



# **Proceedings of the EMII Connected Learning Risk Research Symposium III: Nuclear Incident (Abroad)**

Edited By: McMullan, C., & Brown, G.D. 2018, DCU, Dublin, Ireland

10<sup>th</sup> May 2019



EMII



# **Setting the Scene**

# **Nuclear Incident Abroad: Expert and Public Perception**

Prof Caroline McMullan, Gavin D. Brown & Dr Ann Largey

DCU Business School

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
# Nuclear Incident Abroad: Expert & Public Perception

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
DCU Business School



# Expert: Risk Perception

NRA 2017

# National Risk Matrix 2017



- |                  |                           |  |                           |   |
|------------------|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|---|
| A. Storm ***     | E. Tsunami ***            | I. Food Contamination ***              | M. Maritime Accident ***  | Q. Fire ***   |
| B. Flooding ***  | F. Infectious Disease *** | J. Loss of Critical Infrastructure *** | N. Transport Hub ***      | R. Nuclear Incident (Abroad) ***                    |
| C. Snow ***      | G. Terrorist Incident *** | K. Rail Accident ***                   | P. Hazmat **              | S. Disruption to Energy Supply ***                  |
| D. Low Temp. *** | H. Animal Disease ***     | I. Aviation Accident ***               | O. Industrial Incident ** | T: Network & Information Security/Cyber Incident ** |

Risk Assessment Confidence Levels:                      \*\*\* High Confidence                      \*\* Moderate Confidence                      \* Low Confidence

# Descriptors – Nuclear Incident Abroad


Likelihood Rating	Classification	Average Recurrence Interval
3	Unlikely	10 - 100 years between occurrences

Flooding	5 Very High Impact
People	Deaths greater than 1 in 20,000 people for population of interest OR Critical injuries/illness greater than 1 in 20,000
Environment	Very heavy contamination, widespread effects of extended duration
Economic	Greater than 8% of Annual Budget
Social	Community unable to function without significant support

Conf. Level	Criteria
High ***	Assessment based on expert knowledge of the issue and/or reliable, relevant, current data. Consistent agreement among assessors.

# Public: Perception, Worry & Preparedness (2018)

# Risk Rating: Nuclear Incident Abroad



Public - Mode



Public - Mean



Expert - NRA



# Nuclear Incident Abroad: Likelihood & Impact


Nuclear (Abroad)	Code	Percent
Extremely Unlikely	1	47.4
Very Unlikely	2	18.8
Unlikely	3	23.3
Likely	4	6.3
Very Likely	5	4.2

n = 6007

Nuclear (Abroad)	Code	Percent
Very Low Impact	1	19.0
Low Impact	2	9.3
Moderate Impact	3	10.0
High Impact	4	18.0
Very High Impact	5	43.7


n = 5466

# Nuclear Incident Abroad: Worry




n=5240

# Preparedness




n=4697

# Relative Worry



n=5240

# Relative Risk



n=5466

# Citation

- If citing this presentation, please use the following format:
- McMullan, C., Brown, G.D., & Largey, A., 2019, Nuclear Incident Abroad: Expert & Public Risk Perception. *In*: EMII Connected Learning Series. Risk Research Symposium III: Nuclear Incident Abroad. 10th May 2019.



# Ireland's National Plan for Nuclear Accidents.

**Dr Ciara McMahon**

Programme Manager (Air Quality & Emergency Preparedness)

Office of Radiation Protection & Environmental Monitoring

Environmental Protection Agency

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# Irish Arrangements for a nuclear emergency




Ciara McMahon




1986





In 1986 concluded: Need a nuclear emergency plan!





reeling  
in the years

1996



**epa**

Environmental Protection Agency  
An Ghníomhaireacht um Daoimhna' Comhshaoil

## Joint Oireachtas Committee on Housing, Planning and Local Government – 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2019



*“...much of what I have learned, I learned from the **National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents** and the experiences arising from it. Some of them were very bad experiences in the early days but they certainly **provided the basis for what we have now.**”*

2001



HOW NOT TO COMMUNICATE IN A CRISIS



**Where are  
we now?**

# Systems Approach to Planning

Used at National, Regional and Local Level involving a continuous cycle of activity.

The principal elements of the approach are:

- **Hazard Analysis** (*includes Risk Assessment - 5x5 Matrix*)
- **Mitigation** (*includes Risk Management*)
- **Planning and Preparedness**
- **Co-ordinated Response and**
- **Recovery (incl. Review and Feedback)**





# Step 1: Hazard identification and risk assessment

- Nuclear accident abroad
- Nuclear-powered vessel
- Incident involving licensed radiation source in Ireland
- Transport accident involving radioactive source in Ireland
- Lost/Found radioactive source
- Satellite re-entry
- ...



# Key Hazard Assessments

## Risks to Ireland from Incidents at the Sellafield Site


### Inside This Summary

- 2 The Legacy of Sellafield
- 2 How the Risks Were Assessed
- 6 How Incidents at Sellafield Could Impact Ireland
- 8 Summary of Results
- 9 Additional Technical Details
- 12 The Expert Team

The UK's Sellafield nuclear site, located on the Cumbrian coast, is at its closest point about 180 km from Ireland's coastline. Because of the site's location, its history, and the amount and type of radioactive materials there, the Government of Ireland and the Irish people have long been concerned about how an incident at the site might impact Ireland and the Irish Sea. Therefore, the Irish Government commissioned an assessment to determine the risks to Ireland from incidents at the Sellafield Site and to assess the potential radiological impact on Ireland of postulated severe accidents at Sellafield.

The Sellafield nuclear site that process and store used other radioactive materials stores low-level radioactive waste. The assessment specifically assesses risks from equipment failures, natural events, human error or terrorist activities at Sellafield or the transportation of radioactive materials from Sellafield to Ireland and are within limits set by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII).

This document briefly summarizes the assessment about the Site and the Low-Level Waste Repository used to assess the risks to Ireland from the analysis assesses risks from the Waste Repository from the materials and existing processes constantly changing as the Sellafield and more waste Repository. The information



Potential radiological impact on Ireland of postulated severe accidents at Sellafield



### 1. Incidents involving radioactive sources under regulatory control

Ireland uses radioactive materials in the form of sealed and unsealed sources in support of industry, medical diagnosis and treatment and other societal infrastructure. To ensure the safety and security of all sources of radiation held throughout Ireland, the EPA operates a licensing system.

As of 1st January 2014 there were 1698 active licences which are divided into different bands including industrial, medical, educational/research and laboratories, distributor, dental, veterinary and custody only (see Figure 1). These bands are further subdivided into 'levels' which depend on the complexity of the process and the number and activity of sources and irradiating apparatus being held and/or used.




Figure 1. Licensees of Radiation Sources in Ireland by sector


In broad terms the following risks are associated with licensed sources:

Type of risk	Description of hazard
Loss or theft from storage location or during transit	Despite tight controls, loss/theft can occur. In responding to such events, it must be assumed that source may be with people who may not know its nature and hazard, who can handle it, break it and spread contamination.  Hazard: The hazard depends on the type of radioactive source involved. For the highest hazard sources in Ireland (see list in Tables X to Y), unknowingly handling unshielded/unconfined sources could result in permanent injuries from external exposure or inadvertent ingestion and in localized contamination, requiring clean up.

# Environmental modelling

## NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

Concentration (/m<sup>3</sup>) averaged between 0 m and 200 m  
Integrated from 0000 01 Jan to 0000 02 Jan 06 (UTC)  
C137 Release started at 0000 01 Jan 06 (UTC)



## Used computer prediction models

- 21 years weather data
- Data on sea currents

Calculated resulting environmental levels in Ireland

Calculated radiation doses to people


# Identifying 'worst case' weather conditions



48 hour  
model run  
every 3  
hours

Run model  
for each site



Identify  
maximum  
weather/site  
combination

Full  
assessment  
of this  
combination






1 year




Ingestion dose by radionuclide

# Contamination of food:

- Date of accident assumed was at height of summer – maximised impact on food
- Compared predicted levels in food with EU Maximum Permitted Levels
- Would generally need food controls/agricultural protective actions
- Length of time needed – would depend on severity of accident/weather/time of year





- Cloudshine
- Groundshine
- Skin Contamination
- Inhalation
- Resuspension
- Ingestion





epa

Environmental Protection Agency  
An Gníomhaireacht um Daoimhú Comhshaoil

# Economic consequences

- Economic & Social Research Institute
  - 4 scenarios
  - Costs to economy
    - Agriculture
    - Tourism
    - Business (lost days)
    - Monitoring costs
- €4bn to €160bn

## **The Potential Economic Impact of a Nuclear Accident - An Irish Case Study**

*Prepared by the Economic and Social Research Institute  
for the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government*

John Curtis, Edgar Morgenroth, Bryan Coyne


21 April 2016

This paper has been peer reviewed. The authors are solely responsible for the content and the views expressed.  
The Institute does not itself take institutional policy positions.


## Summary of hazard assessment

- Following a nuclear accident abroad the most significant route of potential exposure would be the consumption of contaminated food
- Most of the ingestion dose could be averted through the introduction of protective actions to reduce the transfer of radioactivity to food products and by restricting the sale of contaminated food
- Importance of agriculture and food to Ireland's economy
  - 15% of the world's infant formula is made in Ireland
  - Ireland is the 5<sup>th</sup> largest exporter of beef in the world


# Response




# EPA Roles in an emergency



- Duty officer: assess notifications/alerts
- Briefings to Departments/Agencies
- Modelling/Measurement of radioactivity in environment and food/feed
- Food and pharmaceutical imports/exports testing
- Information to media/public
- Advice to Irish citizens abroad (through DFA)



# EURANOS Food Handbook



Radiological

Dairy

Crops/Fodder

Meat  
(beef/lamb)

Pigs/Poultry

Food Safety

Sea Fisheries

Waste  
(environmental  
protection)

Laboratory







Know that in an emergency, there would be MANY interested parties



In preparedness, harder to get people's interest and time!



Our view of the world – radiation is a key focus!



Our stakeholders have many hazards to think about – many more likely, more immediate



Still need to have public stakeholder views and assumptions for preparing for public communication


- We do not want to know the details of the various plans
  - We want to know that there are plans
- And where to get information on them (when needed)



To gather public stakeholder views, used phone surveys, face-to-face interviews and focus groups




Q.10 – Q12 Please tell me which one of the statements on this card you agree with?



Public messaging: Need to meet people where they are, not where we are  
Have to know 'where' they are (what assumptions they have on what will happen)



...in the UK, what would you do?




Base: All aged 15+ n=1000

Note: methodology changed from 2010 to 2013 (phone to face-to-face interviews)



# Who is trusted to give information in a nuclear emergency?



Updated plans to give prominent public information roles to Chief Medical Officer and Meteorological Service (as part of weather forecast bulletin)

## Stakeholder engagement: Panel

- Dept of Agriculture, Food & Marine
- Food Safety Authority
- EPA
- Dept of Environment
- Seafood Protection Agency
- Meat Industry body
- Dairy industry body
- National Consumer Agency
- Grain & Feed industry body
- Irish Farmers' Union
- Large retail organisations (supermarkets)

*PREPARE*





Regular meetings of stakeholder panel to present draft strategies and plans – get feedback on acceptability and practicality

## Key Outcome from Panel Discussions

One of the most important issues in the event of a nuclear emergency is good **communications**

Communications with

- Farmers
- Processors
- Suppliers
- Retailers
- Consumers

Communications between industries is also very important e.g. between suppliers and processors

Therefore, all the stakeholders in the food industry must be involved in the communications plan

# Communication in an emergency

- Sub-Group of National Emergency Coordination Group
- Coordinate messaging across all Gov't organisations


- Media (Radio, TV)
- Website: central and main organisations
- Social media (Twitter)
- Press conferences
- Direct to key business groups (agri-food)



# Further work

- Currently finalising major revision to the National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents
- Maintaining Stakeholder Panel

## Nationally




New National Framework 2017

## Nationally, Regionally & Locally



The MEM Framework is for the main PRAs, i.e. the Gardaí, HSE and Local Authorities



Revised Plan for Nuclear Accidents

## Final Words

Thank you to my colleagues:

Veronica Smith, Kevin Kelleher, Robert Ryan and Ciara Hilliard (EPA)  
Sean Hogan and Keith Leonard (National Directorate for Fire and Emergency  
Management)

Thank you for your attention





[www.epa.ie/radiation](http://www.epa.ie/radiation)  
[www.emergencyplanning.ie](http://www.emergencyplanning.ie)





# The Potential Economic Impact of a Nuclear Accident: An Irish Case Study

**Professor Edgar Morgenroth**

Full Professor of Economics

DCU Business School.

Join @ [www.emii.ie](http://www.emii.ie)

# Disaster cost assessment: A case study of the potential economic impact of a nuclear accident affecting Ireland

Authors:

John Curtis, Bryan Coyne, Edgar Morgenroth

[Edgar.Morgenroth@dcu.ie](mailto:Edgar.Morgenroth@dcu.ie)

# Introduction

- The risks posed by Sellafield to Ireland were identified in Bley, D., Bell, J., Ryan, M., Stetkar, J., Wreathall, J. (2012) and the radiological implications of proposed nuclear power plants in the UK on Ireland (RP11, 2013)
- While these deal with the possible scale, nature and distribution of any fallout, they don't deal with the potential costs.
- Curtis, Coyne and Morgenroth (2016, 2018) assess the potential costs under different scenarios


# Context

## Conventions on Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy

- Paris Convention
- Brussels Supplementary Convention
- Vienna Convention
- Protocols Relating to Vienna and Paris Conventions
- 1997 Amending Protocol
- Compensation Convention



# Contamination not decimation



# High impact, low probability events

- 2011 Fukushima Daiichi plant
- 2010 Eyjafjallajökull ash cloud incident
- 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake & tsunami
- 1986 Chernobyl



# Economic Impact methodologies

- Input-output
- Computable general equilibrium (CGE)
- Econometrics





# Objectives

Develop a methodology and use it to assess the potential economic impact.

- Order of magnitude guide
- Easily applied
- Low data requirement



# Method

## Three types of costs/losses

- Direct costs
  - Disaster management costs & monitoring
- Direct losses
  - Lost/damaged produce
- Reputational losses
  - lost markets due to perceived contamination

# Full recovery?

- Seismic events
  - Mass migration
  - Capital flows
- Tractability





# Reputational losses

## Diffusion literature

- Initial shock
- S-shaped (sigmoidal) recovery function



# Reputational losses



# Gompertz growth function

- Gompertz, B. (1825). Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London, 115:513–583.
- Prescott, R. B. (1922). Law of growth in forecasting demand. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 18(140):471–479.
- Winsor, C. P. (1932). The Gompertz curve as a growth curve. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 18(1):1–8.
- Yin, et al. (2003). A flexible sigmoid function of determinate growth. Annals of Botany, 91(3):361–371.

# Proportional recovery

$$-\lambda_{it} = \left(1 + \frac{t_{ie} - t_i}{t_{ie} - t_{im}}\right) \left(\frac{t_i}{t_{ie}}\right)^{\frac{t_{ie}}{t_{ie} - t_{im}}}$$

– industry  $i$  in time  $t$

–  $t_{ie}$  full recovery time period





–  $t_{im}$  inflection point

## $t_{im}$ inflexion point

- Generally  $t_{im} > 0.5 t_{ie}$ 
  - Gutiérrez et al., 2005; Dergiades and Dasilas, 2010; Kaldasch, 2011; Yamakawa et al., 2013
- Set  $t_{im} = 0.67 t_{ie}$



# Proportional recovery: $\lambda_{it}$



$t_{ie}$  (when losses are fully recovered)

—Varies by scenario

Nuclear incident in north-western Europe:

1. No radiological impact on Ireland
2. Low-level environmental contamination
3. Moderate environmental contamination
4. High levels of radiological contamination

# Impact assumptions

	<b>Scenario 1</b>	<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>Scenario 3</b>	<b>Scenario 4</b>
Radiological Impact	None	Minimal	Substantial	Severe
Advice remain indoors	-	-	-	2 days
Loss of working days	-	-	-	3 days
Advice to keep livestock indoors	2days	4 days	8 weeks	-
Food/Environment Monitoring	2 weeks	9 months	10 years	30 years
Export Certification	-	7 years	10 years	60 years
Food import restrictions				
- IE to EU	2 weeks	9 months	1 year	3 years
- IE to Non-EU	2 weeks	9 months	5 years	15 years
Duration of reputational damage				
Tourism	6 months	1 year	6 years	15 years
Post EU import restriction	6 months	1 year	2 years	6 years
Domestic consumers	6 months	1 year	2 years	6 years
Post non-EU import restriction	6 months	1 year	10 years	15 years

# Level of initial losses

$$R_{i1} = \alpha_i V_i \quad 0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1, t=1$$

–  $R_{i1}$  = level of initial loss

–  $V_i$  = total value of pre-incident activity

# Assumptions for $\alpha_i$

$$-\alpha_{agri} = 0.6$$

Source	Country	Crisis	Food	Peak to trough % change in demand
<b>Philippidis and Hubbard (2005)</b>	UK	BSE	Beef/Mutton/lamb Other meats	-72% in quantity -45% in quantity
<b>Ishida et al. (2010)</b>	Japan	BSE Avian Flu	Beef Chicken	-50% in quantity -25% in quantity
<b>McCluskey et al. (2005)</b>	Japan	BSE	Beef	-70% in value
<b>Latouche et al. (1998)</b>	France	Steroids	Veal	-40% in quantity
<b>Niewczas, M. (2014)</b>	Poland	Food Scares	Food	-30% in quantity
<b>Carter and Smith (2007)</b>	USA	GMO	Corn	-7% in price

# Assumptions for $\alpha_i$

$$-\alpha_{tourism} = 0.9$$

Source	Tourist Origin	Tourist Destination	Crisis	Impact
Enders and Sandler (1991)	USA	Europe	Terrorism	54% cancelled reservations
D'Amore and Anuza (1986)	USA	Overseas	Terrorism	79% avoid international travel
Stafford et al. (2009)		Ireland	Terrorism	32% would postpone trip
Mc Kercher and Hui (2004)	Hong Kong		Terrorism	39% changed travel plans
Ioannides & Apostolopoulos (1999)	Overseas	Cyprus	War	-18% arrivals
<b>Mao et al. (2010)</b>	Japan USA	Taiwan	SARS	-98% arrivals -90% arrivals
Huang et al. (2008)	Overseas	Taiwan	Earthquake	-15% arrivals
Mazzocchi & Montini (2001)		Italy	Earthquake	-50% arrivals

# Decline in tourist numbers

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4
UK	0.9	1.8	9.5	23.7
Rest of Europe	0.8	1.5	8.0	20.0
Rest of World	0.5	1.0	5.2	12.9
Total (million)	2.2	4.3	22.7	56.6

	Direct Loss Scenario 1 (€m)	Rep. Loss Scenario 1	Direct Loss Scenario 2 (€m)	Rep. Loss Scenario 2	Direct Loss Scenario 3 (€m)	Rep. Loss Scenario 3	Direct Loss Scenario 4 (€m)	Rep. Loss Scenario 4
<b>Tourism</b>								
UK	-	423	-	846	-	4,125	-	9,003
Rest of Europe	-	356	-	712	-	3,468	-	7,571
Rest of World	-	230	-	461	-	2,245	-	4,899
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	1,963	-	5,138	-
Monitoring & certification costs	-	-	6	-	1,460	-	4,311	-
<b>Exports</b>								
Livestock & animal feed	-	220	480	418	1,550	1,494	3,895	1,904
Meat, dairy, seafood	-	1,956	2,273	3,727	13,800	13,297	34,659	17,902
Cereals, fruit & vegetables	-	209	458	399	1,478	1,424	3,712	1,917
Other food, goods	-	747	1,631	1,422	5,265	5,074	13,224	6,830
<b>Total</b>	-	<b>4,141</b>	<b>6,842</b>	<b>7,991</b>	<b>25,516</b>	<b>31,127</b>	<b>64,939</b>	<b>50,026</b>



# Summary

	<b>Scenario 1</b>	<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>Scenario 3</b>	<b>Scenario 4</b>
Direct Loss (€bn)	-	6.8	25.5	64.9
Reputational Loss (€bn)	4.1	8.0	31.1	50.0
Indirect Losses (IO) (€bn)	0.3	3.5	22.6	44.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>79.3</b>	<b>159.3</b>

- Substantial costs even without radiation
- Costs quickly escalate
- Many costs not considered
  - Health costs
  - Costs of contaminants disposal

# References

Curtis, J., Coyne, B. and E. Morgenroth (2016) [The Potential Economic Impact of a Nuclear Accident - An Irish Case Study](#). Dublin: Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment

Curtis, J., Coyne, B. and E. Morgenroth (2018) [Disaster cost assessment: A case study of the potential economic impact of a nuclear accident affecting Ireland](#) □

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# Q&A

- Contact online :  
<http://emii.ie/contact-us/>
- Twitter :  
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The logo for EMII, consisting of the letters 'EMII' in a dark blue serif font, centered within a light green oval shape that has a slight 3D effect with a shadow.

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