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Incoherence in regime complexes: a sentiment analysis of EU-IMF surveillance

Breen, Michael ORCID: 0000-0002-5857-9938, Hodson, Dermot and Moschella, Manuela ORCID: 0000-0002-3159-9533 (2019) Incoherence in regime complexes: a sentiment analysis of EU-IMF surveillance. Journal Of Common Market Studies, 50 (1). pp. 24-45. ISSN 1468-5965

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Abstract

The proliferation of international institutions means that states can be subject to multiple, overlapping and potentially incoherent international obligations. The regime complexity literature draws attention to this problem but says little about its character and causes. This article investigates whether and why two key components of the international economic surveillance regime – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) – impose conflicting obligations on the same states. Based on a comparative sentiment analysis of more than 400 surveillance documents and using differences in tone as a proxy for incoherence, our results show that the IMF was more pessimistic about member states’ economic policies before the global financial crisis but less so thereafter. Our results suggest that differences in discretionary authority rather than the distribution of power drove such incoherence, with the EU’s fiscal rules encouraging less pessimism before the global financial crisis and more pessimism thereafter.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:international institutions; EU; IMF; regime complexity; international economic surveillance; sentiment analysis
Subjects:Business > Economic policy
Social Sciences > Globalization
Social Sciences > International relations
Social Sciences > Political science
Social Sciences > Public administration
DCU Faculties and Centres:UNSPECIFIED
Publisher:John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dech.12472
Copyright Information:© 2019 Wiley
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:23283
Deposited On:10 May 2019 13:42 by Michael Breen . Last Modified 13 Jan 2021 04:30

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