral vehicle, and so an indigenous movement, may endorse a leftist candidate who promises to represent their interest. The eighth linkage occurred when the popularity of indigenous movements increased and leftist parties recruit indigenous leaders. Finally, the ninth linkage is likely to occur when elitist parties form dependent indigenous parties such as the Peronist party in Argentina formed a dependent sub-unit called agrupaciones.

As stated, this typology can act as a guide for investigating indigenous-left relations at the turn of the century. The linkages are useful because they are "sensitive to change" and are only intended for the short-term such as an electoral campaign or a term in office, which is particularly relevant to this study (Van Cott, 2007: 5). The typology encompasses a variety of possible relations between indigenous organisations and leftist parties ranging from electoral alliances to joint protest activities and the dynamic of each linkage also varies. For instance, in some cases the leftist party will incorporate an indigenous movement within its candidate list while in other cases the indigenous organisation may form a party and incorporate leftist leaders. In other cases still, an indigenous party is the senior partner in an electoral alliance with the leftist party. This variation reflects a wider variation in left-indigenous relations more generally. The typology also provides a guide for observing how the left and indigenous organisations work together and, in turn, provides a framework for investigating the ways in which movements might mobilise support among their bases

(for instance, protest activities or candidate endorsements). The work of Van Cott (2005; 2007) therefore provides a foundation for investigating indigenous movements. Moreover, Van Cott (2007: 2) postulates that of the 'two lefts', indigenous movements are more likely to ally with extreme variants of the left "which shares indigenous peoples commitment to rolling back neoliberalism". Indigenous movements are more likely to support the "stridently populist" over the more "modern and market-friendly" left (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This provides a basis for my argument that indigenous social movement mobilisation can explain the emergence of the contestatory left in particular because of their common enemy in neoliberal incumbents.

Ultimately, however, Van Cott explores the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation in light of support provided by leftist parties. I however, explore variation in support for the left, in light of variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. Given the often symbiotic nature of movement-party relations discussed early in this chapter, these two subjects of research are complimentary rather than in conflict with one another. Indeed, taken together the work of Van Cott and others, my research can provide a more comprehensive understanding of indigenous-left relations in the region by providing an in-depth empirical investigation into the relationship between indigenous movements and leftist parties in the region.

Table 1.2 : Categories of indigenous-left relations

Category	Original linkage(s) which form this category	Example from Van Cott (2007)
Party composition	1. Indigenous social movement organisation forms a party that incorporates leftist leaders and popular organisations	El *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik, Ecuador (1996)*
	5. Indigenous organisations and leftist intellectuals/popular movement leaders form a joint political party	*Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala* (late 1990s)
	8. Leftist party incorporates indigenous movement within candidate list	*Movimiento Bolivia Libre* incorporates numerous organisations (1990s) Indigenous agrupaciones within the Peronist party, Argentina
	9. Leftist party forms a dependent indigenous subunit or allied party	
Candidate endorsement	**7.** Indigenous movement/parties endorse a leftist candidate	*Pachakutik endorse Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006)*
Electoral alliance	**2.** Indigenous party is senior partner in electoral alliance with leftist parties or popular movements	Pueblos *Unidos Multiétnicos* del Amazonas (PUAMA) and Patria Para Todos, Venezuela (2000) *Movimiento Bolivia Libre and*
	6. Indigenous movement/party and leftist party compete in electoral alliance.	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, Bolivia (1997)
Representative alliance	**3.** Indigenous party representatives work with leftist party representatives in legislatures, constituent assemblies, municipal councils	Pueblos *Unidos Multiétnicos* del Amazonas (PUAMA) and Hugo Chavez-MVR in Constituent Assembly of Venezuela (1999)
Protest alliance	**4.** Indigenous social movement organisations join with popular organisations in protest activity	Cochabamba Water War, Bolivia (2000)

Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2007)

1.3 Summary

There are essentially three bodies of literature outlined in this chapter. The first deals with the prevailing explanations for the left turn which are centred on the issue of discontent with neoliberal incumbents. This research is situated within this literature by arguing that indigenous people were among some of the most discontented with these incumbents and the failure of their policies to alleviate inequality, poverty and political marginalisation in particular. The contribution of this research however is to illustrate that due to political disillusionment and distrust, the indigenous constituency could not be mobilised by leftist parties and instead these parties relied on the movements to generate support on their behalf. In doing so, I highlight the role that the indigenous movements played in the emergence of the left, which, in turn, illustrates that social movements can play a role in electoral politics. Moreover, through the cases studies in particular, the research uncovers the ways in which the movements mobilised their bases for the left, thus providing insight into how social movements can play a role in electoral politics. Indeed, revealing the strategies used and the nature of the movements' relationship with the left, the research reveals more about how the left came to power. This is a relevant contribution because much of the discussion on the left focuses on why the left came to power (such as economic, social and political discontent). Additionally, I contribute to the literature on the 'Two Lefts' by arguing that indigenous movements are more likely to support the contestatory than moderate left if given that option. Therefore, where they are mobilised they may help to explain the emergence of different types of left in the region. Given that this body of literature is to date, quite narrow, this research can provide a valuable contribution.

The second body of literature addressed in this chapter relates to social cleavage structure, social bases and the potential mass-mobilising capacity of social movements. This body of work provides a foundation for the argument that social movements have a mass-mobilising capacity, which they can use to generate support for parties. I seek to contribute to this literature by providing a detailed study which specifically explores the mass-mobilising capacity of movements. In addition, because the research is focused on indigenous movements and the left in particular, I further the work of Roberts (2002) and Cleary (2006) who postulate this mass-mobilising thesis in the context of the left turn. With little empirical investigation into

the relationship between movements and parties more generally, I hope to contribute to prevailing literature on social cleavages, social bases and the potential mass-mobilising capacity of movements by demonstrating movement-party alliances are an important aspect of this literature. Indeed, a central argument of this research is that movements, through alliances with political parties, can play a role in the outcome of elections. By providing evidence that movements can play such a role I also seek to contribute to social movement theory.

Firstly, social movement theory is focused primarily on explaining variation in levels of mobilisation. Olsen (1965) first challenged the assumption that collective action was based on irrationality, and instead demonstrated that the participation of individuals in such behaviour was a rational and deliberate choice made by individuals. Since then, social movement theorists have sought to explain variation in levels of collective action, and more specifically social movement mobilisation. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the availability of resources to a movement greatly influenced their ability to mobilise, resulting in the emergence of resource mobilisation theory. Soon after, Tilly (1978) argued for a more interactive approach by emphasising the impact of interests, opportunity and organisation in explaining variation in mobilisation levels. Tilly's work acted as the genesis of political process theory (PPT), further developed by McAdam (1982), which stressed the importance of mobilising structures, political opportunity structure and cultural framing for movement mobilisation. PPT was advanced further by McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) and despite challenges from Goodwin and Jasper (1999) for an overemphasis on structure[33], political process theory remains the dominant paradigm of social movement theory. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this research adopts a more pluralist approach in understanding variation in mobilisation as influenced by the works of Vermeersch (2006; 2012) and Barany (2001). Importantly however, this research does not seek to explain variation in mobilisation. Indeed, the work of Yashar (2005) also discussed in more detail in the next chapter adequately addresses this issue for the countries studied in this dissertation. Fundamentally, the goal of the research is not to explain variation in mobilisation, but rather the impact of this

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[33]More specifically the authors argue that there is not enough consideration for the role of morals, principles and emotions in mobilisation.

variation on politics more generally, and electoral politics more specifically. In this way the research attempts to move the discussion beyond why some movements mobilise and other do not to instead ask, what impact does this variation have on other facets of politics?

Secondly, because I argue that this variation can impact electoral politics, and the fate of political parties in some cases, I challenge the assumption that new social movements operate within an "essentially non-party space" (Kaldor, 2003: 85). By arguing that movements form alliances with political parties, particular around election time, I directly challenge the assumption that movements operate in a non-institutionalised and non-party space. This has an implication for our typical understanding of a social movement as an informal political actor participating in non-institutionalised and contentious forms of political participation (such as protests) to one which can also enter the formal realm by working to garner support for a political party in one of the most institutionalised form of political action, namely elections. Ultimately, I hope to contribute to social movement theory firstly by shifting the debate towards the implications of the variation in mobilisation on politics. Secondly, I hope to contribute to the literature by challenging the assumption that movements are informal actors primarily concerned with non-institutionalised politics, which in turn may develop our understanding of social movement behaviour in contemporary politics.

 The third body of literature outlined above, deals with general indigenous-left relations in the region. Current research on the relationship between indigenous people, their movements and leftist parties remains somewhat understudied and fragmented. For instance, Madrid (2005; 2011) and Lupu (2009) focus on the micro level relationship between indigenous people and their propensity to vote left while Van Cott (2007) exclusively explores relations between indigenous movements and parties. I provide a theoretical contribution to this body of work by suggesting that the relationship between the indigenous voters and the left is actually facilitated by indigenous movements. I also provide an empirical contribution by demonstrating that movements do indeed generate support among their bases for the left and illustrating the ways in which they do so.

Chapter 2: Research Design

Introduction

The central research question of this study is; *what explains the emergence of the left in Latin America at the turn of the Century?* As discussed in the introduction the variation in the type of left which has emerged in the region is a secondary puzzle within the left turn. Accordingly, the secondary research question in this study is; *what explains the variation in the types of left which have emerged during the left turn?* The hypothesis is that the variation in levels of indigenous movement mobilisation can help to explain variation in support for the left across the region because they acted as a central political ally for the left. In addition, it is hypothesised that levels of mobilisation may also help to explain the variation in the types of left which emerged because these movements are more likely to support the contestatory left rather than the moderate left. The principal dependent variable therefore is variation in support for the left in Latin America at the beginning of the left turn. The central independent variable is variation in levels of indigenous movement mobilisation. As demonstrated on Figure 2 in the introduction the independent variable is interactive and considered in conjunction with population size. The purpose of this chapter is to further clarify the argument by outlining the causal mechanism. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables will then be discussed. This chapter will also outline the mixed-method approach adopted to answer the research question. Finally, the justification of case selection and suitability of field interviews will be addressed before providing some expected outcomes of the study.

2.1 The causal mechanism

A good causal mechanism should provide "proper explanations" that "detail the cogs and wheels of the casual process through which the outcome to be explained was brought about" (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010: 50). Specifically, a causal mechanism identifies how "x and y inter-relate" in a manner which "builds support for a theory" (Gerring, 2004: 348; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 86). The casual mechanism in this research is centred upon a political alliance between indigenous movements and the left in Latin America at the beginning of the left turn there. The alliance is based

on a mutual agreement in which movements mobilise their bases in support of the party in return for the implementation of policies addressing indigenous demands by the left once elected. While this is a mutually beneficial agreement, this research is principally concerned with the impact of the alliance on the outcome; electoral support for the left at the beginning of the left turn. It is worth noting however, that while this relationship is beneficial for the movements in theory, it is not always the case in practice because the parties may not fulfil their promise once in power, making the movements the real risk-takers in this alliance. The chapter will now discuss the nature of movement-party relationships in more detail.

A movement-party alliance

Movements act as "extra-parliamentary party organisations" in movement-party alliances which entrepreneurial politicians and their parties "need in order to win the prize of government" (Strøm, 1990: 575). Extra-parliamentary organisations such as movements can satisfy party needs by supplying information about the preferences of the electorate and by mobilising supporters (Strøm, 1990). Therefore, the movements can act as the "political mobiliser" in this context by encouraging their social base to take part in political action including protesting, voting or indeed simply joining a party, movement or active civic organisation (Vermeersch, 2012: 224). In this way, extra-parliamentary organisations are a source of "cheap labour" for the party because they can be "satisfied by nonmonetary compensation such as public policy and spoils" (Rucht, 2004: 207). Indeed, for the party, "the ideal activist is highly policy motivated and is similar to the typical voter in that support can be exchanged for promises of future public policy" (Rucht, 2004: 207). As a result, party leaders ally with organisations that can help them win elections by providing them with mobilised voters and in return they can promise implementation of particular polices once in power (Strøm, 1990: 575).

In the case of Latin America, Freidenberg and Levitsky, (2006:178) note that informal organisations such as social movements constitute the "meat" for many parties because they "recruit activists, select candidates, raise money, maintain societal linkages, and most importantly deliver votes". At the same time, movements hope that "close ties with a party" guarantees representation within the legislative process and the government should that party succeed in presidential elections in particular

(Dalton, 1996: 321). I argue that indigenous movements can act as political mobilisers for the left and provide cheap labour in return for nonmonetary or "prospective" compensation such as constitutional amendments that recognise indigenous rights or other policies related to indigenous demands (Strøm, 1990: 575). Furthermore, the more highly mobilised a movement the more effective it is at mobilising its bases for the party, therefore levels of mobilisation matter. This is a particularly effective strategy for parties where indigenous voters represent a substantial percentage of the population, providing an electorally advantageous base of support. For this reason, the research considers the size of indigenous population (as proportion of total population) in conjunction with mobilisation levels in explaining the variation in support for the left.

Movement-party alliances also allow each actor to participate in a mutually beneficial agreement without jeopardising their respective reputations amongst their base of support. Alliances are formed by actors who want to "keep some of their autonomy and distinctiveness, and therefore refrain from merging into a single entity whose prior constituent elements become more or less invisible, or completely dissolve as distinguishable units" (Rucht, 2004: 203). This is pertinent for indigenous social movements because, to them, merging with a party could taint their reputation as an informal, non-institutionalised political actor among their social base. This is also relevant for political parties on the left who may wish to align with movements because they "provide ideas, a mass base and/or radical mood", yet maintain autonomy so they do not exclude or isolate non-indigenous or moderate voters (Rucht, 2004: 207).

Movements and parties are part of "two different systems of action" and each "will play different roles" in politics which allows us to distinguish between the party and the movement (Diani, 1992: 15). Roberts (1998: 74) argues that given these different roles, there is no reason why "parties and movements cannot complement each other". The problem is that because there is no "consensual formula on how to do this" we find that "parties have entered into a variety of relationships with social movements" which in turn can blur the lines between parties and movements. This is particularly the case when movements and parties become "overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics" (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 213). For instance, in some

cases the alliance can be based on an "organic model" in which parties are the "political expression of organisation groups in civil society" (Roberts, 1998: 75). Distinctions between the party and the movement are "deliberately blurred" in the organic model as the party often engages in social struggle outside the sphere of institutional politics and the party members and leader are "drawn directly from social movements rather than from the ranks of a separate, professional political caste" (Roberts, 1998: 75). This will become more relevant when we discuss the case of Bolivia in this study where evidence of such 'blurred lines' are evident between indigenous movements and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). As will be argued, the blurring of these lines proved advantageous for the movements because it enabled them to mobilise support for their ally without losing their legitimacy among their bases. It was also beneficial for the party because the movements acted as a reliable source of cheap labour and source of support for the party.

The indigenous base of support

Indigenous voters in Latin America in the lead up to the left turn were especially valuable because they had no party affiliation, yet in some cases, they represented a substantial proportion of the vote share (Madrid, 2005). The lack of party affiliation meant that in the early 2000s, no political party could "count on the automatic contribution of an indigenous electoral bloc" (Stavenhagen, 2002: 34). The indigenous electoral base was not affiliated with any party because it was detached from institutionalised politics. Distrust towards the state and institutionalised politics, as discussed in Chapter 1, can help to explain this detachment. The root of this distrust however, is in the historical ill treatment and marginalisation of indigenous people by the state. In terms of power structure in Latin America, indigenous peoples[34] have always been seen as "subalterns" (Becker, 2008: 9). This is best illustrated by Marcela Cornejo of *Centro de Documentación Sobre la Mujer* (CENDOC) and *Centro de Culturos Indígenas del Perú* (Chirapaq) who explains that:

> "the ideas of democracy, citizen participation and vigilance are little
> understood or accepted in a population whose majority has never been

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[34] Here the author is referring to highland indigenous peasants specifically. It is worth noting that Amazonian groups were also marginalised by the state in the sense that they were simply ignored.

sovereign or represented in its legitimate interests and that has always been manipulated and ignored."[35] (Cornejo, 2006).

Stavenhagen (2002: 34) explains that instead "indigenous demands are channelled in other ways than through traditional party policies". I argue that indigenous movements provide the principal channel for indigenous demands. If a political party wishes to capture the support of an indigenous electoral bloc, it must first ally with the movement, which can then act as an intermediary between indigenous voters and the party. Because indigenous voters are detached from institutionalised politics, parties cannot mobilise this base without first obtaining the support of the movement that represents indigenous people. For this reason movements are crucial extra parliamentary organisations. Figure 2.1 below illustrates that indigenous people are more trusting towards indigenous movements than political parties. This figure is based on public opinion survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for all of Latin America in 2006.[36] Respondents were asked to score their confidence in political parties and indigenous movements from 1 (no trust) to 7 (much trust).The results indicate that indigenous people are more trusting towards indigenous movements than political parties. Specifically, over 20 per cent of respondents claim to have much trust in indigenous movements while only six per cent claim to have much trust in political parties.[37] The implication of higher trust in movements than in parties is that indigenous people are more likely to perceive the movement as their representative than a party. They are therefore more likely to follow the guidance and decision-making policies of indigenous movements than of political parties. If the party establishes a relationship with the movement, they can garner access to this bloc of voters because the movement acts as the voice and principal decision-maker for the wider community.

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[35] My own translation

[36] 2006 is the first year in which surveys asked respondents to self-report their ethnicity, and so it is the earliest data available to investigate indigenous peoples trust in parties and movements. Self-reporting is used rather than mother tongue here because there are too many variables when all mother tongues in the region are considered.

[37] The Chi2 for the tabulation between political parties trust and self-reported ethnicity was (539.9) and Cramérs V was (0.06). For the cross-tabulation between indigenous movement trust and self-reported ethnicity the Chi2 was (279.4) and Cramérs V was (0.08).

Figure 2.1: Indigenous peoples' trust in political parties versus indigenous movements, 2006.

Source: Barómetro de las Americas 2006, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

By the early 2000s indigenous activists became increasingly aware that "they can only get so far if they go it alone" (Stavenhagen, 2002: 41). It was at this point that indigenous movements opted to ally with political parties. Indigenous movements allied with political parties rather than other movements first and foremost because a party can be elected to government and directly implement change. Additionally, competition between movements for social bases and/or financial resources often results in conflicts, which can make movement alliances more problematic (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Furthermore, indigenous movements ally with the left rather than indigenous parties because indigenous parties are unlikely to win a majority and gain the power necessary to implement change. Typically, indigenous parties are weak or fragmented, which can be off-putting for indigenous voters. Tanya Korovkin (2006) explains how divisions within indigenous movements in Ecuador for example, led many indigenous voters to support the left rather than indigenous parties. These parties can also be exclusionary, they can choose to represent one particular ethnicity and isolate others. For example, in Bolivia the political party Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) predominately represented Aymara identities in 2002. Indeed, MIP adhered to a radically indigenous ideology called 'Indianismo'[38] and represented the Aymara people in particular. In 2002 however, MIP won just over 19 per cent of the

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[38] Indianismo is a radical indigenous ideology that focuses on the subordination of indigenous people and can manifest an anti-western or "anti-white" sentiment (Van Cott, 2009:53).

vote in municipalities where the majority of the population spoke Aymara as their mother tongue while Movimiento al Socialismo won 29 per cent indicating that even for Aymara speakers, MIP were too radical (Madrid, 2012). This research argues that leftist parties are more compatible allies for indigenous movements because they do not divide ethnicities and because they are more likely to win elections, making them a better strategic choice for movements.

The compatibility of indigenous movements and the left

As discussed in Chapter 1, before the mobilisation of indigenous movements in the 1980s and 1990s there was a "long history of leftist parties incorporating indigenous communities and fighting alongside them for agrarian reform" (Van Cott, 2005: 35). During this time indigenous people relied on the left to express many of their socioeconomic demands (Van Cott, 2007:36). Peeler (2003) notes that the left actively supported indigenous and peasantry mobilisation at this time because they saw it as a potential political ally. After the mobilisation of indigenous movements the balance of power switched and the defunct 'old' left of the 1970s relied on indigenous movements to revitalise a "moribund left by injecting more content and legitimacy into a sterile socialist discourse" (Van Cott, 2007: 40). It is important to note here that while I recognise the symbiotic relationship between indigenous movements and the left throughout history, this study is principally concerned with the nature of this relationship during the left turn specifically. Therefore, while the left played a role in the initial mobilisation and politicisation of indigenous people and their movements, this research is principally concerned with how these movements mobilised support for the left in later years, during the left turn. That is, I am more concerned with how this relationship benefited the left than how the left helped mobilise the movements in previous decades. For now however, it is worth simply noting that the history of relations between the left and indigenous movements in the region provided the foundation for their political alliance during the left turn.

The alliance between indigenous movements and the left during the left turn was centred on a policy congruence and solidarity against the 'right'. As discussed in the previous chapter discontent with neoliberalism is a central explanation for the left turn. I argue that because indigenous people and the left were among those most discontented with neoliberalism they shared a common enemy in the right-winged

governments which had implemented these policies. As the central opposition party to the right, indigenous movements shared the common goal of subverting right-wing incumbents from power. This relates to the work of Rucht (2004) who explains that movement-party alliances are particularly common among oppositional parties who "tend to seek linkages with like-minded extra-parliamentary groups to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the government" (Rucht, 2004: 207). In the case of Labour parties in Germany and Britain during the 1970s for example, trade unions were "important allies since they have a great number of members, hence conference votes" (Koelble, 1987: 257). The British Labour Party actively sought out an alliance with trade unions not only to acquire member votes but to also pursue a strategy of "no enemies on the left" (Koelble, 1987: 256). In this way Labour and trade unions became "allies in the struggle against the party right" (Koelble, 1987: 256). This project proposes a similar relationship between leftist parties and indigenous movements in Latin America.

This alliance was not only based on a goal of ousting the right. Rather, the 'new left' which emerged at the turn of the century in the region offered policies which directly appealed to indigenous peoples and their movements. Although the specific policies of the new left will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, the left more generally proposed policies such as land reform and redistribution of wealth which were largely congruent with indigenous demands. Indeed, because the contestatory variants of the left propose the more radical redistribution of wealth and land reform, it is likely that indigenous movements would support this left if given the choice between these parties and the moderate left who are less radical in their approach and policies. Nonetheless, indigenous movements and the left are compatible allies because they have a historical relationship with one another and because, at the turn of the century the new left offered policies which were compatible with indigenous demands. Lastly, both actors shared a common enemy in the traditional right.

There are however exceptions to indigenous-left relations which should be addressed here. Specifically, Guatemala is an outlier in the study of indigenous movements and the left because the behaviour of the movements is often dictated by clientelistic linkages rather than ideologically congruence. First and foremost, Guatemala underwent a brutal civil war between the years 1960 and 1996 in which indigenous Mayan people and their communities were systematically targeted by a series of

military regimes over the 36 year period. It is estimated that 200,000 people died or were 'disappeared' during the war, most of whom were indigenous (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011). This inevitability impacted indigenous movement mobilisation, particularly as movements which did emerge during the war to address the systematic targeting of indigenous people were only met with further violence (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011).

In the post-war era however indigenous movements emerged with the goal of rearticulating indigenous demands in light of the Peace Accords (1996). Indeed, the movements merged to create a consultative body called "Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil" (Civil Society Assembly - ASC) which played an integral role in the peace agreement. By the early 2000s however the role of movements' vis-à-vis the state changed and government was more interested in pleasing political and economic elites than indigenous movements. Movements had to change their strategies and they did so by deciding to ally with political parties. True to the fragmented nature of the movements there was no consolidated effort to align with one party and instead different movements allied with different parties, often those which provided the best career opportunities for the indigenous leaders (Yagenova & Castañeda, 2008).

In most cases however, the movements sought to ally with the left or centre-left. For example, National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples and Campesinos (CONIC) allied with the 'social-democratic' Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE). The UNE however receives much support from new business elites and is more a centre-left party than it is left (Yagenova and Véliz, 2009). This fragmentation of indigenous movements in Guatemala means that there is very little relationship between the movements and the people they claim to represent. Therefore it is not surprising that we see the movements ally with parties such as UNE but this does not necessarily translate to support for that party among indigenous people in Guatemala. Furthermore, because clientelism is rife in Guatemala we might not expect indigenous communities to support parties such as the UNE even when movements encourage support. For example, in 2012 a report by the National Democratic Institute[39] (NDI) found that 37 per cent of respondents were aware of vote-buying in their community

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[39] In conjunction with the University of Notre Dame and Acción Ciudadana

and the report estimated that 17 per cent of respondents indeed practice in vote buying. It is not surprising therefore that we do not see a reflection of the movements aspirations to support the left at the micro level in Guatemala, especially given that right-wing parties are traditionally more likely to have more material resources at their disposal than the left. Indeed in a country where 50.9 per cent of the population lives in poverty and 15.2 per cent live in extreme poverty it is not surprising that clientelism is rife at the micro level (NDI, 2012). Given that indigenous and campesino communities are among the most impoverished it should not be unexpected that they are most likely to practice vote-buying. Consequently, the relationship between indigenous people and leftist parties is different in the context of Guatemala.

The nature of political alliances

It is important to note the fragile and temporal nature of these alliances. Just as a movement can provide a party with the support necessary to come to power, it can also retract that support should the party not fulfil its obligations once in power. The relationship between the British Labour party and trade unions from 1974-1979 offers an illustrative example of the temporal nature of alliances between parties and 'extra-parliamentary party organisations'. These actors made an alliance in 1973 in which the unions supported the "governments attempt to fight inflation by curbing their wage demands" in return for "favourable industrial policy, unemployment relief and structural modernisation" (Koelble, 1987: 257). When Labour failed to fulfil their part of the deal due to the economic pressure of a financial crisis, the unions mobilised against their former ally by instigating "a great number of wildcat strikes" (Koelble, 1987: 257). Union members realised that they could also demonstrate their dissatisfaction by voting against their union leaders (Koelble, 1987). Consequently, "union leaders found themselves under pressure to punish the parliamentary party for its ineffective policies", which detrimentally impacted the support for the party within its social base (Koelble, 1987: 261). Koelble (1987: 261) claims that the pressure put on leaders to punish Labour had a "more important effect" on the party than the failure of its economic programme. It could be argued therefore that Labour's defeat in the 1979 elections was partly a result of the breakdown in their alliance with the trade unions.

This research argues that a similar fate may lie ahead for leftist parties who do not fulfil the promises made to the movements that helped elect them. Beasley-Murray et al. (2010: 3) explain that for the left to retain power in the region it must "maintain and deepen" close ties with the social movements that helped bring them to power. If the left do not deliver on the promises made to movements before their election, the movements will withdraw their support for subsequent elections. Without this base of support the party could lose subsequent elections. For this reason, the electoral base provided by social forces such as indigenous movements represent a valuable source of electoral support, that if withdrawn, could be detrimental to the party. It could be argued that this is a particular danger for the contestatory left who are more likely to rely on the support base of movements than on a moderate or middle-class electoral base of support which the moderate left may have built up during its time in office. The fragile nature of movement-party alliances may provide a temporal explanation for the rise and decline of the 'new left' in some cases in the region.

2.2 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables

The dependent variable: variation in support for the left

The election of former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in 1998 marks the beginning of the 'new left' in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Figure 2.2 below demonstrates the steady rise of the left in presidential and legislative elections from 1990-2010. The left vote share is measured here by calculating the proportion of the total vote won by the left in each presidential and legislative election from 1990-2010. This is my own measurement adopted from the electoral data from Latin America provided by Baker and Greene (2011).[40]As the figure demonstrates, there was a steady increase in the vote share of the left during this time, and we can see that this became more pronounced from the late 1990s. More recently this left turn has shown signs of abating, as demonstrated by the 2009 election of right-wing President

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[40] As will be discussed in the next Chapter this is calculated by summing the vote share of all leftist candidates and parties to get the combined vote share of left in each election. I used the ideological score provided by Baker and Greene to establish which parties and candidates were left (all those with a score between 0 and 10.5)

Sebastián Piñera in Chile. The 'left turn' is considered by this research to encompass the time frame of 1998-2009.

The political left which emerged at the turn of the century was labelled the 'new left' in order to distinguish it from the 'old' revolutionary left of the 1960s and 1970s. The old left is epitomised by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution (1959) and was centred on Stalinist, Maoist or indeed 'Fidelista'[41] ideologies of armed leftist revolution (Petras, 1997). The new left is more socially democratic in nature and more concerned with electoral democracy than armed radicalism (Petras, 1997). This new left can be understood as political parties and leaders principally concerned with social equity, justice, solidarity, redistribution of wealth and greater control over their economies (Panizza, 2005; Lupu, 2005; Cleary, 2006; Lievesley & Ludlam, 2009; Weyland, 2010; Doyle, 2011). Also common to the new left is the commitment to popular participation and the desire to deepen ties with social bases, a characteristic particularly pertinent to this research (Cameron, 2009; Petras, 1997). Within this broad left, the extent to which leaders pursue these policies, and the strategies used to achieve these goals, varies. Wiesehomeier's (2010) ideological scale of Latin American presidents from left to right outlined in the introduction highlights the variation in policy positions adopted by presidents in the region.

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[41] Fidelista is a reference to Fidel Castro's ideology during the Cuban Revolution.

Figure 2.2: The 'Left Turn' from 1990-2010

Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011).

As previously mentioned, a secondary puzzle addressed in this research is the variation in the types of left which have emerged during this time. This research incorporates this puzzle by postulating that the variation in the type of left which emerged may be explained by the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation because the movements are likely to support the more radical policies of the contestatory left. It is therefore important to explain the central differences between the types of left in the region.

Firstly, the term 'contestatory' left is adopted from the work of Weyland (2010: 3) who explains that it originates from the "urge to contest with enemies", including political adversaries, business sectors and the US government. This is a key difference between the contestatory and the moderate left. That is, while the moderate left pursue their goals more prudently and with respect for economic constraints and political opposition, the more extreme left pursue these goals by aggressively challenging neoliberalism, attacking political opposition and contesting globalisation and US hegemony (Weyland, 2010). I adopt Weyland's label of the contestatory left because I feel it best embodies this left and avoids more problematic labels such as a 'good' or a 'bad' left.

The contestatory left is also different in terms of its policies and how it pursues them. That is, while all governments of the new left "broke with neoliberalism and embraced redistributive social policies" others took "bolder measures" in their economic reform (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 23). The moderate left typically embraces the market, remains open to free trade and investment pacts (including trade agreements with the US) and adheres to conservative fiscal policies (Madrid, 2010). In terms of privatisation moderate variants have neither privatised much of state-owned assets nor nationalised private firms (Madrid, 2010). In contrast, contestatory leftist governments have taken a more statist approach by expanding state intervention in their economies (Madrid, 2010). This entails more state control over economic activity, an increase in public spending and easing in fiscal policy, sometimes "at the expense of central bank independence" (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 21). State controls on trade, foreign investment and capital flows have also been tightened under the contestatory left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 22). Therefore these governments differ in terms of economic policy goals. The variation is best explained by Mazzuca (2013: 108-109) as the "wholesale reversal of trade liberalisation and privatisation" by the contestatory left on the one hand, and the "more restrained moderate-left reforms within free-market parameters" of the moderate left on the other.

The statist agendas of the contestatory left has been "facilitated by buoyant revenues from natural resources" and is particularly evident in the area of control over natural resources (Eaton, 2013: 7). Nationalisation of natural resources, such as oil in Venezuela and Ecuador[42] and gas in Bolivia are key characteristics of this left. Revenue generated from these resources is redistributed to fund ambitious social programmes designed to help the disadvantaged (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). These programmes focus on areas such as providing housing, building schools and health clinics, as well as subsidised food markets in low-income communities (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Furthermore, this left has also been more likely to implement policies of land reform, which is a central concern for indigenous movements (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Madrid, 2010).

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[42] While oil is not yet fully nationalised in Ecuador, President Rafael Correa increased the state's share of oil profits from 50 to 99 per cent since coming to power in 2006 (Madrid, 2010).

Recentralisation of state authority is also an innate characteristic of the contestatory left. Since coming to power the contestatory left has sought to reverse many decentralisation reforms implemented by incumbents. For example, Bolivian President Evo Morales implemented deep cuts in revenue to departmental governments (Eaton, 2013). This policy triggered protests and increased polarisation between the gas rich department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the rest of the country (Eaton, 2013). Interestingly, many contestatory leftist leaders justify the recentralisation of the state and ensuing conflicts with mayors and governors by classifying it as a class-struggle against the "presumably privileged class positions of the right-of-centre subnational elected officials" (Eaton, 2013: 3). This highlights the propensity of the contestatory left to espouse class-based rhetoric that is critical of the right, which is in turn likely to appeal to indigenous movements. These leaders also follow a "strongly plebiscitarian style of rule" in which referenda are commonly used to implement change and "demonstrate majority support" (Eaton, 2013: 6). The contestatory and moderate left also differ in foreign policy. Given the statist and anti-neoliberal nature of the contestatory left, it is not surprising that it rejects agreements with the US while its moderate counterpart are open to such agreements. Rather than forming relations with the US the contestatory left pursues agreements with "a variety of traditional rivals with the US" such as Iran, Russia and the People's Republic of China (Madrid, 2010: 590).

Variation in support for the left is measured by vote share in presidential elections, which are first order elections in the region. Given that the executive branch heavily shapes policy, presidential elections represent a change in power in a way that legislative elections do not (Stokes, 2009). Consequently, movements seeking change are more likely to focus on electing parties to the executive branch where the party will have sufficient power to implement change. Since the distribution of votes in legislative and presidential elections is often quite similar, focusing on the presidential race in the qualitative cases does not impede the research. The central goal of the study is to assist in explaining support for the left in presidential elections. Support for the left is operationalised using the four central measures listed on Table 2.1 below. Each variable is drawn from existing data on electoral results and ideological positioning of parties and presidents across the region sourced by

prominent scholars in the field and is discussed in more detail in the following quantitative chapter.

Table 2.1: Operationalisation of the dependent variable for the quantitative analysis

Variable	Measurement	Source
Presidential VRL (*presvrl*)	The degree of support for leftist candidates relative to all other candidate in any given presidential election. The degree of support is indicated by a scale of support for the right (1) to support for the left (20). The authors provided data for the period 1990 to 2009.	Baker and Greene (2011)
VRL Doyle (*presvrl2*)	The degree of support for the left in any given presidential election relative to support for all other candidates. The degree of support is also indicated by a scale that runs from support for the right (0) to support for the left (4). The authors provided data for the period 1978 to 2009, although only data from the period from 1990 to 2009 is used in this analysis.	Wiesehomeier & Doyle (2012)
Lower house VRL (*lhvrl*)	The degree of support for leftist parties relative to all other parties in any given legislative election. The degree of support is indicated by a scale of support for the right (1) to support for the left (20). The authors provided data for the period 1990 to 2009.	Baker and Greene (2011)
Left Vote Share (*leftvoteshare*)	The proportion of the total vote won by the left in each presidential and legislative election. It can be used to reveal vote share of the left by type of election (presidential or legislative) or cumulatively over time (for example by year as shown on Figure 2.2 at the beginning of this chapter). Using updated data on the ideological scores of parties from Baker and Greene (2011), this variable provides data from 1990 to 2011.	Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011)

The principal independent variable: variation in indigenous movement mobilisation

Social movements can be understood as a mobilised group, which make demands that challenge existing policies and practices through non-institutionalised forms of action (Pickvance, 1999). Generally, social movements seek to; alter the social structure, redistribute wealth, organise previously unorganised groups against the institutional elites, and represent the interests of those who are excluded from the polity (Jenkins, 1983). Indigenous movements are understood as "a tidy subset of the social movements in the region" (Houghton and Bell, 2004: 5).While most social movements in Latin America share the common goal of challenging neoliberalism there is a "strong distinction" between indigenous and non-indigenous movements in the region based on the ethnic demands incorporated by indigenous movements (Houghton and Bell, 2004: 5). These demands include indigenous political rights, access to bi-cultural education, wealth redistribution, land reform, territorial autonomy and respect for customary law (Van Cott, 2005; 2007, Yashar, 1998).

Indigenous peoples represent approximately eleven per cent of the total population of Latin America, amounting to fifty million across the region (Van Cott, 2007:33). The cultural and linguistic diversities among indigenous people are immense with some estimating a total of 379 distinct ethnic groups across the region with further variation within each group (Tresierra, 1999). Given this heterogeneity it is not surprising that indigenous movements, often "defy political scientists' attempts to categorise them in neat typologies" (Warren and Jackson, 2002: 12). This research divides the movements into two broad categories of highland and lowland groups in accordance with the work of Alison Brysk (2007) and Salvador Martí i Puig (2010). The lowland or 'tribal', movements are based in the Amazon and lowland Atlantic/Pacific regions of Latin America (Martí i Puig, 2010: 84). These movements represent a small proportion of the overall indigenous population (of eleven per cent), however because they are concentrated in specific areas they comprise an important social base (Martí i Puig, 2010). Lowland movements mobilised around specific ethnic demands such as recognition of indigenous rights and protection of territories, often with the help of international advocacy networks (Martí i Puig, 2010). The highland, or Indian, movements are concentrated in the Andean and Mesoamerica regions of Latin

America and are comprised of indigenous farm workers known as campesinos.[43] These groups tend to interchange between ethnic and class identities (Peeler, 2003: 69; Van Cott, 2005: 35). It is important to note that this research focuses on highland and lowland groups exclusively and does not include Afro-indigenous peoples or their movements. The ethnic composition and collective identity of Afro-indigenous groups in the region is vastly different from that of highland and lowland groups. To include all of these groups would be erroneous given this diversity in identity and culture. For instance, the culturist argument for ethnic mobilisation implies that a common culture is the "essential basis of an ethnic community's political continuity" (Vermeersch, 2006: 31). While shared culture alone does not explain mobilisation[44] it does provide the foundation for a collective identity and given the diversity between Afro-indigenous groups and highland/lowland groups it would be erroneous to apply the same causal mechanism across all of these groups. Rather this study adheres to the work of prominent scholars in the field of indigenous social movements in Latin America who analyse Afro-indigenous groups separately from lowland and highland groups in the region. The variation in movement mobilisation is a central part of this study, therefore the following discussion conceptualises movement mobilisation generally and the mobilisation of indigenous movements studied in this research in particular.

Conceptualisation of indigenous movement mobilisation

Social movements are "moving targets" that "have a brief life upon the stage" (Tarrow, 1991: 17). This makes it difficult to capture a particular episode of mobilisation or indeed variation in levels of mobilisation over time. Nonetheless, the level of mobilisation of movements is a central part of this study and therefore we must look closely at what explains variation in the mobilisation of the groups studied here. To do this we must first address what 'mobilisation' means more generally.

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[43] The Andean Region of Latin America consists of the following countries; Bolivia, Peru Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia. The Mesoamerican region consists of the following countries; Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama and the nine federal states of the southeast region of Mexico: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatan. Please find a map of each region in the appendix.

[44] Ethnic mobilisation cannot be explained by a shared ethnic identity or culture alone. Vermeersch (2006) highlights that if this were the case then we would see little rather than stark variation in the mobilisation of Romani movements across Europe. Rather Vermeersch (2006) argues that variation in ethnic mobilization is dependent upon four central factors: political opportunity structure, framing, opportunities within the international environment and ethnic competition.

Political mobilisation "denotes the deliberate activity of a group of individuals for the realisation of political objectives" (Barany, 2001: 309). Mobilisation therefore represents the transition of a group from non-action to collective action. Collective action can be understood as "joint action in pursuit of common ends" and typically manifests in strikes, elections, petitions or marches and other activities common the realm of contentious politics, or "unconventional political action" (Tilly, 1978: 84; Barany, 2001;Vermeersch, 2012: 225).

Simply put political mobilisation can be understood as "the process by which political actors organise collective efforts in order to attempt to bring about political change" (Vermeersch, 2006: 28-29). Collective efforts allow a movement to represent and formulate the demands of their social base in order to bring about change (Vermeersch, 2006). In the case of indigenous movements in Latin America this typically means addressing issues of land reform or bilingual education. Often, collective efforts are based upon a collective identity understood as a shared "cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institutions" (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). For example, the mobilisation of an ethnic social movement occurs when a movement mobilises along ethnic lines (which acts as their collective identity) in order to achieve political ends (Nagel & Olzak, 1982). It is important to note however that collective identities are not always pre-existing or ethnically based and in the case of indigenous movements in Latin America identities of class and ethnicity often overlap (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Specifically, ethnic lines can often overlap or intertwine with socioeconomic or class lines. Indeed, the mobilisation of indigenous movements against neoliberalism in the region mixed both cultural and class-based identities by incorporating economic and ethnic repression as grievances against the neoliberal model (Silva, 2009). The overlap between class and identity is not unusual for ethnic movements. Reactive theory suggests that ethnic mobilisation is "prompted by unequal division of resources along ethnic lines" and "dependent upon the economic competition between ethnically differentiated segments of the working class" (Vermeersch, 2006: 34). Reactive theory can be problematic for the understanding of ethnic movement mobilisation because it assumes that ethnic identities are predetermined and therefore mobilisation will automatically coincide with the unequal division of resources. The ethnic competition model posits that ethnic

mobilisation can be driven by inequality and deprivation but that ethnic identities are not a given and instead can be constructed by political leaders (Vermeersch, 2006). I argue that while economic disadvantage alone does not explain ethnic mobilisation, or indeed variation in ethnic mobilisation, it can explain the often intertwining of ethnic and socioeconomic demands, particularly as indigenous peoples are socioeconomically disadvantaged.

Indigenous movements across the region began to mobilise in the late 1980s under demands of indigenous rights including the recognition of indigenous peoples and their territories (Sieder, 2002). During this time existing leftist parties supported indigenous movement mobilisation (Van Cott, 2007). By the early 1990s indigenous movements became more autonomous from the left and underwent an intense period of independent mobilisation. The quincentenary of the discovery of the Americas in 1992 triggered an increase in mobilisation as movements across the region mobilised to "demand the basic human and civil rights that their peoples had been denied for centuries" (Rodríguez and Carruthers, 2008:3). Highland groups first mobilised around socioeconomic demands such as land and employment by the mid-1980s they began to incorporate ethnic demands, such as the recognition of indigenous rights (Martí i Puig, 2010). In many cases highland movements mobilised earlier than lowland movements. For example, the Katarista movement in Bolivia in 1979 is an example of early highland mobilisation. The lowland movements did not mobilise until the late 1980s and early 1990s. The late mobilisation of lowland movements can be explained by their geographic and administrative isolation. For instance, lowland regions were, for the most part, overlooked by the state until the neoliberal era when the privatisation of land led to an influx of resource exploration by the state and private companies. This jeopardised the territories of lowland communities, providing the motivation for the mobilisation of these movements.

The variation in the level of mobilisation is central to this study. I argue that highly mobilised movements are more effective in generating support for the left. The strength of social ties between a movement and its base can help illustrate this. For instance, a highly mobilised movement is likely to have stronger ties and connections with their social bases than lowly mobilised movements that are weak and fragmented. The strength of social ties can act as a measure in the prediction of

individual participation. Therefore where social ties are strong, individuals within the social base are more likely to act in accordance with the movement (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). The stronger the connection and social ties between a movement and its base, the more likely the movement can efficiently mobilise its base in support for a party. Conversely, where social ties are weak, the connection between the movement and the base will also be weak, and individuals are less likely to follow the instructions of the movement. For this reason, I expect to find stronger support for the left where movements are highly mobilised than where they are weakly mobilised. The work of Yashar (2005) provides an explicit framework for understanding variation in indigenous movement mobilisation in the context of Latin America and the movements studied here. She provides three variables essential for understanding the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation across the region. They are motivation, capacity and opportunity.

Motivation relates to the incident, threat or critical juncture, which occurred to motivate individuals to become involved in mobilisation, and take political action. In many cases the motivation for indigenous movement mobilisation was the transition from corporatist citizenship regimes to neoliberal regimes from 1980s-1990s. Corporatist citizenship regimes can be understood as a type of citizen regime which "generally advanced the idea" that citizens have some civil rights, such as the right to organise, and some social rights, such as the right to a basic standard of living (Yashar, 1998: 81). Under corporatist citizen regimes, labour and peasant associations were promoted and received state subsidies. These regimes sought to reconstitute Indians as peasants by implementing land reforms which returned titles to highland Indians such as the Velasco regime in Peru (1965-1975), discussed in more detail later in this chapter. These regimes were replaced by neoliberal regimes from the 1980s onwards, which had a different perception of citizenship based on individual autonomy and responsibility that was rooted in the promotion of free markets in land and labour (Yashar, 2005). This type of regime threatened the local autonomy and subsidies enjoyed by the movements under corporatist regimes thus sparking the mobilisation of movements against neoliberalism.[45]

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[45] For a more detailed discussion on corporatist versus neoliberal citizenship regimes please see Yashar (2005) *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America; The rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post liberal Challenge.*

The second factor necessary for mobilisation is the type of political opportunity structure in place and whether movements have the freedom and space to mobilise. Yashar (2005) argues that in periods of political closure and militarisation, opportunities for legally organising in a group are closed and so mobilisation cannot take place.[46] Political opportunity theorists postulate that "declining repression should promote movement mobilisation and success while increasing repression should deter mobilisation and inhibit success" (Schock, 1999:361). It is important to state however that this is not simply a case of whether the system is open or closed, but rather the degree to which each state is open or closed (Maiz, 2003). This is in congruence to the work of Yashar (2005) who equates openness with associational space but insists that associational space is not necessarily synonymous with democratisation. Rather associational space "exists to varying degrees in different political contexts" (Yashar, 2005: 77).

Ultimately for Yashar (2005: 77), the common denominator is that these contexts do not "trample the capacity to associate and speak out". We can reconcile this with the work of Schock (1999) who examined the mobilisation of social movements in the Philippines. The author finds that "social movements do not mobilise in the same way; some are activated by an open POS whereas others are not because they react to threats" (Schock, 1999:3). This relates to the above discussion in which movements mobilised in reaction to the change from corporatist to neoliberal systems. The point here is that mobilisation cannot be explained simply by absolute freedom and associational space. Instead, the degree to which a state is open or closed can impact the levels of mobilisation we might expect. Moreover, opportunities are not given but rather they must be perceived as opportunities by the movement itself in order to be seized, thus highlighting the role of movements themselves in recognising opportunity (Barany, 2002). Ultimately, what this illustrates is that political opportunity structure helps to explain the variation in the mobilisation of indigenous movements in Latin America but only when understood in conjunction with other factors such as motivation and the organisational capacity of the movement discussed below.

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[46] Therefore political opportunity structure can be understood as the space available for groups to organise. This is determined by how much associational space is available for groups under a given regime. The more open the space the easier it is for groups to form. This however must be taken in conjunction with the other two variables, motivation and organisational capacity, to explain levels of mobilisation.

Movements must strengthen their organisational capacity in order, "to initiate and sustain" the movement (Yashar, 2005: 71). While the organisational capacity of a movement can be determined by a variety of factors[47], Yashar (2005) explains that the strength of pre-existing networks between movements is crucial for explaining variation in indigenous movements in Latin America. She argues that networks "provide a forum for future indigenous leaders to meet, share common experiences, develop a common language, identify common problems, and articulate common goals" (Yashar, 2005: 71). Networks are particularly important for indigenous communities separated by vast distances (Yashar, 2005). Networks increase the capacity of a movement to mobilise because they transform "a group of concerned individuals into a viable movement" (Yashar, 2005:74). In many cases, external state actors such as International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) helped communities establish these networks whilst in others, internal actors such as trade unions, churches, and in some cases the state, have helped establish these networks. (Yashar, 2005: 73). Where these networks existed prior to the motivation for mobilisation and political opportunities we see higher levels of movement mobilisation which helps to explain variation in mobilisation (Yashar, 2005).

The mobilisation of the indigenous movement, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1985 is a case in which all three of Yashar's (2005) components came together. In this case, neoliberalism provided the motivation for mobilisation while democratisation provided the opportunity structure necessary to mobilise and the pre-existing networks established by churches and peasant unions before the 1990s worked to enhance the level of mobilisation. This highlights the importance of understanding social movement mobilisation as an interactive process in which a variety of components come together and result in mobilisation. This is especially important for understanding ethnic mobilisation which for Barany (1998: 548) "does not occur in a vacuum" but rather "needs a number of ingredients, or prerequisites, in order to succeed". Finally, while the work of Yashar (1998; 2005) is concerned with explaining the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation, this study is primarily concerned with the impact of this variation on support for the left in

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[47]Such factors include the strength of collective identity (Vermeersch, 2006; Barany 2002), the framing of grievances and demands (Vermeersch, 2006; Fumagalli, 2007; Jenson, 1998) and the strength of movement leaders (Barany 2002; Vermeersch 2012; Polletta and Jasper 1998).

the region. Although these topics are inextricably linked, the research grounds itself in the work of Yashar (2005), which has sufficiently identified levels of mobilisation both across and within the five cases outlined on Table 2.2 below. By using the work of Yashar (2005) as a foundation to explain variation, the research can better direct its efforts into investigating whether this variation can explain variation in the support of the left.

Table 2.2: Indigenous population and movement mobilisation by country.

Country	Indigenous Population % of total	Regional or National Movements	Level of Movement mobilisation
Bolivia	71	Regional	Strong
Guatemala	66	National	Significant
Peru	47	Regional	Weak
Ecuador	43	National	Strong
Mexico	14	Regional	Significant

Source: Adopted from Yashar (2005) and Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.

Operationalisation of indigenous movement mobilisation

The operationalisation of indigenous movement mobilisation is a complex task, not least because social movements are by nature "moving targets" making it difficult to measure their mobilisation levels at any one time (Tarrow, 1991: 17). This in turn makes it difficult to capture variation in mobilisation over time. For example, while Yashar (2005) provides a useful categorisation of mobilisation levels for the five countries (see Table above) this does not capture the variation in levels of mobilisation over time. To overcome this, I designed expert surveys to capture levels of indigenous movement mobilisation across time, providing original data for the study of indigenous movement mobilisation. Given that this is an original measurement it is important to specify its construction by providing a more detailed discussion on the expert surveys here.

The surveys were limited to five cases in which indigenous peoples represent a substantial percentage of the total population. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, indigenous population size is considered an important factor for the level of support for the left. The reasoning here is that although population is not a guarantee of mobilisation, there should be a large enough population so that if a social base were to mobilise it would have an impact on elections. In this way, the independent

variable is interactive. The cases are Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico. An indigenous population is considered as substantial by this research when it exceeds ten per cent of the total population. For example, as Table 2.3 below illustrates the indigenous population of Argentina is one per cent of total population. Even if every indigenous person in Argentina joined an indigenous movement and mobilised, it would still represent too small a social base for a party to consider it electorally advantageous.

Table 2.3: Estimated indigenous population across Latin America

Country	National Population	Indigenous Population	Indigenous Population (%)
Bolivia	8,329,000	5,914,000	71
Guatemala	12,640,000	8,342,000	66
Peru	27,013,000	12,696,000	47
Ecuador	12,920,000	5,556,000	43
Belize	250,000	47,000	19
Honduras	6,250,000	938,000	15
Mexico	100,350,000	14,049,000	14
Chile	15,211,000	1,217,000	8
El Salvador	6,123,000	429,000	7
Guyana	697,000	56,000	8
Panama	2,808,000	168,000	6
Suriname	431,000	26,000	6
Nicaragua	4,813,000	241,000	5
Paraguay	5,586,000	168,000	3
Colombia	39,686,000	794,000	2
Venezuela	23,543,000	471,000	2
Costa Rica	3,644,000	36,000	1
Argentina	36,955,000	370,000	1
Trinidad & Tobago	1,075,000	12,000	1
Brazil	166,113,000	332,000	0
Uruguay	3,278,000	1,000	0
Total	**477,715**	**51,971**	**11**

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.

It is important to note that while Honduras also exceeds the threshold, it is not included in this study. Firstly, the ethnic composition of the indigenous population of Honduras is different than that of the other cases. For instance, one of the largest

indigenous groups in Honduras is the Garifuna people[48] who are decedents of marooned African Slaves and the indigenous people of the Caribbean who were deported from the Island of St. Vincent in 1797 and who eventually settled in Honduras (Anderson, 2007). The Garifuna and other afro-hondureños groups dominate the ethnic makeup of Honduras. This is different from the indigenous population found in the other cases which is comprised of Mesoamerican or Indian (highland movements) and indigenous people from the amazon (lowland movements). This difference is important because the demands of these groups are distinct from the movements studied here. Consequently, the relationship and dynamics between ethnic movements in Honduras can be quite different from the movements in Bolivia or Peru for instance.[49] As mentioned earlier the cultural difference between Afro-indigenous and lowland/highland groups is quite distinct and for these reason the two groups are not typically compared.

This is not to say that smaller movements, more comparable movements did not emerge in Honduras. For example, Mesoamerican groups such as the Chortí[50] organised into smaller organisations. In the late 1980s these small movements allied with OFRANEH however and as a result the indigenous movement in Honduras is understood as one general autochthonous[51] grouping of diverse ethnicities rather than the lowland-highland distinctions we get in the cases selected for study (Anderson, 2007). This changes the dynamics of relations with the state and potential allies, such as parties, that operate within it. For instance, the Honduran state incorporates indigenous and black subjects within one single paradigm of collective rights and legislative framework (Anderson, 2007). The complexity of the ethnic composition of indigenous movement in Honduras, and indeed of other cases where Afro-indigenous communities are more dominant, means that it is somewhat of an apple among the

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[48] The population of Garifuna alone is 49,952 according to a 2001 government report (Anderson, 2007).

[49] For example, in the late 1970s the Garifuna group established an organisation called La Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña (OFRANEH), which as the title suggests identified itself at first as an afro-Honduran organisation. Where mobilisation occurred it was along afro-ethnic lines and mobilisation therefore is centred more on anti-racism and class divisions rather than demands for ethnic rights (such as bi-lingual education for instance) (Hooker, 2005). By the late 1980s the OFRANEH made diverse alliances ranging from timber merchants and military officers that were centred more along class than ethnic lines (Anderson, 2007).

[50] Numbering 37,052 according to a 2001 government report (Anderson, 2007)

[51] The term autochthonous can be understood as pertaining to native, indigenous or aboriginal identities and is used by Anderson throughout his article.

oranges in terms of case selection and is therefore excluded.[52] Finally, the selection of cases used in this study closely follows in the footsteps of prominent scholars on indigenous politics in Latin America such as Deborah Yashar (2005) and Donna Lee Van Cott (2005; 2007; 2008) who focus their studies on the cases of Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru.

The case of Romani movements and political parties in Eastern Europe illustrates the importance of considering population size in this study. Although some Romani movements sought alliances with political parties, the parties were not willing to ally with the movements because the Romani communities represent a low proportion of the population[53] (Barany, 2002: 227). By representing a small proportion of the electorate there was little incentive for parties to pursue an alliance, illustrating that without an electorally advantageous social base movement-party alliances are unlikely to form (Barany, 2002: 301). Similar to indigenous people in Latin America, a social bias against the Romani ethnicity amongst the electorate meant that if a party was to include a gypsy name on their list they risk that "one Romani vote means the loss of two others" (Barany, 2002: 301). In other cases parties "court gypsy voters" by asking popular gypsy personalities to campaign for them in gypsy communities, or by buying the gypsy vote with cash, food supplies or festivals (Barany, 2002: 301).

There is no guarantee however that the voters will adhere to their side of the agreement. For example during the 1998-1999 presidential and legislative elections in Macedonia two major parties distributed food in the Romani suburbs yet the community voted for a party that had no contact with the community during the campaign (Barany 2002: 302). For this reason, movement-party alliances are less likely to occur and even if they did, they would have minimal impact on the electoral success of a party. This study therefore focuses on cases in which a population is

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[52] Honduras is also excluded because the indigenous population of Honduras is simply not consistently reported which could impede the research if incorrectly selected. For example, according to figures from a 2006 report by the Inter-American Development Bank listed on Figure 3.6 above, the indigenous population of Honduras represents 15 per cent of the total population. However, according to a report by the Honduran government in 2001, the total indigenous population is 7.2 per cent of the total population (Anderson, 2007). Given that population size is the qualifier for case selection we should exclude ambiguous cases such as Honduras.

[53] Romani population Hungary and Bulgaria is less than ten per cent of the total population (Barany, 2002).

large enough that if it were to mobilise if could have a considerable impact on the electoral success of a party.

The experts were asked to score levels of indigenous movement mobilisation by country, based on a scale of mobilisation (see appendix A.1 for a copy of the survey). I developed this scale of mobilisation based on social movement theory as well as an understanding of Latin American indigenous movements as informed by scholars such as Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005; 2007; 2008). Vignettes were provided to experts in order to score mobilisation levels according to low, medium or high levels (see appendix A.1 for vignette). Experts were asked to score indigenous movement mobilisation in each case in the following time frames; 1990-1998, 1999-2006 and 2007-2011. These time frames are consistent with the time frame selected for analysis of the dependent variable (1990-2011)[54] and capture variation within both the central variables (before and after the left turn in 1998 and before and after intense indigenous movement mobilisation in the mid-late 1990s). The survey was originally compiled and sent to experts in 2011, therefore this year is included in the time frame. It is unlikely that mobilisation dramatically increased or decreased in 2011 alone however, and because experts were asked to give a score per time frame rather than by year, this does not compromise the analysis.

While Chapter 3 will provide a more detailed discussion on the expert surveys, it is important to note here that they are the central measurement for indigenous movement mobilisation. They are a fundamental part of the research design because they provide a measurement for the key independent variable where it did not previously exist. In this way the survey data provides an original measure of indigenous movement mobilisation which can be used in the quantitative analysis to test the breadth of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and the variation in support for the left. The survey data also provides original information about the behaviour of indigenous social movements more generally as questions were also included to observe what activities are typically undertaken (protests or community meetings for instance) and whether movements are mobilised in some regions more than others (highland versus lowland movements). The responses to

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[54] As listed in Table 2.1 the dependent variable is measured in four ways, the first three measurements (*presvrl, presvrl2 and lhvrl*) provide data from 1990 to 2009 while the fourth measurement (*leftvoteshare*) includes data from 1990 to 2011.

these questions provided a comprehensive and practical understanding of indigenous movements in the region and the scores provide a measurement for mobilisation. Therefore, the survey data alone provides an empirical contribution to research in this area.

Admittedly, a shortcoming of the movement mobilisation scores from the expert surveys is that they only provide data for five cases. Given that the goal of the quantitative study is to provide breadth to the study this presents an obstacle for the quantitative analysis. In order to overcome this I include some proxy measurements for indigenous movement mobilisation, which I use first in a quantitative study of all eighteen Latin American countries. These include indigenous population and a general mass mobilisation score provided by the work of Roberts (2002) outlined in Chapter 1. Roberts (2002) categorises each Latin American country as either having a labour mobilising or elite party system. His work suggests that labour mobilising countries are more susceptible to mass mobilisation, therefore I renamed his labour mobilising countries as mass mobilising. The logic here is to use indigenous population (which admittedly is not a guarantee of mobilisation) along with mass mobilisation to uncover whether variables have a positive effect on support for the left when interacted with the measurements of the main dependent variable. Once these tests are conducted, I use my indigenous mobilisation score to test the relationship between mobilisation and support for the left within the five countries across the same time frame. Table 2.4 below provides a full overview of the measurement of the independent variable for the quantitative analysis.

Table 2.4: Operationalisation of the independent variable for the quantitative analysis

Variable	Measure	Source
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation *(movemobscore)*	0-2. where o is low, 1 is medium and 2 is high.	My original expert survey
Indigenous Population	As percentage of total population	The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
Mass Mobilising *(massmob)*	Dummy variable where 0 is non-mass mobilising and 1 is mass mobilising	Roberts (2002)

2.3 The mixed method approach

This research adopts a mixed-method approach, which is understood as a "synthesis" of ideas from qualitative and quantitative research (Johnson and Turner, 2007: 112). Both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed to investigate the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and the variation in support for the contestatory left. Specifically, a quantitative study is used to test the general relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the contestatory left. This is complemented by in-depth comparative case studies of Bolivia and Peru, which exposes the nuts and bolts of this relationship.

The difference between qualitative and quantitative methods is a difference of 'breadth' and 'depth' (Mabry, 2008: 216). For example, quantitative studies "sample from broad populations and produce grand generalisations" thus providing breadth. Conversely, qualitative methods such as comparative case studies "provide a deep understanding about specific instances" (Mabry, 2008: 216). This allows the researcher to "peer into the box of causality" and "see X and Y interact" (Gerring, 2007: 45). Importantly, both breadth and depth are "needed for understanding social phenomena" (Mabry, 2008: 2016). Essentially, while "researchers invariably face a choice between knowing more about less, or less about more", the mixed method approach enables one to overcome this challenge by providing an approach in which both breadth and depth are of equal importance (Gerring, 2007: 106).

Furthermore, if the ultimate goal of scientific research is inference, the mixed-method approach can provide the methodological triangulation necessary to increase "inferential leverage" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 7, Tarrow, 2004: 174). Triangulation is understood as the combining of qualitative and quantitative methods and is useful because it "heightens qualitative methods to their deserved prominence and, at the same time, demonstrates that quantitative methods can and should be utilized in complementary fashion" (Jick, 1979: 610). The mixed method approach also enables more rigorous testing because "the bias inherent in any particular data sources, investigators and particularly methods will be cancelled out when used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators, and methods" (Johnson et al., 2007: 115). Consequently, methodological triangulation achieved through a mixed-method approach allows the researcher to be more confident of their results because the hypothesis undergoes two sets of testing (Johnson et al., 2007: 115).

Finally it is worth noting that the philosophical underpinning of the mixed method approach is "pragmatism" (Denscombe, 2008: 270). Mixed methods are pragmatic because they offer the researcher a "common ground" between quantitative and qualitative research paradigms, which often participate in "sterile and unproductive dualisms" over positivism (or post-positivist) and constructivism (or interpretivism) (Denscombe, 2008: 270-273). Accordingly, the mixed-method approach represents a "third paradigm" for social research that "incorporates a distinct set off ideas and practices that separate the approach from other main research paradigms" (Denscombe, 2008: 270). In addition, the mixed method approach provides an alternative for those who feel that "neither quantitative nor qualitative research alone will provide adequate findings" (Denscombe, 2008: 274). For others the mixing of methods is necessary in order to "provide an adequate answer" to the research question (Denscombe, 2008: 274). Ultimately, this project adopts a mixed-method approach in order to sufficiently answer the research question, and in turn make appropriate causal inferences.

The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to explore the relationship between the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation and variation in support for the left. Specifically, a time-series, cross-sectional analysis is used to assess the relationship of indigenous movement mobilisation and the percentage of the left's vote share in

legislative and presidential elections across Latin America. The analysis was conducted for eighteen Latin American countries from 1990 to 2009[55] using an original dataset. This time frame was selected in order to capture variation in the relationship over time. This allows us to observe the relationship both before the left turn in 1998 and after the left turn which can be considered to ebb from 2009. This time frame also encompasses a period of intense indigenous movement mobilisation during the 1990s and a period in which the left experienced sweeping success across the region from 2000-2006. Ultimately, the quantitative study provides an overview of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left across a time frame that provides variation within both variables.

The project conducts a qualitative analysis using the comparative case study method. The comparative method allows the researcher to study "wholes" rather than "parts" (De Vaus, 2008: 236). Case studies help "achieve explanations by building a full picture of the sequence of events, the context in which they occur, and the meaning of actions and events as interpreted by participants and their meaning as given by a context" (De Vaus, 2008: 236). Accordingly, and as previously stated "the primary virtue of the case study method is the depth of analysis that it offers" (Gerring, 2007: 49). Depth is understood as "detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance in an outcome that is accounted for by the explanation" (Gerring, 2007: 49). Moreover, the comparative case-study method permits repeated experiments, or 'the logic of replication', which ensures that the case that matched the predicted theory did not occur by chance, thus strengthening the hypothesis (De Vaus, 2008: 237). The strength of this however, lies upon the 'strategic selection' of case studies (De Vaus, 2008: 237).

2.4 Case selection

For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 128) case selection is "crucial" for the degree to which the research can "provide determinate and reliable results". Specifically, the researcher must avoid selection bias, considered by the authors as the "most egregious error" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 142). Ordinarily, the panacea for selection

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[55] Due to data limitations, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the analysis does not include elections after 2009. This however does not impede the research because it is concerned primarily with the left turn at the turn of the century and secondarily with the ebb of the left turn around 2009-2010, both of which are included in this dataset.

bias is random sample, in small-n research however this is not "appropriate" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 142). Przeworski & Teune (1970: 32) explain that "for practical reasons the selection of countries can rarely be random". Instead, selection must be based on "tactical choices" that are "limited to the question of the 'best' combination of countries" (Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 32-33).

In order to select the 'best combination of countries' and avoid selection bias the most similar system design (MSSD) is adopted in this research. MSSD requires selection of cases which are "similar on all the measured independent variables except the independent variable of interest"; in this case the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. This allows the researcher to control for other explanations. This system is advocated by Lijphart (1971) who explains that cases should be selected systematically, include as much control as possible, be comparable and focus on the key variables. This technique ensures non-selection on the dependent variable and variation on the independent variable which are crucial for making causal inferences in scientific research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).

The cases of Bolivia and Peru are carefully selected in order to optimise variation both across and within cases. Firstly, they vary on the independent variable of indigenous movement mobilisation at a country case level. In the case of Bolivia, indigenous movement mobilisation is high, while in Peru it is low. The cases also provide within-case variation because there is variation between lowland and highland mobilisation within each case. Therefore, the research adheres to the advice of King, Keohane and Verba (1994:140) who state that the "best 'intentional' design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables". The authors also acknowledge that selecting on the independent variable alone is "often unrealistic for qualitative research" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141). Rather, the authors explain that when we must take into account the values of the dependent variable we should select observations with particularly high and particularly low values (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). The 2005 elections in Bolivia represent a case in which the contestatory left was successful, while the 2006 elections in Peru represent a case in which the moderate left was successful. Selecting cases in which the value of the dependent variable varies is useful because it can "help us to gain some valuable

information about the empirical plausibility of a casual inference" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141).

The MSSD is made up of two countries in the Andean region of Latin America, Bolivia and Peru. According to Lijphart (1971:688) the "geographic proximity" of countries means they are "likely to be similar in many other respects". This is true for the cases which are part of the great Andean Corridor, a region which is often overlooked despite historical crises of democratic representation and political distrust (Yashar, 2005: 226; Mainwaring et al, 2006: 17). Both cases experienced "parallel political trajectories" as a result of a shared colonial past (Yashar, 2005: 226). Accordingly, Bolivia and Peru underwent a "politico-institutional parallel" in which the treatment of indigenous people was the same under the colonial constitution (Yashar, 2005: 226). Bolivia and Peru also share "unitary political systems" that allows the researcher to hold institutional factors constant such as party systems which according to Yashar (2005: 19) are fragmented and volatile in each case.

Crucially, Bolivia and Peru share the same demography. Firstly, they both have substantial indigenous populations. In Bolivia, the indigenous population represents 71 per cent of the total population while for Peru it is estimated as 47 per cent. As previously explained, a substantial indigenous population is important because there should be population large enough so that if mobilisation were to occur it would considerably impact the success of the contestatory left. The composition of indigenous populations is also similar in each case because they are geographically dispersed and ethnically divided between the highland and lowland groups providing variation within the cases (Yashar, 2005: 227). Importantly, the highland Quechua and Aymara Indians make up the majority indigenous group while the indigenous people of the lowlands constitute a minority (Yashar, 2005). It is particularly important in a project about indigenous movements that we compare movements which are similar in their demographic composition. In this way the research heeds the warning by Gerring (2007: 50), that if one were to compare "apples and oranges" then "one cannot learn anything about underlying causal processes". In order to understand the causal process, this research selects cases that are similar but that vary on the key dependent variable. The selection of these cases also helps control for alternative explanations.

Controlling for alternative explanations

Discontent is considered as the 'lowest common denominator' for explaining the left turn because it includes a variety of issues that drove voters left. This argument is predicated on the assumption that there was a neoliberal incumbent. As illustrated on Table 2.8 below, both countries experienced neoliberal incumbents in the elections studied (2005 in Bolivia and 2006 in Peru). Peru was governed by right-winged President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and later by centre-right President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) (Schmidt, 2007:814). In Bolivia, the election of Evo Morales in 2005 was preceded by a succession of right-wing neoliberal presidents including President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada known as 'Goni' (2002-2003) and Carlos Mesa (2003-2005). Furthermore, in each case the incumbent implemented failing neoliberal reforms which generated discontent.

There are a number of indicators that can be used to assess discontent. The first is whether economic growth occurred during the neoliberal era. Table 2.5 provides an overview of GDP annual growth rates in each country between 1994 and 2004. In the case of Bolivia, GDP annual growth decreased in 2000 and by 2004 it had not recovered to the growth levels achieved in 1998 and the preceding years. In Peru, GDP fell dramatically between 1994 and 1998 and although it recovered somewhat in 2002 it feel again in 2004. The fluctuation of growth rates provides a basis for measuring discontent with these regimes.

Table 2.5: GDP annual growth (%) in Bolivia and Peru (1994-2004)

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
Bolivia	4.8	4.5	5.0	2.3	2.7	3.8
Peru	12.7	2.5	-0.5	2.5	5.4	4.6

Source: O'Toole (2011)

Unemployment rates can also indicate the performance of neoliberal regimes in Bolivia and Peru. It can be argued that high rates of unemployment were a source of discontent because neoliberal incumbents failed to deliver employment. As discussed in Chapter 1, in some cases the privatisation of state companies increased unemployment in some sectors, such as the Carlos Menem (1989-1999) administration in Argentina. Table 2.6 below demonstrates that urban unemployment

increased dramatically in the lead up to the left turn in Bolivia (2005). In Peru, unemployment experienced a marginal decrease from 1985-2000 but unemployment increased again in 2002.

Table 2.6: Urban unemployment in Bolivia and Peru (1985-2002)

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2002
Bolivia	5.7	7.2	16.4	15.1	19.7
Peru	10.1	8.3	7.9	7.0	9.4

Source: UNDP (2004: 123)

Continued inequality is also a source of discontent resulting from neoliberal reforms. Inequality levels can be measured using the Gini coefficient. The following graph indicates the available Gini coefficient scores for each country from the earliest available data for the 1990s to the incumbent score closest to the left turn in each case. As Figure 2.3 below indicates, inequality remained high in Bolivia between 1991 and 2001. While the lowest Gini coefficient was reported in 1991, between 1993 and 1997 inequality increased substantially reaching its highest point in 2000 and only decreasing marginally in 2001. Interestingly, it was at this time that indigenous movement mobilisation against the neoliberal incumbent Sánchez de Lozada or 'Goni' intensified, as evidenced by the Cochabamba Water War in 2000 and ensuing demonstrations discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Ultimately, inequality remained high in Bolivia throughout the neoliberal period. In Peru, inequality was also high during the neoliberal era. As Figure 2.4 below indicates, despite a drop in 1997 inequality increased dramatically between 1998 and 1999. We also see a decrease in 2000 but inequality rose again in 2001. As with Bolivia, inequality was high under neoliberal incumbents despite some relief in 1997. Although it is difficult to assert the reason for the drop in inequality between 1994 and 1997, it is worth noting the re-election of neoliberal President Alberto Fujimori in 1995 who by this time was becoming increasingly authoritarian and besieged by allegations of corruption. While this cannot explain the decrease in inequality levels entirely, it is worth noting the political upheaval during this era.

Figure 2.3: Inequality in Bolivia (1991-2001)

Inequality in Bolivia, 1991-2001

	1991	1993	1997	1999	2000	2001
■ Gini Coefficient	42	53.6	58.3	57.9	62.8	58.5

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.

Figure 2.4: Inequality in Peru (1994-2001)

Inequality in Peru, 1994-2001

	1994	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
■ Gini Coefficient	44.9	34.8	56.2	56.7	50.8	54.1

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.

As stated in Chapter 1 this research agrees that levels of discontent are important for understanding the left turn because it provided a central motivation for the electorate to vote for the left. Rather than challenge discontent as an explanation, this research

seeks to build upon it by arguing that indigenous people were amongst the most discontented with neoliberal reforms and for this reason were ideologically congruent with the left. The specific contribution made by this research to the discontent argument however is to highlight the importance of indigenous movements in transforming this discontent to electoral success by mobilising their bases in support of the left.

The chapter will now discuss the cases selected for the qualitative study in light of prevailing explanations for the emergence of two types of left in the region which is the secondary puzzle explored in this research. Explanations for this variation in centred on two factors; commodity booms and the level of party system institutionalisation. Weyland (2009: 146) states that commodity booms are a "crucial factor" in explaining the variation in the emergence of the contestatory and moderate left. The argument here is that the boost in revenue generated by commodity booms allows the contestatory left to pursue its ambitious social policies and garner support for future elections. This research argues however that the commodity boom explanation does more to explain the endurance of the contestatory left once in power than the emergence of the various lefts. Nonetheless both cases have access to natural resource rents. Figure 2.5 below displays the growth in the total resource rents for both cases from 1990-2006. Although Bolivia is rich in gas and Peru in oil, total resource rents is a suitable measurement for comparing the two countries because it is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal and mineral rents, and forest rents (World Bank, 2013). The graph below indicates that resource rents greatly increased from the early 2000s. This highlights revenue from these commodities was also available for use by neoliberal incumbents and so an increase in resource rents cannot explain the emergence of the contestatory left.

Figure 2.5: Increase in resource rents in Bolivia and Peru (1990-2006)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.

Firstly, resource rents as percentage of GDP increased before the election in each case[56] and so leftist governments were not yet in a position to spend the revenue generated on redistributive policies. For instance, Weyland (2010) argues that the revenues generated from the boom allow the contestatory left to increase social spending and increase popularity. However, the left must be in power in the first place in order to implement these polices and reap the rewards. The central interest of this research is to explain the emergence of these governments in the first instance, rather than what contributes to their re-election later. Moreover, it is argued here that the commodity boom argument is somewhat endogenous. That is, when we do not control for endogeneity we might see "that the values of our explanatory variable take on are sometimes a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable" (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 185). Commodity booms can be said to be a consequence rather than the cause of the contestatory left because once in power these leaders typically implement policies such as the nationalisation of commodities, providing them with higher resource rents which they then use to finance ambitious redistributive polices. For these reasons, the commodity boom argument is an insufficient explanation for the variation in the emergence of variant types of the left.

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[56] Resource rents increase dramatically in 2004 in Bolivia and in 2006 in Peru.

Party institutionalisation is also considered to explain variation in support for the left. Indeed, for Weyland (2010), discontent with neoliberalism should be considered in conjunction with levels of party system institutionalisation in order to explain variation in left support. The combination of discontent with weak party systems provides the opportunity for new leaders and movements to emerge whose "fiery rhetoric and ambitious promises" were favoured by the discontented electorate (Weyland, 2010:20). Conversely, well-institutionalised party systems make it more difficult for new, more extreme, parties or leaders to emerge. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006: 2) also argue that party institutionalisation matters for the emergence of more extreme or 'anti-party politicians' such as former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. While the authors do not distinguish between a left-right divide (they also include former right-wing President Alberto Fujimori of Peru), their argument is similar in that they state that weakly institutionalised party systems are more vulnerable to allowing anti-party politicians to emerge and the contestatory left can be considered as such. For this reason, we should expect that the contestatory left are less successful where party systems are highly institutionalised.

When we consider the case of Bolivia and Peru however we find that both countries have weakly institutionalised systems, yet the contestatory leftist candidates emerged in Bolivia in 2005 and not in Peru in 2006. Jones (2005) provides a party institutionalisation index score which is an aggregated score of electoral volatility, party roots, party and election legitimacy, and party organisation. According to this index scores, both Bolivia and Peru are at the lower end of party institutionalisation. Bolivia scores 56 while Peru scores lower with 53 indicating "weak party systems that are constantly changing" (Jones, 2005; Arce, 2010). Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) also provide a measurement for party system institutionalisation by compiling a mean measurement of electoral volatility within legislative elections from 1980-2002[57] in which Bolivia receives a score of 39.8 and Peru again scores lower with 51.9. Peru in particular is considered as "extremely volatile" by the authors (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 9). Sánchez (2008: 321) explains that party system institutionalisation in Peru was greatly weakened under President Alberto Fujimori (1980-2000) who introduced a "number of executive-driven reforms designed to open up the political

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[57] In the case of Peru the time frame is 1980-2001

system". Sánchez (2008: 31) argues that Peru has "struggled to recreate a bona fide party system" since the Fujimori era and this is reflected by continued electoral volatility which is "among the very highest in Latin America". Despite a weakly institutionalised party system however, the extreme left did not emerge in Peru during the 2006 elections studied in this research.

Party system institutionalisation in Bolivia is described as inchoate by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). During the 1990s the weakly institutionalised traditional parties of *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) and Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)* dominated vote share (Sánchez, 2008). However the social unrest which occurred in the early 2000s in Bolivia, including the Cochabamba Water War (2001), changed the political system because the traditional parties "were unable to channel newly politicised social grievances" (Sánchez, 2008: 323). Consequently, various newly formed movements and parties emerged to contest the 2002 and 2005 elections signalling the disintegration of the old party system (Sánchez, 2008). Ultimately, party system institutionalisation is weak for both elections studied.

Table 2.8 below provides an overview of the abovementioned explanations in relation to the two cases selected. Three additional indicators of discontent are included here. The first is percentage of change in GDP per capita between 1980 and 2002, which is negative seven per cent in each case indicating that contraction may be a source of discontent. Privatisation was also a distinct characteristic of the neoliberal era. The privatisation of land was an issue that affected indigenous people in particular (Yashar, 2005). For this reason I include an indicator for privatisation here in the form of privatisation of revenue (as percentage of GDP). The measurement captures the mean percentage of GDP generated from privatisation between 1990- 1995, which encompasses a period of neoliberalism in each case. Revenue generated from privatisation accounted for two per cent of GDP in Bolivia and 1.6 per cent in Peru. Compared with other Latin American countries, Bolivia and Peru have the highest percentage of GDP generated by privatisation in the region. For example, Mexico is the only country to equal Bolivia's two per cent while Argentina (1.2) and Nicaragua (1.5) fall just behind Peru (O'Toole, 2). Privatisation then was also very high in both cases, adding to the argument that discontent can help to explain the left turn.

Finally, I also include my explanation of indigenous movement mobilisation. As the table illustrates, this is the only variable which differs across the cases suggesting that the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation may help to explain the variation in support for the left, and for the contestatory left in particular. The table also illustrates the within case variation of indigenous movement mobilisation between highland and lowland groups. The chapter will now turn to a discussion of the variation on the central variables across, and within cases.

Table 2.8: Controlling for alternative explanations in the qualitative analysis

Variable	Bolivia	Peru
Neoliberal/Right Incumbent	Yes	Yes
Additional Indicators for discontent		
GDP per Capita % change 1980-2002[58]	-7	-7
Privatisation Revenue % of GDP 1990-1995[59]	2.0	1.6
Other Explanations		
Party System Institutionalisation[60]	Weak	Weak
Commodities	Gas	Oil
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation		
Movement Mobilisation (Country)	High	Low
Mobilisation Highland Movements	High	Low
Mobilisation Lowland Movements	Low	High

Variation on the independent variable

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, variation on the independent variable is a crucial component of intentional case selection. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 140), "the best 'intentional' design selects observations to ensure variation on the explanatory variable". Accordingly, cases were selected in which the independent variable, indigenous movement mobilisation varies. Despite having substantial indigenous populations with a "remarkably similar pattern" of marginalisation and exploitation, indigenous political mobilisation has occurred on a much larger scale in Bolivia than in Peru (Van Cott, 2007:34; Peeler, 2003:74).

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[58] World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 2002
[59] O'Toole (2011)
[60] Mainwaring and Torcal (2006)

Specifically, indigenous movements in Bolivia have been amongst the most active in Latin America. The early 1990s represented a period of "multiple indigenous mobilisation" and "energetic effervescence among grassroots indigenous organisations" in Bolivia (Gustafson, 2003: 275). Indigenous political mobilisation in Peru has been markedly weaker, in particular it has been "less active, less institutionalized and less successful" (Van Cott, 2005: 143). The "profound failure" of indigenous movement mobilisation in Peru has been directly equated with the "largely non-existent" political mobilisation of indigenous people in Peru in general (Lucero and García, 2007: 234). Ultimately, despite fitting some conditions for mobilisation such as population and motive (marginalisation or discontent with neoliberalism) indigenous movement mobilisation in Peru "barely exists" (Yashar, 1998: 26). Furthermore, where movements do exist in Peru they are weak and fragmented regional movements (Yashar, 1998).

Mobilisation also varies within cases. Specifically, variation exists within highland and lowland movement mobilisation. In Bolivia for instance, highland movements such as Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) "were among the most vocal opponents of the government" throughout the late 1970s and 1980s (Postero, 2006: 195). Their mobilisation is exemplified by their use of protests and road blocks that paralysed transportation in 1979 which is considered as the largest mobilisation since the 1952 revolution and signalled "the return of the peasantry as an independent national political actors" (Van Cott, 2005: 55). CSUTCB itself drew much inspiration from the highland Indian Katarista movement in the 1960s, who incidentally, named their movement after the leader of the highland rebellion against colonial powers in 1781, Túpac Katarí (Van Cott, 2005). Today, CSUTCB is Bolivia's largest indigenous movement with affiliates in each department, as well as a major base of support in its home department of Cochabamba among the cocaleros (coca growers) from the Chapare region in particular (Van Cott, 2005).

Mobilisation occurred more slowly in the Bolivian lowlands. Although movements such as Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) formed in the early 1980s, it was not until the 1990s when lumber companies, cattle ranchers and highland migrants began to encroach on their territory that these movements took

their demands public (Postero, 2006: 195). In 1990, CIDOB along with its affiliate organisation, Central de los Pueblos Indígenas de Beni (CPIB), organised a thirty-five day March for Territory and Dignity from Trinidad to La Paz which "dramatically raised awareness" of the demands of the lowland movements and "changed the face of Bolivia forever" (Postero, 2006: 195, Van Cott, 2005: 61). The march marked the mass mobilisation of lowland movements which until this point remained relatively subdued when compared to their highland counterparts.

Conversely in Peru, indigenous movement mobilisation is higher among the Amazonian movements than the highland or Sierra movements. The division between the highland and lowland groups is "particularly pronounced" in Peru, both in terms of their treatment by the state and in how they have organised (Van Cott, 2005: 143). Highland indigenous mobilisation in Peru followed a similar path to its Andean neighbours Bolivia and Ecuador until the 1970s. Similar to Bolivia, Peru also experienced an indigenous rebellion in the 1780s when Túpac Amaru II led an uprising against Spain. Later in the 1960s Túpac Amaru II was used as a symbol to mobilise indigenous rebellion during the land invasions of the 1960s organised by peasant unions such as the Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP) set up in 1947. By the late 1960s and 1970s however, highland mobilisation subsided. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the military government of Juan Velasco in 1968 introduced policies which benefitted the highland communities such agrarian reforms that resulted in the repatriation of lands to campesinos and educational reforms which introduced bilingual education (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). Such reforms reduced mobilisation because movements had less grievances.

Secondly, the Velasco Regime (1965-1975) began a series of reforms which began the "de-indianisation" of Peru (García & Lucero, 2005: 160). Essentially, Velasco re-organised the highland indigenous population along class rather than ethnic lines making 'indigenous' mobilisation unlikely. Indeed, while some indigenous movements emerged during the 1970s, they remained weak and fragmented with interethnic struggles between Quechan and Aymara further weakening movements (Van Cott, 2005). Finally, the emergence of the guerrilla movements Sendero Luminoso in 1980 dealt a deafening blow to indigenous movement mobilisation in the highlands. Sendero Luminoso terrorised communities and forced indigenous

organisation leaders to resign (Van Cott, 2005). Other campesinos joined the organisation making their communities targets for violence by the armed forces fighting Sendero. While indigenous movements were consolidating in Bolivia and Ecuador during the 1980s, highland Indians in Peru were being assassinated or recruited by Sendero, thus greatly impeding their opportunities for mobilisation (Van Cott, 2005).

While mobilisation in Peru is weak compared to its Andean neighbours, the lowland movements offer an exception. For example, the emergence of movements such as Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) in 1976 have mobilised in the lowlands. Similar to the lowland movements in Bolivia, AIDESEP mobilised to fight "Andean colonisation" of Amazonian territories in which highland Indians migrated to the Amazon territories to cultivate land (Postero, 2006: 166). Unlike the lowland movements in Bolivia however, AIDESEP is the most active and internationally linked indigenous movement in Peru during the 1980s (Van Cott, 2005: 158). Today it is mobilised at local, regional, national and even international levels as indicated by its on-going dialogue with the United Nations and World Bank regarding issues of indigenous rights and climate change (Postero, 2006: 167). By 1998 AIDESEP represented forty-two of the fifty-nine federations within the Amazonas region of Peru (Yashar, 2005:251). Notwithstanding this success however, AIDESEP has remained internally divided since its formation. For example, in 1987, members of the Amuesha group, left AIDESEP and formed Confederation of Amazonia Nationalities of Peru or CONAP (Van Cott, 2005:158).

Highland and lowland movements also vary in terms of the population of their social bases. Highland movements, for example, tend to represent a larger social base than lowland movements because highland ethnicities such as Aymara or Quechua represent a majority of the indigenous population, while lowland ethnicities represent a minority in each case. In Bolivia, highland ethnicities represent over 55 per cent of the total population (Gigler, 2009). Specifically, Quechan people represent 31 per cent of the total national population and Aymara represent 25 per cent (Gigler, 2009). In stark contrast, Bolivia's lowland indigenous groups represent just six per cent of the total population (Gigler, 2009). The pattern is similar in Peru whereby highland groups make up the majority. In Peru, over eight million people identify as Quechua

while the Aymara population is estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000 (Minority Rights Group International). Combining these ethnicities alone brings the total highland population to close to 8.6 million, or twenty-nine per cent of the total population.[61] The total lowland populations are estimated significantly lower at 350,000, or just one per cent of the total population (Minority Rights Group International). Table 2.9 below displays these figures as percentages of total country populations.

Table 2.9: Breakdown of indigenous population by case

	Bolivia	**Peru**
Highland Population as % of total	25	29
Lowland Population as % of total	6	1
Total	31	30

Source: Adopted from Gigler (2009) and Minority Rights Group International (2013).

Ultimately, cases in which indigenous movement mobilisation varies were selected for this study. This section of the chapter demonstrates that levels of mobilisation and proportion of social bases vary greatly within the cases. Consequently, my research heeds the warnings stipulated by prominent scholars of political science by employing variation on my independent variable within the intentional case selection and MSSD research design.

Variation within the dependent variable

The election cycles selected for the qualitative analysis represent an electoral shift to the left which provides variation on the dependent variable. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, it is often "unrealistic" within qualitative research to select on the independent variable alone. When we must consider the values of the dependent variable however, we should select cases in which the values vary (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141). As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the elections selected for study in the qualitative analysis include the 2005 elections in Bolivia and in the 2006 elections in Peru. These elections are selected because they signify an electoral shift to the left in each country. In Bolivia, the election of Evo Morales in

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[61] These are calculated using current population of Peru which is 29.4 million according to World Development Indicators from the World Bank.

2005 was preceded by a succession of right-wing neoliberal presidents including Sánchez de Lozada or 'Goni' and President Carlos Mesa (Singer, 2006:197). In Peru the right dominated politics in the form of right-winged President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and later by centre-right President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) (Schmidt, 2007). What does vary however, is the type of left elected in each of the case. In the case of Bolivia in 2005, Evo Morales was elected and is considered a contestatory leftist candidate. In Peru however, the moderate left won the elections with President Alan García in 2006. Indeed, in the case of Peru, Alan García defeated contestatory leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who was later elected in 2011. This variation allows me to assess the potential impact of movement mobilisation on the electoral success of these parties, whilst holding other controls constant such as discontent and inequality discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

2.5 Field interviews

The data for the qualitative case studies was collected during fieldwork in Bolivia and Peru from April to July 2012. Specifically, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with key members of indigenous movements, political parties, non-governmental organisations, and indigenous activists (see appendix B.1 and B.2 for full list of interviewees). The purpose of interviews was to investigate the role of movements in support for the left through primary data obtained from first-hand accounts of movement-party alliances from the actors themselves. Through the interviews I wanted to establish whether movements entered into an alliance with the left, and if so what was their principal motivation for doing so. I also wanted to uncover the ways in which the movements mobilised their bases for the party where they did enter into an alliance.

The interviews provide the central data for the qualitative analysis and are a key component of this research. Centrally, interviews can reveal information, insights and nuances that secondary data cannot. This is especially the case when it comes to the study of political alliances, which are enigmatic by nature. For example, newspaper data is not sufficient for analysing movement-party alliances because the researcher is over reliant on information that the media rather than the researcher considers important. By relying on this data alone the researcher runs the risk of omitting

valuable information. Importantly, interviews provide a more in-depth understanding of events and relationships, which is necessary for making appropriate inferences. For instance, Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 673) argue that, "interviewing is often important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do". This is especially useful for my research, which 'needs to know', what a set of people think in order to understand why they may, or may not, have formed a political alliance. The research also 'needs to know' the respective actors interpretation of the alliance or support, what form the alliance took (what have they done) and the current relationship between the actors (what they are planning to do). Ultimately, often seen as "a conversation with a purpose", interviews can reveal more in-depth insights by directly engaging with those involved in the phenomenon under investigation (Webb and Webb, 1932: 130).

In the case of this research, in-depth semi-structured interviews provided first-hand accounts of the relationship between indigenous movements and political parties in Bolivia and Peru (see appendix B.3 for full list of interview questions). Semi-structured interviews were selected because "they allow for certain degree of flexibility" and "for the pursuit of unexpected lines of inquiry during the interview" (Grix, 2004: 127). Given that this research is the first to explicitly address the relationship between indigenous movements and parties in Latin America it was crucial that there was flexibility within interviews that allowed me to pursue unexpected lines of inquiry. Interviews were conducted across a variety of locations in each country in order to capture variation in movement mobilisation within each case. Locations were selected on the basis of indigenous movement mobilisation and variation in the type of indigenous movement, as informed by the expert surveys and the literature on indigenous movements. As discussed previously, while some movements are nationally organised, others are more regionally based requiring travel beyond a country's capital city.

The movements were initially selected for interview through a method of purposive sampling informed by the literature. Purposive sampling occurs when the researcher makes a strategic choice about where, how and with whom interviews are conducted (Palys, 2008) Purposive sampling of interviews allows the researcher to

"purposefully" select interviewees which will help to "illuminate the questions under study" (Patton, 1990: 169). Just as purposive sampling in case selection "offers a degree of control" over selection bias, purposive sampling of interviewees offers control over the quality of information obtained in interviews (Barbour, 2001: 115). By purposively selecting the movements, politicians and relevant organisations from the outset the most relevant information required to answer the research question was received. This is a particularly useful strategy when undertaking fieldwork in Latin America, where travelling vast geographic distances to meet different movements can restrict precious time in the field. Once initial interviews with key interviewees were conducted however, a snowball sampling method followed. NGOs and activists provided an impartial view of the relationship between the movements and parties. Table 2.10 below provides an overview of interviews conducted in each country. The point of saturation occurred early in both Bolivia and Peru. In particular, key points regarding movement-party relations were consistent across interviews thus providing reliability for the study, and interviewing a variety of sources allowed for triangulation, as information could be crossed-checked.

Table 2.10: Overview of interviews conducted in the field

	Bolivia	Peru
Movements	12	8
NGO/Research Organisations	7	3
Politicians	6	4
Academics	2	4
Activist/ Others	2	2
Total	**29**	**21**

The interviews spanned from twenty minutes to over one hour in many cases which provided rich data for analysis. At the beginning of each interview, interviewees were presented with a letter of authentication stipulating the impartiality of the research, signed by my dissertation supervisors. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim by native speakers in order to minimise risk of misunderstanding or loss of data. Finally, the interviews for each country were analysed using thematic analysis by organising the data into themes and sub-themes. Themes were identified through the repetition of topics that "occur and reoccur" (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975: 83). Similar to the point of saturation, themes emerged quickly and consistently across the interviews in each case.

2.6 Expected outcomes

Given the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation in Bolivia and Peru it is expected that where mobilisation is high indigenous movements provided a base of support for the left. In Bolivia, it is expected that this support contributed to the success of the party in the 2005 elections because it mobilised a large base of support with no previous party affiliation. In the case of Peru, where mobilisation is weak, it is expected that ties with social bases are not as strong which impacts the movements ability to mobilise substantial support for the left. In other words, although the movements may have supported the left in the 2006 elections, it is expected that this support did not translate into electoral success because the movements were too weak to have an impact.

Table 2.11 below lists the expected outcomes for this research both across and within cases. In each case, the country level is firstly addressed and this is followed by expectations for highland and lowland movements within each case. In the case of Peru, highland, or Sierra, movements are considered to be quite weak and where they are mobilised it is often fragmented and along class rather than ethnic lines. While still generally weak, lowland movements are comparatively more mobilised than their highland counterparts. For this reason they are ranked 'higher' in the Table 2.11 below in relation to highland movements in Peru alone. In the case of Bolivia, mobilisation of highland movements is considered higher than that of lowland movements and for this reason they are categorised as 'higher' in Table 2.11. In relation to the secondary puzzle on the 'two-lefts' it is expected that where given the opportunity to support either the contestatory or moderate left that the movements chose the former. Where the movements were highly mobilised this in turn contributed to the success of these parties. Finally, it is expected that the dissertation will reveal that under certain conditions, social movements can be important political allies for parties. As discussed in the introduction such a finding would have implications for the way we typically understand social movements as well as implications for the electoral strategies of parties.

Table 2.11: Expected outcomes across and within cases

Case	Level of mobilisation	Expected Outcome
Peru	Low	Despite a potentially high social base as indicated by population, movement-party alliances are expected to be less likely because movement mobilisation is weak.
Peru Highland Movements	Low	Despite a potentially high social base as indicated by population size, movement-party alliances are expected to be less likely because highland movements are not highly mobilised.
Peru Lowland Movements	Higher	Movement-party alliances are expected to be more likely than highland movements because they are more mobilised. However, any alliances are expected to be weak because of small potential social base.
Bolivia	High	Movement-party alliances are expected to be likely because movements are highly mobilised and the potential indigenous social base is large as indicated by population size.
Bolivia Highland	High	Movement-party alliances are expected to be likely because highland movements are highly mobilised and their potential social base large.
Bolivia Lowland	Lower	Movement-party alliances are expected to be less likely because these movements are less mobilised than highland movements. Small social base.

Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section descriptive statistics relating to the central variables are outlined with the purpose of enriching our understanding of the left turn in Latin America, and the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. The second section presents the results of the macro level analysis which examines the nature of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left across the region from 1990-2009. Finally, the third section of the chapter will outline the results of a micro level analysis in which the relationship between individual indigenous voters and support for the left is examined using survey data from *Latinobarómetro* 2006.

The goal of the quantitative analysis is to provide an overview of the nature of the relationship between the two central variables. A quantitative analysis is useful because it can help to tease out causal relationships more generally. This is explored in the macro level analysis in particular where a number of variables are tested in relation to support for the left. I expect to find that support for the left is highest where indigenous movement mobilisation is high. The goal of the individual level analysis is to uncover whether indigenous people do indeed support the left in the region.[62] The central argument of this thesis is that where indigenous people support the left they do so because they are mobilised by the movements that represent them, thus highlighting the importance of movements in generating support for the left. The chapter concludes by outlining the central findings of the quantitative analysis which can be used as a blueprint for the qualitative case studies that follow.

3.1. Descriptive statistics

This section of the chapter firstly provides some descriptive statistics on the central dependent variable, variation support for the left, before turning to the principal independent variable, variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. As previously mentioned, indigenous movement mobilisation is considered in conjunction with indigenous population. Therefore some descriptive statistics on the interaction between mobilisation and population are provided here.

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[62] As discussed in Chapter 1, authors such as Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) provide evidence that indigenous people supported the left in the region during the left turn.

The dependent variable: variation in support for the left

As displayed on Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, variation in support for the left is measured in four ways. The first is support for the left in presidential elections (*presvrl*). The second is support for the left in lower house elections (*lhvrl*). Both of these measurements are sourced from Baker and Greene (2011) and measure the degree of support for leftist candidates or parties in each election in relation to all other contenders in that election. The authors call this 'Voter Revealed Leftism' (VRL) and they construct it by firstly noting the ideological position of the candidate or party as measured by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009). They multiply this score by the vote share of that candidate or party and sum the electoral results for all contenders in the election to obtain the VRL score of that candidate or party. They do this for each candidate/party in each election from 1990-2009. Each candidate/party is then placed on an ideological scale of support for the right (1) to support for the left (20) (Baker and Greene, 2011).[63]

The VRL method of measurement is becoming an increasingly recognised measure of support for the left (see Shifter 2011, Doyle 2011 and Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012). Indeed, the third variable used to measure support for the left is an adaptation of Baker and Greene's VRL score generated by Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2012). The authors constructed their own version of the VRL score which ranges from support for the right (0) to support for the left (4) in all presidential elections from 1978-2009. The authors create this score by firstly considering all presidential candidates who won five per cent or more of the popular vote and assign an ideological score to each candidate.[64] The authors then multiply this score by vote share of each candidate in that election. The products are then summed for every candidate in the election to provide a measurement for support for the left that is relative to all other candidates in the presidential election. The principal difference between this measurement and that of Baker and Greene is that this variable extends to presidential elections since 1978 and considers only those who received more than five per cent of the popular vote. It

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[63] Formally $VRL_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Ideo \log y * voteshare_{it}$

[64] The ideological score was based on Coppedge (1997), updated scores of Pop-Eleches (2009) and expert survey data from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009).

is used in this study as a supplementary measurement of support for the left in presidential elections and is labelled here as *presvrl2*.

The VRL scores capture the degree of support for the left relative to all other contenders allowing us to observe variation in support for the left, relative to all other parties of the left. VRL scores therefore capture the "fine-grained distinctions" between the extreme and the moderate left by providing ideology scores along a continuum and this is useful for a study which is interested in variation in support for the types of left in the region (Baker and Greene, 2011: 47).

Finally, I include a fourth measurement which simply reports the proportion of the total vote won by the left in each election from 1990-2011 and is not relative to other parties or candidates in the election (*leftvoteshare*). I calculated this by summing the vote share of all leftist candidates and parties in each election to get the combined vote share of the left.[65] I summed the vote share of these candidates[66] and multiplied this score by one hundred to get the percentage of the total left vote in each election. This provides a general measurement for support for the left across the region by merging results from both legislative and presidential elections to get the mean support for the left.[67]

This variable (*leftvoteshare*) also provides us with an overview of the general increase in support for the left between 1990 and 2011. While this variable relies on data from Baker and Greene (2011) which only extends to 2009, the authors do provide updated ideological scores for elections as far as 2011.[68] Using the updated ideological scores by the authors I was able to determine candidates and parties of the left and the vote share of these candidates in elections from 2009 to 2011. Therefore *leftvoteshare* captures support for the left between 1990 and 2011 which sufficiently captures the

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[65] I used the ideological score provided by Baker and Greene to identify parties and candidates on the left (all those with a score between 0 and 10.5).

[66] The proportion of vote shares was also provided by the Baker and Greene data

[67] It is worth noting however that this variable is coded in such a way as to allow the researcher to divide it into presidential and legislative elections if necessary.

[68] While the authors provide updated data on the proportion of the left vote, their data is not updated with new ideological scores in order to calculate VRL scores for these candidates and parties. It would be erroneous to estimate ideological scores for candidates in elections succeeding those listed in the Baker and Greene data because of the extent to which party ideologies can shift between elections in some cases. For example, in 2006 presidential candidate Ollanta Humala moved from the contestatory left to the centre by the 2011 elections. The emergence of new parties further complicates estimating ideological scores, which could also skew the results.

period of time before (1990-1997), during (1998-2008) and after (2009-2011) the left turn.

The graphs below depict support for the left in accordance with each of the measurements discussed above. We begin with support for the left in presidential elections using the variables *presvrl* and *presvrl2*. Figure 3.1 below identifies a shift from the centre-right to the centre, which becomes more pronounced after the turn of the century. The shift to the centre reflects the argument made by Baker and Greene (2011) that Latin Americans are becoming more centrist and therefore vote for the moderate left. The authors find that the region-wide VRL score moved from the centre-right (7.95) in 1995 to close to the midpoint (9.82) in 2008 (Baker and Greene, 2011). While Figure 3.1 below paints a very general picture of a shift to the centre it is important to note that within this time "the presidential vote choices of Latin Americans clearly moved to the left" because VRL in the region increased by two points (Baker and Greene, 2011: 48). Therefore there was a shift towards rather than to the left between 1990 and 2009 (Baker and Greene, 2011). This is similar to Seligson's (2007: 87) claim that while there was a mass ideological shift to the left in the region at the turn of the century, the "magnitude of the shift is small".

Figure 3.1: Support for the left in presidential elections (presvrl)

Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011).

Figure 3.1 above illustrates the shift to the centre that Baker and Greene (2011) find in their study using the same data. In order to move beyond Baker and Greene's findings, their VRL score is supplemented by Wiesehomeier and Doyle's (2012) VRL score (*presvrl2*). As Figure 3.2 below indicates presvrl2 further substantiates the shift to the centre. Again Latin American voter preferences moved from the centre-right to the centre during the period 1990-2009, indicating a shift towards rather than to the left.

Figure 3.2: Support for the left in presidential elections (presvrl2)

Source: Adapted from Wiesehomeier and Doyle's (2012)

Figure 3.3 below demonstrates support for the left in lower house elections using the measurement *lhvrl* and again indicates a shift from the centre-right to the centre. According to Baker and Greene (2011) the region-wide VRL score increases by just 0.5 during this time. This is comparatively lower than the two-point increase in the presidential elections leading the authors to conclude that, "the left turn in Latin America has been a strictly presidential phenomenon" (Baker and Greene, 2011: 50).

Figure 3.3: Support for the left in legislative elections *(lhvrl)*

Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011).

From the above graphs we can conclude that there was a shift from the centre-right to the centre across the region in both presidential and legislative elections between 1990 and 2009. This shift towards, rather than to the left can be misleading however because it potentially devalues the central puzzle, 'the left turn'. While the above graphs indicate a generalised move towards the left, Shifter (2011: 113) rightly notes that "there is little question that, at least in the first part of the twenty-first century, candidates who could be described as left-leaning gained growing support and allegiance in parts of Latin America". The growing support for left-leaning candidates in the first part of the twenty-first century is precisely what this research is interested in and this puzzle is worthy of further investigation.

Figure 3.4 below demonstrates the growing support for the left during this time using the variable *leftvoteshare* which provides the mean vote share of leftist candidates by year in presidential elections only. We can see that there is a substantial increase in the vote share of the left from the late 1990s to 2000. In 2000 alone the left won over 50 per cent of the vote share in presidential elections across the region. This is

reflected in the election of presidents such as Ricardo Lagos in Chile and the re-election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The figure also demonstrates the steady increase in the vote share of the left from 2003-2007. This result represents a period of increased success for the left beginning with the election of Néstor Kirchner as president of Argentina in 2003, and culminating with the election of his wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in 2007. A number of other countries also experienced a shift to the left at this time including Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador.[69]

Figure 3.4: Left vote share in presidential elections by year (1990-2011) (*leftvoteshare*)

Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011).

The figures above provide insight into the general shift to the left across the region. However, it is important to capture the variation across the region and within countries in order to appreciate the variation in support for the left. To capture this I used the ideology scores (sourced from Baker and Greene)[70] of each winning party in

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[69] Please see Table 1 in the Introduction of this thesis for a full overview of all presidents elected and re-elected in the region during this time.

[70] I used the ideologically scores from Baker and Greene (2011) which allows me to include elections as far as 2011.

each presidential and legislative election in each country to measure the mean ideology of the government over time. The ideological scale runs from left (0) to right (20) and I isolate only the winning party in each election in order to capture the mean ideology of the ruling government in each case. To capture a shift in the ideology of ruling governments across time in each country I divided the scores into three time frames of 1990-1997, 1998-2008 and 2009-2011. Figure 3.5 below highlights a steady ideological shift to the left by ruling governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. There is also a shift to the left in the Dominican Republic and Paraguay within the first two timeframes with data missing for the third timeframe. However, we can assume that in the case of the Dominican Republic, the left remained the dominant ruling ideology because the successful candidate in 2012 was Danilo Medina Sánchez from Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) who was the candidate from the incumbent party. In Paraguay however, leftist President Fernando Lugo was impeached in 2012 and replaced by the conservative candidate Horacio Cartes in 2013 signalling the end of the left turn in Paraguay. The figure also indicates a steady shift to the right in Chile[71], Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.

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[71] Indeed, recent elections in Chile indicate that there is a 'return' of the left in the country as former leftist President Michelle Bachelet was re-elected with over 62 per cent of the total vote share in December 2013.

Figure 3.5: The 'Left Turn' by country (1990-2011)

Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011).

Ultimately, the descriptive statistics above illustrate three things. First, the general electoral shift in the region between 1990 and 2009 was towards rather than to the right. Second, there was an intensive increase in leftist presidents from during the early to mid-2000s. Third, when we examine the left turn across time within each country we see important nuances which are lost when we examine the shift across the region more generally. For example, while the region wide shift was *towards* the left, country level shifts were sharper in Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay for example. This highlights the importance of observing the left turn in the context of the countries within the region rather than the region generally. This is in congruence with the work of Leiras (2007) who argues that there is no 'one size fits all' explanation for the left turn across Latin America precisely because of the economic, social and political variation which exists there. The author states that:

> "Given the varying discipline with which different Latin American countries
> implemented free-market reforms, the uneven success of those reforms across
> countries and over time, and the significantly different social and partisan

contexts in which electoral competition takes place, it is highly unlikely that one general explanation fits all Latin American cases. If such a general explanation exists, it would surely have to include other factors besides the failure of free-market strategies." (Leiras, 2007: 401).

The point is that this variation makes the analysis of the left turn in a strictly generalised context problematic because it can cause us to miss important nuances within the region, which can in some ways devalues the puzzle itself. The work of Leiras (2007) also highlights that it would be erroneous to focus on the failure of neoliberal reforms as the central explanation without considering other variables relevant to particular cases. Accordingly, I argue that the variation in support for the left can, in some cases be explained by the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. To provide substantial context for this argument we can now turn to some descriptive statistics regarding indigenous movement mobilisation.

The principal independent variable: variation in indigenous movement mobilisation

Indigenous movement mobilisation is primarily measured using original expert surveys designed to capture variation in mobilisation levels across time. As outlined in Chapter 2, I created original expert surveys for five countries, namely Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. These countries were selected based on the size of the indigenous population in each case; therefore the independent variable is an interactive one consisting of levels of mobilisation and population size. It is argued that a population of ten per cent or more ensures that the population was high enough to potentially impact elections if mobilised but low enough not to exclude too many cases. Figure 3.6 below provides an overview of the variation in indigenous population across Latin America, including the five cases selected for study here.

Figure 3.6: Variation in indigenous population across Latin America, 2006.

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.

The expert surveys were designed to capture variation in indigenous movement mobilisation both across and within cases. Specifically, experts were asked to assign a mobilisation score for each country across three time frames of 1990-1998, 1999-2006 and 2007-2011 allowing me to observe mobilisation across time in each case. Experts were asked to score the mobilisation level of movements on a scale of low (1), medium (2) and high (3) in each of the three time frames in their country of expertise, thus providing variation within cases. Experts were provided with vignettes to describe each level of mobilisation (please see appendix A for a full copy of the survey including vignettes). The vignettes were based on five different aspects of mobilisation including; nature of mobilisation, duration and commitment, the estimated number of people involved, impact of mobilisation on social awareness and activities undertaken during the mobilisation. This information allowed me to score mobilisation in terms of high medium or low. For example, mobilisation that was deemed timid in nature, revolved around the mild activities such the distribution of leaflets and included less than fifty people was considered an incident of low mobilisation. Conversely mobilisation was considered high if it was disruptive in

nature, included more contentious activities such as roadblocks or rallies, and consisted of several hundred people. Using these vignettes as a guide experts were asked to score mobilisation levels of indigenous movements as high, medium or low in each timeframe. The final mobilisation score for each time frame in each country was coded in accordance with the highest response. For example, in the case of Bolivia the period 1990-1998 is considered one of high mobilisation because this was the score most assigned to this time frame by the experts.

The survey was sent to 210 experts selected from the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) member's database and chosen based on country expertise. Those who listed 'ethnicity and indigenous people' as an area of expertise were also selected. The surveys were distributed digitally using the online survey application Lime survey. Response rates are a concern for any researcher wishing to utilise surveys and this is especially the case when sending electronic surveys to five different countries and to experts across a number of disciplines[72]. The aim of the survey is to quantify indigenous movement mobilisation, which like all social mobilisation, is by its very nature, a fluid phenomenon and therefore something that is not typically quantified. In some ways this presented the challenge that experts in this area may not be susceptible to taking part in such a survey. Nonetheless, the survey was carefully informed by social movement literature and indigenous social movement literature in particular in order to accurately represent the nature of indigenous movement mobilisation. Surveys were available to experts in both English and Spanish in order to further facilitate participation.[73] As Table 3.1 above indicates however, the response rate is particularly problematic in the case of Mexico where there is a response rate of just 3.4 per cent. Despite these limitations the survey provides original data on the mobilisation of indigenous social movements that can be used in the quantitative analysis.

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[72] Disciplines included political science, sociology and experts in ethnicity and indigenous people
[73] The Spanish version of the surveys was cross-checked by a native speaker to ensure they were correct.

Table 3.1: The response rate from the expert surveys

Country	Number of Surveys Sent	Full Response	Partial Response	Total Response	Total Response Rate (%)
Bolivia	52	9	3	12	17.3
Ecuador	36	7	3	10	19.4
Guatemala	29	4	1	5	13.8
Mexico	58	2	3	5	3.4
Peru	35	5	4	9	14.3
Total	210	27	14	41	19.5

Figure 3.7 below displays the mean mobilisation score of each country from 1990-2011 based on the survey data. Bolivia has the highest level of indigenous movement mobilisation with a score of 1.6 and is closely followed by Ecuador with a mean of 1.2 and Mexico (mean of 1.1). Indigenous movements in Peru are less mobilised with a mean of .9, and Guatemala has the lowest mobilisation score of all the cases (.6). The graph provides an interesting depiction of the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation between the qualitative case studies included in this study, Bolivia and Peru.

Figure 3.7: Indigenous movement mobilisation across the five cases (mean)

Source: Author's own data

Through the survey data I was able to capture variation in mobilisation within countries across time. Figure 3.8 below demonstrates the within-case variation by using the raw data from the expert survey scores, which ranges from low (1), medium (2) and high (3).

Figure 3.8: Indigenous movement mobilisation across time (1990-2011)

Source: Author's own data

The figure offers some interesting results. There is an increase in mobilisation across time in Bolivia and Guatemala that stabilises during the last time frame of 2007-2011. Indigenous movement mobilisation decreases over time in both Mexico and Ecuador. In Mexico this may be explained by the waning of the central anti-globalisation, indigenous-based movement, Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), known as the Zapatistas. The Zapatistas emerged in 1994 and underwent a period of intense mobilisation at the turn of the century including a national march on Congress in Mexico City in 2001. The movement however was less mobilised by the late-2000s, which may explain the low score in 2007-2011.

In Ecuador, the national indigenous movement, La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) first mobilized in 1986 and underwent a period of intense mobilisation during the 1990s. They were highly mobilised in the early 2000s when they were integral in the ousting of Ecuador's President Mahuad in 2000 and subsequent election of President Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002. CONAIE also mobilised support for President Rafael Correa in the second round of the 2006 elections. Once elected Correa went about rewarding the movements for their support by

implementing a constituent assembly to address indigenous rights and issues as promised. CONAIE however were not fully satisfied with the new constitution nor their relationship with Correa and the relationship deteriorated quite rapidly. For example, some movement members such as Pepe Acacho from the Amazonian region claim that Correa used the movement as a "stepping stone" and that President Correa "has stolen our ideals. He has been the worst President of all for us" (Caselli, 2011). It can be argued then that Correa incapacitated CONAIE once elected which weakened them between 2007 and 2011. In 2012 however the movement mobilised against Correa by initiating national and regional protests, demonstrating renewed mobilisation of the movement (Wolff, 2007).

In Guatemala and Peru the level of mobilisation across time is as one might expect for countries that underwent violent internal conflicts in which indigenous populations greatly suffered. For example, in Guatemala a brutal civil war (1960-1996) devastated indigenous communities who suffered severe human rights abuses as discussed earlier in this thesis. There was also an absence of political freedom during this time in Guatemala, which greatly impeded the ability to for indigenous communities to mobilise. For example, Yashar (2005) argues that political opportunity structure is a central component of mobilisation and Guatemala was a closed space until the late 1990s. Similarly, the internal war in Peru (1980-1992) between the state and the Shining Path greatly affected indigenous communities and therefore their ability to mobilise.[74] Highland indigenous communities were especially impacted by the war and caught between enemy lines (the state and Shining Path). Like Guatemala, there was little political opportunity structure in Peru at this time, which impeded mobilisation. Ultimately, while the mobilisation of indigenous movements was already underway in Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico during the mid-late 1990s, the constraints of war took its hold in Peru and Guatemala causing a lag in mobilisation. As Figure 3.8 below demonstrates however, mobilisation levels in Peru caught up with Bolivia by 2007.

The chapter will now provide some descriptive statistics which depict the relationship between levels of mobilisation and indigenous population. As Figure 3.9 below

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[74] The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru (Comisión dela Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú) or (CVR) of 2003 found that an estimated 69,280 died or were 'disappeared' during the conflict and that indigenous people were the main victims of the conflict (Peru Support Group, 2004).

illustrates, a large indigenous population does not necessarily guarantee high movement mobilisation. For example, while Mexico has the lowest indigenous population of those included in the survey, it has a higher mean mobilisation score than the country with one of the highest indigenous populations, Guatemala. Conversely, while Peru has a high indigenous population it is among the least mobilised. Moreover, Ecuador has an indigenous population that is just three per cent less than Peru but indigenous movement mobilisation is the second highest in the sample. The point here is that mobilisation is not determined by population size. The relevancy of population size for this research is that a high population can have a bigger impact on elections, but only when movement mobilisation is also high. I argue that in cases where population is high but mobilisation is low (Guatemala for instance) we should not expect to see high levels of support for the left because there are no movements to act as intermediaries between indigenous people and the party. In this way, mobilisation is central for explaining support for the left, and population is more important for measuring how much support the movements can provide. The interaction of these variables helps to determine variation in support for the left because I argue that we expect to see highest support where both mobilisation and populations are high and lowest where mobilisation and population are lowest.

Figure 3.9: Variation in indigenous movement mobilisation and population across the cases

Source: Author's own data

Although the principal aim of the expert surveys was to develop a proxy measure for indigenous movement mobilisation, they were also used as an opportunity to learn more about indigenous social movement behaviour more generally. In a separate section of the survey, experts were asked to list in numerical order a list of political activities undertaken by indigenous social movements. Figure 3.10 below lists the activities undertaken by indigenous movements in order of rare to very common. This graph represents the mean of all countries in the survey.

Figure 3.10: Political activities commonly undertaken by indigenous social movements

Source: Author's own data

As the Figure 3.10 indicates, community meetings are the most commonly pursued political activities undertaken by movements. This is not surprising given the strong sense and importance of community and community leaders to indigenous people. Protests are also among the most common activity undertaken by the movements, and more at a small than large scale. Again this is not surprising given the often, insufficient means, an indigenous movement would have to organise a large-scale protest. With little resources these movements cannot afford the transportation and organisational costs involved in large-scale protests. This is especially the case where mobilisation levels are medium or low and networks between movements are weak, further complicating the organisation of a large-scale national protest. In these cases, indigenous movements are much more likely to organise small-scale local or regional protests which are more manageable in terms of financial and organisational costs. Interestingly, more formal methods of political action are less commonly undertaken by the movements including, letter writing and distribution of materials such as

leaflets. These results are not surprising given the high illiteracy rates among indigenous people in the region and the costs involved in producing materials.[75] Finally, it is also unsurprising to find that fundraising is amongst the least likely activities undertaken by indigenous social movements. The high poverty levels among indigenous people, demonstrated on Table 3.2 below, mean that there is little fundraising to be done within indigenous communities. Rather, many movements rely on the state or NGOs for financial support.

Table 3.2: Poverty and extreme poverty across the five cases

	Indigenous people living in poverty (%)	Indigenous People living in extreme poverty (%)
Bolivia	71.4	52.4
Ecuador	84.3	63.3
Guatemala	73.7	24.3
Mexico	95.3	85.4
Peru	62.8	22.2

Source: Adapted from Hall and Patrinos, 2006.

Note: Figures are for 2000

While Figure 3.10 outlines the activities undertaken by movements more generally, Table 3.3 below illustrates the variation across countries. Unusually, letter writing is very common in Peru. Given the high rates of poverty and illiteracy there we might not expect the movements to partake in this activity. Moreover, letter-writing is a more formal political action that we do not associate with movements more generally and indigenous movements especially and so this result is unexpected. Ecuador presents another interesting result as canvassing is listed as a common activity. This might be explained by the transition of CONAIE from a movement-party in 1996 when it first ran in elections, so it was likely to be canvassing since then. Ultimately, the results provide a useful roadmap for understanding the behaviour of indigenous social movements in these countries. Results from Bolivia and Peru are particularly useful because they can act as a guide for the qualitative case studies used in this study.

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[75]According to Jiménez et al., (2006: 59) "illiteracy is widespread in the indigenous population" of Latin America.

Table 3.3: Political activities commonly undertaken by indigenous social movements, by case.

	Bolivia	**Ecuador**	**Guatemala**	**Mexico**	**Peru**
Community Meetings	Very Common	Very Common	Common	Common	Very Common
Protests (small)	Very Common	Common	Common	Rare	Very Common
Protests (large)	Very Common	Common	Common	Rare	Common
Petitions	Common	Common	Common	Rare	Common
Canvassing	Rare	Very Common	Rare	Common	Rare
Letter Writing	Rare	Rare	Common	Rare	Very Common
Distribution of Materials	Rare	Rare	Common	Common	Common
Fundraising	Common	Rare	Common	Rare	Rare

Source: Author's own data

The statistics outlined here are purely descriptive. The goal is to provide us with a better understanding of the central dependent and independent variables for following quantitative analysis, as well as the qualitative case studies. The chapter will now provide the results of the macro-level analysis.

3.2 Macro analysis

In this section of the chapter I will present the results of a series of regression analysis employed to test the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left.

The data

The dependent variables are measured using the four measurements outlined at the beginning of the chapter, *presvrl, presvrl2*, *lhvrl* and *leftvoteshare*. The independent variable, indigenous movement mobilisation, is measured in two ways. The first measurement is adopted from the work of Roberts (2002) and categorises Latin

American countries into labour mobilising and elite party systems.[76] Cleary (2006) directly links Roberts' (2002) categorisation to the emergence of the left by claiming that the success of the left in the region is associated with countries with labour mobilising systems in particular. Therefore, it is expected that mobilisation is more likely to occur in labour mobilising party systems than in elite party systems. A dummy variable *massmob* was created to distinguish between these two party systems.[77] Debs and Helmke (2010) also use Roberts' categorisation of party systems as a means to capture mass mobilisation.

It is important to note from the outset however that *massmob* in no way captures indigenous movement mobilisation. Rather, this variable acts as a proxy for mobilisation more generally and simply distinguishes countries where mobilisation is likely to occur (labour mobilising countries) from countries where mobilisation is not likely to occur (elite mobilising). Moreover, *massmob* does not vary over time and is primarily based on the classic populist era of Latin American politics in the period of the 1930 to 1980s. Finally, few of the countries categorised as labour mobilising by Roberts (2002) have substantial indigenous populations however three of the five countries selected for the surveys are considered labour mobilising, including Bolivia, Peru and Mexico (Guatemala and Ecuador have elite party systems).[78] Despite these limitations *massmob* is useful because it allows us to test the argument that mass mobilisation can help explain support for the left (see Roberts 1998; Cleary 2006; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2008). Debs and Helmke (2010: 227) explain that "even in contexts where the left has been weakened…the new post-2000 left is able to draw on some latent capacity among the poorer sectors for organisation and mobilisation" and it is therefore important to consider mass mobilisation when exploring support for the left.

The second measurement of the independent variable (*movemobscore score*) is based on the indigenous movement mobilisation scores obtained from the experts' surveys. Unlike *massmob*, this measurement specifically captures indigenous movement mobilisation. Its limitation however is that it only does so for the five cases previously

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[76] Please see Table 1.1 in Chapter 2 for the full list of Roberts' classification of countries

[77] Where labour mobilising systems are 1 and elite party systems are 0.

[78] It is important to note that Roberts (2002) excludes El Salvador and Guatemala from his categorisation but Debs and Helmke (2010) have coded them both as elite mobilising. This research follows the work of Debs and Helmke (2010) and also codes these countries as elite mobilising.

outlined, which limits the study to 60 elections (presidential and legislative). So while *massmob* fails to capture indigenous movement mobilisation, *movemobscore score* does so but is limited by number of observations. Notwithstanding these limitations it is equally important to recognise that by using both measurements we can tentatively observe the nature of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left in a quantitative manner.

Three other explanatory variables are also included in the analysis. Each of the variables used are consistent with the prevailing explanation for the left discussed in Chapter 1. The first is *incumbent ideology* which accounts for the 'backlash' argument in which dissatisfaction with right-wing incumbents drove voters to the left.[79] The second variable is *incumbent inequality* which measures the level of inequality in each country under incumbents.[80] Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient as provided by the World Bank. The Gini coefficient is a widely used measurement of inequality where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is maximum inequality. Finally, because dissatisfaction with economic progress is also part of the backlash argument GDP growth (annual %) is included in the analysis and is obtained from the World Bank.[81] As stated in Chapter 1, this research is not concerned with the rejection of these explanations. Rather it seeks to contribute to them by analysing them in the context of indigenous peoples and their movements specifically. Therefore, these variables are included in the analysis in order to provide a more comprehensive overview of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left whilst controlling for prevailing explanations.

The relationship was first tested using multiple regression with robust standard errors. Multiple regression analysis was then conducted and interaction terms were

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[79] This variable is coded as 0-1 where 0 is an incumbent from the right and 1 is an incumbent from the left.

[80] Specifically, the last year of each presidential incumbent term was used to capture inequality levels under that incumbent government. In many cases, this was simply recorded for the year preceding elections. It was important not to record the year of the election because where elections are held in the middle of the year the Gini score for that year represents both incumbent and newly elected governments. For this reason the last full year of the incumbent's term was used. The exception was in cases where data was missing for the last year of the incumbent's term, in such instances, the Gini score for the second last year of the incumbent's term was considered. In some cases this was also unavailable and so the year of election was used in these cases. The years selected are based on presidential incumbents only and therefore legislative elections are coded in accordance to the last year of the presidential incumbent. So, if legislative elections occur in the middle of a presidential term, the Gini score used is still that of the previous incumbent.

[81] GDP growth is measured for the year of the election.

introduced. Interaction terms are particularly useful when the analysis wishes to observe a relationship that has a conditional hypothesis (Brambor et al., 2006). A conditional hypothesis is one in which "a relationship between two or more variables depends on the value of one or more other variables" (Brambor et al., 2006: 64). In the case of this analysis, an increase in indigenous movement mobilisation is associated with an increase in support for the left when the condition 'substantial indigenous population' is met, but not when the condition 'substantial indigenous population' is absent. Thereby suggesting that support for the left is highest where indigenous movement mobilisation and population are high.

Ultimately, interaction terms help to capture the interaction between levels of mobilisation and levels of indigenous population. Measures of indigenous population size however are "notoriously unreliable and tend to vary in methodology across countries" which can result in measurement error (Rice and Van Cott, 2006: 711). In order to mitigate measurement error the indigenous population size is measured using data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which is a reliable and widely used source among Latin American scholars.[82] The chapter will now outline the results of the analysis in which the relationship was tested using multiple regression without interaction terms. Following this the results of the analysis in which interaction terms were introduced are discussed. The chapter will then turn to the individual level analysis.

The results

As Table 3.4 below indicates, mass mobilisation (*massmob*) is positively associated with support for the left and this is statistically significant across all four models. The relationship is especially substantive in the leftvoteshare model. The results suggest that support for the left is likely to increase in labour mobilising than elite party systems. It can be tentatively argued then that the labour unions and peasant organisations which Roberts (2002) discusses in his work provided a base of support for the new left at the turn of the century, in the same way as they did for the traditional leftist and populist parties during the era of ISI (1950s-1980s). Perhaps these results are not surprising because they indicate that the left performs best in

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[82] This is a continuous variable based on the data we see on Table 2.3 in Chapter 2.

countries that Roberts (2002) categorises as labour mobilising. More generally, the result indicates that a mass mobilising base is important for the left.

The results indicate that the second measurement of the dependent variable indigenous movement mobilisation (movemobscore) is negatively associated with support for the left in the leftvoteshare model. This result is not statistically significant however. Therefore we cannot draw any inferential conclusions from this result. The *leftvoteshare* model is the only measurement of the independent variable listed on Table 3.4 below because the number of observations in the remaining models was too low to include in the study.[83] As Table 3.4 also demonstrates, there were no statistically significant results in the *leftvoteshare* model in relation to the remaining variables. Indigenous population is negatively associated with support for the left, with the exception of the final model.[84] This proved interesting as the model is limited to the five cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Mexico where indigenous population is over ten per cent. Nonetheless the result is not statistically significant and therefore there is little we can say about this relationship.

Incumbent inequality and incumbent ideology present some interesting results. Inequality is negatively associated with support for the left in the lower house model (*lhvrl*), and because Gini coefficient is measured 0 (equal) to 1 (unequal) the result implies that the more equal a country the less support there is for the left. It could be argued however that the reverse is also true, that is; the less equal a country the higher support for the left. Although this is not directly observed through this analysis the implication remains. What is clear is that as the Gini coefficient decreases so too does support for the left. This relationship is only significant in the lower house however and is not highly substantive. Incumbent ideology is also significant in the lower house elections (*lhvrl*) and in the fourth model (*leftvoteshare*). However, because incumbent ideology is coded as 0 (right) and 1 (left) it means that as the incumbent goes from right to left, support for the left increases. So, support for the left increases when there is a left rather than a right incumbent as the backlash argument might suggest. This is highly statistically significant and substantive in the *leftvoteshare* model[85] which indicates that support for the left is highest where the left is the

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[83] There were just 19 observations in the presvrl and *presvrl2models* and 24 in the *lhvrl* model.
[84] The leftvoteshare and indigenous movement mobilisation model
[85] P<0.01 and coefficient is 16.1018

incumbent. High levels of support for the left once already in power may be explained by the redistributive policies implemented by leftist governments across the region earning them popularity, at least in their first terms. This result however does not help to explain how the left came to power in the first place.

The analysis above demonstrates that mass mobilisation more generally helps to explain support for the left as evidenced by the significance of this relationship across all measurements of the independent variable. Additionally, GDP growth is negatively associated across all models implying that there is higher support for the left when there is less economic growth. This finding is consistent with the argument that the lack of economic growth under neoliberal incumbents drove voters left. The results are neither substantive nor significant however, consequently the lack of economic growth cannot be said to explain support for the left based on these results.

Table 3.4: Mobilisation and support for the left without interaction terms

Variables	*presvrl*	*presVRL2*	*lhvrl*	*leftvoteshare*	*leftvoteshare[86]*
Mass Mobilisation	1.245076**	.2773108*	.9604338***	10.48389***	
	(.5450553)	(.1593694)	(.3406424)	(10.48389)	
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation					-.5403157
					(3.2007)
Indigenous Population	-.0021283	-.0038901	.0060704	-.0076073	.0098762
	(-.0021283)	(.003837)	(.009107)	(.062897)	(.0862839)
Incumbent Inequality	-.0678271	-0.0168218	-.0588546*	-.1089093	1.297553
	(-.0678271)	(.0135504)	(.0342837)	(2883671)	(.4326308)
Incumbent Ideology	.691822	.0963936	.9823759**	16.1018***	13.30122
	(.691822)	(.1735839)	(.409562)	(3.204569)	(6.728779)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0332603	-.0324062	-.0229269	-.0648559	-.0317623
	(-.0332603)	(.0245935)	(.0473126)	(.3426428)	(.5694543)
Constant	11.76447	2.534966	10.78142	30.1405	-37.7332
	(11.76447)	(.6888838)	(1.848107)	(15.26847)	(23.38207)
R-Squared	0.1436	0.1443	0.2070	0.2394	0.2129
N	65	65	81	169	51

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 3.5 below demonstrates the results of the analysis when we include interaction terms. It is worth noting that even with the introduction of interaction terms, mass mobilisation continues to be positively associated with support for the left across all four measurements of the independent variable. It is statistically significant across all models and highly substantive in the *leftvoteshare* model.

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[86] This leftvoteshare model denotes the analysis ran with indigenous movement mobilisation in which only five countries are included (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). All models preceding were run with the massmob variable as the central independent variable which includes all countries in the dataset.

Indigenous movement mobilisation (movemobscore) however, is negatively associated with support for the left and is highly substantive and statistically significant. As with the previous analysis, while all measurements of the independent variable were included in the analysis, there were too few observations in the *presvrl*, *presvrl2* and *lhvrl* models to validate their inclusion in Table 3.5 below (please see appendix C for full results of all tests).[87] Indigenous population is also negatively associated with support for the left in this model. Although not a highly substantive relationship, the implication is that support for the left is higher where indigenous populations are low, rather than where they are high as would be expected.

The interaction term mass mobilisation*indigenous population was introduced as an exploratory proxy to capture indigenous mobilisation across all countries. The results indicate a negative relationship which is statistically significant in the *leftvoteshare* model. While this relationship is not very substantive, the implication is that support for the left is lower in labour mobilising countries with high indigenous populations. However, given that only three of the eight countries listed by Roberts as labour mobilising have substantial indigenous populations (Bolivia, Peru and Mexico) it is unlikely that this variable can tell us much about the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left. Instead we must turn to our principal measurement of the independent variable, the interaction term indigenous movement mobilisation*indigenous population. The result indicates a statistically significant positive relationship. This is the key finding from the analysis because it implies that support for the left is high where indigenous population and indigenous movement mobilisation is also high.

As with the previous analysis outlined on Table 3.4 above, incumbent inequality is negatively associated with the left in the lower house model. Therefore as the Gini coefficient decreases so too does support for the left, thus implying that there is less support for the left where countries are more equal. Indeed, it can be argued that where inequality is low there is no mandate for leftist parties who centre their policies on alleviating inequality. In other words, if inequality is low so too is support for the left because addressing inequality is not an important issue. Incumbent ideology is once again positively associated with support for the left and this is highly substantive

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[87] Again there were just 19 observations in the *presvrl* and *presvrl2models* and 24 in the *lhvrl* model.

and significant in the *leftvoteshare* model. Because incumbent ideology is coded as 0 (right) and 1 (left) it implies that support for the left is high when the left is the incumbent rather than the right as the 'backlash' theory might suggest. This tells us more about continued support for the left than it does about the emergence of the left in the first place (which is the goal of this research).

Finally, GDP growth is negatively associated with support for the left across the first three models implying that support for the left is high where economic growth is low, thereby supporting the argument that the failure of neoliberal incumbents to provide growth drove voters left. The direction of this relationship changes in the last two models however. The implication here is that an increase in economic growth is associated with an increase in support for the left, and this is more substantive in the fifth model which includes the five countries from the survey only. Ultimately, the results for GDP are not statistically significant therefore there is little to be observed on the relationship between GDP growth and support for the left in this case.

Table 3.5: Mobilisation and support for the left including interaction terms

Variables	presvrl	presVRL2	lhvrl	leftvoteshare	leftvoteshare[88]
Mass Mobilisation	1.751048**	.4281977**	1.17545***	14.23665***	
	(.7123276)	(.1881823)	(.4348726)	(3.344204)	
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation					-20.07877**
					(8.195758)
Indigenous Population	.0119095	.0004017	.0133272*	.117202	-.5431189**
	(.0140704)	(.0048353)	(.0075412)	(.0772089)	(.253218)
Mobilisation* Indigenous Population	-.027697	-.0082402	-.0137135	-.226657*	
	(.0249509)	(.0077549)	(.018045)	(.1192123)	
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation* Indigenous Population					.4280106**
					(.165444)
Incumbent Inequality	-.0792202	-.0202808	-.0630704*	-.1815594	1.126727
	(.0525734)	(.0136862)	(.03441)	(.2848851)	(.3932475)
Incumbent Ideology	.5923487	.0718225	.9961547**	16.07414***	11.96429
	(.6213956)	(.168812)	(.4095915)	(3.274425)	(6.02072)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0193024	-.0293191	-.0210886	.0023174	.4769356
	(.0867816)	(.0247151)	(.047901)	(.3412128)	(.7455919)
Constant	12.11383	2.642796	10.87771	31.85016	-5.279453
	(2.780596)	(.6919339)	(1.855281)	(15.07906)	(25.33032)
R-Squared	0.1644	0.1700	0.2155	0.2553	0.3086
N	65	65	81	169	51

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

[88] This leftvoteshare model denotes the analysis ran with indigenous movement mobilisation in which only five countries are included (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). All models preceding were run with the massmob variable as the central independent variable which includes all countries in the dataset.

Based on both of the analyses above we can conclude that mass mobilisation helps to explain support for the left. This was statistically significant across all models and highly substantive in the *leftvoteshare* model both with and without interactions. Accordingly, it provides a strong foundation for the argument that the left depend on mass-mobilising bases for support in elections.

It can also be said that incumbent inequality is negatively associated with support for the left in the lower house. The result implies that there is less support for the left where countries are more equal. As previously discussed this may simply reflect the lack of a mandate for parties to address inequality typically proposed by the left. Incumbent ideology was positively associated with support for the left in the lower house and again in the *leftvoteshare* model. However, because this variable is coded as 0 (right) and 1 (left) it implies that support for the left is high when the left is the incumbent therefore suggesting that the redistributive polices and the reforms carried out by the left once in power, is well among the electorate. Nevertheless, this result does not provide insight into how the left came to power in the first instance.

The central finding of the analyses is related to the key independent variable, indigenous movement mobilisation. Indigenous movement mobilisation alone was negatively associated with support for the left in both cases but was statistically significant and highly substantive in the interaction model. However, when indigenous mobilisation was interacted with indigenous population it changed the direction of the relationship. Therefore indigenous movement mobilisation*indigenous population is positively associated with support for the left in the *leftvoteshare* model. This is the key finding of this analysis because it demonstrates that high levels of indigenous movement mobilisation and population are related to high levels of support for the left. Although it is not a highly substantive relationship it nonetheless provides a real indicator that indigenous movement mobilisation can help to explain support for the left, particularly where indigenous population provides a large base of support. This is particularly interesting given that indigenous population (although admittedly not statistically significant) was negatively associated with support for the left in the same model, implying that it is not just population size that matters. Rather it is whether that population is mobilised in support for the left, which I argue was facilitated through the movements. Figure

3.11 below demonstrates the nature of the relationship between the variables, support for the left, indigenous population and indigenous movement mobilisation in the five cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

Figure 3.11: Marginal effects for indigenous movement mobilisation and indigenous population (*leftvoteshare*)

Source: Author's own data

Figure 3.11 above demonstrates that support for the left increases in line with indigenous movement mobilisation in cases of high indigenous populations. Furthermore, where population is high, support for the left is observed to ne highest when indigenous mobilisation is high indicating that a high population alone cannot explain support for the left. Rather it is the combination of a high population and high indigenous movement mobilisation that explains higher support for the left according to this graph.

Interestingly, there is another relationship can be observed from Figure 3.11. As indicated by the blue line above, support for the left decreases in cases of low indigenous population despite high mobilisation. The case of the Mapuche movements in Chile mentioned in the introduction may offer some insight here. Chile

represents a case of a high mobilisation but low indigenous population and therefore the Mapuche do not constitute a large enough population to impact support for the left. Moreover, because they represent a low base of support they are not likely to be of any strategic advantage to political parties at the national level and therefore are unlikely to form of movement-party alliances. As long as the Mapuche movements represent such a minority and do not ally with larger, more general, social movements they will not be of strategic importance for parties and they are unlikely to achieve their political goals.[89] Chile therefore represents a case in which mobilisation is high but indigenous population are low and so support for the left decreases. Even if such movements were to support a political party for instance this would have little consequence at the national level without the support of other social bases also.

The goal of the quantitative analysis above was to explore the role of indigenous movement mobilisation in support for the left. More generally, the analyses provide us with further indication that mass mobilisation matters to support for the left. Despite the data limitations the results of the last model in each of the above tables can provide a blueprint for relationships between the movements and the left. Central to my argument is that the movements mobilised their bases in support for the left which contributed to the success of the left at the turn of the century. To explore whether indigenous people did indeed support the left we can now turn to the individual level analysis.

3.3 Individual analysis

This section of the chapter addresses the relationship between indigenous voters and the left in Latin America. The goal is to investigate whether indigenous people supported the left, thereby providing a base of support for these parties. This research suggests that where indigenous people vote left it is because indigenous movements mobilise them to do so. These movements mobilise support for the left because once in power they can help the movements achieve their goals, this is the basis of the political alliance. While Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) both provide empirical evidence that indigenous people are likely to support the left, this section of the chapter will use the survey data sourced from *Latinobarómetro* 2006 to further explore the relationship between indigenous people and the left in the region.

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[89] That is to say, at least not without the support of other movements or international pressure from organisations, such as United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

To investigate this we must first identify who is indigenous within the sample. To do so we can explore two questions from the survey. The first question is; 'What is your Mother Tongue?' Those who selected an indigenous language as their mother tongue can be considered as part of the indigenous base. This includes a sample of 657 people, which amounts to just 6.25 per cent of the total sample for Latinobarómetro in 2006. Secondly, we can isolate those within the sample who selected an indigenous language as their interview language. This constitutes just 134 people or 1.33 per cent of the total sample. Selecting either question can allow us to isolate indigenous voters. The mother tongue question however is a more suitable measurement of the independent variable in this analysis (the indigenous vote).Those who selected an indigenous language as their mother tongue is a more representative measurement for identifying the indigenous base because it encompasses both those who may select Spanish as the interview language, otherwise consider themselves indigenous. For instance, in some cases indigenous people may not want to identify as such in the survey by selecting an indigenous language as the interview language but we can assume that if they select an indigenous language as their mother tongue that they are indeed part of the indigenous base. On this matter we can follow in the footsteps of scholars such as Madrid (2012) who includes mestizos who speak Spanish as part of the indigenous base in his study. Furthermore, the mother tongue question also provides a larger sample than the interview language question which is important in any quantitative analysis. Consequently, mother tongue is the primary measurement of the indigenous base in this analysis.

It is important to note that capturing indigenous identity through surveys is undeniably problematic. Responses given can vary depending on the propensity to identify as indigenous on any given day. While I recognise the limitations of capturing indigenous identity in this manner, I also argue that these limitations should not discourage us from exploring the relationship. The results may provide important indicators which can be used as a guide within the qualitative research, providing triangulation within the study.

As with the previous analysis, the dependent variable remains support for the left. It is measured using the responses to the question in the survey, "For which party would you vote this Sunday?". Survey responses were coded by Wiesehomeier and Doyle

(2012) in accordance to the ideology[90] of the party selected by each respondent. The ideology of the party is based on a scale which runs from right (-10) to left (10) where 0 is the centre. Parties which have an ideological score of less than 5, for instance, can be considered extreme left parties while those between 0 and 5 are considered left or centre left (where closer to 0). Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2012) provide this measurement for responses to Latinobarómetro in 2006 exclusively and therefore this is the year selected for study. The year 2006 is also significant because it represents a period of accelerated support for the left in the region. For example, in 2006 leftist leaders were elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and the re-elected in the case of Lula in Brazil. In order to analyse the relationship between indigenous voters and support for the left I ran a basic OLS regression. Table 3.6 below demonstrates the results of this test. The results indicate that those who selected an indigenous language as their mother tongue are more likely to vote for the left, however this relationship is not statistically significant.

Table 3.6: The indigenous vote

Variables	Mother Tongue (*indigenous2*)
Support for the Left	.0970957
	(.202417)
Constant	10.08802
	(.0516773)
R2	0.0000
N	10080

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.

Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

Figure 3.12 below depicts this relationship by country and provides some interesting results, particularly in terms of the qualitative case studies in this research. In both Bolivia and Peru, the indigenous vote is positioned towards the left suggesting that the indigenous people do provide support for the left in each case. It is clear from the graph that indigenous people support the left in these two cases more than any other

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[90] Ideology was obtained using Wiesehomeier and Benoit's (2009) ideology scores

in the region and this is a statistically significant relationship. It is also interesting to note, that while not statistically significant, indigenous people in the remaining three cases of interest (Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico) are also positioned to the left of the scale (albeit more to the centre in the case of Mexico).

Figure 3.12: The Indigenous vote by country (mother tongue)

Source: Author's own data

The case of Venezuela and Argentina also provide significant results, albeit in a direction we may not expect. That is, indigenous people are positioned to the right of centre in Argentina and further to the right again in Venezuela. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the case of Venezuela presents an outlier because there is a low indigenous population, low indigenous mobilisation yet the late President Hugo Chávez symbolises the left in the region (the contestatory left in particular). In the introduction I argued that indigenous movements and their communities in Venezuela assimilate into the movements of the poor who provided a base of support for Chávez. The results from Figure 3.12 above however imply that indigenous people are not supporters of the left in Venezuela, or in Argentina for that matter. One key explanation for this could be the persistence of clientelistic ties between the poor,

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such as indigenous communities, and the right in the region. In such cases, indigenous people are likely to vote for the right based on clientelistic linkages rather than the programmatic linkages with the left proposed by this research. In relation to the overall argument however, because indigenous populations are small in each case, we do not expect these populations to have a substantial impact on support for the left at a national level.

It is our cases of Bolivia and Peru in which we find the most interesting results. If the indigenous population in these cases are voting left as the graph suggests, then I argue it is because the social movements that represent them mobilise them to do so. If this is the case, then the movements are indeed important allies of the left in the region. While both the macro and micro level analyses discussed in this chapter provides some indicators that these movements matter, the qualitative case studies are used to further investigate the relationship.

3.4 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left in the region. The chapter began by providing some descriptive statistics on the key variables, support for the left and indigenous movement mobilisation. The descriptive statistics indicated that the left turn in the region is more a shift *towards* rather than to the left when examined region-wide, much as previous scholars suggested (see Baker and Greene, 2011). However, when we explore the left turn over time and across cases using the *leftvoteshare* variable we see that the left underwent a period of accelerated success in the early and mid-2000s. Furthermore when we analysed the vote share of the left over time and across all countries it became apparent that the left turn was sharper in some cases more than others, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay. This highlights the importance of assessing the left turn in the context of cases and over time so that we do not devalue the puzzle by assessing it too generally. Importantly, we find that there was a shift to the left in the two cases selected for our qualitative case studies, Bolivia and Peru.

The descriptive statistics also provided an overview of the distribution of indigenous population and mobilisation in the region. Specifically, results from the expert survey provided us with some key information on the mobilisation of movements in Bolivia,

Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. While we find that both population and mobilisation is high in the two cases of majority indigenous populations, Bolivia and Ecuador, cases like Peru and Guatemala demonstrated that a high population does not guarantee mobilisation. Mexico meanwhile indicated that even countries with comparatively smaller populations can achieve medium-high levels of mobilisation. The information collected from the surveys also provided us with a better understanding of the behaviour of these movements. For example, we found that community meetings and protests are the most commonly undertaken by indigenous movements and that they are less likely to undertake more formal types of political participation such as letter-writing.

With this in mind, the second part of the chapter examined the relationship between support for the left and indigenous movement mobilisation. The macro level analysis tested the relationship between these central variables using four measurements of the dependent variable (support for the left) and two measurements of indigenous movement mobilisation (*massmob* and *movemobscore*). The results indicate that mass mobilisation can help explain support for the left across the region. The implication of this result is that the left benefit from a mass-mobilising base. The central finding however was that the interaction term indigenous movement mobilisation*indigenous population was positively correlated with support for the left. In the final section of the chapter, the individual level study sought to uncover whether indigenous people support the left. Using data from Latinobarómetro in 2006 we found that indigenous people[91] in Bolivia and Peru are positioned more to the left than other cases, again providing a basis for the argument that they represent an important base of support for the left if mobilised.

The results of the quantitative analysis provides breadth to the study by looking at the general relationship between the central variables. So far, we can say that mass mobilisation and in some cases, indigenous movement mobilisation, is correlated with support for the left. Correlation however is not causation and to truly uncover the causal relationship we must now turn to the qualitative case studies of Bolivia and Peru.

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[91] Those who selected an indigenous language as their mother tongue

Chapter 4: Bolivia

"We [indigenous people] are the base, the majority….we have a name for it…

Kollasuyo"

- Froilán Puma Carmona, leader of CONAMAQ (Interview, May 22nd, 2012).

Introduction

The first case study to be discussed is Bolivia where, in 2005, the election of Evo Morales and his party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) signalled the country's left turn. Bolivia was selected because indigenous movement mobilisation is high and therefore it is anticipated that support for the left would also be high here. More specifically, it is expected that indigenous social movements are highly mobilised and have strong social ties with their bases. The indigenous population of Bolivia is highly substantial; culminating in 71 per cent of the country's total population, therefore the mobilisation of these bases would generate considerable support for the party.

In relation to the 'backlash' argument, Bolivian politics was dominated by a succession of neoliberal governments since 1985. The Víctor Paz Estenssoro administration (1985-1989) implemented a "radical" neoliberal economic policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) which continued under succeeding administrations until 2003 when social movements mobilised to reject the model under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (known as Goni) (Conaghan, 1990: 17). Indeed, neoliberal restructuring in Bolivia "was the most radical in Latin America after Chile" (Kohl, 2006: 305). By the turn of the century however it became evident that this model was failing. On October 17th 2003, an estimated 500,000 protestors marched in La Paz calling for the resignation of Goni and "death to neoliberalism" (Kohl, 2006: 304). Goni resigned amid this social pressure and fled to Miami, leaving his vice-president Carlos Mesa in charge (Kohl, 2006). By June 2005, Mesa too resigned under continued protest and elections were called for December 2005 (Kohl, 2006).

The 2005 election signalled the left turn in Bolivia. The election was between the contestatory left represented by Evo Morales and his party MAS, and the right

represented by Jorge Quiroga and his party Poder Democrático y Social (Podemos). Morales won by a majority of 53 per cent and the election marked the highest voter turnout in 25 years (Ballivián, 2006). For many, Morales was the "anti-establishment" and "anti-elite" candidate whose presence in Bolivian politics was "long-awaited" (Madrid, 2012: 65; Ballivián, 2006: 38). In particular, Morales received much support from indigenous people who represented 71 per cent of the MAS vote (Madrid, 2012).[92] The 2005 elections not only marked the success of the contestatory left, but they also occurred at a time of high indigenous movement mobilisation. Many of the movements were involved in the protests which ousted Goni in 2003 and Mesa in 2005.

There are a number of indigenous movements identified within the literature as central actors in Bolivian politics. They include; Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (or the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia) (CSUTCB), Proyecto Fortalecimiento Organizacional del Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (Project Organisational Strengthening of the national Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu) (CONAMAQ), Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous People of Bolivia) (CIDOB), Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia "Bartolina Sisa" (the National Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous and Original Women of Bolivia) (CNMCIOB-BS) and Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia) (CSCIB)[93] (Yashar, 2005: Van Cott, 2005; 2008: Postero and Zamosc, 2004). These movements are central to the analysis.

Ultimately, the 2005 elections in Bolivia is a case in which the contestatory left won elections amid high levels of mobilisation and with much support from indigenous people. This chapter assesses the role of the indigenous movements in mobilising support for MAS. Firstly, the chapter will provide a brief but relevant historical background to Bolivian politics. The 2005 elections will then be outlined before

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[92]This figure is adopted from the work of Madrid (2012) who uses the LAPOP surveys to calculate the ethnic composition of the MAS vote share. Indigenous people are considered as those who self-identify as indigenous or selected an indigenous language as their first language.
[93]Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (CSCIB) is formally known as Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB).

providing an overview of the movements and their respective social bases. Finally, the chapter will turn to the results of field interviews in which evidence of movement support for MAS in 2005 is outlined.

4.1 Historical background

Like many Latin America countries, Bolivian history is marked by military juntas, revolution, on-going economic crisis and persistent corruption and clientelism. Bolivia was once part of Peru and the great Inca Empire (1438-1532), until colonisation in the 16th Century. During colonisation by the Spanish, Upper Peru (now Bolivia) was rich in silver deposits and therefore a major source of income for Spain (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). The spirit of mobilisation was evident in Bolivia from 1781 when indigenous leader Túpac Katarí led a rebellion against the Spanish in the city of La Paz (Meade, 2010). Despite his defeat, Túpac Katarí remains a symbol of indigenous rebellion in Bolivia. An independence movement emerged in 1809 which included the geographically dispersed guerrilla independence movements known as *republiquetas* (1809-1825) which were led by local caudillos (or 'strong men' local leaders) and were comprised of rural campesinos and Indians, as well as independence leaders from Argentina (Meade, 2010; Unzueta, 2003). However it was the South American liberator José San Martín defeat of the Spanish in Peru in 1821 that led to the liberation of Upper Peru in 1825, renamed initially as Bolívar (in honour of Símon Bolívar) and later as Bolivia.[94]

The first constitution was enacted in 1826 and there have been 16 subsequent constitutions since then including the most recent in 2009 ratified by the government of Evo Morales. Constitutional amendments however were very much in the power of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the state until 2004 when the National Congress approved a constitutional reform package which contained a provision for national-level referendums (Breuer, 2008). The 1967 Constitution was the constitution in effect during the 2005 elections, although it had been amended on several occasions. Since 1997 the president was elected for a five year term without consecutive re-election, but the former presidents could run once one-term had passed

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[94] More specifically, the Spanish monarchy refused to recognise the independence of Peru and a series of battles ensued between independence movements and supporters of the crown (royalists). It was the Battle of Ayacucho (1924) led by Antonio José de Sucre which ultimately resulted in the liberation of Upper Peru.

(Political Database of the Americas (PDBA)).Bolivia has a bicameral congress in which there are 27 seats in the Senate (upper house) and 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). The country is divided into nine departments with one governor (*prefecto*) per department[95] (PDBA). In 2005, there were 327 municipalities and municipal councils elect mayors for five year terms (PDBA). Since the new constitution in 2009, the number of municipalities increased to 337.

Since their independence however, Bolivia has had "one of the least stable political histories in Latin America" (Van Cott, 2003: 755). From 1900 to 2009, Bolivia experienced a total of 29 attempted coups, 19 of which were successful (Lehoucq, 2011). Not surprisingly then, Bolivia's transition to democracy (1978-1982) is described as a "transition through rupture" and has earned a reputation as a country with "*par excellence* of political instability and military coups" (Mayorga, 2005: 152; Mayorga, 1997: 142). Before exploring more modern characteristics of Bolivian politics it is important to discuss the 1952 Revolution led by the leftist party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), which represents a critical juncture in indigenous-left relations in Bolivia. The 1952 revolution arose when incumbent President Mamerto Urriolagoitía Harriague (1949-1951) refused to transfer power to the democratically elected Víctor Paz Estenssoro of MNR. When Urriolagoitía installed the head of the Bolivian military Hugo Ballivián (1951-1952) as president, MNR seized power with a military coup. Of particular relevance to this study is the role played by highland indigenous communities, or campesinos, in supporting the MNR revolution. These communities "radically mobilised" in favour of MNR, who, in turn, "used the campesinos to win the revolution" (Yashar, 2005: 155; Van Cott, 2005: 53). Many of these communities were politically mobilised by the Chaco War[96] (1932-1935) with Paraguay in which 200,000 highland Indians fought[97] (Westin, 1968). Bolivia's defeat generated a mood of discontent and mobilised highland Indians who had acquired a "sense of political consciousness" whilst fighting in the war (Westin, 1968: 87). In this way, MNR tapped into the mobilisation of these communities, which supported their revolution based on an ideological congruence

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[95] Governors or *prefectos* are also elected for five year terms.

[96] The Chaco war was a conflict over territory along the border with Bolivia and Paraguay known as Chaco Boreal. The territory was considered to be rich in oil. Bolivia lost the war and lost over 50,000 soldiers resulting in a "period of social and political disintegration" (Westin, 1968: 86).

[97] Indeed, highland Indians were conscripted by the State to fight in the Chaco War.

and a common enemy in the incumbent government. For instance, the MNR appealed to highland campesinos in particular by denouncing the latifundia system of agriculture in Bolivia in which a small number of large landowners owned the majority of the land which was worked by campesinos (Westin, 1968).

Undoubtedly, the relationship between MNR and highland communities at this time represents the first indigenous-left alliance in Bolivia. Interestingly, the nationalistic rhetoric of the contemporary contestatory left could be considered reminiscent of the MNR in the 1950s who denounced the large "tin barons" who spent "their fortunes abroad" and who were responsible for Bolivia's woes (Westin, 1968: 96). Like the contestatory left, MNR in the 1950s also made populist and ethnic appeals by claiming that the highland Indian "by the very weight of his number is the number one factor in the economy", and should therefore be central to the rebuilding of Bolivia after the Chaco War (Westin, 1968: 96).[98]

Once in power, MNR sought to secure this "principal mass political base" by immediately implementing reforms that especially benefitted indigenous communities (Smith, 2005: 256). Chief among them was the 1953 Land Reform (Law Decree 3464) which established the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA). The reform included the following objectives; the redistribution of land, abolition of unpaid labour, the promotion of Indian communities, stimulation of agriculture, preservation of national resources and promotion of migration to the less populated eastern lowlands to cultivate land (where Amazonian communities reside) (Malloy and Thorn, 1971: 162). The day the reform was announced was proclaimed the national "Day of the Indian" thus highlighting that the reform was specifically aimed at highland indigenous people (Malloy and Thorn, 1971: 162). President Víctor Paz Estenssoro also implemented a series of education reforms and social services in rural communities where highland indigenous people resided (Madrid, 2012). Crucially, MNR removed literacy restrictions on suffrage, allowing the largely illiterate indigenous campesino population to participate in elections for the first time (Madrid, 2012).

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[98] This claim was made in 1940 by Enrique Sánchez de Lozada, a central figure in MNR and father of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni).

In order to secure the indigenous base, MNR institutionalised party support by also reorganising local indigenous unions, or *sindicatos,* across Bolivia into national federations. The sindicatos were structured firstly by respective province[99] and then by department.[100] This fed into one national federation as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below (Yashar, 2005). Importantly, indigenous movements in Bolivia remain organised in this way today. As this chapter will show, this structure has proven an effective way to communicate up and down the chain of command. Centrally, it is an efficient way to disseminate important information about protests, marches and even what candidate the movement will support in upcoming elections. Moreover, by organising highland communities in this way the federations became the "interlocutor between the peasants and the state" (Yashar, 2005: 159). I argue that movements remain the principal 'interlocutor' between indigenous people and the state today and for this reason they can play a central role in mobilising support for candidates.

Figure 4.1: Federated structure of indigenous movements in Bolivia after the 1952 Revolution.

Source: Adapted from Yashar (2005)

The reforms and institutionalisation of the indigenous base proved a successful strategy for MNR who in 1958 secured 95 per cent of their total vote from indigenous provinces (Madrid, 2012). Consequently, indigenous people were a key base of support for MNR until fellow party member René Barrientos overthrew the government in 1964 through a bloody coup. Barrientos initiated a campaign of

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[99] There are 112 provinces in Bolivia
[100] There are nine departments in Bolivia

repression against indigenous organising during the 1970s which marked a dramatic change in MNR-indigenous relations (Smith, 2005).

By the mid-1980s, Bolivia was in the depths of an economic crisis that "was unprecedented even by Latin American standards" (Conaghan et al. 1990: 17). The MNR government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) took drastic neoliberal measures to tackle the on-going crisis in which hyperinflation reached 8,000 per cent in 1985 (Conaghan et al. 1990). In 1985, Paz Estenssoro and Goni (then Minister for Planning) implemented the neoliberal program entitled, the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Mayorga, 2005). Neoliberalism continued under the Jaime Paz Zamora government (1989-1993). His party Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) pursued the same NEP style policy[101] to tackle the crisis.[102] Neoliberalism was accelerated once again under the first administration of Goni (1993-1997) who expanded privatisation to a point where 50 per cent of a number of strategic companies were given to investors free of charge (Mayorga, 1997). In 1997, former military dictator Hugo Banzer of the right-wing Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) was elected and included a drastic policy to eradicate coca in conjunction with neoliberalism. The 'eradication of coca' policy destroyed over 80 per cent of the coca crop worsening the position of highland indigenous communities who exclusively cultivated coca and were already suffering from neoliberal policies (Van Cott, 2003). When Banzer was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2001, he transferred his power to his vice president Jorge Quiroga who continued this policy and would later face Morales in the 2005 elections whose presidency would finally break the reign of neoliberal governments since 1985.

Another characteristic of Bolivian politics that is relevant to this study is the domination of politics by the traditional parties since the return of democracy in 1982. As Table 4.1 below demonstrates, MNR, ADN and MIR have dominated presidential elections from 1982 until the ousting of Goni in 2003. The ideological positioning of these parties has shifted over time. For instance, the MNR moved from a leftist revolutionary party in the 1950s concerned with the inclusion of indigenous people to

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[101] However, Paz Zamora did not pursue neoliberalism to the same extent. For example, despite securing the passage of a privatisation law in Bolivia, the administration did not have the "political will" to implement it (Mayorga, 1997: 146)

[102] Interestingly, Paz Zamora pursued neoliberal policies despite the social democratic roots of his party. Specifically, MIR drew inspiration from the socially democratic policies and political style of Salvador Allende in Chile.

one that pursued radical neoliberal polices from the mid-1980s. MIR can be described as a "somewhat less than social democratic" party yet in 1989 it entered an alliance with the unequivocally right-wing ADN (Domingo, 2005: 1731). Indeed coalition building among these three parties was another common pattern in Bolivian politics that was broken by the election of MAS in 2005. Coalitions are incentivised by the electoral system, which stipulates that should a party not win over 50 per cent of the vote, elections are decided by Congressional vote (Domingo, 2005).

Table 4.1: Ruling parties in Bolivia since the return to democracy 1982

Years	Party	President
1982-1985	MNR	Hernán Siles Zuazo
1985-1989	MNR	Víctor Paz Estenssoro
1989-1993	MIR*	Jaime Paz Zamora
1993-1997	MNR	Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada
1997-2001	ADN	Hugo Banzer Suárez
2001-2002	ADN	Jorge Quiroga
2002-2003	MNR	Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada

* Coalition with ADN

By 2005, the political sentiment was of contempt for traditional politics. As María del Carmen (of the opposition party Plan Progreso para Bolivia- Convergencia Nacional (PPB-CN)) explains, "people were tired of these traditional parties, and so they put their hopes into Evo Morales" (Interview, May 7th, 2012). The Bolivian people had also grown tired of corruption associated with these parties. For example, a 2003 poll indicated that confidence in parties was just six per cent (Barr, 2005). Politics was also "stifled" by the clientelistic linkages between these traditional parties and their bases[103] (Domingo, 2005: 1731). These linkages were so inherent in Bolivian politics that the failure to reward supporters with employment, or other benefits, was considered a "betrayal" by the parties and a "misuse of public office" (Domingo, 2005: 1731). The perseverance of corruption and clientelism since democratisation, along with the domination of traditional parties illustrates that by 2005, Bolivians were not only discontented with failing economic policies but also by politics. As discussed in Chapter 1, political and economic discontent is a central explanatory variable for the left turn and it was certainly present in the case of Bolivia. Table 4.2 below illustrates the increase in support for MAS between 2002 and 2005 and the

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[103] The MNR for instance, pursued a clientelistic relationship with indigenous bases after the revolution (Smith, 2005)

coinciding decrease in support for MNR during the same period. The table also displays the increase in voter turnout between the two elections. This chapter will demonstrate how the mobilisation of movements in support for MAS between 2002 and 2005 can help to explain these increases in support and voter turnout. The chapter will now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 2005 elections before discussing the central indigenous movement in Bolivia. The chapter will then outline the evidence from field interviews which indicate that the increase movement mobilisation in support of MAS in 2005 can help to explain the growth in support for the party and voter turnout.

Table 4.2: Performance of MAS and MNR between 2002 and 2005

	2002 (%)	**2005 (%)**
Support for MAS		
Presidential election	22.46	53.7
Legislative elections[104]		
Chamber of Senators	30	44
Chamber of Deputies	21	56
Support for MNR		
Presidential election	22.5	6.5
Legislative elections[105]		
Chamber of Senators	36	1
Chamber of Deputies	11	7
Voter Turnout		
Majority Indigenous Province	70	83
Minority Indigenous Province	68	81

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE)

4.2 The context of the 2005 election

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 2005 election was preceded by a period of significant mobilisation by indigenous movements. Indeed, the increase in movement mobilisation can be traced back to 2000 when indigenous movements in Cochabamba successfully reversed plans to privatise water through a series of protest, which became known as "La Guerra del Agua" (or the Water War). In 2002, reforms implemented by Goni resulted in the widespread mobilisation of indigenous

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[104] The results listed are the percentage of each chamber controlled by MAS.
[105] The results listed are the percentage of each chamber controlled by MNR.

movements across the country (Singer, 2007: 200). Reforms included a proposed policy to eradicate coca (a legacy of the Banzer-Quiroga regime) which directly threatened the livelihood of highland coca growers represented nationally by the movement Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). In response, CSUTCB mobilised their social base in opposition to the policy. In particular, the Cochabamba representative of the CSUTCB, the Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba (FSUTCC), coordinated widespread roadblocks across the Chapare region paralysing traffic along the country's central highway (Kohl, 2006, Pinto-Ocampo, 2008). In July 2002, Goni proposed the privatisation of Bolivian gas which resulted in the mobilisation of a new movement called the National Coordinator for the Defence and Recovery of Gas (NCDRG), which was an alliance of highland peasants and cocaleros movements who were later also joined by military leaders (Kohl, 2006: 320). By October 2003, the issue of gas privatisation had become particularly contentious and a broad coalition of social movements, including indigenous movements, took to the streets in La Paz in what they called La Guerra del Gas (or the Gas War) (Kohl, 2006). It was this mass mobilisation that led to the resignation of Goni and his successor Carlos Mesa in 2005 (García et al., 2004: 3). In accordance with the constitution, the President of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltze, replaced Mesa and called presidential, congressional and prefecture elections for December 2005 (Kohl, 2006).

This illustrates the level of mobilisation of movements, including indigenous movements in the run up to the 2005 elections. Indeed, if it were not for the mobilisation of movements to oust Goni, elections would not have taken place until 2006. The Water War is particularly important for understanding the increase in mobilisation of indigenous movements. Firstly, indigenous people who opposed the right-wing administration of Hugo Banzer led the Water War 2000. In this way, the Water War represents the first major mobilisation in Bolivia against neoliberalism and it was led by indigenous movements. Secondly, the mobilisation was a success. The reversal of the contract by the Bolivian government to US water company Bechtel demonstrated that movements could achieve their goals through mass mobilisation, thus it acted as an inspiration for other movements. According to Mayra Gómez, indigenous activist and Senior Programme Officer for Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND):

"The mass mobilisations after the 2000 Water War had succeeded in ousting Bechtel. But, the political system still did not appear to represent the will of the people, so they continued to mobilise up to the 2003 Gas War."(Interview, February 3rd, 2012).

Interestingly, the way in which the Water War was eventually resolved demonstrates the lack of trust in the effectiveness of political parties. The strikes were resolved through the media and the Catholic Church rather than through dialogue with political parties or with the government. The parties were simply not viewed as "the means to achieve social justice or political participation" highlighting the disconnection between the movements and institutionalised politics (Postero, 2006: 205). Furthermore, the mobilisation in opposition to Goni symbolises the discontent for neoliberalism in Bolivia at this time. The results of the 2005 elections (displayed in Table 4.3 below) illustrate the desire to break the pattern by replacing the right with the left, and the contestatory left in particular. For instance, regional leader of CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that the Gas War in 2003 "made people think, it made them think that we no longer want a President like that [referring to Goni], who kills its people[106], who makes people suffer and so from this moment the situation changed and we decided to rise up more strongly for change" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). This mobilisation for change is evident in the clear demise of the traditional parties in 2005. As shown on Table 4.3 below, MNR received just over six per cent of the vote while MIR failed to even enter a candidate. ADN meanwhile relabelled itself as Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS) under Quiroga (Ballivián, 2006). Also of significance is the poor performance of the indigenous party, Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) led by former CSUTCB leader, Felipe Quispe. The radically indigenous nature of the party signified the lack of appetite of Bolivians for an ethnic party, and their preference for the contestatory left as represented by MAS. Moreover, the MIP exclusively appealed to Aymara's therefore excluding the non-Aymara population resulting in a low vote share (Madrid, 2012).

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[106] Luís Gabriel Morales is referring to the October 2003 Gas War when Goni sent the military to control the crowd who clashed with protesters resulting in the death of eighty protesters. The incident is known as 'Octubre Negro' or Black October (Garcia, 2006).

Table 4.3: Results of the 2005 elections in Bolivia

Presidential candidate	Party	Valid vote (%)	Ideology
Evo Morales	MAS	53.7	Contestatory Left
Jorge Quiroga	Podemos	28.6	Right
Samuel Doria Medina	UN	8	Centre-Right
Michiaki Nagatani	MNR	6.5	Right
Felipe Quispe	MIP	2.2	Indigenous
Others		0.13	
Total Valid Vote		100	
Blank Votes		3.0	
Null Votes		3.4	

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE)

The campaign itself was "short, but eventful"[107] and was led by Morales and Quiroga from the outset (Ballivián, 2006: 40). Morales was the "anti-establishment" candidate and fervently criticised both the Goni and Mesa administration for their pursuance of neoliberalism and coca eradication (Ballivián, 2006). Morales claimed that these policies were directly responsible for poverty, corruption and the weakening of the state under previous governments (Ballivián, 2006). Ultimately, Morales claimed that the only people to benefit from neoliberalism were "the elite and foreigners" (Ballivián, 2006: 48). In addition Morales positioned himself and his party as "outsiders" who like most Bolivians, were "victims of the political system" [108] (Ballivián, 2006:48). To illustrate this Morales referred to his expulsion from Congress in 2002 when he was accused of "inciting violence" in the Chapare during the FSUTCC roadblocks (Van Cott, 2003: 769). Morales also attacked traditional parties by emphasising how they had failed to bring about reform since the return to democracy (Ballivián, 2006). He bolstered his 'outsider' status by highlighting that his party, MAS, had never entered a coalition, nor held a majority in Congress, since its foundation in 1997 (Ballivián, 2006). In this way, Morales was securely positioned as a "champion of change"[109] (Ballivián, 2006: 41).

Importantly, Morales espoused contestatory left demands such as the nationalisation of privatised companies, including gas and mining companies which he claimed to

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[107] My own translation.
[108] My own translation.
[109] My own translation.

have "pillaged the land of its real owners, the indigenous people" (Madrid, 2012; La Nación, 2005). As one might expect, he vehemently condemned coca eradication polices and the US for encouraging such polices (Ballivián, 2006; Madrid, 2012). Indeed, his general opposition to the US only intensified after its Ambassador Manuel Rocha appealed to the people of Bolivia not to vote for Morales who would be a "major cocaine exporter" (Jim Schultz, May 10th, 2012; Madrid, 2012). In response, Morales elevated the coca leaf as *the* symbol of Bolivian resistance whilst using the incident to highlight the ignorance of the US on coca cultivation (Madrid, 2012). Morales declared his admiration for leaders like Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez thus definitively allying himself with the contestatory left (La Nación, 2005). Perhaps unlike his idols, Morales was perceived as a "leader with all the attributes of a rebel, but with none of their flaws" (Ballivián, 2006: 48).

While MAS is accepted within the literature on the left as a leftist party, there is undoubtedly an ethnic component to the party that must be addressed (see Weyland 2009; Panizza 2005; Weyland et al. 2010). Essentially, MAS is not an indigenous party but it draws much support from indigenous people and makes direct appeals to this base of support and to the movements which represent them. Madrid (2012) refers to this as 'ethno-populism'. For instance, Morales made direct ethnic appeals by promising to fight racism, discrimination, inequality, eliminate illiteracy and ultimately, bring indigenous to power" (Madrid, 2012; BBC Mundo, 2005; Ballivián, 2006). Morales chose Álvaro García Linera as his running mate. Linera was a leftist intellectual who was previously arrested for his participation in the radical indigenous movement Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katarí (EGTK) (Ballivián, 2006). García claimed that his main objective in 2005 was to support the "first indigenous president of Bolivia and of the continent"[110] (Ballivián, 2006: 41). A central part of his campaign was his promise to implement a constituent assembly and reform the constitution to address indigenous demands (Ballivián, 2006). By selecting a running mate that had strong roots in a radical indigenous movement and by emphasising policies such as the new constitution, MAS directly appealed to indigenous people. The promise of constitutional reform is particularly important because, as will be

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[110] My own translation.

discussed in more detail later, it acted as the perspective compensation for indigenous movement support in 2005.

It is important to clarify however that although MAS has strong ties in the Chapare[111] region, and despite its appeals to indigenous people, it is a contestatory left rather than an indigenous party. In 2005 MAS never claimed to be an indigenous party and also appealed to the electorate more generally as a leftist party. After 2000 in particular MAS reached out to other bases such as white people and mestizos, arguably to expand their base of support and improve their chances of success in upcoming 2002 elections. In order to appeal to these voters the party countered claims that Morales was radical and by 2005 white people and mestizos made up half of the party (Madrid, 2012). So while MAS certainly has an ethno-populist component it is not an indigenous party but rather a contestatory left party which happens to make appeals to the indigenous base.

In stark contrast to Morales, Jorge Quiroga was very much part of the system that Morales was strongly opposing. As vice president, he assumed the presidency from 2001-2002 after president Hugo Banzer fell ill (Banzer was the founder of right-wing ADN). Prior to his vice-presidency Quiroga served as Banzer's Minister for Finance under neoliberal reforms exemplifying his affiliation with the right and neoliberalism (Ballivián, 2006). In addition, Quiroga pursued the coca eradication policy implemented by Banzer and retired to the US at the end of his term, further highlighting that he was the opposite candidate to Morales in almost every way (Ballivián, 2006). In order to campaign for President in a climate of such discontent, Quiroga rejected an ADN ticket and instead formed Podemos. The party may have included the word 'social' to boost support but it was an alliance of conservative citizens groups from departments such as Santa Cruz, and former members of ADN (Ballivián, 2006). As part of his campaign, Quiroga promised to better distribute the profits from natural gas back into Bolivian society, but was opposed to nationalisation (Ballivián, 2006). Like Morales, Quiroga also promised to hold a constituent assembly. Unlike Morales, his focus was more on the reform of the political system generally than on addressing the demands of indigenous movements specifically

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[111] This region is predominantly populated by Indigenous (Quechua) coca growers.

(Ballivián, 2006). Quiroga appealed to the middle class by questioning the stability of a potential MAS government particularly given how they had led the protests against Goni (Ballivián, 2006). Quiroga also accused Morales of polarising Bolivia and threatening to imitate a Chávez model of governance (Ballivián, 2006). In an attempt to further bolster support among Bolivia's middle and upper class, Quiroga selected Bolivia's most popular news presenter, María René Duchén as his running mate (Ballivián, 2006).

The third candidate in the running was Samuel Doria Medina. Medina was one of Bolivia's biggest businessmen and owner of the cement factory Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento (SOBCE) (Ballivián, 2006). Before creating his own centre-right party the centre-right Unidad Nacional (UN) Medina had served as Minister for Planning (1991-1993) under Goni. His campaign centred on the promotion of Bolivian business', claiming that they were the key to growth and employment (Ballivián, 2006). Medina positioned himself as a centre-right candidate and an alternative to Morales on the extreme left and Quiroga on the right (Ballivián, 2006). He selected Carlos Dabdoub as his running mate, who was a spokesperson for the conservative Santa Cruz movement for autonomy, Confederación Internacional Autonómica (Ballivián, 2006). The movement was set up in response to indigenous mobilisation in the highlands and is predominantly compromised of business associations from Santa Cruz seeking autonomous status in order to attain regional control over natural resources in the department, including gas and timber (Eaton, 2007). It can be argued then that Medina limited his appeal to Bolivian businessmen and conservatives in favour of autonomy for Santa Cruz. This limited appeal may explain his poor national performance in the elections in which he won just eight per cent (see Table 4.3 below).

Figure 4.2: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority indigenous departments in the 2005 presidential elections

Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2005) and Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE).

Figure 4.2 above illustrates the distribution of support for the candidates by majority and minority indigenous departments[112]. The figure demonstrates the high level of support for Morales in majority indigenous departments where he received over 61 per cent of the vote within these departments. Morales performed especially well in the majority indigenous departments of Cochabamba and Potosí where he received over 60 per cent of the departmental vote in each case (see Table 4.5 below). Conversely, Quiroga performed worse in majority indigenous departments. For instance, Podemos performed best in the departments of Beni and Tarija in the lowlands where Quiroga received 46 and 45 per cent of the departmental vote respectively (CNE Bolivia, 2005). Medina also performed poorly in majority indigenous departments and instead received most of his support from the department of Pando (23 per cent), which has the lowest indigenous population of Bolivia (see Table 4.5 below) (CNE Bolivia, 2005). Medina also performed well in Santa Cruz,

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[112] Bolivia has nine departments, five of which are majority indigenous departments. They include, in order of the highest to the lowest populations; Potosí, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro and Chuquisaca. Please see appendix D for a map of Bolivia divided by departments.

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implying that his appeal to businessmen and those in favour of Santa Cruz autonomy was somewhat useful, however he still received just 12 per cent of the departmental vote.

Indigenous people "proved crucial to the MAS's 2005 victory" and the majority of those who self-identified as indigenous voted for Morales. Specifically, 71 per cent of those who self-identified as indigenous voted for Morales in 2005 and 63 per cent of those who identified as 'mestizo who speak indigenous languages'[113] also voted for MAS (see Table 4.4 below) (Madrid, 2012: 61). This was an increase of over 30 percentage points from 2002 for both groups. Table 4.4 below illustrates that voter turnout in indigenous provinces[114] also increased from 2002-2005 by 13 per cent. Therefore we can say that an increase in voter turnout coincided with an increase in indigenous support for MAS. Moreover, the increase in voter turnout and indigenous support for MAS corresponds to a general rise in support for MAS between 2002 and 2005 of over 30 percentage points giving Morales a majority. This majority is of particular significance because it meant that MAS could avoid the Congressional vote of the sitting members from the 2002 elections. The vote would have presented a challenge for MAS who had 27 seats in Congress in 2002 compared to the combined 65 seats held by opposition parties such as MNR, ADN and the right-wing party Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR).[115] Interestingly, MAS also increased their presence in Congress in 2005 by gaining an additional 49 seats in and consequently a majority in Congress.[116] As Table 4.4 below indicates, MAS increased their presence in the Senate by 14 per cent, and won the majority in the Lower House with an increase of 35 per cent. It is important to note that this research does not suggest that MAS won the 2005 elections exclusively at the hands of indigenous votes. After all, Table 4.4 shows that MAS also received an increase in voter turnout and support in non-indigenous provinces and from mestizos (an increase of 23 per cent) and white people (an increase of 26 per cent). What this research does suggest however is that the

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[113] Madrid refers to this group as 'indigenous mestizos'. Indigenous mestizos are considered part of the indigenous base. Often indigenous people do not want to identify as indigenous on surveys and so select 'mestizo who speaks indigenous languages' from the survey instead.
[114] Provinces are the second administrative division in Bolivia after Departments. There are 112 provinces in Bolivia.
[115] There are 130 seats in Congress. MNR held 36 seats, ADN held five and NFR held 25.
[116] In 2005 Bolivia had a total of 157 seats in Congress. They were divided between the Senate (27) seats and the Chamber (130 seats). This was changed in 2009 under the new constitution and the Congress was renamed Plurinational Legislative Assembly and seats were increase to a total of 166.

increase in indigenous voter turnout and support may be attributed to an increase in indigenous movement mobilisation in support for MAS from 2002-2003. Specifically, this chapter will outline how indigenous movements in Bolivia formed an alliance entitled el Pacto de Unidad (or the Unity Pact) in 2005 to ensure the election of MAS. Before the pact the movements were fragmented but the pact united the bases of the respective movements and consolidated support for Morales in 2005. Madrid (2012: 53) suggests that a central strategy of MAS to "woo" indigenous voters in 2005 was to establish "ties with a vast number of indigenous organisations across the country". Ultimately, the research argues that this increase in movement support for MAS in 2005 greatly contributed to the "significant progress" made by MAS between 2002 and 2005 (Ballivián, 2006: 43).Furthermore this progress holds particular significance when we consider that MAS did not only win the election but did so by a majority, thus avoiding the potentially challenging Congressional vote.

Table 4.4: Voter turnout and distribution of the MAS Vote 2002-2005, by ethnicity.

	2002 (%)	2005 (%)
Support for MAS		
Presidential election	22.46	53.7
Legislative elections[117]		
Chamber of Senators	30	44
Chamber of Deputies	21	56
Voter Turnout		
Majority Indigenous Province	70	83
Minority Indigenous Province	68	81
Distribution of MAS vote by ethnicity		
Self-identify indigenous	37.8	71.1
Self-identify mestizos who speak indigenous languages	27.6	63.6
Self-identify mestizos who speak only Spanish	11.5	34.2
Self-identify white	5.8	31.6
Total Respondents	21.6	53.3

Source: Adapted from Corte Nacional Bolivia (CNE) and Madrid (2012)

Finally, in order to observe the potential impact of movement mobilisation on the vote share of MAS, we can turn to Table 4.5 below which provides an overview Morales' support by department from 2002 to 2005, along with the movement that is mobilised in each department. Indigenous population is also included here and it corresponds to majority and minority indigenous departments depicted on Figure 4.2 above. The movements are listed in order of their strength in each department. For instance, both CSUTCB and CONAMAQ are present in the department of La Paz but CSUTCB have more mobilisation capacity in La Paz than CONAMAQ and are listed accordingly.

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[117] The results listed are the percentage of each chamber controlled by MAS.

Table 4.5: Geographical distribution of Morales's vote share 2002-2005, by department.

Department	Indigenous Population % Department	2002 (%)	2005 (%)	Movement[118]
Highlands				
Potosí	83.9	27.0	62.6	CSUTCB, CONAMAQ
La Paz	77.5	22.5	54.2	CSUTCB, CONAMAQ
Cochabamba	74.4	37.6	66.6	CSUTCB,CSCIB,Bartolinas,CONAMAQ
Oruro	73.9	29.2	64.8	CONAMAQ, CSUTCB
Lowlands				
Chuquisaca	65.6	10.1	53.7	CIDOB, CSUTCB, CONAMAQ
Santa Cruz	37.5	10.2	31.6	CIDOB, CSCIB, Bartolinas
Beni	32.7	3.2	33.2	CIDOB, CSUTCB
Tarija	19.7	6.2	57.8	CIDOB
Pando	16.2	20.0	16.6	CSUTCB, CIDOB[119]
Total	62.05	20.9	53.7	

Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2005: 51), Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE), and García et al. (2004). Note: The correlation between indigenous population and 2002 results was .64. The correlation between indigenous population and 2005 results was higher at 0.74. Both indicate a strong positive relationship between indigenous population and support for MAS.

The table above indicates that support for MAS increased by almost 30 percentage points or more across the highland departments from 2002 – 2005. For instance, MAS experienced an increase of 35 percentage points in Cochabamba and Potosí resulting in a majority for MAS for those departments. These departments are majority indigenous departments which correspond to the results displayed on Figure 4.2 above where Morales performs especially well. CSUTCB and its affiliates Las Bartolinas and CSCIB supported MAS in both elections, which explain the base of support for MAS during this time. Cochabamba for example was the stronghold of MAS support in both elections which can be explained by the presence of CSUTCB's "most militant" affiliate, FSUTCC in the Chapare region of the department (Grisaffi, 2013: 58). The presence of CONAMAQ in each department is interesting however because in 2002, CONAMAQ did not support Morales but in 2005 they entered the

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[118] This is based on the work of García et al. (2004) who provide an overview of areas of mobilisation and influence for each movement. For the purpose of clarity, areas of mobilisation are listed by department. It should be noted however, that in some cases the movement's area of mobilisation may be in particular provinces within the department rather than the entire department.

[119] Pando is an area of influence rather than mobilisation for CSUTCB and CIDOB.

pact with the other movements to mobilise support for MAS. The role of CONAMAQ in mobilising bases is particularly important when we consider the results of Oruro, which is the movements' central zone of influence and mobilisation (García Linera et al. 2004). Support for MAS increased by 35 percentage points in Oruro between the two elections and this coincides with support from CONAMAQ in 2005 (the movement did not support MAS in 2002).

The department of Tarija provides another interesting example of the potential role of movements. MAS experienced an increase in support of over 50 per cent in Tarija, which was their biggest increase in support and won the department for MAS. This is a particularly notable achievement given that the department is not a majority indigenous department but rather it has one of the smallest indigenous populations in Bolivia. Tarija however is also a stronghold of CIDOB who like CONAMAQ did not support MAS until the entered the pact in 2005, which may help to explain the increase in support there. CIDOB are highly mobilised in Beni, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca where support for MAS increased by 30, 21 and 43 percentage points respectively. Unlike the exceptional case of Tarija, high levels of polarisation exist between indigenous people and white or mestizos populations in Santa Cruz and Beni, which may explain the incapacity of MAS to win a majority there. For example, this polarisation primarily exists between indigenous people and white people of Santa Cruz known as Cruceños, many of whom moved to Beni thus expanding polarisation to this department. Chuquisaca offers an example of a department in which the increase in support also gave MAS a majority where three movements are mobilised.

Two movements, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, did not support MAS in 2002 but consolidated their support with that of CSUTCB in 2005. Finally, the only department in which Morales experienced a decrease in 2005 was in Pando which has the lowest indigenous population and where CSUTCB and CIDOB have affiliations but are not highly mobilised. Overall, Table 4.5 offers an insight into the role indigenous movements may have played in increasing support for MAS in 2005. In order to explore this further the chapter will provide evidence from field interviews with movements explaining the ways in which they mobilised support for MAS in 2005. Before doing so however, the chapter will provide an overview of the movements and their respective social bases.

4. 3 The movements

Indigenous movements in Bolivia have been amongst the most active in Latin America (Lucero, 2007). Indeed, social movement mobilisation more generally is high in Bolivia. For instance, every government from 1985 to 2005 enforced a state of emergency as a result of high levels of social protest (Domingo, 2005: 1727). Mobilisation of indigenous movements can be traced to the 18th Century indigenous rebellion led by Túpac Katarí. Katarí and his wife Bartolina Sisa held the city of La Paz to siege for over eight months in 1871 and the rebellion is the symbol of indigenous resistance in Bolivia today (Arbona and Kohl, 2004). The largest indigenous women's movement in Bolivia, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia 'Bartolina Sisa' (CNMCIOB-BS), directly incorporates Bartolina Sisa into their name and are as a result more commonly known as "Las Bartolinas". Additionally, Túpac Katarí, and his famous last words 'I may die as one, but I will return and I will be millions' are often used as a symbol of indigenous mobilisation by highland movements such as CSUTCB (Lazar & McNeish, 2006).

Despite this profound history of mobilisation, indigenous movements in Bolivia remain fragmented. The fragmentation of the movements reflects an immense ethnic diversity in Bolivia, where 37 distinct ethnic groups exist (Van Cott, 2005). Fragmentation extends beyond typical highland-lowland divisions that we see elsewhere in the region. Instead, "political rivalry is particularly pronounced" between highland Aymara and Quechua movements (Van Cott, 2005: 52).[120] This rivalry is often based on intense competition for resources but more fundamentally it is rooted in an ideological clash between Katarismo[121] and Indianismo, which impedes alliances. Indianismo for instance, seeks to highlight the unfair subordination of indigenous people within society, and it is therefore anti-white and anti-western in its position (Van Cott, 2005: 53). Specifically, Indianismo "rejects the labour-union model of organisation as a western imposition and rejects, at least publicly, alliances with non-indigenous groups" (Van Cott, 2005: 53). For this reason Indianismo, in principle is incongruent with leftist–indigenous alliances or indeed, movement–party alliances. Katarismo meanwhile is more heterogeneous and less ethnically radical. It

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[120] Quechan people represent 31 per cent of the total national population and Aymara represent 25 per cent (Gigler, 2009).
[121] Named after Túpac Katari

"blends class consciousness with ethnic rights claims and calls for the reconstruction of the Bolivian state along ethnic criteria" (Van Cott, 2005: 53). For instance, the indigenous party Movimiento Katarista Nacional (MKN)[122] followed a Katarismo ideology and "sought alliances with non-indigenous social movements and leftist populist political parties" (Van Cott, 2005: 53). This divergence exists today as CONAMAQ adopts an Indianismo ideology and CSUTCB a Katarismo one. Regional leader of CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that, "our movement is campesino, indígena and originario, because we are for everyone" (Interview, May 16th, 2012).

Such variance is important for understanding indigenous movement mobilisation in Bolivia. Ideological variation and competition for resources can explain why a united national indigenous movement such as La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), is "unlikely to occur in Bolivia" (García Linera. et al., 2004: 21). Instead, movements in Bolivia are "compelled to invent network structures of co-ordination around specific issues and temporarily negotiate…. without losing the autonomy of their decisions" (García Linera, 2004: 21).[123] Importantly then, while indigenous movements in Bolivia are fragmented, they do form "thematic alliances" through which they temporally consolidate around an issue that is of common concern. (García Linera, 2004: 21).[124] The Pacto de Unidad mentioned in the previous section of this chapter is an example of this. Ultimately the pact was the unification of movement support for Morales in which the diverse movements listed on Table 4.6 below came together with the common purpose of electing Morales. The movements formed the pact in order to elect Morales in return for the prospective compensation of a constituent assembly and eventual redrafting of the constitution to address indigenous rights. The pact was important because it consolidated support for Morales typically divided by the diversity of their social bases and ideologies, and their competitiveness with one another for resources. To demonstrate this diversity and to learn more about the mobilisation of the movements, the Chapter will now discuss each movement in turn. We begin with Bolivia's central lowland movement CIDOB which is traditionally less mobilised than the highland movements.

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[122] MKN competed in the 1993 elections receiving just 0.8% of the vote share.
[123] My own translation
[124] My own translation

Table 4.6: Overview of indigenous movements in Bolivia

Movement	Year Founded	Movement Type	Social Base
CSUTCB	1979	Highland	Highland indigenous campesinos especially coca growers
CSCIB	1971	Highland	Highland people who moved to lowlands or the 'colonizadores'
Las Bartolinas	1980	Highland	Highland indigenous women
CONAMAQ	1997	Highland	Highland Aymara communities
CIDOB	1982	Lowland	Lowland indigenous peoples

The lowland movement: CIDOB

While lowland movements are generally less mobilised than highland ones, recent plans to build a road through the lowland national park Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS) accelerated mobilisation in the region. Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) is the largest regional movement and is a confederation of eight smaller regional movements (see appendix E for a diagram of the movement's structure). Since Morales initiated a plan in 2008 to build a road through this national park, where many lowland indigenous people reside, CIDOB and its affiliated movements intensified mobilisation culminating in more recent marches entitled "La Marcha Por el Territorio y la Dignidad" (March for Territory and Dignity). CIDOB however, originally formed in 1982 to represent the "pueblos indígena" or "originario" of the lowlands and Amazon (Gustafson, 2003: 273; CIDOB, Interview May 4th, 2013). The movement is mobilised along ethnic rather than class lines and initially mobilised in response to the exploration of their territories by ranchers, loggers and highland Indians incentivised to migrate there to cultivate land during the MNR government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro in the 1950s (Yashar, 2005).

From 1978, the Guaraní people held a series of community meetings for those affected by exploration in their territories. In 1982, with the support of NGOs such as Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (APCOB), these communities formed CIDOB (Yashar, 2005). The military regime of René Barrientos (1964-1982) did not seek to control CIDOB as it had the highland movements, illustrating the apathy of the state toward lowland indigenous people (Yashar, 2005)[125]. As a result, CIDOB continued to organise meetings under the regime and by 1989 it expanded its base and re-established itself as a confederation (Yashar, 2005). As a federation it incorporated movements such as Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CPIB) which mobilised in direct response to the migration of highland communities, known as the 'colonizadores', to their territories to cultivate land. This migration was incentivised by the state since the MNR revolution. The goal was to 'colonialize' and cultivate the lowland region, and therefore increase production of primary commodities (Yashar, 2005; García Linera et al., 2004). In 1990 CPIB, with the support of CIDOB, initiated the first 650 kilometre long, Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad from the lowlands to La Paz (Yashar, 2005).

By 1994 the structure of CIDOB encompassed various communities in the departments of Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz. Later, reforms under the first Goni administration (1993-1997) granted concessions to companies wishing to exploit natural resources in the lowland territories causing an increase in mobilisation (Yashar, 2005).[126] In 1994 Goni introduced the Law of popular participation 1994 (LPP) which decentralised the political system, thereby making politics more accessible to indigenous people living in rural regions (Gustafson, 2003). Also in 1994, Goni introduced an Education Reform which introduced bi-lingual education to indigenous people for the first time (Gustafson, 2003). These reforms stimulated political participation of indigenous people in Bolivia, and led to further mobilisation.

In 1996 CIDOB led a march from the lowlands to La Paz calling for an indigenous law (Ley Indígena), which they hoped, would guarantee the rights of indigenous people and their territories (Yashar, 2005). When the march reached the highlands, CSUTCB joined CIDOB increasing the number of marchers from 200 to 30,000 by

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[125] MNR re-organised the structure of the highland unions to institutionalise party support and left the lowland communities untouched.
[126] Such as 1996 Ley Forestal (or Forest Law)

the time it reached La Paz (Yashar, 2005). The unification of movements for an indigenous law highlights the capacity for movements to form thematic alliances. In 1996, Ley de Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley INRA) was revised to include the legal recognition of indigenous territories which "opened the door" for further legislation on these issues (Yashar, 2005: 217). By 2000, CIDOB incorporated affiliate originario organisations outside the highland departments of Cochabamba and La Paz therefore expanding their base beyond the lowlands (Van Cott, 2005).

Ultimately, CIDOB represent a social base that is organised along ethnic lines and has expanded substantially over the last number of years. While it is difficult to estimate the size of CIDOB's social base, the indigenous population of the lowlands was estimated at 220,000 in 1994 and so we can consider this as the potential base of support for CIDOB (Yashar, 2005). Over 90 per cent of this population resides in the departments of Santa Cruz and Beni where CIDOB are highly mobilised (Yashar, 2005: García Linera et al., 2004). The movement is also highly mobilised in parts of Chuquisaca and Tarija (García Linera et al., 2004). Finally, given that many of these bases live in isolated communities within the Amazon, the radio is a vital tool used to disseminate information about upcoming marches or community meetings (García Linera et al., 2004). Importantly, radio broadcasts are used as the "official communication of the assemblies". These assemblies are community meetings in which leaders decide on a variety of topics, such as Marches or what party to support in the upcoming elections (García Linera et al., 2004: 238).

The highland movements: CSUTCB, CSCIB, Las Bartolinas and CONAMAQ

The CSUTCB is Bolivia's "most important contemporary campesino organisation" (Van Cott, 2005: 273). Specifically, CSUTCB is the "largest indigenous organisation in Bolivia with affiliates in every department" (Van Cott, 2005: 59). Moreover, it is "without a doubt the main force of pressure mobilisation in Bolivia today" (García Linera, et al., 2004: 130). CSUTCB was founded in 1979 during a national congress by the umbrella union Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) in order to unify campesinos against state repression. By the end of 1979, CSUTCB had initiated a series of roadblocks that paralysed transportation in the country for a week and signified the "return of the peasantry as an independent political actor" in Bolivia (Van Cott, 2005: 55).

In the late 1980s the movement was seized by the Quechua coca-growers of Cochabamba, many of whom migrated to the Chapare region to grow coca after Víctor Paz Estenssoro's NEP created huge unemployment in the mining sector (Yashar, 2005). Mobilisation intensified in the mid-1980s when the government implemented coca eradication polices which once again threatened employment (Van Cott, 2005: 57). Soon, the movement incorporated cultural and ethnic demands, often linking the coca leaf with Bolivian identity and cultural freedom (Van Cott, 2005). In 1994, the movement united all the coca growing federations across Bolivia and organised the Marcha Por la Dignidad y Soberanía Nacional (March for Dignity and Sovereignty) in which 10,000 people participated (Van Cott, 2005).

As stated earlier, the movement follows a Katarista ideology, which incorporates both indigenous and campesino identities. Regional leader of CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel Morales claims to be an example of this heterogeneity as he explained that he is Guaraní, an ethnicity typical of the lowlands, yet he is a regional leader in CSUTCB which is an "instrumento de lucha" (instrument of war) from the highlands (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Gabriel explains that some movements only include "indígena" in their documents to gain more resources from international NGOs, thus highlighting the tension between movements in Bolivia (Interview, May 16th, 2012).

Like all Bolivian movements CSUTCB is organised as a national federation (see appendix E). Unlike other movements however, it has affiliations in all of Bolivia's nine departments, which are linked to provincial federations in each department (García Linera et al., 2004). The provincial federations are connected to smaller unions called 'centrals' and 'sub-centrals', which are, in turn, directly linked to the local communities (García Linera et al., 2004). Each of these unions, from 'sub-centrals' to the national confederation itself and has a leader or 'dirigente' (García Linera et al., 2004). At the local level these leaders ensure that their base complies with decisions made higher up in the structure and "with the decisions of mobilisation" (García Linera et al., 2004: 132). Together the CSUTCB operates as one "major mechanism of coordination" with a tight structure through which it can reach its respective social bases (García Linera et al., 2004: 132). The mobilisation of their bases is also aided by radio such as "Radio Soberanía" which is owned by the FSUTCC and broadcast across the Chapare region and some other areas of Cochabamba (Grisaffi, 2013: 58).

Furthermore, CSUTCB is strongly affiliated with other movements which are independent in their own right, and who represent distinct social bases. Firstly, the women's movement CNMCIOB-BS or simply las Bartolinas considers itself the "sister" organisation operating at a parallel level to CSUTCB (García Linera, 2004: 505). Las Bartolinas were founded in 1980 in order to provide a space that was "representative of women" within CSUTCB, which until that point was dominated by men (García Linera, 2004: 505). As an organisation that operates parallel to CSUTCB, some leaders of las Bartolinas have crossed over to CSUTCB, including former Executive Secretary of FNMC-BS (las Bartolinas), Leonilda Zurita who is currently regional leader of CSUTCB for the department of Cochabamba (García Linera et al., 2004: 505, Interview, Leonilda Zurita, May 9th, 2012).

CSUTCB is also closely affiliated with Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (CSCIB) which formed in 1972. CSCIB represent the highland communities that migrated to the lowlands to cultivate the land, known as the 'colonizadores' (the same colonisers that CIDOB mobilised against in the late 1970s). These communities migrated to the lowlands because of the scarcity and contamination of land (due to agro-industry) in the highlands (CSCIB, 2013). In the 1960s the government incentivised the migration through a US backed program called "Alliance for progress" within which a "settlement plan" encouraged migration in order to bolster the cultivation of products for exportation (García Linera et al., 2004: 275). However, the quality of soil in the land was too poor for cultivation and when the state reneged on their promise of assistance, the communities suffered intense economic hardship (García Linera et al., 2004: 277). Today, the movement is affiliated with 36 organisations in Bolivia including COB, and is organised federally in the departments of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Beni, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija.

The final movement to be discussed is CONAMAQ, which was founded in 1997. The movement represents the Ayllus[127] of Aymara people from Potosí, Chuquisaca, La Paz and Cochabamba (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008). Their goal is the reconstruction of "original nations" through the self-determination of indigenous communities (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 1). The main principle of the movement is that the Aymara people should play a role in Bolivian society by protecting the environment of the

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[127] Ayllus means community in Aymara

communities it represents, whilst also maintaining their own cultural, economic and social institutions, such as customary law (García-Linera et al., 2004). The movement is centrally concerned however with the creation of a Constituent Assembly in order to reform the constitution in light of indigenous rights regarding customary law and territories (García-Linera et al., 2004).

The social base of CONAMAQ is smaller and more homogenous than the other movements. Their social base can be found in the "more marginal and poor areas" of Bolivia (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 1). These communities have less formal education and almost exclusively speak indigenous languages rather than Spanish (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008:1). While CONAMAQ began as a confederation with affiliates in Potosí (FAOI-NP) and Oruro (FASOR) it expanded its base to the Aymara people of Cochabamba (Ayllus de Cochabamba) and Chuquisaca. Similar to CIDOB and CSUTCB, the radio plays an "integral role" in mobilising the base by disseminating information and consolidating identity (García-Linera et al., 2004: 336). For example, CONAMAQ broadcast bulletins with information regarding meetings or marches on local radio stations such as the university radio stations (García-Linera et al., 2004: 336).

As mentioned in the introduction, the movement adopts an Indianismo ideology through which they reject "the existing political system and especially the existence of political parties" (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 4). Despite their reluctance to become involved in institutional politics, the movement entered into the Pacto de Unidad with the other movements to support MAS in the 2005 elections. The movement is more interested in "proposing solutions" through roundtable discussions with various organisations as well as government, a strategy preferred over marches or protest (García Linera et al., 2004:329). In 2000 for example, CONAMAQ organised a meeting in an open air theatre of La Paz with all its affiliate organisations to make proposals to the government regarding issues of indigenous territories, natural resources and the reconstitution of indigenous authorities or customary law (García Linera et al., 2004). More recently, in 2012, CONAMAQ held a series of meetings with the mining union to discuss the impact of the industry on indigenous communities (Interview, CONAMAQ, May 29th, 2012). For CONAMAQ therefore, roundtable discussions are more commonplace than mass demonstrations. They have

however, marched with other movements such as CIDOB. In 2002, for example CONAMAQ joined CIDOB and other non-indigenous movements such as Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST) in a march from the lowlands to La Paz and occupied the main plaza outside government buildings until the government would enter into a dialogue with them (García Linera et al., 2004). Additionally, CONAMAQ are key supporters of CIDOB in their current mobilisation around the TIPNIS issue.

The movement however, is less likely to ally with CSUTCB with whom the relationship is more "distanced" (García Linera et al., 2004: 336). In terms of competition for resources in particular, CONAMAQ feel that CSUTCB only act on the interest of the cocaleros, claiming that, "everything is for the cocaleros" while other indigenous communities suffer (García Linera et al., 2004: 336). CONAMAQ also question the autonomy of the CSUTCB given the support it receives from MAS, thus further highlighting the tension between the two movements (García Linera et al., 2004: 336).

Ultimately, the movements of Bolivia are highly mobilised, but also highly fragmented. As demonstrated by the discussion above, each movement represents different social bases from different segments of Bolivia's indigenous population. Some are more tightly structured with a large national social base (CSUTCB), while others are loosely organised and represent a smaller more regional base (CONAMAQ). Some movements work together despite representing very different 'indigenous' communities (CONAMAQ and CIDOB), while others are less likely to unite despite sharing similar ethnicity (CONAMAQ and CSUTCB are both highland identities). In 2005 however, all three movements and their affiliate organisations came together to support Morales as will now be demonstrated. The goal of this section of the chapter is provide an overview of the movements in Bolivia. This thesis argues that because indigenous movements are highly mobilised in Bolivia they can provide a case of support for the contestatory left. The chapter will now turn to the results of field interviews to uncover whether movements did indeed provide support to the contestatory left candidate Evo Morales in the 2005 elections.

4.4 The results of field interviews

As Table 4.7 below illustrates, all the aforementioned movements supported MAS in 2005. Specifically, CSUTCB and their affiliated organisations, CSCIB and the

Bartolinas all supported MAS in 2002 and 2005.[128] CONAMAQ and CIDOB however, only supported MAS in 2005 after the formation of the Pacto de Unidad through which all the movements sought to install a MAS government in order to achieve their common goal of a new constitution. Evidently, their goal was in congruence with that of Morales, who during his campaign promised to redraft the constitution to address indigenous rights. Consequently, the policy of drafting a new constitution acted as the primary prospective compensation in this movement-party alliance in 2005.

Table 4.7: Indigenous movement support for Morales 2002 and 2005

Movement	Type of Movement	Support in 2002	Support in 2005
CSUTCB	Highland	Yes	Yes
CSCIB	Highland	Yes	Yes
Las Bartolinas	Highland	Yes	Yes
CONAMAQ	Highland	No	Yes
CIDOB	Lowland	No	Yes

This section of the chapter will provide empirical evidence that the above movements mobilised their social bases in favour of MAS. This case of Bolivia however, demonstrates that movements can provide support for a party that goes beyond the mobilisation of their respective bases. Firstly, CSUTCB, CSCIB and the Bartolinas all played an integral role in the formation of MAS. They helped to form MAS but were also sure to maintain their own movement identity and not entirely merge into the party. This is important because it allowed them to mobilise their bases as a movement rather than as a party, and therefore maintain their legitimacy among the indigenous bases. Secondly, by uniting under the Pacto de Unidad the movements consolidated their support for Morales, which can help to explain the increase in voter turnout, and indigenous support for MAS between 2002 and 2005. The movements mobilised their bases by using radio broadcasts and their organisational structures to communicate support from the national to the local level. Furthermore, the movements played a vital role in increasing the vote for MAS by ensuring the

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[128] While the Bartolinas and CSCIB are very closely related to CSUTCB, they are treated here as separate independent movements because they represent different and specific social bases.

indigenous people within their bases were registered to vote. The chapter will now turn to outlining these forms of support in more detail and with evidence provided by interview data.

The movement creates the party: CSUTCB and MAS

Originally, the focus of this research was centred on how indigenous movements mobilised support for established parties. In the case of Bolivia, however it soon became apparent that understanding movement-party relations in this way was problematic. Firstly, it implied that "political parties were above the movements and they were wanting to harness the energy created by the social movements from above", understanding relations in this way was simply "too vertical" (Mayra Gómez, Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Secondly, viewing movement-party relations in Bolivia this way is problematic because the established parties had "lost it, they had been completely discredited. So they were in no place to harness anything." (Mayra Gómez, Interview, February 3rd, 2012). That is, existing parties in Bolivia could not be trusted, and so the movements did not view them as potential allies. For instance, Daniel García Pamo of CIDOB explains that the traditional parties could not be trusted because once in power they "distributed the spaces of power, the ministries, only between them and so indigenous movements and the people were always discriminated against, by not forming part of the structure" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). With no potential ally within established politics, the movements had to create their own party or 'abrazo politico' (political arm). Luís Gabriel Morales, regional leader of CSUTCB, explains that "we said, let's put a campesino president into power that will be there to make laws, changes and work for us" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Consequently, CSUTCB created MAS and prioritised the constituent assembly by making it its main goal. As Gabriel Morales explains, "MAS was supported because it was the political arm created to achieve the new constitution" (Interview, May 16th, 2012.).

Indeed, by examining the roots of MAS we can appreciate the part CSUTCB played in its formation. The party roots lie in the coca-growing Chapare region of Bolivia where the cocaleros first mobilised in the 1980s in opposition to the eradication of coca policy proposed first by President Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) and subsequently by Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989). As discussed earlier in this

chapter, the Chapare cocaleros first mobilised through the Cochabamba section of the CSUTCB, the Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba (FSUTCC) (Van Cott, 2005). While the FSUTCC initially mobilised in opposition to the 'eradication of coca' policies, they soon began to incorporate other demands such as indigenous rights, the sacredness of the coca and autonomy for indigenous regions from the state (Van Cott, 2005). In 1994, the CSUTCB leaders met with members of CIDOB and CSCIB to discuss forming an 'abrazo politico' through which the movements could achieve their goals (Van Cott, 2005). CIDOB were apprehensive about creating a political party and instead chose to pursue a policy of self-determination from the state (Van Cott, 2005). The CSUTCB remained committed to the creation of a party and formed Assembly for the Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples (ASP) in 1995 (Van Cott, 2005: 69). In March of that year, leaders of CSUTCB declared that "in an historic congress, the campesino and originarios[129] of the country have said ENOUGH! to the manipulation of the parties of the oligarchy and of colonialism, and we have begun the path of the construction of our own political instrument" (Van Cott, 2005: 70). The Bartolinas, as a movement parallel to CSUTCB, were also involved in the formation of MAS at this point. Former leader of the Bartolinas, Berta Blanco explains that along with CSUTCB and CSCIB, the Bartolinas "decided to create a political arm to defend our rights, and to tackle this we created the political instrument IPSP[130], and so the Bartolinas is one of the leaders of the political instrument" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). CSCIB explain that they mobilised support for MAS in 2005 because they had "built MAS" and that they are "a social arm of this [MAS] government also" (Interview, Gustavo Aliaga, May 27th, 2012).

Due to issues with registration the ASP could not run independently and instead "borrowed" the registration of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), which allowed them to run in six of the nine departments of Bolivia (Van Cott, 2008: 52). Interestingly, this offers an example of an indigenous-left alliance that preceded the 2005 elections because ASP was, at that point, a predominantly indigenously comprised party. With most of their support coming from the cocaleros in the

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[129] Original peoples
[130] As discussed below, when Morales left the Assembly for the Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples (ASP) in 1998, he created the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (IPSP). Berta Blanco is referring to the role of Las Bartolinas in the creation of IPSP, which was later renamed MAS-IPSP, or MAS for short.

Chapare, ASP won over three per cent of the national vote and elected ten Mayors (Van Cott, 2008). In the 1997 presidential election, ASP selected party leader Alejo Véliz as presidential candidate who won three per cent of the vote. The party won four seats in the lower chamber (Van Cott, 2008). Evo Morales won the highest proportion of all national deputies, but was accused of instructing followers not to vote for Véliz in the presidential election that resulted in the departure of Morales from ASP in 1998 (Van Cott, 2008). Morales created a new party with CSUTCB, CSCIB and Las Bartolinas called "Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People" (IPSP) (Van Cott, 2008). However, again due to registration difficulties for new parties, IPSP adopted the legal personality of a defunct socialist party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Van Cott, 2008).The party was officially registered as IPSP-MAS but known as MAS.

The adaptation of the legal personality of MAS demonstrates that the party was content with the perception of a leftist rather strictly indigenous party from the outset. In 1999 MAS won 80 Mayoral positions at the municipal[131] level thus illustrating that its appeal was not restricted to the Chapare region (Van Cott, 2008: 53). The appeal of MAS dramatically increased just three years later when Morales almost clinched the 2002 presidential elections. Indeed, the electoral success of MAS in 2002 was quite unexpected. Jim Schultz, of the Democracy Centre claims "it was a shock, nobody expected them to do so well in 2002" (Interview, May 10th, 2012). Mayra Gómez directly refers to the importance of increased voter turnout in this surprising result claiming that "the importance [here] was the increased voter turnout amongst rural indigenous peoples who were beginning to see a possibility of interaction with the political system" (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Despite the unexpected success in 2002, MAS failed to win the election because according to Mayra Gómez, "2002 wasn't the ripe moment". She continues that;

> "it all happened so fast, the movement seized the situation, the long history of
> mobilisation and resistance was now claiming natural resources, using
> customary law and then the moment came right, but it hadn't been the
> intention or belief maybe, that they [MAS] could take over political power on
> their own". (Interview, February 3rd, 2012).

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[131] Municipalities are the third administrative division of Bolivia following Departments and Provinces. In 1999 there were 311 municipalities in Bolivia, this increased to 393 in 2009.

It is the contention of this research that 2002 was not the 'ripe moment' because MAS did not yet have the consolidated support of all the indigenous movements and their respective bases. Accordingly, MAS could not have taken 'political power on their own' because indigenous movement support was fragmented in 2002. For instance, CIDOB were first approached by CSUTCB in 1994 but declined to participate in a movement alliance (Van Cott, 2005). Instead, CIDOB chose to ally with small local parties such as Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) with whom they had "programmatic affinities", or traditional parties with whom they had "clientelistic linkages" (Van Cott, 2005: 72; 76). Ultimately, these alliances proved futile for CIDOB and in 1996 they approached the leaders of CSUTCB and CONAMAQ about the possible creation of a pact that would pursue a new constituent assembly, but due to "disunity" the pact was rejected (Van Cott, 2005: 72). The idea of a pact was revived in 2002 however and eventually led to the Pacto de Unidad established in 2004 in anticipation of the election. This pact was central to the success of MAS in 2005. For instance, Luís Gabriel Morales of CSUTCB explains that it is possible that MAS would have lost the 2005 election were it not for the "many affiliations" that "all instructed their bases how to vote" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). It was the amalgamation of the affiliations of all the movements in 2005, which bolstered support for MAS.

It is important to note that, while CSUTCB was central to the creation of MAS it, like CSCIB and Bartolinas, have also worked to remain autonomous movements distinct from the party. Rather, during interviews, members of CSUTCB consistently referred to the movement as a central supporter of the 'political arm' (the party) rather than part of it necessarily. Senator Adolfo Mendoza of MAS explains that "CSUTCB is an organisation, or if you like a resource organisation for the peasant movement" (Interview, May 17th, 2012). While this is indeed a blurred line it is important to highlight that CSUTCB and the other movements remain organisations in their own right, albeit inextricably linked with MAS. For example, unlike the Green movements in Germany discussed in Chapter 2, CSUTCB did not merge into MAS, but rather acts as an organ external from the party with its own "autonomy and distinctiveness" (Rucht, 2004: 203).

For this reason, CSUTCB should be acknowledged for the role it played in the formation of MAS. Crucially however, it should also be recognised that by maintaining its identity as an indigenous organisation, CSUTCB could mobilise its

base of support for the party, without losing its credibility among those bases by becoming an institutionalised party. It is for this reason that the movements are adamant to refer to themselves as an instrument or 'abrazo politico' for MAS rather than part of the political party. Identifying with the latter implies a loss of autonomy to a party, and an institutionalisation, which indigenous people are not as likely to support. Indeed, Roberts' (1998) classification of an 'organic model' of movement-party articulation is perhaps the most appropriate way to understand MAS. The author explains that organic models exist where parties "emerge as the political expression of organisation groups in civil society" (Roberts, 1998:75). In such cases, the party "may appear to be more of a movement than an apparatus for electoral contestation" but ultimately movement-party lines are "deliberately blurred" in order to attract a mass of unorganised voters (Roberts, 1998:75). We can also link this to our discussion of party-society linkages discussed in Chapter 2 by categorising the relationship between MAS and CSUTCB as an encapsulating, or participatory linkage in which a party organ is constructed to mobilise the masses (Roberts, 2002). In this case CSUTCB acted as a party organ but it was through the Pacto de Unidad that this organ truly began to consolidate support for the party by incorporating secondary associations all of which proceeded to mobilise their bases in support of MAS.

A Movement alliance: 'El Pacto de Unidad'

The pact was officially created in 2004 by CSUTCB, CSCIB, Las Bartolinas, CIDOB and CONAMAQ and was itself a result of intense mobilisation of these indigenous movements since 2002 (Oporto, 2004). For instance, the Water War and an increase in lowland mobilisation from 2002 onwards led to the articulation of new demands, the centre of which was the creation of a constituent assembly (Oporto, 2004). The pact was "born" during 'La Marcha por la Soberanía Popular, el Territorio y los Recursos Naturales' in May 2002 (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 2012). CONAMAQ joined the march when it arrived in the highlands a month later and together they completed the marched on to La Paz (Garcés et al., 2011). Following this, the movements met in Santa Cruz in November 2003 to discuss a proposal for the creation of a constituent assembly which they entitled "Propuesta de Ley de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente del Pacto de Unidad" (Garcés et al., 2011: 35). The movements continued drafting plans for a constituent assembly

before sending it to the Congressional Joint Committee on the Constitution in 2004 (Garcés et al., 2011: 35).

The main goal of the pact was to ensure a constituent assembly and the construction of a plurinational state with a new constitution (Oporto, 2004). The movements also included the incorporation and further participation of social organizations within the political process in Bolivia (Oporto, 2004). Importantly, the pact was not designed specifically to elect Morales, but rather it was an agreement amongst the movements that they shared a common goal of reconstructing the Bolivian constitution. Moreover, the movements met on many occasions since 2002 to finalise a communal proposal. Senator Adolfo Mendoza of MAS highlights the centrality of the constitution in the Pacto de Unidad explaining that it was a "concrete way of convening a constituent assembly" (Interview, May 17th, 2012). However, in order to achieve their goal, the movements needed to install a president that would deliver on their new constitution in accordance with their vision. The movements chose Morales as their ally and mobilised support among their bases accordingly.

Daniel García Pamo of CIDOB explains that the pact represented the common goal of writing a new constitution in which indigenous rights would be prioritised (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Through the pact, the movements "proposed a new alternative, a new vision for the country" starting with the "recognition of all thirty-six indigenous nations in the new constitution" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). García Pamo describes this as a "united war" by the movements who chose MAS as their "instrument of war" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). CONAMAQ leader, Juan Jose Salina, explains that, "yes, we were part of the Pacto de Unidad and we played an important role" (Interview, May 29th, 2012). CONAMAQ's motivation to participate in the pact was that "the constitution had to be changed to recognise all the indigenous nations and so in 2005 we made the political instrument" (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 2012). Consequently, the "elections have fought to bring Morales to the presidency under the Poncho, under the Pacto de Unidad" (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 2012).

The election of MAS was to benefit all the movements in the pact; "we were all to gain power through MAS" and so "we made the pact to vote for the president" (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 2012). For CSUTCB, the pact was

made in order to make "new laws" and to "achieve the new constitution" (Interview, Luís Gabriel Morales, May 16th, 2012). Therefore, CSUTCB were not only driven by a general desire to elect MAS, the party they helped to create, but also by a specific aspiration to redraft the constitution.

Senator Adolfo Mendoza explains that through the pact, the movements could mobilise votes for MAS in 2005 (Interview, May 17th, 2012). Senator Mendoza adds that this was a collective decision by the movements. The implication of the pact is that in order to create a plurinational state, the movements needed to ally with a party that would initiate this process. With all other parties discredited, the movements, and CSUTCB in particular, created MAS. On the back of the unexpected success of MAS during the 2002 elections, the movements united to support MAS in 2005. Secretary General of CSCIB, Gustavo Aliaga suggests how the pact was deemed the best plan for electing MAS;

> "firstly, to be in government you must start with what you have, for example from our organisation we started, then you add more organisations but we agree exactly and we live together and [recognise] that we have our own experience, we have our own needs, and that has been really important, and with the rural support, indigenous and campesino organizations, elected Evo. I consider that, without this there would have been no government [MAS] and without it there can be no government" (Interview, May 27th, 2012).

Aliaga's words highlight the movements' recognition that the collective effort of mobilising their respective bases could be a powerful tool in ensuring the election of Morales. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the indigenous and campesino organisations for the survival of MAS both in 2005 and for the upcoming 2014 elections. Finally, Froilán Puma Carmona exemplifies the important of the indigenous base in bringing Morales to power when he notes that; "missing from the Pact de Unidad at this time, in 2005, was the middle class and the workers, the Pacto de Unidad was the indigenous people and the syndicate organisations[132], these brought Evo Morales to power" (Interview, May 22nd, 2012).

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[132] Here Froilán Puma Carmona is referring to CSUTCB.

The pact can also be related back to collective-based linkages discussed in Chapter 2 in which citizens become associated with a party through affiliation with a social group or organisation (Roberts, 2002). Arguably, the pact signified the commitment of the movements to mobilise their bases in support of Morales and in doing so their bases became associated with MAS. The Chapter will now outline the specific ways in which the movements mobilised their bases in support of MAS.

The movements mobilise their bases

Froilán Puma Carmona of CONAMAQ claims that in Bolivia you cannot come to power without the support of indigenous people because "we are the base, the majority", he explains that; "we have a name for it…Kollasuyo[133]" (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). This was certainly the case for MAS who, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, relied on the indigenous vote in 2005. The indigenous movements through the Pacto de Unidad were important in mobilising this support as evidenced by leader of CIDOB, Daniel García Pamo who states "all the bases [of CIDOB] supported Morales in 2005" and that MAS and CIDOB were "very tight" in the lead up to the 2005 elections because "we were fighting the same cause" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Furthermore, García Pamo explains how both CIDOB and CONAMAQ worked to "strengthen the structure of MAS" by travelling "to the communities with the new constitution, to publically announce it, to promote it" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). He continues that, "we informed them [the communities] of its importance [the constitution], and especially of the article about rights and how this would benefit them" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Evidently, by promoting the new constitution, the movements were promoting Morales upon whom they relied to implement this policy once in power. García Pamo highlights the enthusiasm for the constitution in the communities by explaining that there was "no need to hold marches" in support of MAS because once CIDOB explained the constitution to these communities, "there was a consensus" that this constitution had to be realised (Interview, May 4th, 2012).

CIDOB played a particularly important role in mobilising their base in favour of MAS given how geographically isolated these communities are, and how typically "excluded" they are from information about elections (Interview, May 4th, 2012).

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[133] Although the precise meaning of Kollasuyo is varied, Puma Carmona is referring in this context *to* the power of the indigenous community of Bolivia, which as a majority holds importance in Bolivian politics.

These bases, typically located in the Amazonian region of Bolivia, have a variety of distinctive languages as well as other barriers to participation. By travelling to the bases, CIDOB overcame the barriers of linguistic, cultural and indeed geographical isolation in the Amazon that MAS, or any other political party would inevitably face if trying to mobilise this base of support. Crucially however, CIDOB did not just disseminate information but they also ensured that voters in these communities were registered to vote, thus potentially increasing the voter turnout of indigenous people in the Amazonian region (Interview, May 4th, 2012).

Indigenous activist Marco Molina describes relations between MAS and CIDOB as "very strong" during the 2005 elections (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). He offers some insight on how movements such as CIDOB mobilised their social bases in support of MAS by explaining the decision making process in indigenous communities. Each community is represented by a "*Capitán* Grande" (or community leader), who meets with the leaders from other communities in a gathering known as an "asamblea" (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). During the asamblea, the community leaders decide on various issues including who to vote for or whether to take part in protests (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). The leaders and their respective communities are "very co-ordinated" with the larger movement who influences their decisions (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). For example, if the movement was organising a march, the leader of the movement will tell each of the Capitan Grandes that "your community should support six people in the march", and they will be provided (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). Crucially, a similar process takes place when deciding on what candidates the movement will support in elections. In 2005 the leader of CIDOB communicated to the Capitan Grandes and regional leaders that, "Evo is our candidate" (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). The Capitan Grandes then return to their bases and inform the community of the decision (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). In conjunction with this, Molina also claims that clientelistic linkages also exist in very secluded areas of the Amazon, where "induced voting" occurs in some cases (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). Nonetheless, it is clear that CIDOB use their federated structure to disseminate decisions made higher up in the movement, which proved an effective tool for mobilising support.

CSUTCB also used the organisational structure of the movement to communicate decisions to the bases through community leaders. Luís Gabriel Morales of CSUTCB explains that the movement holds a congresses and asambleas (or assemblies) every

month with leaders from all nine departments. He uses the departments of Tarija, Pando and others as examples of Congresses held at this level; "Congreso Ordinario de Tarija, de Irupana, de Cobija, de Pando" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). During the departmental Congress, "activities are planned and issues discussed" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Political decisions are also made during these congresses and regional leaders are told what "directions" to communicate to their "base" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). The potential for mobilisation is very high within CSUTCB who claim that some regional leaders have a base of "five thousand people" while "others represent ten thousand" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). This begs the question as to whether some movements, if they have larger base, are more important than others in the eyes of the party. According to CSUTCB, "we have more affiliations yes, but we don't consider ourselves more important", Luís Gabriel Morales continues however that CSUTCB are older and therefore have more "political maturity" than the other movements (Interview, May 16th, 2012). As mentioned above, the implication here is that with more political maturity and affiliations, CSUTCB may have a larger and more organised social base and therefore may provide more support for MAS than other movements. Moreover, given the role CSUTCB played in forming MAS, it could be argued they have provided more reliable and stable support for the party. This adds a further complexity to movement-party relations, which will be addressed in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter.

CSUTCB also used radio broadcasts to communicate to their bases, which as discussed earlier in this chapter can be a useful tool for disseminating political decisions. For instance, whilst asking regional leader Luís Gabriel Morales how the movement mobilises its base, he informed me that "Soy Radialista tambien" (I am also a radio announcer) (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Here Gabriel is referring to Radio Soberanía, the coca growers' radio station in the Chapare region of Cochabamba which is "owned, managed, staffed, and financed" by the Cochabamba section of CSUTCB, Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba (FSUTCC) (Grisaffi, 2013: 58). The radio station is the "voice of the cocaleros" and a source of pride for FSUTCC who painted its walls with images of an old man chewing the coca leaf claiming the leaf is the culture of their ancestors (Grisaffi, 2013: 61; Grisaffi, 2010: 432). According to one journalist from Cochabamba, in 2005, the radio station was used as a common mechanism to

mobilise bases in rural areas of Cochabamba (Interview, May 10th, 2012). The radio is an especially effective tool for those who work outside cultivating coca all day (Interview, May 10th, 2012). Ultimately, CSUTCB have played a crucial role in mobilising their bases for MAS, as Luís Gabriel Morales explains, "our [CSUTCB] role has been important, because the idea was to awaken our social base" (Interview, May 16th, 2012).

CSCIB follow a similar pattern. Secretary General of CSCIB, Gustavo Aliaga explains that "we prepared proposals [for government] for how we might get to be in the next government" he continues that this proposal, referring here to the political proposal of MAS was "socialised within the department levels, the regional levels and this is how to get to power" (Interview, May 27th, 2012). Therefore, CSCIB helped MAS to formulate a plan for government and in order then to ensure the election of MAS, and in turn the implementation of this plan, they went to the bases at the regional and departmental levels and explained the proposal to these bases. This he states "is how we arrived in government" (Interview, May 27th, 2012). He continues that people knew Morales and considered him a leader[134] who "had lived the same experiences of us" and who had worked for the interest of the people in the organisation (Interview, May 27th, 2012). Aliaga demonstrates the blurred lines between party (MAS) and movement (CSCIB) by explaining that they "will always follow this government" because Morales is "one more member" of CSCIB (Interview, May 27th, 2012). Aliaga is referring to how Morales, even now as president of Bolivia, remains a member of both CSCIB and CSUTCB.

Finally, Mayra Gómez provides an interesting perspective on how movements mobilised votes for MAS in 2005. She explains that in 2005;

> "[t]here was a massive campaign because it was led by indigenous people, if anything they were talking to their communities, but they were also reaching out to others, particularly in urban communities and people outside the indigenous group. Consumer societies, the neighbourhood counsel, they were reaching out to everybody" (Interview, February 3rd, 2012).

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[134] Along with CSUTCB, Morales was also the leader of CSCIB and continues to be President of these organisations today, as well as President of Bolivia.

This illustrates that indigenous movements did not only mobilise support amongst the indigenous social base, but, by reaching out to those 'outside the indigenous group' may have been responsible for mobilising support in non-indigenous communities such as mestizos or white people. As indicated by the results on Table 4.5 of this chapter, the support for MAS within these demographic groups also increased between 2002 and 2005. The implication here is that by mobilising support outside of their own communities, indigenous movements in Bolivia played a truly exceptional role in supporting MAS in 2005. Mayra Gómez also explains the ways in which indigenous movements mobilised this support. Firstly, she explains that the movements ensured everyone had opportunity to vote by ensuring "voting rights" (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). The movements did this by "lobbying for additional voting centres in the countryside, easing registration requirements, hitting the pavement on campaigns all over the country and not just cities" and through "word of mouth" (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Definitively, Mayra explains that this occurred at every level of the community "starting with Ayllu politics, the indigenous structures, and then going off to everyone" (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). In other words, the movements secured support within their local communities and movement structures before mobilising support in other non-indigenous communities.

This section of the chapter illustrates the ways in which indigenous movements mobilised support for MAS in 2005. Although the use of radio, canvassing and lobbying undoubtedly contributed to the party's success, the research argues that the most effective way the movements mobilised support was by ensuring indigenous people could vote and by using their organisational structures to effectively communicate decisions to the bases. More generally, by consolidating this support through the Pacto de Unidad the movements increased the mobilisation of support from 2002. The chief motivation for this was the common goal of a constituent assembly and the transformation of Bolivia to a plurinational state. In 2009, MAS delivered on their promise when they held a referendum for the new Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which was ratified with by a majority of over 60 per cent (Corte Nacional Electoral Bolivia, 2009). The first article of the new constitution recognises Bolivia as a 'plurinational' state in which community-based law and linguistic pluralism is legally recognised in accordance with the proposal of the

movements made to Congress in 2004 (Constitución de 2009 de la República del Bolivia, article 1).

The impact of movement support for MAS in 2005 is best described by Mayra Gómez, who when asked whether MAS could have come to power without the support of indigenous movements, claims;

> "No, without social movements they wouldn't have been in power, or, it wouldn't have delivered a 54 per cent lead at a presidential election. It would have probably been local politics like before."[135] (Interview, February 3rd, 2012).

This is in congruence with the argument made earlier in this chapter that although it is difficult to measure the precise impact of movement support for MAS in bringing the party to power, the evidence presented here suggests that their role was not only decisive but also exceptional in terms of movement-party relations.

4.5 Conclusion

The chapter outlined that the movements were integral to the electoral success of the contestatory leftist party MAS in three ways. Firstly, despite founding the party, CSUTCB worked to stay distinctive as an organisation so that they could mobilise support for MAS among their bases. Moreover, the movement chose to refer to MAS as a 'political arm' rather than a political party. This was an effective strategy because indigenous people are wary of such labels. Secondly, the movements formed the Pacto de Unidad which consolidated their support for MAS across diverse, and previously fragmented, indigenous bases. Thirdly, the movements mobilised their bases by maximising their organisational structures to communicate decisions to regional and community leaders, who could then instruct their communities to vote for MAS. Moreover, the movements ensured that those eligible to vote were registered, thus boosting voter turnout and support for MAS.

Finally, it is worth noting the nature of indigenous movement relations with MAS today. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, movement-party alliances are fragile and temporal in nature. This is the case in Bolivia where the strength of the Pacto de Unidad has gradually broken down resulting in the departure of CONAMAQ

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[135] Here Mayra is referring to the performance of MAS in local elections from 1998-2002.

and CIDOB from the pact. The crux of this breakdown is with the failure of MAS to deliver on the perspective compensation i.e. the constitution in a way that satisfies these two movements. That is, these movements are not entirely satisfied with the constitution delivered by the Morales Government in 2009. For Froilán Puma Carmona of CONAMAQ claimed that despite the new constitution holding Plurinational in its title, "we are not living in a plurinational state, we are living in a republican system like before" (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). Specifically, he claims that "the Plurinational State is not working, right now it is just a name, following republican laws, colonisation, extraction and political manipulation" (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). Ultimately, the movement no longer supports MAS because they were supposed to be the party to represent their demands for the elections but CONAMAQ now feel "deceived and betrayed" by MAS (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). In light of this, the movement is currently, "working on self-determination for the next elections."(Interview, May 22nd, 2012.)

CIDOB explain that the Pacto de Unidad is "broken" now that CONAMAQ and CIDOB have left the alliance. (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Specifically, CIDOB explain "now everything is quite the contrary, there is no application of the law we created" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Daniel García Pamo explains that in the communities the people "don't understand what is happening"; he states for CIDOB and its affiliates "it is difficult for us, this agreement, the promise, hope that we had in that moment, it failed" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). He refers especially to the on-going issue with TIPNIS which he says is a problem "was born in 2008, 2009 when the President in his discourse abroad and in the international congress's talks about the defence of Mother Earth (Pachamama), this is a nice discourse but in reality everything is on the contrary" (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Finally, Daniel García Pamo claims that the government is now creating "distrust" within the communities and for this reason "Morales will not win" the next elections (Interview, May 4th, 2012).

CSUTCB however remain the central base of support for MAS. In contrast to CIDOB, Luís Gabriel Morales claims that if there were an election next week they would support MAS, the leader exclaimed; "yes! We will support MAS and the President until the end!" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Kathryn Ledebur of Andean Information network (AIN) provides some insight into the continued support of

CSUTCB for MAS by explaining that the cocaleros and CSUTCB is the "stronghold" of MAS support because they created the party. Moreover, as long as MAS continue to provide employment to CSUTCB and CSCIB, through their policies they will remain loyal to MAS (Interview, May 16th, 2012). This raises the questions as to whether some movements are more important to MAS for support, than others. For instance, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that CSUTCB were more "politically mature", "stronger" and with more affiliations and social base than the other movements (Interview, May 16th, 2012). It could be implied that because CSUTCB has a stronger social base, upon which MAS relies, MAS will support CSUTCB in whatever social conflicts arise, thus producing rivalry and dissention between the movements.

In the case of TIPNIS, CSUTCB are in favour of the construction of the highway through the national park because it will enhance the transportation of coca and other products. CIDOB and CONAMAQ on the other hand are in opposition to the highway because it trespasses on indigenous lands. This is an extremely contentious and a highly polarising debate in Bolivia today. Moreover, it is one that is almost exclusively between indigenous movements. MAS and CSUTCB have not backed down to the social pressure of the marches made by CONAMAQ and CIDOB, or when they do, they almost immediately renege on their promise to halt construction because of the social pressure of CSUTCB and CSCIB, highlighting their allegiance to these movements. This presents an interesting challenge for MAS in the upcoming 2014 elections. MAS have lost the support of two central movements who represent very particular bases. However, the bases of the CSUTCB, CSCIB and Bartolinas remain firmly in MAS' favour. The right in Bolivia is gearing up for a comeback as opposition campaigns emerge more vehemently than ever in Santa Cruz. In a rare alliance, the right in Santa Cruz have even openly supported the marches by CIDOB and CONAMAQ in defence of TIPNIS.

More recently, CIDOB and CONAMAQ announced that they "will not support the MAS, we are not satisfied we do not want members that are subordinate to a party" (Arellano, 2013). Instead the movements announced their plan to borrow the name of a pre-existing party and run their members within this with the "priority" of winning uninominal seats (Arellano, 2013). This move to local seats represents an interesting course for the movements indicating that they are no longer interested in entering into

alliances with political parties for presidential elections but will instead concentrate on local elections. Indeed, the 2014 elections will demonstrate whether MAS can win the elections with the cocalero base alone. If so, the 2014 elections may provide an opportunity to assess whether some movements really do matter more than others.

Chapter 5: Peru

"In 2006, we entered into a bet with President Humala…we believed in Humala

because he was challenging the right...who were a danger to us all"

- President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrión

Pintado (Interview, June 22nd , 2012)

Introduction

The second case study selected for the qualitative analysis is Peru where the 2006 elections signalled a left turn in a country previously dominated by neoliberal President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and his successor, centrist President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). Peru was selected because despite a large indigenous population which represents a total of 47 per cent of the total population, indigenous movement mobilisation is low. Given that indigenous movement mobilisation is the principal explanatory variable, low mobilisation in Peru compared to high mobilisation in Bolivia provides variation within the independent variable across cases. As with Bolivia however, there is also variation within the case of Peru because indigenous movements in the lowlands are more mobilised than their highland counterparts. This is the opposite of Bolivia where highland movements are more mobilised. In light of this contrast, we expect to see different results in Peru than we did in Bolivia. Specifically, because mobilisation is low it is anticipated that the movements are less effective at mobilising support for the left and therefore the parties do not perform as well at the national level, despite a potentially large social base. This is not to say that the movements failed to mobilise support the left within their bases, but that because mobilisation of the movements is low, it did not have the same impact as the movements in Bolivia. Accordingly, we expect to see lower support for the left. More specifically, because the 2006 elections in Peru was a contest between candidates of the 'Two Lefts, we expect to see less support for the contestatory left in particular with whom indigenous movements are most likely to ally. The case of Peru therefore, provides an opportunity to address the secondary puzzle of the two lefts.

The 2006 presidential elections in Peru took place during a time of immense discontent with persistent corruption and a lagging economy (Schmidt, 2007). Opinion polls in 2005 indicated that 80 per cent of Peruvians were 'not very satisfied

with democracy', indicating that political discontent was pervasive (McClintock, 2006). Unlike Bolivia however, discontent was not met with mass mobilisation on the streets. Instead the desire for change was demonstrated by a record high voter turnout in 2006 of 90 per cent (McClintock, 2006). Therefore, while discontent was prevalent in both Bolivia and Peru in the run up to the elections studied, it manifested in different forms of political action in each case. Interestingly, in Bolivia mass mobilisation was followed by the election of a contestatory leftist president and in Peru there was an absence of mass mobilisation and the defeat of the contestatory leftist candidate and success of the moderate left. Therefore Peru offers the opportunity to explore variation in support for the left generally as well as variation in support for the types of left which emerged. It is anticipated that indigenous movements supported the contestatory left but their low levels of mobilisation meant they were less effective at translating support into electoral success than their Bolivian counterparts.

Two leftist candidates dominated the 2006 election in Peru. The first was former president Alan García (the moderate left candidate) and the second was newcomer Ollanta Humala (the contestatory left candidate). While Humala won the first round of elections (with just over 30 per cent of the vote share), he lost in the second round by five per cent (La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)). Importantly, Humala won much support from the majority indigenous provinces in both rounds. He won 63 per cent of the vote of those who self-identified as indigenous in the 2006 Latin American Opinion Poll (LAPOP) survey in the second round of the 2006 elections (Madrid, 2012). Accordingly, the 2006 election provides a case in which a contestatory leftist candidate lost the second round of the election yet received the majority of its vote share from indigenous people. This chapter will assess the role of indigenous social movements in mobilising support for Humala within their social bases and investigate the impact of this support. Five indigenous movements, both lowland and highland, are discussed. They are Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú (CONAP), Confederación Campesino del Perú (CCP), Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) and Confederation National de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por la Minera (CONACAMI). While the original intention of this research was to address the 2006 elections alone, interviews revealed that indigenous movements provided

stronger support for Humala when he ran again in 2011 and was elected president. This presented an opportunity to assess movement support for a candidate across two electoral cycles and in doing so observe whether the variation in Humala's success can be explained by a variation in movement support across this time. Therefore, both the 2006 and 2011 elections are analysed in relation to movement support in this chapter. As with the case of Bolivia, the chapter will proceed by firstly providing a historical background on Peru. Secondly, the context and results of the 2006 elections will be discussed before turning to an overview of the movements in Peru. The results of field interviews are first presented in light of the 2006 elections and second in light of the 2011 elections, an overview of which is provided later in the chapter.

5.1 Historical background

The city of Cuzco in the highlands of Peru was once the centre of the Inca Empire (1438-1532) that stretched as far north as Ecuador and as far south as Chile (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). Peru was colonised by Spain in the 16th Century and the city of Lima became the 'City of Kings' under Spanish rule (Skidmore and Smith, 2001:183). Apart from the unsuccessful revolutionary revolt by the indigenous leader Túpac Amaru II (1780-1781) there was little resistance to Spanish rule. Indeed, it was the Argentinian liberator José San Martín who liberated Peru in 1821. San Martín met with the other great liberator of the Americas, Simón Bolívar in 1822 who was central in the subsequent battles with Spain in 1824. Although Spain refused to recognise the independence of Peru, under Bolívar the independence movement successfully freed Peru from colonial rule.

In the post-independence era a number of issues emerged which remain central characteristics of Peruvian politics today. The first is the persistence of caudillismo ('strong-man' or dictatorial style leadership) politics centred on the military leaders and the second is the political instability that comes with this style of politics. For example, there were 15 constitutions and 35 presidents within the first forty years of independence and only four of these presidents were elected according to constitutional procedures (Scott Palmer, 2011). The first civilian president was Manuel Prado elected in 1872, over fifty years after San Martín liberated the country. Politics was for the elite only and conditions for indigenous people in particular in no way improved under independence. Despite representing over 70 per cent of the population in the 1820s, indigenous people were treated as subalterns in Peruvian

society and were forced to work as labourers on the haciendas (plantation) of large land owners, or they tried to pass themselves as mestizos to find employment in the cities (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). From the outset then, it was clear that the only way indigenous people could become part of Peruvian society was to "abandon their own heritage" and assimilate into the Spanish and mestizo dominant society (Scott Palmer, 2011: 237).

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) with Bolivia and Chile, bankrupt Peru and the traditional elite in power. To alleviate their war debts Peru offered up key infrastructure and resources. For example, in 1889, Britain cancelled over US$200 million worth of debt in exchange for Peru's railroads, the Lake Titicaca steamship line, subsidies, free use of major ports and a large area of Jungle land (Scott Palmer, 2011). This initiated a trend of dependency on foreign nations, which would be an inherent factor of Peruvian politics throughout its history.

Despite a brief period of civilian rule (1895-1919), political instability re-emerged in the period 1919-1968 during which time populist leaders from mass-based parties and military leaders dominated politics. It was during this time that Peru's strongest mass-based party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) first emerged. APRA captured newly emerging social forces within the labour and student movements and also captured the middle-class sectors of the northern coast (Scott Palmer, 2011). From 1956 to 1982, APRA was a centre-conservative party that was willing to make alliances with former enemies to gain political power (Scott Palmer, 2011). In 1962 for instance, APRA formed a coalition with its "archenemy" former military dictator General Manuel Odría (1948-1956) to govern Peru. Other political parties emerged during this time including Acción Popular (AP) founded by Fernando Belaúnde Terry who was elected president in 1963 and whose base of support could be found in the southern highlands of Peru (which is mostly populated by highland indigenous Indians) (Scott Palmer, 2011). Importantly, unlike other Latin American countries, the political cleavages that emerged in the region at this time were based on divisions over military versus civilian rule than on liberal-conservative divides (Scott Palmer, 2011).

By 1968 the Belaúnde government was usurped by the military regime of Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). Velasco's government was the first to

implement any real reform since independence and is considered one of Peru's "most ambitious military governments" (Skidmore and Smith, 2001: 208). As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, a central reform of Velasco was his Agrarian Reform Law, the slogan of which was "Land for those who work it" which directly appealed to the highland indigenous Indians who were working on the large haciendas (Cant, 2012). Between 1969 and 1980 over 360,000 farmer families received land titles as a result of Velasco's reforms (Scott Palmer, 2011). The reforms also gave rise to new social actors such as agricultural co-operatives and neighbourhood associations. Citizenship participation however remained very much 'top-down' in structure which took place through government agencies such as the National Social Mobilisation Support System (SINAMOS) set up by the Velasco regime.

Political instability re-emerged however and another military leader, Francisco Morales Bermúdez, overthrew Velasco in 1975. Finally, a Constituent Assembly was set up in 1978 and the first constitution since the post-independence years was ratified in 1979. The constitution stipulated that national elections should take place every five years and municipal elections every three years beginning in 1980 (Scott Palmer, 2011). The constitution limited the presidential term to five years and formally established a bicameral legislature in which there were 60 seats in the Senate (upper house) and 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). Crucially however, the constitution introduced universal suffrage and lifted the literacy requirement which excluded indigenous people in particular. The 1980 elections gave rise to new parties such as the Izquierda Unida (United Left) (IU) established in 1980 which was a broad alliance of leftist parties. Other existing parties re-emerged to contest the elections such as Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Christian Party) (PPC).

Former military leader Belaúnde won the election in coalition with PPC. Ensuing economic hardships[136] and the escalation of violence by the region's most "radical and violent guerrilla organisation" the Shining Path[137] led to the election of APRA's Alan García in 1985 (Scott Palmer, 2011:266). García had led a successful personalistic campaign and once in power began a policy of nationalisation, starting with the banks (Scott Palmer, 2011). In 1990, Alberto Fujimori was elected president.

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[136]Foreign debt rose to over US$13 billion by 1985.
[137] Who announced their 'peoples war' on the eve of the 1980 election.

Fujimori had successfully campaigned on a platform of anti-party politics. In 1992 he initiated an autogolpe (or self-coup) in which he dissolved congress. In 1993 a new constitution was ratified which restricted immediate re-election of the president and reorganised the legislature into a unicameral congress consisting of 130 members (Scott Palmer, 2011). It also increased the powers of the executive (Scott Palmer, 2011).

Ultimately, the Fujimori era ushered in the "progressive deinstitutionalisation of electoral politics and a return to more personalistic approaches at the centre" (Scott Palmer, 2011: 253). While mass parties dominated politics between 1919 and 1968, a growing sense of antiparty politics emerged in the second half of the 20th century. As a result Peruvian politics is marked by "flamboyant" leadership styles in which parties are "personalist vehicles" (Scott Palmer, 2011: 237). Politics is based on personal figures rather than political parties and as a result the multi-party system is fragmented and highly volatile. For instance, in 1995 fourteen groups contended for the presidency and in 2000 there were 12 competing parties for the presidential elections (Scott Palmer, 2011). Peru is also a semi-presidential system but the power remains in the hands of the president who nominates the prime minister. Politics has also been dominated by authoritarianism; since independence nondemocratic regimes have ruled the country "three-fourths" of the time. (Scott Palmer, 2011: 265). Even with the establishment of electoral democracy in 1980, Peruvian politics has been largely "democratic in form but authoritarian in substance" (Scott Palmer, 2011: 226).

Throughout its history then, elections have been "intermittent and tentative" and focused on the will of the oligarchy (Scott Palmer, 2011: 254). Indeed, electoral restrictions throughout history have excluded non-elite sectors of society and reinforced elitism. For instance, the secret ballot was not introduced until 1930 and the property ownership requirement was lifted in 1931 (Scott Palmer, 2011). Women were granted the right to vote in 1956 but a literacy requirement was particularly exclusionary until it was lifted with universal suffrage in 1980. The exclusionary nature of Peruvian politics is also reflected in the low mobilisation of social and political groups, who have played "less of a role in politics" in Peru than in any other country in the region (Scott Palmer, 2011: 252). While 30 per cent of the workforce was incorporated into unions in the 1980s, this declined to less than 10 per cent by 2000 (Scott Palmer, 2011).

The dominance of personal leadership over party ties is evidenced in a study conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in 2005 that found that, of the politicians interviewed, most elected officials viewed party affiliation useless once they came to office (NDI, 2005). Politicians are unlikely to toe party lines and instead they operate in a state of constant conflict with one another, even within their parties. The NDI report on Peru's political party system indicated that the caucus spokesperson for Perú Posible (Peru Possible, PP) often contradicts statements by his own party's ministers and publically criticised the party leader, and President of Peru, Alejandro Toledo.

Finally, there is little political oversight in this personalistic political culture. The principal Congressional Oversight Committee (Comisión de Fiscalización), which drives political debate in Peru and is highly publicised and therefore a position on the committee "is the most coveted assignment in Congress", further demonstrates the priority of personal exposure for politicians in Peru (NDI, 2005: 13). This dominance of personal figures over political parties was also a central component of the 2006 elections, to which the chapter now turns.

5.2 The context of the 2006 election

A central theme for elections in Peru is 'el mal menor' (or 'the lesser evil') referring to the poor quality of candidates presented to the electorate. This was a common theme in both the 2006 and 2011 elections. In 2006, the choice between Ollanta Humala of Unión por el Perú (UPP) and Alan García of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)[138] is considered one of 'el mal menor' (Espinosa Pezzia, 2008). This theme continued in 2011 when Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa claimed the choice of candidates was like choosing between "AIDs and terminal cancer" (Levitsky, 2011: 85). Later in the campaign he publically lent his support to Humala, a decision rooted in a vote against Humala's opposing candidate, Keiko Fujimori, than for Humala (Levitsky, 2008). The recurrent theme of 'el mal menor' is substantiated by the former[139] president of the National Congress of Peru, and representative of Humala's party Gana Perú, Daniel Abugattás when he explains that; "Indigenous people supported him [Ollanta Humala] in both elections, not because of

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[138] APRA is also referred to as PAP.

[139] At the time of interview (June, 2012) Daniel Abugattás was the President of Congress. His term ended in July 2012.

some identification or because he is seen as a leader but, because he is the lesser evil" (Interview, June 15th, 2012).

A second characteristic of Peruvian elections is the importance of 'personal figures' over party ties. This is the legacy of the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), an era often referred to as 'Fujimorismo'. Many of Fujimori's reforms debilitated the political party system in Peru and it has yet to recover. Tanaka (2011: 77) notes that Peruvian parties are "weak and personalised organisations" and are only concerned with the pursuit of political power. Moreover, Peruvian parties "lack any roots in society" and are "virtually devoid of ideological contours or policy positions" (Tanaka, 2011: 77). According to Antolín Huáscar Flores, president of the highland campesino organisation Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), "figures, or candidates, are more important than political parties" (Interview, June 21, 2012). He uses the case of Humala in 2011 as an example in which a candidate with a weak party can win an election, "look at Humala, he won and he has no party" (Interview, June 21st, 2012).

 Marleni Canales Rubio, an indigenous rights lawyer and former president of el Consejo Consultivo de Pueblos Indígenas, de la Comunidad Andina (CAN)[140], also highlights the role of "personal figures" in Peruvian elections when she states that Peruvian people are "influenced by generated opinions on a 'personal figure' rather than their conviction, or their proposed policy" (Interview, June 19th, 2012). The president of highland organisation CNA states that "there are no parties, and especially no real opposition parties" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Of particular concern to this research, Marleni Canales Rubio describes political parties in Peru to be like "western political parties" which act as a "conglomerate of individuals who come together for certain purposes" (Interview, June 19th, 2012). She argues that this is simply "incompatible with the goals of Peru's indigenous people", and as a result, their relationship with parties is particularly difficult (Interview, June 19th, 2012).

These two characteristics of Peruvian electoral politics potentially present significant implications for this research. Firstly, if elections are centred on a lesser evil, Peru presents a very different motivation for support than Bolivia, which was driven by an

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[140] Marleni Canales Rubio served as President of CAN in 2010 and works closely with indigenous movement Confederation National de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por la Minera (CONACAMI)

unequivocal ideological congruence with the policies of MAS. This relates to the second characteristic, the personalistic nature of Peruvian parties, which may imply an allegiance to a candidate's personality rather than their ideological positioning. This is an important consideration for this study, which posits that indigenous movements support leftist parties based on ideology. Despite these idiosyncrasies, this research finds that indigenous movements, with the exception of CONAP, supported Humala in both 2006 and 2011. While this support was in part motivated by 'el mal menor', movements also strongly identified several policy proposals as a reason for lending their support. Many of these policies in 2006 are characteristic of the contestatory left including the nationalisation of natural resources and the cultivation of coca. Although Humala moderated to the centre-left in 2011 he continued to appeal to indigenous votes by pursuing polices of social inclusion and indigenous land rights. As will be discussed later in this chapter, movement support for Humala was greatly motivated by these proposed reforms.

A final factor that is important in the case of Peru is the relationship between political parties and indigenous communities. As discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, indigenous movements are crucial intermediaries between a distrustful indigenous social base and parties. Indeed, movements bridge the gap between this social base and parties by mobilising support for the party in their communities. In Peru, the relationship between indigenous people and political parties is particularly disaffected. As explained by Marleni Canales Rubio above, Peruvian parties are 'incompatible' with indigenous people (Interview, June 19th, 2012).This is reflected in the statement by CONAP president, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez who claims that indigenous people in the lowlands in particular "have no trust in the political system" (Interview, June 11th, 2012). Moreover, the presence of political parties in indigenous communities is largely absent demonstrating the unimportance of this base to most parties. Javier Torres, president of civil society organisation Asociación de Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), describes the behaviour of political parties in highland indigenous communities as the following;

> "It is like the rural communities during festivals, nothing happens all year, everything is closed and there are few people around, but for the week of the festival it is crowed with people, and then on the seventh day everything returns to normal. Political parties are like this. They all converge on the

community during elections and speak with people. They arrive in buses and bring you to the [voting] location. There is a mountain of unknown people whose only goal is to get you to the location. Then they leave." (Interview, June 20th, 2012).

The implication here is that there is a clear disconnect between indigenous communities and political parties in Peru and so we would expect that movements play a particularly important role as intermediary between base and party. Arguably, this role was especially important in the 2006 elections because there was "no major party or candidate that strongly identified with southern Peru" which is predominantly populated by poor and indigenous communities (Schmidt, 2007:815). Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) reports that the representation of indigenous movements and their participation in national politics during the 2006 election was "not present in either the structure or platforms of political parties" (IDEA, 2006: 1). Indeed, the discourse regarding indigenous politics in Peru during the 2006 elections was weak in comparison to that of Bolivia in 2005. With no indigenous party, weak ties to existing parties and a relatively reticent indigenous discourse throughout the elections, indigenous movements in Peru had no option but to ally with contestatory leftist candidate Ollanta Humala who was the only candidate to appeal to the indigenous vote (Madrid, 2011).

The results of the 2006 election

Table 5.1 below lists the results of the first round of the 2006 elections along with the ideological positioning of the competing parties. They include; Ollanta Humala whose party Unión por el Peru (UPP) represents the contestatory left in this study and Alan García of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) which represents the moderate left. Lourdes Flores Nano of the conservative electoral alliance, Unidad Nacional (UN) was also a central contender and so is included in this part of the discussion. Two further candidates are listed on Table 5.1 below including the Martha Chavez of the right-wing Alianza por el Futuro (AF), Valentín Paniagua of Frente de Centro (FC) a centrist personalist party and finally Humberto Lay leader of the evangelistic party, Restauración Nacional (RN). As the table indicates, the three main contenders for the first round were Ollanta Humala, Alan García and Lourdes Flores.

Table 5.1: The results of the first round of the 2006 election

Candidate	Party	Valid Votes in the first round (%)	Ideology
Ollanta Humala	Unión por el Perú	30.61	Contestatory Left
Alan García	Partido Aprista Peruano	24.32	Moderate Left
Lourdes Flores	Unidad Nacional	23.81	Right
Martha Chávez	Alianza para el Futuro	7.40	Right
Valentín Paniagua	Frente de Centro	5.80	Centrist
Humberto Lay	Restauración Nacional	4.37	Christian Conservative
Others		3.7	
Total valid votes		83.9	
Blank votes		11.9	
Null votes		4.2	

Source: La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)

In 2006, Ollanta Humala ran as the presidential candidate for the leftist party UPP (Schmidt, 2007). Although he originally announced his candidature for presidency with his own party Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP), the party incurred difficulties with registration and instead "struck a deal" with UPP (Schmidt, 2007: 816). As a former army-officer with no political experience Humala opted for an 'anti-system' strategy in which he appealed to the public's disenchantment with the political system (Cameron, 2009: Meléndez, 2006). This strategy was particularly effective amongst the disillusioned poor and indigenous communities (Meléndez, 2006). Consequently, Humala represented an outsider who offered a new alternative to 'politics-as-usual' in Peru (IDEA, 2006). Javier Torres president of SER in Peru explains that "Humala's discourse in 2006 marked a return of the discourse of the left in the electoral process of Peru for the first time since the 1990s" (Interview, June 20th, 2012). Indeed, Humala was the first "significant leftist candidate for more than fifteen years" (Interview, Javier Torres, June 20th, 2012). This is reflected in the policies pursued by Humala in his 2006 campaign including a proposal to increase state control of the economy and nationalise natural resources (Schmidt, 2007). Humala also strongly opposed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, which was a central issue during the elections (McClintock, 2006). Moreover, Humala was a "virulent nationalist" and pursued close ties with late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez who it was claimed, helped to fund Humala's campaign (McClintock, 2006: 100; Schmidt,

2007).Humala also campaigned for the protection of coca cultivation by opposing eradication policies introduced by previous governments (Schmidt, 2007). Populist and nationalist rhetoric was evident throughout his campaign. He contended that should the right-wing candidate Flores Nano be elected, this decision should be "overturned in the streets" (Schmidt, 2007: 817).

Many of these policies appealed to indigenous voters. For instance, his vehement opposition to the FTA was centred on a claim that it would "ruin the competitiveness of local crops" which are predominantly grown by highland campesinos (IDEA 2006:3). Humala's opposition to the FTA also appealed to lowland communities who feared the agreement would lead to an increased presence of private companies in their territories. In addition, Humala's position on the production of coca appealed to coca growing campesino communities of north central Peru.

In conjunction with his polices, Humala occasionally used his "largely unspoken" ethnicity to appeal to indigenous voters (McClintock, 2006: 101). Humala was born in the city of Lima, was privately educated and is "neither indigenous nor white" (McClintock, 2006: 101). His 'indigenous roots' are by default because they are consequence of a nationalist-ethnic ideology developed by his, father, Isaac Humala, in the 1960s called "etnocacerismo" (or ethno-nationalism) (Schmidt, 2007: 815). Etnocacerismo advances the superiority of Peru's indigenous culture and the "copper-coloured" indigenous majority over other ethnicities (Schmidt, 2007: 815). While Humala was forced to distance himself from his family during the campaign[141], he occasionally referred to etnocacerismo in his campaign rhetoric (McClintock, 2006; Madrid, 2012). Therefore, Humala's ethnic appeal is more because he is perceived as a friend of indigenous people due to his father's ideology. None of the movements in this study claim to support Humala because they perceived him as an indigenous candidate.

Alan García ran with his party APRA, which is Peru's oldest, most established and well-organised party (McClintock, 2006; Dietz, 1998). In stark contrast to Humala's strategy of 'anti-politics' García's candidacy was tainted by the mistakes made in his

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[141] Humala's father claimed that if he were President he would grant an amnesty to incarcerated members of the terrorist organisation Sendero Luminoso. In a separate incident his mother claimed that all homosexuals should be "shot" (McClintock, 2006:101). Finally, Humala's brother, who is much more radical, ran against Humala in 2006 (McClintock, 2006).

previous presidential term (1985-1990). During his first term, García was responsible for "the worst economic crisis in Peru's history" culminating in increased poverty and food shortages (McClintock, 2006: 102). At the end of his term the newly installed[142] President Alberto Fujimori ordered a warrant for García's arrest forcing him to flee to Paris, only to return in 2001 to face Fujimori in the presidential elections (McClintock, 2006). Despite his misgivings, support for García was strong within APRA's traditional support base along the north coast of Peru (McClintock, 2006).

In 2006, García positioned himself as an alternative to the extreme left of Humala and the conservative ideology of Flores Nano (McClintock, 2006). García aligned himself with the icon of the moderate left, former president of Brazil Luiz 'Lula' da Silva. Lula was seen as "the model for the progressive left" and García was keen to follow his example (Starr, 2006). His moderate left approach is also evident in his position on the FTA, which García did not oppose, but rather proposed the formation of a multi-party commission, to review the agreement (IDEA, 2006).

García claimed that he learned valuable lessons from his first term that provided him with experience and an edge over the other candidates (Schmidt, 2007). He also appealed to younger voters (who did not remember the blunders of his previous term) by playing 'reggaetón' music throughout his campaign travels and in advertisements (Schmidt, 2007). His appeal to campesino and indigenous voters was much more subtle. His policy of "la sierra exportadora" (the "exporting highlands") could be argued to target campesino voters by focusing on "dramatically increasing" the exportation of over 26 highland-agricultural products (McClintock, 2006: 103). Originally considered a long shot for the election in January 2006, García gained much momentum by the first round of elections and qualified for the run-off with Humala in June 2006. Before addressing the second round in more detail it is important to consider the campaign lead by the closest contender to Humala and García, Lourdes Flores of the conservative electoral alliance, Unidad Nacional (UN).

Flores represented the right-wing conservative electoral vehicle, and although it is not the subject of this study should be discussed for two reasons. Firstly, Flores was the "clear frontrunner" leading with 32 per cent support from decided voters in October

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[142] Fujimori was elected by the people in 19990, but staged an 'autogolpe' (self-coup) in 1992 in which he dissolved Congress and transferred all power to the executive branch.

2005 (Schmidt, 2007:816). By early January 2006[143] however, Humala overtook Flores in the polls, thus demonstrating the preference for a contestatory left over a conservative right candidate (Schmidt, 2007). Indeed, Flores' biggest weakness was her association with the rich elite and neo-liberal businessmen of Peru (Schmidt, 2007). Additionally, Flores advocated the FTA with the US claiming it was "key to the development of Peru" thereby illustrating that her polices were centred on ideals of neo-liberalism (IDEA, 2006). While Humala presented himself as the "ordinary Joe", Flores was dubbed the "candidate of the rich" and dropped to third place in the first round and elimination from the race (McClintock, 2006: 102).

The electoral result of the first round highlights the distribution of votes according to the demographic divide of Peru. As Figure 5.1 below indicates, Humala relied heavily on the support of majority indigenous departments.[144] García's support came from minority indigenous departments such as Piura, Ica and La Libertad (Van Cott, 2005). Flores meanwhile won the department of Lima, where a third of the electorate resides and contains an indigenous population of ten per cent (Van Cott, 2005).[145] In addition to the support from indigenous majority departments, Humala won the majority in the shantytowns of the city of Lima where many rural indigenous migrants reside (Schmidt, 2007: 817). Ultimately, much of Humala's support came from indigenous people and departments such as Ayacucho and Huancavelica, where the "impoverished" and those of "indigenous decent" reside (McClintock, 2006: 96).[146]

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[143]The first round of the election took place in April

[144]Peru has twenty-five departments, five of which are majority indigenous departments, namely Apurímac, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Puno, and Ayacucho. Please see Appendix F for a map of Peru divided by departments.

[145] Most of Lima's indigenous population live in the poorer parts of the city of Lima and migrated there for work or to escape the terror of Sendero Luminoso in rural areas during the 1980s.

[146]Humala won over 62 per cent of the vote in Ayacucho and 59 per cent in Huancavelica.

Figure 5.1: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority indigenous departments in the first round of the 2006 election

Source: Author's own compilation, adopted from Van Cott (2005) and La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)

Although this pattern of support continued in the second round (displayed in Figure 5.2 below) it was not enough to win the election overall as Humala lost by five per cent. The second round was marred by a series of events that greatly damaged Humala's popularity among non-indigenous voters. Firstly, the encroaching presence of Hugo Chávez affected Humala's reputation. Chávez initially endorsed his "compadre" Humala at the beginning of the campaign but his support soon escalated into a political spat directly with García (McClintock, 2006: 104). For example, Chávez criticised the then sitting president Alejandro Toledo for his preliminary signing of FTA and García responded by claiming that Peruvians should be able to negotiate with the US as Chávez had done with oil (McClintock, 2006: 104). Chávez called García a "swine, a gambler and a thief" and as the conflict escalated both countries withdrew their ambassadors to the shock of the Peruvians (McClintock, 2006: 104). As a "disciple of Chávez" Humala was greatly affected by this turn of events (McClintock, 2006: 104). Opinion polls indicated that Peruvians would not vote for Humala precisely because of his association with Chávez (McClintock,

2006). Later in the campaign Humala arrived late to a televised debate and claimed that García supporters blocked his route. However, CCTV footage revealed that the delay was a result of Humala's unscheduled stop in a local shop (McClintock, 2006). Such events created a political opportunity for García who bolstered his leftist appeal by "matching" some of Humala's leftist policies in the second round such as advocating the renegotiation of contracts with international corporations and focusing on social and labour issues (Schmidt, 2007: 817). García coined a new slogan for this policy of "responsible change" during the second round and his apparent strategy to incorporate some of Humala's positions into his own campaign reflects the popularity of his leftist discourse in the first round (Schmidt, 2007: 817). The results of the second round are displayed on Table 5.2 below and indicate that Humala lost the election by five per cent.

Table 5.2: The results of the second round of the 2006 election

Candidate	Party	Valid Votes in the second round (%)
Ollanta Humala	Unión por el Perú	52.6
Alan García	Partido Aprista Peruano	47.3

Source: *La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)*

Despite losing the election in the second round, Humala managed to maintain the support of indigenous people which increased by over 17 per cent in the five majority indigenous departments in the highlands (see Table 5.5 below which displays Humala's vote 2006-2011). In the lowland departments of Pasco, Amazonas and Ucayalí all of which have an indigenous population of over ten per cent, support for Humala in the second round increased by over 15 per cent in each case as displayed in Table 5.2.

Indeed, as was the case in the first round there was a clear geographical breakdown in the electoral results, which correspond with departments of high indigenous populations. More specifically, while García won the departments along the north coast, the indigenous departments of the highlands "overwhelmingly orientated toward Ollanta Humala" (Panfichi, 2006: 2)[147]. This is depicted on Figure 5.2 below in which Humala relied on the support of the indigenous departments. While this

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[147] My own translation

support was not substantial enough for Humala to win the election, it demonstrates the level of support Humala received from indigenous voters.

Figure 5.2: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority indigenous departments in the second round of the 2006 election

Mean Departmental Vote in the Second Round, 2006

Source: Author's own compilation, adopted from Van Cott (2005) and La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)

The indigenous vote is at the heart of this project which is concerned with the role the movements played in mobilising support among the communities. The chapter will now turn to a discussion of the movements in Peru and their role in mobilising support for Humala in the 2006 elections. This is followed by an analysis of movement support in 2011.

5.3 The movements

While indigenous movement mobilisation is markedly lower in Peru than in Bolivia, it would be erroneous to assume that indigenous movements in Peru are completely de-mobilised. For example, the mobilisation of lowland movements within the Amazonian region of Peru offers "a regional enclave for indigenous organising" (Yashar, 2005: 250). Table 5.3 below provides an overview of these movements and

their social bases. Although, like Bolivia, they are all organised under a federal structure with affiliates across Peru, the indigenous movement as a whole remains nationally fragmented and internally divided (Lucero and García, 2007: 242). Unlike Ecuador for example, where corporatist policies instilled a sense of "solidarity and community ties" amongst the country's indigenous population, Peru's corporatist policies had the "opposite impact-generating greater tension, distrust and competition" amongst indigenous movements (Yashar, 2005: 241). One exception to the typically fragmented relationship of these movements is the Conference of the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples of Peru (COPPIP), which was first held in Cuzco in 1997. The conference was an attempt to unite highland and lowland movements into one national organisation. By 2001, AIDESEP and CONACAMI were leading forces in a revising the organisation, which they called, the Permanent Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples of Peru (also COPPIP). The COPPIP provides an example of highland and lowland cooperation, which although led by AIDESEP and CONACAMI, also incorporates the other movements (listed below) on issues such as constitutional reform proposals (Van Cott, 2005). However, the COPPIP is not institutionalised or as strong as similar organisations in Ecuador or Bolivia and it largely remains "a space to develop common strategies" than an organisation within its own right (Van Cott, 2005: 163).

Table 5.3: Overview of indigenous movements in Peru

Movement	Year Founded	Movement Type	Social Base	Federal Structure	Estimated number of social base[148]
AIDESEP	1979	Lowland	Amazonian and lowland regions	222 regional organisations representing 64 indigenous peoples	350,000 people[149]
CONAP	1987	Lowland	Amuesha People in the Amazon	35 affiliate organisations across 11 departments	150,000 people[150]
CCP	1947	Highland	Campesinos working within the Agricultural sector		
CNA	1971	Highland	Campesinos working within the Agricultural sector	114 agrarian leagues, across 17 departments representing 1,385 grassroots organisations	174,000 peasant communities[151]
CONACAMI	1997	Highland	Indigenous Communities affected by mining across Peru	24 Regional organisations across 18 Departments	Represents over 1,135 communities across 16 departments[152]

Source: Author's own

The lowland movements

AIDESEP formed in 1979 and is the most prevalent and active movement in Peru since the 1980s (Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 2005). AIDESEP's goal is to unite the different ethnic communities within the Amazonian region in order to address issues such as land appropriation and the promotion of bi-lingual education (Yashar, 2005). By 1998 AIDESEP represented 42 of the 59 federations within the Amazonas (Yashar, 2005). Notwithstanding this success, the movement remains internally divided since its formation. In 1987, members of the Amuesha group left AIDESEP and formed Confederation of Amazonia Nationalities of Peru or CONAP (Van Cott, 2005). While both organisations are active today, CONAP "remains the relatively weaker, less internationally connected organisation" (Van Cott, 2005:159).

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[148] It is important to note that these figures are purely estimates based on a variety of sources. It is very difficult accurately estimate the social base of any movement. Consequently, the figures above can only truly act as indicators of the size of a social base.

[149] According to http://www.aidesep.org.pe/

[150] Estimated figure in 2002 according to Van Cott (2005: 159)

[151] According to a report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in 1998

[152] According to current president of CONACAMI Magdiel Carrión Pintado, (Interview, Magdiel Carrión Pintado, June 22, 2012)

In 1982, AIDESEP formed international alliances with other indigenous movements in surrounding countries (Hughes, 2010). The result of these alliances was the formation of the Coordinator of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) in 1984, which represents eight Amazon basin countries and is led by AIDESEP (Hughes, 2010). AIDESEP were also instrumental in forming alliances with other movements within Peru as demonstrated by the establishment of COPPIP discussed above. Their role in establishing national and regional land associations is greatly aided by the funding they receive from international NGOs such as Oxfam America (Albó, 2008; Hughes, 2010). By 2000, AIDESEP united 222 regional and local organisations throughout the Amazon, encompassing 64 Amazonian peoples (Van Cott, 2005). In 2009, the movement received international attention when they clashed with police in the Amazon city of Bagua, resulting in the death of 34 people including ten civilians and 25 police officers (Hughes, 2010). The mobilisation of AIDESEP at this time was driven by the decision of then president Alan García to privatised indigenous communal lands. This marked a period of immense mobilisation in the Amazon and is discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

AIDESEP were politically active since the 1980s when they placed candidates in local and regional elections (Van Cott, 2005). The movement was also instrumental in registering thousands of undocumented indigenous people during the 1980s and 1990s (Van Cott, 2005). Importantly, the movement played a role in politicising indigenous people in the amazon by holding workshops with their affiliated federations on the electoral processes and distributed information on political participation in indigenous languages (Van Cott, 2005).

As previously mentioned CONAP separated from AIDESEP and established itself as an independent movement in 1987. By 2002, CONAP included 35 affiliated federations representing an estimated population of 150,000 indigenous people throughout eleven departments of Peru (Van Cott, 2005). It is organised into 5 regional headquarters, 12 directives and a secretary of women's affairs (Van Cott, 2005). Current President of CONAP Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that CONAP is a defence organisation for the struggle of indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon including the defence of collective and individual rights of indigenous people (Interview, June 11th, 2012). It represents over 67 ethnic groups in the Amazon

all of which have their own distinct language and culture but a common vision to advance indigenous rights such as the protection of their cultural identity and territories and the provision of bi-lingual education (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). In conjunction with these rights CONAP are also concerned with the protection of biodiversity and an indigenous 'cosmovision' ('viewpoint') (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that indigenous people of the amazon are "different from national society" and are "now fighting for our lives, for our territories" in Peru (Interview, June 11th, 2012).

Similar to AIDESEP, CONAP was also politically active from the late 1980s onwards. While CONAP did not place candidates from their organisation in elections, they facilitated independent indigenous candidates wishing to compete in local elections (Van Cott, 2005). According to former president of CONAP Cesar Sarasara, running independently from CONAP is necessary "in order to keep the national organisation free from involvement in electoral politics that might distract or divide it" (Van Cott, 2005: 159). Instead, CONAP offered their support to independent candidates by allowing them to "speak at CONAP and other affiliate's meetings" and aiding in their registration for election (Van Cott, 2005: 159). This reflects the position of CONAP, which is to "not to belong to a political party" (Van Cott, 2005: 161). This remains the position of CONAP today and is best expressed by current president of the movement Oseas Barbarán Sánchez who states;

> "CONAP should not have any association with any kind of political institution or political party, neither of the left nor the right, because CONAP is a protest movement and should act independently and autonomously in its decisions" (Interview, June 11th, 2012).

Despite the desire to remain autonomous from political parties however, CONAP also stated that they "should look for strategic alliances with other political parties" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). This seems to contradict the statement above, and indicates that while the movement believes it should remain autonomous it also recognises that in order to achieve their long term goal of the legislative protection of their rights, the movement will have to seek alliances with parties. They are particular about the kind of party they are willing to work with

however. CONAP claim that alliances should only take place with "their own" political party which should have an "Amazonian doctrine and not a Marxist one" and who should be "purely indigenous" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). With no such existing party it appears CONAP would need to establish this party themselves. The possibility of CONAP establishing such a party however remains uncertain. In 2002, former president of the movement Cesar Sarasara claimed that "CONAP does not aspire to seek national congressional offices until it has developed a strong regional electoral base" (Van Cott, 2005: 161). CONAP has yet to establish this base because they do not claim to support any of the recent congressional candidates from Amazonian territories such as Eduardo Nayap Kinin, elected to congress in 2011. The lack of support for Nayap may relate to his running under Humala's Gana Perú party in 2011 rather than independently, and he is also of Awajún peoples represented by AIDESEP (La República, 2012).

Ultimately, the Amazonian movements present an exception to the otherwise weakly mobilised indigenous movements of Peru. Higher mobilisation in the region is attributed to the role of NGOs and Catholic Church in providing structural assistance and supporting networks amongst indigenous groups (Yashar, 2005). Moreover, mobilisation in the Amazonian region was also aided by the fact that the region, until recently had, "maintained autonomy from the state for most of Peru's history'" (Yashar, 2005: 250). Finally, the region emerged almost unscathed by the atrocities of the civil war with Sendero Luminoso, which debilitated and destroyed indigenous communities in the highlands (Yashar, 2005).

The highland movements

Indigenous mobilisation in the highlands of Peru can be traced back to the 1920s when traditional "juntas comunales" or community boards were legally recognised by the state as a form of local authority (Van Cott, 2005: 145). The juntas helped to organise indigenous communities who were experiencing harsh labour conditions and struggling to regain their land (Van Cott, 2205). By 1923, indigenous mobilisation intensified and a rebellion to reclaim land emerged across the Andean departments resulting in the filing of thousands of lawsuits to the state for the reclamation of land (Van Cott, 2005). This is an important consideration in the study of mobilisation in the highlands of Peru because it provides evidence that mobilisation did occur but was

later incapacitated by the reforms implemented by the Velasco regime (1968-1975), and later again by the civil war with Sendero Luminoso (1980-1992). Everardo Orellana, leader of CCP in Junín, explains that mobilisation in Peru is not the same as Bolivia "because the civil war debilitated the movements from organizing" (Interview, June 11th, 2012). According to Marleni Canales Rubio, "over 70 per cent of the highland population were disappeared" during the internal conflict with Sendero Luminoso and this explains low mobilisation in the highland (Interview, June 19, 2012).

The exception to this is the formation of campesino organisations called *rondas campesinos* in the northern department of Cajamarca during the late 1970s. The rondas were indigenous community organisations that formed in response to the theft of livestock and were supported by local political parties (Van Cott, 2005). By the 1980s, communities across the Sierra formed rondas in order to fight Sendero Luminoso who brutally targeted them (Van Cott, 2005).[153] The relevance of the rondas is that while not officially a movement, these local organisations adopted an ethnic element and is used as an exception to typically weak mobilisation in the highlands (Van Cott, 2005).

The oldest indigenous movement in Peru is the highland Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP) formed in 1947 which was principally concerned with issues of labour and land. During the 1950s CCP was involved in massive land invasions in the Andean region[154] and later began to incorporate other demands such as access to primary education. In the 1960s mestizo Hugo Blanco joined CCP becoming the central figure of the movement. Hugo Blanco mobilised campesino communities, especially in Cuzco were mass rallies were held and "fostered a fundamental change in the collective self-perception of indigenous peoples" who were "once ashamed to wear their ponchos and speak Quechua" (Van Cott, 2005: 146-147). The mobilisation of campesino communities in the highlands was driven by CCP and it is estimated that over 300,000 campesinos participated in over 300 land invasions during the 1960s (Van Cott, 2005). Leftist parties such as APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party also played a supportive role in this mobilisation, thus illustrating the long history of CCP alliances with the "urban left" in Peru (Van Cott, 2005: 147). These

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[153] The Peruvian government provided the rondas with arms to fight Sendero Luminoso
[154] The departments of Cuzco, Pasco and Junín were especially mobilised.

parties were urban-based at the time and sought worker-peasant alliances with rural indigenous organisations such as CCP and the Cuzco Federation of Workers (FTC) in particular[155]. Such alliances however were difficult to sustain as ethnic demands clashed with class-based struggles concerning with land and labour (Van Cott, 2005). The lack of unity and distrust amongst campesino communities acted as a division within the movement (Van Cott, 2005).

In 1968, the reforms made by the Velasco regime benefited some sectors of CCP more than others creating tension within the movement (Van Cott, 2005). The establishment of Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) by Velasco in 1972 for example, debilitated CCP as it provided an alternative space for campesino mobilisation. A central part of SINAMOS was the creation of Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), which was designed to defend indigenous land and convert it into cooperatives (Yashar, 2005). As a government-sponsored organisation with more resources, it inevitably became more popular amongst the communities leaving CCP incapacitated at both national and local levels (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). With the fall of the Velasco regime in 1972 CNA was subject to oppression by the Morales Bermúdez regime (1975-1980) which revoked the reforms of Velasco. In 1979 however CNA reconstructed itself as an autonomous organisation (CNA, 2013). CNA now represents a social base of 174,000 peasant families through its federation structure that includes; 17 agrarian federations (departmental level), 114 agrarian leagues (provincial level), 1,385 grassroots organisations (organizaciones de base) (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, 1998). CNA represents small farmers and campesino communities working within the small-medium sized agriculture sector and promotes projects concerning food security and sustainable agriculture (CNA, 2013).

The CCP re-mobilised during the 1990s and currently claims to represent small farmers and campesino communities working within the small-medium sized agriculture sector (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 14th, 2012). The organisation became involved in formal politics and alliances with political parties from the late 1990s onwards. In 1999, they made alliances with political parties for national legislative elections including Alejandro Toledo's Peru Posible (Van Cott, 2005). In

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[155] The FTC is now an affiliate of CCP and a central part of the federation structure

2001, the CCP and affiliate organisations again entered in to a political alliance with Toledo in which the support and votes of CCP members was "conditioned on the fulfilment of pre-election promises" (Van Cott, 2005: 154). This is a clear example of a movement-party alliance, which this research investigates and highlights the willingness of CCP to enter into such alliances. Similarly, in 2001 CNA entered into a similar alliance with the right-wing Unidad Nacional and even provided funds for their campaign (Van Cott, 2005). In contrast to CCP however, members of CNA were appalled at this alliance and initiated protests culminating in the destruction of the office of CNA and the decision by the organisation to avoid political alliances thereafter (Van Cott, 2005).

The final highland organisation to be outlined is CONACAMI which formed in 1999. CONACAMI are primarily concerned with the mining sector in Peru which greatly affects their communities (Van Cott, 2005). Since 1992 the number of hectares mined in Peru increased from four million to twenty-five million, resulting in major environmental and health implications for indigenous communities (Van Cott, 2005). Given the large number of communities affected by mining CONACAMI has a large base of support that spans 18 departments encompassing over 1,135 communities across 24 regional organisations (Interview, Magdiel Carrión Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Their social base is predominantly communities from the northern Sierra but also some communities from the lowlands and along parts of the coast (Interview, Magdiel Carrión Pintado, June 22nd, 2012).

In July 2002, the organisation underwent a period of mobilisation as it led a march through Lima demanding government attention to indigenous rights and economic, social and environmental harm caused by mining (Van Cott, 2005). The national march was entitled "Por la vida, la tierra, el agua y el agro" and was centred on three issues. The first was the demand that the World Bank modify its fiscal policies towards mining companies. The second demand was related to respect of indigenous people and their territories through the implementation of a "Ley de Consulta Previa" (Albó, 2008). Thirdly, there was a call for a political economy that prioritised agriculture and to change the national legislation to incorporate rights of the communities and the environment (Albó, 2008).

Like its Amazonian counterpart AIDESEP, CONACAMI is an international organisation that works with affiliates in Bolivia and Ecuador. In 2001, CONACAMI invited indigenous leaders from Bolivian (such as CONAMAQ) and Ecuadorian movements (such as ECUARUNARI) to Cerro de Pasco in the Andean Region of Peru for a conference on the impact of mining on indigenous communities (Albó, 2008). It is a regionally recognised organisation since its involvement in large-scale protests against President Toledo in 2002 (Van Cott, 2005; Lucero and García, 2007). Although its members are primarily indigenous Quechua speakers, CONACAMI did not incorporate indigenous demands until 2003 when its leaders travelled to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to petition against the Peruvian government. It was during this trip that CONACAMI first articulated its demands along ethnic lines. It now considers itself a movement between campesino and indigenous ethnicities. This is explained by CONACAMI president Magdiel Carrión Pintado when he states that "while the organisation first formed to protect communities affected by mining, it has taken other trajectories too, such as climate change, food sovereignty, creation of a people's constitution, criminalisation of protest, and defence of people's territories (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). The chapter will now outline the support provided by these movements to Humala in 2006 and 2011.

5.4 The results of field interviews

With the exception of CONAP, indigenous movements supported Humala in both the 2006 and 2011 elections, as indicated on Table 5.4 below. Before turning to the interview data, the chapter will now briefly outline some key aspects of the 2011 election that are important for this study.

Table 5.4: Indigenous movement support for Humala 2006 and 2011

Movement	Type of Movement	Support in 2006	Support in 2011
AIDESEP	Lowland	Yes	Yes
CONAP	Lowland	No	Tacit Yes
CCP	Highland	Yes	Yes
CONACAMI	Highland	Yes	Yes
CNA	Highland	Yes	Yes

Firstly, in 2011 Humala "presented a different face to voters" by moderating his extreme left position and distancing himself from 'Chavista' inspired policies (Sánchez-Sibony, 2012: 114). Humala publicly requested that Chávez refrain from meddling in Peruvian politics in 2011 (Sánchez -Sibony, 2012). Instead Humala publically aligned himself with Lula just as García did in 2006 (Dennison, 2011).With his new coalition party Gana Perú, Humala's campaign motto was La Gran Transformación (or 'the Great Transformation") and included proposals for cheaper consumer price for natural gas and redistributive social polices (Sánchez -Sibony, 2012: 114). He also vowed to recover natural resources that were typically exploited by foreign companies (El Comercio, 2011). Two polices however appealed directly to indigenous voters.

The first was the plan for social inclusion which involved the creation of a Ministry to address issues of poverty and development directly affecting indigenous communities (El Comercio, 2011).The second policy proposal was a constitutional amendment that would ensure that Peru's constitution and domestic law were amended to be in compliance with article 169 of the International Labour Organisation Convention. The convention stipulates that indigenous people must be first consulted before the state can take any action that may affect their territories (Stetson, 2012). This was called the *Ley de Consulta Previa* (the law of prior consultation) And was of utmost importance to all indigenous movements because it would prevent private investment in the Amazon without prior consultation (which directly affects the lowland movements). It also offered protection for the expansion of extractive industries such as mining without prior consultation. Humala developed this policy in the aftermath of lowland protests in Bagua. Therefore, while Humala moderated his nationalist and contestatory leftist rhetoric in 2011 his policies sill appealed to the indigenous people who voted for him again in 2011, as Table 5.5 indicates. This relationship is best summed up by AIDESEP who claim that in 2011 "Humala had to moderate in order to convince the people in Lima that he was not radical" but "the indigenous vote for Humala was certainly for his government plan in both 2006 and 2011" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012).

Table 5.5: Humala's percentage valid vote share across both rounds in 2006 and 2011, by department[156]

Department	Indigenous population % of Department	2006 Round 1 (%)	2006 Round 2 (%)	2011 Round 1 (%)	2011 Round 2 (%)
Highlands/Sierra					
Puno	66.01	51.5	69.6	62.71	77.90
Apurímac	64.69	57.4	73.8	51.48	68.40
Ayacucho	60.67	62.4	83.4	58.04	72.10
Huancavelica	56.33	59.3	76.4	55.46	72.23
Cuzco	55.43	56.3	73	62.61	77.10
Huánuco	26.72	43.9	63.8	44.09	63.46
Arequipa	17.21	48.5	64.6	47.87	65.91
Junín	13.14	40.9	62.7	38.28	54.66
Cajamarca	1.09	28.6	52	31.58	51.16
Coast					
Ancash	31.75	30.9	47.5	30.83	58.32
Tacna	21.73	48.8	60.8	57.15	73.46
Moquegua	21.29	42.6	53.4	47.81	66.75
Lima	9.06	23.7	38	21.26	42.47
Ica	6.1	27.9	40.8	31.00	50.09
La Libertad	0.52	15.6	27.4	24.63	43.34
Tumbes	0.49	23.6	46.6	27.85	45.77
Piura	0.34	25.8	44.4	31.18	47.66
Lowlands/Amazon					
Pasco	12.12	28.4	46.6	30.42	51.03
Amazonas	10.6	32	57.6	40.81	58.62
Ucayali	10.54	33.7	49.5	39.15	54.25
Loreto	4.5	30.6	52.8	29.30	56.53
San Martin	2.64	34.7	58.8	36.04	52.13

Source: *Author's own compilation, adapted from Van Cott (2005: 142), Yashar (2005: 234) and La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE).*

In conjunction with the support for his polices, Humala also received support because he was once again, 'el mal menor'. His opponent, right-wing Keiko Fujimori is the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori who was serving a twenty-five year

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[156]The correlation between indigenous population and first round of the 2006 results was 0.85.The correlation between indigenous population and second round of the 2006 results was 0.79.The correlation between indigenous population and first round of the 2011 results was 0.77.The correlation between indigenous population and second round of the 2011 results was 0.81.

sentence for crimes committed during his presidency ranging from corruption to murder and kidnapping (Tanaka, 2011). According to AIDESEP, Fujimori represented a "very dark part" of Peru's political history (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). For some, "the key difference" between 2006 and 2011 elections, was that the candidates in 2011 were "very distinctive" and there was a strong 'anti-Fujimori' vote in 2011(Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, June 18th, 2012). There was a deep 'anti-Fujimori' sentiment among the movements which further motivated them to support Humala. Fujimori's polices included a 'tough-on-crime' public safety policy entitled 'mano dura' (or 'the strong hand') for which she hired the counsel of New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (Sánchez -Sibony, 2012: 113). Her economic policies were a repeat of those implemented by García and Toledo, prioritising the business community and neoliberalism (Sánchez -Sibony, 2012).

Another key difference between the 2006 and 2011 elections was the mobilisation of indigenous movements around indigenous rights to territory in the Amazon, which began in 2008 and escalated into the violent clashes with police in Bagua in 2009. Peru is a signatory to UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), and to the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 (ILO169). The latter stipulates the Right to Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) in which indigenous people must be consulted on any legislation that may directly affect them (Stetson, 2012). In 2008 AIDESEP claimed that García's policies violated the above convention and declaration because the FTA with the US and other polices affected the territories of indigenous people across Peru and were being pursued without prior consultation (Stetson, 2012). In August 2008, AIDESEP organised a meeting of over 1,900 indigenous communities in Lima who came together to initiate a peaceful protest against these policies, and more generally against extractive industries in indigenous territories (Hughes, 2010). AIDESEP were particularly anxious to reverse Decree LD No. 1090 which would see over 45 million hectares of the Peruvian Amazon lose protected status, thus opening it up for and private investment or agricultural development (without prior consultation) (Hughes, 2010).

In response to the 2008 protest, the Congress "promised to reverse the decrees affecting" indigenous people (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, June 18, 2012). However, this promise was reneged upon and resulted protests in Bagua

in 2009 where AIDESEP and its affiliates conducted public demonstrations, road and river blocks, strikes and occupations of oil and gas installations throughout the Amazonian region (Stetson, 2012). The road and river blocks proved to be a particularly effective strategy in disrupting transport in the region. As tension escalated García declared a state of emergency in the five departments of the Amazonian region (Amazonas, Cuzco, Loreto, San Martín and Ucayali) (Stetson, 2012). AIDESEP leader, Alberto Pizango declared that indigenous communities had a right to insurgency (Hughes, 2010). In June 2009, García deployed the military and police resulting in clashes and the death of thirty-four people (ten civilians and twenty-four police officers) (Hughes, 2010).

The case of Bagua is important because it marks a turning point in indigenous mobilisation in the Amazon. Moreover, other indigenous movements of the highlands such as CONACAMI mobilised in support of AIDESEP in the lead up and aftermath of Bagua. Crucially, however, the case of Bagua strengthened the relationship between indigenous movements and Humala because he supported the movements and condemned García's actions. This greatly increased movement support for Humala in 2011. According to AIDESEP, "Humala's party was the only one that supported us and for this reason Ollanta was given support" in 2011 (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, June 18th, 2012). Therefore it is argued that the case of Bagua, and the mobilisation directly preceding it, is central in understanding why the movements, with the exception of CONAP, provided strong support for Humala in 2011. This has an important implication for the way we understand movements in Peru, which are typically weak and fragmented. After Bagua the movements across Peru united against García and neoliberalism in a new way by together articulating their demands for indigenous rights to their territories. Moreover, by supporting the movements during this time Humala could strengthen his relationship with them and rely on their support in 2011.

This section of the chapter identified the central aspects of the 2011 election in order to provide background information essential for the understanding of relations between Humala and the movements across two electoral cycles.

Movement support for Humala in 2006

Javier Torres, of civil society organisation SER, explains that, in 2006, Humala was the first "real" leftist candidate to run in Peruvian elections since 1990 and "so logically, all the social movements, big and small, indigenous or not, supported Humala" (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). In particular there was a "natural convergence" between Humala and indigenous social movements, which was based on Humala's opposition to neoliberalism (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Indeed support for Humala was based on the shared "grand enemy of capitalism, the transnationals and the mining companies" (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Humala's support was partly based on his ethnic appeals through his father's ideology of etnocacerismo as previously discussed. According to one observer during the 2006 campaign Humala claimed that the "real Peruvian is the Indian and mestizos" such as "those of the mountains jungles or coasts" (referring to both lowland and highland indigenous people) (Andersen, 2010: 22). Consequently, "the matrix of campesino and indigenous movements thought Humala had an ethnic discourse" in 2006 and so supported him (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012).

Movement support for Humala is evident in an interview with AIDESEP in which Communications officer for AIDESEP, Edson Rosales Figueroa states that his movement supported Humala because he opposed previous governments such as Fujimori, Toledo and García (during his first term) who pursued development polices based on "purely" extractive industries which were "were affecting the Amazon" (Interview, June 18, 2012). AIDESEP mobilised votes for Humala "across the Jungle" including the "emblematic" zones of Cenepa and Huampani both in the Amazonas department where Humala won a majority (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012).[157] Edson Rosales Figueroa states that the "decentralised" structure of AIDESEP helped them mobilise support for Humala because they have offices throughout the Jungle, making it "very easy" to contact the social bases (Interview, June 18th, 2012). If bases are easy to contact, the implication is that the movement can mobilise these bases more efficiently and more quickly.

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[157] These zones are part of AIDESEP's stronghold within the Amazon region. This region also holds significance for Ollanta Humala as he was based there during the Cenepa War in 1995, in which Peru and Ecuador fought over disputed land along their border (Ostrowska, 2010)

Importantly, decision making within the Amazon revolves around the community leaders who call a meeting to decide "the best course of action" when it comes to political decisions such as voting (Interview, June 18th, 2012). While AIDESEP did not explicitly outline how they mobilise votes, it can be implied by Edson Figueroa's reference to the structure of the organisation that decisions made at these meetings are disseminated throughout the organisation using this federal structure. Crucially however, unlike many of the Bolivian movements, AIDESEP is not a 'top-down' organisation in which the hierarchy makes decisions. In AIDESEP there is no hierarchy. Rather AIDESEP is a bottom-up movement in which the president, Alberto Pizango is "a voice" for all the organisations within AIDESEP, and that the real power lies with the Apu chiefs in the communities who ultimately decide what will happen within their bases (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Javier Torres notes that "Pizango doesn't have the power to change the decisions they make, he is only the 'voice' for these communities" (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). This is a defining difference between AIDESEP and other movements in Peru (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012).

Undoubtedly then, political decision making within AIDESEP is consultative and ultimately in the hands of the chief of each community. It could be argued however, that while this bottom-up structure exists, movement leader Alberto Pizango may still influence decisions within the organisation because he is trusted as their representative and he is the person who meets with government representatives and politicians. Therefore it is likely that the opinion of Pizango holds much weight within the communities and that the chiefs are likely to agree with his propositions in terms of political decisions. Consequently, while this bottom-up, consultative structure is important, political decision-making may implicitly lay in the hands of Pizango and AIDESEP. Regardless of who is in charge, AIDESEP openly supported Humala in 2006. Their central motivation was that his polices on extractive industry and neoliberalism was congruent with their goals. For instance, Edson Figueroa explains that this support was based on "a promise" that Humala would respect indigenous people, their "cosmovision" and their views on sustainable development and environment within the Amazon (Interview, June 18th, 2012).

Unlike AIDESEP, the president of CONAP, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, is keen to declare the movements' independence from political parties claiming that they did not

support any party in the 2006 elections (Interview, June 11th, 2012). Specifically, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that CONAP is a protest organization that is set up to defend the rights of indigenous people in the Peruvian Jungle and that to align with a party would result in the loss of the organization's "essence, independence, transparency and autonomy"(Interview, June 11th, 2012). For CONAP to support any political party, "left or right" would contradict the very "constitution" of the movement (Interview, June 11th, 2012). To align with a party would be a "major risk" for the movement which should instead act "independently in its decisions" (Interview, June 11th, 2012).While it is clear that CONAP do not mobilise votes among their bases for candidates, the president of the movement also emphatically denounces Alan García. Referring to García, he states that the 2006 election was "one in which a candidate who never fought for indigenous people ran" (Interview, June 11th, 2012). Specifically, indigenous people "were invisible" to García and perceived as "savages" with "no rights" (Interview, June 11th , 2012). While it is clear that CONAP as a movement do not mobilise votes within their community for any party, the criticism of García by CONAP's president suggests that there may have been a natural convergence of indigenous people with Humala rooted in the common enemy of García and his neoliberal policies, as proposed by Javier Torres of SER. Indeed, this natural convergence is evident when Oseas Barbarán Sánchez states, that as president of the movement, "I cannot use CONAP to support Humala" because the movement "must maintain independence" (Interview, June 11th, 2012). Ultimately, the movement does not mobilise votes for any candidate but the denouncement of García and implied support of Humala by CONAP's president illustrates the natural convergence of indigenous people of the amazon with Humala in 2006.

The highland movements are more explicit in their support for Humala. For instance, President of CNA, Antolín Huáscar Flores openly declares that the movement supported Humala in 2006. Referring to the indigenous people of the highlands and the emergence of Humala in 2006 he states; "imagine these people were waiting for a change, they were waiting for a great transformation" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Specifically Antolín explains that "we were waiting to see who could change poverty, especially in places in the south like Puno, Cuzco, Ayacucho and Huancavelica" and when CNA examined Humala's policy proposal they felt he would bring this change (Interview, June 21st, 2012). This support is evident in the electoral success of

Humala in the aforementioned departments in 2006. Antolín Huáscar Flores also provides insight into how his movement mobilised support for Humala by firstly referring to the structure of the organisation, which he describes as a "pyramid" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). The structure begins with CNA at the top which includes Antolín Huáscar Flores as the "leader" and moves to the agrarian federations in 15 departments. This level is followed by the provincial and regional agrarian leagues and finally to smaller local and community organisations situated at the bottom of the pyramid (Interview, June 21st, 2012).

As leader of the movement, Antolín Huáscar Flores travels to all the regional organisations during "the period of campaigning" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). For example he states that he travelled to Cuzco and Apurimac in 2006 and visited all the offices and institutions of CNA where he is "trusted and has influence" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). During his travels he discusses candidates with the regional offices and helps them "further evaluate" what candidate they should support, for example he may say "look this candidate is not for us maybe this candidate is better" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). In conjunction with this, CNA call a national assembly with the leaders of all their organisations to debate the candidates; "for example, some say support Humala and some say no, it's a debate" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). At the end of the national assembly meeting "we decide, yes this guy and we say ok, now go and pass the message to your bases" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Therefore, like the case of many of the highland movements in Bolivia, CNA mobilise support for parties using the structure of the organisation to 'pass along' their candidate choice to the social bases. Importantly, Antolín Huáscar Flores is eager to clarify that the movement is "not paid" for this support but rather it is "unconditional support" based on the policy proposals of candidates (Interview, June 21st, 2012).

CONACAMI also lent their support to Humala in 2006. We can refer here to the opening quotation of this chapter in which President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, states that "in 2006, we entered into a bet with President Humala" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). They supported Humala because his party offered something "new" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Interestingly, CONACAMI viewed Union por el Peru (UPP) as a nationalist party rather than a leftist party, which he claims "had lost all credibility in Peru" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). CONACAMI "believed" in Humala in 2006 because he "was challenging all those on the right"

who were a "danger to us all" (Interview, June 21st, 2012). This illustrates once again that a common enemy in the right can act as a motivation for indigenous movement support for Humala.

Finally, regional leader of CCP, Everardo Orellana[158], explains that their movement supported Humala in 2006. Interestingly however, CCP only supported Humala in the second round of elections because they entered their own candidate in the first round. It was not until their candidate lost that CCP gave Humala their support in the run-off (Interview, June 14th, 2012).

Evidently, movement support for Humala was strong in 2006. Indeed, CONAP is the only movement to emphasise their independence and autonomy from political parties. The other movements declare their support for Humala was based on his proposals to alleviate poverty and respect indigenous viewpoints. This support however, is also based on unification against the common enemy of the right as mentioned by many of the movements. This is an interesting result and one that is in congruence with the casual mechanism proposed in this research, as discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, Humala lost the 2006 elections in the second round by five per cent. This outcome calls into question the capacity of the Peruvian movements to elect presidential candidates to office. In order to address this issue the research compares movement support in 2006 with support in the 2011 elections in which Humala won. By comparing the elections in this way we can better assess whether any changes in movement support occurred across the elections, and its potential influence on Humala's success in 2011.

Movement support for Humala in 2011

Movement support for Humala continued in 2011, again with the exception of CONAP who remained autonomous. Javier Torres of SER claims that in 2011 it was clear from the outset that whatever candidate was "anti-García" would be the winner because there was an "anti-García vote" in 2011 based on "everything his second term represented" (Interview, June 20th , 2012). Javier Torres is referring here to García's neoliberal polices and his reaction to Bagua during his 2006-2011 term (Interview, June 20th, 2012). He explains that Humala was critical of García and "very distinct"

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[158] Everardo Orellana is regional leader of CCP in the highland department of Junín.

from him and that "for this reason he won" (Interview, June 20th, 2012). In addition to the anti-García vote, indigenous movements in 2011 were "drawn to" Humala's "ethnic discourse of 2006" and his "interesting claim about national sovereignty and the sovereignty of communities" in the aftermath of Bagua (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Ultimately, in 2011 Humala was critical of García and a candidate that prioritised indigenous people, at least "that is how he was perceived by the people at that time" (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012).

Movement support for President Humala in 2011 is confirmed by Congresswomen for President Humala's party in 2011 Gana Perú, Claudia Faustina Coari Mamani. Congresswomen Mamani, herself a self-identified campesina from Puno, explains that in 2011 Puno was a "bastion of support for President Humala" where the President "won one-hundred per cent" (Interview, June 28th, 2012). In particular, Humala received great support from "the campesino movements" who supported him on his policies of "social inclusion and gender participation" (Interview, June 28th, 2012). Congresswomen Mamani more generally explains that, campesinos and indigenous people are "only leftist" and that "the right-wing candidates never take into account the poor that live in indigenous communities as they should" (Interview, June 28th, 2012). This is in contrast to Humala who "recognises the suffering of the indigenous communities" (Interview, June 28th, 2012).

In 2011, AIDESEP supported Humala in "all of the Jungle for Humala" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Support was mobilised by speaking with the communities and movements "close to the river" who know AIDESEP "very well" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Crucially, Edson Rosales Figueroa explains that while AIDESEP analysed Humala's government plan with these communities "a relationship with Humala was firm for some time" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). It can be argued that AIDESEP are not only referring to the relationship established in 2006 but also of the strengthening of this relationship from 2008 during the mobilisation against García. As already discussed, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP claimed that because Humala was the only party to support the movement during the Bagua debacle, the movement rewarded him with their support in 2011 (Interview, June 18th, 2012).

AIDESEP not only supported Humala in the presidential elections but also in legislative elections by supporting candidates from his party Gana Perú (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). For instance, "many congresistas of Humala went to Cenepa and to Bagua before the events occurred" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). These members of Congress were from Humala's Union por el Peru elected in 2006 and include Congresswoman Marisol Espinoza who subsequently became Humala's vice-president in 2011, and Daniel Abugattás president of Congress for Gana Perú from 2011-2012 (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). These members of Congress came to Bagua before the 2009 clash with police to speak with AIDESEP and its communities and "explain the benefits of the law, of ILO 169, the pros and cons, how they could do things and how we could do things" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Through these meetings, AIDESEP and Humala's party members "came to a good understanding" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Humala's support for AIDESEP and their leader Alberto Pizango are made clear by AIDESEP. For example, when García "denounced" Pizango and issued a warrant for his arrest, Humala "called to offer a lawyer" to AIDESEP (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). AIDESEP did not accept Humala's offer because they claim that their protests "were not political in this way", meaning they were not for political gain of parties nor were they to receive political gifts (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Nonetheless, this offer of support undoubtedly helped to strengthen Humala's the relationship with AIDESEP.

Later in 2011 "various meetings" took place between Alberto Pizango[159], AIDESEP and "leftist parties" such as Javier Díez Canseco from Partido Socialista (PDD) to promote Humala for President (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Through these meetings it was decided that "Ollanta would be President by the hands of the people" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). In January and February of 2011 there was another meeting in the Jungle during which AIDESEP meet with CNA, CCP and CONACAMI in order to "to strengthen their fight" for indigenous rights by creating a pacto de unidad or 'pact of unity' (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). During the meeting the movements discussed

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[159] Alberto Pizango fled to Nicaragua in 2009 where he was granted political asylum. He returned to Peru in 2010 and was arrested at the airport. After pressure from many civil society organisations he was released on bail and therefore able to legally participate in meetings in 2011 with political parties.

Humala's plan, which they felt "guaranteed the respect of indigenous people and their territories" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th , 2012). The movements felt that Humala would be "a President that would respect their position" and so "Ollanta was put into this pact" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). This support is substantiated by Javier Torres who states that in 2011 AIDESEP "made alliances with Gana Perú" (Interview June 22nd, 2012).

Ultimately, it was "in parallel" with the mobilisation of AIDESEP in 2008 that "Ollanta became an ally of indigenous people" (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). According to Hughes (2010: 90) Humala and his party were "likely to be one of the main beneficiaries of the mounting political crisis" brought on by the Bagua case, and it appears that this was indeed the case. It can be argued therefore that Humala's support of AIDESEP during the Bagua conflict strengthened their relationship resulting in stronger movement support in the 2011 elections. Moreover, given that AIDESEP underwent a period of immense mobilisation from 2008 as a result of Bagua, their reach within their bases may have increased at this time. The combination of an increase in mobilisation and solidification of a relationship with Humala between 2006 and 2011 may explain the slight increase for Humala within the Amazonian departments between these elections as listed on Table 5.5 above. Given however that this increase is only slight across each round of the election[160] it is more likely that the impact of this relationship was that it secured Humala's support in the region despite his more moderate positioning in 2011. It would be expected that such a position would ordinarily weaken his support among the indigenous movements and their communities. Ultimately, that AIDESEP mobilised support for Humala in the isolated departments of the Amazonian region of Peru is unequivocal and, at the very least this is likely to have sustained his success in the region despite becoming a moderate left candidate.

As with the 2006 elections, CONAP asserted their unequivocal autonomy from parties and reiterated that they did not support any party in the 2011 elections (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). While CONAP do not dismiss that Humala received support by indigenous people, and the poor in particular, he

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[160] For example if we compare the first round of 2006 with the first round of 2011 we can see an increase with the Loreto. Similarly, this increase is evident in each of the second rounds with the exception of San Martín. Interestingly, these departments have the lowest indigenous populations in the region.

claims that this "has not been organic" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11, 2012). Specifically he states that it is not like Bolivia where there was organic support for "Evo" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). For example, "it is not like I said 'let's go support a progressive revolutionary president'" like the movements in Bolivia in 2005 (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). CONAP do however recognise that Humala has done positive things for indigenous people in Peru including signing the law of prior consultation in 2011 (a law he remarks that García opposed in 2005) (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). Moreover, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez concedes that "thanks to Humala "the ministry for social inclusion was established which was a central policy proposal during his 2011 campaign (Interview, June 11th, 2012). However he complains that Humala is now inclined to "favour private investment sectors", which he claims is another reason why Humala is different from Evo Morales (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012).

CONAP did not support Humala in 2011 despite the appeal of his polices. CONAP does however recognise that in order to achieve their long-term goals they may need to establish "closer ties with the state" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). Their motivation for pursuing such a course of action would not be to support Humala but rather a necessary step towards achieving their goals (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). CONAP would like to create an indigenous party so that they can elect their own candidates to Congress (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). There are however two "barriers that limit [AIDESEP]" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). The first is the difficulty in uniting highland and lowland movements, and the second is the financial cost of creating a party. For example, if CONAP wanted to place their own candidate in any election they would need the money to pay and "control the media" so that their candidate receives coverage in the election (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). An alternative may be to establish a strategic plan with other sectors such as "labour, indigenous sector, the business sector and political parties that identify with indigenous people" (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). Interestingly, the left will not be the beneficiaries of such an alliance. As expressed by Oseas Barbarán Sánchez; "leftist parties would be ones who want to take advantage of these votes but they are disillusioned because they do not defend

the rights of the Amazonian people", and therefore CONAP would not align with them (Interview, June 11th, 2012).

In contrast to CONAP, highland movement CCP supported Humala in 2011 specifically because of his policy on social inclusion and against Fujimori. CCP regional leader, Everardo Orellana, explains that CCP "have done a lot of work to support Humala" (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). Votes were mobilised by "guiding" and "leading the people to see what rights they have" such as the right to vote (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). Humala was chosen as the candidate to support because of his policy for social inclusion and because "he was the only alternative to Fujimori, and so we supported Humala" (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). Specifically, he claims that the support of CCP for Humala was more a "vote against Fujimori" than for Humala. Regardless of their motivation, "Humala had the support of all the campesino movements and so he won the vote in the south of Peru, and in areas like Tacna and Ancash" (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th , 2012). He also uses the example of Cuzco and his own department of Junín which he claims "had much support for Humala" remarking that "we [CCP] worked very hard to support Humala" in these departments.

Table 5.5 of this chapter indicates that support for Humala grew in some departments from 2006 to 2011. For example, there is an increase from the second round in 2006 to the second round in 2011 in departments such as Tacna, Ancash and Puno. The second round is assessed because CCP ran a candidate of their own in the first round of 2006 and so did not support Humala in this round, thus making a comparison of these rounds problematic. However, support for Humala also declined in some cases such as in Cuzco where CCP claim that they "worked hard for Humala" (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). There is however an increase of support in Cuzco and Junín between the first round and second round. This reflects Everardo Orellana's statement that their support for Humala was more "anti-Fujimori" than it was "for Humala" because it was in this round that the two candidates faced each other (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). Ultimately however, Humala won a majority in each of these departments in the second round of the 2011 elections, which contributed to his overall vote share within the interior. Given that CCP claim they worked hard to support Humala in his 2011 campaign by mobilising

votes in these departments, it can be suggested that they in turn, contributed to his success.

The final movement to be discussed in light of support for Humala in 2011 is CONACAMI. President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrion Pintado claims that Humala's policy in 2011 offered something "new" and that, "with Ollanta there could be change" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). He claims that his polices "included interesting things for the people" and so "we as an organization said let's support this" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). For CONACAMI this was "a decision based on how [they] wanted change in the country" including the proposal by Humala to change the constitution so that *Ley de Consulta Previa* would be included (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). CONACAMI claim that during the second round against Fujimori there was a "change in the structure of elections" because the "people in the country, the indigenous campesino people, the rondas had a force" and "you could see that Ollanta would be their President" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). CONACAMI claim that because Humala represented change "we formed a pacto de unidad with AIDESEP, CNA, CCP, the confederation of campesino women and CONACAMI" and "in this pact we spoke with Ollanta and the people who made the alliance and even with those of Toledo" in order to elect Humala in 2011 (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012).

As discussed above, AIDESEP also refer to this pact made in January and February of 2011, which united highland and lowland movements in support of Humala. The pacto de unidad however "did not end well and now we are all dispersed" as the lowland and highland movements are once again disconnected (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). CONACAMI are currently constructing their own party that "will be a political arm for the movements" like MAS in Bolivia (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). The difficulty however is that all the indigenous movements "have different visions" and ideas for reform and there is no "political table to represent ourselves or to be representative" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012).

CONACAMI make an important point about the election of members of congress, which is deemed to be a further barrier to uniting indigenous support. Magdiel

Carrion Pintado claims that members of congress "do not win elections for their conviction" but because they have money (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). He explains that "there is much politicking" at this level and that the right in particular have "commercialised elections" by distributing "gifts" to several communities such as food and other goods[161] (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). He quickly asserts however that the left also distribute "gifts" because they are not the "true left, they do not represent the bases" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). CONACAMI claim that in 2011 Keiko Fujimori distributed gifts in the countryside as part of "a millionaire campaign" to buy votes (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Specifically, communities were given "a mountain of money" to paint their houses with slogans for Keiko Fujimori (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Interestingly this attempt at a clientelistic relationship was unsuccessful because although the communities painted their walls for Fujimori, they voted for Humala; "the people that live inside are for Humala but their walls are of Keiko" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). According to Magdiel Carrion Pintado, this was a nation-wide trend;

> "This is the case in almost all of the country, you understand? You sold your wall, but your conscience was with Humala, you will vote for Humala" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012).

According to CONACAMI "people were convinced that Ollanta would win by 80 per cent and so 50 or 60 per cent of the houses were painted for Keiko" because it would not make a difference to the election and at least they would have some money (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Sometimes however, this form of clientelism can contradict the expectation. For instance, the department of Piura is "one hundred per cent anti-mining but Keiko won in the city" because there are very poor neighbourhoods in the city and Keiko "came with gifts and bought votes, here votes are traded" (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Indeed, Humala lost the department of Piura in each round of both elections (see Table 5.5). This raises an important issue for this research because it suggests that in some cases communities that would ordinarily support Humala are subject to clientelism, which causes them to change their vote. This in turn, calls into question the capacity of the

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[161] Specifically he refers to gifts of "fesadas, tazas and panetones" or "parties, cups and cake".

movements to mobilise votes that transfer into electoral success for the left. For instance, the movements may have supported Humala and mobilised votes within their social bases for him but with the persistence of clientelism in Peru it is difficult to determine whether the mobilisation of support for Humala really transfers into votes.

5.5 Conclusion

The central research question asks whether the variation in support for the contestatory left in particular, can be explained by variation in mobilisation of indigenous social movements. In the case of Peru indigenous social movement mobilisation is low and we find that the contestatory left candidate, Ollanta Humala, did not win the 2006 election. Rather, he won the 2011 election as a moderate left candidate. The data reveal that, with the exception of CONAP in 2006, indigenous movements supported Humala in both his 2006 and 2011 presidential campaigns. Despite this support it was not enough to propel Humala to victory in 2006. Moreover, it was the 'middle class' vote that pushed Humala to victory in 2011. Indeed this was a strategy by Humala as evidenced in his move from the extreme to the moderate left, or for some the centre (Tanaka, 2011). However, indigenous movement support remained despite the move from the extreme to the moderate left. As noted earlier, evidence from the field interviews, AIDESEP suggest that Humala's move to the moderate left was a necessary strategy in order to win Lima and so the movements continued to support him based on his policies. However, support for Humala among indigenous voters did drop in some cases. The work of Tanaka (2011) finds that if we compare Humala's percentage vote share in 2006 and 2011 within the poorest provinces, we see that support for Humala decreased overall. Tanaka (2011) argues that the electorate shifted to the centre in 2011 and so Humala selected a strategy that would appeal to this new centrist electorate. This is in line with the argument made by Baker and Greene (2011) as discussed in Chapter 1, which suggests that, the Latin American electorate shifted to the centre at the turn of the century, and that the moderate left appealed the most to this moderate constituency. Humala's appeal to the centre saw him loose much support from the poorer segments of society in 2011 but gain more support from the middle and upper class (Tanaka, 2011).

While it is clear that the support of indigenous people did not win the election for Humala in 2006 or in 2011, it was nonetheless a consistent base of support in most cases and this value of this should not be underestimated. Indeed a number of factors may have skewed Humala's results in the poorer indigenous regions such as clientelism as highlighted by CONACAMI. What is interesting however is that the indigenous vote for Humala was "one hundred per cent" for his government plan and the fight against a common enemy of capitalism (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012; Interview, Javier Torres, June 20th, 2012). This is unlike the typical personalistic or clientelistic relationship between indigenous people and electoral candidates because there was a focus on Humala's policies and how they could benefit the lives of indigenous people.

Some other important issues were revealed through the data. The first is the questionable capacity of Peruvian movements to mobilise support among their bases because of their low levels of mobilisation. For example, Javier Torres suggests that "indigenous movements in Peru don't have that much capacity" to mobilise votes in presidential elections (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Former president of Congress, Daniel Abugattás states that the capacity of movements to mobilise votes for a party is difficult. He states "the problem is that the parties are unable to bond and build relationships that enable them to work together with social movements" (Interview, Daniel Abugattás, June 15th, 2012). Crucially, Marleni Canales Rubio claims that the central problem is the inherent disregard by parties for movements once elections have passed. She states that "parties have not taken indigenous social movements seriously" rather they see them as "a manageable mob, which can help them in certain circumstances when they need their vote but no political party takes seriously the indigenous movements" (Marleni Canales Rubio, June 22nd, 2012). She believes that; "political parties have never paid attention to these organisations or given them any importance. If Bagua did not happen they still wouldn't invite them to a meeting, or meet with them" (Marleni Canales Rubio, June 22nd, 2012). Indeed, this highlights the inherently fragile and temporal nature of political alliances in any given context.

Javier Torres of SER also highlights the ability for alliances to fall apart when he explains that now Humala's attitude towards AIDESEP has changed and that he "does not give leaders of the Amazonian movements, such as Pizango of AIDESEP any [political] space" (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Rather, Humala's

attitude towards AIDESEP is one of "vote for me if you want" and "nothing more than this" (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Similar to AIDESEP, CCP are now also discontented with Humala claiming that while they supported him for his policy proposal in 2011 "the truth is that every day this [policy] goes unfulfilled" which has led the withdrawal of support for Humala (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). He explains that CCP "believed Humala was another person, with another mind set" but they are discontented with his performance since his election (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). It seems as though the experience with Humala has only managed to create further disfavour towards existing political parties in the eyes on the movements. Indeed, both AIDESEP and CONACAMI were in the process of setting up their own, indigenous-based political party at the time of interview. CONAP also stated during their interview that future political alliances should be with indigenous-based parties that have a particular emphasis on the beliefs of lowland, Amazonian indigenous people. It appears that despite coming together in a pact of unity in 2011, the movements are once again fragmented and unlikely to form a unified indigenous political party, through which they might best achieve their demands.

Movements seem to have more of an impact at the local and provincial elections however. Javier Torres explains that at the local level there are "meetings of community chiefs, or the presidents of the communal assembly, in the case of the Amazonian groups, who meet and decide what candidate to vote for but this only impacts the local level and as far as the provincial level" (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Ultimately, the movements only make an impact where the indigenous population is higher (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). For example, "there was a candidate for Congress for Humala's party that was 'Awajún[162]' and he won election with a massive vote share from Awajún people which are the base of AIDESEP" (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Here Javier Torres is referring to Congressman Nayap Kinin who was elected in 2011 as representative of the Amazonas department. In some cases therefore, "some political weight allows movements to help elect members of congress and Alcaldes (mayors) because of their political weight and dispersion of votes in some districts".

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[162] Awajún are an indigenous people that live in the north of Peru on the border with Ecuador

While the above provides an example in which the support from the movement helped to elect a member of congress, this case is more the exception than the rule. Instead, it appears that in most cases, "it is the urban population that decides the election" (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). For example, in 2011, the Apu (chiefs) claim that the candidate they supported lost the vote because the "colonos"[163] have more of a "census" in their district (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). This result according to the Apu was "fraudulent" simply because "it was not the respect of the will of the majority" (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Ultimately, the problem is "the electoral composition of the districts", and for this reason "they cannot put a president of the republic in the office" (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). This example highlights a central question for this study, which is that even with high levels of mobilisation; could indigenous social movements in Peru play an integral role in the election of candidates when the electoral system still favours the elite? I argue that until fairer proportional representation of indigenous districts is introduced in Peru, it will be difficult for movements to impact even local elections. Furthermore, with continuing fragmentation and ethnic homogeneity between the movements, it is unlikely they could ever have the same impact as the Bolivian movements who not only united through their Pacto de Unidad but also reached beyond their indigenous bases to mobilise support for MAS.

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[163] Colonos means the settlers. These are non-indigenous people who live in the same department as the Apu's, the department of Amazonas.

Conclusion

"Our role has been important, because the idea was to awaken our social base"

- Luís Gabriel Morales, regional leader of highland movement CSUTCB in Bolivia (Interview, May 16th, 2012).

The goal of this study was to explore the role of indigenous social movements in support for the left in Latin America at the turn of the century. The central argument is that these movements entered into a political alliance with the left through which they mobilised their bases in support of the party. In return the movements sought prospective compensation in the form of policies addressing indigenous demands, to be implemented upon the election of the party. The research finds empirical evidence to substantiate this argument. Specifically, we find that movements in both cases entered into a political alliance with the left driven by the prospective compensation offered by these parties. These findings are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, they help to explain support for the left in the region, and the contestatory left in particular because the movements mobilised their social bases in support of this left. Second, the findings demonstrate that social movements can play a role in electoral politics by mobilising their bases around election time. Third, by acting as intermediaries between the indigenous base and the party, the movements bridged the gap between a disillusioned and demobilised sector of society and institutionalised politics. The implication of this was that it allowed the party to draw support from a new social base, typically distrustful of parties[164], which contributed to support for the left. The second implication is that, by acting as intermediaries, the movements (re)introduced[165] a detached and marginalised sector of society into institutionalised politics in a way that can only work to enhance representative democracy in the region. The conclusion will proceed by outlining these finding in more detail before engaging with the implications mentioned above. Finally, some avenues for future research will also be outlined. The study adopted a mixed-method approach to

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[164] For instance, we can refer to Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2, which demonstrates that indigenous people are more trusting of indigenous movements than political parties. Please consult Appendix G.1 and G.2 which demonstrate this relationship in Bolivia and Peru specifically.

[165] I include parenthesis around 're' throughout to denote that in some cases indigenous people were reintroduced into politics by the movements but in other cases this was the first introduction to institutionalised politics for other indigenous communities, such as many isolated communities in the Amazon region.

investigate the role of indigenous movements in the left turn. Accordingly, a brief discussion of the findings of the quantitative analysis is provided here before turning to the findings from qualitative case studies which are at the heart of the research.

The findings

The quantitative analysis first explored the relationship between movement mobilisation (*massmob*) and the left using cross-sectional data from all Latin American countries between 1990 and 2009. The results indicated that mass mobilisation is positively correlated with support for the left across all models, including and excluding interaction terms. The implication is that the left do indeed rely on a mass-mobilising base (Cleary, 2006). However, because this measurement did not capture indigenous movement mobilisation specifically, the results from the original expert surveys were used to test this relationship across five countries. The results indicated that support for the left was highest in cases where both indigenous movement mobilisation and indigenous populations were high. This supported the argument put forward in the introduction that the left performs best where mobilisation is high and population was substantial enough to impact elections (see Figure 2 in the Introduction). The macro analysis therefore demonstrated a correlation between indigenous movement mobilisation, indigenous population and support for the left, albeit not very substantive. Although the small number of cases within this analysis presents some inferential challenges, this remains the key finding of the macro analysis because it suggests that indigenous movement mobilisation can help to explain support for the left in some cases.

An individual level analysis was also conducted using survey data from Latinobarómetro. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between indigenous voters and the left across the region to uncover whether indigenous people provided a base of support for the left. While no general relationship was found, country level analysis demonstrated that indigenous people support the left, at least in the two qualitative cases explored in this study. Ultimately, the individual level analysis indicates that indigenous people in Bolivia and Peru are likely to support the left. While the quantitative analysis provided evidence of correlation between the central variables, causation could only be established through the qualitative case studies.

The qualitative findings are best summarised by addressing three central questions within each of the case studies. The first is whether indigenous movements entered into an alliance and provided support for the party? The second is, what was the impact of this support? Lastly, in light of the evidence provided, can we say that social movements matter? That is, can movements play a role in electoral politics? Indeed, this question also allows us to explore the importance of movements for politics and democracy more generally.

In terms of the first question, evidence from both cases indicated that indigenous movements entered into a political alliance with the left and mobilised support for these parties. Moreover, both cases demonstrated that the movements supported the contestatory left in particular. In relation to the argument this provides evidence that indigenous movements are more likely to support the contestatory rather than the moderate left, and therefore the emergence of this left in some cases and not in others, can in part, be explained by the mobilisation of indigenous movements. For instance, in the case of the 2006 Peruvian elections the movements supported the contestatory leftist candidate Ollanta Humala rather than moderate left candidate Alan García. Even when Humala moderated his position in 2011 movements continued to mobilise support for him, believing that he was not really a moderate left candidate but rather he "had to moderate in order to convince the people in Lima that he was not radical" in order to ultimately win the election (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18, 2012). In Bolivia while movements were not faced with a choice between the types of left, they did refer to the contestatory nature of Morales with whom they felt "united in war" (Interview, Daniel García Pamo, May 4th, 2012). Indeed, it can be argued that even if a moderate left candidate entered the race in 2005, the movements would have still chosen to support Morales. More specifically however it was the policies proposed by these contestatory leftist candidates that acted as the chief motivator for movement support.

In Peru, the movements explained that their support in both the 2006 and 2011 elections was driven by Humala's government plan. For the movements Humala was seen as the candidate for change and polices such as a focus on poverty alleviation, the reformation of extraction polices in the Amazon and his rejection of free trade agreements with the US directly appealed to the movements. During his 2011 campaign Humala put forward his plan for government entitled 'The Great

Transformation' in which he included a proposal to establish a Ministry for Social Inclusion and to implement a 'Law of Prior Consultation' (Ley de Consulta Previa) to protect indigenous territories from exploitation. These policies directly appealed to highland and lowland groups and acted as the central motivation for mobilising support in favour of Humala. While it is important to also note the 'lesser of two evils' component of movement support for Humala, it was the abovementioned polices which acted as the prospective compensation in this movement-party alliance, and therefore the central driver in movement support. The movement-party alliance in Bolivia was unequivocally based on prospective compensation. Morales' policy to establish a constituent assembly was the central motivation for consolidated movement support across the typically fragmented indigenous movements in Bolivia. The movements created the Pacto de Unidad in order to mobilise enough support to elect Morales to office so that he could implement this very policy.

The movements mobilised support in a variety of ways. In both cases, their organisational structures were utilised to effectively mobilise support for the left from the national to local levels. The movements also used radio broadcasts and public meetings to mobilise support. Crucially, they travelled to their bases to ensure indigenous communities were registered to vote and campaigned for additional polling stations in isolated areas to help facilitate voting. In the case of Bolivia, indigenous movements even reached beyond their own indigenous base to the cities where they also campaigned for Morales. Ultimately, the research provides evidence that the movements mobilised support for the left in both cases and that policies relating to indigenous issues acted as the prospective compensation for movement support.

The second question leads us to explore the impact of this support on the elections in each case. Chapter 4 demonstrated how voter turnout and support for MAS increased between the 2002 and 2005 elections. This coincided with the consolidation of movement support for MAS through the *pacto de unidad*. Given the consolidation of this support and evidence that the movements actively worked to register votes and facilitate the voting process, we can argue that the support provided by the movements for MAS positively impacted the results for the party. In light of this we can say that movements matter because they can play a role in electoral politics by mobilising a base of support for the party.

The impact of movement support for the left is not so straightforward in Peru. Firstly, Humala lost the 2006 election despite support from the movements. Secondly, despite more consolidated support from the movements in 2011[166] we do not see a corresponding increase in support for Humala within the majority indigenous departments. Instead, the results across the majority indigenous departments are quite mixed, increasing slightly in some cases (Tacna, Ancash and Puno) and decreasing in others such as Cuzco where the CCP worked hard to mobilise support for Humala. Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter 5, it was the increase in middle-class support which swung the vote for Humala in 2011. However, that indigenous movements and their bases did not singlehandedly win the election for Humala should not overshadow the important contribution of this support in sustaining overall indigenous support for the left in 2011. Instead, we should remember that indigenous people comprise approximately 47 per cent of Peru's total population and, when mobilised, represents a substantial base of support for any party. Arguably, the unbalanced weight of the electoral system in favour of Lima impedes the true impact that the movements could have on elections.

It is nonetheless important to explain why support in indigenous departments did not increase with further mobilisation of movements in light of the Bagua case. There are two explanations for this. The first is that despite an increase in mobilisation, movement mobilisation remains comparatively low to Bolivia. Rather, in Peru, the movements remained quite fragmented and isolated from one another and while their pact was good in theory, in reality it did not translate to increased support for Humala within indigenous bases. This also raises questions about the strength of the relationship between the movements and their bases. Where movements are less mobilised they are less likely to have strong social ties with their base and this may have impacted the 'mass-mobilising capacity' of the movements in Peru. Ultimately, a loose tie with their bases implies that the movements are unlikely to have much influence or legitimacy within their bases, which inhibits their ability to generate support.

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[166] AIDESEP, CNA, CCP and CONACAMI all meet to form a pacto de unidad in order "to strengthen their fight" for indigenous rights and they felt that supporting Humala was how they could achieve this goal. Furthermore there was a notable increase in movement mobilisation between the elections in light of the conflict in Bagua.

The persistence of clientelistic linkages between the right and indigenous communities in Peru also proposes an obstacle to the mobilising capacity of movements. While the research finds evidence that movements voted for Humala despite being paid by his opponent Keiko Fujimori to paint the side of their houses with slogans there is also evidence that clientelistic linkages prevailed in other communities. For instance, Fujimori offered very poor communities in the department of Piura gifts of cakes, cups and blankets in return for votes. Ultimately, Fujimori won a majority in this department despite CONACAMI mobilising communities in favour of Humala, therefore illustrating the pervasiveness of clientelistic linkages there. It is only through further research and a focus on these relationships at a local level can we truly uncover the presence and impact of such linkages on the mobilising capacity of movements and indeed on indigenous communities.

The implications

There are a number of implications of this study. The first implication is that by mobilising support for the left the movements can help to explain support for these parties at the turn of the century. In this way the research contributes to the literature on the left by providing 'el factor indígena'. Moreover, by providing evidence that the movements are more likely to support the contestatory rather than the moderate left, the research contributes to the literature which explores the type of lefts that have emerged in the region. Additionally, by illustrating the mass-mobilising capacity of social movements the findings support the argument that movements can act as important allies and sources of labour for parties.

While the focus of this study has been Bolivia and Peru the same underlying mechanism (that indigenous movements provide a base of support for the left) may have implications for other indigenous movements and leftist parties in the region. Movements in Ecuador are highly mobilised and are central actors in Ecuadorian politics. A signature characteristic of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) for instance is their 'levantamientos populares' ('popular uprisings'). Their most dramatic uprising so far was their role in the ousting of President Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa in 2005 and their support for current contestatory left President Rafael Correa in the second round of the 2006 elections. As in Bolivia then, Ecuador is a case in which there is a high level of indigenous movement

mobilisation and large indigenous population (43 per cent) and high support for the contestatory left, at least during his first election. Similar to the relationship between CIDOB and CONAMAQ with Morales in Bolivia, CONAIE in Ecuador have withdrawn their support for President Correa demonstrating the fragility of these alliances.

Similar to Peru, the relationship between indigenous movements and the left in Guatemala is somewhat fractured by the imprint of war and persistent clientelism. While the indigenous population is very high (66 per cent), mobilisation remains low. Even where movements form alliances with the left the connection between the movement and its base is too weak to have any impact and clientelistic linkages with traditional parties prevail. If the indigenous movements in Guatemala could unite in mobilisation they might offer an alternative to the indigenous people there. Through mobilisation the movements can break clientelistic linkages much as CIDOB have done in Bolivia by mobilising indigenous communities with policies that might provide long-term gains. Indeed, the 2011 elections in Guatemala indicated the potential for an indigenous-left alliance when the coalition of leftist parties[167] selected indigenous activist and Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Menchú as their presidential candidate. However, the coalition received less than four per cent of the vote share and was eliminated in the first round. It could be argued that without high levels of mobilisation the indigenous movements were unable to generate support for the coalition.

While the focus of this study has been on indigenous movements, the argument that movements can provide a base of support for the left could be extended to other movements of the disenfranchised, such as movements of the poor in the shantytowns of Latin American Cities. For instance, the movements of the poor provided a base of support for Chávez in Venezuela. In Argentina, the 'piqueteros' were central actors in the 2001 demonstrations which ousted President Fernando de la Rúa. Their mobilisation attracted the attention of opposition party Partido Justicialista (PJ) whose

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[167] The coalition included The New Nation Alternative (Alternativa Nueva Nación) and The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG-MAIZ on the left and Menchú's indigenous party Winaq.

leader, Néstor Kirchner would go on to win the 2003 elections (Firchow, 2007). Some factions of the piqueteros worked closely with the Kirchner administration, again illustrating the potential for movement-party alliances in the region (Firchow, 2007).

Conducting an investigation into these alliances in Latin America, or indeed beyond would increase the generalisability of the argument that movements of the disenfranchised and demobilised can provide substantial support for new parties. This is especially the case where there is a broad ideological congruence such as a shared anti-neoliberal sentiment or call for radical reform is substantiated by specific policy proposals that appeal to the movements.

This in turn, has potential policy implications for opposition and new parties in newly emerging democracies. Specifically, where institutionalised politics have been completely discredited by corruption or repression the connection with society is undoubtedly ruptured making it difficult for parties to generate support for elections. However, a movement-party alliance might offer an alternative avenue to generate party support. This is especially the case for emerging opposition parties in new democracies because they are most likely to be ideologically compatible with the movements. Social movements through their mass-mobilising capacity represent a useful political ally for new parties, particularly in emerging democracies.

The findings also have implications for our typical understanding of the behaviour of social movements. As mentioned in the literature review, Kaldor (2003: 85) explains that new social movements operate within an "essentially non-party space". This research provides evidence that this is not always the case. Rather, the evidence suggests that through movement-party alliances, the 'space' between social movement and parties is in reality quite distorted. By taking part in an alliance with the primary goal of electing a particular party to government, movements enter electoral politics, a space typically reserved for parties. The behaviour of the movements during such an alliance changes their typically contentious behaviour as they become more concerned with ensuring their bases are registered to vote and facilitating the voting process for their bases, than with holding demonstrations or protests. While this change in behaviour is only temporary, often only lasting for the duration of the alliance, it is still an interesting implication of the findings which contributes more generally to our understanding of social movement behaviour.

More generally this contributes to the social movement literature by demonstrating that movements are not strictly informal actors and that in some cases, in order to achieve their goals and progress their cause, they are willing to work with (rather than contend) institutional actors such as parties. Moreover, they do so by engaging in one of the most institutionalised forms of political behaviour, namely electoral politics. This is an important contribution because it implies that we must reach beyond our traditional assumptions of social movement behaviour in order to truly understand contemporary movements, particularly those emerging in newly democratising societies such as Latin America and more recently the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. For some contemporary movements engaging in electoral behaviour and working with 'new' parties in particular represents a new strategy for addressing their grievances, albeit one that previous movements may have vehemently opposed. With democratisation and shifts within dominant political paradigms comes a new kind of political opportunity structure, one which not only explains variation in mobilisation but may also help to explain the variation in the behaviour of the movements from challengers of the institutional political system to active participants within it. Ultimately, these findings highlight the importance of advancing social movement scholarship beyond explaining variation in levels of mobilisation to analysing the impact of this variation on politics more generally. In doing so, we can learn more about the behaviour of contemporary movements as stated above whilst highlighting just how dynamic and influential social movements can be in politics.

Finally, the study also highlights the democratising role social movements can play in politics. As mentioned above, where parties and institutionalised politics have been discredited movements can fulfil the representative role typically held by parties in a democracy. This increases the representativeness of democracies because even the most marginalised can feel somewhat represented in politics. Movements can also work to repair the party-society linkages in their respective countries by acting as an intermediary between parties and their bases. Collective-based linkages occur when citizens become associated with a party through affiliation with another organisation such as a union or movement. This research finds evidence that indigenous communities became associated with the left through the movements which helped to repair the relationship between parties and indigenous sectors of society in both Bolivia and Peru. Moreover, because the relationship between the movements and

parties was based on policy congruence in each case, we can say that the linkages between indigenous communities and the parties was also driven by this motivation, therefore establishing these linkages between party and society.

This is an important implication in a region where programmatic linkages are historically weak and often based on clientelistic linkages instead. For example, CIDOB in Bolivia explained that they used the new constitution to motivate their bases to support MAS. What is interesting in this case is that according to CIDOB, simply informing their bases about the benefits of a new constitution was enough to convince indigenous communities to vote for MAS. The movement made the point that for many communities this was the first time they had been consulted about elections in this way, thus implying that previous linkages with parties were not based on informing indigenous communities of policy proposals. The key point here is that CIDOB established this programmatic linkage by travelling to their bases and informing the previously excluded communities of the policies of MAS.

We also see evidence in Peru that programmatic linkages, established through the movements, prevailed over clientelistic linkages. The leader of CONACAMI explained that while Humala's opponent, Keiko Fujimori, paid indigenous householders to paint their walls in favour of her, that they still supported Humala. Simply put "the people that live inside are for Humala but their walls are of Keiko" (Interview, June 22, 2012). Ultimately the role played by the movements in repairing the relationship between party and society has important implications for other cases in which this relationship is broken. This is particularly so given that the relationship was, for the most part, repaired in such a way that programmatic linkages, considered paramount to a responsive, accountable and representative democracy, prevailed over clientelistic ones (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Downs, 1957).

It can also be argued that encapsulating, or participatory linkages were established in the process of movement-party alliances. For instance, these linkages occur when the society is incorporated directly into politics "beyond the act of voting" (Roberts, 2002:16). In the case of this research, I argue that by mobilising their bases along programmatic lines movements re-politicised a previously excluded sector of society. While the movements were certainly important in the act of voting (by ensuring registration and facilitating voting in isolated communities through additional polling

stations) they also worked to re-politicise these communities in a way that reached beyond the act of voting. This is best demonstrated by the opening quote of this conclusion in which the regional leader of CSUTCB in Bolivia explains that the role of movements was to "awaken our social base" (Interview, May 16th, 2012). The awakening of the bases and the re-politicisation of indigenous movements more generally is evident in the newly emerging indigenous parties in each case. For example, even where movement-party alliances have fallen apart, these movements and their bases have not simply retreated from whence they came but have instead begun work to establish new indigenous parties. In Bolivia, CIDOB and CONAMAQ have initiated the process of setting up their own party to contest the local elections in 2014. In Peru, AIDESEP have gained much support in their bid to establish a new indigenous political party.[168] While the leaders of these parties are unlikely to enter the presidential palace, their very presence within electoral politics increases the representativeness of their democracies.

Improving representativeness and mobilising a previously excluded sector of society into politics undoubtedly enhances the quality of democracy in their respective countries. We can consider here the work of Gaetano Mosca (1923; 1939: 52 cited in Dahl 1989: 240) who proposes the problem of minority rule in democracies, he states that;

> "The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second class, the more numerous class, is directly controlled by the first".

We can apply the issue of minority rule to the cases of Bolivia and Peru where indigenous people under both indigenous and poor identities, represent a 'numerous' sector of society yet have been ruled by the first class since colonisation. Indeed, the movements have reduced the minority rule problem by working to elect parties and politicians who better represent their demands, such as the election of Morales to the presidency in Bolivia or indigenous candidates like Congressman Nayap Kinin and Congresswoman Claudia Faustina Coari Mamani in Peru. Ultimately, while indigenous movements emerged from the late 1980s onwards, it can be argued that through movement-party alliances at the turn of the century new linkages have been

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[168] Whilst visiting the offices of AIDESEP in Lima the movement was in the process of filling the signatures it received in support of establishing their party among their bases.

established which have awoken the indigenous bases, increased their representativeness in their democracies and incorporated indigenous demands into the national political debate.

Future research

There are three potentials avenues of further research. The first is to continue to observe the relationship between the actors addressed in the case studies. It would be particularly useful to continue to analyse the relationships in the lead up to the 2014 election in Bolivia and 2016 elections in Peru in order to uncover how movement-party alliances change over time. This study has already found that alliances have fallen apart in some cases, such as the relationship between CONAMAQ, CIDOB and MAS in Bolivia. Interestingly, the conservative parties of UN and Podemos have come out in support of these movements and their struggle over the issue of TIPNIS discussed in Chapter 4. While this support is soft in nature, and motivated by an opportunity to further condemn Morales, it nonetheless marks an unusual turn in the relationship between indigenous movements and the right in Bolivia. Further research would uncover whether the fallout of alliances with indigenous movements will impact support for the left in upcoming elections. In addition, further investigation of the relationship with other parties might help to explain increased support for the right in some cases. Supplementary analysis of the relationship between the actors discussed here would also allow us to observe the performance of the movements which are attempting to transition to indigenous parties. For instance, in the case of Peru it would be interesting to observe the behaviour of established parties and other indigenous movements towards these new actors. Specifically, it would be important to uncover whether parties will behave competitively towards them or see them as a potential ally within congressional and local elections. Moreover it would be important to observe how the emergence of indigenous parties will impact relations with the remaining movements. In particular, we could observe whether this will promote the unification of indigenous political actors in Peru or act to further divide them.

The second avenue for future research is to extend the study to indigenous movement-party relations in the three other countries with substantial indigenous populations (Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador). This would provide more cases and variation

which would further enhance our understanding of the relationship between the movements and the left. The argument could also be extended to the relationship between leftist parties and other movements representing marginalised and discontented bases in the region. As mentioned earlier, such movements may also be compatible allies for the left and further exploration might provide more insight into the left turn as well as movement-party relations more generally.

Finally, an analysis of movement party-relations at the local level would also be an interesting avenue for future research. Specifically, such a study could use the cases discussed here along with Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador to investigate indigenous movement-party relations during local and municipal elections. This would add another layer to the analysis by assessing the impact of movement-party alliances in local elections. For example, in the 2011 elections AIDESEP mobilised their bases to elect candidates from Humala's party to Congress including Congressman Nayap Kinin elected as a representative of the Amazonas (which is AIDESEP stronghold). At the same time however, chiefs from a smaller movement in Northern Peru actively mobilised support for a candidate in local elections but failed to elect him due to the unfair composition of electoral districts. An investigation of local level elections would allow us analyse the impact of movements in local elections and to consider other factors such as the electoral composition of districts as an impediment for representation for movements and their bases

An analysis of local elections would also help to resolve some of the important issues raised in this study including allegations of coercion by movements and clientelism by opposition parties at the local level. For example, in Bolivia Marco Molina claimed that in some cases movements coerced their bases into supporting MAS. While there is no evidence to conclusively suggest that this is the case, it would be imperative to investigate such claims by paying closer attention to the relationship between the movements and their bases at the local level. Claims of clientelism such as those exposed in Peru could also be resolved through a study of the relationship between movements, parties and bases at the local level. While movements have managed to break some clientelistic linkages through education and informing their bases of candidate's policies other cases emerged in which clientelism prevailed. For instance, the leader of CONACAMI explained that in the case of the department of Piura, Keiko Fujimori's gifts of cakes, cups and blankets outweighed the need to

address the contamination of water due to the mining industry there, as proposed by Humala. Further research is required in order to truly understand the implications of these claims on democracy and the people living in these communities.

The findings of this study demonstrate that social movements are important political actors, not only because they can mobilise support for a party but also because they can enhance the quality of democracy by reintroducing marginalised sectors of society to institutionalised politics based on programmatic linkages. Where political trust is lost and institutionalised politics delegitimised, social movements become important actors in fulfilling the role typically held by political parties. Moreover, because social movements are perceived as outsiders of the institutionalised system they can play a powerful role in re-politicising the disenchanted and in turn enhancing representative democracy. However, the ability of movements to fulfil this role greatly depends on their level of mobilisation and their capacity to mobilise and politicise their social base. The movement must choose their ally wisely and ensure there is a clear ideological congruence based on programmatic linkages, which can legitimise the alliance to the social base. Where movements fail to adequately select their party ally on this basis, they run the risk of delegitimising themselves in the eyes of their base and, in turn, further disengaging them from politics. This study however highlights that even where they have fallen apart, the movement-party alliance between indigenous movements and the left have resulted in the (re)politicisation and (re)integration of indigenous people into national politics in such a way that their demands are better represented in their respective countries. In light of this, it seems appropriate to end as we began with the opening quotation of this thesis:

> *The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant participation in [traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of conducting politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalized majorities.*
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> - *Juan Del* Granado, Mayor of La Paz (2001-2010).

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Edson Rosales Figueroa, Communications and Press Officer of AIDESEP, June 18, 2012, Lima.

Everardo Orellana, Dirígente of CCP for Junín, June 14, 2012, Lima.

Javier Torres, President of Asociación de Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), June 20, 2012, Lima.

Magdiel Carrion Pintado, President of CONACAMI, June 22, 2012, Lima.

Marleni Canales Rubio (Dra.), Lawyer for indigenous rights and former el Consejo Consultivo de Pueblos Indígenas, de la Comunidad Andina (CAN), June 19, 2012, Lima.

Oseas Barbarán Sánchez,   President   of   CONAP,   June   11,   2012,   Lima

Appendices

Appendix A- Copy of the Expert Survey
A.1 Copy of the Expert Survey in English

Welcome,

My name is Gemma Mc Nulty, from Dublin City University. I am conducting research regarding the levels of mobilisation amongst indigenous social movements in Bolivia. This survey is part of a larger research project which include five countries of Latin America, namely, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico and Guatemala.

The survey takes less than 15 minutes to complete. You have been selected to participate in this survey based on your expertise in this area. Consequently, your participation is invaluable to this project. Your answers to this survey will be completely confidential and only used at the end of the research. You can choose to participate in Spanish or English, or alternate between both. You will have an opportunity at the end of the survey to add any comments or suggestions regarding this survey.

The email you received inviting you to this survey includes a brief definition of concepts which may be useful whilst filling out this short survey.

Thank you for your time.

Gemma Mc Nulty.

There are 10 questions in this survey

Quantity and General Activity

1 [natquant] How many indigenous social movements would you estimate are active in Bolivia in the following time frames?

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Less than 50	Between 50 and 100	More than 100	I don't know
1990-1998	○	○	○	○
1999-2006	○	○	○	○
2007-2011	○	○	○	○

2 [subquant] Are indigenous social movements *active* in some regions more than others? Please mark any relent regions below.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Not Active	Active	Very Active	I don't know
Altiplano	○	○	○	○
Los Llanos Orientales	○	○	○	○
Los Valles	○	○	○	○

3 [election1] In your opinion, is the *number* of indigenous social movements more or less likely to increase around election time?

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ More Likely

- ☐ Election time makes no difference

- ☐ Less Likely

- ☐ I don't know

- ☐ Other:

4 [election2] In your opinion, is social movement *activity* more or less likely to increase around election time?

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ More Likely

- ☐ Election time makes no difference

- ☐ Less Likely

- ☐ I don't know

- ☐ Other:

Protest Activity

5 [pronat]On average, how many indigenous social movement protests occur(ed) per year, during the following time frames?

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Less than 50	Between 50 and 100	Over 100	I don't know
1990-1998	○	○	○	○
1999-2006	○	○	○	○
2007-2011	○	○	○	○

6 [protype]Are indigenous social movements more likely to have regional/local protests or national protests?

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ Regional

- ☐ National

- ☐ Local

- ☐ I don't know

- ☐ Other:

7 [proreg]Are there any regions in which indigenous social movement protest activity is higher than others. Please mark any relevant regions below.

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Less Active	There is no difference between regions	More Active	I don't know
Altiplano	○	○	○	○
Los llanos Orientales	○	○	○	○
Los Valles	○	○	○	○

Social awareness activities

8 [social]Of the activities listed below, which are more commonly undertaken by indigenous social movements in Bolivia? *

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Rare	Common	Very Common	I don't know
Fundraising	○	○	○	○
Petitioning	○	○	○	○
Door-to-Door Canvassing	○	○	○	○
Community Meetings	○	○	○	○
Distribution of leaflets or materials	○	○	○	○
Letter-writing to policy makers	○	○	○	○
Protests (large scale)	○	○	○	○
Protests (small scale)	○	○	○	○

Mobilisation Level

9 [score]Outlined below are three vignettes, each representing the characteristics of levels of mobilisation in accordance with this research. Please select a mobilisation level for Bolivia in the provided time-frames in accordance to these vignettes. *

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Low mobilisation	Medium Mobilisation	High Mobilisation
1990-1998	○	○	○
1999-2006	○	○	○
2007-2011	○	○	○

Mobilisation scores:

1. Low mobilisation

- *Nature:* Timid demonstrations causing little to no disruption within the community. Locally based demonstrations or activities
- *Duration & Commitment:* Demonstrations only lasting a few hours. Often the demonstration disperses before the issue is addressed in any way.
- *Numbers:* Less than 50 people. For instance, a small crowd gathering in a local plaza.
- *Impact:* Little to know media coverage. The issue is not addressed in the media and so has little impact.
- *Activities:* Typical small timid handing out leaflets or materials locally, perhaps carrying some banners.

2. Medium Mobilisation

- *Nature***:** More disruptive nature. Closure of infrastructure or roads a possibility. For instance the closure of the streets to make way for the demonstration. Usually nationally based, in places of symbolic reference such as presidential palace/seat of government.
- *Duration & Commitment:* Protest/Activity lasts at least one day and does not disperse until government or policymaker recognises the issue (perhaps in the form of a press conference).
- *Numbers:* over 100 people. Typically one large demonstration with a number of small movements or an umbrella movement. No simultaneous protest activity in other regions.
- *Impact:* Media coverage makes public aware of the demonstration, thus the public are aware of the issue.
- *Activities:* Leaflets, Banners, Slogans, Petitions, Rallies, Marches from one place to another such one governmental building to another.

3.High Mobilisation

- *Nature:* Very disruptive. Infrastructure greatly disrupted with on-going closure of roads due to road blocks and other forms of protest. Clashes with the police.
- *Duration & Commitment:* Protests can last days or weeks. Often they do not disperse until issue is resolved.
- *Numbers:* 100's of people. Simultaneous national and regional protests can occur. Other movements may join the demonstration under an umbrella issue.
- *Impact:* National Media coverage brings issue the forefront for the public.
- *Activities:* Occupations, Rallies, Road Blocks, long marches across the country to the seat of government. Boycotts, blockades.

Other comments

10 [open]

Do you have any additional comments or suggestions you would like to include in this section of the survey?

Please write your answer here:

Thank you for participating in this survey.

Your contribution is essential to the project and greatly appreciated.

01.01.1970 – 01:00

Submit your survey.

Thank you for completing this survey.

Appendix B- Field Interviews
B.1 Detailed List of Interviewees from Bolivia

Movements (12)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
CSTUCB	La Paz 16th May	30mins	Luis Gabriel's Dirigente of CSUTCB
CONAMAQ	La Paz 22nd May	20mins	Froilán Puma Carmona Dirigente of CONAMAQ
Ayllus de Cochabamba	Cochabamba 24th April	10mins	Part of CONAMAQ
Bartolinas Sisa	La Paz 16th may	20mins	Also known as FNCB-BS and CNMCIOB
FSUTCC	Cochabamba May 8th	11mins	Part of CSTUCB
CIDOB	Santa Cruz 4th May	26mins	Daniel Garcia Pamo
TIPNIS	Cochabamba 26th May	23mins	Pablo Rojas
TIPNIS	Cochabamba 23rd May	5mins	Rosecha Rojas
CONAMAQ	La Paz 29th May	10mins	Juan José Salina: Dirigente in the south of Bolivia (on the frontier with Argentina). Secretary General : Gustavo Aliaga
CSIB	La Paz 27th May	16minutes	Part of CIDOB;
CPILAP	La Paz 25th May	18minutes	Aldon Patino, secretaria de Educacion de CPILAP (77558835)
Fejuve de el Alto	La Paz 27th May	55 minutes	Juan Martela; Dirigente of Fejuve el Alto during the ousting of Goni and lead up to Morales

election.

Politicians (6)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
Leonilda Zurita	Cochabamba May 9th	5mins	Chief of MAS for Cochabamba
Maria Viscarra Gil	Santa Cruz May 4th	40mins	Diputada for UN
Maria del Carmen	Santa Cruz May 7th	25mins	Diputada/Suplente por PBB
Senador Mendoza	La Paz May 17th	30mins	Senator for MAS who represents indigenous communities. Although not himself indigenous. Was in academia and then became part of MAS to construct the new constitution.
Cocaleros/MAS	Cochabamba May 9th	47minutes	**Two** members of MAS, one "supporter" of MAS and Luis from riseup.

Relevant Research Organisations (7)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
CEADESC	Cochabamba with George komadina	27minutes	Works in particular with chiquitano movements from Santa Cruz
CIPCA	La Paz	25mins	Really useful discussion
CIPCA	Cochabamba	23mins	Juan Carlos Reyes Carlos Revilla
UNITAS	La Paz May 25th		Specialises in Urban social movements around La Paz and el Alto
IBIS	La Paz	1 hour	Jose Luis Alvarez: Oficial de Programa
UNITAS	La Paz May 25th	1 hour	Jose Luis Alvarez: Director of UNITAS
UNITAS	La Paz May 27th		Marco: Works directly with movements and organisations in el Alto

Others (12)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
Jim Schultz	Cochabamba	1hour	Can Quote but send him what I am quoting first.
John Crabtree	La Paz	1hour	Don't Quote
Marco Molina	Santa Cruz	43mins	Works with indigenous movements in Santa Cruz . *Can quote*.
Conference about performance of new constitution in the Hotel Presidential	La Paz	2hours 30mins	With Xavier Albo, Jorge Viana, Senadores, members of movements. NOT AN INTERVIEW but a recording to be used in my research.
Session of Deputies	Santa Cruz	1 hour	Discussion regarding indigenous land in Santa Cruz; the indigenous community was present.
Session of Senators	La Paz	27minutes	Building a road in Tarija through indigenous land
Protest in Cochabamba by workers and doctors	Cochabamba 24th April	13mins	Here I asked people in the protest why they were protesting and their impressions of Morales. Also includes discussion with Lucinda Crespo, the director general of the hospital of Cochabamba.
CONAMAQ – Platforma			This was a presentation by CONAMAQ regarding their political goals. This was a discussion with representatives

			from the mining union regarding issues of contamination of indigenous lands due to mining.
TIPNIS press conference	La Paz May 27th	10mins	Mini-press conference in support of TIPNIS by CIDOB and CONAMAQ
TIPNIS press conference	Cochabamba		Press conference by leader of TIPNIS in Cochabamba 2 days before they started their new march
Los Medicos	Cochabamba	10mins	Speech by leader of medicos in Cochabamba
Luis from Riseup.com	Cochabamba	1 hour	Very informal discussion

B.1 Detailed List of Interviewees from Peru

Movements (8)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
AIDESEP	Lima, June 18th	25mins	Edson Rosales Figueroa, communications and press officer for AIDESEP
CONACAMI	Lima, June22nd	1 hour	President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrion Pintado.
CONAP	Lima, June 11th	36mins	President of CONAP, Oseas Barbaron Sanchez
CCP	Lima, June 14th	36mins	Everardo Orellana Dirigente of Junín for CCP
CCP	Lima, June 15th	43mins	Jorge Prado Sumari, dirigente of CCP for Huancavelica and Vice President of CONVEAGRO
Confederación nacional Agraria Peru (CNA)	Lima, June 21st	53mins	President of CNA, Antolín Huascar Flores
El Muro	Cuzco, June 1st	10minutes	Member of Muro Cuzco
FDTC (Federation of workers Cuzco)	Cuzco, June 4th	13minutes	Secretary General Hector Calla Chuso

Politicians (4)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
Daniel Abugattás	Office of the President of the Congress, Lima. June 15th	25mins	President of the Congress
Hugo Carrillo	Congress, Lima June 28th	43mins	Congressman
Claudia Faustina Coari Mamani	Congress, Lima June 28th	14mins	Congresswoman
Joel Camargo, Movimiento Tierra y Libertad.	Lima, June 25th	1 hour	A Dirigente of the political party for land and liberty in Peru currently campaigning for the next elections. This is a party between a leftist and campesino/rural party. The interview includes a discussion on defining the party.

Organisations, Academics & Activists (9)

Name	Date and Place	Duration	Notes
DESCO (Centro de Estudios y promocion del desarrollo)	Lima, June 8th	1 hour	Molvina Zeballos, President of DESCO
SER	Lima, June 20th	1 hour	Javier Torres, President of SER
APRODEH	Lima, June 11th	10mins	Human Rights organisation that specialises in indigenous rights. Interview with President of organisation Francisco (Pancho) Soberón
Sinesio Lopez	Lima, June 28th	40mins	Head of the School of Government and Public Politics PUCP, Lima. (Pontifica Universidad Catolica del Peru)
Erick Pozo	Lima, June 12th		Academic, also at PUCP.
Henry Pease	Lima, June 22nd	33mins	Academic and ex-Congressman for Movimiento Democrático de Izquierda (MDI)
Domilita Castillo	Lima, June 27th	53mins	An activist/politician/ movement member. Especially in her community which is predominantly campesino.
Marleni Canales Rubio	Lima, June 19th	1 hour	Lawyer and indigenous movement members. Ex-presidenta del Consejo Consultivo de Pueblos Indígenas de la *Comunidad*
Erick Huaman	Lima, June 20th	1hour 30mins	A specialist in indigenous/campesino rights. Has interviewed Hugo Blanco on several occasions and thus

holds a very
particular perspective
on campesino
movements in Peru.
Also travels to
Bolivia to speak with
movements.

B.3 List of questions in the semi-structured interviews

<u>Question Guide for Movements:</u>
1. Can you think of an occasion when you mobilised indigenous voters towards a political party?
   - Did you mobilise indigenous voters towards any particular party?
   - If so, why that party?
   - Who mobilised them? (Leaders, members?)
   - Who decided this? (movement leaders, the people, the members generally)

2. When & why?
   - In terms of the time frame, what era?
     - This can be explained in years or presidential eras, Goni, Paz Zamora…
   - Why?
     - Why that party and not others? What did you expect in return? (Prospective compensation?)

4. How?
   - What did you actually do?
   - What mechanisms?
     - Protests, Candidate endorsement, canvassing….
   - More institutional or non-institutional routes?

5. What did you expect to receive in return for mobilising these voters?
   - What particular policies
   - (Or was if gifts?)
   - (Did you get what you were promised?)

The "If not" questions
   - If not, why not?

Conclusion
So in context of all this, am I right in understanding that,
   - You did (did not) mobilise voters to vote for ………..
   - You did this because……………..
   - And in return………………………
   - And the situation now is……

<u>Question Guide for Parties:</u>

1. Did indigenous movements help mobilise support for the party?
2. If so, how? What did they do?
3. If not, why do you think they did not work with your party?
4. What was you alliance based upon? Policies? Or was there another motivation?
5. What impact to you think the movements had on the elections? And on support for you party?
6. Are indigenous movements important in Bolivia/Peru?
7. If so in what way?

8. Do Parties care about the movements? Do they believe they can be useful allies?
9. How is the relationship between the movement and party now?

Question Guide for Academics/Activists:

1. What was the relationship between indigenous social movements and the left during X elections?
2. Do you think the movements were important for the party? Did they mobilise support?
3. How would they mobilise support?
4. Do you think it made any difference?
5. How is the relationship now?

B.4 Copy of ethics form presented to the interviewees before each interview

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH ETHICS

April 5th 2012, Dublin

The research aims to explore the relationship between indigenous social movements and political parties in Bolivia and Peru. The interviews will help investigate whether indigenous social movements and political parties work together during elections and if so how. Ultimately, the research is interested in the relationship between social movements and parties. The questions asked will be regarding personal experiences of members within social movements and political parties.

Gemma Mc Nulty, PhD candidate at the School of Law and Government is the lead researcher. Gemma's research is also funded by Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS), funded by the Irish Government. The research is part of a doctoral dissertation which remains independent of political objects and is not subject to interference by any government or non-government bodies.

Gemma Mc Nulty
School of Law and Government
Dublin City University,
Dublin 9, Ireland
+353 87 41 37 344
gemma.mcnulty2@mail.dcu.ie

Participants are required to participate in an interview, which will be recorded if the participant agrees.

Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question)
Do you understand the information provided?
Yes/No
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?
Yes/No

Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
        Yes/No
Are you aware that your interview will be taped?
        Yes/No

This recording will be stored in Dublin City University and will be accessible only to me.
Names and all other details can be changed to protect anonymity if required.
Confidentiality of information provided is subject to legal limitations.

Signature:

I have read and understood the information in this form. My questions and concerns have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form. Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project

Participants Signature: _____

Name in Block Capitals: _____

Witness: _____

Date: _____

If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please contact:
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President for Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland. Tel +353 1-7008000

Appendix C. Quantitative Analysis
C.1 Mass mobilisation and support for the left (massmob) with no interaction variables

Variables	presvrl	presvrl2	lhvrl	leftvoteshare
Mass Mobilisation	1.245076**	.2773108*	.9604338***	10.48389***
	(.5450553)	(.1593694)	(.3406424)	(10.48389)
Indigenous Population	-.0021283	-.0038901	.0060704	-.0076073
	(-.0021283)	(.003837)	(.009107)	(.062897)
Incumbent Inequality	-.0678271	-0.0168218	-.0588546*	-.1089093
	(-.0678271)	(.0135504)	(.0342837)	(2883671)
Incumbent Ideology	.691822	.0963936	.9823759**	16.1018***
	(.691822)	(.1735839)	(.409562)	(3.204569)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0332603	-.0324062	-.0229269	-.0648559
	(-.0332603)	(.0245935)	(.0473126)	(.3426428)
Constant	11.76447	2.534966	10.78142	30.1405
	(11.76447)	(.6888838)	(1.848107)	(15.26847)
R2	0.1436	0.1443	0.2070	0.2394
N	65	65	81	169

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

C.2 Indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left (movemobscore) with no interaction variables

Variables	presvrl	presvrl2	lhvrl	leftvoteshare
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation	.0306135	-.1263065	.6986483	-.5403157
	(1.060275)	(.3665617)	(.3328416)	(3.2007)
Indigenous Population	-.0295032	-.0040627	-.0167234	.0098762
	(.0204369)	(.0078162)	(.0114619)	(.0862839)
Incumbent Inequality	.0843721	.0164702	.1052603	1.297553
	(.0830575)	(.0328967)	(.041917)	(.4326308)
Incumbent Ideology	-.9178969	-.2117583	1.400991	13.30122
	(1.079232)	(.4056795)	(.5438487)	(6.728779)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0426788	-.085238	.0834066	-.0317623
	(.2550973)	(.0792754)	(.0615855)	(.5694543)
Constant	6.257643	1.3230313	2.684829	-37.7332
	(5.210613)	(2.012112)	(2.428803)	(23.38207)
R2	0.1595	0.0090	0.4003	0.2129
N	19	19	24	51

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

C. 3 Mass mobilisation and support for the left (massmob) with interaction variables

Variables	*presvrl*	*presVRL2*	*lhvrl*	*leftvoteshare*
Mass Mobilisation	1.751048**	.4281977**	1.17545***	14.23665***
	(.7123276)	(.1881823)	(.4348726)	(3.344204)
Indigenous Population	.0119095	.0004017	.0133272*	.117202
	(.0140704)	(.0048353)	(.0075412)	(.0772089)
Mass Mobilisation & Indigenous Population (*interaction*)	-.027697	-.0082402	-.0137135	-.226657*
	(.0249509)	(.0077549)	(.018045)	(.1192123)
Incumbent Inequality	-.0792202	-.0202808	-.0630704*	-.1815594
	(.0525734)	(.0136862)	(.03441)	(.2848851)
Incumbent Ideology	.5923487	.0718225	.9961547**	16.07414***
	(.6213956)	(.168812)	(.4095915)	(3.274425)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0193024	-.0293191	-.0210886	.0023174
	(.0867816)	(.0247151)	(.047901)	(.3412128)
Constant	12.11383	2.642796	10.87771	31.85016
	(2.780596)	(.6919339)	(1.855281)	(15.07906)
R2	0.1644	0.1700	0.2155	0.2553
N	65	65	81	169

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

C. 4 Indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left (movemobscore) with interaction variables

Variables	presvrl	presVRL2	lhvrl	leftvoteshare
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation	-3.947096 (2.310069)	-1.5066* (.8300203)	-.7384124 (.8805137)	-20.07877** (8.195758)
Indigenous Population	-.1423259* (.0661771)	-.0431167*	-.0584655* (.0284111)	-.5431189** (.253218)
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation & Indigenous Population (*interaction*)	.086854** (.0439334)	.0300327 (.0172221)	.030342 (.0228798)	.4280106** (.165444)
Incumbent Inequality	.0472029 (.0680893)	.0039666 (.0293862)	.103473** (.042327)	1.126727 (.3932475)
Incumbent Ideology	-.9730501 (1.109701)	-.2374214 (.4046411)	1.389554** (.5331261)	11.96429 (6.02072)
GDP Growth (%)	-.0401885 (.239374)	-.0804415 (.0712988)	.0947646 (.0604404)	.4769356 (.7455919)
Constant	13.3973 (5.881331)	3.792383 (2.13535)	4.801297 (2.508005)	-5.279453 (25.33032)
R2	0.3632	0.2749	0.4837	0.3086
N	19	19	24	51

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1

C4. Results Direct from Stata

Mass Mobilisation model original (no interaction) (massmob)

. regress presvrl massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                              Number of obs =      65
                                               F(  5,     59) =    1.45
                                               Prob > F       =  0.2207
                                               R-squared      =  0.1436
                                               Root MSE       =  2.0553
```

presvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
massmob	1.245076	.5450553	2.28	0.026	.1544231	2.33573
indigpop	-.0021283	.0120116	-0.18	0.860	-.0261635	.0219069
giniincum	-.0678271	.0516067	-1.31	0.194	-.1710919	.0354377
rightincum	.691822	.6410224	1.08	0.285	-.5908609	1.974505
gdpgrowth	-.0332603	.0850052	-0.39	0.697	-.2033553	.1368348
_cons	11.76447	2.740765	4.29	0.000	6.280213	17.24873

. regress presvrl2 massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                              Number of obs =      65
                                               F(  5,     59) =    3.02
                                               Prob > F       =  0.0172
                                               R-squared      =  0.1443
                                               Root MSE       =  .55633
```

presvrl2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
massmob	.2773108	.1593694	1.74	0.087	-.0415867	.5962082
indigpop	-.0038901	.003837	-1.01	0.315	-.0115679	.0037878
giniincum	-.0168218	.0135504	-1.24	0.219	-.043936	.0102925
rightincum	.0963936	.1735839	0.56	0.581	-.250947	.4437342
gdpgrowth	-.0324062	.0245935	-1.32	0.193	-.0816177	.0168053
_cons	2.534966	.6888838	3.68	0.001	1.156513	3.913419

. regress lhvrl massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

Linear regression

```
                                              Number of obs =       81
                                              F(  5,    75) =     3.74
                                              Prob > F      =   0.0044
                                              R-squared     =   0.2070
                                              Root MSE      =    1.507
```

lhvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
massmob	.9604338	.3406424	2.82	0.006	.2818393	1.639028
indigpop	.0060704	.009107	0.67	0.507	-.0120716	.0242125
giniincum	-.0588546	.0342837	-1.72	0.090	-.1271512	.0094421
rightincum	.9823759	.409562	2.40	0.019	.1664864	1.798265
gdpgrowth	-.0229269	.0473126	-0.48	0.629	-.1171784	.0713246
_cons	10.78142	1.848107	5.83	0.000	7.099802	14.46304

. regress leftvoteshare massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

Linear regression

```
                                              Number of obs =      169
                                              F(  5,   163) =    10.24
                                              Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                              R-squared     =   0.2394
                                              Root MSE      =   17.434
```

leftvotesh~e	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
massmob	10.48389	2.661285	3.94	0.000	5.228855	15.73893
indigpop	-.0076073	.062897	-0.12	0.904	-.1318052	.1165907
giniincum	-.1089093	.2883671	-0.38	0.706	-.6783261	.4605076
rightincum	16.1018	3.204569	5.02	0.000	9.773982	22.42962
gdpgrowth	-.0648559	.3426428	-0.19	0.850	-.7414468	.6117351
_cons	30.1405	15.26847	1.97	0.050	-.0089969	60.28999

Indigenous Movement Mobilisation model original (no interaction) (movemobscore)

. regress presvrl movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                               Number of obs =      19
                                                F(  5,    13) =    1.56
                                                Prob > F      =  0.2391
                                                R-squared     =  0.1595
                                                Root MSE      =   1.886
```

presvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	.0306135	1.060275	0.03	0.977	-2.259972	2.321199
indigpop	-.0295032	.0204369	-1.44	0.173	-.0736544	.014648
giniincum	.0843721	.0830575	1.02	0.328	-.0950627	.2638068
rightincum	-.9178969	1.079232	-0.85	0.410	-3.249437	1.413643
gdpgrowth	-.0426788	.2550973	-0.17	0.870	-.5937831	.5084255
_cons	6.257643	5.210613	1.20	0.251	-4.999202	17.51449

. regress presvrl2 movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                               Number of obs =      19
                                                F(  5,    13) =    0.60
                                                Prob > F      =  0.7029
                                                R-squared     =  0.0990
                                                Root MSE      =  .72695
```

presvrl2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-.1263065	.3665617	-0.34	0.736	-.9182148	.6656019
indigpop	-.0040267	.0078162	-0.52	0.615	-.0209125	.0128592
giniincum	.0164702	.0328967	0.50	0.625	-.0545989	.0875392
rightincum	-.2117583	.4056795	-0.52	0.610	-1.088176	.664659
gdpgrowth	-.0805238	.0792754	-1.02	0.328	-.2517878	.0907402
_cons	1.323013	2.012112	0.66	0.522	-3.023891	5.669918

. regress lhvrl movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                               Number of obs =      24
                                                F(  5,    18) =    7.97
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                R-squared     =  0.4003
                                                Root MSE      =   1.046
```

lhvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	.6986483	.3328416	2.10	0.050	-.000626	1.397923
indigpop	-.0167234	.0114619	-1.46	0.162	-.0408039	.0073572
giniincum	.1052603	.041917	2.51	0.022	.017196	.1933246
rightincum	1.400991	.5438487	2.58	0.019	.2584071	2.543574
gdpgrowth	.0834066	.0615855	1.35	0.192	-.0459796	.2127929
_cons	2.684829	2.428803	1.11	0.284	-2.417896	7.787554

. regress leftvoteshare movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                                Number of obs =       51
                                                 F(  5,    45) =     2.66
                                                 Prob > F      =   0.0345
                                                 R-squared     =   0.2129
                                                 Root MSE      =     14.6
```

leftvotesh~e	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-.5403157	3.2007	-0.17	0.867	-6.986856	5.906225
indigpop	.0098762	.0862839	0.11	0.909	-.1639085	.183661
giniincum	1.297553	.4326308	3.00	0.004	.4261898	2.168916
rightincum	13.30122	6.728779	1.98	0.054	-.2512399	26.85367
gdpgrowth	-.0317623	.5694543	-0.06	0.956	-1.178702	1.115178
_cons	-37.7332	23.38207	-1.61	0.114	-84.82711	9.36071

Mobilisation model (*massmob*) including interaction

```
. reg presvrl i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
```

```
Linear regression                                Number of obs =      65
                                                 F( 6,    58) =    1.32
                                                 Prob > F      = 0.2611
                                                 R-squared     = 0.1644
                                                 Root MSE      = 2.0476
```

presvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
1.massmob	1.751048	.7123276	2.46	0.017	.3251698	3.176927
indigpop	.0119095	.0140704	0.85	0.401	-.0162554	.0400744
massmob#c.indigpop						
1	-.027697	.0249509	-1.11	0.272	-.0776417	.0222476
giniincum	-.0792202	.0525734	-1.51	0.137	-.1844574	.026017
rightincum	.5923487	.6213956	0.95	0.344	-.6515098	1.836207
gdpgrowth	-.0193024	.0867816	-0.22	0.825	-.1930147	.1544099
_cons	12.11383	2.780596	4.36	0.000	6.547861	17.6798

```
.
. reg presvrl2 i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
```

```
Linear regression                                Number of obs =      65
                                                 F( 6,    58) =    2.44
                                                 Prob > F      = 0.0360
                                                 R-squared     = 0.1700
                                                 Root MSE      = .55261
```

presvrl2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
1.massmob	.4281977	.1881823	2.28	0.027	.0515099	.8048856
indigpop	.0004017	.0048353	0.08	0.934	-.0092773	.0100806
massmob#c.indigpop						
1	-.0082402	.0077549	-1.06	0.292	-.0237634	.0072829
giniincum	-.0202808	.0136862	-1.48	0.144	-.0476768	.0071152
rightincum	.0718225	.168812	0.43	0.672	-.2660915	.4097365
gdpgrowth	-.0293191	.0247151	-1.19	0.240	-.0787917	.0201535
_cons	2.642796	.6919339	3.82	0.000	1.25774	4.027852

```
. reg lhvrl i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)

Linear regression                                    Number of obs =       81
                                                     F( 6,    74) =     3.25
                                                     Prob > F      =   0.0069
                                                     R-squared     =   0.2155
                                                     Root MSE      =    1.509
```

lhvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
1.massmob	1.17545	.4348726	2.70	0.009	.3089475	2.041953
indigpop	.0133272	.0075412	1.77	0.081	-.0016989	.0283533
massmob#c.indigpop						
1	-.0137135	.018045	-0.76	0.450	-.0496689	.0222419
giniincum	-.0630704	.03441	-1.83	0.071	-.1316339	.0054931
rightincum	.9961547	.4095915	2.43	0.017	.1800259	1.812284
gdpgrowth	-.0210886	.047901	-0.44	0.661	-.1165334	.0743562
_cons	10.87771	1.855281	5.86	0.000	7.180985	14.57444

```
.
. reg leftvoteshare i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)

Linear regression                                    Number of obs =      169
                                                     F( 6,   162) =     8.98
                                                     Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                                     R-squared     =   0.2553
                                                     Root MSE      =   17.304
```

leftvoteshare	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
1.massmob	14.23665	3.344204	4.26	0.000	7.632801	20.84051
indigpop	.117202	.0772089	1.52	0.131	-.0352637	.2696677
massmob#c.indigpop						
1	-.2236657	.1192123	-1.88	0.062	-.4590761	.0117447
giniincum	-.1815594	.2848851	-0.64	0.525	-.7441265	.3810077
rightincum	16.07414	3.274425	4.91	0.000	9.608084	22.5402
gdpgrowth	.0023174	.3412128	0.01	0.995	-.6714809	.6761157
_cons	31.85016	15.07906	2.11	0.036	2.073304	61.62702

```
.
```

Indigenous movement mobilisation model (expert survey)

```
. regress presvrl movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust)
```

Linear regression

```
                                              Number of obs =      19
                                              F( 6,    12) =    1.94
                                              Prob > F      =  0.1547
                                              R-squared     =  0.3632
                                              Root MSE      =  1.7087
```

presvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-3.947096	2.310069	-1.71	0.113	-8.980304	1.086111
indigpop	-.1423259	.0661771	-2.15	0.053	-.2865134	.0018616
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop	.086854	.043934	1.98	0.071	-.00887	.182578
giniincum	.0472029	.0680893	0.69	0.501	-.101151	.1955568
rightincum	-.9730501	1.109701	-0.88	0.398	-3.39088	1.44478
gdpgrowth	-.0401885	.239374	-0.17	0.869	-.5617397	.4813627
_cons	13.3973	5.881331	2.28	0.042	.5829759	26.21162

```
. regress presvrl2 movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust
```

Linear regression

```
                                              Number of obs =      19
                                              F( 6,    12) =    1.21
                                              Prob > F      =  0.3648
                                              R-squared     =  0.2749
                                              Root MSE      =  .67877
```

presvrl2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-1.5066	.8300203	-1.82	0.095	-3.315059	.3018589
indigpop	-.0431167	.0238815	-1.81	0.096	-.0951501	.0089167
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop	.0300327	.0172221	1.74	0.107	-.007491	.0675564
giniincum	.0039666	.0293862	0.13	0.895	-.0600604	.0679935
rightincum	-.2374214	.4046411	-0.59	0.568	-1.119059	.6442159
gdpgrowth	-.0804415	.0712988	-1.13	0.281	-.2357881	.0749052
_cons	3.792383	2.13535	1.78	0.101	-.8601458	8.444912

. regress lhvrl movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust)

```
Linear regression                               Number of obs =      24
                                                F(  6,    17) =    7.78
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                R-squared     =  0.4837
                                                Root MSE      =  .99862
```

lhvrl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-.7384124	.8805137	-0.84	0.413	-2.596134	1.119309
indigpop	-.0584655	.0284111	-2.06	0.055	-.1184078	.0014767
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop	.030342	.0228798	1.33	0.202	-.0179301	.0786141
giniincum	.103473	.042327	2.44	0.026	.0141707	.1927752
rightincum	1.389554	.5331261	2.61	0.018	.2647561	2.514351
gdpgrowth	.0947646	.0604404	1.57	0.135	-.0327535	.2222828
_cons	4.801297	2.508005	1.91	0.073	-.4901304	10.09272

. regress leftvoteshare movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,
> t)

```
Linear regression                               Number of obs =      51
                                                F(  6,    44) =    4.27
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0018
                                                R-squared     =  0.3086
                                                Root MSE      =  13.838
```

| leftvoteshare	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
movemobscore	-20.07877	8.195758	-2.45	0.018	-36.59623	-3.561305
indigpop	-.5431189	.2532138	-2.14	0.038	-1.053438	-.0328001
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop	.4280106	.165444	2.59	0.013	.0945802	.761441
giniincum	1.126727	.3932475	2.87	0.006	.3341884	1.919265
rightincum	11.96429	6.02072	1.99	0.053	-.169677	24.09825
gdpgrowth	.4769356	.7455919	0.64	0.526	-1.025706	1.979577
_cons	-5.279453	25.33032	-0.21	0.836	-56.32935	45.77045

D. Map of Bolivia with Department Borders

Source: University of Texas available from
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/bolivia_admin_2006.jpg

E. Organisational Structure of Movements in Bolivia

E.1 Organisational Structure of CIDOB

```
                              ┌─────────────────────┐
                              │       CIDOB         │
                              └─────────────────────┘
```

APG Santa Cruz Tarija Chuquisca	**CPESC** Santa Cruz	**CPIB** Beni	**ORCAWETA** Tarija	**CIRABO** Pando	**CPILAP** La Paz	**CPITCO** Cochabamba	**CIPOAP** Tacana Pando
Community	Community	Community	Community	Community	Community	Community	Community

Source: García-Linera et al., (2004)

E.2 Organisational Structure of CSUTCB

```
                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                    │       CSUTCB        │
                    └─────────────────────┘
```

Bartolinas	9 Department Federations
Department Federations	Provinical Federations
Regional Federations	Centrals
Womens Union	Sub-Centrals
Comunnities	Communities

Source: García-Linera et al., (2004)

E.3: Organisational Structure of CONAMAQ

Source: García-Linera et al., (2004)

**Appendix F. Map of Peru with Department Borders**

Source: University of Texas available from
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/peru_admin_06.jpg

Appendix G. Trust in Political Parties versus Movements
G.1 Bolivia

*Indigenous Trust in Parties and Sindicatos using self-reporting in Bolivia, 2006.[169]*

170

Source: *Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Bolivia 2006 Survey.*

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[169] Chi2 for political parties reported (83.6) and Cramérs V reported (0.07). Chi2 for syndicates reported (59.6) and Cramérs V reported (0.06)

Indigenous Trust in Parties and Sindicatos using mother tongue in Bolivia, 2006.[171]

Source: *Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Bolivia 2006 Survey.*

G.2 Peru

*Indigenous trust in parties and movements using self-reporting in Peru, 2006.[172]*

Source: *Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Peru 2006 Survey.*

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[171] Chi2 for political parties reported (60.8) and Cramérs V reported (0.07). Chi2 for syndicates reported (47.9) and Cramérs V reported (0.06)

[172] Chi2 for political parties reported (36.3) and Cramérs V reported (0.06). Chi2 for indigenous movements reported (29.2) and Cramérs V reported (0.06).

Indigenous trust in parties and movements using mother tongue in Peru, 2006.[173]

Indigenous Trust in Parties & Movements, Peru 2006.

Source: *Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Peru 2006 Survey.*

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[173] Chi2 for political parties reported (39.7) and Cramérs V reported (0.11). Chi2 for indigenous movements reported (28.4) and Cramérs V reported (0.1).