Contested Notions of ‘Radicalisation’ and Youth Vulnerability in Mombasa County, Kenya: An Analysis of National and Local Discourses

THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
MIRAJI HASSAN MOHAMED, B.Sc., M.A.

RESEARCH SUPERVISORS:
PROFESSOR MAURA CONWAY
DR. WALT KILROY
JULY 2023
Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed: [Signature]

Miraji Hassan Mohamed

ID Number: 16212923

Date: 24 July 2023
Acknowledgements

Working on this project often reminded me of a popular Kenyan phrase that ‘Degree ni Harambee’ to mean obtaining an academic qualification requires collective effort. I am humbled and grateful to my own Harambee committee who contributed towards making this project a success. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisors Prof. Maura Conway and Dr. Walt Kilroy for their intellectual guidance, emotional support and encouragement. They both believed in me and cheered me on even when I doubted myself. I also thank my independent panel members Prof. Eileen Connolly, and Dr. Erika Biagini for their thorough and insightful feedback throughout the years.

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the brilliant civil society organisations/practitioners and young people who generously shared their stories and experiences. Their willingness to talk with me and inviting me to attend their activities profoundly shaped this project, and I am so thankful for their trust in me. It was an honour to sit with them and engage in stimulating discussions.

I am grateful to the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University, the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Dublin City University, and the Higher Education Authority of Ireland for funding this research.

To Arpita, Loise, Adel, Mr. Hanjari Charo, Annelieke, May, Job, Christine, Liridona, Veronica, Sheelagh, Olive, Khalfan, Kheir, Fatma, and Maureen your invaluable advice for parts of this project at various levels, reassurance, the endless encouragement, wonderful meals, and laughter made the PhD experience more manageable and enabled me to push forward during difficult times.

Lastly, I am eternally thankful to my family who have been a constant source of support. My sisters and brothers, and Ma for being my point of reference for words and phrases I could not translate, and for being enthusiastic about my academic achievements. To my dad and Ma who never failed to remind me to dress warmly and ask how my studies were progressing, you were the reason I am achieving this milestone today.

To my Westen family, thank you for the endless encouragement, wisdom, and engaging debates about my project. Finally, I do not have enough words to thank my fiancé, Pepijn Westen, for his constant love, and faith in me. Your help with retrieving data made this project possible. Your support, encouragement, and patience particularly made the PhD experience pleasant and less stressful.
# Table of Contents

Declaration ........................................................................................................................................... i  
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... ii  
List of illustrations ................................................................................................................................. vii  
List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. viii  
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ x  

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1  
   From the War on Terror to the Struggle Against Violent Extremism .............................................. 1  
   Objectives, justifications and research questions ............................................................................. 3  
   Background of the study .................................................................................................................... 6  
      ‘Radicalisation’, PCVE and their uptake in global and regional bodies ........................................ 6  
      Localising ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE: an overview of Kenya’s journey so far ......................... 13  
   Historicising ‘radicalisation’: repackaging old conflicts with new frameworks ............................ 17  
      Locating the Coastal region in Kenya’s history ............................................................................ 17  
      Land politics, economic marginalisation and violence ................................................................. 20  
   Identity and discourse in knowledge production .............................................................................. 23  
   Thesis Outline .................................................................................................................................... 25  

Chapter 1. Theorising ‘Youth Radicalisation’ and ‘Extremism’ in Kenya ............................................. 29  
   Previous studies: debates, agreements and disagreements on radicalisation ............................. 33  
      Individual vulnerabilities and predispositions .......................................................................... 33  
      Socio-cultural settings of ‘radicalisation’ .................................................................................... 35  
      Gendered dynamics of ‘radicalisation’ ......................................................................................... 36  
      ‘Radicalisation’ settings ................................................................................................................ 39  
   Situating the study: ontological and epistemological shortcomings of existing studies .......... 42  
   In conversation with Critical Terrorism Studies .............................................................................. 46  

Chapter 2. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 54  
   Critical Discourse Analysis .............................................................................................................. 55  
   Analytical Tools ............................................................................................................................... 58  
      Fairclough’s Three-dimensional framework ............................................................................... 58  
      Social Actor Network (SAN) ...................................................................................................... 62  
      Legitimation Framework .............................................................................................................. 64  
   Applying Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional model, Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor  
      Network and Legitimation Frameworks ......................................................................................... 67  
   Text and Participant Selection ......................................................................................................... 68  
   Text Selection ................................................................................................................................. 68  
      Policy documents ....................................................................................................................... 69  
      Political speeches and statements .............................................................................................. 70  
      Press articles ............................................................................................................................... 70
Participant selection ........................................................................................................ 71
Expert interviews ........................................................................................................ 72
Engaging young people .............................................................................................. 74
Researching Kenya and the challenges of accessing data ........................................... 77
Notes on Transcribing and Translating ...................................................................... 79
Reflexivity and positionality: (un)learning from the past ........................................... 80
New concerns, old settings: on safety and security during and beyond the study .... 82
  Being local, being a woman, being Muslim and the many other beings: identities
  and the structuring of access to participants ......................................................... 85
  Intersecting identities and multiple positionalities .................................................. 86
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................... 94
Coding Categories ...................................................................................................... 94
  My journey of analysing press articles .................................................................. 98
Handling focus group data ......................................................................................... 100
Limitations of this study ............................................................................................ 101
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 102

Chapter 3. Competing National and Local Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’:
Analysis of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism and the Mombasa
County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism ............... 104
  ‘Terrorism’ and counterterrorism: tracking discourse patterns across three regimes
  ......................................................................................................................................... 105
Introducing Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) Policies ........ 107
Notes on formatting .................................................................................................... 110
On what drives ‘radicalisation’ and how to prevent it ................................................ 112
Psychosocial concerns ............................................................................................... 113
  ‘Radicalisation’ and Culture .................................................................................... 115
  ‘Radicalisation’ as a rejection of fundamental national values ............................... 115
  ‘Radicalisation’ as an outcome of extreme religious ideologies ......................... 118
  The role of social networks ..................................................................................... 121
  Socialisation .............................................................................................................. 122
  ‘Radicalisation’ as a consequence of socio-economic and political dynamics ....... 123
  Economic determinants of ‘radicalisation’ ............................................................... 124
  The politics of counterterrorism .............................................................................. 126
  Externalising threats ............................................................................................... 126
Discursive Construction of ‘Radicalisation’ ............................................................... 127
  Representation of young people in policies ........................................................... 127
  Legitimation strategies ......................................................................................... 129
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 133

Chapter 4. ‘Radicalisation’ in Elite Discourses: Analysis of Presidential Speeches
and Statements, 2015—2018 ...................................................................................... 140
National Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’ ................................................................... 141
  ‘Radicalisation’ as the opposition to national values ............................................. 142
Chapter 5. Constructing 'Radicalisation': Analysing How the Press Legittimates the boundaries of 'Radicalisation' through Personal Authority

Description of Media Content and Analysis

Press Discourses on 'Radicalisation'

Psychosocial concerns

- Representation of young people in psychosocial themes

Cultural concerns

- Ideologies
- The role of powerful Others
- Socialisation
- Gender norms and roles
- Representation of young people in cultural-related themes

Politico-economic concerns

- Economic determinants
- Violent counterterrorism
- Local conflict dynamics
- Spaces and places
- Externalising threats
- Representation of young people in structural discourses

(De)legitimating Emerging Discourses on 'Radicalisation'

- Authorisation
- Moral evaluation

Conclusion

Chapter 6. ‘Radicalisation’ from a Practitioners’ Points of View: Analysis of Interviews with PCVE Civil Society Practitioners

Dominant Discourses

- ‘Radicalisation’, Culture and Identity
- Socialisation
- Debating Identity: ‘radicalisation’ as a ‘youth problem’
- The role of powerful Others in ‘radicalisation’
- ‘Radicalisation’ as a Political Construct
List of illustrations

Figures

Figure 2.1 - Dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis 59
Figure 2.2 - Social Actor Network (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 52) 63
Figure 2.3 - Layering Discourses, Themes and Codes 97
Figure 2.4 - Distribution of CDA sample by year and outlet 99
Figure 3.1 - Cover page of the National Strategy to CVE 108
Figure 3.2 - Cover page of Mombasa County Action Plan for PCVE 109
Figure 3.3 - Psychosocial Themes on ‘Radicalisation’ 114
Figure 3.4 - Cultural Themes on ‘Radicalisation’ 115
Figure 3.5 - Socio-economic Themes on ‘Radicalisation’ 124
Figure 5.1 - Distribution of Psychosocial Themes 176
Figure 5.2 - Distribution of Cultural Themes 180
Figure 5.3 - Distribution of Politico-economic Themes 187
Figure 5.4 - Distribution of Legitimation Strategies in the Press 193
Figure 7.1 - Interaction between participants during FGDs 238
Figure 7.2 - Challenging the link between religious beliefs and violence 241
Figure 7.3 - Dissenting voices in FGD2 242
Figure 7.4 - FGD1 interactions about cultural relations 245

Tables

Table 2.1 - Distribution of Texts by Thematic Events 99

Boxes

Box 2.1 - Criteria for inclusion of press articles and presidential speeches 69
Box 7.1 - Encounters with Policing 256
Box 7.2 - Encounters with Shiranga 257
# List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>New York and Washington 11 September 2011 Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>County Action Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Container Freight Station Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDP</td>
<td>County Integrated Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPK</td>
<td>Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Critical Terrorism Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWSK</td>
<td>Child Welfare Society of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daesh</td>
<td>Arabic acronym for the Islamic State group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDE</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>Emergency Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Female Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUC</td>
<td>Garissa University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPK</td>
<td>Islamic Party of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic States of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPPSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport Corridor Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAP</td>
<td>Mombasa County Action Plan for PCVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Male Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACOSTI</td>
<td>National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>North Frontier District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCK</td>
<td>National Security Council of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCVE</td>
<td>National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEV</td>
<td>2007/2008 Post Election Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSR</td>
<td>Religious Societies Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>Social Actor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGR</td>
<td>Standard Gauge Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-structured Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPKEM</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUM</td>
<td>Technical University of Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVE</td>
<td>Transforming Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Human High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States or United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEDF</td>
<td>Youth Enterprise Development Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Contested Notions of ‘Radicalisation’ and Youth Vulnerability in Mombasa County, Kenya: an Analysis of National and Local Discourses

Miraji Hassan Mohamed

This thesis employs a critical discourse analysis approach to examine how different actors negotiate the boundaries of what can (and cannot) be defined as ‘radicalisation’. The study analysed two major policy documents, Kenya’s National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism and the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE); 57 speeches and statements of Kenyan president Kenyatta; 474 press articles; 19 interviews with PCVE practitioners; and two focus groups conducted with 11 young people in Mombasa. I found that Kenya’s ‘radicalisation’ discourse draws on diverse discursive resources of legitimation and representation to advance psychosocial, cultural, theological and politico-economic themes. Policy texts, speeches and the press attributed ‘radicalisation’ to psychosocial, cultural and theological explanations while discrediting the socio-economic and political contexts facilitating ‘radicalisation’. These themes composed national discourses and were (de)legitimated through authorisation and moral evaluation strategies. In contrast, practitioners and youth often but not exclusively described ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of cultural, social and political injustices. These local discourses were justified and (de)legitimated through moral evaluation, particularly, analogies. National and local discourses categorised young people in contradictory ways. On the one hand, genericisation, classification and aggregation strategies represented all young people as victims and ‘at-risk’ of becoming violent due to their socio-economic and cultural contexts. On the other hand, nomination, genericisation, indetermination, classification, differentiation, and functionalisation also characterised youth and specific young people as ‘a dangerous Other’ threatening Kenya’s stability, peace and prosperity. Young people’s experiences and perceptions blur the victim—dangerous binary highlighting how aspects of vulnerability and youth exercise of agency in uncertain socio-economic and cultural contexts coexist. They challenge universal knowledge claims and demonstrate that the subaltern knows their situation better; thus, their accounts need to be taken seriously. The texts under analysis were produced in different domains, but they drew on elements and discourses from each other, thus showing complex patterns of discourse continuity and transformations. This research contributes by showing that discourses are products and productive of multiple practices of power (power relations) and particular representations of youth as a social category that make up the boundaries of what can be intelligibly considered as ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE. This was particularly possible because of the condition of linearity which enabled Kenya’s disparate categories of past and contemporary events to be viewed and depicted as falling within a single trajectory. This research shows parallels between the colonial and post-independent state discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and ideas of who constitutes a ‘radical’. It is almost entirely the category youth which is often a constellation of a wide range of ideas, situations and circumstances that allows the different security stakeholders (local and global ones) to agree that ‘radicalisation’ is a ‘youth issue’ without having to unpack what they each mean by ‘youth’ or even ‘radicalisation’. This research underscores that it is the amorphous discourse of youth that allows ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE to first, exist and second, reinforce paternalistic logics under the guise of protecting young people.
Introduction

From the War on Terror to the Struggle Against Violent Extremism

*It was terrorism, then radicalisation and now we are at extremism*

- MP0619, PCVE Practitioner.

The modern concept of counterterrorism has its roots in the 20th century, specifically in response to the increasing threat of terrorism globally. And while terrorism has been predominantly used to define the actions of non-state actors. Scholars have also used terrorism to characterise the actions of states (e.g. Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta’s and Daniel Arap Moi’s governments as reign of terror\(^1\)) and colonial empires (including Portugal, Holland, France, Britain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain) (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Citizens for Justice (Nairobi, Kenya), 2003; Elkins, 2005; Jalata, 2013). It was in the 1960s and 1970s that terrorism became a significant concern, with a number of high-profile attacks carried out by various groups, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany. In response, governments worldwide began developing strategies aimed at preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. The September 11th attacks in 2001\(^2\), however, marked a turning point in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. While previous attacks were largely labelled fundamentalism, 9/11 ushered in a discursive shift with attacks and measures to counter them increasingly adopting the ‘war on terror’\(^3\) framework (Hodges, 2011).

The ‘war on terror’ is a phrase that was used by the then President of the United States of America (USA), George W. Bush, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, to mobilise a US-led international military campaign aiming to destroy al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and to curtail ‘rogue states’ and effect regime change. While the military assault was initially launched in Afghanistan in October 2001, the Iraq war was launched approximately eighteen months later as part of the same ‘war on terror’ campaign, in addition to the implementation of


\(^2\) Henceforth abbreviated as 9/11.

\(^3\) My choice of using single quotation marks is a political act of resisting and questioning the conventional wisdom of lexicon such as radicalisation, extremism, Islamic extremism, war on terror, rogue states and acts of war among others that is often used in terrorism studies. These concepts are widely deployed in formal, semi-formal and private spaces; however, their meaning is taken for granted. Henceforth, in this thesis I use double quotation for text quoted verbatim. Single quotation marks are, however, used to express the need to question the conventional meanings of terms we use in our day-to-day interactions as experts of security, and targets of security interventions. Such a reflection can expose the latent and hidden ideologies disguised in words we commonly deploy in our work. Also, it can help us ensure that our work as academics and activists does not further the oppression of already marginalised groups.
various security measures such as the US PATRIOT Act aimed at preventing further attacks. Accordingly, this war metaphor connotes a particular way of talking about and understanding terrorism and counterterrorism. This metaphor reproduced claims and assumptions about the nature of the 9/11 attacks, the identities of the terrorist Other, the nature and scope of the threat, the vulnerabilities and the responses deemed necessary (see Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006; Jarvis, 2008; Tsui, 2020). This construction, while containing imperialist undertones, is also laced with cultural and racial tropes.

Specifically, George W. Bush’s rhetoric that framed 9/11 as an “act of war” (see more Hodges, 2011) is crucial to understanding the threat of terrorism and the naturalised military responses globally. In this framing, the conflict was seen as a “war between good and evil”, where good symbolically stands for the West/Christians/liberal democracies while the evil “other” encompasses the non-Western/Muslims/non-Christians (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007, p. 125). In this framing, the identities of the former are built through metaphors representing them as civilised, freedom-loving, and progressive. In contrast, the latter is represented as backward, savage, and freedom-hating. Such a framing not only controlled the kind of representations that emanate therefrom (e.g. a focus on ‘Islamic extremists’ qua Muslims as terrorists), but it made ‘war’ appear as the only legitimate response of pre-empting the risk of terrorism. Although George W. Bush’s administration left office, their discourse continues to influence how countries worldwide make sense of terrorism and the ensuing counterterrorism responses; which is primarily the focus of this thesis.

The US-led ‘war on terror’ and the ensuing measures raised concerns about declining civil liberties and human rights both in the West and countries that joined the Global Coalition against terrorism (Stohl, 2008; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). It is in the wake of this mounting criticism against the Global War on terror (GWOT) that from 2005 there was a marked shift from speaking about the GWOT to the “Struggle Against Violent Extremism” (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011, p. 9). This culminated in the birth of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) which later also encompassed preventive efforts, and came to be widely shortened to PCVE (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Lehane, 2018).

Evidently, through the development of PCVE the ‘war on terror’ prompted a shift in language from the aggressive rhetoric of ‘war’, and pejorative characterisations of communities, e.g. ‘Islamist extremism’ (Lehane, 2018). Second, it extended itself to a “wider set of partnering agencies, from educators to artists,” (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018, p. 3), and has come to be characterised as a multi-stakeholder approach. In addition, through the development of PCVE the ‘war on terror’ has come to encompass a wider range of methods for countering terrorism beyond militaristic-oriented measures such as increased arrests and the expansion of intelligence gathering measures (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit, 2016).
To a focus on measures that address the conditions that make people vulnerable to extremist ideologies with the aim to prevent ‘radicalisation’ (behavioural), and ‘radicalisation’ leading to terrorism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Sabir, 2017). This link to the GWOT helps us to understand and situate the development in terrorism, counterterrorism and PCVE at the United Nations level, the regional and the country-level (as I will show in the background of the study section).

This chapter provides the reader with a historical background and context to help situate the main argument of this thesis which is that ‘radicalisation’ should be approached as a discourse rather than a stable and neutral category. The chapter begins by outlining the study’s context, objectives and the research questions. It then proceeds to trace the global, regional and national developments in terrorism and counterterrorism. With the purpose of showing how Kenya’s discourse and practice of terrorism and counterterrorism (including PCVE) is shaped by global events and politics. The third section historicises ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya. This section shows how the contemporary deployment and understanding of the concept is shaped by historical developments that occurred during the colonial and post-independent eras and how these shape Kenya’s relations with its Coastal region and how politics and conflict dynamics are understood. By unpacking these dynamics, I show that an analysis of ‘radicalisation’ and the identities constructed as dangerous is embedded in local conflict dynamics that position certain cultures and ethnic communities as outsiders and ‘not-fully Kenyan’. Having established how these historical developments continually influence and condition power relations between the centre and periphery, Muslims and non-Muslims, and between Kenyans of Black African and those of Asian descent, the fourth section then turns to problematise the concept youth. Given that numerous studies primarily see ‘radicalisation’ as a social issue predominantly affecting youth, I reflect on what I mean when I use the term youth and/or young people in this study. This conceptual analysis is crucial to understanding how ‘youth’ as a category for ‘radicalisation’ (as I show in chapter one) makes possible PCVE and an understanding of youth/in a way that would not be possible if youth were a prior conceptualised in a different way. The last section of this chapter outlines the structure of this thesis.

Objectives, justifications and research questions

Using Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Terrorism Studies lenses (which I elaborate in chapter one), I approach ‘radicalisation’ and its ensuing practices such as PCVE interventions as neither objective nor neutral reflections of reality. I argue that there are numerous ways of describing and interpreting ‘radicalisation’, with each crafted using certain words and discursive strategies. Thus what we come to know as ‘radicalisation’ is,
to use Jackson’s (2005, p. 2) characterisation, “a carefully constructed discourse” designed to achieve specific goals.

Adopting such a theoretical and methodological approach allowed me to trace and analyse discourses as they emerged in different sites and focus on how various actors and their actions engaged with the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This keeps the focus of the study on powerful actors and their actions (dissemination of discourses through policy and elite texts), but also the individuals and social groups directly affected by these actions and those seeking to change the policies currently in place. This critical approach allows the study to focus on dominant discourses and how such discourses are resisted or challenged while also adding the voices of young people and grassroots actors as actors who are often silenced because their perspectives are not regarded as authentic and actors who may be overlooked, respectively.

While the problem of ‘radicalisation’ is often identified to largely be an issue at both the Northeastern and the Coastal regions where most of Kenya’s Muslim population has settled, this study explored the subject of ‘radicalisation’ by focusing on Mombasa. I focus on Mombasa County because first, Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu—all counties in the former Coast province—have become hotspots of ‘radicalisation’ and recruitment as evidenced by numerous studies including Badurdeen, 2012, 2018, 2020; Botha 2015; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014. Not just for extremist groups like al-Shabaab, and youth gangs but also for secessionist groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and political parties led by the ruling and opposition sides alike, e.g. the Black Muslims group and the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) respectively. This ease of political mobilisation almost certainly results from—among other dynamics—underdevelopment. Despite the region’s long history as a primary tourist destination, housing Kenya’s main port, and a booming extractive industry, it ranks low on most development indicators (Cox, Orsborn and Sisk, 2014; Onyango and Patel, 2021). Consequently, disenfranchised youth have joined extremist groups, whereas others support extremist and secessionist groups because of their political discontent with the state (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2015; Mohamed, 2015; Badurdeen, 2020).

Second, I focus on Mombasa because of its rich and complex history. Due to its strategic location on the Indian ocean and the growing plantation economy, Mombasa was a key city in ‘the East African’ slave trade complex. Hence various states and empires fought to

\[4^{*}\] Grassroots actors are also entangled in complex power relations. On one hand, they directly work with youth and their communities, who project certain expectations and on the other hand, they work with donors/governments who also project their interests. Further, grassroots actors have their own interests and work in a context where the civic space is continually shrinking. Thus, they navigate between these different interests and values.
establish their domination. This long and complex colonial history makes Mombasa and the Coastal region defy rigid modes of classification, complicating Kenya’s understanding of political mobilisation.

This study was guided by the following research questions:

**Main Research Question**: How do elites, the media, civil society and young people construct ‘radicalisation’ in the Kenyan context?

*Sub-question 1*: What themes do elites, the media, civil society and young people use to construct ‘radicalisation’?

*Sub-question 2*: How do these themes constitute identities for young people?

*Sub-question 3*: How do young people negotiate, appropriate or challenge such constructions?

The study analysed texts from producers, consumers, and targets of PCVE interventions to answer these questions. I analysed written and spoken texts. For written text, I analysed:

- two policies on Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism: 1) the NSCVE—declassified version and 2) the Mombasa County Action Plan (MCAP) for CVE.
- 474 online press articles by the *Nation Africa* and *The Standard*;
- 57 speeches and statements of President Kenyatta.

Whereas for spoken texts, I analysed 19 interview transcripts derived from semi-structured interviews conducted with PCVE practitioners and two focus groups conducted with 11 young people in Mombasa County, Kenya, in 2019. By analysing these texts, this study exposes essentialist assumptions about ‘radicalisation’ and its characterisation of young people as dangerous, with the purpose of suggesting alternative ways to understand ‘radicalisation’, which would ensure more meaningful and ‘non-violent’ PCVE.

---

5 Uhuru Kenyatta was Kenya’s 4th president and son of former president Jomo Kenyatta. President Kenyatta assumed office on 9th April 2013 to 13 September 2022.

6 I use the term non-violent because donor/policy-driven PCVE ignores contextual dynamics, resulting in increased violence and criminalisation of young people. MP2319, shared that, besides Mombasa County commissioners’ office ‘shoot to kill order’ issued in 2015, some NGO programmes have also created more harm in society. One example was a project for Likoni and Mvita that used a relief form approach to enhance economic empowerment and reduce the appeal for violent extremism. Grants were awarded to ‘reformed youth’ groups, but this created havoc because other unemployed youth with non-criminal histories felt sidelined. Resulting in the emergence of the ‘Shika panga pata mradi’ slogan which means if you ‘wield’ a machete, you will be awarded grants. Youth groups attacked each other and community members and within a week since the programme launched the groups had increased from 50 to 90. While the programmes goal was to alleviate economic hardships, its approach and methodology were ill-informed.
Background of the study

‘Radicalisation’, PCVE and their uptake in global and regional bodies

In the 1990s, as the optimism for peace and stability continued to fade in the post-cold war era, a rethinking—on the changing nature of conflicts and their effects, and the role of aid in conflict and post-conflict situations—began to emerge (Duffield, 2001). While there had been a preoccupation with addressing conflicts by mostly relying on counterinsurgency (COIN) military strategies to neutralise threats and effect regime change, for example, the British Empire’s suppression of anticolonial movements or insurgencies that emerged in the late 19th and early to mid-20th century in India, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland (Bennet, 2007), and the Anglo-American military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. These strategies’ use of “exceptional and highly militarised methods of social control and discipline”, especially on racialised Others (Sabir, 2017, p. 206) have been highly criticised for being based on an Orientalist discourse that constructs non-European Others as inferior, barbaric and therefore in need of ‘civilising’ (Said, 1979). In addition, the failures of such strategies including alienating local populations by inflicting mass casualty (Anderson, 2006) continue to be raised. As a result, advocates have increasingly urged military strategies to be supplemented with nonmilitary forms of COIN loosely termed hearts and minds. Such approaches seek to win the support of the population in conflict zones by addressing their political, social, and economic needs (Nagl, 2005). Following the logic that by gaining the support of the local population, through improving their quality of life, the insurgency will lose its base of support and eventually their ability to operate will be undermined leading the counterinsurgent force to achieve a more sustainable victory (Branch and Wood, 2010). However, critics point out that hearts and minds approaches encompass a wide range of nonmilitary forms of COIN ranging from population displacement to political liberalization (Carruthers, 1995) and can be equally punitive and culturally unsympathetic as the use of military force (Branch, 2010).

In addition, at the core of nonmilitary forms of COIN is the battle/war of ideas, which according to Nagl (2005) has controversially come to be treated as seriously as the battle for territory. The battle/war of ideas are COIN tactics tailored to target beliefs (including but not limited to attitudes, perceptions, prejudices, ideologies, worldviews, cultures) values, and emotions seen as fuelling insurgencies. The battle/war of ideas has especially been at the core of the “Struggle Against Violent Extremism” agenda since 2005. Owing to the description and conceptualisation of terrorism as a form of ‘new war’. The idea of ‘new wars' stems from the belief that the nature of war has changed in the post-Cold War era where whilst ‘old wars' were inter-state i.e. conflicts between regular armies, contemporary warfare i.e. ‘new wars’ are said to be distinct from the ‘old wars’ in terms of the actors involved, the
goals, methods and forms of finances (Kaldor, 1999, 2013). Proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis argue that ‘new wars’ are characterised by intra-state conflicts involving non-state actors, such as armed groups and criminal organizations; fluid, networked warfare, with multiple actors involved in different stages of the conflict; transnational dynamics, where actors, resources, and support networks operate beyond national borders; identity politics i.e. ethnocultural and religious tensions and poverty are seen as the major drivers of conflict rather than ideology (Ibid). Framing terrorism as a ‘new war’ and especially in the post-911 era where groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL are predominantly framed as constituting a global insurgency (Taarnby, 2007; Sageman, 2008; Nesser, 2010) that uses terrorism and violence to further strategic political objectives but also non-violent techniques and tactics aimed to generate legitimacy, support, and consent for its actions and agenda (Kepel, 2006) has allowed for two major changes.

Accompanying the ‘new wars’ debate has been the merging of development and security policy. Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing shift in the way development and security are viewed. With development increasingly being seen as essential for achieving security, and security as crucial for sustainable development (Duffield, 2001; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). The merging of security and development led to the emergence of a new security framework, in which “poverty and the wider modalities of underdevelopment” are seen as a high risk for conflict and insecurity (Duffield, 2001, p. 121). Such assessments situated ‘developing countries’ as the locus of insecurity. This logic was further reinforced by the ongoing civil and protracted conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), and the post-9/11 era rhetoric about rogue states allying with terrorist networks that have global reach (Jackson, 2005; Ditrych, 2014). This framework propounded the idea that “there is no place for terrorism in the ‘developed’ world” (Ditrych, 2014, p. 84). Making development a goal to be achieved, which translated to security becoming a commodity and counter-terrorism strategies exportable techniques and forms of knowledge (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). One significant consequence of this new security framework has been the justification of military interventions in ‘developing countries’ (Martini, 2021) to maintain the international hegemonic order by containing insecurities within countries identified as dangerous or harbouring danger (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). However, these practices also undermine the sovereignty of ‘developing countries’ and contribute to furthering instability. Such overt politicization of development aid has also become increasingly linked to the War on Terror and the fight against terrorism. For example, from the late 1990s the US has increasingly tied its aid to a demonstration of insecurity (‘terrorism’) resulting in the prioritisation of aid
allocation to military activities\(^7\) as opposed to areas such as education and health which were previously primary recipients of development aid (Lind and Howell, 2008, 2010).

Similarly, according to Keukeleire and Raube (2013) the EU, through its various instruments such as the ESS of 2003, report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy’ of 2008, European Consensus on Development–2006 and agreements such as the 2010 Cotonou Agreement with its major development partners in Africa, Pacific and Caribbean countries has reiterated the link between security and development. Specifically, in 2004 the EU created the African Peace Facility (APF)\(^8\) a financial instrument dedicated to the financing of security-related action within the framework of European Development Fund (EDF). The APF provides structural support for the African Peace and Security Architecture which sits within the African Union (AU) and deals with the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa (Ibid). Through the APF, the EU supports African states in the development of their security agenda. APF funding has primarily been used to support security agendas, structures and capacities such as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) among others. While the EU and the US remain the biggest donors committed to reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, and assisting in development in third countries, they have continuously reiterated that these initiatives are carried out to safeguard Western interests (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013).

On the one hand, the new security framework has allowed ‘developed countries’ to exert influence over ‘developing countries’ and to impose their own political and security interests rather than taking into account the needs of ‘developing countries’ (Chandler, 2007, p. 379). On the other hand, it has enabled authoritarian regimes in ‘developing countries’ to align their interests with western interests in order to secure aid while at the same time using this alliance to avoid scrutiny regarding their governance systems, civil and human rights records (Namwaya, 2020; Lauterbach, 2021). Coupled with the rise of extremist groups such as ISIL, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, these developments have resulted in significant changes in the way development and security policies are designed, implemented, and funded. In the sections that follow I will place the ‘radicalisation’ debate and the PCVE policy agenda by reviewing global, regional and national contexts of its emergence.

The UN, for instance, has adopted several international legal instruments including the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), the UN

---

\(^7\) A detailed review of US aid specifically to Kenya and its ties to security can be found in Chapter four.

\(^8\) APF is managed by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) and funded through the European Development Fund.
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the 2014 UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, the 2015 UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security and the subsequent 2016 UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to PCVE. These instruments act as strategic frameworks for the UN system on counterterrorism and PCVE. They recognise the need for comprehensive approaches not only encompassing military measures but also preventive measures that will directly address the drivers of violent extremism. With the drivers of insecurity, more broadly, and violent extremism ranging from development issues such as lack of socioeconomic opportunities, marginalisation and discrimination, poor governance, violation of human rights and rule of law, and unresolved conflicts to ‘radicalisation’ in prisons. Some of these issues are also raised in the debates and programs on addressing violent extremism in the Horn of Africa region and specific countries such as Kenya with varying degrees of emphasis.

These international instruments acted as policy guidance for regional bodies as well as UN member states. However, a historical review shows that the AU has had long-standing debates to prevent and address terrorism as early as 1992 when the organisation was still known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In its 28th ordinary session, in 1992 the OAU adopted a Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States [AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII)]. In this resolution, the Union pledged to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism. Albeit given the original objective of the OAU, as a regional union designed to fight for decolonisation and ridding the continent of apartheid, it is unsurprising that measures to prevent extremism and terrorism were oriented towards strengthening coordination and consultation between member states. Further, the OAU’s 30th ordinary session in 1994 adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations [AHG/Del.2 (XXX)] condemning the threat posed by movements based on religious, political and tribal extremism and calling on its members to enhance cooperation, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other States. These efforts resulted in the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted by the 35th ordinary session in July 1999. In comparison to the previous resolutions and declarations, this convention was detailed in terms of defining what “terrorist acts” entail and the global threat posed by terrorism. Also, it contained more action points, including requiring states to criminalise terrorist acts under their national laws, establishing state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and providing a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance.

---

9 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was first adopted on 8 September 2006 but gets reviewed by the UN general assembly every two years.
Notably, the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted during a time when there were widespread conversations about extremist networks with global reach, Sudan’s aiding of Osama bin Laden, the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and US’s response to the attacks by launching a missile targeting a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan (Solomon, 2015). As a result, there was partly international pressure—for example, resolutions such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which binds all member states to comply—for African countries to strengthen their capacity to prevent and combat terrorism. This is especially the case since the concern has been that Africa has many weak states which provide safe haven for terrorists where they can freely finance and launch terrorist attacks and hide from international retribution. Thus adopting the OAU Convention demonstrated the commitment of African countries to work with the international community to address this global challenge.

Moreover, the OAU Convention was adopted at a time when the OAU was re-launching itself. From being largely focused on supporting the fight of decolonisation to a continental organisation (the African Union) aiming to increase cooperation and integration of African states in order to drive Africa’s growth and economic development. This need to rebrand from OAU to AU required strategic actions that would claim Africa’s position in global politics and increase the legitimacy and credibility of the AU as a key player locally and internationally. As such, while the OAU convention was adopted in 1999, it came into force in 2002—during the 1st anniversary of 9/11—with the adoption of the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Sturman (2002) contends that the act of adopting the plan of action on the first anniversary of 9/11 served to symbolically demonstrate Africa’s commitment to the GWOT while practically effectuating the AU’s own regional instrument, i.e. the 1999 OAU Convention.

In addition, since western political and security interests were becoming increasingly prioritised as opposed to the needs of African countries, adopting the plan of action was an opportunity for African countries “to secure resources needed to fulfil their obligations” (Sturman, 2002, p. 104). In other words, African countries used the recognizable and legitimate narratives of terrorism and counterterrorism to repackage their own issues and appeal for aid. If anything, the practical counterterrorism measures stipulated in the plan of action such as: coordinating border surveillance, developing and strengthening border control points, combating the illicit import, export and stockpiling of arms, ammunition and explosives, exchange of information mutual legal assistance; exchange of research and expertise; and the mobilisation of technical assistance and cooperation, both within Africa

10 See https://au.int/en/overview.
and internationally, and to upgrade the scientific, technical and operational capacity of Member States, are measures relevant and constructive to addressing Africa’s wider security challenges. As part of the implementation of the plan of action, the AU also established initiatives and institutions such as the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Counterterrorism Observatory (ACTO), and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism, to guide AU counterterrorism efforts, mobilise support for the continents efforts in counterterrorism, strengthen member states capacities in counterterrorism and assist them in implementing the provisions contained in various AU and international counterterrorism instruments.

It is worth noting that one of the major obstacles facing the global and regional policies, programs and instruments has been the inability to reach a consensus on a legally binding definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2013b), as well as its closely associated concepts of ‘radicalisation’, and (violent) extremism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Coolsaet, 2012). This has granted states a significant degree of discretion in formulating their own definitions of these concepts. Browns (2020b) research examining the implementation of CVE policies at global, regional and national levels in several countries including the UK, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, notes a considerable overlap in countering and preventative measures. The lack of consensus has also resulted in the implementation of a broad range of measures under the PCVE policy domain (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). These measures are often grounded in specific theories about ‘radicalisation’ and (violent) extremism which I discuss in more detail in chapter two.

Another criticism levelled on these policies and programs has been their ill-conceived assumption about youth or young people and their relation to conflict and security (Altik et al., 2020). This assessment, as has been pointed out is rooted in existing literature. For instance, a review of the ‘new wars’ literature in the 1990s reveals its interests in the notion of child soldiers and other children affected by war mostly in regions of sub-Saharan Africa and South America (Brett and MacCallin, 1996). These studies show some evidence of the growing involvement of young people in conflict. Going further back in history, the participation of young people in the first and second world war is well documented (see Haer, 2019). Similarly, studies specifically in the disciplines of psychology and education in the 1970s and 80s show evidence of young people engaged in conflicts in Israel, Northern Ireland and South Africa (Cairns, 1994). In these arguments, young people are seen as both victims and perpetrators of conflict, thus there is an emphasis on recognising young peoples resilience, needing to protect youth, and acknowledging and championing young peoples rights.
In addition to young people’s roles as combatants and victims in conflict situations, Altiok et al., (2020) notes that from the 2000s scholars have also paid more attention to young people in post-conflict situations and their involvement in peace processes, development and reconstruction11. These debates also coalesce with neoliberal perspectives that conceptualise youth as resources to be harnessed or invested in, to promote economic growth and stability (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2018). This logic stems from youth bulge ideas that link the propensity to civil conflict and terrorism to burgeoning youthful populations (Urdal, 2007). In addition, the GWOT and the rise of extremist groups that are almost exclusively associated with young people under the age of 25—and Muslims youth’s potential for ‘radicalisation’ and violent extremism (Awan, 2016; Maira, 2020), and the youth-led activism for democratic reforms from Iran to the 2010-12 Arab spring (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018) have all renewed interests in understanding youth-led activism but also heightened the conceptions of young people as a security threat. This heightened interest in youth and security and extensive activism led to the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 in 2015. Remarkably, UNSCR 2250 is celebrated for its significant recognition of the diverse and especially positive roles played by young people in peacebuilding and security (Williams, 2016). UNSCR 2250 recommends member states to: a) increase participation of young people in decision-making at all levels in local and in mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflict, b) ensure the protection of civilians, specifically youth during armed conflict and in post-conflict situations, including protection from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, c) support youth’s engagement by creating spaces where they are recognised and provided with adequate support, d) establish and strengthen partnerships and finally, e) consider the impact of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) on youth as well as the needs of youth affected by armed conflict.

As this thesis shows in more detail in its empirical chapters, despite such ground-breaking acknowledgments and policies, young people are still predominantly seen as perpetrators of violent extremism—especially young Muslim men. This stems from the failure to treat youth as a problematic category. In turn, affecting how they are engaged in the peace and security agenda. Youth, as I show, in predominant understandings of ‘radicalisation’ are only seen as a security threat; a construction which emanates from an intersection of gendered stereotypes and racialised assumptions which promote and depend upon a particular understanding of youth as potentially dangerous and disruptors. As such, youth are the targets of interventions (such as PCVE) which aim to minimise or mitigate their violence.

Localising ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE: an overview of Kenya’s journey so far

In Kenya, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The concept of terrorism was used to define the violent actions of both state and non-state actors as early as 1975. On state terrorism, like the British empire, the two post-independent administrations, Jomo Kenyatta’s (1963–1978) and Daniel Arap Moi’s (1978–2001), also engaged in terrorism to suppress dissidence (Citizens for Justice, 2003; Elkins, 2005). Similarly, non-state actors such as the Maskini Liberation Front (MLF), February Eighteen Movement (FEM), the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF), and Mungiki also engaged in terrorism against civilians and government administrations (Mogire and Mkutu, 2011).

More attacks were witnessed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The most devastating attack was the 1998 simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es salaam, Tanzania by al-Qaeda which killed 224 people and wounded more than 5000 (Solomon, 2015). Then in 2002 the Mombasa twin bombing of; an Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and an Israeli airliner departing from Mombasa’s Moi International Airport. Both attacks positioned Kenya on the global map while also highlighting the global reach of terrorism. Further, since 2012, Kenya has increasingly witnessed small- and large-scale attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based militant group. Some of the high profile attacks include the 2013 Westgate shopping mall siege that resulted in 67 deaths, over 400 injuries and extensive damage to infrastructure. Again in April 2015 al-Shabaab conducted a siege on the Garissa University College (GUC).

Like the preceding attack al-Shabaab singled out non-Muslims resulting in the death of 147 people most of whom were students and over 80 others were injured. Later in June and July 2015 attacks believed to have been led by al-Shabaab were carried out on villages in Mpeketoni and Tana River, resulting in the deaths of at least 48 people with dozens others injured and infrastructure destroyed. Yet again in 2019, al-Shabaab orchestrated an attack on the DusitD2 business complex that killed 21 people and injured many others.

Following these attacks there have been arrests and prosecutions of individuals linked to terrorism in Kenya. In addition, to address the rising threat of terrorism some of the measures have been openly militarised: such as the 2011 Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Operation Linda Nchi12 in Somalia, the 2012 operation Sledgehammer in Kismayo southern Somalia; and the numerous local large-scale operations such as the 2014 Operation Sanitisation of Eastleigh also known publicly as Operation Usalama Watch; and Operation

---

12 Swahili for protect the country. This foreign military operation was launched in October 2011 by KDF (see further Mohamed, 2022).
Linda Boni. And other small-scale operations including curfews, stop-search operations, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial assassinations and disappearances of terror suspects.

Notably, before the 2002 bombings, attacks were almost always labelled fundamentalism. But from 2002 onwards, there has been a discursive shift with attacks and measures to counter them increasingly replicating international framings. Such framings include the increased linking of terrorism to Islam in political spaces and policy areas (Mohamed, 2022). At times this has been done in implicit ways. For example, through using terms such as ‘Islamic terrorism’, or ‘Islamic extremism’. According to Jackson (2007), using such terms can create an implicit association between Islam and terrorism. In other instances, the linking of Islam to terrorism has been done more explicitly, for instance, by proposing laws to regulate madrasa curriculums, labelling mosques as ‘radicalisation’ centres, or even by declaring Muslim-majority regions within Kenya as hotspots of ‘radicalisation’ (see such linkages in Ombati, 2016). These framings have also emphasised Muslim youth’s potential for ‘radicalisation’ to violent extremism (Maira, 2020). As a result, the global and regional institutions (as shown above) and national governments worldwide have focussed on the ‘extreme’ ideologies propounded by groups like al-Shabaab, and ISIL and the need to promote a ‘moderate’ Islam. In addition, there have been continued efforts seeking to identify the drivers of (violent) extremism (as I show in great detail in chapter two) some of which have (over)emphasised particular youth demographics as being prone to ‘radicalisation’ leading to terrorism.

Following these developments, from 2011 PCVE started being implemented by non-governmental organisations in Kenya. The first Kenyan-based CVE initiative—Kenya Transition Initiative—was implemented between 2011 and 2014 by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)’s. Kenya Transition Initiative implemented “a pilot programme of the new CVE concept” that was essentially countering the drivers of violent extremism by funding activities “such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates on sensitive topics, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder”, and so on (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 1). This programme “privileged ideological and religious pull factors, and largely neglected to focus on psychosocial drivers such as empowerment, status, belonging, and so on” (Ibid, p. 7). This is because the programme was donor-driven; hence, the donors’ logic about the nature of the threat and how best to mitigate it informed what CVE activities should focus on.

It is only in 2015 that the Kenyan Government started speaking about and incorporating PCVE as part of its broader counterterrorism approach. Besides the global discursive shifts from the ‘war on terror’ to the PCVE rhetoric, Kenya’s PCVE rhetoric was also prompted by three main events happening locally. First, research continues to show that from 2011 there
has been a rise of the homegrown threat (Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018), evidenced by the participation of Kenyans in al-Shabaab operations abroad and locally. Second, there has been mounting pressure from Kenya’s Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and donors for the government to adopt non-coercive approaches that adhere to human rights principles and the rule of law. Finally, alongside attacks in Kenya, there has been an increasing number of young Kenyans choosing to actively support al-Shabaab and ISIL by travelling/attempting to travel to Somalia and Syria respectively. Media reports indicate that while most of the individuals traveling abroad to join extremists groups have been young men (Abdi, 2015; Ombati, 2015); there has been a significant number of young women as well (Sanga, 2016). Thus the Kenyan government included PCVE as part of its counterterrorism approach with an aim to prevent ‘radicalisation’. Kenya’s PCVE national policies while highlighting myriad of causes, they minimise the role of structural material causes of ‘radicalisation’ including historical injustices, inequality and unemployment. But instead overemphasise the role of ideology and the need to counter extremist ideologies by strengthening cohesion, and promoting ‘national values’ and patriotism. This framing of the problem as ‘ideological’ while minimising material factors is influenced by eurocentric claims about terrorism but also Kenya’s own history of conflicts. Specifically conflicts widely termed as ‘ethnic conflicts’ or ‘ethnic-based conflicts’. This is language that has been widely used by both local and western scholars and conflict analysts (Van Hoyweghen et al., 2000). Postcolonial scholarship critiques such labelling as perpetuating the colonial legacy of dividing and categorizing societies based on simplistic, often arbitrary criteria like ethnicity while obscuring that conflicts labelled ethnic often have roots in historical and structural factors\textsuperscript{13} such as colonialism, economic exploitation, and political marginalisation\textsuperscript{14}. Thus, ‘radicalisation’ and extremism in the NSCVE are characterised as stemming from ethnic and religious ideologies—a framework that anyone familiar with the politics in Africa, and particularly Kenya, can easily identify with.

Like other countries, Kenya has ratified and implemented most UN resolutions and AU conventions and declarations. This has included creating synergies with these existing legal instruments by drafting and adopting a national CVE strategy. Kenya’s national CVE strategy was developed by the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) of Kenya with funding from the European Union (EU) Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa. The national strategy is organised around five key areas. The first entails the three levels of prevention: the general, specific and individually oriented levels. The general level targets the whole society with an aim to address conditions that are conducive to the spread of extremist

\textsuperscript{13} See section on historicising radicalisation.

\textsuperscript{14} See Jalata, 2013
ideology. Here, interventions are encouraged to focus on strengthening cohesion, and promoting ‘national values’ and patriotism. The specific level targets environments that enable “early stages of radicalisation”. Approaches at this stage seek to “inform, educate and empower Sheikhs, Alims, Imams, and local communities to be able to resist the threat posed by extremists. Specific preventive efforts will also target prisons and remand facilities”\textsuperscript{15}. Individually oriented preventive efforts target individuals “who are becoming radicalised or are part of a violent extremist group, and can be motivated to disengage”. At this level, the government has initiated a series of interventions including the 2014 presidential amnesty pardon which was introduced to allow the re-integration of Kenyan youth who denounced al-Shabaab.

The second area of Kenya’s CVE strategy is organised around nine work pillars. With six pillars: psychosocial, education, political, faith based and ideological, arts and media and online pillars focussing on the drivers of ‘radicalisation’ and (violent) extremism and the kind of interventions stakeholders implementing in these areas should focus on. The remaining three pillars: security, training and capacity building, and legal and policy, focus on empowering stakeholders with skills, tools and awareness to effectively counter violent extremism. The third area of the strategy is dedicated to disengagement and reintegration with the focus being on building capacities at the local and national level dedicated to receiving “de-radicalised and dis-engaged individuals” and rehabilitating and reintegrating them back into the society. The fourth area of the strategy outlines institutions at the national and local levels engaged in prevention efforts, and the different areas and activities these institutions can focus on for effective implementation. The final and fifth area of the strategy outlines the research agenda for CVE. This agenda prioritises research on religious doctrines used by extremist groups, the socio-economic and cultural roots of extremism, and effective methods for counter messaging among others (for a full list see NSCVE, p.31).

Following the 2016 launch of the National Strategy and its associated guidelines for developing County Action Plans, several counties in Kenya—specifically those located in the Coastal and Northeastern regions which are identified as ‘hotspots for radicalisation’—began drafting their County Action Plans for PCVE (for a detailed analysis of Mombasa county’s action plan see chapter four).

Besides the oversimplification of ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya’s policies which has resulted in the criminalisation of a broad range of behaviours (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015). Criticism has been mounting regarding the role of language in this policy area (Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018; Mohamed, 2021; Oando and Achieng’, 2021). The Kenyan government has been accused of appropriating frames, metaphors, tropes and practices of the GWOT

\textsuperscript{15} See NSCVE p.27.
to demonise its Muslim population (Prestholdt, 2011; Mohamed, 2022) and to exercise political control (Kiai, 2015). Also, key data such as those detailing the number of foreign fighters, those undergoing de-radicalisation and reintegration, and what the de-radicalisation and reintegration process entails remains highly classified and inaccessible\(^\text{16}\). Hence, while theoretically the policies are grounded in broader ideas about partnerships probably to indicate the establishment of more democratic relationships, in practice CSOs lament that the government is only interested in one-way partnerships\(^\text{17}\). Critics have also raised concern about: the unaccounted for young people who surrendered under the 2014 presidential amnesty program, the increasing cases of extrajudicial assassinations and disappearances, surveillance and profiling of Muslim and Somali communities, and the use of collective punishment (Amnesty International, 2014; Independent Policing Oversight Authority, 2014; HRW and KHRC, 2015; HRW, 2016).

Even with the criticism levelled against Kenya’s counterterrorism practices and the awareness regarding the politics of language in the PCVE policy domain, there are not yet any studies that employ critical methodologies to determine how dynamic discursive practices work to constitute and change our understanding of ‘radicalisation’ and more broadly the nature of (in)security in the elite, the press, the public and the private domains which this analysis seeks to do. This study has been influenced by the theoretical and methodological deficiencies of the growing literature on ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya that continues to treat ‘radicalisation’, terrorism and other related concepts as objective categories and neutral reflections of reality.

**Historicising ‘radicalisation’: repackaging old conflicts with new frameworks**

*Locating the Coastal region in Kenya’s history*

Before 1895, the Omani Empire dominated the Coastal region (Chittick, 1971). During this period, the region experienced a growth in commerce from trading in enslaved people, ivory, turtle, and rhinoceros horns, resulting in a booming economy and the growth of Coastal cities (Nwulia, 1975). However, by 1509 the Portuguese empire had established its hegemony after waging war on Coastal cities that resisted their rule (Ibid). In 1698, the locals assisted by Omani troops overthrew the Portuguese. Hence, from the 1700s to 1850, the region was controlled by the Omani Empire, who built a profitable venture by trading in enslaved Africans—from inland-based ethnic groups—with the Arab settlers and the French due to the growing plantation economy (Berg, 1971; Nwulia, 1975).

---

\(^{16}\) MP0719, local NGO project assistant.

\(^{17}\) MP2319, CBO director.
By mid-19th century, European missionaries, abolitionists and explorer expeditions coincided and justified imperialism. Facilitating the 1895 declaration of Kenya’s Coastal strip as a British protectorate (Ndzovu, 2014). Following this declaration was the construction of the railway line, which resulted in the Coast becoming home to a growing South-Asian migrant population. These developments changed the cultural and religious composition of the Coast, blurring “rigid modes of classification” and complicating “popular perceptions of Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry” (Prestholdt, 2011, p. 9). For example, while it was initially possible to speak of ‘native,’ as Indigenous Black Africans and ‘non-natives’ as Arabs, Asians and White people as racial categories used by the colonial administration to differentiate its ‘subjects’. The Swahili—people of mixed African, Arab, and Asian descent—defied the existing categories due to their racial ambiguity. However, during Arab, Portuguese and British rule, race, religion and class structured relations, access to jobs and leadership positions. For example, under British rule, Arab elites filled top cadres, clerical and administrative positions while habitually the Mijikenda and the Swahili were excluded due to the assumption that they were racially inferior thus “incapable of organizing themselves politically” (Ndzovu, 2014, p. 24). This fostered the exclusion of Indigenous Coastal Africans from fully participating in the socio-economic, political and cultural spheres.

The situation for Indigenous groups worsened with the 1907 move of the administrative capital to Nairobi. And it also changed for Arabs, as the Arab administrators were replaced with secular-educated indigenous Christians from the inland communities of Kenya (see Mwakimako, 2003). Accordingly, the move was also seen as a further exclusion of Coastal Muslims (Arab, African and Swahili Muslims) from the political community (Ibid). It became increasingly difficult for Muslims, in general, to retain/secures jobs in the colonial administration due to lack of secular education. From then on political associations were formed around race, ethnicity and religion. But even then, only Arabs (including Swahili from 1952) had political power because they had voter rights (Ibid). This means indigenous African Muslims were left without representation in the colonial administrative structure (e.g. the Kenya legislative council), instead the administration decided the Arabs could speak for all Muslims. Such a policy enhanced racialisation in political leadership and reinforced “communal competition and strife over leadership in the Muslim communities” (Mwakimako, 2003, p. 8).

It is the dissatisfaction with the status quo coupled with the growing national movement that saw some African Muslims, specifically Mijikenda ethnicities supporting the unification of the Coastal strip with Kenya (see Prestholdt, 2014) which promised equal treatment for all. And because the unification threatened Arab’s monopoly, during the independence ‘negotiation’ Arabs mainly advocated for the secession of the Coast (see Ndzovu, 2014)
along with a few other Coastal communities who preferred secession for different reasons (Willis and Gona, 2013). These secession attempts coincided with secession attempts of the North Frontier District (NFD) i.e. a region in Northeastern Kenya which is also largely Muslim and inhabited by Somalis. The secession campaigns amplified race, ethnic and religious claim-making.

These campaigns at times generated unlikely alliances where Africans aligned with Arabs and, at other times, Africans against Arabs (Ibid). Both sides have historically been nervous about one another, with Arabs regarding African nationalists as “inferior” and “outsiders”, while African nationalists considered Arabs “non-indigenous”, aiming to perpetuate racial privilege (Ndzovu, 2014, p. 37). These indigeneity and migration politics continue to structure Kenya’s Coastal politics. For example, in the 1990s, civil society and churches’ efforts led to multipartyism, creating new spaces for organising. Using this opportunity, local Coastal politicians instrumentalised grievances resulting in violence targeting non-Coastal communities (Willis and Gona, 2013). The administration responded heavy-handedly, banning the IPK and labelling it a ‘radical Islamic’ group (Mazrui, 1997; Ndzovu, 2012), hence, delegitimising IPK’s activism and framing Muslims—particularly Arab Muslims—as ‘troublemakers’ and ‘unpatriotic’.

After 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ increased tensions between Kenya’s government and its Muslim communities, accused of colluding with ‘Islamist groups’ (an evolution of Kenya’s terrorism discourse is explained in Chapter Three to further highlight the positioning of Muslim and Islam in Kenya). Coupled with MRC’s renewed secessionist calls drawing on indigeneity, perceptions of Coastal people as “not fully Kenyan” (Prestholdt, 2011, p. 7) and Muslims as a problem have increased. The government continues to curtail separatist efforts, politicising and labelling them as ‘radical fundamentalists’ and ‘al-Shabaab affiliates’.

While concurrently labelling Muslim-run Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)—Muhuri and Haki Africa—as ‘sympathisers/financiers of terrorism’, for criticising human rights and international law violations and exposing corruption in the security forces (Kiai, 2015; Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith, 2018b; Ruteere and Mutahi, 2018). Thus delegitimising their claims. Given this historical context and Kenya’s position as a key regional player in GWOT, emerging discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism more broadly need to be questioned, however. Unpacking the historical context reveals how certain identities have come to be constructed as a problem or dangerous and what this means for our contemporary understanding of ‘radicalisation’ and how it characterises young people. In the following section, I outline economic grievances and their connection to violence in Mombasa County and the Coastal region as a whole.
Land politics, economic marginalisation and violence

Throughout the colonial era, administrative and legal mechanisms were used to dispossess and disinherit Indigenous people of their lands. Under the Omani Sultan, “only Sultan’s subjects (mainly Arabs and Swahili)” were allowed “to register land as private property on the Coast” (Kanyinga, 2000, p. 11). These legislations ignored the Mijikenda and ex-slaves’ land rights while favouring Arabs and Swahilis (Cooper, 1997). The situation worsened under the British Empire due to the 1902 and 1915 Crown Land ordinances and the 1926 Native Bill Trust, which allowed massive land dispossession throughout Kenya to satisfy their rising demand for infrastructure and European settlement. The disregard for customary land tenure systems resulted in five million acres of land seized from Africans and annexed to European settlers18 by 1914. The number rose to 7.5 million acres by 1962; thus affecting production and socio-political relations and organisation.

Africans became the Crown’s tenants with “temporary occupation rights to land”, which could be suspended to allocate the land to settlers (Kanyinga, 2000; Syagga, 2011, p. 6). These land policies created acute land shortages, landlessness and discontent among Africans, fuelling uprisings such as the Mau Mau19. The administration pushed for land individualisation reforms through the 1954 Swynnerton report, disguised as a plan to increase Kenya’s agricultural productivity. However, it aimed at privatising land ownership to facilitate settler agricultural production (Kanyinga, 2000). Individualising land in the Native Reserves was a strategy to contain economic and political discontent and undermine Mau Mau’s support. However, these reforms resulted in grave challenges ranging from “disputes over land ownership” to those citing a “more skewed distribution of land”, thus reinforcing ethnic-based interests in land (Ibid, p. 9).

Post-independent governments exacerbated landlessness by failing to address historical injustices. These governments acknowledged that landlessness hindered Kenya’s goal for food security. Yet retained colonial land policies, but emphasised: “optimum land utilization and—supposedly—equitable redistribution” (Ibid, p. 9). Their measures, however, were primarily cosmetic as they did not alter the existing land laws. Also, the administrations suppressed and excluded nationalists pushing for land redistribution (Ibid). Such lack of significant action fostered inequalities in land ownership. Besides, post-independent governments strategically used the land market and patronage ties to regulate who can access private and public land. Kenyatta and Moi’s regimes used land to maintain and expand political support and patronage networks (Branch, 2011; Klaus and Mitchell, 2015; 18 See Mortensen, 2004. 19 Mau Mau (1952—1960) a kikuyu-led liberation movement that agitated for the end of British colonial rule in Kenya.
Klaus, 2020). In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, provincial authorities and politicians forcibly displaced indigenous Mijikenda along the Coast to allow powerful elites to acquire private landholdings to develop tourism facilities (Kanyinga, 1998). Since the 1990s, land has been acquired by forcibly evicting individuals following land conflicts common around election years, as happened in 1997 at the Coast, leaving over 100,000—primarily non-natives—displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Landlessness is exacerbated by corruption in land adjudication, displacement, and the ensuing ethnic violence, which has caused a proliferation of squatters across Kenya, with the Coast province having the largest number (Kamau 2009b as cited in Syagga, 2011). This inability to own or even have access and rights to use land has left many communities disenfranchised. Several administrations have devised land adjudication and dispute resolution mechanisms such as issuing titles and establishing settlement schemes to address landlessness. However, the titling process has been prolonged due to poor processing of land disputes and claims and emerging boundary disputes, which continue to multiply due to improper handling mechanisms (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2019).

Settlement programs are also marred with corruption and nepotism. In comparison to settlement schemes created for landless Kikuyu, marginal communities—such as Mijikenda—were often placed in schemes that offered considerably smaller plots, did not have fertile farming land, and had limited institutional support (Kanyinga, 1998, 2000; Anyadike, 2014; Nyongesa, 2017; Boone, Lukalo and Joireman, 2021). Such practices reaffirmed that socio-economic resources are allocated and controlled along ethnic identities, thus fostering resentment among the original inhabitants that feel side-lined (Chome, 2020). Concurrently, settlement schemes reinforced the creation of ethnic enclaves as political strongholds for elites (Boone, Lukalo and Joireman, 2021), allowing certain communities to accumulate economic and political power over time. Coupled with the implementation of macroeconomic policy reforms such as the 1980s implementation of Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, vertical and horizontal marginalisation has increased (Kang’ara, 1999; Rono, 2002).

The launch of new economic projects20 has further allowed economically privileged communities to secure land and other land-based resources. In contrast, communities with less economic power have reignited indigeneity claims and intensified ethnic competition over land and other resources. Ideologies such as Pwani Si Kenya21 and secessionist

---

20 Such as LAPSET corridor program in Lamu, the Mombasa—Nairobi SGR-Only Cargo directive and the Dongo Kundu Bypass Highway.
21 Is a slogan that translates to “The Coast is not Kenya”.
politics have gained traction within this context. At times this competition and claim-making has been used to mobilise and call for violence against those deemed ‘outsiders’ as was the case of the 1997 Likoni clashes and the 2015 Mpeketoni attacks because marginalised groups feel their issues remained unaddressed (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Nyongesa, 2017). The government has ignored legitimate concerns about socio-economic and political injustices and has instead collapsed disparate groups to a single political community (i.e. the ummah) connected by a shared religious identity (Mohamed, 2021; Mohamed, 2022).

Situating coastal politics within this framework allows Kenya’s government to delegitimize claims about inequality while constructing coastal groups as being inherently dangerous or threatening (Branch, 2011). And whilst during Kenyatta and Moi’s regimes coastal people calling for reforms were characterised as troublemakers and fundamentalists respectively (Ibid). In the age of the GWOT, they have come to be stigmatised and stereotyped as being terrorist sympathisers—see the conditions that enable this construction in chapter three. Like the old times when such characterisation justified military crackdowns, collective punishment, arrests, detention and torture (H. Whittaker, 2012; Anderson, 2014), currently they are used to justify surveillance, harassment, profiling, and enforced disappearances (IMLU, 2016, 2022) thus exacerbating the Othering of groups seen as culturally different.

The continued underdevelopment of the Coastal region is thus due to neglect by the central government in providing basic services, investing in infrastructure, and creating economic opportunities as such resulting in increased insecurity (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010; Buigut and Amendah, 2016). The 2019 census reveals that youth unemployment is severe relative to adults, and it remains uneven between sexes and by location. Nationally, youth unemployment is 1.5 times higher than adult unemployment. Furthermore, most employed youths are confined to low-skilled and low-wage jobs. Regionally, 49.27 per cent of youth in Mombasa are unemployed, which is 11 per cent more than the national rate, and 16.62 per cent higher than the county Nyeri22. High unemployment stems from the central and local government's inability to create job opportunities and the politicisation of development projects that continue to entrench marginalisation instead of balancing economic development. The Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSET) project and SGR-Only Cargo directive (Standard Gauge Railway) targeting the Coastal region are a few examples of projects that entrench marginalisation. In Lamu, the launch of LAPSET was followed by increasing land prices and land grabbing by non-natives with more financial means (Nyongesa, 2017). In Mombasa, the SGR-only Cargo directive stifled the Coast's

---

22 Nyeri is a county located in the former Central Province and in the 2019 census, recorded the lowest unemployment rate for youth across Kenya.
economic growth (Warah, 2019), causing a loss of nearly 8.4 per cent of its annual earnings and rendering 2,987 direct port employees jobless (Ogollah et al., 2019).

While unemployment—and widespread poverty—do not cause terrorism (Piazza, 2006, 2011). They are particularly dangerous when they intersect and interact with widespread corruption in government and security services, government inability to provide basic services, violation of human rights, weak or authoritarian governments (Stern, 2003), and patrimonial politics (Barker and Ricardo, 2005). This interaction produces hopelessness and frustrations among the masses, creating an appeal for violence (see Barker, 2005). Several government-commissioned reports, such as the 1999 Akiwumi, the 2008 Sharawe, and the 2013 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission reports, show that economic grievances primarily drive post-election violence and other forms of political violence in Kenya. Academic studies also show that grievances have created widespread dissatisfaction with the state and led to a growing ‘radicalisation’ of Kenya’s Muslim communities (Mogire and Mkutu, 2011; Badurdeen, 2012; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014; Botha, 2015; Mwangi, 2018).

This historical context shows how socio-economic, political and cultural developments in colonial and post-independent eras continue to shape local conflict dynamics and relations. I argue that an understanding of ‘radicalisation’ should be grounded within these historical developments. Before proceeding further, the next section problematises the concept of youth to further our understanding of identity construction and how certain identities have become the foci of ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism debates.

Identity and discourse in knowledge production

Moving away from ideas about youth “as a universal experience connected to biological and physiological developmental phases of human beings” (France, 2000, p. 321). Because reducing youth to a transitional phase ignores politico-cultural differences within and across countries. Instead, I approach youth as a problematic period and argue that the construction of youth identities is not confined to age processes alone. Rather it is an ongoing complex process influenced by people’s socio-cultural contexts (Gabsi, 2019). In this study, I approach ‘youth’ or young people—which I use interchangeably—as a socially constructed identity. Identity construction processes are situated within their socio-historical, economic and politico-cultural contexts. For example, African societies are rooted in a gerontocratic order (Smith, 2011), with adulthood reserved for rich elite men and a few older women while the rest are considered minors (BCPR-UNDP, 2005). Youth is, thus, a negotiated identity, produced through social relationships and fluid across time and space.

Smith (2011) argues that interpersonal practices—rites of passage, school-to-work transition and starting one’s family—shape youth access to full membership in society.
These practices have implicit assumptions about unquestioned qualities of young people and treat the youth period as a universal construct. However, because poverty and prolonged periods of unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa prevent youth from ascending to adulthood. Leonardi (2007, p. 391) advances that young people’s engagement in violent organisations such as al-Shabaab is an attempt to gain access to restricted domains rather than “generational rebellion”. And this is because interpersonal practices are embedded in diverse power relations that restrict the choices available for youth and decisions about what it means to be young.

Kenyan conceptions of youth are shaped by ethnic, religious, and politico-historical developments within Kenya. While the methods used by youth-led initiatives to instigate political transformations—e.g. the Mau Mau resistance—are questionable, youth’s role in fostering political change in Kenya is widely acknowledged (Ojiambo, 2017). However, unlike older generations that are seen as favouring politics of accommodation or manipulation, youth are seen as confrontational (Botha, 2014). These concerns with ‘youth behaviour’ have to do with moral concerns, as well as the labelling of youth as a social group that is problematic. Confrontational behaviour of youth is seen as threatening to the status quo because it functions beyond the boundaries of socio-cultural norms. Where ideal youth is one who traditionally conforms to societal expectations embedded in gerontocratic and patriarchal configurations (Burgess and Burton, 2010). These relations maintain social order in most societies. Youth functioning beyond these configurations are labelled as a risk. This identity construction process relies on “summoning of difference, the relativisation [sic] of the self as against the “other” imagined as separate, outside—and perhaps also as marginal, inferior and dangerous” (Kennedy, 2001, p. 3).

Crafting the ‘self’ and ‘other’, especially in the post-9/11 period, has occurred in formal, semi-formal, public and private spaces. For example, terrorism coverage emphasises cultural frames differentiating ‘us’ from ‘them’ in the international media (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2014). Here Islam is portrayed as a violent religion and Muslims as fanatics (Omanga, 2012). Also, the same media frames violent women in contrasting ways to men. Where men are portrayed as political agents, while women are depoliticised as actors (Nacos, 2005; Conway and Mclnerney, 2012; Martini, 2018; L.B Jackson, 2021). However, such constructions do not just occur and remain in the media domain. They interact with constructions produced in other domains, whether in parliaments during law-making processes, academic conferences, outreach activities, or between friends at the dinner table. What these constructions have in common is that they are driven by our subjective ideas and narratives, which are shaped by our shared socio-cultural norms, as this thesis demonstrates in the various empirical chapters.
Thesis Outline

Chapter One contextualises the concepts of ‘radicalisation’ and extremism. In this chapter, I critically review existing literature in this area, identifying the main debates, areas of (dis)agreements and what still remains unquestioned. By engaging with the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of the previous studies I specifically question the youth category—which has received limited criticality in research on ‘radicalisation’. Using Kenya as a case, I argue that combining critical terrorism studies (CTS) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) could enable us to understand both the youth category and ‘radicalisation’ and how the two co-constitute each other. In this chapter, I argue Kenya’s complex history and local conflict dynamics—as discussed in the Introduction—contribute to the current deficiencies in studies on ‘radicalisation’ by showing how power and language interact to (re)produce our ideas of ‘radicalisation’ and the appropriate measures for addressing it.

Chapter Two outlines the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology for this study. My study approaches ‘radicalisation’ as a discourse, thus probing the relationship between power, knowledge and discourse. The study applied insights and tools from different CDA approaches to understand this relationship. This chapter reviews three main approaches used: Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional framework, Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network, and Van Leeuwen’s Legitimation Frameworks. It then details how these frameworks are applied in this study, how texts and participants for this study were selected, and the tools that were used to gather data, and how NVivo software was used to manage and analyse data. Here, I show how data was coded, how similarities in the codes were identified to create themes and eventually how the themes build towards discourses. I conclude this chapter with a reflection on my positionality and the limitations it affords this research.

Chapter Three acts as the backdrop for the other empirical chapters. It presents the findings from an analysis of two policy texts, the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) and the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP). It first, situates ‘radicalisation’ within elite discourses on ‘terrorism’ and counterterrorism in Kenya’s three regimes: the Moi, Kibaki and Kenyatta administrations. The analysis reveals, first, that the policy texts were structured and produced for highly literate audiences. Second, there are three competing themes in policy texts: Psychosocial and cultural themes on ‘radicalisation’ are more prevalent in the NSCVE. And cultural and to a larger extent, themes with socio-economic characters are more prevalent in the MCAP. However, the analysis shows that both texts foreground themes on culture and identity in their understanding of ‘radicalisation’ by drawing on specific discursive resources. The themes advanced in the NSCVE build towards national discourses which are discourses produced by institutions. The themes advanced by the MCAP have both local and national
characters. Hence, in this chapter we can see both discourse continuity and transformations.

Chapter Four analyses elite discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and focuses on 57 speeches and statements delivered by President Kenyatta from 2015 to 2018. The analysis finds a continuity of national discourses on ‘radicalisation’ which centre around themes of conflict and identity. In the former, ‘radicalisation’ is a clash of cultures and values, whereas in the latter, ‘radicalisation’ is enabled (by powerful Others) and affects specific identities (youth). The chapter argues that national discourses have managed to cast Kenya's internal and external counterterrorism operations as a continuation of the colonial struggle. In this chapter, I show how by building national discourses informed by international frameworks of terrorism, Kenya has managed to establish itself as an ally and anchor-state of the GWOT in the international arena. Locally, the national discourses have become a shorthand for silencing any form of dissent, thus reinforcing authoritarianism.

Chapter Five analyses press articles to understand how the press determines what is known about ‘radicalisation’ and who is authorised to speak about ‘radicalisation’. By analysing 474 news texts published from 2015 to 2018 by Nation Africa and The Standard online platforms, I argue that the press advances elite discourses through its sourcing patterns and practices. This chapter reveals that the press’ overreliance on official sources as credible sources served to legitimize government perspectives and narratives about problematic cultures and identities. This in turn ensures discourse continuity and restricts what could be intelligibly said about ‘radicalisation’. This chapter also shows marginal discourses—those emphasising the structural conditions within which radicalism occurs—that challenge the totality of state discourses, however, in instances where such conditions were discussed, they were primarily from less “legitimate” sources as they were covered in columns and commentaries. This chapter argues that the press reifies existing power structures thus affecting what the public can know and come to know about ‘radicalisation’ and what measures to prevent and counter-radicalisation are seen as appropriate and necessary.

Chapter Six explores ‘radicalisation’ from a PCVE practitioners’ point of view. This chapter aims to show a) how practitioners describe ‘radicalisation’ by employing narratives that resonate with everyday conflicts and social organisation, b) how practitioners’ constructions characterise social actors, c) how these constructions discursively legitimise or delegitimise what is dominantly considered ‘radicalisation’, and d) what interventions the dominant discourses make possible. The findings from expert interviews conducted with PCVE practitioners show that ‘radicalisation’ is represented as a) an issue of culture and identity, b) a political construct, and c) the outcome of socio-economic and political injustices. The
first and the third discourses also appear in policy documents, and elite discourses but are articulated with variations. Practitioners foreground local issues in their understanding of ‘radicalisation’, thus they build towards local discourses which are legitimised and normalised through analogies. In this chapter, I argue that while civil society transforms the discourse by advancing a compelling case for approaching ‘radicalisation’ as partly an outcome of debilitating socio-economic conditions, most of their preventative work is directed at culturally shaping young people and communities. However, this could be due to PCVE being driven by donor interests, limited financial means, and because of the regimes increasing authoritarianism which has limited the civic space.

Chapter Seven brings youth voices into the debate on ‘radicalisation’. This chapter analyses data from two focus groups undertaken in the summer and winter of 2019. This chapter shows that young people’s understanding of ‘radicalisation’ draws on their experiences of everyday (in)securities. Young people demonstrate an advanced awareness by also drawing in discursive resources including but not limited to their experience in implementing PCVE and as beneficiaries of other adjacent programs. This chapter discusses how youth consider themselves vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’ owing to an interaction of micro-level issues and experiences, societal expectations about the acceptable forms of masculinities and femininities and debilitating socio-economic and political conditions. However, young people do not think they themselves are helpless victims or dangerous. They project dangerousness onto a minority of young people who are members of extremist organisations and gangs, but even then they demonstrate a nuanced understanding of agency. This chapter underlines that while young people’s accounts blur the distinction between victim and perpetrator by showing that the categories are neither static nor mutually exclusive, young people’s experiences are riddled with contradictions due to the specific way in which being young is defined in their communities. Thus, I argue that the young people distancing themselves and projecting the characterisation of dangerousness to the minority does not change much because the characterisation of ‘youth as dangerous’ is already part of a framework that criminalises the youth identity.

The Conclusion of this research ties together the project’s main findings. It broadens the discussion from the preceding chapters and reflects on what these findings mean for PCVE. It is argued here that discourses are products and productive of multiple practices of power (power relations) and particular representations of youth as a social category that make up the boundaries of what can be intelligibly considered as ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE. I reiterate that while the texts under analysis were produced in different domains, they all drew on elements and discourses from each other. This was particularly possible because of the condition of linearity. In this reading, Kenya’s disparate categories of past and contemporary events are viewed and depicted as falling within a single trajectory. As shown throughout
the analysis and by looking at the colonial and post-independent state discourses on ‘radicalisation’ we can see parallels in ideas of who constitutes a ‘radical’. It is almost entirely the category youth. Thus I argue, it is this category which often is a constellation of a wide range of ideas, situations and circumstances that allows cooperation—under the framework of multi-stakeholderism and partnerships—between the different security stakeholders (local and global ones) and to agree that ‘radicalisation’ is a ‘youth issue’ without having to unpack what they each mean by ‘youth’ or even ‘radicalisation’. I argue that this affects the kinds of PCVE developed because they are entirely founded on paternalistic logics.
Chapter 1. Theorising ‘Youth Radicalisation’ and ‘Extremism’ in Kenya

Research on ‘radicalisation’ and extremism has raised conceptual, theoretical and ethical issues crucial to understanding the phenomena of terrorism and more generally political violence. Some of the key issues that have been debated and are still contested in this area include definitional issues, the role of religion, the radical milieu, the role of gender in political violence and terrorism, ‘radicalisation’ settings and the responses to ‘radicalisation’ also widely classified as PCVE strategies. On definitional issues, besides existing for several centuries, throughout history, radical has implied different things (Mandel, 2009). ‘Radicalisation’ derives from the Latin word *radicalis* or *radix*, understood as “going to the root nature of a thing” (Mandel, 2009, p. 104). Over time, radical was used in different languages and fields to denote other things, including the root of a number, humour, and moisture (Bötticher, 2017) 23. Significant changes occurred to how ‘radicalisation’ was deployed since it became a popular framework in terrorism studies in the post-9/11 period. Kundnani (2012) and Silva’s (2018) surveys note an exponential increase in publications on ‘radicalisation’ since 2001. And while prior to 2001 studies on conflict and political violence spoke of “‘becoming’ a terrorist, ‘joining’ a terrorist group, or of being ‘recruited’” when describing individuals or groups “process of deepening involvement in radical violent causes and activism” (Silke and Brown, 2016, p. 129). As evidenced by studies focusing on groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Shining Path (Silke and Brown, 2016) and even Kenya’s *Mungiki* (Rasmussen, 2010). All these studies speak of recruitment. However, post-9/11, most literature speaks of ‘radicalisation’, when seeking to explain processes and dynamics that influence transition towards violence and joining violent groups (Silke and Brown, 2016).

The term ‘radicalisation’ continues to be a key area of focus in terrorism studies since 9/11 (Githens-Mazer, 2012). Scholars and practitioners agree that ‘radicalisation’ remains an “ill-defined, complex,…controversial” (Coolsaet, 2012, p. 331) and overall a “very problematic concept” (Schmid, 2013a, p. 6). This conceptual imprecision can be summarised as an outcome of three issues. First, the close association of ‘radicalisation’ with other related concepts i.e. terrorism and violent extremism (see for example how Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010), defines radicalisation). Specifically, the majority of definitions see violence as the defining characteristic of radicalism. This is in itself flawed because it conflates radical beliefs and action (Schmid, 2013a; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, 2017); making it

---

difficult to assess what is being measured. Borum (2011) and Lynch (2017) argue that the relationship between radical ideas and radical action is not clear-cut and neither is it unidirectional.

Second, ‘radicalisation’ is often decontexualised. Whereby it is defined without referencing any particular contexts and situations (Sedgwick, 2010). Overlooking the nuances and distinctions between different types of radicalism leads to overly broad and simplistic understanding of the phenomenon (Lindekilde, 2016). Third, Schmid (2013a) adds that, ‘radicalisation’ has predominantly been seen as a process that applies to non-state actors, particularly individuals and small groups. Such a conceptualisation obscures how state actors can become radicalised and the complex dynamics between state and non-state actors in certain contexts (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011).

In an attempt to navigate these definitional dilemmas, Jackson et al., (2011) and Schmid (2013b) note that some studies have uncritically adopted government definitions thus ignoring the ways in which power relations shape the definition of ‘radicalisation’ and who is perceived as being at risk of ‘radicalisation’. Or by viewing ‘radicalisation’ in relation to mainstream politics (this was also the case among CSOs interviewed in this study) (Sedgwick, 2010). The problem of this perspective however, is that it often treats core Western liberal values as a benchmark to define what is considered radical (Lindekilde, 2016). Not only are such perspectives problematic because they fail to reflect the values and beliefs of non-Western cultures and societies (Ibid). But they also reinforce a eurocentric worldview as a universal model of knowledge and practice. Other studies drawing from social movement theory and the situation action theory have restricted ‘radicalisation’ to the move towards using political violence, and specifically terrorism as a tactic to achieve political goals (Bouhana and Wikström, 2011). Such a definition focuses on the situational contexts and how the morality to support and encourage acts of terrorism is acquired. Lindekilde (2016, pp. 533-534) adds that this definition could crucially distinguish between “cases of illegal violence and legal political activism”, however, “to use the definition in practice, one would have to define terrorism, for example, by reference to terrorism laws in the relevant country or countries”.

Other studies in an attempt to consider context have used the concept of religious radicalisation as a conceptual and empirical category. For example, Rink and Sharma’s (2018, p. 1233) research ambiguously defines religious radicalisation as “the level of support for the use of violence to achieve a religio-political objective”. Their study views the concept of religious radicalisation as serving a descriptive function for the study context. Specifically, they argue the descriptor ‘religious’ “underscores that radicalisation often involves events affecting a religious group’s global membership, such as the rise of militant
groups or political parties affiliated with Christianity or Islam” (Ibid, p. 1233). The problem with the concept of religious radicalisation is that most studies in international relations only view religion as a function “of most often an ideology, sometimes an institution and sometimes a community” (Brown, 2020a, p. 280). This means that religion only serves a specific purpose within a given context or is a means to an end. While religion can function in this way, reducing it solely to a functional category overlooks its complexity and richness as a cultural and spiritual phenomenon. It also reinforces a secular bias where religion is seen as less real, as secondary, as less significant and as an ‘Other’ in comparison to other social or political categories (Cavanaugh, 2004). According to Brown (2020a), such a misunderstanding ignores biases and subjectivities within international relations. For example, the apparent link between Islam and terrorism and the association of Muslims with terrorism; where religious identity or motive only becomes a relevant category for Muslims, and by and large Black and Brown people (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011). This produces “racialised and hierarchical binaries—we have reason, they have religion; we have politics, they have culture—within which the religious is always disruptive and inferior” (Brown, 2020a, p. 281). Thus making religious knowledge and the religious subject as ‘suspect’ and always ‘at risk’ of ‘radicalisation’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Martin, 2015). Violence by Muslims is particularly pathologised and seen as destructive and uncompromising.24

Not only does this have real consequences for justifying extreme counterterrorism measures targeting Muslims (Jackson, 2007; Lynch, 2013). But, the idea of religious radicalisation which generalises Islam also allows a homogenisation of disparate groups with different objectives and operating in different spaces and times, while ignoring the role of religion in non-Muslim violence (Gunning and Jackson, 2011) a case in point is far-right and alt-right violence. Finally, the concept of religious radicalisation is itself biased because at the analytical level it gives primacy to religious motivations and explanations of violence and serves to de-emphasize the wider social and political contexts within which violent actors and groups emerge (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Gunning and Jackson, 2011; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Adib-Moghaddam, 2014; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; Monaghan and Molnar, 2016; Mwangi, 2019, 2018b).

24 This view can be found in most orthodox studies on terrorism with some seminal works being Hoffman’s Inside Terrorism; Ranstorp’s Terrorism in the name of religion; Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the mind of God in its various editions; Stern’s Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill; and Laqueur’s The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction.
Such diverse definitions have yielded different analytical arguments on the causes and mechanisms of ‘radicalisation’. Some studies have developed explanatory models which posit ‘radicalisation’ as a linear and predictable process, that progresses through fixed phases where certain factors are at play. Linear models have been criticised for assuming a one-size-fits-all process of ‘radicalisation’ (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011), over-emphasising certain factors (e.g. the role of ideology) while neglecting others, narrowly focusing on individuals’ profiles and predispositions (Horgan, 2006; Schmid, 2013a), and portraying ‘radicalisation’ as a one-way process thus foreclosing the possibility of disengagement or deradicalisation (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Borum, 2011). In response to these criticisms, scholars have developed nuanced pathway models for ‘radicalisation’, where emphasis is placed on the interplay between multiple factors operating at the micro, meso and macro levels (see McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011).

In the first section of this chapter, I will independently engage with findings and debates assessing ‘radicalisation’ at the micro level (or individual level), meso level (the wider radical milieu) and the macro level (the societal and political dynamics) to tease out areas of agreements, disagreements and what still remains unquestioned. The second section will situate the current study by expounding on the unquestioned dimensions of ‘radicalisation’, particularly its unproblematic engagement with the category ‘youth’. Using Kenya as a case study, this section will argue that while numerous studies on ‘radicalisation’ have been conducted in the study’s context, often these studies fail to adequately engage with the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This section will, therefore, show that by using Critical Terrorism Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis, the proposed study can in-depthly challenge the core categories and assumptions about ‘radicalisation’ and show how they draw from western experiences to shape how old conflicts are named and local politics reorganised. The final section summarises the main contribution of this chapter which is that theorising ‘radicalisation’ as a discourse by using CDA will open opportunities for critically exploring what is known about it, who produces this knowledge, how it is produced and legitimated, and how it constructs identities for young people and what this means for PCVE.

25 For phase models see Danish Security and Intelligence Services PET (2009), A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation among Young People; and Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) NYPD model.
Previous studies: debates, agreements and disagreements on radicalisation

Individual vulnerabilities and predispositions

While ‘radicalisation’ continues to become a buzzword in terrorism studies, it is widely agreed by scholars and practitioners that there is no terrorist personality (Horgan, 2005) nor is there an accurate terrorist profile (Borum, 2004; Horgan, 2005). Besides this acknowledgement, many studies as Lindekilde (2016, p. 536) aptly puts it, suggest “some type of individual vulnerability as key risk factors”. Some of these studies advance that individuals who have been radicalised showed signs of self-doubt, questioned their belonging, were unable to cope with: challenging or complex situations and stressful situations, and were unwilling to recognise differing worldviews (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2014). Others have argued that individuals at-risk of ‘radicalisation’ are those who are confronted with challenging life events such as loss of a loved one, loss of livelihood among others (Silke, 2003; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Nesser, 2010). These situations make individuals more likely to seek out radical milieus as a way to find answers and increase certainty (Lindekilde, 2016, p. 536). Often such individuals are more likely to approach or access communities they share values with. Sageman (2004), in his ground-breaking study Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad, shows that, the likelihood of radicalising increases if individuals have social ties to groups or people (such as friends or family members) who hold extreme views or who are involved in extremist groups. This likelihood also increases for people who were raised with certain religious beliefs that may align with radical ideologies; or those whose immediate environment has extremist groups.

Other highly regarded studies, for example Wiktorowicz (2005) Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, has used the concept of cognitive opening to argue that when an individual experiences a psychological crisis, which could have been caused by a personal tragedy, emotional distress, consciousness rising or persuasion by activists, their previously held beliefs are shaken leaving them receptive to new ways of thinking. Critics point out that there are a majority of individuals who share the experiences and concerns of those deemed vulnerable, but they do not use/condone violence as a means to effect change (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Van Metre, 2016). However, individual vulnerabilities are seen to make the individual vulnerable “to self-selection or outreach radical milieus” (Lindekilde, 2016, p. 536). Studies including Taarnby (2007) and Wiktorowicz (2005) have shown how extremist networks deliberately target e.g. first and second generation immigrants, converts, those with existing grievances and those in search of

26 Also see Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008) and Christmann (2012).
meaning/identity.Positing that radical ideologies may resonate with such individuals because they provide simplified answers to complex issues and offer easy-to-follow action plans. In other words, people who are experiencing uncertainty and seeking clarity may find radical ideas appealing because they offer a sense of certainty and a clear path forward.

McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) caution that not all pathways to radicalisation entail ideology. While some individuals may be ideologically motivated, for others ideology only comes in at a later stage and functions retrospectively to rationalise violence. Instead, literature on individual vulnerabilities reiterates that drivers of radicalisation are mostly related to personal tragedies and a search for: belonging, meaning, purpose, identity, and thrill (Kepel, 2006; Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Taarnby, 2007; Von Hippel, 2007; Grignard, 2008; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Kleinmann, 2012; Rink and Sharma, 2018).

In addition, research in this area also suggests that some personal factors affect an individual's vulnerability to radicalisation. Such studies have drawn attention to demographic factors such as age, gender, religion, ethnicity, level of education and physical factors such as histories of crime, violence and substance abuse (see AIVD, 2002, 2004; Leiken, 2004; Taarnby, 2007; Olsen, 2009; Botha, 2017; Rink and Sharma, 2018; Vergani et al., 2020). And while studies linking vulnerability to gender, religion and ethnicity have been criticised for propounding narratives of Black and Brown youth as political and security threats (Hendrixson, 2004). The category of age and/or generation (youth) have not been met with the same criticality. Despite emphasis by scholars, practitioners and international instruments such as UNSCR 2250, on the need to recognise the diversity of youth experiences. Often youth in mainstream ‘radicalisation’ literature is defined biologically as an age-bound phase or functionally as a transition period. In the former, for example, most studies/policies on ‘radicalisation’, and international relations more generally, advance arguments about young people or youth aged between 14 to 25 (for studies focusing on western contexts see AIVD, 2002, 2004; Pew Research Center, 2007; Olsen, 2009) or 18 to 35 to be at risk of ‘radicalisation’ (for studies on the East and Horn of Africa see Botha, 2015, 2017; Rink and Sharma, 2018).

Scholars of sociology argue that age-bound definitions fail to capture the conceptions of youth across culture (Altiok et al., 2020). Because they are based on eurocentric perspectives that often use age as a measure of maturity. However, as I have also shown in the introduction and chapter one, the definition of youth, and the way societies view youth varies across time and space and also within societies (Mubashir and Grizelj, 2018). Thus there is need for theory and practice to recognise youth as a heterogeneous social group that may not avail of the same opportunities, experiences or inclusion/exclusion, inequality and marginalisation. In the latter, youth is defined as a transitional phase between childhood

34
and adulthood characterised by physical and psychological changes. Here, youth is also assumed to be a universal phase with ‘youthhood’ seen as a period of receptiveness, and vulnerability (Altiok et al., 2020). This view, however, only sees youth in the process of becoming. Thus limiting our view of youth as 1) a form of personhood, and 2) a lived experience that needs to be researched and understood in the present (Ibid). Christiansen, Mats and Vight (2006, p. 16) neatly capture the problems with both approaches by stating that they see young people as a homogenous group that goes through a set process of growing up physically, mentally, and socially, therefore making young people appear as if they have no agency and are just following a “natural” path of development that they cannot change.

In summary, literature on ‘radicalisation’ that uncritically adopts developmental and socio-biological conceptions of youth fails to capture the ways in which definitions of who is a youth/adult and what constitutes youthhood/adulthood are interlinked with issues of power, authority and social worth.

**Socio-cultural settings of ‘radicalisation’**

While individual factors are important in understanding ‘radicalisation’, the significance of the radical milieu cannot be understated (Winterbotham and Pearson, 2020). According to Borum (2012), for ‘radicalisation’ to happen, the individual must be exposed to radicalising settings. This exposure or contact to radicalising milieus (i.e. friends, families, radical religious elites, and movement entrepreneurs who are part of extremist networks) occurs through the mechanisms of self-selection, social selection and outreach or recruitment (Della Porta, 1995; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Christmann, 2012; Botha, 2014; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, 2016; Hellsten, 2016; Lindekindle, 2016; Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018; Githigaro, 2018; Rink and Sharma, 2018; Badurdeen, 2018a) and can involve talking to radicalising agents or accessing radicalising material in the offline and/or online domains (Suler, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Neumann, 2013; Ducol et al., 2016).

Studies assessing the influence of social settings on ‘radicalisation’ often draw on social movement theory and social psychology to understand group dynamics and intergroup conflicts (Borum, 2011). These studies have argued that recruiters or ‘radicalisation’ agents consciously create opportunities for exposure, e.g. by holding outreaches, which they use to identify likely targets (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Borum, 2012). Afterwards, agents organise events such as study sessions to offer participants information about how they can participate while using incentives to persuade recruits to join (see Sageman, 2008). During this process, agents frame messages in ways that resonate with the values,
beliefs and interests of the recruits while also aligning them with the ideological position and goals of the group (Della Porta, 1995; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). Literature has shown that in recruitment processes radicalising milieus employ mechanisms ranging from persuasion to manipulation and coercion through tactics like isolation (Sageman, 2004; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Badurdeen, 2020, 2018b)\(^{27}\), group bonding, group polarisation, and peer pressure to move individuals and groups towards violence (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Christmann, 2012).

There are three principal areas of disagreements in this literature. First, that this literature oversimplifies ‘radicalisation’ by reducing it to the influence of cultural relations (see for example Rink and Sharma, 2018). While cultural relations can play a role in ‘radicalisation’, this literature overemphasises their influence thus constructing communal cultures (which are often non-western cultures) as the problem. Also, it concurrently fails to acknowledge how cultural relations in communal cultures are essential for guaranteeing access to opportunities (jobs, education, and access to services) that improve individuals well-being (Mohamed, 2015). Such demonisation however is not new; rather it is rooted in orientalist discourses that construct non-western cultures as an inferior ‘Other’, as critical terrorism studies scholars have consistently shown (Barkawi, Roberts and Jackson, 2007; Mahony, 2010; Khalid, 2011). This in turn impacts how and what counterterrorism and PCVE policies will be developed and implemented (Mamdani, 2002). Closely related to this, is that literature overemphasising cultural relations overlook individual agency and decision-making in the ‘radicalisation’ process. Studies on young people's engagement with ISIS, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have shown that even within constricting socio-cultural settings, individuals have some form of agency; it could be in the form of coping, acting or adapting in their social environments (Matfess, 2017; Badurdeen, 2020; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). This does not negate that forced recruitment e.g. through human trafficking or grooming occurs. But it is meant to emphasise, an argument that others have also made that not all recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ is forced\(^{28}\).

**Gendered dynamics of ‘radicalisation’**

Other studies in this area have explored the role of gender in terrorism, how gender dynamics shape men’s and women's recruitment and ‘radicalisation’, the roles women and men play in extremist organisations, and women’s role in PCVE and counterterrorism. Studies using a gender lens to explore; the role of women in violent extremism and PCVE,

\(^{27}\) For literature on specifically young girls and women being groomed, forced/early marriages and forced recruitment through human trafficking (see Matfess, 2017; Jesperson, 2019; Petrich and Donnelly, 2019; Stern, 2019; Badurdeen, 2020).

\(^{28}\) This is an argument that many scholars have reiterated. See Matfess, 2017; Badurdeen, 2020; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020.
and the motivation and recruitment dynamics driving women into extremist groups have highlighted two arguments. First, that women’s engagement in terrorism is linked to personal relationships (see for example, Ndung’u and Salifu, 2017; Ndung’u, Salifu and Sigsworth, 2017; Badurdeen, 2018b). And that second, within extremist organisations, women play secondary roles such as recruiters, cleaners, cooks, and spies (Dolnik, 2004; Zedalis, 2004; Jacques and Taylor, 2008; Ndung’u and Salifu, 2017; Nthamburi, 2018; Badurdeen, 2018c), depending on the socio-economic, political, cultural and individual contexts surrounding the women.

The main disagreement in this literature has been in what ways gender is considered a useful category of analysis. Almost all studies on ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya that identify gender as an essential component in political violence are often predisposed to a traditional view of gender as a category relevant to women. Gender is only problematised when women are involved in violent groups whereas for the men, their gender and how it impacts their engagement in similar groups is not questioned. This is despite studies in areas such as civil wars showing that sub-Saharan African young men’s involvement in armed insurgency groups is a way of young men challenging existing power distribution in societies with crystallised gerontocratic arrangements (Barker, 2005; Barker and Ricardo, 2005). Being a man in these contexts is associated with having an income which translates to “exerting authority” which accords men “access to young women and girls for physical and reproductive labour” (Duriesmith, 2017, p. 44). Young men who are unable to achieve these milestones may feel emasculated. These subordinated groups of men—in this case, young men—thus adopt combative roles in an attempt to affirm their masculine authority (Ibid). Hence, violence becomes a tool they use to reassert dominance.

An approach to gender, as a category relevant to women, confines the analysis on gender to the gender roles argument, hence, whenever women’s involvement is probed, it is viewed in relational terms to men. These arguments, however, exceptionalise women’s participation and motivations. Despite numerous studies globally showing that women have been historically active in political violence just like men (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2011; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). Some studies depoliticise women’s engagement by sexualising their motives and locating them within personal concerns (Dolnik, 2004; Bloom, 2011b, 2011a; González, Freilich and Chermak, 2014) as opposed to men whose motivations are by default assumed to be political (Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2011). Such essentialist positions are embedded in assumptions about men and women being inherently violent and peaceful, respectively. Therefore when women engage in violence, it is too far-fetched a reality that most people explain women's
actions using narratives that position them as naïve and often manipulated into violence by their male relations (for an extended analysis, see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2011; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). In turn, this forestalls the possibility of considering women’s roles in violent organisations other than support or secondary roles. By foregrounding women’s passivity, these studies reinforce the assumption that women are exclusively victims in conflict (Cunningham, 2003).

Such a reductive analysis could also be embedded in essentialist positions that explain women’s violence through traits seen as essential to womanhood (Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). Here, women engaging in political violence are considered non-feminine or to use Sjoberg and Gentry’s (2007) characterisation “monsters”. Their violence violates “social norms of non-violence” and “essentialist gender norms casting women as pacifist” (Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020, p. 39). Their violence is characterised as ruthless, aggressive and deadly thus unique from men’s. Also, their violence is irrational, making these women outrightly dangerous. This characterisation is based on the assumption that ‘real women’ are non-violent (Berrington and Honkatukia, 2002). Hence, whether they joined for economic empowerment or to improve their social status, their engagement is still viewed within patriarchal configurations, thus advancing ideas that women need saving. Also, such depoliticisation of women’s violence that fails to give a complete account could result in women receiving “more lenient and unjust sentencing, inadequate rehabilitation, disengagement and deradicalisation programmes” (Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020, p. 12).

Other studies have approached gender by focussing on the tactical role it plays in extremist organisations. Badurdeen’s (2018b), for example, used an overarching gender framework combined with Rational Choice theory, and the concept of Victimology to understand voluntary and involuntary recruitment of women into al-Shabaab. The study revealed that women within al-Shabaab, whether recruited voluntarily or involuntarily, navigate between varied roles such as combat, intelligence gathering and surveillance, domestic and sexual. However, with the increasing crackdowns and profiling of men; al-Shabaab has tactically recruited women because they undergo less scrutiny and physical police searches due to cultural and religious norms (see also Cunningham, 2003; Bloom, 2011a; Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2011). Hence, by exploiting these cultural and religious norms, al-Shabaab continues to meet their strategic and logistic needs.

Additionally, in terms of motivation, Badurdeen (2018b) established that when the benefit of joining, e.g. being with peers to seek thrill and adventure, seeking revenge, financial

---

30 For literature on women in varied roles (see Nacos, 2005; MacKenzie, 2009; McEvoy, 2009; Bloom, 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Gentry and Sjoberg, 2016).
independence, or to be with a loved one outweighs the cost women voluntarily joined al-Shabaab; because they view it as an opportunity for empowerment. But there are also some women who “unknowingly fall prey to Al-Shabaab through the promises of employment, marriage, or education sponsorship” (Badurdeen, 2018c, p. 160). Cases of grooming, forced/early marriages and forced recruitment through human and sex trafficking by extremists organisations have also been shown to occur in other contexts (see Matfess, 2017; Jesperson, 2019; Petrich and Donnelly, 2019; Badurdeen, 2020). Badurdeen’s studies set itself apart from other studies focussing on Kenya, by highlighting that not all recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ is forced and that some women participate in extremist groups to improve their social status.31

More studies in this area have also begun to nuance gender as a complex and contextual set of beliefs that shape women’s and men’s behaviour. These studies argue that men’s and women’s recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ is determined by how communities structure gender roles (Matfess, 2017; Pearson and Winterbotham, 2017; Badurdeen, 2020). Following this conceptualisation of gender, Badurdeen’s (2020) study shows complex patterns of al-Shabaab female returnees in Kenya. The study found that there are women who view joining as a way of fulfilling their religious commitment; often, this motivation was embedded within—local and global—political grievances faced by Muslim communities. Some women joined in search of justice, others’ participation was shaped by “gender-dynamics of submission and subordination within families and the community”, and others’ due to the lack of better options (Badurdeen, 2020, p. 616). While this could mean that some women have autonomy in decision-making, Badurdeen cautions that often their decision-making functions in accordance with broader patriarchal norms and values which are also articulated in al-Shabaab propaganda where a woman’s value—to herself and society—is attributed by her ability to conform to existing gender roles. These findings and the extensive scholarship by Black feminists on agency, crucially highlight that agency can be disruptive and could often function outside normative ideas about women's naivety and Muslim women's oppression.

‘Radicalisation’ settings

Whereas most research on ‘radicalisation’ has focussed on individual vulnerabilities and the socio-cultural settings within which ‘radicalisation’ occurs, research particularly inspired by critical theory has encouraged a critique of the material conditions of ‘radicalisation’. Such conditions depending on context have been identified to include socio-economic inequalities (Muhsin, 2012; Mercy Corps, 2016; Matfess, 2017), violent counterterrorism

31 This has also been shown by other studies abroad (see for example, Peresin and Cervone, 2015; Saltman and Smith, 2015; Matfess, 2017; Pearson and Winterbotham, 2017).
One of the areas of contention in this literature has been the role of poverty and exclusion on ‘radicalisation’. Studies focusing especially on Southeast Asia e.g. on Indonesia, India and sub-Saharan Africa on countries such as Kenya and Nigeria indicate that poverty—especially underemployment and exclusion from meaningful political processes contributes to ‘radicalisation’ (see Medhurst, 2000; Mogire and Mkutu, 2011; Badurdeen, 2012; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014; Botha, 2015; Mohamed, 2015; Mattess, 2017; Mwangi, 2018; Brown, 2020b), particularly when unemployed and destitute young women and men join extremist groups that promise them material incentives. This is especially plausible for countries such as Kenya that have acute historical injustices that trace back to colonialism and the continued colonial policies, as I have detailed in the introductory chapter. Other scholars of terrorism and political violence argue that unemployment—and widespread poverty—do not cause terrorism (Malecková, 2005; Piazza, 2006, 2011). However, the two are seen as particularly dangerous when they intersect and interact with widespread corruption in government and security services, government inability to provide basic services, violation of human rights, weak or authoritarian governments (Stern, 2003), and patrimonial politics (Barker and Ricardo, 2005). This interaction produces hopelessness and frustrations among the masses, creating an appeal for violence (see Barker, 2005; Dowd, 2016).

Numerous studies focussing on western contexts by Tahir Abbas and also scholars like Bouhana and Wikström (2011), and Brown (2020b) also show failed government policies e.g. on multiculturalism and integration account for the emergence and growth and support of extremist ideologies and movements among Muslim communities. Hence, poverty and exclusion are dynamics worth considering especially in contexts such as Kenya where majority of the population live in absolute poverty, and where corruption is high and patrimonial politics and nepotism determine resources allocation (see introduction and chapter five to seven). In such contexts, extremist groups have been known to leverage these conditions to provide services such as education among other forms of relief and promise salaries/incentives for those who join them (Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023). Not everyone in such conditions joins for the money; some join because they ascribe to the ideologies of such groups whereas others see these groups as their opportunity to get back

32 Several government-commissioned reports, such as the 1999 Akiwumi, the 2008 Sharawe, and the 2013 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission reports, show that economic grievances primarily drive post-election violence and other forms of political violence in Kenya.
to the state—which often fosters inequalities—hence, such groups are seen as a means for retribution (Mohamed, 2015).

Other research has looked at the role of counterterrorism policies on ‘radicalisation’. Arguing that the formation and growth of extremist groups not just in the 21st century but even social movements of the 1970s and 1980s was an outcome of increased repression by the state (Della Porta, 1995; Silke, 2005; Parker, 2007; Geltzer, 2011). In an environment of increasing repression, individuals may seek out and cooperate with others experiencing grievances with the perpetrator; in this case, personal grievances become group grievances (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). Thus the political context—in this case violent counterterrorism policies—have been seen to play a role in shaping the appeal and success of extremist ideologies and movements (Lindekilde, 2014). This is plausible given that “revenge for acts of repression, injustice and humiliation” are well cited motivations for terrorism (see for instance McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Schmid, 2013a, p. 36). In Kenya, numerous studies have also shown that the growing ‘radicalisation’ of Kenya’s Muslim communities, i.e. Somali and Coastal communities—and also other forms of violence occurring in marginalised regions have corresponded with increasing state repression (Mkutu, Marani and Ruteere, 2014; Anderson and McNightly, 2015; Botha, 2017). Schmid (2013a), is sceptical about this causal relation and calls for more rigorous research. Schmid argues that there are instances where repressive counterterrorism has worked such as in Argentina and Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. However, Schmid acknowledges that while these measures worked the repercussions were of “near-genocidal proportions” (2013a, p. 36). In other cases like Algeria and Peru in the 1990s repressive counterterrorism is said to have been worse than the terrorism it was meant to counter (Ibid).

Another area of debate under ‘radicalisation’ settings has been the role of the internet. There are contentions as to whether the internet plays a causal or facilitative role in the processes of ‘radicalisation’ and recruitment (Awan, Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2011; Benson, 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, 2017). Most researchers agree that the advent of the internet with its low cost, ease of access almost globally, speed, the anonymity it affords its users, and the weak legislations has played a significant role in enabling dissemination of information by extremist groups (Brachman and Levine, 2011; Ducol, 2012; Weyers and Condon, 2014; Conway, 2012a). The internet has allowed like minded people to connect, create ideological communities, raise funds for extremist causes, disseminate extremist content such as training and bomb making manuals, plan and select targets of attacks, recruit and radicalise individuals (Furnell and Warren, 1999; Cohen, 2002; Lee and Leets, 2002; Thomas, 2003; Neumann, 2013; Ducol et al., 2016). Sageman (2008) sees the online environment as having replaced the real world physical spaces of
interaction. Thus the two domains—online and offline—are represented as distinct from each other (Koehler, 2014; Bastug, Douai and Akca, 2020). Other scholars such as Gill et al., (2017), Lindekiilde, Malthaner and O’Connor (2019), and Whittaker (2021, 2022) view the online–offline dichotomy as false and instead see the two domains as complementing each other. These scholars speak about a complex information environment as one where the activities of violent actors rely on both the online and offline domains. Conway (2017) while assessing online radicalisation, also urges for viewing individuals as “prosumers” i.e. as producers and consumers of extremist materials. Thus this literature has contributed by showing how the uptake of extremist content is shaped by individual vulnerabilities and their environment.

Situating the study: ontological and epistemological shortcomings of existing studies

Studies on ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism focussing on Kenya have contributed immensely to our understanding of the issue as I have shown in the reviewed literature. One of the primary contributions that remains unmatched has been the rich empirical evidence which has been obtained by collecting and analysing primary data. Unlike studies focussing on western contexts that continue to “recycle [sic] assumptions and truisms”, as Jarvis (2016, p. 71) notes. However, this shortcoming is partly connected to researcher safety (Breen-Smyth, 2009) and partly to the predominant idea that encourages researchers to not speak directly to those designated as terrorists in order to protect their scholarly independence (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996; Zulaika, 2012).

Despite such contributions, studies focussing on Kenya have several shortcomings. First these studies and the ensuing policies (as I show in chapter three), by and large have uncritically adopted eurocentric views on ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism and failed to adequately engage with context-sensitive research. A case in point is that most existing studies treat 9/11 and the global war on terror as their point of entry into understanding ‘radicalisation’ (see for example the different studies conducted by authors such as Botha, Githigaro, Badurdeen). And while such events are indeed useful and important, universalising them perpetuates what Walker (2004, p. 527) calls “ontological violence” which functions to sustain “the suppression and silencing indigenous ways of conceptualisation”. Even after ‘independence’ colonial relations have remained intact between the centre and periphery. Not only through trade, and military partnerships (Karbo and Virk, 2018) but also in knowledge production. Knowledge from the west is accorded higher standing and passed off as common-sense knowledge. An example which forms the basis of this thesis, is the use of concepts such as ‘radicalisation’, extremism, terrorism and their definitions. Scholars, practitioners and policies in Kenya adopt eurocentric worldviews uncritically thus passing off western interests, values and norms as universal models of
knowledge, practice and experience. Thus, heeding critical terrorism studies chief commitment, this study critically interrogates the accepted knowledge on terrorism, how it is reproduced in the global south, and how the reproduced knowledge functions and what it achieves or not.

Such a critical examination will question the taken-for-granted assumptions in dominant knowledge, and examine how such knowledge is shaped by contextual and historical forces and developments. So far Mwangi’s (2019, 2018b) reading of counterterrorism in Kenya as a weapon of power for shaping politics and populations and Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala’s (2023) recently published study on local meaning-making in defining violent extremism is a step in this direction. However, both studies fall short in several ways. First, these studies fail to adequately situate terrorism and its related processes in their historical contexts. Thus they engage in a practice Jarvis (2008) calls “writing linearity”. Writing linearity is a practice of excluding any "reflection of the historical background" of an event and instead presenting the current event under investigation in a single trajectory (Jarvis, 2008, p. 253). For example, Mwangi’s work highlights how violent counterterrorism has been used to target the Somali community, but it only evaluates this practice and its consequences in contemporary times, for lack of a better word in the age of the GWOT. However, there is lengthy literature by historians and conflict researchers that shows that scapegoating Somalis as well as other minorities such as Muslims–in Kenya, has been part of Kenya’s state building project (see Schlee, 1989; Sheikh, 2007; H. Whittaker, 2008, 2012; Lochery, 2012; Anderson, 2014; Mohamed, 2022). Similarly, while Badurdeen and colleagues examine the social and cultural meanings attached to violent extremism, they pay less attention to how these meanings developed at different historical junctures and what those developments mean in terms of how ideas about violent extremism have changed over time. Thus to understand what ‘radicalisation’ is today and how it is often and easily conflated with Somali and Muslim identities and connected to the spaces they inhabit, it is crucial to situate ‘radicalisation’ within the political, contextual and historical conditions where certain narratives exist and violence comes to be seen as a legitimate means to bring about social change (Kundnani, 2012, 2015). This historicising helps us to understand why and how dominant knowledge is structured and locally translated, accepted and/or resisted.

Closely related to this is that fewer scholars have triangulated a variety of data. For instance, Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala’s (2023, p. 1) study examines meaning-making and notes that “violent extremism is a loaded concept and—at the national level—the parameters used to define it are usually framed by the state, powerful ruling elites, and members of the international community, either directly or indirectly through donor-funded projects”. Nevertheless the study only relies on data obtained from body map workshops. This methodology is well-suited to explore how meaning is created and resisted in everyday
life, focusing on a select stakeholder—i.e. local communities. But it misses out on how the
construction of violent extremism by locals is not necessarily divorced from other cultural
resources such as the media. Numerous studies show that the news media, remains the
most prominent site where threats are constructed and securitised not just by amplifying
and disseminating dominant discourses, but it is also a site where dominant discourses are
disseminated (for media and the construction of terrorism, see Altheide, 2002, 2007, 2009;
Norris, Kern and Just, 2003; Croft, 2006; Stohl, 2006; Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2009; Awan,
Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2011; Powell, 2011; Conway, 2012b), and defended through
subtle practices such as sourcing (for sourcing terrorism, see Li and Izard, 2003; Jackson,
2005; Woods, 2007; Raphael, 2009; Miller and Sabir, 2012; Calhoun, 2016; Tellidis, 2016;
Wolfendale, 2016). Badurdeen and colleagues do acknowledge that “the state, powerful
elites and members of the international community directly or indirectly set the parameters
for how violent extremism is defined” (Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023, p. 1).
However, their study does not systematically demonstrate how these processes occur and
how they are interlinked.

My study is designed to address these gaps by triangulating various data produced at
different levels. This study achieves this by analysing institutional texts (e.g. security
policies, presidential speeches and online news), practitioner accounts and young people’s
voices. Such a holistic approach allows me to trace key patterns and continuities on how
meaning is constructed. Also, it convincingly allows me to explore the ways in which the
emerging meanings can function as what Laffey and Weldes, (1997, p. 193) characterise
as “symbolic technologies”. Because emerging meanings can be used by elites to
(re)position subjects, structured accepted knowledge and eventually legitimate policy
responses (Jackson, 2009, p. 68). This form of analysis is especially crucial and missing in
the current studies, despite studies abroad (Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006; Holland, 2016,
2013a, 2013b; Tsui, 2017; Martini, 2021) showing its utility. Mwangi and Badurdeen’s
studies contribute significantly by calling for a rethink and introspection of PCVE, and
measures that address local needs in general. However, such recommendations may be
difficult to actualise if there is no systematic engagement illustrating and describing the
relationship between textual and social and political processes.

In addition to historicising and triangulating, this study engages local communities and
youth or what Gayatri Spivak refers to as letting the subaltern speak for themselves. While
the reviewed studies also engaged young people (Badurdeen, 2012, 2018b; Botha, 2013,
2017) this study sets itself apart by engaging them as co-creators of knowledge. I approach
young people as experts of their own experiences. Such an approach is transformational
and emancipatory. Transformational, since it critically engages with ideas that view African
youth within the victim–perpetrator binary—as evidenced in the lengthy literature on civil
wars and child soldiers. This study argues that worldviews that position youth as either victims or perpetrators, deny young people their agency by assuming they are passive in making decisions that affect their lives (Mohamed, 2021). Because of such views young people are rarely engaged in research as co-creators of knowledge. Rather they are predominantly seen as an anomaly to be studied and the knowledge produced about them “provides authorities with a map for action and intervention” both prior, during and after ‘radicalisation’ (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 543). This should not be taken lightly since research, in contexts abroad, has shown how knowledge on ‘radicalisation’ performatively and productively constructing particular individuals and communities as potential threats legitimates governmental interventions (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013, 2015). Engaging young people as experts who are knowledgeable of their own situations, thus, amplifies their voices and transforms the debate. Such an approach could also allow young people to (re)position themselves as subjects within the existing interpretations and their own interpretations, thus fulfilling an emancipatory function.

With this in mind, this study employed a critical theoretical and methodological framework designed to interrogate the accepted knowledge on terrorism, how it is reproduced in the global south, and how the reproduced knowledge functions and what it achieves or not. I embark from this position based on two interrelated ideas. That, first, so far most of the literature and what is known about ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya, and by extension the global South is widely informed by foreign policy and eurocentric frameworks. This observation was made in Raphael’s (2009) book chapter In the service of power: Terrorism studies and US intervention in the global South. Yet despite such a crucial observation—even as I started to write my thesis in 2019, nearly a decade later—fewer studies are critical of claims and assertions advanced in mainstream literature. Hence, it is by interrogating such claims that this study can illustrate the ways power relations underpins our conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ and the discursive practices deployed to define the boundaries of acceptable knowledge about ‘radicalisation’. Second, this study systematically engages with these dominant frameworks showing how they have been used to repackage old problems and summon old enemies using frames, metaphors, tropes and practices widely accepted in the GWOT (Prestholdt, 2011; Mohamed, 2021; Mohamed, 2022). Thus my study distinguishes itself from existing studies by engaging with ‘radicalisation’ as a socially constructed concept whose meaning is negotiated at various levels through various practices.

---

See Haer (2019) for a more recent synthesis of literature on child soldiers.
In conversation with Critical Terrorism Studies

So far, the review of existing literature has highlighted that there are challenges with the dominant frameworks for understanding ‘radicalisation’. These challenges according to numerous critical scholars are not limited to conceptual inconsistencies in theory and practice (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009a; Martini, Ford and Jackson, 2020), the lack of clarity regarding the nature of the causal relations being inferred (Jackson et al., 2011; Silva, 2018), the inability to question commonly held assumptions in policy documents and from official sources (Ranstorp, 2009; Raphael, 2009; Tellidis, 2016; Wolfendale, 2016), an overreliance on secondary sources (Ranstorp, 2009; Silke, 2009), a disproportionate and rather reactive focus on ‘Islamist’ groups (Silke, 2009), the inability of PCVE to define “the specificity of what they are preventing” which is partly an outcome of definitional ambiguities (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit, 2016, p. 6), the production of risk-indicator models that construct certain individuals and communities as “at risk” and “risky” (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 394), the role of popular media in the construction of threats (Awan, Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2011), or the lack of attention to the circumstances that violence becomes a rational choice (Dalacoura, 2009; Gunning, 2009; Toros and Gunning, 2009; Lindekilde, 2016). Hence, there is a need for critically reflexive approaches that broaden the scope of the conceptual analysis (Jackson et al., 2011; Toros, 2016). Understanding ‘radicalisation’ in such a manner will thus begin by examining and acknowledging the different ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical positions.

Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) is one of the critical approaches that has continually challenged the biases and silences in orthodox studies (Jackson, 2007; Jarvis, 2009; Gunning, 2007a). CTS traces its roots in constructivism. Doty (1993, p. 298) contends that a constructivist approach, in International Relations more broadly, allows a focus on “not why a particular outcome (was) obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible”. In terrorism studies, a constructivist approach allows the examination of threats as social constructions; thus focussing on how social actors perceive, interpret and represent threats (see for example Campbell, 1998; Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006).

Departing from a CTS standpoint thus means questioning how ‘radicalisation’ is “perceived in reality—ontology and how we know what we believe is already known within this reality, that is, epistemology” (Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 115). CTS draws on several philosophical paradigms including constructivism and interpretivism. Perhaps why CTS views itself as “a very broad church that allows multiple perspectives, some of which have been considered outside of the mainstream, to be brought into the same forum—with the attendant benefits
Different studies employing (or characterising themselves as) CTS are united by their critical orientation and predominantly a “reflexive standpoint on the nature of knowledge production” (Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 114).

Particularly, my approach to researching ‘radicalisation’ has increasingly been informed by CTS’ ontological position that views terrorism and its related concepts such as ‘radicalisation’ as “social products and not objective truths” (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 137). In other words, these concepts are not seen as objective/neutral reflections of reality as orthodox studies often assume, but as socially constructed. Taking such an ontological position means questioning the category ‘radicalisation’ by critically engaging with attributions about ‘radicalisation’ made by different actors including political elites, practitioners, and beneficiaries/targets of counter-radicalisation interventions and how and what identities are constituted in the attributions and the consequences this has on the types of interventions designed and implemented. Research taking this ontological position include Richard Jackson’s *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism* (2005), Stuart Croft’s *Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror* (2006), and Chin-Kuei Tsui’s *Clinton, New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror* (2017), which all explore the relationship between words and practices particularly the US-led war on terror launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

These works argue that language plays a crucial role in making particular policies—in this case war—possible. Jackson (2005), Croft (2006) and Tsui (2017) show that the threat of terrorism as existential was socially constructed through language and discourse in politics, the media and popular culture. In turn, the ensuing war makes meaning, constitutes and reinforces identities for the self and Other (Heath-Kelly, 2016). For example, the war on terror served to secure “Western” state identities “as righteous and legitimate against the threat of the barbarous other” (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 139). In other words, this war not only shapes our understanding of the world and international relations, but also reinforces certain identities and power structures. These studies show us that language matters in two ways. First, it makes certain policies (il)logical and second, language enables political elites to silence alternative discourses, consolidate power and identity, and manufacture consent for particular policies by packaging it in particular ways (Croft, 2006; Holland, 2016, 2013b). Tsui’s (2017) study employing a Foucauldian genealogical approach further shows that the language of the US-led war on terror and its discourses were not revolutionised by George

---

34 Studies informed by a naive realism position, for example, approach ‘radicalisation’ and its related concepts as objective, thus use qualitative and quantitative methods to examine variables that increase or decrease youth’s susceptibility to radicalisation and recruitment (see Botha, 2014; Rink and Sharma, 2018).
W. Bush’s administration; rather they can be traced back to US counterterrorism policy from Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton and through to George W. Bush’s administration. Similarly, Alice Martini’s *The UN and Counter-terrorism: Global Hegemonies, Power and Identities* (2021) analyses the evolution of UN Security Council’s actions against counterterrorism and extremism. Martini using a genealogical approach shows that the Council’s definition of international terrorism and how this construction evolves is shaped by the Council’s establishment of legal practices and bodies, as well as by the discourses of its members. Thus Martinis’ study provides valuable insights on the development of global counterterrorism efforts and the role of power relations in shaping those efforts. Taken together, these studies contribute by showing how discourses of terrorism and counterterrorism and the language of the war on terror can be contextualised in distinct sites with different political cultures.

Seminal studies adopting this ontological position have also focussed on ‘radicalisation’ and counter radicalisation. Specifically, the idea that terrorism can be “preempted through the production of anticipatory ‘knowledge’” has shifted a focus on vulnerable populations i.e. Muslims and young people worldwide “constructing a matrix whereby the risk posed by individuals could be quantified through the assessment of ‘radicalisation’ indicators” (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 150). Studies have analysed the implementation of counter radicalisation interventions arguing that not only are they embedded in orientalist tropes (Khalid, 2011; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Brown and Saeed, 2015; Martin, 2015; Brown, 2020b) but also the very logic of the ‘radicalisation’ concept lacks empirical basis and predictive power (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Richards, 2011; Kundnani, 2012, 2015). Counter radicalisation policies thus, become policies that are not “responding to knowledge about transitions to terrorism” but as “creating and performing that ‘knowledge’ – creating circular justification for its own subsequent interventions” (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 152). These studies, therefore, also highlight the social construction of terrorism and how it functions to enable passing new laws, extending surveillance (Kundnani, 2009; Jarvis and Lister, 2013; Elshimi, 2015; Ragazzi, 2015), constituting identities and legitimating pre-emptive action (Amoore and De Goede, 2008a; De Goede, 2008; Heath-Kelly, 2013, 2016).

Adopting this ontological position derives from the gaps identified in the existing literature (as discussed in the previous section) whereby research continues to produce knowledge that has been used to develop risk-indicator models/early warning signs of ‘radicalisation’ and to develop and implement PCVE intervention frameworks without problematising the role of language and the politics of terrorism (Jackson, 2005; Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b). Thus while studies focussing on western contexts have systematically engaged with the politics of terrorism, the situation in the global South and particularly in regions such as the East and Horn of Africa—where extremists groups operate—requires
a more robust engagement. Moreso because several scholarly reviews have shown how an understanding of terrorism locally continues to be informed by international discourses (see Dowd, 2016; Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023). Consequently, resulting in PCVE interventions that are designed and implemented based on western interests rather than local needs (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). Not only does this extend imperial control by western powers and perpetuate eurocentric views as universal. But it also reproduces contested knowledge claims and ignores and underplays “specificity, context, history, and nuance” (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b, p. 222). Therefore, critiquing, interrogating and problematising the deployment of ‘radicalisation’ and its meaning in institutionalised, public and semi-private spaces will allow us to first, understand the local social constructions of ‘radicalisation’, their convergences and divergences from mainstream universal knowledge systems and their functionality not just for security but for politics too. Such an examination will open up opportunities for scholars and practitioners alike to rethink the ways we understand ‘radicalisation’ and political violence in general.

Second, adopting this ontological position allows for the analysis of voices which may be silenced by mainstream universal knowledge systems or dominant discourses (Zulaika, 2016; Gunning, 2007a). For example, it is common practice that those labelled “terrorists” or even those who are targets of counterterrorism are rarely afforded the platform to have their voices and opinions heard (see, for example Toros, 2012; Breen-Smyth, 2014). The situation is even dire for young people who are intersectionally disadvantaged. While they disproportionately remain the primary targets of counterterrorism and beneficiaries of PCVE, often their voices are silenced. In the same way that ways of seeing, understanding and explaining social reality have been silenced by the epistemological traditions of the West, and this has constrained intellectual life, starved scholar-ship of richness and complexity, and made it more difficult to conceive of and embrace alternatives that lie beyond the canon of Western epistemologies (Dawson, 2019, p. 75).

Young people and grassroots ways of seeing, understanding and explaining social reality have been silenced by elite voices and those who speak on their behalf because young people are not considered mature, wise and experienced enough or as Mac Ginty (2015, p. 841) puts it the “local” is seen as either “static” or undeveloped, “rural, traditional”, “incapable” or simply uncivilised enough to understand and articulate their situations. Adopting this ontology not only helps to interrogate claims in dominant knowledge but also affords silenced voices—young people and grassroot groups—a platform to engage with knowledge about their own realities. In other words, it lets the subaltern speak because they know more about their own situations. Thus this thesis responds to CTS calls for research that prioritises “specificity, context, history, and nuance” (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b, p. 222).
In addition to a discursive ontology, CTS adopts a critical reflexivity epistemology to understand how the world works. Epistemologically CTS adheres to several commitments. First, CTS acknowledges that the process that contributes to the creation, consumption and dissemination of knowledge is a social process and that power dynamics and subjectivity influence the research process (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009a). In other words, there is no neutral or objective knowledge about terrorism; rather the research process is shaped by ideological, ethical-political dimension (Toros and Gunning, 2009).

Raphael’s (2009, p. 51)\(^{35}\) analysis of the US in the global South, for instance, shows that “in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South” mainstream literature has replicated claims advanced by “official US government analyses”. This replication has occurred by a continuous and unquestioning dependence on particular US government sources, coupled with frequent deployment of unverified claims (Ibid). This is noteworthy because official analyses have been exposed for presenting a politically-driven interpretation of terrorism (Ibid). Thus, taking a critical reflexivity epistemology means analysing how local constructions of ‘radicalisation’ are created. It also implies “being aware of and transparent” about my own values and standpoints as a researcher (see more in chapter three–reflexivity section) and how they shape the research process and research outcomes and how those might relate to the local and wider interests of society (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b, p. 222; Dixit and Stump, 2011).

Second, CTS epistemological position acknowledges a link between knowledge and power (Holland, 2016). Critical scholarship has, for instance, shown that specific constructions of terrorism and counterterrorism have enabled the passing of new laws which would otherwise be deemed unconventional, justified extending surveillance, and constituted certain identities as “at risk” and “risky” thus legitimating pre-emptive action (Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015)\(^{36}\). Thus there is a need to analyse the construction of ‘radicalisation’ to expose the relations of power that shape and legitimate dominant discourses and young people’s constructed identities. Understanding these relations of power and how they work is crucial for: exposing the contextual dimensions that are often neglected in favour of dominant knowledge—often eurocentric perspectives (Blakeley, 2007; Raphael, 2009; Oando, 2022), understanding geo-politics, and the reproduction of the status quo (Toros and Gunning, 2009).

Often, analysing social constructions flows from the idea that discourse and language do not mirror or describe the world but script, create and construct it (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

---

\(^{35}\) Also see Ranstorp (2009) for an extended account on the research practices when engaging with official sources.

To describe an event such as the Garissa University College attack by al-Shabaab, the kidnapping of schoolgirls in Nigeria by Boko Haram, the beheadings by ISIS, or the Christchurch Mosque attack in New Zealand we choose words that accurately help us to build up the event in what we understand it to be. Hence, in these examples, we know what we mean when we speak or read of attacks, kidnappings, and beheadings. Holland (2016, p. 429) adds that “a discourse occurs where language produces the meaning of things in a fairly systematic, regular, and predictable way”. For instance, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, dominant discourses suggested that the attacks were an act of war and we can only defeat al-Qaeda by launching a war on terrorism, hence the counterterrorism campaigns were essentially described as just wars (Jackson, 2005; Erjavec and Volčič, 2007; Hodges, 2011).

Similarly, al-Qaeda and other individuals—such as Saddam Hussein were described as tyrants, mad, evil, savages and animals (Lakoff, 2001, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Holland, 2013b, 2013a). Holland (2016, p. 430) contends describing and interpreting these events differently was difficult, “because the language used to talk about them [sic] was so pervasive, resonant, and dominant”. An analysis on language and discourse is thus important for challenging dominant discourses. To achieve this, CTS scholars have used various methodologies including critical discourse analysis (CDA) which draws its inspiration from philosophers such as Ferdinand de Saussure, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida among others. Owing to the works of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, CDA has developed theoretically and methodologically to analyse power, ideology and critique (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Wodak, 2001c). Like CTS, CDA is founded on a critical orientation and pursues an emancipatory objective of exposing the ways in which language use reinforces existing power structures, with an aim to identify ways in which language use can be transformed to challenge relations of domination (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

In CTS scholarship, CDA has been used to study the discursive construction of terrorism and counterterrorism. Shepherd (2006) used CDA to explore the construction of gender in US discourses on counterterrorism. Revealing that the Bush administration constructed and perpetuated the gendered identity: of the enemy as “an irrational barbarian” and an “irrational dreamer”; of the nation as “the greatest force for good in world history”, and ‘a great nation’; and of the intervention as “a queer war” and “a noble cause” (Shepherd, 2006, pp. 21–32). These representations produced a narrative that not only resonated with the prior masculinisation of US identity but was also seen as a legitimate narrative of war. Shepherd’s analysis also reveals that within the discursive construction of identity post-

37 See Jackson (2005, 2007) work which I have reviewed throughout this chapter.
9/11, US’s economic concerns were marginalised; hence, the tensions created by this marginalisation can be used “as a critical tool” to challenge “gendered constructions that were represented as seamless at the time” (Shepherd, 2006, p. 21). Holland (2016, p. 432) aptly summarises that methodologically, using a CDA approach together with CTS helps “to reveal the construction of terrorism and counterterrorism in order to challenge and resist their oppressive effects, with a view to realising a space to think and speak in less dangerous and oppressive ways”.

Following from these ontological, epistemological and methodological positions is CTS’ normative commitment to emancipatory progress—also shared by CDA (Jackson et al., 2011). CTS’ research is committed to challenging: dominant discourses (as evidenced by the in-depth review of literature in this chapter) which deconstruct normative assumptions about terrorism and counterterrorism, how orthodox approaches are primarily concerned with national security while ignoring state terrorism, human and societal security thus reproducing the status quo (Toros and Gunning, 2009; Jackson, Murphy and Poynting, 2010; Blakeley and Raphael, 2016; Raphael and Blakeley, 2016). CTS’ emancipatory agenda has also focused on highlighting and addressing the conditions that can be seen to “impel actors to resort to terrorist tactics” (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b, p. 224; Toros and Gunning, 2009; Gunning, 2007a). More generally, CTS commits to responsible research ethics. Not in the least adopting a do no harm approach to research, particularly in cases where the research focuses on groups commonly labelled as terrorists/radicals or dangerous; being clear and open about the researchers’ goals and values; keeping interviewee information confidential and obtaining informed consent from participants (Toros and Gunning, 2009). But also considering the potential impact the research may have and how it could be used in society, especially in cases where the research could have negative consequences for certain groups of people (Ibid).

In summary, this chapter builds on the background of this study outlined in the introduction. This chapter has reviewed existing research highlighting the fundamental areas of debate on ‘radicalisation’ and extremism, which primarily include definitional issues, the role of religion, the radical milieu, the role of gender in political violence and terrorism, ‘radicalisation’ settings and the responses to ‘radicalisation’ also widely classified as PCVE strategies. This chapter has also identified the problems with these debates which include their failure to treat the ‘youth’ category with the same criticality as has been afforded to gender. My research proposes nuancing the concept of youth to understand emerging discourses on ‘radicalisation’. This is especially relevant in the context of Kenya where youth is an expandable category, as shown in the introduction. Thus my research proposes to combine CTS and CDA to theorise ‘radicalisation’ as a discourse in order to expose the
discursive practices used by institutions, organisations, and actors to shape our understanding of a social issue such as ‘radicalisation’. Taking this position will create opportunities for critically exploring what is known about ‘radicalisation’, who produces this knowledge, how this knowledge is produced and legitimated, how this knowledge constructs identities for young people and what this means for PCVE. Having provided the backdrop for this study, the following chapter discusses and explains the theoretical underpinnings and methodological considerations applied to this study.
Chapter 2. Methodology

This project looks at the ways in which ‘radicalisation’ is spoken of in Kenya and with what effects. It questions how power, knowledge and discourse are intertwined by analysing ‘radicalisation’. Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Terrorism Studies lenses act as broader theoretical frameworks for this project. Van Dijk’s work on the (re)production of stereotypes and prejudices, and Wodak’s work on discrimination, identities, gender and institutions, shows that to understand how discourses constitute identities, it is essential to start by looking at how common assumptions are semiotically realised. In this sense, this project reflects on the different voices in preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) to understand how meaning is realised and how identities are constituted within this process. My interest in this area arose from experience of working and interacting with young people, and an interest in finding out how policies and programs for PCVE work. Research to date has largely focused on these young people in terms of their age, gender, educational background, class, religion and their propensity to violence while at the same time accentuating their inadequacies without acknowledging the way the construction of their violence, and youthfulness affects their daily lives. Taking this position, I was inspired by Mwangi’s (2017, 2019, 2018b) reading of counterterrorism in Kenya as a weapon of power for shaping politics and populations. Further, Bachmann and Hönke’s (2010), interpretation of counterterrorism as a form of liberal intervention that has been used in the global South to protect the homeland. My own research differs from Mwangi’s which fails to adequately situate terrorism and its related processes in its historical context. Mwangi’s work highlights how violent counterterrorism has been used to target the Somali community, but it only evaluates this practice and its consequences in contemporary times, for lack of a better word in the age of the GWOT. However, there is lengthy literature by historians and conflict researchers that shows that scapegoating Somalis as well as other minorities such as Muslims—Kenya, has been part of Kenya’s state building project (see Schlee, 1989; Sheikh, 2007; H. Whittaker, 2008, 2012; Lochery, 2012; Anderson, 2014; Mohamed, 2022). Similarly, a newly published study by Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala (2023) examines the social and cultural meanings attached to violent extremism. But this research too, pays less attention to how these meanings developed at different historical junctures and what those developments mean in terms of how ideas about violent extremism continually change and transform. To understand what ‘radicalisation’ is, today, and how it is often and easily conflated with Somali and Muslim identities and connected to the spaces they inhabit it is crucial to situate ‘radicalisation’ within the political, contextual and historical conditions where certain narratives exist and violence comes to be seen as a legitimate means to bring about social change (Kundnani, 2012, 2015). This historicising will help us to understand why and how dominant knowledge is structured and locally translated, accepted and/or
resisted. This way of thinking about counterterrorism has served as a backdrop to probe beneath the surface of PCVE programs working with youth to interrogate the silences and assumptions they are founded on. Therefore, I am undertaking this research in search of an alternative perspective that could resist dominant constructions, which in discourse theory terms passes as a form of resistance.

This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the methodological considerations. It is divided into nine sections. The first section reflects on the Critical Discourse Analysis approach as the main theoretical lens informing this study. It highlights how ‘radicalisation’ can be theorised as a discourse by using CDA thus opening opportunities for critically exploring what is known about it, who produces this knowledge, how it is produced and legitimated, and how it constructs identities for young people and what this means for PCVE. The second reviews the analytical tools utilised in this project and explains why they were selected. The third details how Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional model, Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network (SAN) and Legitimation Frameworks were applied. The fourth explains the type of data gathered, why the data was selected, and how the data was accessed. The fifth section reflects on the process of transcribing and translating the data while the sixth reflects on my positionality and situatedness and how it shaped the research process. The seventh section outlines the way the various data was analysed in NVivo. The eighth section unpacks the limitations of this study and what this means when we look at the findings. Finally, I conclude the chapter by summarising the main levels of analysis that the next five empirical chapters will focus on.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a theoretical and methodological approach for examining “the relations between discourse and other aspects of social life” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2018, p. 1). The CDA label describes Fairclough's (1992) analytical framework. Also, it denotes a broader movement consisting of approaches committed to analysing discourse and its relations to ideologies, institutions, social identities, and other social elements (Fairclough, 2012). CDA originates in applied linguistics, with its key proponents being Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak and Theo van Leeuwen. CDA arose out of dissatisfaction with purely linguistic approaches which failed to comprehensively theorise the link between language, power and ideology (Machin and Mayr, 2012). To overcome this shortcoming, CDA incorporates a sociocultural analysis as one of its theoretical and analytical dimensions. This dimension allows the analysis to focus on textual processes and their relationship to social processes. Thus making CDA a relational approach (Fairclough, 2013).
CDA is also *problem or issue-oriented* because it investigates “real issues and problems of today’s worlds” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 280). Research applying CDA covers diverse areas including mass communication and racism (see Van Dijk, 1991; Wodak and Matouschek, 1993; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Richardson, 2017), political communication and racism (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), political communication, nationalism and identity (Wodak *et al.*, 2009; Krzyżanowski, 2010), the spread of knowledge based economies or markets practices (Fairclough, 1993), and political and mass communication and terrorism (Jackson, 2005; Spencer, 2010; Tsui, 2017). This diversity indicates CDA’s transdisciplinarity. CDA combines theories, concepts, and analytical tools from various disciplines to understand the role of language in “constituting and transmitting knowledge”, “organising social institutions”, and “exercising power” (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 7).

CDA’s ability to relate “discourse and other aspects of social life” is facilitated by its theorising of language and discourse which can be understood by focusing on its five basic principles (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2018, p. 1). First, CDA approaches “discursive practices as an important form of social practice which contributes to the constitution of the social world including social identities and social relations” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 61). In other words, the practices through which texts are created, received and interpreted contribute to our perception of the world around us, including how we relate to others and the identities we construct for ourselves and others. Similarly, it is partly through these discursive practices that cultures and society are reproduced and transformed, including power relations. For example, through news production processes, we learn the values that define us and the acceptable ways of acting. Hence, CDA highlights “the discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena” (Ibid, p. 61). Accordingly, discursive practices can be examined by studying discourses which consist of written and spoken language and visual images (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

Second, CDA sees discourse as “linguistic social practices” that constitute and are constituted by “non-discursive and discursive social practices” (Wodak, 2001, p. 66). Meaning discursive and non-discursive events are in a dialectical relationship. CDA assumes discourse shapes, situations, worldviews, social identities, and relations between people and groups of people, hence reproducing and sustaining the status quo. Simultaneously, these elements also shape discourse thus contributing to its transformation. A fitting example is the evolution of terrorism from its first use in the French Revolution to contemporary times. The conceptualisation of terrorism and the representation and self-representation of the ‘terrorist’ label has been reproduced and transformed. Due to situations, e.g. the struggle for autonomy, redistribution and equality politics, and politics of cultural hegemony; institutions including the media, governments,
legal systems; and *social structures* such as gender, sex, religion, ethnicity, race, nationality and class that inform it.

Third, CDA adds that discourse (e.g. terrorism) should be empirically analysed within its social context. A textual analysis should relate the text to the socio-historical context it was produced (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Meaning, analysing the conceptualisation of terrorism should consider the social, political, psychological, and ideological components of context. Through such considerations, we can expose how specific ways of looking at terrorism reproduce unequal power relations based on religion, race, culture, age, and gender through how people are represented and positioned.

From the above, CDA’s fourth feature follows from the premise that discursive practices contribute to creating and reproducing unequal relations of power between social groups (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Relations between social groups are not purely about the majority exerting power over others, but they also involve the minority contesting subjugation. Understanding power relations this way flows from a theorisation of *power* as “a systemic and constitutive element/characteristic of society” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 9). Here, power is embedded in practices and institutions. Thus analysing power entails understanding discursive practices of e.g. news production, policymaking and how they further the interests of certain social groups. To study power, I approached text as “sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance” (Ibid, p. 10).

Power relations are thus understood in *ideological* terms. Where ideology refers to the naturalisation of meanings to sustain social relations. This view of ideology departs from the common conceptions of ideology as “coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values”; instead, CDA is interested in “the more hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies” (Ibid, p. 8). As such, ideologies appear as the commonly shared ideas about an issue. While such ideas may claim ‘neutrality’, they may be used to further the interests of certain social groups. Hence, it is important to question the functioning of ideologies to understand the (re)production of existing inequalities. CDA, therefore, analyses both the discursive practises that inform certain worldviews, construct identities and social relations, as well as the function of these discursive practises in maintaining the status quo. Revealing how discursive practices maintain unequal power relations can contribute to social change by challenging communication processes and practices.

Fifth, CDA achieves the above goal by adopting a critical stance. CDA positions itself on the side of subordinated groups and uses the concept of *critique* to question prevailing
arguments, actions, and taken-for-granted hegemonic identity narratives. Thus, while maintaining scientific rigour, CDA performs an emancipatory agenda by destabilising the existing social order through critique hence contributing to social change.

In summary, CDA engages in comprehensive analysis of language in use. It utilises concretely developed theoretical methods, specific techniques for textual analysis, social theories and methodological guidelines that relate linguistic analyses to social processes. This is important because “texts are often sites of social struggle” (Wodak, 2001, p. 89). On the part of the producers of texts, texts are instruments used to produce dominant groups' ideologies and legitimise actions by limiting how their recipients can interpret them. Whereas on the part of the recipients, texts make familiar arguments, and ideas appear objective and commonsensical. CDA analysts, thus revisit simplistic and one-sided narratives, with an aim of using the results to bring about social change. This study applied analytical tools from three CDA approaches: Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional model, and Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network (SAN) and Legitimation Frameworks. The following sections review these models independently, highlighting their major components and contributions.

Analytical Tools

Fairclough’s Three-dimensional framework

Fairclough (1992) lays out the three-dimensional model in his book Discourse and Social Change. This model is a guide for analysing discourse and it is founded on the premise that to fully understand what discourse is, and how discourse functions, “analysis need to draw out the form and function of the text, the way the text relates to the way it is produced and consumed, and the relation of this to the wider society in which it takes place” (Richardson, 2007, p. 37). In other words, there are three interrelated dimensions of discourse: a) discourse as text, b) discourse as a discursive practice, and c) discourse as a social practice. At the level of discourse as text, the analysis focuses on textual features. Looking at how the text is structured in terms of vocabulary and grammar choices, cohesion and text structure. Accordingly, Fairclough’s (1992) model which is inspired by Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics advances that analysing linguistic features can expose the role of discourse in constructing: social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning.

The level of discourse as discursive practice focuses on the processes of text production, interpretation and consumption. Discursive practices are institutional practices, which in the press include newsgathering, processing, editing, publishing and storing/archiving procedures (Richardson, 2007). Wodak (2001, p. 73) adds that discursive practices are
located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity and are often deployed in the text “to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim”. Hence, they can include naming or referential strategies, predication, and argumentation. At this level, the analysis examines how authors draw on existing genres and discourses to create text and how text receivers apply available discourses and genres to consume and interpret texts (Fairclough, 1992).

The level of discourse as social practices examines ideological consequences of discourse. Analysis explores how discourses are distributed and regulated across texts, what consequences or impacts the texts can have on social relations, and how the text will foster or alleviate inequalities. These different dimensions of analysis correspond to three research procedures. The level of discourse as text mostly involves detailed descriptions of textual features; the level of discursive practice focuses on interpretation; and the level of social practice on explanation. While the framework presents the dimensions as separate entities (see figure. 2.1), actual analysis always overlaps and oscillates.

![Figure 2.1 - Dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000, p.152) (based on Fairclough 1992a, p.73)](image)

The three-dimensional model provides a rich analytical framework for examining the relationship between language use and societal practices. However, most studies using this framework including Fairclough’s own work only analyses a small sample of texts (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Using small samples affects the representativeness of the findings; making them more anecdotal (Stubbs, 1997; Verschueren, 2001). Precisely, critics argue that by relying on small samples of text too often CDA allows researchers to uncover what they want or expect to find (Widdowson, 1998, 2004). One way of overcoming this limitation is by expanding the range and domains of texts being analysed. For this study, aiming to understand ‘radicalisation’ the corpora was designed to include a variety of texts—
policy documents, presidential speeches and statements, news articles, and interview transcripts—produced in different domains over a period of time. A diverse corpora allows for a rigorous relational approach to text analysis (see for example Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Van Dijk, 2006) which in turn results in rich and textured conclusions.

Also, Fairclough’s model is often restricted to textual analysis and overlooks text production and consumption processes besides underscoring their importance (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This limitation stems from a strict conceptualisation of discursive practices. If discursive practices, as in this study, are theorised as located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity and being “more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices” that are deployed in texts “to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” (Wodak, 2001, p. 73). Then analysis, especially of diverse data can focus on how, for instance, referential and legitimation strategies are used to advance certain meanings. These strategies, as studies by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Van Leeuwen (2003, 2008) have shown, form part of the processes of production, consumption, and interpretation of text. Thus examining them in conjunction with textual features could shed some insight into how they contribute towards the intended meaning of ‘radicalisation’ and how such meaning is linked to ideology.

Generally, CDA analysts are accused of projecting their own biases into the research (Schegloff, 1999 as cited in Blommaert, 2005). CDA does not claim neutrality; rather it traces its roots in critical theory thus openly presents itself as socially and politically oriented. CDA, as an interpretative methodology, acknowledges that the researcher’s personal experience and identities impact the research process. Hence, the researcher reflexively engages with their positionality and values throughout the research process.

For this study, CDA and particularly Fairclough’s approach was limited in its conceptualisation of context. Fairclough emphasises the need to pay attention to context—the processes of text production, distribution and consumption—within which discourse is embedded (Fairclough, 1992). The said social context can encompass the situational context of language use, the institutional and the wider social contexts (Ibid). Fairclough’s work is grounded in text production—and indepthly assess’ the verbal context by focussing on textual relations. But due to its inadequate theory of how texts operate in social contexts the audience’s reception of texts is often assumed based on the researcher’s interpretation of the text (Widdowson, 1998; Breeze, 2011). Resulting in overly simplistic assumptions about how language in use is connected to social reproduction (Breeze, 2011). Van Dijk (1991, 2016) attempts to overcome this by emphasising the social cognitive dimension of context. Using this framework, Van Dijk’s analysis attempts to understand discourse by analysing the cognitive structures that mediate social and discursive practices. Such a
conceptualisation, however, is only possible if power is conceived as oppressive (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), which in itself forecloses any possibilities for resistance and discourse change.

For my study, using Fairclough’s approach alone risked overlooking the social relations within which texts come into being. Drawing inspiration from Wodak’s (2001) approach, I included other ethnographic methodologies that would allow me to take into account this dimension of analysis. This included obtaining qualitative data through interviews and focus groups thus allowing “a more thorough inclusion of context and its exploration via fieldwork and ethnography” (Krzyżanowski, 2011, p. 233). In other words, ethnographic methodologies are necessary for providing context to the data and gaining an insider’s perspective of how, why, and which discourses are adapted in particular ways across different spaces and time.

I must caution that ethnographic methodologies do not provide all answers relating to criticism levelled against context (for more debates see Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). Rather their inclusion is important to mitigate some of the shortcomings which have been caused by a “preoccupation of texts as the only objects of CDA-based or CDA-inspired examinations” (Krzyżanowski, 2011, p. 233). For example, in chapter three of this thesis the analysis starts by focusing on policy documents to identify the construction of ‘radicalisation’ and the identities it constitutes. Then, in chapters four and five, the analysis proceeds to analyse presidential speeches and statements and news reports showing that some of the discourses identified in policy texts are reproduced in political and popular discourses. These chapters argue that discourses are influenced by elite actors in the society. To a great detail, these chapters also show that the context in which language is used is created both through the language itself and through the specific interaction or situation in which it is used. This detail is important when we think of how the relationship between ‘radicalisation’ and cultural relations is tackled in the presidential speeches and news reports. Both texts espouse this discourse, however, the former places greater emphasis on the role of opportunistic elites—particularly during election years, and when the social event is targeted towards local audiences, whereas the latter emphasises religious elites and familial relations. The analysis also shows that these texts are connected by intertextual relations; a detail which would have been missed had the analysis only focussed on one type of text.

Further, in chapter six and seven, I augment the analysis from the previous chapters by data obtained from interviewing CSOs and focus groups with young people—as the targets of PCVE policy implementation. These chapters help to show “the interplay between concrete actions and group-or society-level forces and patterns” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 61
In other words, the interviews and focus groups show discourse in action by illuminating first, the extent to which the categories identified in chapters three to five are exemplified by CSOs and young people. Here, my study shows that dominant discourses on ‘radicalisation’ are naturalised by (c)overt argumentation—evaluative adjectives and analogies—patterns. Second, the ethnographic data also shows how salient categories are created through social interaction in one-to-one and group settings. Meaning is, thus, negotiated by how participants position themselves and others (Kitzinger, 1994; Smithson, 2000). Thus, using ethnographic methodologies gives insight on how discourses on contentious issues are transformed in semi-public and private settings and situations (Kitzinger, 1994; Temple, 1998). Concurrently, by triangulating ethnographic data with data from institutional texts—policies, presidential speeches and news reports—this thesis shows how macro and micro discourses are connected. However, substantiating these findings was only made possible by combining Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach with Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network (SAN) and Legitimation Frameworks. Together, this analytical framework allows for a multi-layered approach to discourse and its relation to society. In the next part, I will outline Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network and Legitimation Frameworks as the complementary tools I used.

**Social Actor Network (SAN)**

Following from the conceptualisation of discursive practices as encompassing referential/representational strategies, this study adopted Van Leeuwen’s (2003) Social Actor Network (SAN) framework. SAN is an analytical framework for examining how social actors (participants of social practices) are represented in discourse. SAN is premised on the assumption that representations are embedded with ideologies (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Thus, analysing representations reveals the ideologies at play and how power relations and inequalities are maintained (Van Leeuwen, 2003).

SAN draws on several socio-semantic categories (see figure 2.2) and argues that social actors can be excluded or included in discourse. *Exclusion* occurs when social actors are left out in the representation, and it can take two forms. Social actors can be excluded through suppression or backgrounding. *Suppression* occurs when social actors are entirely left out in the text, whereas *backgrounding* deemphasises the social actors or pushes them to the background. In backgrounding, “the excluded social actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given action, but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text, and we can infer with reasonable (though never total) certainty who they are” (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 29). Inclusion can take many forms. Van Leeuwen (2008) differentiates between *genericisation* and *specification*. The former occurs when social actors are referred to generically, i.e. they
are represented as a class of actors, for instance, through words such as people or individuals.

In the latter, social actors are represented as identifiable individuals through assimilation or individualisation. In assimilation social actors are referred to as groups. Assimilation can be realised through aggregation and collectivisation. Aggregation quantifies social actors and treats them as statistics (e.g. a dozen of youth), whereas collectivisation organises them through real or imaginary shared traits (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Collectivisation can be realised for example through terms such as ‘Kenya’, ‘this nation’, and ‘the community’.

Social actors can also be determinated or indeterminated. Indetermined social actors are “unspecified” or represented as “anonymous individual or groups”, whereas determinated social actors’ identity is “one way or another specified” (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 39). Indetermination is often realised through indefinite pronouns such as “somebody,” “someone,” “some,” “some people” or through aggregation such as “many agree…” or “some may…”.

Determination can take several forms. First it can occur through differentiation and indifferentiation. In differentiation social actors are explicitly differentiated from each other. This functions to create differences between the “self” and the “other” or between “us” and “them” (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 40). In this study, during the focus groups, participants used differentiation strategies to differentiate between ‘dangerous youth’ and ‘the good youth’.

Figure 2.2 - Social Actor Network (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 52)
Second, determination can be realised through *categorisation* and *nomination*. In nomination social actors are named. The naming can be realised formally by using surnames, semi-formally through combining a given name and a surname and informally by using given names only (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Nominations can also be accompanied by titled—i.e. *titulation*—as in Mr. Mike or not.

In categorisation, social actors can be *functionalised* i.e. when they are represented in terms of the roles and functions they play for instance, leader, worker, and teacher among others. Or they can be categorised through *identification*. Identification can take three forms. Social actors can be *classified* according to the major categories used by society to differentiate groups of people (Van Leeuwen, 2008). These categories can include gender, sex, religion, nationality, age, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity and race, among others. Identification can also be *relational*. Here, social actors are represented “in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations to each other” (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 43). Relational identification can be realised through nouns indicating relations, for example, mother or uncle. Or by using possessive pronouns with these nouns, for example, her mother or his uncle, among others.

The categories reviewed so far are mostly sociological categories of representation and these will be the focus of this study. I chose Van Leeuwen’s SAN because during the initial reading phase I had noted the data differentiated young people. Thus, an actor analysis approach was needed to unpack further how such constructions and representations are realised to advance a certain way of knowing about ‘radicalisation’ while marginalising others. Also, an actor analysis approach could expose the functions these representations play in influencing how we perceive young people and the PCVE policy priorities. In addition, this framework can be applied to diverse sources of data.

So far, I have outlined the three-dimensional model and SAN and how they can be used to analyse emerging discourses and how they characterise young people. However, another framework is required to analyse how such discourses and ways of naming are legitimated. I employed Van Leeuwen’s legitimation framework to unpack this.

*Legitimation Framework*

Van Leeuwen (2007) advances that the analysis of legitimation allows us to see not just what social actors are saying but rather who and how they are explaining and justifying the arguments they advance. This framework is premised on the assumption that events gain meaning through discourse. And that the processes of meaning-making involve several strategies, one of which is legitimation. Legitimation is “the process by which speakers accredit or license a type of social behavior” (Reyes, 2011, p. 782). This process is enacted
by argumentation. Reyes (2011, p. 782) contends that legitimation involves “providing arguments that explain our social actions, ideas, thoughts, declarations” to achieve a certain goal. Accordingly, the goal could be to seek support or approval (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 92). Reyes (2011, p. 782) adds that “this search for approval can be motivated by different reasons: to obtain or maintain power, to achieve social acceptance, to improve community relationships, to reach popularity or fame, etc.” Legitimation thus “adds the answer, sometimes explicitly, sometimes more obliquely, to the question ‘why’—‘why should we do this?’ and ‘why should we do this in this way?’” (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 93). Van Leeuwen outlines four major categories of legitimation: authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and mythopoesis.

In this study I focus on legitimation by authorisation and moral evaluation. The reason for focusing on these two strategies is partly logistical; identifying these strategies in the text did not require advanced specialist knowledge or skills in linguistics. Rather they required knowledge on institutional practices and cultural knowledge of the research context. Institutional knowledge concerns having insight about, e.g. practices of news production which relies on certain conventions about sourcing and news processing. Cultural knowledge is knowledge about the local context for example, the shared values and organisation of social relations. Having lived and worked in the research context, I possess skills and knowledge on institutional practices and cultural knowledge, which came in handy when analysing legitimation strategies.

I also focused on these two strategies because they are often used in everyday interaction and especially in discourses on terrorism. However, they are deeply ingrained and often treated as common-sense or understandings or intelligible ways of doing things (for instance, citing sources in the press or supporting claims by citing experts/the law). It is precisely because they are taken-for-granted that they should be the focus of the analysis. Analysing them will expose how they naturalise certain ways of understanding ‘radicalisation’ and not others.

Accordingly, authorisation answers the “‘why’ questions—‘Why should we do this?’ or “Why should we do this in this way?’” (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 94). This question can be answered by: “because so-and-so says so”, because the law says so or because ‘I’ say so, where the so-and-so or ‘I’ is someone or an institution “in whom some kind of authority is vested” (Ibid, p. 94). In other words, authorisation is justification by referencing or drawing from different institutions or individuals in whom authority is vested. There are various forms of authorisation. Personal authority is when legitimisation is sort by referencing persons with institutional authority or institutions with authority. For example, referencing the minister of a government department or the ministry itself is a form of personal authority. Authority can
also be impersonal which is achieved when we cite law, rules and regulations. Authority can also be based on expertise; here, we reference the credentials of people to support our position.

Other forms of authority are role model, tradition and authority of conformity. In the case of role model authority, social practices are regulated by charismatic leaders or individuals, and it is a common form of legitimation in advertising. In authority of tradition, justifications are made based on tradition. Hence, the answer to the question, why should we do this? Is because “this is what we always do” (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 108). In authority of conformity, social practices are regulated by what others do. Hence the answer to the question “why should we do this?” is because “that’s what everybody else does” or “because that’s what most people do” (Ibid, p. 109).

The second form of legitimation that I focus on is moral evaluation. In moral evaluation legitimation is achieved by referring to value systems (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Social practices are regulated not by authority but by moral values. This form of legitimation can be directly invoked through evaluative adjectives and/or analogies. Accordingly, Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 99) asserts that here the answer to the question:

‘Why must I do this?’ or ‘Why must I do this in this way?’ is not ‘because it is good,’ but ‘because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values’ (or, in the case of negative comparison, ‘because it is not like another activity which is associated with negative values’).

Sometimes analogies are realised directly through similarity conjunctions or circumstances of comparison. However, analogies can also be realised through narratives of comparison, which are small stories structured as narratives (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Notably, analogies often describe an activity belonging in one social practice in terms of another, thus transferring the values attached in the first activity to the second one (Ibid). Often to justify or critique a social practice. Van Leeuwen’s Legitimation framework was most suited for understanding how language functions ideologically. It offered a practical and accessible method of tracing how texts explain, (de)legitimise, and critique ‘radicalisation’ to control how we view it, what meaning we ascribe to it and underline specific counterterrorism and PCVE courses of action. Having outlined the different analytical tools used in this study and why they were selected, the next section describes how these tools were utilised for data analysis.
Applying Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional model, Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network and Legitimation Frameworks

My analysis focused on three levels: the level of the text, discursive practice and social practice. At the level of the text, the analysis focused on linguistic features, mainly vocabulary and grammar. On vocabulary, I looked at how individual words were used and how words were combined to form sentences and clauses. The main aim here was to identify how discourses were linguistically realised and how these discourses, for instance, represented and characterised youth actors through their word choices.

At the level of discursive practices, the analysis examined two types of argumentation strategies: referential and legitimation strategies. I examined these strategies using Van Leeuwen’s SANs and legitimation frameworks. On referential strategies, this study analysed how youth social actors were named. This involved unpacking what aspects about youth social actors were foregrounded and which ones were backgrounded. Hence, I analysed how youth social actors were characterised in terms of the traits, characteristics, qualities and features defining them. The aim of analysing referential strategies was to understand how discourses constitute the social identities of others and ourselves. Analysing discursive practices is based on the premise that “discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 63). Thus by examining how young people are represented and positioned in discourses of ‘radicalisation’ we can understand a) how unequal power relations are (re)produced and b) the role of discursive practices in maintaining unequal power relations. Revealing this could help challenge communication practices and processes.

Other discursive practices analysed at this level were legitimation strategies. Legitimation strategies are a form of argumentation strategy that are persuasively applied to justify, explain, delegitimise and critique social practices. These strategies may be (c)overtly invoked through specific linguistic realisations. This study focused on two legitimation strategies: authorisation and moralisation or moral evaluation. When analysing legitimation strategies, I looked at how arguments were explained, justified or critiqued. Under authorisation, I focused on what type of actors/institutions or legal doctrines were invoked. I queried the data using the following guiding questions:

- Were the arguments being made by figures of authority? If so, what did this form of authorisation achieve?
• Did they cite experts, e.g. academics, analysts, practitioners, reports or statistics? And if so, why were these cited? What value did they add to the argument being advanced?

When analysing moral evaluation, the aim was to understand what value systems were referenced to support the arguments. Here legitimation was realised directly through evaluative adjectives and/or indirectly through analogies. The analysis focused on what adjectives and analogies were used in the data and what they (de)legitimised or critiqued. This was relevant for understanding how culture and society shape how we view events and what meaning we ascribe to them. The final level of analysis—discourse as social practice—looked at the consequences of the discourses emerging from the data. Here I focused on what solutions and policy options the different discourses make possible and what this means for young people.

**Text and Participant Selection**

**Text Selection**

This project draws on different documents. May (2011, pp. 191–192) suggests that, documents "read as the sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily and longer-term basis: they also constitute particular readings of social events". Documents reveal information referring to the periods, the people, the places, the spaces and the social relations. Not just by the information they contain but also by the information, they choose to leave out. In addition, documents are a rich resource for analysis because they enable the researcher and reader to reflectively explain how the use of a document is linked to the present. In discourse analytic terms, documents are not analysed; rather it is texts that are analysed. Here, texts is used to refer to the contents of the document.

This project focuses on both written and spoken text. For written text, I analysed: two policies on Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism; the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE—popular or declassified version) and the Mombasa County Action Plan for CVE. I also analysed 474 online press articles by *Nation Africa* and *The Standard*, and 57 speeches and statements by the 4th president of Kenya—Uhuru Kenyatta published between 01.01.2015 and 31.12.2018. I selected this time period because of increased al-Shabaab recruitment activities and Kenya’s growing counterterrorism architecture, as I have detailed in the introduction and chapter one. From the adoption of PCVE policies, increased local and foreign security operations and donor
interests in PCVE, to the attempts to make PCVE more multisectoral and participatory. Hence, including data for this period is essential for this project.

In terms of spoken data, I analysed 19 interview transcripts derived from semi-structured interviews conducted with PCVE practitioners and two focus groups conducted with 11 young people in Mombasa County, Kenya. In the next subsections, I outline the sampling criteria for the data.

**Box 2.1 - Criteria for inclusion of press articles and presidential speeches**

1. The texts need to mention radical—and/or its variants, i.e. ‘radicalization’ or ‘radicalisation’—and youth/young people or events related to terrorism or ‘extremism’ such as counterterrorism or PCVE policies, programs and/or institutions. These details could be mentioned in either the headline or body of the article.
2. Press articles must mention the above subject in relation to the context of Kenya.
3. Speeches and articles must have been published online between 01/01/2015 and 31/12/2018.

**Policy documents**

Two policies the NSCVE and the MCAP were sampled for this study. These documents were included because they are thematically related to this study by being the only documents entirely dedicated to the PCVE policy domain in Kenya. Thus, they conform to a specific genre of writing; by using a specific tone, format and their aims are also different compared to texts such as speeches. Also, these policy texts are worthy of analysis because they inform different stakeholders of the government’s official position on the issue of ‘terrorism’ and its ensuing practices such as PCVE. This is the principal factor that makes these documents important in studying the conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’, and how to approach it. While these documents are attempting to counter the contemporary challenges of security, they are also drafted and facilitated by political elites—such as members of parliament—and institutions such as NCTC, EU, UNDP. In the process, these documents define the official position of what constitutes ‘radicalisation’, and what is expected of each stakeholder in PCVE. By analysing these texts, my study will help unpack the official boundaries of what constitutes ‘radicalisation’.
Political speeches and statements

Based on the criteria outlined in Box 2.1, I focused on 57 speeches and statements of President Kenyatta. The president's speeches and statements were selected because, first, the president is an authoritative figure whose power stems from his position as the head of state and government. As head of state, the president’s power is best viewed in terms of his control over and access to discourse. The president is well-positioned to shape the direction/interests of his administration and public opinion on different issues. Second, the president is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As the commander-in-chief, the president exercises supreme operational command control of Kenya's defence forces. In addition, the president chairs the National Security Council of Kenya (NSCK)\(^{38}\). As the chair, the president has exclusive access to discourse: access to high-level meetings (international and national), and more so meetings of NSCK which he presides, thus controls the agenda, speech acts, regulates turn allocation, decision-making and topics. In both scenarios, the president’s authority guarantees that his pronouncements cannot be so easily disqualified as fallacies, let alone be criticised more so when they are aligned with the global discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism.

Also, the president through his office has access to the most crucial instruments of governing, such as media resources and administrative organs. With such access, the president can control and influence public opinion and the decision-making processes. In addition, the 4\(^{th}\) administrations ascendency to power is relevant for this project because it has been accompanied by increased incidences of ‘terrorism’ which have led to a rapid growth of Kenya’s counterterrorism architecture. This makes President Kenyatta’s administration a crucial moment in the development of terrorism—interactions with and reactions to ‘Islamic terrorism’, a debate around youth in relation to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, increased financial support from foreign governments for defence and security organs of Kenya, the adoption of PCVE as a growing domain of counterterrorism—and contributes to determining a particular conceptualisation of the threat.

Press articles

I chose online press articles as sources of data because their impact does not just depend on the outlets gross size of readership but also their long-standing reputation of “originality

\(^{38}\) According to Chapter 14 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya the National Security Council is a constitutionally mandated body that exercises supervisory control over national security organs. NSCK also: a) integrates the domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security in order to enable the national security organs to co-operate and function effectively; and assesses and appraises the objectives, commitments and risks to the Republic in respect of actual and potential national security capabilities.
and credibility as news providers” (Nyabuga and Booker, 2013, p. 19). As a result of their perceived credibility, press articles could influence opinions and perceptions on different issues. This makes it important to include press articles in this project. The sample included press articles from two outlets, i.e. Nation Africa39 and The Standard40. These outlets publish both national and regional news, have linked online and print versions that are updated frequently and have the highest levels of readership nationally and regionally (Newman et al., 2020). Regional publications, e.g. Coast observer and Coastweek were not included because they weren’t readily accessible online. On political diversity, Nation Africa is right-leaning, while The Standard is left-leaning (Omanga, 2012). However, these political positions shift depending on the political economy of the media ownership and who is in power. Currently, most shares in Nation Africa and The Standard belong to political elites connected to the government.

The two outlets are distinct and diverse enough to depict varied news coverage reflecting the Kenyan mass media landscape. The outlets publish the most widely read papers in Kenya. They have both print and online publications, therefore, maintaining presence in both offline and online spaces. While the media landscape has been changing, the press remains a relevant source of news consumption in Kenya. Given that many Kenyans now have access to the internet through their mobile phones, Nyabuga and Booker (2013) quoting rankings by the Opera website, affirm that the Nation Africa features 10th, whereas The Standard features 12th as the most accessed new sites. This indicates that people in Kenya rely on online news sources. Data for this project was gathered from the news, opinions, editorial, columns, features, blogs, and commentary sections of online news sites. The sample included the daily as well as weekend editions. Running a keyword search with radical on Nation Africa and The Standard websites returned 343 and 131 news items published between 2015 and 2018 respectively. The data was downloaded in an automated manner directly from the respective news outlets’ websites as HTML files. Then, the title, author, the publication date and the article were extracted from each HTML file and any formatting data was stripped away using a python program. The resulting TXT files were imported into NVivo for processing and analysis.

**Participant selection**

To understand why particular viewpoints on ‘radicalisation’ and specific constructions of youth continue to be more dominant than others this study triangulated document sources with interview and focus group data. In CDA, ethnography or other types of field-research

---

39 Nation Africa can be accessed at https://nation.africa/kenya.
40 The Standard can be accessed at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/.
such as interviews can be additional tools to “adequately understand” and “theorise [sic] the research object” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 95). Besides increasing our understanding of the research object, “incorporating internal perspectives of discourse participants” (Reisigl, 2017, p. 47) is progress towards pursuing the goal of emancipation. To gather participants’ perspectives, I used purposive and snowball sampling to find and choose practitioners and young people working/benefitting from PCVE in Community-Based Organisations (CBOs).

**Expert interviews**

I conducted 19 interviews during the spring and winter of 2019. Participants were drawn from various relevant organisations and were also diverse religiously, ethnically and gender-wise. One participant worked for an INGO that was locally-led. Ten participants were drawn from NGOs; seven of these participants worked in locally-initiated and led NGOs, whereas the remaining three worked in an internationally-led NGO. Of these three participants in the internationally-led NGO, two were locals and one was an international employee. Seven other participants were drawn from CBO’s that were locally initiated and run and the remaining one participant worked for a student association. Of the 19 participants: three served in administrative capacities; four served in top-management positions (i.e. directors) and 12 directly worked in capacities implementing T/PCVE projects and programs. Participants also identified with diverse religious views. Eleven identified as Muslims, five as Christians and two did not categorise themselves as belonging to specific religions. Ethnically, ten participants were coastal natives (with eight identifying as Mijikenda and two as Swahili), eight were from other regions of Kenya (two of which were born and raised in Mombasa), and one was a European foreign national. In terms of gender, 14 participants were male whereas the remaining five were female (see Appendix F). These categories were important in detailing how and why participants understood ‘radicalisation’ the way they did.

For the expert interviews, I utilised semi-structured interviews (SSI). SSI use a guide organised as questions or around themes to direct the researcher through the key areas that need to be covered (Martinson and O’Brien, 2010). My interview guide contained a few pre-set questions centred around: how participants understand the terms ‘radicalisation’ and extremism, how they implement these two concepts in PCVE projects, and the stakeholders of their PCVE work. The rest of the questions were formulated as the interview progressed. The main challenge with interviews is that they consumed a lot of time from the initial processes of planning, preparing, and setting up to the actual conducting of interviews. Moreover, it was also time-consuming in terms of transcribing and analysing a “huge volume of notes and many hours of transcripts” (Adams, 2015, p. 493).
Overall, SSIs were most suited for this project because they gave participants a chance to articulate their experiences freely compared to methods such as surveys, where the opportunity for elaboration of statements would have been limited. Therefore, SSI’s encouraged unpredictable insights. The flexible guide allowed the participants and me a chance to go into detail whenever necessary. Also, pre-set questions were suitable in providing reliable, comparable qualitative data (Adams, 2015) between different participants with an interest in the same social issue.

I interviewed civil society practitioners implementing PCVE projects. These practitioners were selected because PCVE is their area of expertise; therefore, they bring rich experiences and knowledge on the subject. In addition, most CSOs implementing in this area are actively engaged in the consultation process of drafting and implementing the MCAP. Meaning, they represent a particular category within the civil society population who negotiate their positions as producers and consumers of PCVE knowledge. They are placed in a unique position where they not only have to align their work with government, donor, and community demands, but they also have to carefully design and implement their programs in a terrain where criticism is often reduced to ‘sympathising with terrorists’ or even ‘spying the communities on behalf of the government’. Hence, their inputs allow a differentiated examination of the official narratives of ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya.

My background in psychology and experience in research helped me during the entire process. I started mapping potential interview participants during the early phases of the project. During the mapping process, I made several trips to the research site so that in-between, I would have ample time to go through the transcripts, identify gaps and reflect on how I could pursue them in my next visit to the research site. With this plan, I developed a schedule capturing all organisations in Mombasa working on PCVE and the period they will be engaged. Once this was completed, I applied for a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) and ethical approval from the Dublin City University research ethics committee. The former was approved in December 2018 and the latter in February 2019 and further amended in October 2019. Having secured the approvals, I proceeded to send introductory emails to the first group of potential participating organisations. Most of the organisations responded with a date, time and venue, but I had to follow up on a few that had not responded.

The actual interviews began by discussing the Plain Language Statement and the Informed Consent form to allow participants time to raise queries and decide. All participants that

41 I relied on my knowledge of CSO’s in Mombasa as I had established contact with some of them in 2014/2015 while researching on radicalisation for my M.A dissertation.
were initially approached participated in this study. The interviews lasted for approximately 45 to 90 minutes, apart from a few that lasted longer than 2 hours. With the participants’ consent, interviews were recorded on an audio device and notes were taken. The audio recordings were later downloaded, transcribed and imported into NVivo for processing. Upon completing each interview session, I updated my research journal; reflecting on the processes, the things that stood out and areas to be improved.

All participants were anonymised during coding. This decision was arrived at because Mombasa is a relatively small area, and therefore naming some participants might compromise the anonymity of others. Hence, I anonymised participants using a coding system that indicated their gender and a unique 4-code digit. For example, FP1319—refers to Female Participant number 1319, whereas MP2219 stands for Male Participant 2219.

**Engaging young people**

Initially, I had only planned to conduct one-to-one interviews with all participants because they are better at guaranteeing confidentiality. Upon embarking to the research site and engaging with the participants, we settled for Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). First, because most CBOs are small in size and might rely on community goodwill to run their activities, as a result, the participants preferred FGDs because they are time-effective. This was sensible since an FGD of six people only takes 90 minutes, whereas one-to-one interviews would take about 6 hours. Participating in FGDs saved participants time and allowed them to carry out other activities. In addition, participants felt that individually they had different ways of translating the concepts of radicalisation and extremism, therefore, FGDs could help them to observe commonalities and differences, and learn from each other. On my part, FGDs added value to the project by allowing me to observe group dynamics and how responses are potentially influenced in a group setting.

Two FGDs were conducted in autumn/winter of 2019. FGD1 occurred in Kisauni on and FGD2 in Likoni42. I engaged young people because including them was a way to amplify their voices. This decision was also guided by CDA’s and CTS’ commitment to an emancipatory political praxis where research is not only about problematising normative frameworks but also engaging, though not necessarily agreeing, with other alternative perspectives (Gunning, 2007a)—such as those emanating from individuals labelled ‘radical’. Such inclusions serve to ameliorate some of the existing power imbalances. And this is also my contribution to the emancipatory agenda. As someone who has been subjected to profiling practices and at times witnessed others undergoing the same without

---

42 The focus groups are coded throughout this study as FGD1 and FGD2.
being able to assist. I believe true emancipation begins with amplifying the voices of Othered social groups, for three reasons. To begin with, youth have controlled access to discourse (e.g. access to the media—especially official outlets), thus their opinions remain unheard. By engaging youth this study amplifies their voices. In addition, youth have passive access to professionals—e.g. police officers and government ministers—who often make decisions on and about young people. Thus, academic research is a good avenue of giving youth an active opportunity to articulate their stories.

Finally, in some situations, youth often end-up as onlookers/consumers—as media audiences—of issues affecting them because they are neither asked for their opinion nor allowed to speak for themselves. This is primarily due to generational relations that cast youth as immature, inexperienced and therefore lacking wisdom. Engaging youth was a way for me to tap into their experiences of how they receive representations about themselves produced by other social actors, and how they reflexively self-construct themselves. From a CDA perspective, both representations by other actors and self-representation feature discourses that are in circulation in relation to one subject or another. Therefore, a rich analysis needs to incorporate “the different positions of the social actors” to identify the ways in which “diverse genres and discourses are networked together” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 235). Triangulating organisational texts with interview and focus group data was also a way to overcome methodological criticism levelled against CDA approaches including Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Framework as predominantly relying on analyses of organisational text.

FGD1 consisted of five participants; one female and four males, and FGD2 consisted of two female and four male participants. By religious and ethnic orientation, FGD1 was very homogenous. All participants identified as Muslims and were from ethnic communities indigenous to the Coastal region. In contrast, FGD2 consisted of both Christians and Muslims and ethnically, participants were from diverse parts of Kenya. Also, in FGD1, all participants operated in the same capacity (i.e. project officers) within the organisation. As a result, I observed their interaction to be less hierarchical, and the participants engaged more freely; indicating that power was evenly distributed within the group. FGD2 was diverse in terms of employment capacity thus to an extent I observed that the interaction had boundaries. For instance, while a participant had shared a certain view comfortably during a one-to-one interview, when they voiced the same opinion in the FGD and it was refuted, typically the participant opted to either respond or behave apologetically. This shows the power dynamics of interaction in a group differ greatly based on several elements such as employment positions, gender, sex, religion, and so forth.
I met most of the FGD participants on the interview day except for one from FGD2 that I had previously interviewed during my MA project in 2015. The FGDs took between 75 to 120 minutes, during which the discussion was audio recorded, and handwritten notes were also made. Later the recording was downloaded, transcribed and imported to NVivo for processing. The notes were typed and linked to the transcript as memos. The session rolled out with a discussion on the languages my participants were comfortable using. They preferred Swahili and this was a good gesture on my part because it toned down the researcher—participant hierarchy by ensuring that both were on the same linguistic level making the interaction more casual. Also, conversing in Swahili ensured that all participants were included in the conversation, thus it was an effective way of capturing the voices that could have otherwise been left out. Once the language aspect was agreed on, we discussed the Plain Language Statement and the Informed consent forms and translated them to Swahili to ensure everyone was fully informed. I then addressed a few questions that were raised regarding the storage and use of data. I also addressed questions regarding what participants stand to benefit from the research.

Once this was finalised, the session proceeded with the researcher acting more as a facilitator than an interviewer. Both sessions were typically relaxed, which could be because we all came from Mombasa. Hence we shared similar cultural knowledge and experiences. Also, there was no age-difference between us thus participants talked casually about their experience without feeling the need to justify their opinions. Coupled with the fact that participants in both groups were co-workers, they freely disclosed details that would be otherwise uncomfortable when sitting amid strangers.

All focus group participants were anonymised when coding. This is because by being young alone especially in the age of the GWOT young people are viewed as suspects. Thus anonymising and pseudonymising them was necessary to protect them from further harm, especially if the details they reveal are critical of government policies. I have experienced some of the hardships youth navigate on a daily basis and I have watched parents and families fear for their young people but most especially young men every minute they left the house. As such, my study is committed to not marginalising an already marginalised social group. The scheme used to pseudonymise young people only indicates their gender and order of participation during the focus group. For example, MP1 stands for Male Participant 1.

While there were no financial incentives to be gained, participants in FGD1 requested for my assistance in grant writing and project planning. I was happy to assist them whenever I had time because it was an opportunity to see how they implemented their art activities for PVE.
Researching Kenya and the challenges of accessing data

The initial proposal for this research aimed to engage more deeply with the processes of text production and consumption. Specifically, I wanted to research in greater detail how the policy documents (NSCVE and MCAP), news articles, and presidential speeches and statements were produced. This meant indepthly following and analysing parliament (both for the national and local parliament) proceedings from the time the policy is initiated, to the time the bill is drafted. While ideally documents such as parliament proceedings are available online, in the Kenyan context the electronic version of the Official Hansard Report can only be used for information purposes. Copies to be used for research have to be certified by the Hansard Editor. Getting approximately 1200 printed copies of proceedings certified would have been both time consuming and costly. Let alone the possibility that access to these documents and stakeholders may also be hindered by organisational deficiencies such as “intentional delays, unnecessary excuses, and loss of files, corruption, and nepotism—a phenomenon blamed on “the system” (Gokah, 2006, p. 67).

Similarly, had I continued with my original proposal, for consistency I would have had to also focus on news media processes of production (Richardson, 2007, 2017), to understand news. This means engaging with how the internal guidelines shape news narratives. This process is usually conducted by textually analysing editorial policies, in conjunction with interviewing and observing editorial teams and processes (Barkho, 2011, p. 297). In the same way, to understand how presidential speeches and statements are produced and consumed would have meant conducting an ethnographic study with the presidential strategic communications unit. In addition, such a research design would have had to take into account the nuances in the process of producing speeches. Experts have detailed that speeches vary widely. While some speeches involve one-to-one consultations with the president, others are transmitted through press channels, whereas others are crafted over an extended period of time by larger teams—also comprising different ministerial departments (The Nairobi, 2015). Hence, designing and executing a study that will factor such nuances not only requires a well-trained research team but also access to proper institutional support, in terms of funding from my academic institution and an established academic network in my home country. Being a postgraduate student, I neither had the funding nor a well established network with local academic institutions to undertake such a research. While this research design would have yielded richer data, I did not pursue it for several logistical, theoretical and practical reasons which I detail below.

To begin with, understanding presidential speeches and statements, news reports, and policy texts in this manner would have required several longitudinal ethnographic case studies and archival research. These are methodologies that require advanced specialist
training (Given, 2008). Additionally, these methodologies yield vast amounts of data, which while useful in tracking changes over time, according to Roberts (1996), it may be time-consuming and resource-intensive to analyse such data and make sense of it. Logistically, obtaining the research permit to engage the presidential strategic communications unit would have been nearly impossible (Morse, 2019). Obtaining such permission would have been logistically impossible, given that the research would have been seeking to engage the president's office which is the highest political office in Kenya.

As for engaging journalists and news editors, scheduling conflicts emanating from the pressure exerted by news agencies (Phillips, 2011) would have made it difficult to conduct and complete the research in a timely manner. As I would have been required to spend prolonged periods of time at the research sites, which would have impacted my Irish immigration permission, and I would have also had to apply for several research permits for Kenya, since they are primarily only issued for a maximum of 12 months. This would not have been viable financially and timewise; as immigration permissions and research permits are costly and may take unpredictably long to process.

In addition, for the ethnographic part of my study, I could have chosen to understand young people’s perspective by analysing their social media engagement. Social media can be a great resource for understanding meaning-making and identity construction (Cook and Hasmath, 2014; Boczkowski, Matassi and Mitchelstein, 2018). But social media data can also be noisy and unreliable, as users may not always provide accurate or truthful information (Taylor and Pagliari, 2018). It may also be difficult to distinguish between real and fake data because some of it is automated by bots or fake accounts, thus this can skew data. Moreover, I was wary of primarily relying on social media data for ethical and security concerns. I am researching a sensitive subject which is still highly securitised in Kenya (Kiai, 2015; Mwangi, 2018b). And particularly taking into account the existence of paid law enforcement informers infiltrating social media platforms such as Facebook to profile young men they believe to be ‘gang members’ (Olewe, 2019), such an approach could have exposed me to unwarranted risk and even worse exposed participants to further harm. The danger posed by Kenya’s police ‘death squads’ and ‘killer cops’ is real, as numerous reports have shown how young men who were profiled on Facebook, often ended up on ‘death lists’ and were eventually assassinated by ‘killer cops’ (BBC, 2016; Nyabola, 2016; Olewe, 2019; CIVICUS, 2022; Van Stapele, 2022). Thus, I proactively did not use social media data to avoid further criminalising youth identities.

Practically, archiving social media data may be impossible because users can constantly modify it or choose to protect their messages if they wish so (Taylor and Pagliari, 2018). The greatest hurdle, was that data on social media needs to be collected through different
interfaces such as the Streaming API, the Rest API, and the Search API, (Weller et al., 2014), as well as, CrowdTangle, and the R package “academictwitterR”. I, however, would not have been able to mine such data because I neither have the computer language and programming skills needed nor the funds to outsource such services.

With these shortcomings in mind, I primarily adjusted my proposal in two ways. First, to access elite level discourses, presidential speeches and statements were the best source material. Because they were easily accessible on the presidential website. Second, because focussing on processes of text production such as the internal guidelines of news media organisations was not viable given the scope of the study, the time available to complete it, and funding constraints. I focussed on the argumentation strategies appearing in the texts under analysis to understand social practices and the power relations of the social actors involved (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Machin and Mayr, 2012).

Notes on Transcribing and Translating

The process of transcription occurred after interviewing had been completed for each phase respectively. The audio-recordings were stored according to the data protection regulations of the Dublin City University research ethics committee and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Since this project aims to interpret the meanings of contents of the participants accounts, the transcript entailed what Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009, p. 74) call the “semantic record of the interview” which entails “a transcript showing all the words that are spoken by everyone who is present”. On the one hand, for the interviews conducted in English, the transcription task was simple; I ran the recording through otter software, and then I listened to it while going through the transcript manually to confirm its accuracy. On the other hand, for the interviews conducted in Swahili such as the focus groups, or using a mix of Swahili and English, the transcribing task was time-consuming; as the process, first, entailed transcribing then translating.

One of the challenges I encountered while translating was slight changes in meaning due to some Swahili words not having an exact equivalent in English. As a result, I used a word that had a closer meaning to what was being implied, however this also depended on the context within which the word/phrase was used. For example, during FGD1 participants used the word beneti and the phrase shega ile mbaya. The word beneti was used to refer

---

44 I transcribed 19 interviews. However, I only transcribed sections of MP2519’s interview because the interview was conducted in a loud environment and the participant was barely audible thus even noise suppression algorithms were not effective.

45 Available at https://otter.ai.

46 It is a slang term for a bayonet. It is loosely used to refer to machetes, knives and other weapons commonly used by youth gangs. Such language is especially deployed when the speakers do not
to machetes and knives. And it was used to exclude people who are not part of the conversation. This word belongs to the lexicon of words often used by youth gangs. However, the age mates of those young people who are gang members and PCVE practitioners are familiar with these terms because they interact with gang members regularly. The phrase *shega ile mbaya*\(^{47}\) can range in meaning from being regarded highly to feeling extremely good or wonderful. However, in the context where this phrase was used it implied feeling that oneself was accomplished.

Transcribing and translating involved a back-and-forth process. I spent hours consulting on some of these phrases with my close network\(^{48}\). And this is because some of the phrases and words are seasonal or to put it in Swahili *maneno ya msimu* or *maneno ya mtaani*. This means they are words that are popular among specific social groups, at specific times, places and spaces. Some words/phrases fade out while others have a much longer lifespan. Hence, the transcribing, translating and analysis processes were periods of learning as well as reflecting and appreciating the complexities of language and discourse all together.

**Reflexivity and positionality: (un)learning from the past**

As earlier stated in the introduction and literature review, while numerous studies on ‘radicalisation’ continue being conducted there is a dearth of studies that problematize the assumptions embedded in the knowledge being produced, particularly for studies focussing on the global South. In the past few years, I have read and worked broadly in the conflict, peace and security domain, but have been disappointed that scholarship for and about the global South is not met with the same criticality as when it focuses on the global North. For example, numerous studies on Western contexts such as the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Australia, Germany, the US and Canada have deconstructed terrorism and the ensuing counterterrorism practices and counter-radicalisation policies (Jackson, 2005, 2007; Jarvis, 2008; Oriola, 2009; O’Toole, DeHanas and Modood, 2012; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; Jarvis and Lister, 2015; Sjøen and Mattsson, 2020; Wahlström, 2022). In the global South, few studies have highlighted the constrictions want to draw attention to themselves. Also, this language is deployed to exclude people who are not considered insiders within a specific group. Hence, young men sitting at the makeshift may use this word when they notice a passer-by or someone sitting with them but one they do not consider a member of the group thus not comfortable sharing the details of activities they are engaged in. See more on the reflexivity section.

\(^{47}\) The phrase is a slang used to mean feeling extremely good/accomplished about oneself. In this context, the phrase is used to mean by joining Chafu and being seen as a commander, one’s self-image improves.

\(^{48}\) This was necessary because despite being a native speaker having stayed out of my country for the past 9 years I have not kept up with seasonal words. Thus consulting was an opportunity to learn and expand my command of the language which was crucial for making accurate analyses of the data.
in contemporary counterterrorism and PCVE as embedded in Western foreign policy influences (Blakeley, 2009; Raphael, 2009; Keenan, 2010; Qureshi, 2010; Solomon, 2015). However, far fewer studies–rooted in terrorism studies–have engaged with the dilemmas of knowledge production.\textsuperscript{49}

Coming from a country where knowledge and expertise on almost everything is imported from the West, I began to notice the emergence and use of ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya’s media and political landscape as early as 2010. For my M.A dissertation, I researched on the dynamics of al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya. I conducted interviews, participated in panels and attended CSO network meetings to understand recruitment dynamics in Mombasa. During the interviews it became apparent that different peace and security stakeholders suggested different patterns of recruitment thus making different policy recommendations. Upon returning from the research site when I was writing my findings, I felt that I should have phrased my questions differently. Perhaps, instead of asking \textit{what causes young people to join groups like al-Shabaab}, I could have explored \textit{young people’s experiences of recruitment}. So many questions lingered even after I had submitted my thesis. I searched for more critical scholarship and I came across the journal of critical studies on terrorism and the first articles I read were Jarvis’ (2008) \textit{Time of terror: writing temporality into the war on terror}, and Hoskin and O’ Loughlin’s (2009) \textit{Pre-meditating guilt: radicalisation and mediality in British news}. These articles were important in setting my path towards a PhD. I began to consider developing a research project that would explore how ‘radicalisation’ is constructed by different stakeholders and in different spaces and what identities the prevailing constructions co-constitute. I felt that taking this approach would allow me to understand how meaning and identities are negotiated, contested and defended in policy and practice.

To argue that meaning and identities are negotiated, contested and defended meant reflecting on the existing literature and the conversations that occurred during the PCVE\textsuperscript{50} network events and the data I had gathered from interviewing young people, CSOs and

\textsuperscript{49} My concern here is that there are adjacent fields such as development studies that have extensive literature detailing the politics of knowledge production. This literature critiques the concept of development by relearning and reassessing the realities of communities in Africa, Asia and Latin America from their own perspectives (Ferguson, 1994; Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 2010; Esteva and Prakash, 2014). A similar approach remains underutilised in terrorism studies.

\textsuperscript{50} On studying meanings it is important to flag that PCVE is a relatively new concept of characterising multi-stakeholder interventions aimed at countering and mitigating terrorism. In Kenya PCVE was formalised in 2016. Prior the state and CSOs would refer to existing practices as peace and security interventions and/or peacebuilding programs, to emphasise that any terrorism-related initiatives were a security domain. The shift to PCVE signals multi-stakeholder engagements and partnerships.
security stakeholders, for my MA. During these events it was reiterated that ‘radicalisation’ among youth poses a global threat to stability and development, in particular, because extremist groups are largely composed of young people\(^{51}\). The situation is dire for low income countries experiencing demographic youth bulges and where there is poor governance and other forms of social inequalities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005; Urdal, 2007; Botha, 2013). Thus young people get socialised to particular world views that are extreme and eventually participate in terrorism (Botha, 2014). Efforts to address ‘radicalisation’ among young people have involved implementing programs—such as skills building, critical thinking training—aimed at reducing individual vulnerabilities (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014; 2016; Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018). Other measures informed by frameworks that consider environmental and individual drivers have focussed on developing counter-narrative strategies with an aim to address the emergence and exposure of terrorism supportive moral contexts by providing alternative settings (Aly, 2015). I read this existing scholarship and the claims made in the different events as ways of thinking about ‘radicalisation’. Like most interpretive research focussing on conflict and post-conflict societies, I was aware that such data could suffer “from reality distortions” due to participants’ “faded memories and selectivity” (Bouka, 2013, p. 120). However, my research rejects the idea that the value of the data solely lies in its factual accuracy, and instead emphasises the importance of “understanding from within” (Yanow, 2006, p. 11), that is, understanding the meaning and perspectives that individuals ascribe to their experiences.

**New concerns, old settings: on safety and security during and beyond the study**

Taking this approach thus meant engaging with several concerns. My first dilemma was how to research and write about youth without falling back on the same tired narratives of crisis, dangerousness and violence. Not only are such perspectives “available in research reports and statistics”, but “Africanist discourse” continually denies “African youth intentionality of action and agency” (Abbink, 2005, p. 2). Thus, is it ethical to engage young people in this study particularly in Africa where they are “widely and consistently perceived as problematic in essence”? (Ibid, p.2). Will this research expose them to further harm? Especially since scholarship on ‘radicalisation’ already criminalises the youth identity. Other studies have pseudonymised and anonymised research participants and their attributions (Mohamed, 2015; Botha, 2017; Badurdeen, 2020, Adebayo and Njoku, 2023). The aim being to protect research participants from harm and prevent further criminalisation should their attributions be too critical of state policies.

There was real fear of reprisals. During my M.A data gathering, I had noticed participants were hesitant to be part of the research, for fear of government harassment and surveillance. These fears were not unfounded but they occurred in the wake of increasing cases of extrajudicial assassinations and disappearances and the labelling of critics of state policies ‘radicalised’ or ‘sympathisers’ (Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; Kiai, 2015). Often, those participants who agreed to give interviews, only consented to me taking handwritten notes and not any other form of audio-visual recording. As a result, paying attention to such challenges of undertaking research in dangerous contexts (Sluka, 1995, 2020; Goodhand, 2000; Baird, 2009) was necessary. Literature in this area has highlighted issues of safety, fear, danger and a need to reflexively engage with these issues, how they may affect the nature of access to data and what this means for the research (Ibid). Institutional processes and procedures are a way of navigating what Lee (1995) calls ambient dangers. These are the types of dangers which are inherent to the research site, hence they are dangers that can be anticipated–by conducting a situational analysis and risk assessment—and planned for. An example of ambient dangers were related to researching in certain areas of Mombasa which are regarded as dangerous, and how I would go about accessing participants for this project.

Having been involved in researching this subject area since 2014, I had established and maintained connections with some CSOs implementing peace and security more broadly, and PCVE specifically. These established connections were crucial to ensure access to more participants in the research site. Especially, given the difficulties I had encountered in 2014 where any data related to terrorism and counterterrorism was guarded (Mohamed, 2015). Having established networks helped to build trust and rapport with organisations I had not worked with before, because as the researcher I was being introduced by “a trusted social network” (Cohen and Arieli, 2011, p. 423). Additionally, it reduced risk to the researcher (Roll and Swenson, 2019), given that some organisations I had worked with in 2014–2015 could vouch for me. In my case, gaining access to the research site was unproblematic. Once I sent an email to organisations, introducing myself, the project and inviting them to participate, most of them were interested in my research and were enthusiastic about sharing their experiences and knowledge. They also suggested and

---

52 Before moving abroad for further studies I had been working as a humanitarian aid worker in Kakuma Refugee camp. As part of the role I often conducted situational analysis and risk assessments during the distinct phases of the project management life cycle. I applied this knowledge and skills during my PhD to assess risk to the subject of the research and risks to the researcher. I used the information gathered to seek ethical approval and a research licence from Dublin City University and the Kenya National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, respectively.
introduced me to other organisations I could interview, in other cases some of these organisations invited me to their activities while others requested me to help review their funding applications.

However, I was also aware that while CSOs are well-embedded with the community and other experts they also serve as gatekeepers (Crowhurst, 2013). They do not just introduce the researcher to other participants, but they could: influence what information other participants are willing to share, shape the researcher's understanding of the field which will eventually have consequences for the research, for example by shaping how the researcher interacts with other participants (Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert, 2008; Crowhurst, 2013). Also, existing networks can be problematic because without a shared understanding of risk and what's ‘acceptable’ risk, they may advise going into certain research sites. This is particularly the case because such networks primarily operate in the conflict-affected environments thus they “may be more accustomed to security risks and may downplay or accept more risks” (Gordon, 2021, p. 65). I was confronted with a similar dilemma when thinking of two research sites—Majengo and Old Town. Some CSO stakeholders shared that the research sites were safe, however, others felt that the areas would be safe insofar as I was accompanied by a Local of these areas. Upon discussing further about the types of risks CSOs encountered, I realised the risks they were willing to take were more than what I considered acceptable. Perhaps my apprehension also stemmed from having lived in Europe for nearly 10 years, in my brother's characterisation I had grown soft. As a result, upon further reflection, I made the decision to exclude conducting focus groups in Majengo and Old Town from my research. These areas—as I have detailed in the limitations of the study section—are primarily homogenous, religiously they are Muslim areas and ethnically they are composed of Swahilis, Somalis and Arabs. As a result, they are sites that are considered at risk of extremist activity, as evidenced by the extensive terrorism-related media coverage they receive, the focussed assessment in policy documents, travel advisories advising foreigners to avoid the said areas, and not forgetting the burgeoning academic interest and funding opportunities on the subject of Islamist extremism. These areas have thus been securitised and are often the core focus of Kenya’s counterterrorism (Prestholdt, 2011; Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; Mohamed, 2022).

53 A local here with a capitalised L is used to show that not anyone is accepted to be a guide but rather it’s people who are embedded in these spaces. So for example, NGO workers who are born, raised and still live in the areas where they work. I considered myself a local but upon reflecting on this specific scenario I was neither a local nor a foreigner.
54 See MCAP p.21, paragraph 24–25.
The practice of exclusion is considered part of good research ethics. And researchers can exclude certain sites for various reasons. For some exclusion of certain research sites can minimise the risk of harm to the researcher and participants (Romano, 2006; Mertus, 2009; Mazurana and Gale, 2013; Gordon, 2021). Exclusion can also be applied to sites that are “over-researched” (Omata, 2019, p. 17) and participants who may be suffering from research fatigue (Roll and Swenson, 2019). Not only does this protect the quality of the data by ensuring researchers can obtain more meaningful data from participants who are willing and able to contribute to the research (Ibid). But exclusion is also an ethical decision that ensures the well-being and dignity of participants over the value of the proposed research (Hemming, 2009). In my research, excluding certain areas certainly avoided exposing such spaces to further surveillance and criminalisation. But at the same time could their exclusion risk my research being accused of advancing a single youth experience? And what are the potential impacts of such scholarship on already vulnerable populations? I constantly worry that my work might unintentionally reinforce the very discourses it seeks to destabilise. And while I come from the same surroundings, have experience working with young people and researching on this subject, I navigated my different identities and positionalities throughout the research process. These were concerns or situational dangers (Lee, 1995) that could not be “captured in the ‘good’ ethical guidelines of institutional paperwork but had to be negotiated and grappled with daily in the field” (Njeri, 2021, p. 389).

**Being local, being a woman, being Muslim and the many other beings: identities and the structuring of access to participants**

Throughout the research process I was confronted by issues some of which are of a situational nature. I have deliberated on concerns around the relationship between the researcher and the research. My M.A experience served as a constant reminder that a complete detachment and a total neutral observation is near impossible. In other words, questions about how I (as the researcher) shape the research, or what Edge (2011) refers to as prospective reflexivity. This type of reflexivity frequently tackles questions regarding researcher’s positionalities or situatedness, that is, how their gender, religion, age, ethnicity among other multiple and shifting identities shape the research process (Njeri, 2021). Also, it engages with how the researcher views themself in relation to others and how such insider—outsider positioning shapes the research process from how the problem is framed, the research questions that come to be formulated, access to the research site and participants, type of information likely to be gathered, how the data will be analysed and presented, to the types of research outputs and how the research will be utilised. For example, while conducting interviews in Mombasa in 2015, I realised that apart from being located in an environment shaped by religion, ethnicity and location, I am also located in
and understand what happens around me by drawing on discourses of religion, culture, and society which are historically situated in the same discourses I wish to challenge.

Concurrently, I have concerns pertaining to the implications the research has on me (the researcher). This element of reflexivity is referred to as retrospective reflexivity (Ibid). It assumes that research is a process and not just the end product (England, 1994), thus, researchers grapple with questions not just about who they are and how this shapes the research, but also who they become (or how they develop) as the research progresses and how this affects the research processes (Attia and Edge, 2017). Taken together, Mann (2016, p. 28) sees reflexivity as being “focused on the self and ongoing inter-subjectivities. It recognises mutual shaping, reciprocity and bi-directionality, and that interaction is context-dependent and context renewing”. Hence, here not only do I reflect on how my M.A experiences shaped my understanding of the subject and the decisions I made in my PhD research process. But also how these experiences have shaped my understanding of the subject and my identity as a researcher. Thus, the reflections I detail below demonstrate the challenges and privileges I navigate(d). As will be noted, some of these challenges were not fully anticipated, whereas others were more (c)overt.

**Intersecting identities and multiple positionalities**

From the moment I delved into studies on ‘terrorism’ and its related phenomena many times, I have been asked whether I am implying if ‘radicalised youth’ are harmless, or if ‘radicalisation’ is not a bad thing. At times, these difficult questions have made me feel the urge to be apologetic. I am aware that my project centres on a highly discursive terrain. Therefore, to avoid re-inscribing the dominant constructions on ‘radicalisation’ and youth, it is essential to be as reflexive as possible. Questioning my subjectivities and how they could shape my role as the researcher is crucial for two reasons. The first reason is morally founded. It would be deceptive to hold others accountable and to a higher standard while obscuring my own subjectivities. Second, by reflecting on how my experiences and identities shape this research, I aim to show my readers that analysing ‘radicalisation’ is not just a theoretical inquiry pursued to obtain an academic qualification. But it also stems from wanting to make sense of my lived experiences, how others around me react to them the way they do and how these experiences are shaped. Finally, questioning my subjectivities reminds the reader and myself of how my situatedness and multiple and shifting identities—what some scholars term as positionality (England, 1994; Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009)—could have shaped how I designed this research, selected my methodologies, and selected, analysed, and interpreted the data. Hence, while questioning studies and
worldviews held by others on ‘radicalisation’, I subject my study to the same standards as I am reminded that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128).

An important element of positionality is that it is determined by the position we occupy in relation to ‘the Other’ (Collins, 1999; Merriam et al., 2001; Obbo, 2006; Onyango-Ouma, 2006; Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009; Edge, 2011). A researcher can be an: insider, outsider or none (Merriam et al., 2001; Mwambari, 2019) while at the same time being an expatriate, a local or neither (Njeri, 2021). These positionings can be multiple, complex and shift depending on our identities—that is class, age, race, religion, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, geographical location and gender among others. Based on my identities, I see myself as a young, African, Muslim, Coastal, Mijikenda, Kenyan, heterosexual, woman, and both a social justice activist and a researcher. These identities are self ascribed and they are also based on how others perceive me. Identities are thus shaped by societal norms and reinforced by interactions with others (Onyango-Ouma, 2006; Njeri, 2021).

I have been a Muslim all my life, and while living in Kenya I was visibly Muslim based on how I dress. Growing up I noticed fewer differences between myself and non-Muslims. Perhaps this is because I come from a religiously diverse family. Furthermore, apart from belonging to a minority religion, I also belong to a minority ethnic group that primarily resides on the Coast of Kenya. To many, I am a ‘Coasterian’ or Mpwani, which is often used interchangeably with Muslims and sometimes the Swahili ethnicity. This is a highly flawed assumption because not all people from the Coast of Kenya are Muslims or Swahilis, and neither are all Kenyan Muslims and Swahilis only from the Coastal region. However, this bracketing obscures the heterogeneity of both the Coastal and Islamic populations. As a result, being a Coasterian and a Muslim are two identities that as a person who has lived almost her entire life in the region, I have had to interrogate albeit at different intensities varying with the socio-political dynamics. I see religion, ethnicity, gender, sex, and race as identities that shape people’s lives. In the same way that Coastal people’s experiences are marked by their geographic location, Muslim’s experiences are also marked by their religious identity. In Frankenberg’s words (1993, p. 1), “every system of differentiation shapes those on whom it bestows privilege as well as those it oppresses”. Hence, researching radicalisation in Mombasa, I saw myself as a local.

Being a local meant I shared several identities with the participants, including nationality, racial, and often geographical location and ethnic identity. Unlike an outsider researcher who travels from abroad to get the natives viewpoint by immersing themselves into ‘the Others’ culture (Munthali, 2001). Being a local I assumed I was an insider. I felt to a certain
degree connected to my participants because of our shared experiences with violent counterterrorism. For example, while working at Kakuma Refugee Camp from 2013 to 2014, countless times I endured unnerving practices whenever I wanted to access the UN compounds—both United Nations Human High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Food Programmes (WFP). Despite having my staff and national identification documents, I was always denied entry, or I had to put up with derogatory practices such as an extra body search and afterwards having to be tailed by a guard to my destination. When confronted, the guards claimed that additional measures were necessary for all Somalis because they are ‘terrorists’ and therefore a security risk. In addition, while travelling locally and abroad, I have been singled out of the airport security line countless times for ‘extra security screening’. While no explanation was given regarding the criteria used to select people for additional screening, being a frequent traveller, I figured it out. As illogical as it sounds, I was always singled out for ‘extra security screening’ on days that I wore an abaya and a scarf/hijab that was tied covering my hair, neck, and ears and only revealing my face. Whereas, on the other days that I only tied my scarf as a turban or a headgear, or completely went uncovered I was not singled out for the extra screening. I saw my experiences as overlapping with those of my participants. As a young Muslim, I identify with the sense of frustration and vulnerability that other Muslims feel towards activities of groups like al-Shabaab, the stigmatisation in elite discourses of the GWOT, and ensuing discriminatory counterterrorism practices, which are an essential backdrop of this project. These experiences and identity I had assumed would help me to connect and understand my participant’s experiences.

However, some experiences during my interviews made me realise the murkiness of the insider–outsider dichotomy. Onyango-Ouma (2006), Munthali (2001) and Njeri (2021), for instance, have shown how our other multiple identities can easily strip us of the local or insider status and instead lump us up with the category of ‘the Other’. In my case, during some interviews and focus groups, my educated identity or educational status—of a postgraduate researcher from a western educational institution—in comparison to most of my FGD participants who had a secondary school education and a few others with college diplomas, set me apart from my participants. During the focus groups the participants addressed me as Madam or Madam Miraj. I had foreseen this and tried to minimise the power differences by asking participants to refer to me by my first name. However, I knew

55 It is important to mention that the guards categorised me as Somali purely based on my Islamic dress. Hence, for them, Muslim, Somali and Terrorist are one and the same. I did try to bring this up to my employer and, even though they followed up, the relevant authorities denied any form of discrimination and, in practice, everything remained the same.

56 This practice is not new but Mwangi (2019) writes extensively about it in his works ‘The “Somalinisation” of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya: the case of refoulement’, and ‘Securitisation, non-refoulement and the rule of law in Kenya: the case of Somali refugees’. 
Madam or Madam Miraj is a status position which came with certain expectations and privileges. For one an interview with a researcher is formal. Thus, the naming convention participants projected on me were meant to reinforce formalities while signalling power hierarchies. I attempted to distribute power by giving the participants more control over the research process. One way of doing this was allowing participants to decide the schedule and the environment they wanted to be interviewed in. In some cases, participants felt more comfortable in their own homes, where they had control over the environment and could speak more freely without fear of being overheard or judged by others. Especially with research that has potential for reprisal and retribution, participants' ability to decide the date, time and venue for their interviews gave them a sense of control and agency over the research process (Bouka, 2013) while also guaranteeing their personal safety and security. Also, my participants decided on the language of communication they were comfortable with. Some interviews started out in English and organically shifted to Kiswahili amongst other languages. These shifts were often made when participants wanted to share information off the record, when they noticed, for example, community members passing by, or when they wanted to elaborate further on a concept they were sharing. Such flexibility allowed the researcher to build trust and rapport with the participants, thus improving the quality and depth of the data.

Formalities were also reinforced by how participants interacted with each other in my presence. During FGD2, I noticed FP5 conferring with FP3, who then nodded in agreement before excusing herself. Shortly after, FP3 walked back into the interview room and offered me refreshments. Like Smith (1999, p. 138) I interpreted my participants actions as “signs of respect, the sorts of things I have seen members of my communities do for strangers and the practices I had been taught to observe myself”. These actions were also “barriers constructed to keep the outsider at bay, to prevent the outsider becoming the intruder” (Ibid, p. 138). However, being regarded as an outsider also had its privileges. For example, I attended organisational outreach activities, during which I was introduced to more participants, NGOs as well as Mombasa county government officials. In such moments, “my outsider status was an asset for the research” (Njeri, 2021, p. 389). My privileged access to participants also stemmed from my ties to a Western–based academic institution—i.e. Dublin City University. However, this educational status and the power it comes with also affected my research. During FGD2, I noticed participants challenging each other's assumptions on the apparent link between Islam and terrorism. While this indicates participants' ability to engage in self-reflection, accept feedback from peers and question their assumptions, I believe that my educational status and religious identity may have influenced this interaction. Participants could have challenged their peers to demonstrate their knowledge on the issue and situate themselves as knowledgeable in contrast to their peers. Also,
participants may have challenged their peers to avoid offending me—a Muslim researcher and their peers. Self-identifying Muslim participants might have also been aware of the racialised view of Muslims, thus challenged their peers to defend their identity group (Ahmed, 2023) by emphasising that ‘radicalisation’ could also be influenced by Christianity doctrines. Rather than being a hindrance for the research, this interaction revealed crucial details regarding how participants position themselves in group settings (for detailed analysis see chapter seven).

During my research visits, I was also asked by my participants—mostly men who were also non-Muslim and from upcountry ethnicities—how I had made it out of Mombasa and gone for further studies abroad. I explained that I had been awarded a scholarship to go and pursue higher education. There were remarks—made as compliments—about how different I was to Other Coasterians. This was a difficult conversation because I knew it was drawing on my different identities to affirm stereotypes about the Coast and Coastal people while concurrently situating me as different i.e. an exception. I knew this line of questioning stemmed from what Mao’s (2000) poem describes as the wider Kenyan public imagination that stereotypes coastal people as lazy, “living an easy life” and their region as backward (as cited in Waddilove, 2017, p. 3). The same stereotypes continue to be mediated in mainstream media (Ndonye, Yieke and Onyango, 2015) and scientific publications (Hoorweg, Foeken and Obudho, 2000). Thus an educated coastal woman goes against wider perceptions about Muslim women, and coastal people.

In 2019 during an interview appointment with one of the organisations I experienced an overt manifestation of such attitudes. I arrived at the interview venue 15 minutes earlier and found another individual waiting at the reception area. When the receptionist arrived they briefly conversed with their colleague who was passing by in English, and then did the same with the individual I had found at the reception area. Upon concluding their interactions, the receptionist turned towards me and asked me in Kiswahili ‘Habari yako? Tunaweza kukusaidia na nini?’ which translates to ‘how are you? And how can we help you?’ I explained that I had called earlier asking for directions to their organisations because I would be interviewing one of their program officers. With confusion they checked their diary before asking ‘ohh, so you are the researcher?’ I responded in the affirmative and navigated this uncomfortable situation with a polite smile. While I sat back waiting for my interviewee, I reflected on the just transpired interaction, what it meant and how it made me feel.

The interaction implied that individuals like myself are most likely uneducated, thus less likely to be the researcher. Meaning I might have been visiting the organisation for a different reason. Given that most CSOs run paralegal clinics, this assumption was not unfounded. Perhaps the receptionist engaged in self-reflection, because while offering me
refreshments, they shared that it's impressive that I—as a Muslim and coastal woman—was doing a PhD and more so abroad. They also disclosed that they have mostly hosted white researchers, hence she was expecting a white researcher as well. Similar attitudes were also evident during my other interviews and in one of the FGDs. Participants often walked in and then asked their colleagues whether the researcher had not yet arrived. During such conversations I was seated with their colleagues engaging in casual conversations. Similar to the receptionist, these participants also assumed that researchers are mostly white, or often men and that a Muslim woman would most likely not be a researcher but be a local visiting the organisation for a different reason. Non-native experts, especially white researchers, “have claimed considerable acceptability amongst their own colleagues and peers, government officials and society on the basis of their research”, while native voices “have been silenced and ‘Othered’ in the process” (Smith, 2021, p. 158). The assumptions embedded in these interactions reminded me of Smiths (2021, p. 135) observation that “Indigenous communities and organisations react [sic] to research as something done only by white researchers to indigenous peoples”. That even in a predominantly Black country, whiteness—and precisely in a research site setting—embodies power and privilege (Hall, 2004). In other words, while it was easy to doubt my status as a researcher, because of the predominant view that natives are the “‘natural objects’” of research (Smith, 2021, p. 135), the whiteness of the visiting researchers is “unproblematised and an unquestioned status quo and baseline” (Hoong Sin, 2007, p. 481). This of course has implications. For example, participants may be more willing to talk with White researchers because of their perceived neutrality (Fonow and Cook, 1991; Collins, 1999).

My situation was further complicated by my subject of research. I was after all a visibly identifying Muslim researching terrorism. I could tell by the discomfort of my non-Muslim participants whenever the conversation veered to religion qua Islam and ‘radicalisation’. I am sure it was because of my shared identities with those considered radicalised. Which is something that mediatized images, political rhetoric and counterterrorism practices continue to reinforce (Jackson, 2007; Hodges, 2011; M.-S. Abbas, 2019; Mohamed, 2021; Mohamed, 2022). My participants might have feared that because of our (my and extremist groups) shared identities, I might at least rationalise the activities of Islamist extremist groups. This will always be an uncomfortable situation, which I not only encountered at the research site but also at conferences—where it was couched in statements such as ‘but you are a Muslim, how can you objectively study radicalisation?’ And social gatherings, for example, while discussing counterterrorism, on two different occasions a peer and a housemate remarked ‘well don’t you think that killing innocent people is wrong? Besides I am sure they would not single you out if you are not a terrorist’. Such experiences compounded my helplessness, fear and discomfort of being perceived as dangerous.
Retrospectively, what I was experiencing is what Qureshi’s (2020) edited volume calls the worldwide condemnation culture. Which is an expectation projected on people of colour, and particularly Muslims in the context of ‘terrorism’ to condemn acts of violence they are not connected with. In this condemnation culture, racism is normalised and allows the entire focus (and blame) of terrorism to be shifted to communities (Joseph-Salisbury, 2020). Being placed in such a difficult situation, my first thought was to distance myself from the ‘dangerous Other’ by condemning their actions. A reaction which, in hindsight made me become what Mamdani (2002, 2005) characterises as the good Muslim.

By distancing myself I accepted a racialising view of ‘the Other’ (Qureshi, 2020). A view which rationalises harmful counterterrorism practices. Taking this stance influenced the kind of questions I had planned on asking my participants. Looking at earlier notes on my interview guide, I noticed I had written down the question: do you think that the Muslim community is more prone to extremist views than other communities? The question was both leading and pejorative, and it reflected my own preconceived ideas, and my desire to dissociate from ‘Islamic extremism’ so that I am not regarded as a sympathiser or an apologist. Armed with this awareness, I looked through the field notes I had written in 2015 during my MA research. A participant had stated that ‘you are a Muslim you know these things’ (Mohamed, 2015, p. 8). Previously, I had not given the statement much thought. But with further introspection of the recent events and my reaction, I began to understand what the participant inferred. That both of us being Muslim meant we had some shared experiences and understanding. For example, we are mostly likely to undergo ‘extra security checks’ when accessing stores, public transport, government services and even worse when travelling. Thus, distancing oneself or accepting negative constructions was neither analytically nor politically useful, because at any given moment, we all have multiple identities that are part of existing frameworks of policies and practices targeting Othered groups (Mohamed, 2021). Hence, it was more useful to think of how my Muslim identity shaped interactions with different participants.

I saw how while engaging Muslim participants our shared knowledge and experiences offered an entry and allowed for deeper engagements about ‘radicalisation’. Whereas for my non-Muslim participants this identity was viewed with suspicion, thus creating a distance between the researcher and participants. However, shared perceptions also threaten making the research a process of conforming the researchers’ biases (Merriam et al., 2001). I navigated these dilemmas through common practices such as probing and summarising.

This should not be taken to mean that our experiences can be equated. For example, MP1 and MP4s experiences of counterterrorism as young Muslim men would be varied from my own as a young Muslim woman.
to encourage interactions. In addition, keeping a research journal and updating it allowed me to reflect on what I did, what I could have done, and how to improve. For example, from my journal I noticed that the first two interviews— with a Muslim and non-Muslim participant, respectively—I had been less critical. In the former, it was because what the interviewee shared confirmed my biases about profiling which I constantly experience. In the latter, when the interviewee referred to specific areas as hotspots there were follow up questions I could have asked, but I did not want to make the participant uncomfortable by challenging their interpretation of events. Particularly when Islamist extremist groups continually frame their claims as religious and target Christians with violence.

My identity as a young person also added a unique dimension to the interaction. On the one hand, shared identities such as age made it easier to establish rapport and build trust (Merriam et al., 2001; Gordon, 2021; Adebayo and Njoku, 2023). For example, some FGD participants disclosed that, during their teenage phases, they had been part of political pressure groups. Most young people would not make such an admission because of the stigma and stereotypes around political pressure groups (Rasmussen, 2010; Branch, 2011). And the fear that such admissions could endorse the criminalisation of the youth identity (Mohamed, 2021). Thus our youthfulness facilitated more open and honest communication. As a researcher who comes from the same social context and shares the same identities as my participants I was also expected to have a better understanding of their experiences and perspectives. For example, participants made cultural references through language to explain the role of gender ideologies in ‘radicalisation’. I was aware of some of the language because it referred to historical, political, economic, and cultural discourses I am familiar with. However, I did not know the meanings ascribed to some of the other words. This included phrases such as shega ile mbaya and words like beneti. So when I asked the participants what the phrases meant, I was met with doubtful facial expressions or responses such as ‘Really?’ or ‘so, you really don’t know?’

With such responses and reactions, I realised that while age, location, and ethnicity among other markers of identity might have provided an immediate bond which is ideal for the research, my social class and level of education complicated our interaction (Johnson-Bailey, 1999). Further inquiry shows that, particularly, the word beneti comprises terminology commonly used by ‘youth gangs’ in and around Mombasa county. Such terminology is secret code for communication (Abdulaziz and Osinde, 1997), thus would most likely be unknown to non-gang members. Also, this language incorporates slang words which are used to exclude outgroup members (Abdulaziz and Osinde, 1997). According to MP1 of FGD1, beneti can be used to refer to an assortment of small weapons.

---

such as knives and machetes among others. While this language may be used within the community, it is mainly used by youth (Githiora, 2002). Who in most cases see themselves and are also seen by others as belonging to a social group distinct and exclusive from that of the adults (Abbink, 2005). More so for youth from low income groups, apart from marking the youth identity, coded language and linguistic practices also mark social class (Abdulaziz and Osinde, 1997; Hillewaert, 2020), particularly in contexts where belonging is questioned and redefined. Furthermore, besides my youthfulness and position as a local, some words and phrases remained hidden. This is because youth deliberately make them ambiguous when referring to acts of violence/criminal acts they (may) commit. Baird (2018) makes similar observations when researching youth gang members in Colombia. I had a firm understanding of the local context (Teusner, 2016), but not knowing some of the lexicon risked making inaccurate interpretations of the data. Thus, I navigated this dilemma by cross-examining such lexicon with my participants and other young people.

On the other hand, as earlier discussed, shared identities and researcher positions may also create biases or assumptions about participants' experiences and perspectives (Alvesson, 2003; Teusner, 2016). Researchers may assume that they know more about the participants' experiences due to socially shared frameworks i.e, culture, values, beliefs, and attitudes (Alvesson, 2003). In turn, this can lead to unintentional biases in the data gathered and the conclusions drawn. However, among many other strategies of minimising bias such as keeping a research journal detailing my assumptions prior, during and after the research (see Alvesson, 2003; Finlay and Gough, 2003; Coghlan and Holian, 2007; Teusner, 2016) I also verified participant accounts with other sources (Bouka, 2013). In my study, I verified participants' accounts with sources including existing literature, commissioned reports, policy documents, news sources and reports by CSOs. This practice ascertained existing factual themes and it also helped to take note of silenced accounts which this thesis argues should be understood within the socio-political context of terrorism and counterterrorism and PCVE stakeholders being located in specific vantage points.

Data Analysis

Coding Categories

Coding proceeded in two cycles: attribute coding and coding for language. Attribute coding was conducted on press articles, interviews and focus group transcripts. This is because these texts involved multiple participants and sites too, thus attribute coding helped with data management. Additionally, attribute coding was necessary for analysing the contents and distribution of categories in the data. Speeches and statements and policy documents used in this study were only coded for language.
Language coding proceeded in four phases (see Appendix G). First, initial reading examined when the term ‘radicalisation’ is used, in what context and how it is used. I arrived at this by running a word frequency query and then refined it with text searches and queries. This helped to identify terms frequently occurring with ‘radicalisation’ and where they occur in the content. The query results and issues that had been identified while reviewing literature were used to develop codes. Further, in examining the texts I also applied the following questions:

a. What issues are foregrounded when talking about ‘radicalisation’?

b. How were youth actors represented in these arguments?
   - What aspects about youth are foregrounded and backgrounded?
   - What vocabulary is used to describe young people?
   - What social situations are youth portrayed in?

c. What assumptions drive these descriptions?

d. Who is making the arguments? Are the arguments advanced based on expert research and analysis, laws, statistics, and authority figures?

e. What and how do the arguments reference moral values?

f. What are the functions of these discursive practices (referential and legitimation strategies)?

g. How does the language create, maintain or challenge existing power relations?

From this process, I created codes or nodes (e.g. unemployment, corruption, low level of education, violent counterterrorism, alienation, and sense of belonging, among others). I then moved to the second phase: open coding. In open coding, I reviewed each text—with the above guiding questions in mind—and coded words, sentences or paragraphs into existing codes and created new ones for those that had not appeared during the literature review or initial reading. Once this was completed, the analysis moved to the third phase: category creation. Here I looked for patterns and connections in the data. The codes identified in phase 1 were reviewed and reordered into broader categories (either as parent or child codes). For instance, unemployment, corruption and low level of education were placed under the parent node—economic factors.

The fourth phase was category development or creating themes. Here, the focus is on evaluating whether categories can be linked/reduced further into emergent themes, with an aim to summarise the data into a few themes relevant to the research question. I ran different search queries and coding queries to find coding intersections.

I identified similarities and differences in codes between and across texts in the years under review. For example, codes on national values were more prominent in the speeches, while
democratic values and attributions to extreme religious ideologies were prevalent in policy texts and the press. These codes are related as they all allude to values; hence they were categorised under the cultural values theme. Those focusing on different social networks or ‘powerful Other’ formed the theme of cultural relations. And those on gender roles and expectations created the cultural imperatives theme.

These themes captured crucial elements of the way in which ‘radicalisation’ was described. Using this example, together themes on cultural values, cultural relations, and cultural imperatives broadly constructed ‘radicalisation’ as an issue of culture/cultural-related discourses (see figure 2.3). And in other cases where the focus was on demographic details and micro-level processes, the themes constituted identity discourses or individual-level concerns. Sometimes these discourses were labelled under evocative titles such as what someone is going through matters or making values and relations matter.

Once all themes had been identified, I used coding comparisons to assess what themes were prevalent in the texts under analysis. The themes prevalent in policy texts, speeches and statements and the press were categorised as national discourses because they have a national outlook on the issue of ‘radicalisation’ and come directly and indirectly from institutions and elites. Those themes prevalent among practitioners of PCVE in Mombasa and young people from Mombasa build towards local discourses. These discourses are categorised as local because they trickle from local actors thus highlighting localised understandings.
An NVivo visualisation of codes, categories, themes and discourses

Figure 2.3 - Layering Discourses, Themes and Codes, as Organised by the Researcher
My journey of analysing press articles

The unit of analysis consisted of individual news articles. The 474 news texts were uploaded to NVivo and the analysis proceeded in two cycles. The first phase coded for attributes and the second coded for language (see the codebook in Appendix D). The codebook was adapted from Hong Kong Baptist University\(^ {59}\) and modified according to the research questions. Coding proceeded in two cycles. The first cycle, i.e. attribute coding intended to capture the descriptive information and contexts of the text that could later be used for data analysis and interpretation. In attribute coding, I coded for four parts of the news item: general information of the news item, story characteristics, sources and reporting, and the type of framing used\(^ {60}\).

Once attribute coding was completed, I proceeded to the second coding cycle, i.e. language coding (as detailed in Appendix G). The aim of language coding was to analyse the words, vocabulary and grammar used by different actors to understand how they define, name, and identify events and individuals in relation to ‘radicalisation’ and what solutions they propose. To carry out an effective CDA the sample for the news articles had to be reduced. I used Riffe et al.’s (2014) event-constructed sampling strategy to organise news under major discursive events related to terrorism. The discursive events were curated from a developing database project on terrorism-related events\(^ {61}\) in Kenya. The thematic areas were organised under PCVE policies, attacks, arrests and court cases of terror suspects, visits by elite nations and third nation elites, and regional events discussing terrorism and PCVE (see figure 2.4). I gathered news published 7 days following the event under review.

\(^{59}\) Codebook for the analysis of news was adapted from Hong Kong Baptist University. It can be accessed at: https://digital.lib.hkbu.edu.hk/JRP/codebook.php.

\(^{60}\) General information coded for attributes such as name of newspaper, edition, author, gender of the author, type of news story, and placement. Story characteristics collected information on the main topic, and geographical focus. Sources and reporting coded for the most cited sources, and reporting methods for example was their use of factual and verifiable data, and the number of viewpoints per article. In this part, I also assessed whether the document used human or document sources, the source type i.e. whether a state source, political party, foreign source, and ordinary people among others. The final part on framing coded for the types of frame used in the news items. Coding for this section was guided by Entman’s (1993) conceptualisation of frames and Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing typology.

\(^{61}\) The curated database can be accessed at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FU_FB9UeiZ2OpN5v3FYS2ORpJY2gEW0kOGt8slfvu6c/edit?pli=1#gid=72585328.
While coding for language I noticed that the articles (un)intentionally and automatically associated terrorism and (in)security in general with men. Where women were involved in political violence, such news was only covered in ‘gender-related’ special publications. Such coverage relied on essentialist assumptions that position men as inherent to violence and women as nurturing and peaceful in nature. Thus, I went back and reviewed the 474 articles and identified instances of gender (used here to mean women because that is how the press publications portrayed it) related thematic coverage. This brought the final sample size for CDA to 46 (see Table 2.1).

<p>| Table 2.1 - Distribution of Texts by Thematic Events |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUC Attack (10)</td>
<td>Battle of El-Adde (5)</td>
<td>MCAP Launch (2)</td>
<td>African Union Meeting (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-related (2)</td>
<td>Arrests/Court Cases (3)</td>
<td>Gender-related (1)</td>
<td>Gender-related (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Obama's Visit (8)</td>
<td>NSCVE Launch/Police Station Attack (5)</td>
<td>Arrests/Court Cases (2)</td>
<td>US Embassy Anniversary (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Handling focus group data

For this study, ethnographic data was important for understanding how meaning is negotiated. While analysing the data I was reminded that the point of any critical analysis is to distinguish complexity and “deny [sic] easy, dichotomous explanations” of the phenomena being studied (Wodak, 1999, p. 186). Thus discourses should “not be viewed as “static and homogeneous, but as dynamic and contradictory” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 28). Which brings us to the role of the analyst. The analyst's interest is to describe, explain and interpret the contradictions underpinning social life (Wodak, 1999) and while explaining and interpreting these contradictions, the analyst's identities, positionings and values shape the conclusions they draw. Making the analysis a self-reflective process (Ibid). With the focus groups I sought to understand how young people talk about ‘radicalisation’. More specifically, I was interested in how young people narrated their everyday experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism, and relatedly, the particular subject positions they occupied—and/or they were placed by others—and how these enabled or constrained their actions. By using the analytical approach presented in this chapter, I analysed two FGD transcripts.

The first step once the focus groups discussions had been transcribed, was to read and re-read the transcripts, with an intention of immersing myself in the participants’ stories. Because of our shared identities and experiences, I could relate to some of their narratives. However, I was also aware that fully immersing myself is impossible because “all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically constituted” (Kincheloe and Mclaren, 2011, p. 299). The social norms, especially in research situations are well established. Such power structures not only shape what was said, but also when, how and why it was said and how I as the researcher describes, explains and interprets it. Thus this first step of initial reading was useful in describing and interrogating the contents of participant’s views and my position in relation to the same. At this stage, all segments of the transcripts were read and coded to existing categories, and others to new categories. For example, the statement: “there are other young people who get everything from home. But they feel they were demeaned or dehumanised by someone else” was coded under self-worth. Which was a new category. Whereas, the statement: “if I'm radicalised by religion, I am told that to make our society better it is supposed to be purely Islamic”, was coded both under religion and Islam, which were codes that had already been identified in the previous chapters. This broad categorisation was facilitated by linking the data to social theories of ‘radicalisation’ (Horgan, 2005; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Borum, 2011, 2012; Botha, 2017), youth and conflict (Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, 2006; Urdal, 2007; Altiok et al., 2020) and critical discursive literature on ‘radicalisation’ and counter-
radicalisation (Kundnani, 2012; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; Silva, 2018; Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023).

The next step involved paying closer attention to textual features such as words, phrases and stretches of texts that inferred the types of discourses being produced and utilised. For example, in FGD1 and FGD2 segments of texts were highlighted where participants were discussing the role of ‘powerful Others’ in ‘radicalisation’, and the nature of the relationship between the ‘powerful Other’ and young people. The groups identified different types of powerful Others from opportunistic elites, religious elites, and peers to other men and women in the society. Together the codes of opportunistic elites, religious elites, peers, and other men and women formed the theme of cultural relations. I then reread the segments of the conversations and coded for argumentation strategies: a) how participants represented themselves and others (Van Leeuwen, 2003) and b) the legitimation strategies used to advance their arguments (Van Leeuwen, 2008). I used these segments to assess the macro-discourses shaping participants’ narrations and how young people viewed themselves within these discourses. This involved recording what they said and how they said it in a group setup. Thus I analysed groups dynamics by focussing on interactions.

As I have shown in figure 7.4, for example, participants arrived at a shared understanding of ‘radicalisation’ by negotiating meaning with their peers. In the diagram, red lines showed theme connections and the participants that expressed them. Dashed-arrow symbols show both the direction of communication and the tensions in the discussion. Using figure 7.4 and how participants agreed and disagreed with each other, I interpreted participants’ views as shaped by their wider understanding of culture, their own social roles, identities, and relationships with others (Van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak, 2011). At the same time, this also means, participants’ understandings and positionings further reinforce culture. The final step of the analysis involved relating these findings to literature on critical perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism (Raphael, 2009; Qureshi, 2010; Githens-Mazer, 2012; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; Jarvis and Lister, 2015; Solomon, 2015).

Limitations of this study

One limitation of this research was the inability to include Arab, more Swahili and Somali participants in the FGDs. As other studies have shown, Kenya’s counterterrorism has relied on visible ethnic and racial markers (e.g. skin colour, hair texture, accent), thus making the Arab, Swahili and Somali identities the most criminalised identity categories (Prestholdt, 2011; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2015; Mwangi, 2019). Hence, this study would have generated richer insights with the inclusion of these social groups. However, the inability to
access them resulted from several concerns. First, the criminalisation of their identities means these groups limit their interactions to people they trust, know, and can identify with to protect themselves. Thus many would be hesitant to participate in a terrorism-related study without fearing that the study is commissioned to surveil them.

Second, more generally, Arabs and Somalis are relatively middle-income groups compared to most groups such as the Mijikenda. This means they are likely to hang out in different spaces and are far less likely to be volunteering in CBOs. Thus to access these groups, one needs to be an insider. The third limitation was a hesitance on my part as a researcher. For safety reasons, I was hesitant to engage youth groups based in Majengo and Old Town areas—which are also areas with predominantly Swahili, Arab and Somali populations. These areas are widely labelled ‘hotspots’; thus, venturing into them could cause further harm to the participants and expose me to risk. Since these areas are under surveillance, every non-familiar individual is viewed with suspicion. And the risk of being harmed could emanate from those who would view me ‘as a Muslim but a traitor’ and those working in state security agencies who may want full access to the data. With this in mind, the FGDs only focused on CBOs based in Kisauni and Likoni. Despite Kisauni and Likoni being ‘hotspots’, I have extensively lived in these two areas; thus, I am familiar with their dynamics. Also, compared to majengo which is relatively homogenous religiously and ethnically, Kisauni and Likoni are heterogeneous; hence often policing works in different ways.

Another limitation was the inability to have a gender-balanced cohort among practitioners and FGD participants. The study had been designed to include all genders, however, this was impossible once I got to the research site. First, in some organisations, the director decided who should participate in the interview. However, I submitted a request that to participate in the study, the participant should be directly involved in project planning/design and/or implementation of PCVE, which brings me to the second issue. I found out that most people working in these capacities are men, whereas women primarily function in administrative roles. As a result, I only interviewed five female participants. In the FGDs, specifically, FGD1, while two female participants had expressed their interest in the discussion, they did not show up on the day of the discussion, citing family and domestic commitments. We later tried to set-up online interviews, but this was impossible due to poor internet connectivity.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explained how the research was designed, the methods for gathering data and how the data was processed, analysed and interpreted. I ground this study in CDA and CTS, thus probing the relationship between power, knowledge and discourse. This study
applied insights and tools from three main approaches: Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional framework, Van Leeuwen’s Social Actor Network, and Van Leeuwen’s Legitimation Frameworks. Together these three analytical tools formed a framework that offered a comprehensive way of describing, analysing and explaining the different elements of social practices. In the following five chapters—Chapters Three to Seven—I will use the analytical framework developed in this chapter to analyse and explain how discourses on ‘radicalisation’ are articulated in PCVE policy documents, presidential speeches and statements, the press, by PCVE practitioners and young people, respectively. To achieve this, the analysis will focus on three levels of discourse: the text, discursive practice and social practice.

At the level of the text, I will identify how discourses are linguistically realised by analysing how vocabulary and grammar is used to articulate certain themes. I will use this level as the starting point before delving into the second level of discursive practices. Where I will look at what and how argumentation strategies—specifically referential and legitimation strategies—are used to represent and characterise youth actors and how they legitimate, delegitimate or critique what we can know as and about ‘radicalisation’ and those affected by it. The final level of analysis will look at the consequences of the discourses emerging from the data. Here I will assess what solutions and policy options the different discourses make possible and what this means for young people as targets and beneficiaries of PCVE. These five chapters will, thus, subject PCVE policy documents, presidential speeches and statements, press articles, interviews, and focus group transcripts to a detailed analysis to illustrate exactly how ‘radicalisation’ is constituted in these texts.

As CDA proponents reiterate, "texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance" (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 10). While the texts under this study are produced in different domains, they are not entirely separate from each other. They are all part of a broader conversation about ‘radicalisation’; thus, they influence and interact with each other. Unpacking these interactions through CDA could explain how our ‘radicalisation’ knowledge is shaped and maintained. Thereby giving us insight into the role of these conceptualisations of ‘radicalisation’ in shaping the PCVE agenda and defining the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for young people in everyday life.
Chapter 3. Competing National and Local Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’: Analysis of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism and the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

In this chapter, I analyse policies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) to understand how they construct ‘radicalisation’ and how this construction likely determines the types of PCVE measures proposed and implemented. I examined two policy texts; the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) which was developed at the national level, and the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP), developed by the County government of Mombasa. These policies were selected because they are thematically related to this study by being the only texts entirely dedicated to the PCVE policy domain in Kenya, as shown in the introduction. This chapter is divided into six sections. The first situates ‘radicalisation’ by locating it within elite discourses on ‘terrorism’ and counterterrorism practices in Kenya’s three regimes: the Moi, Kibaki and Kenyatta administrations. The second introduces and analyses the NSCVE and MCAP highlighting when and how they were developed and how they are formatted and structured and what these formatting choices suggest about the target audiences of the text. The third analyses definitional debates and emerging themes on ‘radicalisation’. The analysis found that while the national policy largely views ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of problematic identities and cultures. The local policy reiterates cultural discourses but also emphasises the structural conditions that create environments where ‘radical ideas’ and violent behaviours can thrive. The fourth shows that these three themes construct young people as dangerous and a vulnerable group by creatively combining representation strategies of classification, functionalisation and aggregation. Further, these themes are legitimated as objective through authorisation strategies, whereas moral evaluation by analogy frames ‘radicalisation’ as a continuation of the struggle for independence. The fifth section concludes that the continuity of NSCVE discourses in the MCAP partly emerges because the MCAP was developed to support the implementation of the NSCVE. The enforcement of linearity from top-down thus limited what the MCAP could intelligibly include. I argue that rendering cultures and social groups, e.g. youth, as problematic in official discourses justifies the use of aggressive policies on already disadvantaged groups. Hence, it is in this context that the MCAP possibilities and CSOs program implementation work–as extensively discussed in chapter six–needs to be understood.
Kenya’s 1998 al-Qaeda-led attack targeting the US embassy was an essential antecedent in the emergence of the current Islamic terrorism discourse. However, before the 1998 attacks, Kenya has always had tense relations with its Muslim populace. Because of grievances related to the politico-economic marginalisation of Muslims/Muslim-majority regions. Such grievances have at times fuelled political violence, but this violence was attributed to Islamic religious beliefs that oppose secularism (Oded, 2000). Predominantly because of Islam’s ambiguous position in Kenya’s political landscape and popular perceptions of Arabs and Swahili as not being ‘fully Kenyan’ (Mwakimako, 2007; Ndzovu, 2014).

In the 1990s, increasing authoritarianism fuelled dissatisfaction with Moi’s administration, leading to nationwide calls for reforms. At the Coast, IPK led these calls and often the demonstrations ended in clashes with state security forces (Prestholdt, 2011). Ignoring state violence, Moi instead accused IPK of propagating Islamic fundamentalism (Branch, 2011) and linked its funding to Iran and Sudan (The Standard as cited in Oded, 1996). Hence, portraying Arab and Swahili identities as first, outsiders and second, prone to violence (Branch, 2011). And while IPK mobilised under Muslim identity, their propositions were indistinguishable from those of other civil society groups (Ndzovu, 2012). But this construction was made plausible because the IPK directly threatened Kenya African National Unions’ (KANU) dominance at the Coast. Hence, close to the 1992 elections, Moi’s administration refused to register IPK. Because as a religious party, it violated the principle of separation of church and state (Oded, 2000). Also, KANU mobilised youth pressure groups, so-called ‘Black Muslims’, primarily drawn from Mijikenda communities to counter IPK’s politics (Oded, 2000). Resulting in violent clashes between the IPK—Arab/Swahili ‘Brown Muslims’—and the ‘Black Muslims’, thus reinforcing “the image of young Swahili and Arabs as prone to violence” (Prestholdt, 2011, p. 7). This idea reinforced the argument that Coastal communities supported the 1998 bombings, particularly since the bombings occurred during the prime of IPK’s activism (Prestholdt, 2011).

Moi’s administration blamed the bombings on ‘religious fundamentalists’, particularly the IPK-supporting communities and Muslims (Mwakimako, 2007; Prestholdt, 2011). Analysts, the media, American authorities and Kenyans believed that Coastal Swahili and Arab men were involved, despite later evidence indicating that most key actors were foreigners. Moi used the attacks to invite the Federal Bureau of Investigation to work directly with state-security forces (Prestholdt, 2011). The attacks provided an opportunity to rebuild Kenya—
US partnerships severed due to Moi’s government’s human rights abuses and suppression of democracy (Mogire and Mkutu, 2011). Leading to the resumption and increase in US military assistance (Garcia 2003, 2007 as cited in Mogire and Mkutu, 2011) and making the attacks Kenya’s tool for enhancing diplomatic relations.

Counterterrorism remained a low priority for Moi’s administration (Prestholdt, 2011) first, for fear of retaliatory violence if the Muslim population was further alienated. And second, because Moi was securing Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency in an environment of KANU’s declining popularity. However, Moi’s administration used 9/11 to strengthen Kenya—US diplomatic ties by enforcing stricter regulations in processing travel documents of Kenyans of Asian and Arab descent (see Prestholdt, 2011). The subsequent 2002 twin bombings further situated the attacks in the prism of ‘Islamist terrorism’ (Mohamed, 2022).

Shortly after the 2002 attacks, Mwai Kibaki (2002—2012) became Kenya’s 3rd president, but little changed for Muslims. During Kibaki’s era, counterterrorism became a priority area increasingly influenced by the ‘Islamist terrorism’ discourse with Coastal Muslims as the loci of terrorism (Prestholdt, 2011). Counterterrorism architecture expanded, with the enactment of legislation such as the controversial Suppression of Terrorism Bill modelled on the US Patriot Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012, and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010 and formation of institutions such as the Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and NCTC. Most controversial was the launch of Kenya’s first foreign operation—Linda Nchi, the numerous local security operations targeting Muslims/Islamic institutions and the rendition of Somalis (Prestholdt, 2011). With the crippling tourism industry due to rising insecurity and Western states’ travel advisories, Kibaki’s administration “submitted to US [sic] pressure to root out terrorists”, and he identified the terrorism problem “as manageable” and “emanating from the small coastal Muslim community” (Prestholdt, 2011, p. 9).

Kenyatta’s administration mimicked its predecessors. Growing and diversifying counterterrorism from pushing for more legislation to pre-empt terrorism, including the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA) for criminalising and prosecuting terror suspects, and the 2013 Tripartite Agreement which facilitates the repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya (Mwangi, 2017). To the adoption of financial deregulation laws such as the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2017 and the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) bill 2006 to disrupt terrorist financing. Also, to pre-empt the threat, Kenyatta’s administration continued its foreign military operation and locally, initiated several operations and amnesty programs (Mohamed, 2022) which are characterised by profiling, collective punishment, and violations of human rights and international conventions (see further HRW, 2016).
Further, police roundups, death threats, extrajudicial assassinations and disappearances of terror suspects, extortion by security forces, police harassment of terror suspects’ families, and increased surveillance and profiling of Muslims and Somalis have become more common (Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; Amnesty International, 2014; Independent Policing Oversight Authority, 2014; HRW and KHRC, 2015; HRW, 2016; Mohamed, 2021). Counterterrorism has evolved into a tool for exercising political control and advancing authoritarianism. Also, Kenyatta’s administration has expanded Moi and Kibaki’s terrorism framework. From targeting Coastal Muslims to including Somali refugees, policy critics, Nairobi suburbs, and the Northeastern region. His counterterrorism strategy echoes his father’s and Moi’s *Shifta*62 war.

Due to mounting criticism and pressure from CSOs and donors regarding violations of the rule of law and the heavy-handed approach, Kenyatta’s administration using EU funding spearheaded the drafting and adoption of NSCVE and the subsequent County Action Plans (CAP). The EU and Kenyan government see the strategy as instrumental in strengthening their security—development partnership. The strategy shifts counterterrorism from security-oriented to softer and inclusive measures. Theoretically, it complies with the EU and Kenya’s commitment to the UNSCR, conventions on counterterrorism and United Nations (UN) action plans on PVE. However, its implementation violates international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law (Freedom House, 2018). Our understanding of ‘radicalisation’ discourses should thus be grounded in these elite discourses and practices on terrorism and counterterrorism. The following section begins by introducing the two PCVE policies under analysis.

**Introducing Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) Policies**

One of these policies, the NSCVE, was developed at the national level after extensive consultations with local and global interest groups (National Counter-Terrorism Centre, 2016). The NSCVE was introduced in 2016 and is described as “Africa’s first National strategy” that

shifts from military-led counterterrorism to a more holistic approach which demands a fine balance between the use of the “hard power” and the technologies of “soft power” to win hearts and minds and drain the swamps of radicalisation (Kagwanja, 2016).

---

In addition to being available online, the document is also published as a 41-page booklet. It consists of pictures and text laid out in landscape orientation with page-borders lined red. The cover page (see figure 3.1) contains three main elements.

The first is a black and white image of beaded bracelets. These bracelets are used as ornaments in Kenya and throughout Africa. Beyond ornamental value, beads have monetary value and cultural significance. Among the Maasai community, beadwork symbolises various aspects of social life, including beauty, marital status, hospitality, nature, age, and social status (Wijngaarden, 2017). Besides, each colour has meaning, (e.g. white signifies purity, black represents the people and the challenges they endure, green symbolises health and nature, and red represents bravery, unity and blood). Second, the Kenyan flag’s emblem and its accompanying slogan (harambee63) are located on the extreme top-right. The emblem represents Kenya’s core values64. Third, the document’s title is capitalised, bolded and enclosed in a white textbox with its height lined with black, white, red, white, and green, respectively. This colour arrangement is like that of the Kenyan flag. Inside, the documents’ main headings are written in red font and enclosed in white text boxes, while subheadings are written in white and enclosed in red text boxes. The document’s body is written in black font. The NSCVE is available in popular and classified versions. This study focuses on the popular version due to its accessibility and being the version used by CVE stakeholders.

63 Means pulling together. It was the cultural, socio-economic and political philosophy promoted by Kenya’s first two regimes.
64 See Chapter 2 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.
Kenya’s national government mandated county governments to develop CAPs to support the implementation of the NSCVE at the local level. Several counties, including Mombasa, have developed such CAPs after consultative forums with various stakeholders, including representatives from the national government security authorities, CSOs, and local communities. The MCAP was launched in 2017 and will be implemented until 2022. It is an 85-page document that also uses the landscape orientation layout, with the Kenyan flag colours lining the page’s lower border. The main title is written in white font against a green background while the sub-title is in black font against a green background. Inside, all headings are bolded and capitalised while sub-headings are only bolded. The MCAP’s cover page (see figure 3.2) features a photograph of elephant tusks (a popular monument in Mombasa city) located on Moi Avenue next to Uhuru gardens. These aluminium tusks are a historical symbol of Mombasa. Next to the tusks is a coconut tree with a coconut leaf signpost that reads ‘Mombasa City says yes for the children’. The coconut tree symbolises coastal vegetation, while the slogan conveniently places ‘children’ as a security referent that need protection. This is not surprising given that the MCAP aims to ‘save’ children (used generically) from ‘radicalisation’. The cover page also features the Kenyan flag, and its emblem and another emblem of Mombasa County government.

![Figure 3.2 – Cover page of MCAP](image)

Generally, both policies are grounded in broader ideas about partnerships or working together which described each stakeholder’s responsibilities in PCVE and ‘radicalisation’.

---

65 Or devolved governments are local administrative divisions adopted after the passing of the 2010 constitution.
Accordingly, the MCAP’s main objectives is to “promote networking and cooperation between state (National and County) and non-state actors”\(^{66}\). This will be achieved through participation, inclusion, and solidarity among other principles. The governor’s message aptly argues that previous “CVE agendas… [have been] out of touch with local realities”, specifically, security apparatuses responses which are locally seen as “oppressive, intrusive and confrontational”. Not only have such interventions wrongly “perpetrate[d] the notion that religion—especially Islam—is a ‘problem’”, but also they have “counter-productively increased resentment for the regime” fuelled ‘radicalisation’ and the spread of extreme ideologies\(^{67}\). The governor contends that “it is important that solutions [CVE]… emerge based on local realities and sustainable partnerships”. Thus, the policy includes a new “multi-sectoral approach” where the national and county government, security stakeholders, ministries, elected leaders, and other stakeholders collaborate in PCVE work\(^{68}\). Stronger partnerships are viewed as ways to “build synergies” and “ownership of CVE efforts”.

Ideas of partnership indicate the establishment of more democratic relationships compared to traditionally reserving the implementation of security to governments. It should be acknowledged that there has been a global increase in discourses on partnerships, especially after the criticism launched against the problematic ‘War on Terror’. PCVE has been marked by shifting language away from the aggressive rhetoric of ‘war’ and pejorative characterisations of communities, e.g. ‘Islamist extremism’ (Lehane, 2018). Still, PCVE is suspiciously seen as an attempt at sanitising the ostracised counterterrorism agenda (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Hence, it remains questionable whether these discourses on partnerships are only theoretical or will take hold. Notwithstanding, Fairclough (2001) cautions that policy documents can “advocate one-way ‘partnerships’ to serve government purposes”.

Notes on formatting

In CDA format and structuring of documents is as important as its contents. This is because the format and structure chosen suggests the target audience. Looking at the NSCVE and MCAP, it is immediately apparent that the documents were designed to be primarily used by academics, practitioners, and government departments. This is observable in the type of language used. Terminology such as “theory of change”, “operational outcomes”, and “work pillars” are operational concepts mostly used in project management. Thus, only practitioners, academics and government departments will be familiar with these terms and how they can be operationalised, because they form the basis of their day-to-day

\(^{66}\) See MCAP p.41 paragraph 45.
\(^{67}\) See MCAP p.2.
\(^{68}\) See MCAP p.48, paragraph 109.
implementation of projects. Similarly, concepts including “phases of radicalisation”, “disengagement”, “reintegration”, and “de-radicalisation” are likely only familiar to academics specialising in the fields of conflict studies, and sub-field of terrorism studies and practitioners working/researching in these fields. Such language choices indicate that the policy documents were intended for highly literate audiences.

Besides language, the texts use tables, matrices, and frameworks such as SWOT analysis, Stakeholder analysis, pestle analysis and logical framework suggesting they were designed for audiences with expertise in project planning and management. Such individuals are most likely practitioners, academics and those working in government departments. Similarly, this structuring also shows the different genres, e.g. business management and project management, that the texts draw upon.

Other common formatting choices in both texts include the use of bold and italic fonts (e.g. “Strategic End State”, “learning in action”, and numbering and bullet points. These features perform technical functions. Lists and bullets separate items; tables show logical relations between elements; while diagrams structure relations (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006). However, Ledin and Machin (2015, p. 4), add that “the affordances of lists, bullets, tables and diagrams [sic] can therefore be used to manage the way things, the relations between things, processes, participants, times and places are represented”. Thus, these features are not only “reader-friendly” but also direct the reader (Fairclough, 2001, p. 259) to assertions deemed important. In these policies, such assertions included the drivers of ‘radicalisation’, priority areas for PCVE, and the responsibilities of each stakeholder. Hence, formatting facilitates what readers are likely to recall at a later stage.

Flags, emblems, and other politico-cultural symbols are crucial in expressing political and cultural identities. The Kenyan flag, emblem, and slogan (harambee) represent the aspirations and history of the Kenyan people. Their use in PCVE policies evokes a national identity built on shared beliefs, values, and history. They are also symbols of power used to demonstrate the nation’s continued existence and its legitimacy. For example, the shield and spears in the national emblem symbolise weapons used by the Mau Mau, while the colour red symbolises the blood shed during the struggle for liberation from the British Empire. Both texts use political symbols alluding to a united and cohesive Kenya (Umoja), with patriotic citizens (Wazalendo), who look out for each other (Nyayo). Umoja, Uzalendo and Nyayo are the philosophies that have guided Kenya’s state-building process since its independence in 1963. Thus the symbols are grounded in discourses of nationhood and invoking them serves to mobilise cohesion, unity and patriotism. It reminds Kenyans of old victories—Mau Mau victory against the empire—to encourage them to support the current (non)coercive counterrorism efforts.
On what drives ‘radicalisation’ and how to prevent it

In terms of definitions, ‘radicalisation’ remains a contentious concept. While the MCAP was modelled from the NSCVE, there are several definitional issues that warrant further scrutiny. First, the NSCVE and MCAP defined ‘radicalisation’ in a similar manner. Emphasising that ‘radicalisation’ is “a gradual process that employs the ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialise them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist groups or campaigns”69. Additionally, the NSCVE states that:

It is dependent [sic] on a fanatical ideology that rejects dialogue and compromise in favour of an [sic] ends-justifies-ends approach, particularly in the willingness to utilise mass violence to advance political aims—defined in racial, ethnic, sectarian and religious terms—opposed to the democratic principles enshrined in Kenya’s Constitution.

This extract is however omitted in the MCAP. Perhaps to maintain simplicity and ease of understanding or the omission serves ideological purposes. Given that Islam is the predominant faith in Mombasa, the MCAP authors—the consortium of partners led by Mombasa-based CSOs—may have omitted these details because they do not serve their interests and/or to diminish the apparent link between Islam and terrorism that the NSCVE was fostering. Especially because the NSCVE clearly states in bolded and italicised fonts70 that Salafi—jihadi is the leading cause of ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya. Since the MCAP is implemented in Mombasa, this omission serves to avoid intensifying interfaith conflicts.

Second, both documents defined violent extremism as “radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies”71, the MCAP unlike the NSCVE, distinguishes violent extremism from ‘extremism’. It views ‘extremism’ as “ideologies which go beyond what the society perceives to be normal. While extremism may not be necessarily negative or violent, its usage tends to connote violence”. This added detail nuances ‘extremism’ and highlights existing biases in how the concept is deployed.

Moving away from definitional issues, the analysis identified three prevalent discourses on ‘radicalisation’. Psychosocial discourses were dominant in the NSCVE and drew on personal experiences of violence and developmental phases to construct youth as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’ (see figure 3.3). Cultural discourses focused on different aspects of culture (see figure 3.4). They viewed ‘radicalisation’ as a rejection of fundamental

---

69 See NSCVE p.10; MCAP p.VIII.
70 See NSCVE p.23.
71 See NSCVE p.11; MCAP p.IX.
national/traditional values, as an outcome of extreme religious ideologies, bad parenting and as enabled by social networks. Cultural discourses assumed that “fostering patriotism” and “a national identity” at all levels of society will help mitigate ‘radicalisation’. The third discourse attributes ‘radicalisation’ to the debilitating socio-economic conditions young people navigate (see figure 3.5). It highlights many issues ranging from the politics of counterterrorism, local politics, high unemployment rates, and proximity to unstable states to specific areas being considered hotspots of ‘radicalisation’.

While both policy texts contain socio-economic discourses, there are discrepancies in what aspects are emphasised. For example, at the national level is a clear attempt of the NSCVE to externalise ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism more generally. Here ‘radicalisation’ emanates from ideologies originating from “outside Kenya”, and from “unstable states” and states with “ungoverned spaces” neighbouring Kenya. In contrast, at the local level, the MCAP emphasised debilitating “economic conditions” and “poor planning and implementation of counterterrorism” as two aspects facilitating ‘radicalisation’. These discrepancies show the national and devolved governments’ policy priorities, which are both linked, in different ways, to broader political agendas on security and development. In the next section, I analyse the three emerging discourses in-depth to show what assertions they make and what solutions they make possible.

Psychosocial concerns

The NSCVE highlighted the importance of the search for identity among young people who did not feel they belonged in their society as a factor in ‘radicalisation’. Different issues prompted this search for identity. For some young people it was due to experiences of “victimisation or alienation from normal social networks”. For others, it was prompted by feelings of “powerlessness”, “low self-esteem”, “boredom and frustration”. This theme also assumed that ‘radicalisation’ happens because youth is a period of rebellion; hence it is normal for youth to rebel against their parents’ generation and traditional authority figures. Taken together, personal experiences prompted young people to venture out in search of status, meaning, power and belonging. The NSCVE identified boredom, disillusionment, personal tragedies, and a search for status, meaning, power and belonging (see figure 3.3) as factors pulling young people towards violent extremist ideologies.

---

See NSCVE pp.’s 23—24.
Figure 3.3 - Psychosocial Themes on ‘Radicalisation’

These themes creatively employed genericisation, differentiation and classification to construct youth undergoing certain experiences as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’. They argued that “individuals personally susceptible to ‘radicalisation’ include those experiencing low self-esteem, a sense of victimisation or alienation from normal social networks, boredom and frustration, and a sense of powerlessness”. Here, vulnerability is linked to certain psychological and physical experiences. At first social actors are genericised using the generic term “individuals”. This does not reveal the identifiable details of who is considered susceptible except that they are a class of social actors. However, the preceding section\(^{73}\) provides context about the susceptible “individuals”. Adding that:

Kenya has become a target in al-Shabaab’s [sic] oft-stated agenda to establish an Eastern African region of a global caliphate. The terrorists seek to ensure a constant supply of recruits through radicalisation and recruitment of vulnerable Kenyan youths through networks that include online recruitment.

Those susceptible are identified and classified by nationality and age, i.e. Kenyan Youth. These details are important in understanding how differentiation is introduced in section 2—on drivers of ‘radicalisation’—to nuance which Kenyan youth are considered vulnerable. Differentiation shows that “vulnerable Kenyan youth” targeted for recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ by al-Shabaab are those: experiencing an identity crisis, who have undergone a personal tragedy, who are disillusioned and those seeking thrill.

Studies in social movements and terrorism have also shown that many individuals join extremist organisations in search of identity, belonging, purpose and meaning (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Kruglanski \textit{et al.}, 2014). These studies also associate an identity-crisis with vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). Venhaus’

\(^{73}\) See NSCVE p.19 on threat analysis.
analysis of interviews and personal histories of 2032 young men who were foreign fighters concluded that most individuals who join extremist groups have an “unfulfilled need to define themselves” which is rooted in different desires such as personal fulfilment, improved status and self-esteem, and identity consolidation. A search for identity cannot sufficiently explain why individuals join extremists groups as “the vast majority of young people who lack self-esteem do not become terrorists” (Hardy, 2018, p. 85). However, it does play a role alongside certain socio-cultural conditions. In the next section, I analyse the various aspects of culture that policy texts identify as facilitating ‘radicalisation’.

‘Radicalisation’ and Culture

Another discourse attributed ‘radicalisation’ to different cultural concerns (see figure 3.4). This discourse was present in both the NSCVE and MCAP. It emphasised that a rejection of fundamental national values, extreme religious ideologies and social relationships were crucial to understanding ‘radicalisation’. In addition, the MCAP also cited non-religious ideologies, and bad parenting as facilitating young people’s ‘radicalisation’.

‘Radicalisation’ as a rejection of fundamental national values

‘Radicalisation’ was viewed as a consequence of cultural values that were evaluated as being both undemocratic and against fundamental national values. Such cultural values were undemocratic because they contradicted the principles of fairness, liberty, and rule by consent of the governed, respect for human rights, freedom of choice and freedom of religion. Locally, extreme cultural values were those values opposed to Kenya’s national
values, which are defined as an adherence to the principles of unity, fairness, equality and liberty. The general claim was that ‘radicalisation’ occurs in culturally diverse societies lacking cohesion. And with Kenya being deeply divided along ethnic, religious and geographical lines, these divisions have offered a conducive environment for the formation of extreme ethnic/religious and sub-national identities. These extreme identities foster intergroup competition and eventually lead to the support/use of violence on Othered groups.

In particular, the NSCVE made 33 references to the values of cohesion, integration and diversity. It suggested that lack of social cohesion is one of the “conditions that support the spread and adoption of violent extremist ideology”\(^\text{74}\). Because violent extremists like al-Shabaab “reject our Way of Life”\(^\text{75}\). They are “driven by an ideology that aggressively attacks the cultural traditions and histories of African and other peoples as illegitimate and as deserving violent “cleansing or rejection”\(^\text{76}\). They “are radically anti-democratic and, in their authoritarianism, willingness to use mass violence, and refusal to embrace diverse beliefs, are comparable to Stalinism or Nazism”\(^\text{77}\). They have no “respect for another’s cultures and nationalities” and reject pluralism\(^\text{78}\). Similarly, the MCAP made 63 references to the values of cohesion, integration and diversity. It identified a “break-up in social cohesion” as one of the significant challenges affecting Mombasa County\(^\text{79}\). Arguing that ‘radicalisation’ to violent extremism and eventually terrorism has taken hold due to Kenya’s divided nature. These divisions exist at all levels of society. The “inadequate cohesion by both national and county politicians”\(^\text{80}\) has been exploited by “some politicians [to] fund and side with gangs which have the potential to become extremist groups”. Such lack of cohesion makes it difficult for “leaders to work together to address violent extremism and radicalisation”\(^\text{81}\).

The lack of cohesion and existing divisions allowed extremists like al-Shabaab to entrench themselves. Extremists took advantage of existing divisions to recruit and radicalise youth with the goal of enforcing undemocratic governance systems. The MCAP reiterated this observation and viewed Mombasa County as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’ because of the existing divisions. Such divisions hinder effective countering of violent extremism and threaten national security and democracy.

\(^{74}\) See NSCVE p.27.
\(^{75}\) See NSCVE p.12.
\(^{76}\) See NSCVE p.28.
\(^{77}\) See NSCVE p.23.
\(^{78}\) See NSCVE p.12.
\(^{79}\) See MCAP p.1.
\(^{80}\) See MCAP p.46, paragraph 98.
\(^{81}\) See MCAP p.63: political pillar.
Besides cohesion, this theme also emphasised the role of cultural diversity. Diversity was approached in two ways. First, cultural diversity threatened both national cohesion and security. In the MCAP, the county commissioner’s message argues that “the cosmopolitan nature of the County together with its closeness to neighbouring counties has made it vulnerable to groups and individuals with violent extremist ideologies who camouflage within the community and plan their extremist activities”\(^{82}\). Here cultural diversity enables extremist groups to camouflage and conduct their activities undetected. However, diversity on its own is not a precursor for violent extremism. But diversity coupled with inequalities that are experienced along geographical lines could influence the growth of violent extremism. The MCAP advances this by stating that “Mombasa’s economic diversity and associated inequities emerged strongly as key factors which influence the decisions made by youths and young persons to embrace violent extremist ideologies”\(^{83}\). UNDP (2016, p. 14) echoes this finding that diversity “when coupled with exclusive political and economic systems and rent seeking, generates horizontal inequalities that may become a driver for violent extremism”. In other words, it is not diversity that produces violence but the individual and institutionalised discriminatory systems that act as barriers to cohesion and integration.

The second view approaches diversity as a tool that can be used to counter violent ideologies. The NSCVE argues that the very diversity violent extremists threaten to destroy is Kenya’s key PCVE strength. It highlights arts and culture as “a powerful counter to the authoritarian, fanatical ideology of violent extremists and key to national cohesion and resilience”. As a priority, PCVE should “support cultural and arts activities that showcase Kenya and Africa’s diversity of views, histories and cultural production, and co-existence”\(^{84}\). This will help to “reject violent extremist ideologies” and “shrink the pool of individuals that terrorist groups seek to radicalise and recruit”\(^{85}\). The MCAP uses two metaphors about Mombasa to advance a similar view. It sees Mombasa as “an epitome of diversity and co-existence—a cosmopolitan melting pot that has one of the most amazing cultural and ethnic mix in the world.” Accordingly, Mombasa’s “cultural diversity” can be used to enrich, benefit society and “reduce cultural conflicts”\(^{86}\).

By framing ‘radicalisation’ as a consequence of cultural values the NSCVE proposes two cohesion-fostering measures. In the first measure, “agencies will work with political leaders to assist them to advocate for increased cohesion, patriotism, and rejection of all extremist

---

82 See MCAP p.4.
83 See MCAP p.10.
84 See NSCVE p.28.
85 See NSCVE p.13.
86 See MCAP p.61.
ideologies based on religious or ethnic dogma". The second measure, i.e. counter-messaging will "engage Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) to counter violent extremist ideology by pointing to its errors and inaccuracies and to deny anti-democratic and anti-cohesion forces a platform". Also, the MCAP proposes "community CVE outreach activities, CVE dialogue forums with politicians and CVE community meetings with politicians". It argues that conducting cohesion dialogue forums and outreach activities will help to promote tolerance and cohesion. The MCAP also proposes "promoting interfaith activities in institutions of education" to create "more tolerant institutions of learning" and to teach students to "accept diversity and appreciate need for cohesion".

Radicalisation as an outcome of extreme religious ideologies

Twenty-four references attributed 'radicalisation' to religious ideologies. Here, the ideological content and agendas of social actors were the main causes of 'radicalisation'. Six references discussed religion more broadly. Such religious-based assertions were realised through generic claims such as 'radicalisation' happens through "indoctrination—where faith-based [sic] leaders force [sic] their doctrines on [sic] people". Religion in general is seen as enforced on people through religious leaders. The remaining 18 references linked 'radicalisation' to religious orientations associated with Islam and/or beliefs of Muslims.

In the MCAP such assertions were realised by linking violent extremism in Mombasa to "the Saudi version of Islam" which was introduced to Kenya by first, key activists of the IPK especially its youth wing that included "youths like Aboud Rogo and Abubakar Makaburi (who earned the named Makaburi for destroying graves around mosques in Mombasa as part of cleansing the mosques from any form of Shirk)". And second, through scholarship beneficiaries who had travelled to Saudi Arabia to advance their studies. These alien orientations of Islam are considered dangerous because first, they are different from the orientations of Islam practised in Kenya. This difference is foregrounded by the statement that the Saudi version of Islam contradicts "many traditions which Muslims had earlier taken for granted". Such traditions include Maulid93 celebrations. These celebrations have always formed part of Islamic practices in Kenya; however, the Saudi version characterised these

87 See NSCVE p.28.
88 Ibid
89 See MCAP p.12.
90 See MCAP p.53.
91 See MCAP p.44.
92 See MCAP p19, paragraph 18.
93 Or Milad-un-Nabi are celebrations to commemorate the birth of prophet Muhammad observed in Rabi’ al-awwal—3rd month of the Islamic calendar.
celebrations as *bid'a*\(^94\). In addition, the act of destroying graves found around mosques, is contrary to many traditions practised by Kenyan Muslims.

Also, this explanation suggests the Saudi version of Islam and its mobilisers are aggressive. As evidenced by some Sheikhs professing the Saudi version declaring “other Muslims as ‘Kafir’\(^95\) if they did not practice the new version of Islam, hence introducing takfir”\(^96\). Also, while some “major players in IPK” such as “Sheikh Mohamed Dor…collaborated with mainstream political parties…Aboud Rogo and Abubakar Makaburi…rebelled and started preaching *jihad* and calling the elder Sheikhs hypocrites”\(^97\). Thus, the Saudi version of Islam questions the authenticity of the Islam practised in Kenya and constructs Muslims who do not adhere to it as hypocrites. In addition, the Saudi version is dangerous because it advances the *jihad* agenda.

From these excerpts, the MCAP advances several claims. First that ‘radicalisation’, violent extremism and by extension terrorism emanate from foreign orientations of Islam, particularly those from Saudi Arabia. Second, these Saudi orientations are imported into Kenya through Saudi-funded initiatives in forms of educational scholarships. Upon returning to their countries, beneficiaries of these scholarships propagate the Saudi version, which is disrespectful to local practices and aggressively seeks to invalidate them as *unIslamic* to replace them. Third, through circumstances of comparison the MCAP argues that “what Sakina mosque was to IPK in 1990 was now manifested in Masjid Musa as youth led by Aboud Rogo and Makaburi graduated to full blown open preaching of jihad and other extreme ideologies”\(^98\). Here dangerousness is constructed around specific spaces (i.e. mosques), places (e.g. Sakina and Musa\(^99\)) and actors (i.e. Muslim youth). The current (i.e. Rogo and Makaburi’s jihad preaching) and past (i.e. 1990s IPK) events are collapsed under a single trajectory, to emphasise the relevance of ‘the Saudi version of Islam’.

In the NSCVE, the apparent link between Islam and terrorism was realised through assertions such as:

---

\(^94\) *Or bid‘ah* or *bid‘aa* is an Arabic word for innovation. It is used to refer to religious practices or not originally practised by prophet Muhammad. *Bid‘aa* is a derogatory term used by Islamic groups advocating for a return to ‘the pure’ form of Islam.

\(^95\) *Or Kuffar* is an Arabic term that means infidel or disbeliever. It is stems from prejudices that privilege Islam as the one true religion and designates anyone who has not submitted to Islam as an unbeliever.

\(^96\) See MCAP p.19, paragraph 18—19. *Takfir* is the practice of declaring another Muslim as guilty of apostasy and therefore no longer a Muslim.

\(^97\) Ibid.

\(^98\) See MCAP p.21, paragraph 24—25.

\(^99\) Sakina and Musa are neighbourhoods in the Ward of Majengo.
At present, the ideology that is most responsible for radicalisation in Kenya is disseminated by terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, Dae’sh and Al Shabaab. Their Salafi-Jihadi ideology utilises a selective reading of some Islamic religious texts and histories to justify terrorist violence in the name of protecting and advancing Islam\textsuperscript{100}. [bold and italics in original]

Salafi-jihadi ideology is the main violent extremist threat to Kenya. This ideology is “embraced” by “al-Shabaab…, al-Qaeda’s [sic] affiliate in the Horn of Africa, and other terrorist organisations such as Dae’sh (ISIS) that seek ‘entry’ into the Horn of Africa”\textsuperscript{101}. Also, this ideology “is a key driver of the threat since it is critical in radicalisation, which in turn leads to recruitment or ‘lone-wolf’ terrorism”. This is because the Salafi-jihadi ideology, apart from selectively translating Islamic texts and histories to justify violence, it also

uses [sic] claims of global and local victimisation of Muslims to create militant recruits willing to carry out suicide and mass casualty attacks against civilians and infrastructure. These groups often express [sic] an ambition to establish an Eastern African region of a global caliphate that would replace secular legal and governance systems it depicts as illegitimate under Islam [bold and italics in original]. This ambition, as is evident from the actions of groups such as ISIS — is both a threat to world peace and a potent motivator of thousands of young people across the world that have been convinced to join the project\textsuperscript{102}.

The NSCVE does not directly identify the geographical origins of Salafi-jihadi. However, geographical regions are implied by mentioning extremist groups ‘proclaiming to be Islamic’ and being based in Muslim-majority countries. Further, claims about the religious nature of ‘radicalisation’ are advanced by focusing on its goals and actions. The goal is religious, i.e. protecting and advancing Islam and establishing a caliphate. The means towards this goal is suicide and mass casualty attacks against civilians and infrastructure. Both the means and goals are considered irrational.

These claims are more problematic when read in the local context and contexts of global events like the GWOT. Locally, describing ‘radicalisation’ in relation to Islamic religious ideologies is facilitated by the ambiguous positioning of Islam in Kenya’s national sphere and popular perception of Arabs and Swahili as not being natives to Kenya. These narratives, of course, draw on important political developments: including the slave trade ran by Arab traders (Nwulia, 1975), the racial privileges accorded to Arabs and later Swahili at the expense of Black African communities during colonisation by the Omani and the British empires (Ndzovu, 2014). And the 1963 secessionist attempts of the Coast province,

\textsuperscript{100} See NSCVE p.23.
\textsuperscript{101} See NSCVE p.14.
\textsuperscript{102} See NSCVE p.23.
which nationalists viewed as another attempt by Arabs to perpetuate racial privilege (Prestholdt, 2014). Coupled with the war on terror and the rise of groups like al-Shabaab and Dae’sh claiming to profess Islam and represent Muslims there has been a reiteration of orientalist discourses (Barkawi, Roberts and Jackson, 2007). These discourses construct Arabs and cultures associated with the Middle East, i.e. Islam, as backward, barbaric, and irrational compared to ‘civilised’ cultures, i.e. those professing secularism (Ibid). Such pejorative characterisations only look at political violence in simplistic theological terms (Mamdani, 2005).

In Kenya, this predisposition to politicise Islam was renewed after the 2002 twin attacks. Coupled with the rise and growth of al-Shabaab, Dae’sh, and the ensuing threat of home-grown terrorism and foreign fighters, there have been concerted efforts to differentiate good and bad Muslims worldwide (Mamdani, 2005). These assumptions lay blame on the Middle East by perpetuating the idea that Islam was spread to Africa from the outside (emphasis placed on Africans only as recipients of the doctrine) and “drawing parts of Africa into the orbit of a civilisation whose” nucleus “lay elsewhere, thereby separating these parts from ‘indigenous’ African ways” (Becker, 2018, p. 18). By doing so, these assumptions reduce African Muslims to actors without agency and reinforces colonial racial tropes of Africans as intellectually inferior.

Becker (2018, p. 18) notes that the good versus bad Muslim dichotomy assumes that allegiance to Islam is equal to “middle-easternisation”. Hence, there is a constant need—even in the policy texts—to differentiate “African Islam”, which is often assumed to be “moderate” but “at risk of being radicalised by forces from outside” specifically “extreme” forms of “Wahhabi” and “Salafi” Islam (Becker, 2018, p. 18). Attributing ‘radicalisation’ to religious ideology justifies state actions of profiling and targeting of Muslims in the guise of counterterrorism. However, more broadly this argument can be used to delegitimise legitimate forms of activism by Muslims. Hence, this discourse can be used to shrink the civic space, and this will not just affect Muslims but all Kenyans. The NSCVE and MCAP acknowledge that other non-religious ideologies can facilitate ‘radicalisation’. However, these assertions were often made in passing as the focus primarily remained on religious-based ideologies as the primary sources of ‘radicalisation’.

The role of social networks

Another cultural theme described ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of cultural relations. Social networks played a role in “preaching of jihad and other extreme ideologies” to orient young people with extremist content and eventually “incite them” to commit violence. Thirty-two references cited social networks, ten of which were in the NSCVE and 22 in the MCAP. This
theme (also called a “powerful Other” in Chapters Five, Six and Seven) identifies various social actors who radicalise and recruit youth into extremist groups. The NSCVE lists: terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, ISIS and al-Shabaab; religious elites labelled as “extremist clerics”; and recruiters. Besides these actors, the MCAP also includes opportunistic political elites and women. These social actors can facilitate ‘radicalisation’ directly by offering a “selective reading of religious texts”, “preaching of jihad”, “forcing their doctrines on people”, and “inciting radicalised youth to violently claim these institutions”. Or indirectly, as is the case where women “protect members of their families who are suspected of being involved in VE” or where the women themselves “have embraced VE ideologies to the extent of engaging directly in terrorism”.

From this, social networks employ manipulation and coercion to influence youth and other individuals. Here the implicit assumption is that young people and other vulnerable individuals, e.g. prisoners, are naive and probably ignorant. Hence, they are indoctrinated by religious elites and recruiters into adopting extreme ideologies and joining extremist organisations. Besides religious institutions, prisons, educational institutions, training camps, and refugee camps, social networks also recruit and radicalise youth through the internet and mass media. Thus not only do social networks rely on face-to-face interaction to recruit and radicalise, but they also use virtual methods. Often individuals who radicalised virtually were described as having undergone self-radicalisation, i.e. they radicalised “through access to extremist propaganda via media and the internet”. Accordingly, self-radicalised individuals often became “lone-wolf” terrorists.

Socialisation

Five references by the MCAP highlighted the role of the immediate environment and parenting in the ‘radicalisation’ of children and youth. The widespread drug and substance abuse problem in Mombasa County created a conducive environment for the growth of violent extremism and other forms of crimes. Evaluative adjectives were used to characterise parenting. Arguing that “poor parenting—the culture of over-defending children even when they are wrong” and parents “protecting their spouses and children against allegations of being involved in VE” to an extent accounts for the growth of violent extremism in Mombasa County. The assumption being that good parenting and, by extension socialisation, i.e. correcting and punishing children when they are wrong will set children on

103 In the preceding sentence such institutions are listed to include Mosques, Madrassas, and Islamic Welfare Institutions. See NSCVE p.24.
104 See MCAP p.11.
105 See MCAP p.25.
106 See MCAP p.10.
107 See MCAP p.29.
the right path, thus reducing their likelihood of engaging in crime during adulthood. In contrast, covering up people’s wrongdoing and shielding offenders are seen as behaviours that enable violent extremism. The MCAP proposes that parents and parent organisations can stem ‘radicalisation’ by “monitoring children and youth while at home and reporting early warning signs, disappearances and re-appearances of children and youth”\(^{108}\). The assumption is that if parents and society intervene early, ‘radicalisation’ can be mitigated.

An evaluation of CVE projects in Somalia and Kenya found that poor parenting was one of the factors driving youth into criminal youth gangs (USAID, 2013). This is found concerning since violent youth gangs have come to serve as a gateway to violent extremism, especially when these gangs operate in communities like Eastleigh, where al-Shabaab presence is high (Hellsten, 2016; Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016). Other studies reiterate the MCAP’s claim that poor parenting, which could result from the breakdown of familial institutions, leaves youth susceptible to al-Shabaab recruitment (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016; Russell, 2017). Mainly because when children and youth are unable to receive adequate support and guidance from their familial ties, they are likely to turn elsewhere for this support.

So far, I have analysed individual triggers and cultural values and relations that facilitate ‘radicalisation’. These themes have offered a good entry point into understanding the individual and cultural dynamics of ‘radicalisation’. In addition, the policy texts also identify broader socio-economic and political contexts in which radical ideas and behaviours emerge and grow. In the next section, I pay attention to these socio-economic and political contexts.

‘Radicalisation’ as a consequence of socio-economic and political dynamics

Policy documents identified different types of grievances as contributing to ‘radicalisation’. Grievance varied from those relating to the planning and implementation of counterterrorism, local conflict dynamics, spaces and places associated with ‘radicalisation’ to economic determinants and attributing ‘radicalisation’ as emanating from outside the referent regions (see figure 3.5). The MCAP emphasised the politics of counterterrorism planning and implementation, whereas the NSCVE underlined spaces and places used for ‘radicalisation’ and Kenya’s vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ stemming from its proximity to unstable states and the ungoverned spaces in neighbouring countries.

\(^{108}\) See MCAP pp.’s 37—38.
Economic determinants of ‘radicalisation’

Both policies identified unemployment and poverty as major drivers of ‘radicalisation’ and violent extremism. The MCAP framed these conditions as “economic marginalisation”. Arguing that “Mombasa’s economic diversity and associated inequities emerged strongly as key factors which influence the decisions made by youths and young persons to embrace violent extremist ideologies in the County”. Economic inequities in Mombasa stemmed from poverty. And poverty itself was a consequence of “low levels of education transition” which led to “high levels of unemployment”. Addressing poverty is difficult first, because Mombasa has a “limited rural side” thus hindering employment in agriculture. Also, inability to engage in agriculture is compounded by “a lack of proper land tenure system” which is “reflected by high numbers of squatters”. As a result of absence of land capital Mombasa has “a limited fall-back position”. Further, Mombasa’s debilitating economic conditions were exacerbated by the “inadequate structures to attract, develop and expose [sic] the skills and talents of youths”\(^{109}\). Taken together these conditions produced a “sense of discrimination and historical injustice”. The ensuing desperation and frustration drove youth into extremist groups.

The NSCVE also linked ‘radicalisation’ to economic issues. Arguing that “adverse socioeconomic conditions create high levels of frustration and a sense of powerlessness”. Together widespread frustration and powerlessness are “ideal conditions for persuading groups and individuals to embrace violent extremism and to oppose the political, social and legal status quo”\(^{110}\). Also, the NSCVE identified historical injustices as powerful political drivers of ‘radicalisation’. However, the severity of historical injustices was minimised.

\(^{109}\) See MCAP pp.’s 29—30.
\(^{110}\) See NSCVE p.23.
through evaluative adjectives “real” or “perceived” and “narratives”. The NSCVE suggests that:

Real or perceived exclusion from political representation, discrimination, mis-governance and narratives of historical injustice are powerful drivers of radicalisation. Violent extremists often invoke such injustices to inspire opposition to national political structures. Adjectives “real or perceived” were used to question the certainty of experiences and complaints regarding marginalisation. Using these adjectives conceals systemic issues that have been repeatedly raised in numerous studies and by government commissions. Rather, the adjectives imply that the aggrieved may be imagining “exclusion from political representation, discrimination, mis-governance”.

The MCAP noted marginalisation and different forms of discrimination as existing problems. Perhaps because the MCAPs development was locally driven, thus it was able to identify exclusion as a real experience faced by Coastal people. The MCAP’s framing of exclusion conveniently indicates who should be held accountable. In contrast, NSCVE’s claim downplays the validity of the exclusion argument. It reduces people’s lived experiences of marginalisation to an excuse. NSCVE’s hedged claim obscures the government’s role in systemic exclusion. The adjective “narrative” was also used in a similar manner. Narrative can imply fictitious tales or tales not based on reality. Characterising historical injustices as “narratives” implies such claims could be fabricated. Accordingly, the NSCVE views such “narratives” as told by violent extremists to “inspire opposition to national political structures”.

Indeed, the way the MCAP and NSCVE assertions are articulated results in different policy options. On the one hand, the MCAP states that “including [sic] human rights-based approaches that address social, cultural and economic factors” is vital to preventing ‘radicalisation’. The NSCVE also mentions that “no efforts should be spared to ensure that CVE is protective of the human rights and civil liberties of Kenyans.” However, the NSCVE lacks an economic pillar that might address the economic drivers of violent extremism. Instead, to counter political drivers of ‘radicalisation’ such as the “real or perceived exclusion” and “narratives of historical injustice”, the NSCVE suggests that agencies “work with political leaders to advocate for increased cohesion, patriotism, and rejection of all extremist ideologies based on religious or ethnic dogma.”

111 See NSCVE p.23.  
112 See MCAP p.15; pp.’s 62—73.  
113 See NSCVE p.35.  
114 See NSCVE p.28.
The politics of counterterrorism

The politics of planning and implementation of counterterrorism also contributed to creating conducive conditions for ‘radicalisation’. This theme only occurred in the MCAP. Eleven references focused on different aspects of planning and implementation of counterterrorism. For example, the MCAP identified “human rights violations”, “killings and disappearances”, “punitive security legislations”, and “extreme counterterrorism measures by security apparatus” as “conditions that make violent extremism attractive”. Furthermore, several factors operating at distinct levels affect counterterrorism practices. Logistically, Kenya’s “lack of facilities to undertake effective investigation/forensic analysis” has led “to several cases not being prosecuted hence encouraging” security apparatus to resort to measures such as “extrajudicial killings”115. Coupled with the international “Islamisation [sic] of the war against terrorism and VE”, Muslim communities have been left feeling targeted and alienated. The ensuing “tension and restlessness” results in “poor relationships between the police and community”, thus hindering cooperation. Legally, “most of the security legislations have been resisted by CVE actors” because they are “oppressive, intrusive and confrontational”.

Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey (2016) study also reiterates assertions about the role of counterterrorism in facilitating ‘radicalisation’. Their study found that areas—such as Majengo-Nairobi, Garissa, Eastleigh and Majengo-Mombasa—that experienced extrajudicial disappearances, extortions, and police harassment have developed acute negative perceptions about the police. This sense of injustice has been a significant driver pushing most youth from these areas to join al-Shabaab. Other youths from these areas join al-Shabaab because it offers them a chance to avenge the deaths and disappearances of their loved ones (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016). Civil society reports have documented crimes by Kenyan security forces underlining human rights violations during counterterrorism operations116. Thus, police brutality and profiling can act as push factors by helping to legitimise extremist messaging that cites the marginalisation of Muslims locally and abroad.

Externalising threats

Another common theme focused on identifying the physical sources of extremist threats. The NSCVE and MCAP especially approached ‘extremism’ and terrorism as phenomena originating from outside Kenya’s borders and Mombasa County, respectively. This theme

115 See MCAP pp.’s 29—30.
was prevalent in the NSCVE. It argued that ‘radicalisation’ is driven by global actions and events. “Western country policies and interventions in the Middle-East and other acts associated with a perceived ‘Western’ agenda, including Kenya and AMISOM’s intervention against Al Shabaab in Somalia” caused ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya. Apart from foreign and local policy interests, ‘radicalisation’ was also linked to “ungoverned spaces”. Here, “parts of the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn” that had “limited reach of state institutions” created conducive environments for “terrorist groups”. Kenya is considered to be in danger because it borders some unstable Horn of African states with ungoverned spaces

The MCAP also externalised ‘radicalisation’, violent extremism and terrorism. Arguing that Mombasa is vulnerable due to its “proximity to the sea”. This proximity makes “it porous and easy for terrorists to enter the county”. Also, Mombasa’s vulnerability is compounded by its “closeness to neighbouring countries with high levels of insecurity and VE groups”. This theme reveals important details regarding governance challenges experienced by certain areas which could make it easier for extremist organisations to thrive and even venture into neighbouring areas with porous borders. However, this theme has two implications. First, it entirely associates terrorism with ‘Other’ countries/counties, regions and people. Violent extremism and terrorism are used by both policies to create ‘moral others’ so that we can claim that the perpetrators are not like ‘us’. Second, within Mombasa the MCAP underscored “Majengo, Kisauni, Old Town, Bondeni and Likoni” as “hotspots of radicalisation and violent extremism”. Declaring certain places as “hotspots” denigrates large regions and populations as threats. This characterisation is not only reductive, but it also stereotypes certain geographical areas thus (un)intentionally encouraging violent policing which could further fuel ‘radicalisation’.

**Discursive Construction of ‘Radicalisation’**

This section analyses and discusses representational and legitimation strategies used in policy texts to construct young people and (de)legitimise or critique the individual, cultural and socio-economic arguments on ‘radicalisation’.

**Representation of young people in policies**

Generally, individual, cultural and socio-economic themes constructed young people as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’. In addition to genericisation, differentiation and classification mentioned in this Chapter under psychosocial themes, policy texts also employed functionalisation and aggregation. Functionalisation represents social actors in terms of their roles and activities. This strategy can appraise social actors as legitimate (Van

---

Leeuwen, 2008) especially when it is used to describe high profile social actors such as elites. However, functionalisation can also direct the reader’s attention to the negative and destructive roles and activities of social actors. In the NSCVE, there were two instances where functionalisation served the latter purpose. One where it was argued that:

**Anger over Western country policies…including Kenya and AMISOM’s intervention against al-Shabaab [sic] in Somalia, drive reactions in Kenya by sympathisers with violent extremists.**

And in another instance where al-Qaeda, Dae’sh and al-Shabaab “use claims of global and local victimisation of Muslims to create militant recruits willing to carry out suicide and mass casualty attacks against civilians and infrastructure”\(^{118}\).

Other than young people, the terms “sympathisers” and “militant recruits” referred to a much larger social group. However, since these functionalisations are used in the context of ‘radicalisation’, which predominantly affects youth, it suffices to say that these terms referred to young people. However, it is not just any young people but those who identify with the agendas of groups like al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Dae’sh. Functionalisation encourages the reader to evaluate the said ‘youth’ negatively. Since the policy text states that “at present, the ideology that is most responsible for ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya is …their salafi-jihadi ideology” which “utilises a selective reading of some Islamic religious texts and histories to justify terrorist violence in the name of protecting and advancing Islam” [bold and italics in original], it can be argued that both “militant recruits” and “sympathisers” specifically refers to a cohort of Muslim youth. But since no additional details are given to differentiate Muslim youth, this strategy homogenises them. Thus functionalising Muslim youth as “militant recruits” and “sympathisers” dehumanises them and accentuates their dangerousness.

Youth social actors were also aggregated. Aggregation quantifies groups of social actors by treating them as statistics. In the MCAP, aggregation was realised through phrases such as “a number of youth”, “many young men”, and “many youth”, whereas, in the NSCVE, it was realised through “thousands of young people” and “the pool of individuals”. These examples show that aggregation was realised using definite and indefinite quantifiers, and in the NSCVE, it was also realised metaphorically, i.e. “the pool”. The text refers to youth, but actual numbers are replaced by abstractions through the metaphor “the pool”. This adds to the moral panic about ‘radicalisation’ and youth as a generational threat. Even though we are not given specific figures, the use of definite quantifiers such as “a number of youth” and “thousands of young people” could be an attempt to give the impression of objective

---

\(^{118}\) See MCAP p.21, paragraph 24—25.
research and scientific credibility (this becomes especially apparent when aggregation is read in the context of expert legitimation, which was widely used in both policies). Generally, aggregation heightened the extent of the ‘radicalisation’ problem as a youth problem, making youth that dangerous cohort which should be legitimately feared.

In summary, the analysis of policy texts has shown that institutional discourses frame young people within the rigid victim–perpetrator binary. Young people are represented as victims through strategies of identification. In contrast they are also represented as perpetrators through strategies of aggregation and functionalisation. While overtly functionalisation infers that dangerousness or violence is inherent to the youth identity, the findings also indicate that functionalisation is specifically used to represent young Muslims. Such a rigid victim–perpetrator binary serves to simplify our understanding of the complex phenomenon of ‘radicalisation’ (Leonardi, 2007; Altiok et al., 2020). By representing them as victims this binary alludes that young people need ‘to be protected’. Such protectionist arguments infantilizes youth, emphasising their fragility and vulnerability to exploitation (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter, 2015). This renders young people as passive and dependent actors and in turn erases their potential for agency (Altiok et al., 2020). Concurrently, representing youth as perpetrators also reinforces violent tropes about youthhood, thus stigmatising young people and heightening the idea of youth crime (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter, 2015). This rigid binary representation ignores the contextual and historical situatedness of young people that may account for their behaviours and decision-making (Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, 2006; Leonardi, 2007; Burton, Burton and Charton-Bigot, 2010). It also fails to take into account the heterogeneity of young people. For example, there are young people who advocate and work to promote peace, others who are involved in legitimate activities and more who are caregivers and providers, among fulfilling other roles.

**Legitimation strategies**

Different authorisation strategies were employed. The least obvious means of legitimating discourse was achieved through personal authority. However, unlike in the press, personal authority was not directly realised through verbal processes citing institutions and their employees. In the policy texts, personal authority was realised through forewords and messages. A foreword is a piece of writing placed at the beginning of a book, report and even policy document, whereas a message is a piece of writing that provides additional context. Forewords and messages are primarily written by someone other than the author or editor of the book or report. In the policy texts, forewords were written by authority figures such as President Uhuru Kenyatta for the NSCVE and the governor of Mombasa—Hassan Joho for the MCAP. Subsequently, the message for the NSCVE was written by the cabinet
secretary ministry of interior and coordination of national government—the late Major general (RTD) Joseph Nkaiserry, whereas the MCAP’s message was written by E.M. Achoki the county commissioner of Mombasa. All these individuals are figures of authority. Thus, their forewords and messages endorsed the emerging explanations of ‘radicalisation’ and what should be done to address it.

Expert authorisation was also used in the policies. The MCAP utilised different forms of expert authority. Academic studies, by Patterson on Islamic Radicalisation in Kenya among others were directly cited—as evidence to support the MCAPs argument of ‘radicalisation’ being an outcome of Saudi versions of Islam. Statistics from the Mombasa County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) and the 2009 National Population Census data were also used to outline the administrative division of the county and capture its gender diversity respectively. The NSCVE also employed expert authority, not through citations but by invoking relational processes of being such as “experts in Islamic religion worldwide...” to critique the religious legitimacy claimed by extremist groups.

Notably, while both policies cited well-known ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE models, they differed in how these citations were made. The MCAP directly employed academic citation conventions to reference the Danish Model (Aarhus) for prevention of radicalisation and extremism. While the NSCVE used Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model, it did not directly cite this model. The model was presented as an original work of Kenya. I noticed this implicit invocation because of my familiarity with ‘radicalisation’ scholarship. Regardless, the use of both models was a form of expert authority which served varied functions.

First, expert authority gave an impression of objective research and scientific credibility. Since 2008, Denmark has been recognised as a leading country on de-radicalisation and PVE, thus it has become a model country many governments emulate to develop their tools and methodologies for PCVE. Invoking Denmark positioned the MCAP as a well-researched and scientific policy. Second, citing Western models in particular encouraged readers to understand ‘radicalisation’ in a particular way. Because the ‘West’ has found these patterns about the nature of ‘radicalisation’, how it happens and the best policy prescriptions in their own countries, thus this is how we (Kenya and Kenyans) should understand ‘radicalisation’

---

119 For example, see p.18. However, throughout the document academic conventions of citation are employed.
120 These texts are primarily invoked through citations e.g. 2009 National Population Census showed that... or by use of footnotes.
121 See MCAP p.16, paragraph 8.
122 See NSCVE p.23, section on ideological drivers.
123 Also known as the New York Police Department (NYPD) model of radicalisation.
too. Here, the line between expert authority and authority of conformity becomes blurry. Invoking the ‘West’ as a basis of knowledge capitalises on racist tropes about ‘the West’ being advanced in most matters, so their scholarship is elevated and used to determine the boundaries of what we can claim about ‘radicalisation’. However, following Western tools and methodologies blindly could be detrimental because every country has unique socio-cultural and politico-economic dynamics; thus, what works in Denmark may not work in Kenya.

Also, legitimation was achieved by impersonal authority which entails referencing laws, regulations, guidelines and rules. Arguments were made to appear valid not because they are but because the law says so. To begin with, this form of legitimation was achieved by invoking the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. The NSCVE invoked impersonal authority through impersonal clauses such as

The National Anthem, written in 1963, speaks of a ‘Common Bond’. ….. This unwritten contract is what has forged Kenya. Its … articulation is the Kenyan Constitution that was promulgated in August 2010 and consolidated the democratic aspirations of the people\textsuperscript{124}.

Or through assertions such as CVE should “inspire, rally and facilitate a local, communal, national and global rejection of extremist ideologies antithetical to the Kenya’s Nationhood and Way of Life as articulated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights”\textsuperscript{125}.

In the MCAP, impersonal authority was constantly realised through verbal process clauses such as “the Constitution of Kenya 2010 designated Mombasa as…”\textsuperscript{126}; or “Article 1 (4) of the Constitution states that…”\textsuperscript{127}; and “In the spirit of public participation as envisaged by Article 10 of the Constitution…”\textsuperscript{128}. Both policy texts seek to influence what we can know as ‘radicalisation’, who is vulnerable, and the best way to address it by invoking legal doctrines through nouns such as “constitution”, “bill of rights”, “national anthem” and others such as the “Guidelines to Developing County Action Plans (GDCAP)”.

Arguments and claims were also legitimised using moral evaluation. Apart from evaluative adjectives—discussed under socialisation and economic determinant themes—policy texts also used analogies. Analogies referenced historical and contextual events to draw a comparison. Rephrasing Van Leeuwen (2007), analogies can be expressed directly through similarity conjunctions (e.g. as well as, like etc.), circumstances of comparison or through

\textsuperscript{124} See NSCVE p.19.
\textsuperscript{125} See NSCVE p.21.
\textsuperscript{126} See MCAP p.17, paragraph 10.
\textsuperscript{127} See MCAP p.22, paragraph 27.
\textsuperscript{128} See MCAP p.43, paragraph 54.
narratives. Analogies work together with metaphors to provide narratives with meaning (Angstrom, 2011). The main analogy in the NSCVE concerns Kenya’s “struggle against colonialism”\textsuperscript{129}. This analogy is powerful because it equates the current struggle against al-Shabaab to the past struggle against colonialism. In the sense that in both struggles Kenya’s aim is/was to establish democracy, and equality. However, much as the British Empire tried to impose its rule on Kenya, al-Shabaab is trying to impose its ideology and culture on Kenya, thus frustrating democracy and our “Way of Life”\textsuperscript{130}. Al-Shabaab is seen as “a fanatical religious-political movement that seeks to divide and terrorize communities and collapse states in pursuit of political and economic power”. Framed in this manner, the issue of al-Shabaab appears important and the ensuing policy priorities inevitable.

In the Kenyan context, the analogy of struggles for independence is crucial due to the connotations it carries. First, the different smaller struggles that happened throughout Kenya from the 1920s to late 1950s and the widely known Mau Mau movement invoke feelings of patriotism. According to Wa-Githumo (1991, p. 2) the Mau Mau uprising was a response to the “imperialists’ incursions, aggression, land expropriation, as well as the exploitation of the Africans’ natural and human resources”. This analogy summons strength, determination, courage, unity, and equality, a sense of human dignity, justice and most crucial victory of liberation from the oppressors. This analogy is critical if the government wants to trigger mass loyalty or convince the masses towards a specific policy option. The 1950 to 1960s liberation struggles marked the end of ‘colonisation’ and the beginning of a new era for Kenya as a free state capable of self-governance and hypothetically conducting politics without external interference.

Such thinking that frames contemporary security challenges as struggles for independence which ends with Kenya’s victory as a democracy, and al-Shabaab’s defeat, is an analogy that Kenyatta’s administration is eager to use to trigger mass loyalty for counterterrorism policies. This seems necessary following the mounting criticism that the government, including the preceding administration, faces concerning KDF security operations in Somalia, Kenya’s interference in Somalia’s politics, and violent counterterrorism targeting Somalis and Muslims. In this regard, this analogy serves to awaken a sense of patriotism while simultaneously silencing criticism against aggressive policies; since the idea is that we need to protect our way of life by whatever means possible.

\textsuperscript{129} See NSCVE p.19.  
\textsuperscript{130} See NSCVE p.12.
Conclusion

The discourses emanating from institutional texts to large extent demonstrate a continuity of wider eurocentric discourses on terrorism that are grounded in the GWOT framework (Hodges, 2011; Erjavec and Volčič, 2007). The MCAP was developed based on a presidential decree to support the implementation of the NSCVE. Thus to a large extent it shows a great deal of continuity of the discourses found in the NSCVE. Partly, these continuities were made possible because of the MCAPs emergence as an action point of the NSCVE. However, the MCAP does challenge the totality of discourses espoused in the NSCVE by highlighting structural conditions in Mombasa which provide a conducive environment for ‘radicalisation’. In this chapter, I will specifically highlight the socio-cultural and economic programs which are the main interventions that the national and local policy make possible. Further I will nuance the interaction between the conceptualisation of youth within the rigid victim-perpetrator binary and PCVE, particularly I argue that institutional interventions are embedded in paternalistic logics which has real consequences for young people’s inclusion.

On the one hand, by prioritising a reading of terrorism and specifically ‘radicalisation’ as a consequence of culture, specifically religious ideologies that are anti-democratic, reject pluralism and cultural diversity, the NSCVE made possible the adoption of a) policies aimed at regulating religion or countering ‘extremist ideologies’. Prior to the launching of the NSCVE, the government had already made overt attempts to regulate religion. For example, through the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial assassination of clerics suspected of terrorism-related activities (Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; BBC, 2014; Qureshi, 2014). And through its counterterrorism operations targeting Muslim religious institutions such as the 2014 raid on Masjid Musa (Jumbe, 2014), among many other security operations targeting Muslims and Muslim predominant spaces (HRW and KHRC, 2015; HRW, 2016). More attempts at regulating religion were witnessed in January 2016 when the Attorney General’s Office published the Religious Societies Rules (RSR) proposal (Ombati, 2016). These rules would require all religious organisations to declare their source of funding and submit their constitutions showing the programs, ministries, activities they undertake and details about the individuals coordinating those activities. In addition, these rules also stipulated that all religious societies must be registered and be open to inspection by the registrar at any time and maintain a register of its members which would be updated every year. Further, the rules also required religious clerics to possess theological certificates from accredited theological institutions.
Theoretically the rules were broadly aiming to curtail religious institutions from conning and brainwashing their followers (Schwikowski, 2016). Considering the ever-expanding religious market in Kenya—and the continent at large—and mounting claims regarding abuse of power by religious institutions (Karugu, 2019; Mutuura, 2023) the government introduced these rules as a way of ensuring oversight (Ombati, 2016). In practice, the existing tensions between the state and its Muslim population (Mwakimako, 2007) and in the context of the GWOT and its meta discourses that position Muslims as a threat—a framework Kenya’s government has recontextualised (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007; Mohamed, 2022), the RSR should be read as an attempt of the government to further institutionalise the policing of Muslims. This is because the RSR’s would be operating on an already existing framework of policing that targets Othered cultures and groups. For example, while the government withdrew the RSR following opposition by the Catholic, Pentecostal and Evangelical churches (Ottaro, 2016), after the adoption of the NSCVE in 2016 and its primary focus on the role of ideology in ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism, religion has been regulated in several other ways. Literature, as well as reports by CSOs and donors, continues to show how different racial formations (ethnicity, religion and geographical location) inform profiling and surveillance both during organised anti-crime security operations such as curfews and in everyday security practices (U.S Department of Justice . Bureau of Democracy, Human rights and, Labor, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022; Haki Africa, 2020; Al-Bulushi, 2021).

These violent practices, however, affect individuals situated at intersectional identity points differently. For instance, as young persons, individuals could be targeted by police violence because of the apparent association of youthfulness with crime (Mathare Social Justice Centre, 2022). However, their ethnicity, religion, gender, and geographical locations undoubtedly compound young people’s risk of harassment and brutality by the police during counterterrorism and other security operations (Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023), and most likely harassment and abuse by the public. In addition, upon arrests, those from low-income groups are further disadvantaged because they may not be in a position to pay the required bribe to avoid a possible false accusation of terrorism and other forms of crime (Mohamed, 2021; Mathare Social Justice Centre, 2022). Such practices also affect other young people who are non-Somali, non-Muslim and non-Coastal. Several accounts continue to show that the nature of policing in Kenya continues to be violent (Kivoi, 2020) and targets young people due to its inbuilt assumptions about the apparent association of youthfulness with crime and/or antisocial behaviour, unemployment/poverty with crime, and young people’s nonconformity to ideal ways of being young (Kanja, 2014; IMLU, 2016, 2017).

131 For more on how global discourses have been recontextualised in other countries see (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007; Roy and Ross, 2011).
2022; Nyabola, 2016; Kyaa and Kasina, 2020). Because of such inbuilt assumptions youth are often situated as dangerous and criminal by virtue of their youthfulness and the assumed precarity it comes with. However, it should be acknowledged that the situation is even more insidious for youth positioned at the intersections of different identities. Their intersectional identities magnify the types of discrimination and abuse they face, thus creating a unique and compounded experience of different forms of oppression.

Other religious regulatory practices that have developed as a consequence of the ‘radicalisation and culture’ discourse are community awareness and counter narratives programs. For this chapter, counter narrative programs are specifically important because they are an (in)direct consequence of the global expanding counterterrorism infrastructure. Through the aid industry and its focus on supporting the GWOT using the hearts and minds approach, billions have been spent to fund PCVE projects. These projects through donors, elites and civil society encourage the engagement of vulnerable populations because of “the cultural and social predispositions of East African Muslims” which allow “the infiltration of terrorists and radical ideologies in the region” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 75). Framing the Muslim community as the problem and requiring intervention (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Al-Bulushi, 2018) has led to policing by authorities and self-policing, or otherwise explained by critical literature as the practice of governmentality (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Amoore and De Goede, 2008b). Whereby, in the context of the war on terror, ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’ societies are constructed and transformations of governance are–imposed from above and–also internalised by individuals and groups through a variety of practices to shape their own behaviours. One such practice is the development and implementation of counter narratives by Muslim religious institutions such as the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)\(^{132}\), and the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK).

These initiatives are self-regulatory and co-constitute the NSCVE. While they are presented as institutional interventions overtly adopted to address the threat posed by extremist groups (Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018). They target Muslims who as a social group constitute the ‘at risk’ and ‘risk’ society. These interventions' thus, regardless of whether they are developed and implemented by Muslims, their true aim should be seen as an attempt to shape governable individuals and communities, i.e. \textit{the ideal Kenyan Muslim}. This is not far-fetched considering the pre-existing tense relations between the state and its Muslim communities (Ndzovu, 2014), and between ‘Black Muslims’ and ‘Arab Muslims’ (Prestholdt, 2011; Becker, 2018). The interventions function as self-regulatory or internally

\(^{132}\) The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) is an umbrella body of Muslim organisations in Kenya. It was registered on November 12, 1973 following.
disciplining mechanisms adopted by Muslims\textsuperscript{133}. Thus they (re)produce subjects and beliefs. A finding that also appears in analyses of counterterrorism and PCVE policies of the UK (see for extended analysis Heath-Kelly, 2013; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; M.-S. Abbas, 2019). Also, these interventions cause further violence by foreclosing the possibility of acknowledging and addressing structural inequalities. Some of which are historical (Kanyinga, 1998), whereas others are (in)direct impacts of the war on terror (Al-Bulushi, 2018).

On the other hand, by contextualising ‘radicalisation’ and consequently terrorism as a consequence of structural inequalities—such as economic marginalisation, unresolved historical injustices, specifically linked to land dispossession and more current economic policies—the MCAP advances the need for economic programs. Claims of structural inequalities of Mombasa and the Coastal region as a whole trace back to economic and socio-political policies in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independent eras, as I have as elaborated in the introduction\textsuperscript{134}. These policies disenfranchise Indigenous groups. Because of common perceptions in Kenya, “where land is inexorably linked with ethnic identity” and, “ideas of belonging are informed by ethnicity”, meaning land and ethnicity both have influence over how resources are (re)distributed (Kanyinga, 2000; Chome, 2020, p. 312; Boone, Lukalo and Joireman, 2021). In addition, this produces conflicting meanings attached to land, identity and belonging. Where “ideas of vulnerability and marginality” are constantly “deployed to make moral and legal claims in the context of increasing competition for land and resources” and also “giving prominence to exclusivist notions of belonging and citizenship” where some are positioned as ‘migrants’ and others as ‘indigenous’ (Chome, 2020, p. 312). These claims have been raised overtime and identified as the primary causes of conflict and violence\textsuperscript{135}, and very recently the increasing ‘radicalisation’ of young people in Mombasa. Thus, the devolved governance system was precisely put in place, among other objectives, to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities; to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya; and to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya. The MCAP, therefore, anchors its reading of ‘radicalisation’ within these existing local claims about historical land injustices and the continued socio-economic marginalisation of the Coastal region, and Mombasa specifically.

\textsuperscript{133} Muslims adoption of these interventions should be understood in the context of mounting pressure from the public, the media and the governments—and this is not just happening Kenya but worldwide—that centre discourses of terrorism around the apparent link between Islam and terrorism (Omanga, 2012; Media Council of Kenya, 2014; HRW and KHRC, 2015).

\textsuperscript{134} For an expanded account see Kanyinga (1998, 2000), Chome (2020) and Lukalo (2021)

\textsuperscript{135} See the Waki Commission Reports; the 1999 Akiwumi, the 2008 Sharawe, and the 2013 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission reports.
Taking this position foregrounds the connection of ‘radicalisation’ to pre-existing systemic issues, which the NSCVE covertly undermines. As a result, the MCAP recognizes the historical context necessary for understanding violent extremism in Mombasa and by extension the Coast of Kenya. Such a position, contrary to the NSCVE’s position, also challenges dominant discourses about terrorism, thus offering alternative explanations.

Following anchoring itself in existing conditions of Mombasa, the MCAP proposes economic programs to build the capacities and skills of youth to reduce their vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ and recruitment into extremist groups. To achieve this the Mombasa County government has established economic programs in the areas of education and vocational training. For example, the Elimu Fund, Tukuze Vipawa program, entrepreneurial training, and funding streams such as the Mombasa County Revolving Fund. The Elimu Fund is tailored to provide efficient and effective education services, increase access to education and performance, and improve transition and retention rate. In the area of Early Childhood Development Education (ECDE) the program activities have managed to increase the gross enrolment rate from 66.8 per cent in 2014 to 116.6 per cent in 2018 while net enrolment rate increased from 57.4 per cent to 77.6 per cent, respectively (Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2021). KIPPRA adds that the differences between the gross and net enrolment can be accounted for by presence of overage and underage children in ECDE centres. In addition, the low net enrolment of 77.6 per cent indicates that there are children of school-going age who are out of school (Ibid). The county government has approached vocational and technical training by using the Tukuze Vipawa program. The program introduced Mombasa City Polytechnics which are aimed at growing technical skills and increasing the employability of youth. For the period from 2014 to 2020, the Tukuze Vipawa program has benefited over 2400 young people (Republic of Kenya . County Government of Mombasa County Treasury, 2018). The number of beneficiaries remains small given that the youth population accounts for 47 per cent of Mombasa counties total population. However, Mombasa also builds the capacities of young people, women and people with disabilities through its Mombasa County Consolidated Revolving Fund program. This program offers loans to groups and individuals with viable business initiatives and improves social amenities such as social halls, and modern sports grounds. The idea being that expanding access to finance will promote youth and women enterprises to spur wealth creation; to generate self-employment; and establish mechanisms for community driven development. Governor Joho in his 2020 state of the county address 136 said that the fund has empowered more than 20,000 individuals through entrepreneurial training.

136 See For the Record, (2023) accessed at https://academia-ke.org/fortherecord/mombasa-state-of-the-county-address-hon-hassan-ali-joho/
These local economic programs are complemented by those implemented at the national level. This includes programs such as the Kazi kwa Vijana (jobs for Youth) and Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), which were tailored to address youth unemployment prior to the inception of PCVE, and have now been absorbed and/or complement the economic pillars of PCVE. Other newer programs such as The Kenya Youth Development Policy, Biashara Fund and Uwezo Fund were initiated due to the increasing recognition that high youth unemployment and poverty increases youth vulnerability to recruitment into extremist groups (Ruteere and Mutahi, 2018). All these programs and interventions—local and national government ones alike—were founded around ideas of youth inclusion, and youth as ‘the leaders of tomorrow’ or as agents of change. However, their actual implementation, handling of funds and even decision-making does not engage young people (Hope, 2012; National Gender and Equality Commission, 2016). If anything, these programs are informed by a protectionist logic of ‘saving young people’, thus they operate within a structure of superiority and subordination. Those tasked with protecting decide how the programs will be run, for example, in the case of Kazi Kwa Vijana, the protectors decide what activities will be implemented (Mutuku, 2014). And while young people are primarily the beneficiaries they are not involved in the planning and implementation (Ibid). Instead, as the protected—i.e. young people—they are demoted to a position of grateful dependency, where they are expected to be grateful for whatever is offered. As a result, even when the said programs are exposed for mis-management of funds, corruption and numerous other internal deficiencies (Vidija, 2016; Nation, 2020a; Mburu, 2022), young people have limited space to challenge the paternal authority and demand for accountability and a review of official policies. Because they live in contexts where nepotism, weak governance, corruption, and impunity undermine the rule of law (Hope, 2012; National Gender and Equality Commission, 2016; Nation, 2020b). Thus accused elites are well connected and can subvert the rule of law and go unpunished (Hope, 2014). Most importantly, it is also because discourses on terrorism can be wielded against young people as a smokescreen to avoid accountability, as this has already been done to other groups such as Muslim communities (Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith, 2018a) and CSOs critical of state policies (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015).

In this chapter, I have shown how local and national policies' understanding of ‘radicalisation’ and its representation of young people as victims or perpetrators, and the ensuing PCVE it makes possible are informed by protectionist logics or the belief that youth are in need of protection. Ideas of youth as ‘at-risk’ allude to the need for society to save and protect young people. While ideas about youth as ‘risky’ or dangerous allude to the need to control or educate young people. Both remain the primary ways of understanding
young people in Kenya. Further, we also see both policy documents representing youth as the potential economic dividend of the society (elaborated further in chapter four). While this may be positive, it is also founded on protectionist logic, as it also positions adults, especially parents, teachers, elites and elders, as the gatekeepers. Accordingly, protectionist logics are problematic in two interrelated ways. First, they institutionalise the potential imagined danger about youth thus justifying unconventional interventions and second, they limit the space for young people to meaningfully participate in the society as legitimate political and social actors.
Chapter 4. 'Radicalisation' in Elite Discourses: Analysis of Presidential Speeches and Statements, 2015—2018

This chapter analyses elite discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and focuses on 57 speeches and statements delivered by President Uhuru Kenyatta during the years 2015 to 2018. Presidential speeches and statements were the best source material to access elite level discourses because of the power the presidential office as an institution holds. The president is an authoritative figure whose power stems from his position as the head of state and government. For example, as the commander-in-chief of the Kenyan armed forces, and chairperson of the National Security Council of Kenya (NSCK), the president exercises control over and access to discourse by shaping the security agenda. Particularly, we see this playing out with president Kenyatta’s ascendancy to power in 2013 which occurred shortly after the Kenya Defence Forces had been deployed to Somalia by former president Kibaki. In its first year in office, Kenyatta’s administration considerably shaped both how terrorism was conceived and the counterterrorism responses deemed appropriate. For example, in October 2013 the national assembly passed new amendments to the controversial 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to strengthen the criminalization of financing acts of terrorism. In addition, on 10 November 2013 the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed the Tripartite Agreement with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to facilitate the repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya to “safer areas” of Southern Somalia (Mwangi, 2017). And while the repatriation exercise was termed voluntary, viewed in the context of the Westgate shopping mall attack—which had occurred on 21 September 2013—and the ensuing security operations targeting ethnic Somalis and Muslims (Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; HRW, 2014) several ideas about terrorism and counterterrorism were inferred. The first is that terrorism is linked to Somali and Muslim identities and that the geographies of risk are the Coastal region and the North Eastern regions, as these are predominantly Muslim areas and the latter is also predominantly Somali. Second, Kenyatta’s administration (c)overtly communicated that security operations to pre-empt terrorism have to concurrently occur abroad and locally. Locally, operations profiled and targeted Muslims (HRW, 2014) and we also see the language of terrorism being deployed on critics of state policies. For instance, in the wake of increasing attacks locally, the political opposition called for a withdrawal of the KDF from Somalia, in turn it was accused by the administration of “speaking the same language as al-Shabaab” (The Standard, 2014). These exchanges played out in governing instruments such as the media and other administrative institutions which both the administration and opposition have access to, albeit to varying degrees. Such access, thus allows the administration to control and influence public opinions and decision-making processes on
terrorism and counterterrorism, making presidential speeches and statements a perfect entry point of analysing how elites shape discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and the responses deemed appropriate.

This chapter is divided into two sections: the first discusses four dominant national discourses on ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya. The analysis finds that there is a continuity of national discourses on ‘radicalisation’ that centre on themes of conflict and identity. In the former, ‘radicalisation’ stems from a clash of cultures and values, whereas in the latter ‘radicalisation’ is enabled by powerful Others and affects specific identities i.e. youth. The second section discusses the implications of attributing ‘radicalisation’ to identity and culture. It argues that by combining narratives of slavery, colonialism, and the Mau Mau resistance with the narratives of demographic transition and al-Shabaab’s war for territory and political power in explaining ‘radicalisation’, national discourses have managed to cast Kenya’s internal and external counterterrorism operations as a continuation of the colonial struggle. Reading ‘radicalisation’ as a continued struggle for liberation re-works representations and ideologies from previous historical periods. This section concludes by summarising the main contributions of this chapter and argues that by building national discourses that are informed by international frameworks of terrorism, Kenya has managed to establish itself as an ally and anchor-state of the GWOT in the international arena. Locally, the national discourses have become a shorthand for silencing any form of dissent thus reinforcing authoritarianism.

National Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’

To begin with, as many preceding scholars (Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2015; Kundnani, 2015; Monaghan and Molnar, 2016; Silva, 2018; Braddock, 2020) have articulated, there are a myriad of ways that ‘radicalisation’ has been conceptualised, especially since research in this area exists in diverse fields such as education, psychology, political science, history, rhetorical analysis and religion among others. This chapter explores whether the issues raised by the above scholars play out similarly in the Kenyan context. This analysis identifies and presents identity-related and cultural discourses that inform national discourses on ‘radicalisation’. These discourses are expressed through four common themes where ‘radicalisation’ is conceptualised as a) an opposition to fundamental values, b) an outcome of social networks, c) a consequence of religious ideology, and d) a youth problem vs youth as a resource. In the first section, I will analyse each theme independently to show how social actors are represented, what characterisations are foregrounded and backgrounded, how events are ordered, the degree of abstraction and generalisation, and the legitimation strategies used.
‘Radicalisation’ as the opposition to national values

Approximately 33 per cent of the speeches viewed ‘radicalisation’ as an opposition to fundamental national values. This theme was most prevalent in the years preceding and after the election, i.e. 2016 and 2018. It identifies unity, liberty, fairness, and equality as the national values of Kenya’s nationhood. Promoting the idea that Kenya has (un)written national values that each citizen ascribes to. Thus, the breakdown of these values creates a conducive environment for extremists to radicalise Kenyans. Linguistically, this theme was realised through concepts such as national covenant, social covenant, cohesion, integration, tolerance, diversity, and political symbols such as the national flag and the national anthem. In its usage, this theme advances several meanings.

On one level, it invokes Kenya's national history and past events such as the war against colonialism to forge national unity and encourage patriotism. Implying that extremists are no different from the British Empire that held Kenya in a state of terror to access territory and resources and advance its political power. This reading evokes images of the British Empire with the help of local chiefs raiding villages, dispensing corporal punishment and enforcing villagisation policies on local communities resisting their rule. In the contemporary context, the logic of internal—opportunistic elites and al-Shabaab sympathisers—and external threats such as al-Shabaab is equated to the empires. For instance, al-Shabaab is seen as intending to amass political control and territory to create an Islamic state. In comparison, opportunistic elites foster divisions in the community for material gains such as accumulating political power and accessing resources such as land.

On another level, this theme is also embedded in the election-related violent events, with the most prominent being the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence (PEV). The PEV was primarily attributed to the weaponisation of ethnic identities by powerful elites. Due to a lack of unity, cohesion, and integration, elites manipulated ethnic differences to try and forcefully seize political power and control. President Kenyatta designated ‘radicalisation’ as caused by “disunity”, “negativity”, “hatred”, and “politics of divisiveness”\textsuperscript{137}. When addressing the parliament, President Kenyatta recollected that:

\textit{All of us have endured an almost permanent state of political campaigning, which has divided Kenyans, sometimes tragically, as in 2008. That \textbf{disunity} is a direct threat not just to our freedom, and not just to our prosperity, but also to our nation.}

\textsuperscript{137} Remarks by President Kenyatta during the State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi, 2 May 2018.
…we remain vulnerable to other security threats; many of them, from terrorism to trafficking, across borders. [bold sections in original]

In this theme, disunity threatens our freedom, prosperity, and nation by making Kenya vulnerable to diverse security threats such as terrorism and trafficking.

Similarly, during the 2016 Madaraka day celebrations\(^{138}\), he reminded Kenyans how the country was founded narrating that:

Our forefathers suffered greatly to free us from the colonial yoke. Loved ones were lost, and our freedom fighters endured the bitter pain of injustice... Our fathers won because of their unity... They joined together in a national covenant that would bind them, and all who came after them. In making that covenant, they vowed to build a nation that would earn its place in the world… This nation would be founded in fairness, allowing every Kenyan the liberty to achieve their dreams...declared that all men would be equal under this covenant. With this exchange of promises, all of us became Kenya; and Kenya became all of us.

However

In 2007, we sorely tested this covenant. But when we realised our folly, we paused to reflect, we retraced our steps and found the path to peace ... and ultimately ratifying a new Constitution in 2010. The scars of 2007 remind us of the shame of political competition without limits or wisdom.

Again, when addressing Kenyans following the GUC attack\(^{139}\), President Kenyatta alluded that disunity has been created by the "false narratives" about inequality, oppression and marginalisation. As a result of the disunity the "planners and financiers" of the GUC attack embedded themselves in our communities and caused harm to other Kenyans. President Kenyatta states that:

It is unfortunate that a false narrative is being propagated that Kenyan Somalis and Muslims are victims of marginalisation and oppression by the rest of Kenya. Nothing could be further from the truth. They enjoy the full rights, privileges and duties of every Kenyan. In those areas that have received less recognition and support from past governments, our Constitution has made provisions. A large amount of extra financial resources and services are being provided, and Kenyan Somalis and Muslims form a vital part of our national economic and political life.

In this theme, the claims that Muslims are victims of marginalisation and oppression are refuted as “false”. This denial delegitimises real experiences of marginalisation and oppression by reducing them to “false narratives”. Narratives which imply fictitious tales or

---

\(^{138}\) Speech by President Kenyatta during the 2016 Madaraka Day Celebrations, at Afraha Stadium, Nakuru County, 1 June 2016.

\(^{139}\) Statement by President Kenyatta on the Terrorist Attack at Garissa University College, during a Live Address to The Nation, 4 April 2015.
tales not based on reality. Muslims' claims are dismissed as fabricated tales by qualifying them with the adjective false. Accordingly, the theme implies that "false narratives" are told to incite people and create disunity. The NSCVE also reduced claims of marginalisation to narratives. This proclamation means that those Kenyan Somalis and Muslims claiming to be victims are liars. This delegitimises the lived experiences of marginalisation and oppression Muslims and Somalis face in Kenya. Also, such a proclamation reinforces the idea of Somalis and Muslims as troublemakers or rebels without a cause.

Instead of acknowledging the reality of marginalisation and oppression, which several government commissions have identified, the theme deflects attention to the “equal” benefits Somali and Muslim communities receive as other Kenyans. From full rights, privileges and duties to receiving a large amount of extra financial resources and services. This theme distances President Kenyatta's administration from any failings by reluctantly acknowledging that marginalisation may have happened under the past administrations but not the current one. His administration is portrayed as effectively implementing the constitution's provisions to ensure those marginalised areas are receiving extra support. This move casts President Kenyatta's administration as heroes working tirelessly to remedy the mistakes of their predecessors. However, this theme excludes important details that most elites serving in President Kenyatta's administration—including himself—also served in the past administrations. Hence, his administration is also responsible for the existing inequality and systemic marginalisation in one way or the other.

In advocating for unity as an effective component in successful counterterrorism, the theme references several categories of actors in the current conflict. The first are the internal (those in Kenya) and external enemies (those in Somalia). Internal enemies are indeterminated as those "who hide and abet the terrorists", whereas external ones are determined and differentiated as al-Shabaab operating in Somalia. President Kenyatta declares that

We are one. I urge all my brothers and sisters in the affected regions, and across the country, to not allow those who hide and abet the terrorists to compromise and even destroy the development that is fast growing in your area…. The terrorists promise only death, poverty and terror; I am certain that your choice, as expressed in your determination to work with the government to defeat them, will be for development and progress…. Our security demands that we continue the difficult and daunting task of identifying, separating, tracking and deterring the enemy not only in Kenya but in Somalia, … I am calling on all leaders, at all levels of government, in civil society and in the political opposition to speak in a united voice that reflects the importance of sustaining this initiative…

In this extract, Kenyans—civilians, leaders, civil society, and opposition alike—are urged to pick a side wisely. Because "they", i.e. the enemy or terrorist's objective is to cause "death,
poverty and terror" whereas "we" promise development, progress and security. However, to defeat the terrorists, unity is imperative. To achieve unity, the theme urges Kenyans to embrace diversity and "cooperate with the authorities to effectively combat terrorists". Fostering unity and national cohesion is thus seen as an institutional, individual, and collective responsibility. At the institutional level: the media is tasked with responsible reporting\textsuperscript{140}, whereas the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)\textsuperscript{141} works to "...eliminate all forms of ethnic and racial discrimination, enhance tolerance, understanding and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of national life, and protect respect for religious, cultural and linguistic diversity in a plural society".

In addition, President Kenyatta underlines that his administration has pursued several steps to help the country address the challenges hindering national cohesion and integration. Including the passage of the security laws, which have improved security thus "not only restored the confidence of Kenyans but also boosted their ability to go about their businesses unhindered." And the adoption of the Sessional Paper No. 9 on National Cohesion and Integration, which amongst other provisions focuses on the generational transfer of traditional values. Accordingly, the transfer of traditional values will be facilitated by "the institutionalisation and structuring of Elders' Councils from the village to the national level", which will play a role

in alternative dispute resolution processes, youth mentorship, the promotion of harmony, reconciliation, cohesion and augmenting institutional and organisational frameworks on conflict management and resolution within the diverse ethnic, religious and racial groups residing in the country.

During Mashujaa day Celebrations\textsuperscript{142}, President Kenyatta, while addressing Kenyans, reiterated that elders have a responsibility to foster unity. Elders are the "custodians and drivers of traditional values such as forgiveness, respect, honesty, responsibility, communication, love, team spirit, dialogue, integrity, commitment, faithfulness and loyalty which they pass over to the youths and children" during socialisation. This theme calls on Kenyans to take responsibility to foster cohesion and national values. President Kenyatta invokes legal doctrines such as rights, the constitution and national symbols such as the National Anthem. The speaker cites the third stanza of the National Anthem, \textit{"Natujenge taifa letu, ee ndio wajibu wetu, Kenya istahili heshima, tuungane mikono pamoja..."}
kazini, kila siku tuwe na shukrani\textsuperscript{143} [bold in original], to call on Kenyans to unite and work together in building their nation. Political symbols such as the national anthem remind Kenyans of their history and bolster Kenyan 'beliefs and values'. The national anthem evokes feelings of patriotism and reminds Kenyans of their journey since independence. Also, the third stanza reminds Kenyans of their responsibility in honouring the values cherished by their founding fathers. As such, impersonal authority legitimises the need to unite and reinscribe to our national values.

This theme views the fight against terrorism as a continuation of the struggle against colonialism: it is a struggle for equality, self-governance, diversity, tolerance, peace, development and progress. The theme foregrounds identities by oscillating between referential strategies of indetermination and determination (including, functionalisation, and differentiation) to draw the binary of "us" and "them". The former is portrayed as progressive and peaceful and the latter is seen as violent, barbaric and backward. This binary suggests that there are clear differences between the two categories. By dwelling on the differences between the good and the bad actors the theme evades any mention of pre-existing ethnic, racial, and regional inequalities that could encourage 'radicalisation'. Instead, this discourse communicates a particular set of meanings by referring to specific details about shared historical events.

‘Radicalisation’ as a product of social networks

Another theme attributed ‘radicalisation’ to social networks. This theme argues that the movement of young people towards terrorism and other forms of violence occurs through social networks of friends, relatives, elites and religious clergy. Approximately 16 per cent of the speeches identify powerful Others as violent extremists and terrorists, i.e. al-Shabaab, rogue imams and political leaders as actors who impart extreme ideologies on youth. Often powerful Others are dangerous because they take advantage of youths’ naivety, lack of knowledge, wisdom, and experience to manipulate them into violence and terrorism. Implying that youth are passive recipients. For example, during the 2018 Jamhuri day celebrations\textsuperscript{144} while addressing invited dignitaries and Kenyans, President Kenyatta lamented that:

\begin{quote}
We have disrupted many of the [sic] planned attacks by our enemies, and have prosecuted and jailed their operatives. … The enemy lives and walks amongst us and it is every citizen’s duty to protect our motherland. Do not be silent when you see them scheming to kidnap our youth for use as child soldiers, or when you see
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{143} This is the third stanza of the Kenyan national anthem. In English this stanza translates to: Let all with one accord, in common bond united, build this our nation together, And the glory of Kenya, The fruit of our labour, Fill every heart with thanksgiving.

\textsuperscript{144} Speech by President Kenyatta during the 2018 Jamhuri Day Celebrations, 12 December 2018.
them planning to ambush and attack our homes and villages. We must unite and work together, as the Government and citizenry hand in hand, to help those who can be helped to reform and to flush out those elements that remain determined to cause us harm.

The speech employs collectivisation to represent social actors assumed to share certain traits. With the shared trait being that they are “enemies of our motherland”. The theme designates those social actors we should be careful about by using the generic term enemy or enemies. Collectivisation establishes a distance between us and them by purposefully dehumanising the “enemy”. The dehumanisation foregrounds negative activities of the “enemy”, including "scheming to kidnap our youth for use as child soldiers" and "planning to ambush and attack our homes and villages". Identifying and classifying the victims of the “enemy” as youth and children strategically heightens the dangerousness and brutality of the enemy. This is because the terms youth and children predominantly denote innocence and vulnerability.

During the Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) VI summit145, President Kenyatta also said the "terrorists are adept at exploiting open and democratic societies, and are trying to militarise any sectarian or political divide." Both extracts framed "the enemies" and "the terrorists" as cunning because they "live and walk amongst us" and engage in "exploitative" activities to advance their agenda. When addressing the parliament during the state of the nation address146, President Kenyatta also inferred that:

We have also witnessed intense contestation between leaders in a number of other counties. In Narok, Embu, Mandera, Marsabit and Tana River, among others, ethnicity is being used to exclude, divide and manipulate the people. This trend…has the potential to derail the devolution agenda. The aspiration of the Kenyan people was for grassroots development not for ethnic balkanisation. I therefore call on all leaders at the county level to be guided by these aspirations and not their own narrow self-interest.

Still on leaders as a powerful Other, during 2015 Jamhuri day celebrations, while addressing the President of Liberia, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, and Kenyans, President Kenyatta reiterated that:

There are still some among us whose entire political existence is based on resisting our will to move forward as a nation. I urge every Kenyan to reject their calls for negative politics, hatred, finger-pointing and manipulation, and to reject their desire to ignore the facts of the solid achievements we have made since the peaceful

---

145 Statement by President Kenyatta during the Official Opening of TICAD VI Summit, at Kenyatta International Convention Centre, Nairobi, 27 August 2016.
146 Speech by President Kenyatta during the State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi, 26 March 2015.
elections in 2013, and certainly since becoming a Republic in 1964. As a country, we have chosen peace and progress for all our people.

This theme views opportunistic leaders as self-interested individuals that use ethnic divisions and negative politics to advance their ideologies and material interests. Alternatively, this theme can also be read as a critique of opportunistic leaders and elites trying to exploit and exaggerate existing societal divisions to promote their position, profile, or agenda. This is especially in the context of the PEV and the real reverberations for years after 2007. Not only were political leaders, including President Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with orchestrating crimes against humanity, but the PEV revealed the long-running frustration and disenchantment with the political leadership of Kenya. The president and his deputy embarked on a political and diplomatic campaign to undermine and discredit the ICC charges. In 2014 and 2016, the prosecutor dropped the charges for President Kenyatta and his deputy Ruto respectively.

However, there is evidence indicating witness intimidation and the Waki commission report also details the abuses Kenyans were subjected to in 2007/2008. But President Kenyatta has consistently maintained his innocence in relation to the PEV and accusations of land-grabbing levelled against his family. Thus, advancing the theme of ‘radicalisation’ as caused by opportunistic leaders benefits President Kenyatta’s administration in two ways. First, with the 2017 elections fast approaching, he is using it to warn all opportunistic leaders to stop exploiting ethnic divisions for self-gain. While doing this, President Kenyatta constructs himself as a different leader, i.e. ‘a good leader’. Unlike opportunistic elites, he is interested in the common good that is peace, unity and progress, instead of violence and division. Second, President Kenyatta is strategically deploying this theme to construct himself as a leader worthy of re-election for the second term.

This theme only uses classification to refer to Kenyans and youth as the victims of opportunistic elites. However, it applies several strategies to construct elites as the enemy within. In some instances, functionalising those engaged in oppositional politics as "the political opposition" and those leading as "leaders" identified them as political actors to be cautious of because they are non-patriotic, lack loyalty, distort facts, lie, weaponise ethnicity, engage in negative politics, hatred, finger-pointing and manipulation. Thus, the opposition is only portrayed as engaging in negative and disruptive activities.

147 Speech by President Kenyatta during 2017 Madaraka Day Celebrations at Kabiru-Ini Stadium, 1 June 2017.
In other cases, elites were indeterminated as "some in the mainstream governing parties" and "some among us". Indetermination anonymised the social actors and maintained vagueness. It was used to make unsubstantiated claims while shielding the discourse speaker from any potential backlash. Politicians commonly use indetermination because it allows them to construct an 'Other' within the group. Also, it enables elites to later adapt the categorisation to changing needs and political dynamics.

‘Radicalisation’ as an outcome of extreme ‘religious’ ideologies

Another general theme emphasised the role of religion in ‘radicalisation’. This theme was present, to varying degrees, in approximately 15 per cent of the speeches. It was prevalent in 2015 owing to the quantity, frequency and scale of al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya and the involvement of some Kenyan Muslims in some of the attacks. During the Tana high-level forum on security148 attended by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Haile Mariam Desalegne, and other heads of state, President Kenyatta talked about the nature of contemporary conflicts. Arguing that such conflicts result from the "politicisation of religion" by "the Global Jihadist Movement" with the intention "to create an Islamic Caliphate". The global jihadist movement comprises "ISIL in Iraq/Syria, Al-Qaeda and its global franchises, the extremist groups in the Sahel, Boko Haram in West Africa to Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Horn of Africa". These groups "feed into an unprecedented and sophisticated ideology driven by extremist violence" and "deny the diversity of faiths". Thus "their desired Islamic Caliphates in their regions" threaten "the stability of most secular countries within the hotspots". The speech adds that "most of the extremist groups with their radical brand of Political Islam are also trying to take advantage of the void left by the Arab Spring that wasn't definitive in most countries in the Middle East". [bolded sections as original].

In this theme, the politicisation of religion—specifically Islam—plays a critical role in fostering conflicts globally. The different groups referenced as the "Global Jihadist Movement" are the main actors seeking to establish Islamic caliphates in their respective regions. These groups capitalise on local conflicts such as "the void left by Arab spring" to continue their agenda. Accordingly, the "radical brand of political Islam" threatens secular states because its values are opposed to liberal ideals such as democracy, freedom of religion, civic rights and HR, among others.

148 Speech by President Kenyatta during the Tana High-Level Forum on Security, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, 18 April 2015.
In another speech, while addressing the local audience (Kenyans), emphasis was also placed on religion. Recalling the GUC attack, President Kenyatta narrated that the "last three attacks in Northern Kenya where the terrorists separated Muslims from Christians and systematically executed the latter was meant to ignite an inter-faith conflict between the Christians and Muslims, negating our historical reality of peaceful co-existence..." [bolded sections as original]. Since this speech was meant for a broad audience with diverse personal and professional backgrounds, the language used was simple and persuasive. From the use of the pronoun "our", the theme covertly places the source of the attacks as coming from outside Kenya. The goal being to move and convince the audience to understand the attacks as an al-Shabaab-instigated religious conflict. For example, instead of a "radical brand of political Islam", the " politicisation of religion", and the "Islamic Caliphate", the text talks of the "separation of Muslims from Christians" and "systematic execution of the latter" to "ignite an inter-faith conflict between the Christians and Muslims".

This theme uses collectivisation to highlight shared traits between us, i.e. "modern democratic and secular State(s)" such as "Kenya", and differentiate us from them, i.e. extremists such as "al-Shabaab". For example, while speaking at the leaders' summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism—attended by President Obama, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and other delegates—President Kenyatta reiterated that:

As we strive to create frameworks to guarantee better lives for humanity, the extremists reject a social and political order that is anchored on the core democratic principles of pluralism, diversity, individual freedoms and rights to association and speech.

Al-Shabaab's rejection of fundamental values is "a prominent threat to ... regional peace and security" and "to the stability of Kenya." Despite the religious rift that al-Shabaab seeks to create, "Kenyans remain steadfastly committed to the values of diversity, freedom of association and religion." While al-Shabaab "attacks have injured us, they have not bowed Kenya."

The emphasis on religion as a cause of 'radicalisation' was also expressed by identifying places, spaces and names associated with specific religions and social groups. For instance, there is mention of "radicalisation that breeds terrorism" being conducted "in madrassas, in homes and in Mosques with rogue Imams". Madrassas are Islamic schools, mosques are worshipping areas for Muslims, and Imams are individuals who lead

149 Statement on Garissa University College Attack, 4 April 2015.
150 Statement by President Kenyatta at the Leaders' Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism, 29 September 2015.
151 Statement on the Garissa University College Attack, 4 April 2015.
Muslim worshippers in prayers. Imams, mosques and madrassas are generalised and thus represented as homogenous violent actors and entities and implicitly contrasted with another category, 'us', who are viewed as peace-loving. Imams are categorised and functionalised. Failure to specify which Imams, madrassas, and mosques are involved implies that 'radicalisation' occurs in all Islamic spaces and places. Such generalisations obscure the diversities within the categories, thus reinforcing the association of Islam and Muslims with terrorism. This establishes the nature of terrorism and erects fixed boundaries about the perpetrator's identities.

This theme draws analogies between the situation of 'Islamic extremism' in Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and 'Islamic extremism' in Kenya. In these analogies, terrorism-related events happening in different geographical locations and times are merged with the al-Shabaab terrorism in Kenya. These analogies not only create comparisons between the terrorism-related events. But they also explain the causes of terrorism, identify the aggressors and victims, their motivations, their objectives, what countermeasures are necessary, and who should implement them. The analogy allows a homogenisation of disparate categories of actors, contexts, situations and events occurring at different spaces and times to be positioned in a linear trajectory.

In fewer instances, there is recognition in the heterogeneity of Muslims. For instance, during the 2016 State of the Nation address, President Kenyatta stated

I want to pay special tribute to a Kenyan of Muslim faith, Salah Farah. He was shot and killed by terrorists near Mandera for shielding Christians from an attack. He died defending people who he did not know. This is because he believed in their right to freedom of worship and he knew that every single life—irrespective of faith—is sacred. He is a powerful symbol of our country's ambition to attain the full expression of secure and cohesive nationhood, and he is a costly reminder that we all have a role to play in protecting our freedoms. Salah exemplified the best of who we are as a country: a diverse people, united by our common love for liberty and peace, and above all our brothers' keepers. His actions epitomise the National Covenant we so desire to live by\textsuperscript{152}. [bold section in original]

Other examples of this can also be found when President Kenyatta calls on religious organisations and leaders to assist in PCVE efforts. This acknowledgement of non-violent or non-radicalised Islam as a part of the Kenyan society is important for several reasons. More positively, it first highlights the heterogeneity of Muslims. Primarily, in a context where the dominant discourse portrays Muslims as terrorists, this example portrays them as saviours, indicating that Muslims can play different roles. Second, the tribute draws the

\textsuperscript{152} Speech by President Kenyatta, During the State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi on 31 March 2016.
audiences' attention away from subtle differences in religious beliefs to the many shared similarities between Muslims and Christians, such as being Kenyan, freedom-loving, and compassionate. On a negative note, given that the tribute was made following mounting evidence citing profiling of Muslims and Muslim-led civil society during counterterrorism operations, the tribute was used to delegitimise any claims of discrimination rather than refute the apparent link between Islam and terrorism. It implicitly used the moderate versus extremist divide to reinforce the argument that some Muslims are good and others are bad. Particularly, this divide is crucial in mobilising support for PCVE interventions among the Islamic communities.

‘Radicalisation’ and youth: competing narratives of ‘youth as a problem’ vs ‘youth as a resource’

When discussing terrorism, the category youth is often the centre of political, media and public discourses as well as the targets and beneficiaries of PCVE. There were two competing themes concerning youth. Approximately ten per cent of the speeches locate youth as the source of ‘radicalisation’. This theme constructs youth as a security threat. The second theme was present in approximately seven per cent of the speeches and it viewed youth as a resource that needs to be tapped into. Both themes encourage the PCVE interventions to target youth to reduce their vulnerability.

Youth as a problem

The first theme of youth as a security problem was dominantly invoked in the 2015 and 2016 speeches. Reflecting on al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya while addressing Kenyans at the 2015 Madaraka day celebrations, President Kenyatta stated that:

But we face a new kind of enemy, against whom conventional methods will not work. This enemy is a radicalised young man or woman who appears innocent but is devoted to death, division and destruction. He has been misled to believe that he is doing God's work by killing those of different faiths. To deal with this enemy, we must keep improving our methods and tactics. Prevention is better than cure: and that is why we must stop them from being radicalised. We can't do this without the complete cooperation of parents, guardians, and religious leaders… Radicalisation does not always wear its intentions openly. Your child might appear devoutly religious, but you must be able to tell when radicalisation turns piety to evil. Together, we can meet our joint duty of vigilance against those who would harm us. The enemy is cunning, but if we work together, we shall overcome.

153 Speech by President Kenyatta during the 2015 Madaraka Day Celebrations at Nyayo National Stadium, 1 June 2015.
This extract employs different strategies of identification to categorise social actors. Classification orders social actors by age. The extract speaks of "child or children" and "youth" as violent actors. In other instances, relational identification is used when speaking of violent actors. For example, "parents" and by adding possessive pronouns to categorise the child, hence, "your child". Relational identification highlighted how the actors (i.e. youth) deviate from social norms. The discourse speaker uses the possessive pronoun “your” to distance themselves from the parents whose children are deemed deviants. Thus, projecting responsibility for preventing ‘radicalisation’ to the parents of deviant children.

During the opening of the 2016 African employers' summit in Kenya—this event was attended by the Federation of Kenyan Employers, Business Africa, the International Labour Organisation, and the International Organisation of Employers, among other delegates—President Kenyatta expounded on what makes youth a threat to stability and prosperity. Verbatim, the text argues that

The crisis of mass youth unemployment rates among the youth—and make no mistake, it is a crisis—is a threat to the stability and prosperity of Africa. Indeed, it is a crisis so serious as to amount to a fundamental, existential threat as well. [bold section as original]

In this extract, youth are depicted as a “crisis” to stability and prosperity due to high youth unemployment rates. Adding that high unemployment is caused by illiteracy, lack of skills and under-employment. This “crisis” poses a “fundamental and existential threat”. The noun crisis allows the theme to paint a picture of youth employment as a calamity or catastrophe. Further, the adjectives “fundamental and existential” are used to evaluate the nature and scope of the threat. Owing to the hardships that youth live in, youth are seen as vulnerable to joining violent extremist groups. Employer summit speeches are significantly relevant because they are an important backdrop of understanding Kenya's national and local economic programs for PCVE, as I have discussed in chapter three. While the NSCVE only briefly addresses the link between economic issues—specifically high youth unemployment—and ‘radicalisation’ as tertiary, presidential speeches dedicate a considerable time to this in the ‘youth as a resource’ theme (see the next section).

President Kenyatta at the leaders' summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism, urged that it is "the push and pull factors that make Kenyan youth and society vulnerable to violent extremists' ideology." Similarly, while speaking in Mombasa on 1 September 2015,

154 Speech by President Kenyatta, during the Official Opening of the 2016 African Employers’ Summit at Enashipai Resort and Spa, Naivasha, 6 May 2016.
155 Statement on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism, 29 September 2015.
156 Statement by President Kenyatta at State House, Mombasa, on 1 September 2015.
President Kenyatta singled "hopelessness, idleness" and burgeoning school dropout rates as factors that lead to the "growing cases of young gangs" and "radicalisation". Youth functionalised as hopeless, idle, and dropouts are considered dangerous. However, this theme sees dangerous youth as existing on a spectrum. The most dangerous are those youth who "have returned from Somalia" functionalised as returnees or foreign fighters. These youth are also differentiated and evaluated as those "radicalised youths who have returned from fighting with jihadist groups in foreign lands". While there is a rehabilitation program for them, "some of these youths are beyond rehabilitation and pose a significant threat to security of our nation and people". This persuades the audience that unconventional measures are necessary to deal with youth who cannot be rehabilitated.

On this spectrum, the theme also singles out the "devoutly religious youth" as dangerous. They are characterised as dangerous because first, they engage in negative activities such as killing "those of different faiths", and second because they are 'cunning'. Such youth are described as "appearing innocent" but they are devoted to death, division and destruction". These characterisations rely on subjective understandings of innocence, cunning, devout and devotion to evaluate social actors and their actions. Thus situating particular youth identities as dangerous and worth being stopped at whatever cost. This is explicitly implied by the claim "conventional methods will not work" against "the new kind of enemy". And while "prevention is better than cure…some of these youths are beyond rehabilitation and pose a significant threat to the security of our nation and people". This claim excludes that even non-youth social actors are part of violent groups, and they also kill people of other faiths. Such exclusions are essential in fixing the discourse boundaries. By structuring specific youth identities as abnormal through functionalisation and differentiation, this theme legitimises discriminatory policies targeting youth.

Youth as a resource

The second theme views youth positively in economic terms. Youth are seen as resources that need to be utilised to foster stability and prosperity. This assertion contradicts and departs from the description of youth as a problem that was prevalent in the preceding section. Both descriptions were deployed throughout the years to varying degrees. In 2015 speeches, only 22 per cent reference youth as a resource compared to the 69 per cent that view youth as a problem. This shift to youth as a resource continues to increase to 58 per cent in 2016 and 91 per cent in 2017. Notably, this theme was widely invoked during
diplomatic visits, bilateral talks and public holiday addresses. For instance, on 10 August 2015157, when addressing the parliament of Uganda, President Kenyatta stated that:

On the subject of the role of our young people in our future, I want to be especially clear. They are NOT a youth bulge that threatens war and misery. Instead, they are tomorrow's entrepreneurs and workers in world-class enterprises. They pray to make an honest wage for an honest day of work. They are a brave multitude that will defend our communities, countries and regions from terrorists and criminals. I have no doubt that it is NOT gold or oil or other precious minerals buried in our soil that will make us wealthy. In our young population, we have the world's most precious resource. [bold sections in original]

In this excerpt, youth are conceptualised as “resources”, thus situating them at the centre of neoliberal economic policies. As a resource, youth are more precious than the minerals such as gold and oil found in the region of East Africa. A huge youthful population is the gateway to prosperity because it "will draw the world's manufacturers, banks, technological companies, and a host of others". In addition, "Its [youth population] education, connectivity to the world and aspiration to a better tomorrow will give us a globally competitive labour market". Hence, youth transform societies economically and through their participation in empowerment programmes, athletics, agriculture, innovation, and serving in the defence forces to protect their countries from insecurity.

Also, when addressing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and other dignitaries during a joint press briefing158, President Kenyatta proposed that, "We, their elders, must do what we can to make sure that young Africans feel fully included". Here, inclusion is the main solution to "draining" the "pool", "swamp", or "pipeline" from which al-Shabaab and other global terrorist groups can recruit from. Youth are seen as crucial actors of social change. This discursive shift was most visible in 2017. For instance, during the 2017 Jamhuri day celebrations159, while addressing Kenyans, President Kenyatta acknowledged the contributions made by youth in Kenya by narrating that:

Fellow Kenyans, at independence, our young people were filled with optimism. The architects of our republic were young people guided by a few elder statesmen. The independence constitution was negotiated and crafted by young people. Though a few of our young people have been led astray by ethnic-based, divisive politics, I am encouraged by the much larger number of our youth who are working hard, who

157 Speech by President Kenyatta during His Address to the Ugandan Parliament in Kampala, Uganda, 10 August 2015.
158 Statement by President Kenyatta during Joint Bilateral Press Conference—Visit by the Japanese Prime Minister at State House, Nairobi on 28 August 2016.
159 Speech by President Kenyatta during the 2017 Jamhuri Day Celebrations at the Moi International Sports Centre, Kasarani on 12 December 2017.
are hustling, and who approach challenges as an opportunity to overcome. [bold sections in original]

This extract emphasises the nuance by using aggregation. Highlighting that only "a few of our young people have been led astray by ethnic-based, divisive politics," but "the much larger number of our youth … are working hard, … hustling, and … approach challenges as an opportunity to overcome." Aggregation functions to recognise the positive contributions made by majority youth while also highlighting the "few youth" that are misguided. The youth as a resource theme emphasises youths' positive attributes. Also, for the few misguided youth this theme shifts the blame from youth to ethnic-based divisive politics. The audience is not told who “leads youth astray” into ethnic-based divisive politics. These details may have been excluded because, whenever convenient, political speeches tend to avoid any specificity. Especially given that Kenya had held two rounds of presidential elections during this period, the first of which was nullified by the Supreme Court and later repeated on 26 October 2017. The opposition party called for a boycott of the second cycle of elections thus adding to the tension. Coupled with talks of secession by different regions of Kenya, there was fear of impending post-election violence. Understandably, the actor involved in "leading youth astray" could have been omitted to prevent further discord in an already volatile environment.

Notably, several reasons can account for the shift from youth as a problem to youth as a resource. First, that 2017 was an election year in Kenya; thus, the shift was politically driven to mobilise the youth vote, which accounts for 30 per cent of the total electoral vote. In addition, given that President Kenyatta's administration ideologically characterises itself as ‘a youthful administration’ compared to the previous ones, it made sense to change its rhetoric to secure the much-needed votes for its second term. Second, the increasing disaffection among youth and the deepening ethnic cleavages accentuated the possibility of another post-election violence, thus might have propelled President Kenyatta's administration to shift its discursive position regarding youth.

An alternative explanation is that while ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ were highly securitised topics since their inception in 2011, civil society advocacy work and criticism of state's discourses and counterterrorism responses might have steered the change in attitude. Civil society activism exposed the off-book counterterrorism measures and violations of constitutional and international law, which pressured Western donors to hold the state accountable in its implementation of counterterrorism. Also, for the newly adopted soft measures (NSCVE) to be effective, President Kenyatta might have seen the need for

a discursive shift. Third, the shift in narrative depended on the audience being addressed, the context, occasion, time and the place. The examples above show that youth as a resource was deployed during diplomatic visits and bilateral talks, respectively. For the former, this narrative was used to indicate that Kenya was safe, thus encouraged the agreement on the Kenya-Uganda Oil Pipeline project. Whereas for the latter, it encouraged more donor funding to direct youth energies into positive activities.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed speeches and statements made by President Kenyatta between 2015—2018. The analysis identified and explained identity-related and cultural discourses that build Kenya’s national discourses on ‘radicalisation’. These discourses were expressed through four dominant themes on ‘radicalisation’: as an opposition to national values; as a product of social networks; as an outcome of extreme religious ideologies; and ‘radicalisation’ and youth where there are two competing claims of youth as a problem and youth as a resource. This section will discuss the implications of these themes in terms of what it means to represent social actors in certain ways and the kinds of policy possibilities these representations make possible or restrict.

The theme of ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of religious ideology is not new and neither is it unique to Kenya. This theme has been framed using arguments raised in the new terrorism debate. Some of the arguments made, such as religious terrorism having unworldly objectives, have been debunked as weak (see also Burke, 2004; Jackson, 2005, 2007; Gunning and Jackson, 2011) and founded on orientalist tropes (see Mahony, 2010; Khalid, 2011). Nevertheless, this discourse continues to inform foreign policy. Kenya's view of ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of religious ideology is based on similar orientalist tropes. First, this theme is supported by claims that consider Islam as a foreign religion that was introduced in the East African Coast in the 8th century through migration (Ayubi and Mohyuddin, 1994). Despite that Christianity arrived in a similar manner, it is elevated and privileged because most of the population embraced it. Second, Islam's reputation was further ruined by the Omani empire and Arab traders who used it to structure Kenya’s racial, cultural, political and economic relations (Prestholdt, 2014). These experiences of occupation of the Coast of Kenya by the Oman Sultan and later the slave trade ran by the Omani Arabs and Arab settlers, Arab and associated Arab cultures such as Islam have been conflated and come to denote backwardness, domination, savagery and ruthlessness.

Furthermore, both the British and the Arabs in Kenya considered Black Africans as an inferior race, thus "incapable of organising themselves politically" (Ndzovu, 2014, p. 24).
This racialised assumption privileged White, Asian and Arab people in employment and leadership positions while excluding Black Africans. Even after independence, lobbying for community interests at the Coast has relied on ethnic, racial and religious identities. But since Islam is the majority religion, outsiders have identified Coastal politics as ‘political Islam’. This questioned the loyalty of the Muslim population and steered the need for policies to control them. For instance, several policies, including access to identity and travel documents, require Muslims more generally and Muslims with Arab and Somali ancestry to produce more documentation as proof of citizenship and legality (Mazrui, 1993).

Also, owing to increasing religiosity in Kenya (Branch, 2011), religion increasingly plays a role in politics. For instance, the IPK mobilised under Islamic religious identity to push for reforms for equal development and socioeconomic and political inclusion of the Coastal region (Ndzovu, 2014). However, their legitimate efforts were frustrated by the administration and the IPK was constructed as a Muslim problem (Ndzovu, 2014). Hence, the understanding of ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of extreme religious ideologies uses these historical experiences of the various Kenyan administrations with their Muslim population to construct ‘radicalisation’ as a continuity. In this reading, the current and past (the Shifta War, 1990s IPK protests, 2015 MRC secessionist movements) events are viewed under a single trajectory. Jarvis (2008, p. 253) refers to the practice of excluding any “reflection of the historical background” as “writing linearity”.

Depicting conflict linearly offers a partial account of the conflict and its origins. It overemphasises the role of religious ideology by arguing that “some people are unhappy here because this is not an Islamic country”. In contrast, it obscures historical injustices, discrimination, developmental inequalities and violent counterterrorism as longstanding conditions that enable ‘radicalisation’ (Mohamed, 2021). Also, depicting the conflict linearly allows the president to use ‘radicalisation’ as “the latest example in a tradition of increasingly destructive terrorist” violence by Muslims (Brown, 2020a; Jarvis, 2008, p. 251). While still able to distinguish ‘radicalisation’ from its precedents both by virtue of tactics, type of enemy, targets, and spaces where it is conducted, ‘radicalisation’ is situated as part of a traceable and continuous trend of the ‘Muslim problem’.

Intentionally, the view of ‘radicalisation’ as a 'Muslim problem' draws parallels with other countries (in the West and East) that have issues with 'Islamic extremism'. Research shows that after 9/11, many countries from Uzbekistan, Beijing, to India have used the religious ideology discourse to construct their Muslim communities as terrorists or with links to al-Qaeda, thus a security threat (Burke, 2004). This association has several political advantages. First, it has allowed countries to (re)define the nature and scope of pre-existing
conflicts using new jargon (Mohamed, 2022). Promoting the idea that we are all—no matter where we are located—fighting the same enemy. And as this aligns with Western interests—as I have shown in the introduction chapter—the narrative effectively mobilises donor funds and resources for countering terrorism and violent extremism.

According to the Congressional Research Service (2015) report\(^{161}\), Kenya is among the top recipients of both US foreign aid and security assistance in Africa. Annually Kenya receives more than $600 million from the US. Approximately $40 million of this security assistance is primarily for expanding the administrations' Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF); and $188 million for counterterrorism assistance for securing Kenya's border with Somalia and support its KDF forces deployed under AMISOM. This is a sharp increase in comparison to previous years. In 2013 the aid totalled just over $20 million, whereas, from 2015, there has been a sharp increase of over $80 million. In addition, Kenya's military also receives assistance through the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and through regional programs like the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). Kenya's military also uses the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to purchase high technology military equipment, and under State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), it receives support in the form of training in border and coastal security and law enforcement programs.

Coupled with more financial and technical assistance from the UK, Israel, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and EU member states like Denmark, which has increased considerably with the merging of security and development since the 1990s—as shown in the introduction—and a recent resurgence in the wake of 9/11 (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013). It is not surprising why national discourses use the same language of terrorism familiar with Kenya's donors. Because Kenya has aligned its interests closely with Western interests, Western donors have ignored Kenya's violations of human rights and international law (Lauterbach, 2021). According to Namwaya (2020), measures such as extrajudicial assassinations, rendition, repatriation of 'terror suspects', and human rights violations have attracted limited, if any, western criticism. Lauterbach (2021) suggests that Kenya's increased use of extreme force and unconstitutional means seems to be rewarded by allocating more security aid and support.

---

Second, the theme of religious ideology muzzles legitimate forms of activism. By vilifying Islam and criminalising the Muslim identity, this discourse enabled Kenyatta's administration to deregister and gazette Muslim-led CSOs and businesses as terrorist organisations (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015). Not only does this shrink the civic space and rolls back the gains made in Kenya's journey towards implementing liberal ideals. But also, it (un)intentionally allows al-Shabaab's claim of Muslims persecution in Kenya to gain traction. As a result, this could reinforce grievances and increase the 'radicalisation' of Muslims. Lastly, this theme enabled the design and adoption of regulations to monitor religious bodies, such as the 2016 RSR. As shown in chapter three, these regulations, while designed to ensure oversight, their implementation particularly in a context where minority religions–Islam–are criminalised, only served to institutionalise the narrative of terrorism as inherent to Islam, and Muslims as a potential danger. Thus, the presidential speeches and statements (re)produced discourses about ‘radicalisation’ as a consequence of culture already institutionalised in the NSCVE and MCAP. This religious ideology theme, however, is enabled by local and global developments–as the introductory chapter has shown. Historical accounts by imperialists and Kenya’s state-building project have continually constructed Islam as foreign to Kenya, and Muslims as inherently violent (Becker, 2018). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks these orientalist tropes have been recycled and continue to define western foreign policy and security interests (Hendrixson, 2004; Jackson, 2005, 2007; Mahony, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Khalid, 2011). Thus, these dominant discourses are recontextualised to secure foreign and development aid (Sturman, 2002). They also delegitimise claims about inequality (Branch, 2011) and label critics of state policies with terrorism language thus justifying unconventional measures while concurrently avoiding accountability (Namwaya, 2020; Lauterbach, 2021; Mohamed, 2022).

Existing reports and findings in this chapter, have shown how Uhuru’s administration deployed the terrorism framework on critics of state policies (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015). While CSOs accused of being sympathisers were temporarily deregistered thus affecting their credibility and legitimacy of their claims (Mohamed, 2015). For ordinary people such a construction has had even dire consequences. Reports show that between 2007 and 2022 over 600 individuals have been victims of state-enforced disappearances and assassinations, and other forms of aggressive policies (Open Society Justice Initiative and Muhuri, 2013; MISSING VOICES, 2020, 2021; IMLU, 2022). Many of whom have been young people–particularly young men–aged between 18 and 35 years (IMLU, 2016, 2022; Nyabola, 2016). Apart from the human cost, discourses on terrorism–particularly in the Kenyan Coast–have also induced economic costs. State security forces have levelled false charges of terrorism on Muslim communities to extort large sums of money (Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith, 2018b). Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith (2018b, p. 30) state that such
communities have been forced to pay huge sums of money to avoid “unspecified action against them—action which, in the Kenyan context, has included extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance…”. However, the language of terrorism has given legitimacy to the state’s actions and enabled it to avoid accountability (Namwaya, 2020; Lauterbach, 2021; Mohamed, 2022). If anything, Lauterbach (2021) has argued that Kenya’s increased use of extreme force and unconstitutional means appears to have been rewarded by allocating more military aid from donor governments.

The second theme of ‘radicalisation’ as a youth problem corresponds with similar ideas about youth also advanced by the national and local policies. To begin with, the representation of youth as a danger or threat to stability corresponds with dominant trends of the securitisation of development. Trends which have been influenced by the ‘new wars’ thesis which—as discussed in the introduction—situates contemporary conflicts as characterised by the blurring of boundaries between state and non-state actors, the decline in state authority, mass civilian casualties, and the involvement of multiple actors pursuing various political, economic and especially identity-based goals (Gilbert, 2003; Kaldor, 2005, 2013). Furthermore, in the global South burgeoning youthful populations living in destitute socio-political conditions are seen as the main drivers of new wars (Urdal, 2007). It is argued that when a large youthful population is confronted by diminishing economic opportunities, socio-political exclusion, limited access to education and healthcare, they become susceptible to recruitment by armed groups and involvement in violence (Urdal, 2007). Such a reading cites conflicts in the post-cold war era including the ongoing civil and protracted conflicts across the global South (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) and contemporary forms of conflict such as international terrorism (Münkler, 2005; Neumann, 2009; Hoffman, 2017). Amongst the many criticisms levelled on this thesis is its ability to conveniently downplay contextual particularities. More so the role of Western-led COIN interventions which continue to increase in the post-cold war era, the role of state violence as well as the continuities and co-constitution of imperial and colonial projects and how these have led to the geopolitical and economic configurations which sustain violence and inequalities within and across countries (Chandler, 2009). But instead, it perpetuates ethnocentric ideas about the global South, particularly Africa as a geography of risk.

In addition, the dominant trend of securitising development is predominantly influenced by Western states’ conceptualisation of (in)security (Duffield, 2001; Chandler, 2009), which in the wake of 9/11 has increasingly been about safeguarding western political and security interests by containing “regions of potential instability” (Chandler, 2007, p. 363) and “managing the behaviours of those deemed at-risk” (Chandler, 2008, p. 268). Young people have specifically been situated at the centre of this agenda where they are seen as a
potential security threat (Sageman, 2004; Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter, 2015). Particularly, Muslim youths’ potential to ‘radicalisation’ and eventually terrorism has heightened global anxiety (Lynch, 2013) and led to the development of programs targeting young people. Sukarieh and Tannock (2018) contend that this association of youth to security overemphasises the role of youth as security actors and subjects. This directly reduces the context of multidimensional hyper-precarity young people live in. In other words, by framing ‘radicalisation’ as an issue of the ‘youth identity’, elite discourses criminalise the youth identity while omitting the contextual background, including the systemic injustices caused by internal and external policies and actors. For instance, blaming young people obscures the role of the 1980s implementation of the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) designed and supervised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. While these programs aimed to bolster rapid and sustainable economic growth they resulted in a decline in the provision of social services (Rono, 2002). This disproportionately affected the most vulnerable individuals and groups, who rely on publicly funded education and healthcare.

SAPs compounded horizontal and vertical inequalities (Kang’ara, 1999). For example, these policies reduced spending on basic needs and social services which has created hardships among vulnerable groups. Also, it has become impossible for local products to compete with foreign markets whose commodities are subsidised, resulting in loss of livelihoods. In addition, the government has been unable to create adequate employment opportunities for its increasing population thus creating endemic socioeconomic risks among the vulnerable such as high unemployment, underemployment, retrenchments, and an increase in poverty. These conditions have created a conducive environment for the growth of radicalism and criminal activities (Breidlid, 2021). Other than such policies, endemic corruption, nepotism, and the weaponisation of youth by elites to intimidate opponents and sustain power worsens the conditions youth must navigate in their everyday lives. While these conditions are acknowledged when youth are viewed as economic resources, overall, the theme casts young people in cross-cutting images.

On the one hand, they are portrayed as victims of circumstances and objects of manipulation by a powerful adult Other. Since "youth" as a life stage is often used to signify innocence and vulnerability, portraying youth as victims conveniently evokes sympathy for youth. On the other hand, youth are seen as a dangerous Other who is unruly, destructive and thus needing to be contained (Mohamed, 2021). The latter construction is used to add moral panic about ‘radicalisation’, especially given that al-Shabaab and groups like ISIS are predominantly comprised of young people under the age of 25 (Awan, 2016). These two binaries position youth in generational power dynamics where they are seen in terms of
becoming, that is, on their way to attaining adulthood and not as social or political actors in the present. Not being adults means youth do not have the capacity to act but must rely on adults for their thriving and wellbeing. It is such adult-child relations—based on assumptions on culture, race, ethnicity, age, gender, class, and religion, among others—that the discourse draws on to position youth as needing to be saved. According to culture, youth ought to behave in a certain way and only engage in certain spheres. If they do not, they are deemed deviants, thus needing cultural shaping.

The theme of ‘radicalisation’ as a youth problem criminalises the youth identity and is strategically valuable for sanctioning policies that target youth identities without targeting the actual concrete social processes enabling ‘radicalisation’. Since the problem is framed as a problem of identity, it marginalises youth further. Such framing has real consequences. For example, implementing security measures such as stop-and-searches and curfews disproportionately affects youth, especially young men, compared to other social groups (IMLU, 2016, 2022; Nyabola, 2016; Mohamed, 2021). According to the 2019 Census, since most youth—especially young men—primarily work in the informal economic sector with unpredictable working hours, they are more likely to be outdoors late at night, thus exposing them to police harassment. In other cases, youth are generally profiled based on normative assumptions about behaviour and mannerisms (Kanja, 2014; Kyaa and Kasina, 2020; Mohamed, 2021). The criminalisation of youth identity can also affect prospective employment or educational opportunities. Overall, this construction risks reducing both legitimate and illegitimate forms of activism by youth to ‘youth rebellion’, thus increasing the vagueness of what constitutes ‘radicalisation’ and subsequently PCVE in general.

Alternative studies have shown that youth are not devoid of agency (Leonardi, 2007; Mohamed, 2021). Youth are social and political actors who venture into the political space—albeit in unconventional ways—even within their contexts of socioeconomic and political marginalisation (Leonardi, 2007). Thus, approaching youth as social and political actors helps us to understand how their contexts shape the type of agency available to them and how this shapes what it means to be youth in the Kenyan context and what is known about youthhood. It is with these nuances in mind that ‘radicalisation’ as a social issue predominantly affecting youth ought to be understood. Understanding youth and their radical politics in this manner will open space for the designing of PCVE policies that genuinely address the systemic injustices youth live in.

The third theme on ‘radicalisation’ as opposition to fundamental national values is well-established in formal and informal conversations on terrorism both in the Global North and Global South. This argument became popular with the rise of domestic terrorism. Many
governments started looking inwards to understand how their own citizens were resorting to terrorism to achieve political goals. One common assumption with regards to 'Islamic terrorism' is that Muslim communities have failed to integrate because their values are in opposition to secularism (Kepel, 2006; Taarnby, 2007; Von Hippel, 2007). Similarly, Kenya's national discourse blames the failure of "some communities" in embracing the national values crafted by the founding fathers. This argument is partly enabled by the historical and contemporary construction of Muslims as the enemy and as outsiders whose culture and values are different from 'ours', thus we must protect ourselves and our cultures (Mohamed, 2022). This reading is prevalent in eurocentric narratives about terrorism (Newman and Levine, 2006) and it is rooted in Orientalist discourses that constructs non-European Others as inferior, barbaric and therefore in need of 'civilising' (Said, 1979; Sabir, 2017). Thus the administration emphasises the need to adhere to national values or the National Covenant which encompasses the principles of unity, fairness, equality and liberty. These values form part of the Harambee and Nyayo ideology prevalent with Kenya's first two regimes. Renewed calls for the national covenant occurred in the aftermath of the PEV. Particularly important is that an emphasis on national values ignores the historical background. It argues for a recommitment to the National Covenant, but ignores that Kenya continues to make little effort to address historical inequalities and injustices (Ndovu, 2012). Post-independent regimes have continued to allocate jobs and resources such as land to their ethnic communities in exchange for unwavering political loyalty (Branch, 2011). This increased inequality between people, ethnic communities, and regions.

Despite several efforts, subsequent administrations have not successfully addressed historical land injustice and unequal development due to endemic corruption, impunity, and a lack of political will. Several government commissions have highlighted these issues but the administration repeatedly ignores them and instead assumes instilling national values will solve the problem of ‘radicalisation’. One civil right activist commented that

> It is impossible to forge a unified identity without addressing systemic inequality, discrimination and exclusions. For example, as a person how can I identify with my neighbours when I know they are privileged by belonging to a specific ethnic group? When I know my application for an identity document will be rejected because I belong to a certain ethnic group. That is difficult to reconcile with.

In this light, the theme of ‘radicalisation’ as opposition to fundamental national values prioritises symbols of 'Kenyaness'. These shared values, it is assumed, are what binds Kenyans together. The theme banks on the shared values as the cornerstone of solidarity

---

162 Philosophical ideologies that framed the workings of the 1st and 2nd administration of Kenya respectively.
163 Personal communication 8 July 2015.
to achieve an outcome (unite Kenyans and win the war against al-Shabaab) that mirrors the success of the colonial struggle. Thus, it renewed emphasis on the inculcation of national values through schooling and a change in political rhetoric. Understandably, an emphasis on symbols of 'Kenyanness' had certain advantages for President Kenyatta's administration that was seeking re-election for the second term. Given that Kenya is a state composed of diverse language and cultural groups which were united by historical circumstances (struggle against the British Empire), a single Kenyan identity has always been a myth rather than a reality. Even in historical accounts, several communities/actors that the British Empire considered too radical were left out of the foundation story for independence, and only those deemed moderate nationals like Jomo Kenyatta were included (Charton, 2013). As such, it is unclear what the theme implies by the term national values and forging a common identity.

Coupled with institutionalised tribalism, it is difficult for most marginal communities to feel a sense of belonging when there are no meaningful efforts to foster equality. As a result, the theme invokes the national story that captures the values and symbols that define 'Kenyanness' as crucial aspects that will guarantee unity, stability, tolerance, and peace. An allegiance to these values merits who is considered Kenyan. The theme discounts the existing social system of exclusion. Even in places where exclusion is acknowledged, it is framed as a problem that occurred in the previous administrations. This shames those who complain about exclusion making them feel as if they are living in the past. Approaching ‘radicalisation’ as an opposition to national values reduces the existence of systemic exclusion and shifts the blame onto the individual. In other words, it is the individuals or groups who isolate themselves. Hence, the system is not to be blamed because it is perfectly functional, and it is the individual who needs to change.

There are two main problems with approaching ‘radicalisation’ this way. First, failure to integrate is viewed as existing independently of practices of systemic exclusion. Thus leading to the securitisation of integration of minorities and harsh policies against those labelled ‘at-risk’ and ‘risky of’ becoming extremists. This therefore, allows for a selective targeting of certain communities or identities (Lindekilde, 2016). Since the inability to integrate is disconnected from the reality of institutional corruption, nepotism, and deliberate government (in)actions the ensuing policies are framed around safeguarding tradition, cultural values, identity and preventing deviance. These policies encourage mentoring and empowering young people to educate them on our cultural values. Here, young people are seen as a lost generation in need of guidance and their teachers, and mostly elders are seen as beacons and custodians of cultural values. Thus educational and mentoring programs have been developed to inculcate desirable national values (Njagi, 2020). At the
national level these programs are found in the work of NCIC. With funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), NCIC has strengthened and supported Amani (peace) clubs by developing their curriculum aimed at transforming youth and children to embrace cohesion (Njagi, 2020; National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2023). These clubs were initially rolled out in 2014 and they targeted areas identified as hot spots. In 2020, it was estimated that there are over 1500 Amani clubs in schools in the 47 counties, reaching an estimate of 500,000 students and 1000 teachers (Menya, 2020).

Second and interrelated approaching 'radicalisation' this way shifts the focus from the state and its exclusionary policies to the individuals/groups considered a problem. This tasks individuals/groups with the responsibility of adopting national values to fit into a category where—in the first place—they feel unwanted as repeatedly their needs are not recognised. Thus social integration PCVE measures—that focus on reinventing a unified national identity—fail to grasp the underlying causes of radicalism but also leave existing power relations intact. Furthermore, this theme is also invoked to remind Kenyans of the horrors of PEV, thus silencing and delegitimising voices critical of social processes producing inequalities by constructing them as radicals.

The fourth theme of ‘radicalisation’ as a function of social networks is popular in studies informed by social movement theories. Studies stemming from this perspective show that most individuals' movement towards radical politics and eventually terrorism occurs through social networks of friends and relatives. However, the way the social networks' argument is framed in the speeches decontextualises the individuals and groups from the broader socioeconomic and political circumstances they live in, which may contribute to their movement to radical politics. It fails to recognise that social bonds are essential, especially in communal societies where they guarantee access to opportunities (jobs, education, and access to services) and improve individuals' wellbeing (Mohamed, 2015). It is only in limited cases where social networks are an entry into crime. However, by emphasising social networks, the theme identifies 'hotspots' or what the NYPD model calls radicalisation incubators. These are spaces and places where socialisation into radical ideologies takes place, for example, homes, madrassas, mosques, educational institutions,

164 Literature on civil war has extensively documented the idea of elite-led violence. My analysis does not reject that elites mobilise violence for material and ideological benefits. Rather it is crucial to underscore that behind these mobilisation efforts real issues pertaining to structural grievances are often raised. Thus, if we view elites as instrumentalising identity cleavages compounded by real socio-economic grievances then it broadens our understanding of how elites mobilise successfully. However, as it is radicalisation like all other conflicts in Kenya are often reduced to ethnic hatred and those calling for reforms labelled ethnic chieftains to diminish their claims about inequality, nepotism and impunity, to censor by painting them as divisive and cover up corruption.
prisons, and social media. This implication sanctions the expansion of surveillance from public spaces into homes (Mohamed, 2021). By criminalising identities and cultural relations, this theme sanctions and leads to the development of policies such as "early warning systems", which intend "to monitor" individual and groups "for signs of ‘radicalisation’ and then intervene to prevent the drift to extremism" (Kundnani, 2015, p. 16). One drawback is that these early warning systems rely on profiling practices based on different axes of identity.

In summary, most national discourses link ‘radicalisation’ to identity, culture, and cultural relationships. These discourses encourage the design and implementation of PCVE models that contribute to the cultural shaping of individuals whether they are economic or educational programs. Such models are often driven by presumptions about normative behaviour. But what remains unacknowledged is that what is considered deviant behaviour at any point in time is dependent on power dynamics and socio-historical and political context. An appropriate example of this is the *Mau Mau* resistance. On one level, the British Empire considered the *Mau Mau* to be ‘terrorists’, but they were saviours and freedom fighters to most African and colonised communities. The Empire’s characterisation of the *Mau Mau* as terrorists was shaped by colonial views of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, class, as well as demographics. On another level, Kenyans considered the British as ‘terrorists’ because they used extreme violence to advance their economic and political agendas. When addressing local audiences—during election periods, that is 2016 and 2018—President Kenyatta draws on this colonial experience to equate al-Shabaab with the *colonialism suffered by Kenya’s forefathers* during the British Empire’s rule. However, when speaking to an international audience—for example, in 2015 during the leaders summit to counter ISIL and violent extremism—he intentionally excludes the negative side of colonialism, allowing him to position western actors as Kenya’s allies in the war against 'Islamic terrorism'. From this, we can see the boundaries of "us" versus "them" shifting depending on the context—situation, type of audience and interests—and the dominant political culture. In addition, the colonialism analogy also allows the war against al-Shabaab to be read as an extension of the struggle for independence. It suffices to conclude that ‘radicalisation’ acquires its meaning by weaving analogies, narratives, words and language in such a way that it makes possible only certain causal interpretations which in turn only opens space for certain dialogues and policy possibilities. By building national discourses that are informed by international frameworks of terrorism, Kenya has managed to establish itself as an ally and anchor-state of the GWOT in the international arena. Locally, the national discourses have become a shorthand for silencing any form of dissent thus reinforcing authoritarianism.
Chapter 5. Constructing 'Radicalisation': Analysing How the Press Legitimates the boundaries of 'Radicalisation' through Personal Authority

This chapter analyses press articles with a specific focus on how the press reports 'radicalisation'. Particularly, since 'radicalisation' is a conflict-related issue there are three mainstream narratives regarding the role of the media in conflict reporting: the media as a critical observer, as a publicist (Thussu and Freedman, 2003) and as the watchdog i.e. playing the role of holding those in power accountable for their actions and decisions (McNair, 2008). The purpose of this chapter is to advance these debates by unpacking the practices employed by the press to define the parameters of debate or otherwise, determine what is known about 'radicalisation' and who is authorised to speak about 'radicalisation'. By examining this, we will understand why and how some worldviews become dominant while others remain marginal. This chapter is composed of four sections. It begins by systematically analysing the contents of news texts published from 2015 to 2018 by Nation Africa and The Standard online platforms. The content analysis reveals crucial details on the diversity of topics, authorship, sourcing and the types of news frames emerging from the coverage.

Section two analyses the discourses advanced in the different frames. The discourses advanced by the media reflect those appearing in presidential speeches and statements both in terms of structure–i.e. how arguments are built–and vocabulary. Similar to elite discourses, cultural discourses were also the most prominent in media coverage. This is because of media sourcing practices. The media over relied on official sources as new sources, thus official sources legitimate government perspectives and narratives. For example, in this chapter, I show how the media legitimated official narratives by uncritically citing or failing to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions and contradictory claims. Other studies on terrorism have also noted this. Arguing that, when covering conflict, and particularly terrorism the media over relies on official sources (Li and Izard, 2003; Woods, 2007). However, official sources precisely use their ease of access to the media to shape the parameters of debate and public opinion (Thussu and Freedman, 2003).

The analysis exposes gerontocratic, gendered, politico-economic character and the religious framing of 'radicalisation' in the press. Similar to presidential speeches, media coverage also viewed young people within the problematic victim–perpetrator binary. Gerontocratic themes emphasised youth’s immaturity owing to their age and lack of
experience as ‘factors’ that make them vulnerable to manipulation. Similar to elite discourses the media also advanced politico-economic discourses by demonstrating how the state has (c)overtly enabled ‘radicalisation’ by openly fostering inequity, injustices and by failing to address historical marginalisation. However, this discourse varied in how it was presented in the media. Whilst in presidential speeches and statements, inequalities and marginalisation were attributed to past political administrations, in the media economic issues contributing to ‘radicalisation’, specifically forms of institutionalised corruption and unemployment were extensively covered in columns sections of Nation Africa, and hard news sections of The Standard. But those relating to historical marginalisation and heavy-handed counterterrorism were especially common in the hard news sections of The Standard. When they appeared in Nation Africa, they were mostly present in commentary sections and at times this took the form of hedged claims. This variation could be marginal but nevertheless important. First, because hard news consists of more factual information, and timely stories that are deemed more newsworthy (Fedler et al., 2005). Thus The Standard’s inclusion of marginal discourses in their hard news sections served to provide ideological alternatives for thinking about ‘radicalisation’ and what effective countermeasures may be. These alternative ways of knowing are often excluded or reduced through hedged claims, as was shown in national policy texts in Chapter three. Thus including them served to prompt the public to also think about other dimensions of ‘radicalisation’ that elite discourses ignore. Such an approach also served to highlight The Standard’s “role of critical scrutiny over the powerful” (McNair, 2008, p.239) or otherwise the watchdog. The Standard’s challenging of elite discourses allowed the voices of the civil society and representatives of minority religious and ethnic groups to be heard, and gave a more comprehensive and holistic picture about the motives of young people.

Second, Nation Africa’s inclusion of marginal discourses was also an attempt to destabilise dominant discourses. By relegating marginal discourses to commentary sections their credibility was reduced (Armstrong, 2004; Fedler et al., 2005). As they can be dismissed for personal opinions rather than factual reporting grounded in rigorous research. Overall, this limits but does not diminish the potential that marginal discourses could have in shaping public discourse. For example, Omanga’s (2012, p.22) study of how cartoons shape Kenya’s public discourse on terrorism revealed that editorial cartoons prompted debates among readers, thus they were “a powerful form of communication and immortalization of key events”. Similarly commentaries and opinion pieces have been known to encompass persuasive writing (Connor, 1996) thus significantly contributing to news medium’s effective argumentation (Reah, 1998), its persuasive impact, and its reinforcement of readers’ ideologies and attitudes (Van Dijk, 1988).
On cultural discourses, the press also emphasised religion’s primary role in radicalising Kenya’s minority Muslim populations. In line with elite discourses, the media foregrounds the Muslim identity and Islamic culture to define the discursive boundaries of what constitutes ‘radicalisation’ and who can be labelled a ‘radical’. Taken together, these discourses concurrently situated young people within hierarchies of victimhood and dangerousness. Some youth were seen as powerless victims of manipulative powerful Others, whereas others were seen as dangerous political actors. The third section of this chapter shows how these discourses are legitimated in the press. I argue that the press highly relies on authorisation strategies to validate their content. While sourcing is part of journalistic practices—in the final section of this chapter—I show that the press reifies existing power structures by relying on state sources; through personal authority. The press thus influences what the public can know and come to know about ‘radicalisation’ and what measures to prevent and counter-radicalisation are seen as appropriate.

**Description of Media Content and Analysis**

*Background on news text data*

A content analysis was conducted on 474 news texts: with the highest number of news being 343 from *Nation Africa*, which was approximately 2.6 times the number published by *The Standard*—131 news. Majority of news was classified as articles. Typically, articles were characterised by more than three paragraphs; they contained sub-headings and followed the 5W's and 1H news style, that is, who did what, why, when, where and how? Forty-four per cent of news were categorised as articles, columns accounted for 26.58 per cent, briefs accounted for 15.4 per cent, and editorial accounted for three per cent. Columns are news stories where the author explicitly expresses their own opinion, whereas a brief is often a short news item that reports on contingent events. Structurally, a brief has up to three paragraphs and does not usually include subtitles. While categorising articles and briefs relied on the researcher’s judgment, columns were already classified under the column’s tabs on both *Nation Africa* and *The Standard* websites. Such classification is mostly an editorial judgement because columns reflect personal rather than institutional opinions. Hence, they are authored by either the newspapers’ staff or outsiders deemed experts on the issue under discussion. Editorials, however, reflect the outlet's ideological position on specific issues and are generally authored by the editorial team or a senior editor of the newspaper.

Newspaper’s staff (reporters, correspondents, media teams, or editorial teams) authored more than two-thirds of the news (65.61 per cent), especially the hard news category. The remaining one-third of news was written by security experts (11.39 per cent), academics
(seven per cent), professionals (seven per cent), government presses and departments (two per cent) and civilians and other elites (seven per cent). The heterogeneity in authorship indicates that the news presses under review are diverse, but it should be treated with caution as most of the non-journalist individuals (i.e. the security experts, professionals, and elites) involved had ties to the government and/or government institutions. Such relational ties could impact the type of views these authors expressed in their stories. Also, given that most non-journalist categories authored stories in the opinion genres, their stories expressed personal opinions rather than the formal position of the outlet on ‘radicalisation’.

Further, a closer look at authorship by gender also reveals interesting patterns. Approximately 76.16 per cent, 12.66 per cent, and just over three per cent of the news stories were authored by men, women, and co-authored (by a man and a woman), respectively. In the remaining eight per cent of news, the gender of the author was not evident. Most of the news where the gender is unspecified were those authored by news agencies and professional press units such as the presidential service communications unit.

Just over forty-eight per cent of the news were placed in the main section. In comparison, 10.55 per cent were published under county news, and 41.35 per cent appeared under “other news”, which encompasses news published under columns, editorials, features, health and lifestyle tabs. The location of a news story is important because it reveals what is (is not) considered a high-interest story, what the journalists believe their audience needs to know and what stories are likely to attract more revenue from advertising. Hence, most of the stories published in the main section are considered high-interest stories. In the case of online press, they are stories likely to be accessed the most, meaning the outlet can charge more for advertising.

*Story characteristics*

Overall, the most prominent topics covered were police and crime (37.13 per cent), government and legislature (24.05 per cent), social problems (slightly over eight per cent) and defence and military (slightly over six per cent). Police and crime remained consistently high in both platforms. However, in *The Standard*, coverage also focused on topics relating to faith and faith organisations (over eight per cent) and education (seven per cent). In contrast, *Nation Africa*’s coverage mainly focused on social problems (slightly over nine per cent) such as inequality, poverty and discrimination, gender-based issues, and activities on defence and military (seven per cent). This chapter shows that the classic concerns of journalism—lay in policing & crime and government activities rather than topics concerning human rights and the economy, as only slightly over two per cent and three per cent of articles focused on human rights and the economy, respectively.
By gender, men were 50 per cent more likely to cover news on police and crime than women. In comparison, women were 60 per cent more likely to cover news on social problems than men. These percentages are not conclusive because the data sample was small, that is only 12.66 per cent of the coverage was by women. This can be explained by the large discrepancy between the number of men and women employed by the outlets. Also, the chances that men are more likely to cover police and crime topics can be attributed to normative gender assumptions. Previous research has shown that the majority of hard news reporters tend to be male (Ziegler and White, 1990; Ashley and Olson, 1998; Armstrong, 2004; Ross and Carter, 2011). Topics that fall in the hard news category are those primarily concerned with crime, violence, politics, foreign policy, defense, law, economic concerns and to an extent sports (Ashley and Olson, 1998; Armstrong, 2004; Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky, 2010; Mitchelstein et al., 2020). Simultaneously, studies have also shown that women are more likely to cover ‘softer’ issues also referred to as soft news (Desmond and Danilewicz, 2010). Topics in the category of soft news include those related to health, child care, education, human rights and other human interest stories such as those falling in the categories of lifestyle and trends (Armstrong, 2004; North, 2016). Hard news consists of more factual information, timely stories thus deemed more newsworthy (Fedler et al., 2005). Soft news, however, often is meant to entertain, evokes emotions and does not require immediate publication, thus is not considered to be of informational value (Fedler et al., 2005).

Research has shown that such news routines—e.g. the criteria for newsworthiness—are largely male-defined due to the composition of the newsroom (North, 2009; Ross, 2010). Men and women have different experiences of the world, thus they bring different perspectives. For example, normative gender assumptions that regard women as peaceful and view emotions as typically feminine, could in part influence why female reporters are more likely to be assigned to cover soft news (Desmond and Danilewicz, 2010) or ‘normalised’ social problems such as poverty, inequality and gender-related issues. In the same way, gendered assumptions that primarily codify certain activities to be male could influence why male journalists are often likely to be assigned to cover conflict-related stories. It has been argued that in the Kenyan mediascape male journalists are regarded as better placed to protect themselves while in the field thus they get assigned to cover conflict-related topics more regularly, in comparison to their female counterparts. In particular because of gendered assumptions about the fragile female thus they should be

---

165 Macharia, L. and Barry, M. 2023. ‘You can’t be a constructive Journalist and make it as a journalist in Kenya!’ Professionals’ Insights on Constructive Journalism Practice Conference Proceedings IAMCR 2023: Inhabiting The Planet: Challenges For Media Communication And Beyond. Lyon.
protected rather than being exposed to dangerous situations. In addition, these decisions are also based on research that extensively shows that female journalists are more likely to be targets of harassment, and physical and sexual violence (Walsh-Childers, Chance and Herzog, 1996; MISA and Gender Links, 2003; Rego, 2018), thus newsroom avoid assigning female journalists to cover politics and conflict-related stories to protect them from further harm. While some of these practices may be considered ethical they risk reinforcing gender under-representation of women in the newsroom (MISA and Gender Links, 2003). In turn, news reporting by both male and female journalists could represent male perspectives as neutral, uncontroversial and, most importantly, gives the impression that they are impartial (Van Zoonen, 1998; Ross, 2001; North, 2009). However, because of news norms and newsroom socialisation, which encourages uniform reporting based on professional standards, often such standards warrant further interrogation because they were developed in male-defined newsrooms so in reality they are not really uniform but are based on the male gaze (North, 2009).

In terms of diversity of sources and viewpoints, only four per cent of news did not cite any sources. However, 46.41 per cent of coverage relied on unilateral perspectives, i.e. the story was based on one source. By platform, 44.02 per cent and 52.67 per cent of Nation Africa and The Standard’s coverage were unilateral, which raises questions about news balance. If the information presented in most of the news was one-sided, it could be argued that audiences access incomplete stories. The findings also show that 43.25 per cent of news consulted different sources with varying viewpoints. Of the texts by Nation Africa, 44.90 per cent consulted different sources with varying viewpoints, whereas only 38.93 per cent of texts by The Standard did. The diversity of sources and viewpoints is essential in giving balanced coverage and a comprehensive overview of the issue under investigation. To ascertain this, I took a closer look at the type of news sources consulted in the coverage.

Predominantly 42.62 per cent of news relied on state sources as the main news source, of which 63.86 per cent were by Nation Africa, and 36.14 per cent were by The Standard. Of the news that cited a "state source" as the main source, 57.92 per cent were written from a unilateral point of view, and 40.49 per cent had divergent points of view with different weighing. For instance, The Standard’s brief “Controversial Mombasa mosque shut after November 17 raid reopened”166 only relied on unnamed state officials while covering the reopening of a controversial mosque. In contrast, Nation Africa’s article “Majority attribute youth radicalisation to unemployment, report says”167 covered the link between

unemployment and ‘radicalisation’ by consulting different sources (even though most were state sources) that looked at the issue from different angles. Diverse sourcing made the coverage more comprehensive. But the media naturalised elite views by choosing official sources over other sources, such as civil society and ordinary people. Elite views were made to appear natural and commonsensical\(^{168}\), thus discursively limiting what can be known about ‘radicalisation’, and what social actors are authorised to speak about ‘radicalisation’.

News frames

In covering ‘radicalisation’, the press mostly employed solutions frames. Close to forty-two per cent of news focused on identifying possible solutions to the problem of ‘radicalisation’, followed by 36.29 per cent news that focused on analysing and explaining the causes of ‘radicalisation’ and who is to blame. Only about five per cent of news used motivational frames, that is frames concerned with persuading people on a rationale for action. There were observable differences by outlets. On the one hand, the most common frame by *Nation Africa* focused on assessing possible solutions to ‘radicalisation’. This frame was present in 44.31 per cent of news. News items employing this frame proposed different measures for addressing ‘radicalisation’. Some emphasised the need for legal measures. For instance, the adoption of the RSR was seen as necessary to prevent teachers and preachers from disseminating ‘radical teachings’ and to ensure there is consistency in what is taught in madrasas. Other solutions were economic-oriented. They proposed; job creation to mitigate high rates of youth unemployment; increased investment in public schools to ensure young people from low-income groups access quality education; investing in youth empowerment; and diversification of the economy to mitigate unemployment. Social justice-oriented solutions urged the government to address historical land injustices; build mutual trust between communities and law enforcement agencies; create peer-to-peer mentorship programs; adopt participatory PCVE measures; and encourage the formation of positive support networks, among others.

On the other hand, *The Standard’s* coverage mostly (43.51 per cent) focused on assessing the causes of ‘radicalisation’. This frame highlighted different causes of ‘radicalisation’. Economic causes of ‘radicalisation’ were identified as poverty which hinders low-income groups from completing school, thus making them unable to compete with their peers in the job market. And economic marginalisation stemming from inequality, endemic corruption and the inability to diversify the economy. For instance, the threat of terrorism and ensuing travel advisories has adversely affected the Coast of Kenya region that predominantly

\(^{168}\) This point is elaborated in the section on (de)legitimating emerging discourses on radicalisation.
depends on tourism to survive. In addition, cultural dynamics such as poor parenting, opportunist elites (coded as powerful Other) and elites' lack of political will were identified as conditions facilitating 'radicalisation'. Powerful Others were identified as responsible for radicalising young people and children. Such powerful Others included rogue clerics, politicians and even parents. Apart from the causes of 'radicalisation', this frame also identified who was to blame for 'radicalisation' and/or use of violence. For instance, through nomination, specific perpetrators such as "Abdirahim Mohammed Abdullahi, who plotted the Garissa University College massacre"\(^{169}\) were identified and their journey towards terrorism expounded. Other dynamics conducive for ‘radicalisation’ were social injustices related to land dispossession, discriminatory policies when seeking national identity cards and travel documents, and unequal development.

This analysis shows that Nation Africa’s coverage was more solutions-oriented than The Standard’s, which was problem-oriented. Once the content analysis was completed 46 articles sampled based on thematic events (see table 2.1) related to terrorism and PCVE were subjected to a closer reading. A critical discourse analysis of the 46 articles revealed that press coverage attributes ‘radicalisation’ to individual, cultural and politico-economic level explanations. In the next section, I analysed these emerging themes independently, critically problematising their main assumptions, what identities they constitute for young people, and their strategies to construct these identities.

**Press Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’**

*Psychosocial concerns*

Coverage on ‘radicalisation’ often referenced individual-level (psychosocial factors) concerns and motivations. Only six out of the 46 articles thematically sampled referenced this discourse. Both Nation Africa and The Standard attributed ‘radicalisation’ to personal experiences with tragedies or injustices, personal expectations in life, and challenges experienced during demographic phases such as adolescence and young adulthood (see figure 5.1). This discourse was prevalent in stories covering police and crime. A coding query also showed that this discourse primarily appeared in the hard news and column genres of The Standard and Nation Africa, respectively. An advanced query also revealed that individual-related explanations were more common among articles focusing on gender, with gender in the press predominantly used when referencing women’s issues.

---

Individual-related themes attributed ‘radicalisation’ to identity crises. Often, such crises were experienced during adolescence and young adulthood periods when youth mostly struggle with questions regarding their values, beliefs, roles and purpose in life. During these developmental phases, identity crises were triggered by different stressors and changes. For “teenage girls” or “jihadi brides”, identity crises were triggered by the confusion resulting from “surging hormones, peer pressure, parental expectations, and demanding academic requirements”\textsuperscript{170}. For young adults qua young men, it stemmed from “feelings of persecution, marginalisation or past violence of their rights or people close to them”\textsuperscript{171}, a “sense of inadequacy and not belonging”\textsuperscript{172}, a “natural quest for purpose and fulfilment”\textsuperscript{173}, and for others like “Ciku” it originated from a “quest for attention and acceptance”\textsuperscript{174}.

‘Radicalisation’ occurred when individuals were searching for an identity. This search drew young people to extremist organisations in several ways. For youth experiencing a “sense of inadequacy, a gap between the ideals they aspire for and the reality”, embracing extremist ideologies “was the only way to bring about change”\textsuperscript{175}. They used extremist

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{Distribution of Psychosocial Themes}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{170} See Warah, R. (2015b) ‘The girls who join IS aren’t terrorists; they are confused hormonal teenagers’, Nation Africa, 31 May.
\textsuperscript{175} See Sanga (2016).
ideologies to advance their cause, i.e. changing the status quo. For those youth that had experienced injustices, humiliation or alienation, being part of an extremist group offered them a sense of belonging. It prompted them to act to redress the injustices done to them. For “the confused and vulnerable youth”, as was the case of the “jihadi brides”, extremist “ideology and lifestyles” offered them a sense of purpose, whereas, for those seeking thrill and adventure, extremist ideologies and lifestyles were an opportunity for them to “seek personal glory”.

**Representation of young people in psychosocial themes**

Individual-related themes argue that an identity crisis makes young people “susceptible and vulnerable” to manipulation by powerful Others (see the next section). Such vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ was constructed around identity categories of age, gender, sex, religion, family background and level of education. This construction was expressed through two types of categorisation. On the one hand, social actors were identified and classified using age and sex as major categories used by society to differentiate between classes of people. The vulnerable were classified as “young people”, “the youth”, “teenagers”, and “teenage girls”. Such classification relied on the categories of age and sex to create sympathy for young people. Foregrounding their ages—especially in a gerontocratic context—emphasised their victimhood by activating narratives where childhood signifies naivety, innocence and vulnerability. Similarly, foregrounding their sex and gender also reinforced essentialist narratives about women’s innocence and inherent peacefulness. In both Wabala and Warah’s articles, the young women were constantly referred to as “the girls” or “girls” rather than “women” despite most of them being of legal age. Referring to them as “girls” diminished their involvement and roles in extremist organisations. Because the assumption is that girls are immature and childlike. This reinforces the idea that women, in general, are weak, helpless, irrational and in need of protection.

On the other hand, social actors were categorised in the same arguments through functionalisation. Functionalisation portrayed youth in their roles and activities. Young men were often functionalised as “IS fighters” and “combatants”. Whereas young women were functionalised as “jihadi brides”, “the sex slaves”, “female jihadist”, “suicide bombers”, and “jihadist women”. Not only do these representations dehumanise social actors—particularly the men—by making readers evaluate them as dangerous. But, for the women, functionalisation achieves different representational effects. For the “suicide bomber”,

---

176 See Warah (2015b).
177 Ibid
178 According to article 260 of the Kenyan Constitution, an adult is an individual who has attained the age of 18 years.
“female jihadist”, and “jihadi women”, functionalisation together with classification highlighted the dangerousness of jihadi women or “the female terrorist”. These women are deviants or ‘monsters’ because they operate beyond the bounds of ideal femininity, that is the nurturing, peaceful and emotional traits normatively ascribed to women. By foregrounding their deviancy, this category of women are seen as dangerous and ruthless, thus needing to be controlled. With the “jihadi brides”, functionalisation sexualises and infantilises the women to emphasize their innocence. These women are only seen as being lured into extremist organisations by sex or romance: therefore, they are just whores. This diminishes their involvement, thus obscuring their motivations and roles. Instead, their male relations (regardless of age) were considered responsible for manipulating them into joining extremist groups, therefore dangerous.

Finally, representing women and girls as “sex slaves” of al-Shabaab served two primary purposes. It first highlighted the spiritual contradictions of al-Shabaab. Since al-Shabaab proclaims to adhere to Islam, particularly Wahhabi orientations, promiscuous sex and sex slavery is not a lifestyle choice one would expect them to engage in. Thus, functionalisation encouraged the reader to distance al-Shabaab from Islam and the beliefs of Muslims. Second, in one way, representing women as “sex slaves” dehumanises persons who were already in bondage. In another way, functionalisation oversexualised the women's experiences. It emphasises that these women are victims of sexual violence, while at the same time obscuring how they have resisted and overcome such violence. An instructive case is Wabala’s article where Ciku, described as an al-Shabaab “sex slave”, escapes an al-Shabaab warehouse in Somalia where she was kept captive. She travels through “thicket and thorny plantations” and finally makes it to Wajir, where she is “detained by security agents” and later connected with her family. However, representing Ciku as a “sex slave” prevents the reader from seeing her resistance and agency. The coverage uses sexuality and sex to dehumanise the women, but more importantly it also serves to demonise al-Shabaab. This is not a strategy unique to the Kenyan media landscape, rather it has also been deployed to frame other groups such as ISIS and their connection to Jihadi Brides, and sexual trafficking of Yazidi women (Jackson, 2021). And Boko Haram, in the context of Chibok Girls and their continued kidnapping and sex trafficking of Christian women in Northern Nigeria (Matfess, 2017). While highlighting how these groups sexual abuse of women is important, such framing also leaves out details about the complex relationship that extremists organisations have with gender, sex, and sex work. Different extremist organisations hold varied views and practices on sex and gender roles depending on their “group ideology, culture, local social cultures, individuals
and family dynamics. It depends on the expression of local patriarchy. It depends on what is practically possible” (Al-Ali, 2018; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020, p. 10).

‘Islamist’ extremists groups have mobilised around strict conservative gender norms, especially in relation to women's clothing and behaviour as a matter of upholding Islamic women’s modesty and sexual purity (International Crisis Group, 2019), and lauding virtues of women as mothers, homemakers, carers as the real form of empowerment (Mattheis and Winter, 2019; Badurdeen, 2020). Where extremist groups that operate in societies where such binary gender expectations also exist, it is unavoidable that women’s and men's motivation for joining will mirror them (Matfess, 2017; Pearson and Winterbotham, 2017). This is not to argue that grooming or the sexual exploitation of women by extremists does not occur. Undoubtedly grooming and, sexually abuse and exploitation of women occurs, as research globally has continually demonstrated (Matfess, 2017; Jesperson, 2019; Petrich and Donnelly, 2019; Stern, 2019; Badurdeen, 2020). But these practices need to be understood in terms of the relationship between gender and power (Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020; Brown, 2020b).

Research has shown extremist groups may use sexual abuse to promote rigid gender norms thus exerting dominance over women, and restricting their freedoms and rights (Kaya, 2019; United Nations Secretary General, 2020). At the same time, such practices allow them to solidify their power and control over communities, and enhance social cohesion among the group’s members, and social status of recruits (Kaya, 2019; United Nations Secretary General, 2020; Revkin and Wood, 2021). We see a parallel between Kenya's media discourse and western discourses on groups like ISIS, and Boko Haram and their relationships with women. These discourses often associate support for "women's rights" with being non-radical or moderate because it is assumed that embracing gender equality aligns with liberal values and is seen as a counter-narrative to extremist ideologies that often enforce strict gender roles and subordination of women (Shepherd, 2006). However, this simplified understanding of women's agency and extremist groups' ideologies and practices as deviant and linear needs to be avoided.

Cultural concerns

Coverage also reiterated the role of culture in 'radicalisation'. A coding query showed that cultural-related themes were present in 32 articles out of the 46. The themes referenced ideologies, powerful Others (social networks), socialisation and gender norms (see figure 5.2) as enabling ‘radicalisation’. The analysis will unpack each of these themes independently.
Ideologies

Some arguments cited the role of cultural values in facilitating ‘radicalisation’. Twenty-five articles: 16 by *Nation Africa* and nine by *The Standard*, referenced extreme ideologies, particularly those with an Islamic orientation as playing a role in justifying violence. While 54 references attributed ‘radicalisation’ to ideologies, four referred to religion in general, three to non-religious ideologies and 47 explicitly referred to actors, spaces, practices and concepts directly associated with Islam and the beliefs of Muslims. Of these 47, 28 were by *Nation Africa* and 19 by *The Standard*. Direct references to Islam were made through claims such as “some years ago radicalisation of youths in Mombasa was being done in broad daylight in some mosques”\(^\text{179}\) or “Radicalisation that breeds terrorism is not conducted in the bush at night. It occurs in the full glare of day, in madrasas, in homes, and in mosques with rogue imams”\(^\text{180}\). In these articles, extreme religious ideologies were sometimes also referenced as “religious ideologies”, “evil ideologies of al-Shabaab”, or “hateful ideologies peddled by al-Shabaab”.

In other instances, the apparent link between Islam and terrorism was implied through narrations such as:

> Wamy High School was established in 2003 … A majority of its students are Muslims... Ironically, despite the disproportionately large percentage of Christian teachers in the school, only 21 of its current 500 students are Christians. The rest

---


are Muslims. The school's website says it was established by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Wamy) to enable Muslims to access education. Moreover, religion was also a relevant factor when covering the identities of the victims and perpetrators. In 2015 following the separation of GUC students into Muslims and Christians and the latter's execution by al-Shabaab, more emphasis was placed on religion as a crucial factor in al-Shabaab's propaganda. Religious arguments also framed the various attacks that happened in 2015 in Mandera, Garissa and Lamu, including the July 2015 killing of quarry workers. This coverage reinforced the idea of terrorism as 'inherent to Islam'. Thus, encouraging the adoption of RSRs and SUPKEMs "emergency programme to check the lure of Muslims youth into joining Al-Shabaab". These measures would "vet preachers and what they teach in madrassas", standardise the madrassa curriculum, and register Madrassa teachers countrywide. However, in 2016 after the Mandera bus attack, the trope of Muslims as terrorists slightly shifted. For example, coverage of the Mandera bus attack highlighted that "Muslims travelling on a bus to Mandera spontaneously shielded Christians from what could have turned into a bloody massacre by extremists". Specifically, this discursive shift opened space for conversations about building resilient communities.

Besides religious ideologies, political ideologies such as those prioritising “ethnic identity” instead of nationalism/patriotism were seen as facilitating ‘radicalisation’. Like the extreme religious ones, these ideologies weaken “bonds between and within communities”, thus allowing “those fueling division and hate” to easily recruit youth or even encourage violence against those considered outsiders.

The role of powerful Others

Coverage also emphasised the role of powerful Others or social networks in ‘radicalisation’. This theme was referenced 54 times, 32 of which were by The Standard. This theme suggested that youth are vulnerable to manipulation by a powerful Other. Powerful Others were identified as religious elites, i.e. “rogue imams and preachers”, “al-Shabaab”, “al-Shabaab talent-spotters”, “terrorists and terrorist groups”, “recruiters for terrorist organisations”, opportunistic elites, i.e. “politicians”, peers and family members such as

---

184 See Zeuthen (2016).
“brothers and male cousins”. ‘Radicalisation’ happened when powerful Others encouraged youth to internalise extreme values. The articles stated that powerful Others: “conditioned young people to adopt ‘mtu wetu’ (our person) mentality”\textsuperscript{186}; “taught terrorism”\textsuperscript{187}; “groomed young girls”\textsuperscript{188}; “brainwashed youth”\textsuperscript{189}; “lured, radicalised and recruited youths and university students into terror groups”\textsuperscript{190}; “used students and youth to perpetuate violence and cause chaos”\textsuperscript{191}; “encouraged attacks against innocent civilians”\textsuperscript{192}; “manipulated the youth”\textsuperscript{193}; and even trafficked young women into Somalia\textsuperscript{194}. We see that powerful Others influence youth through persuasion, manipulation and even coercion.

The theme also advanced that powerful Others recruited and radicalised youth through mosques, madrasas, homes, coffee houses, institutions of higher learning, and social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp\textsuperscript{195}. Young people were susceptible because powerful Others often exploited (and even satisfied) their emotional/psychological needs, such as their need to belong, a sense of purpose, meaning and to improve their self-esteem (as shown in the previous section). Or they also fulfilled youth’s material needs by offering them financial incentives\textsuperscript{196}. In exchange, powerful Others used youth to achieve varied political agendas.

\textbf{Socialisation}

\textit{Nation Africa} also linked ‘radicalisation’ to bad parenting. Parents were seen as failing in their responsibilities in four ways. First, they fail “to instill in their children the ability to differentiate sources of information”. And because “today’s parents” rarely have time to spend with their children, “the children have no way of authenticating information they get from other sources”. Thus children treat the information they have received as “authentic

\textsuperscript{186} Daily Nation Reporter (2017).
\textsuperscript{187} See Mutambo (2015a).
\textsuperscript{194} See Wabala (2018a).
and “in the process get involved in dangerous information”\textsuperscript{197}. Second, parents fail “by not warning or punishing them [their children] whenever they do wrong” and will even “bail them out, if they are caught by the police doing wrong”. Such children grow up without learning to differentiate right from wrong\textsuperscript{198}. Third, parents fail to report when their children go missing, thus putting other Kenyans at-risk\textsuperscript{199}. Finally, parents have failed to inculcate patriotism in their children and have instead modelled them to value “‘mtu wetu’ [our person] mentality”\textsuperscript{200}. Bad parenting results in children adopting “improper values and religious teachings” and eventually acting violently towards those: they consider outsiders or with different values.

**Gender norms and roles**

Coverage also approached ‘radicalisation’ in relation to gender norms and roles. This theme was referenced 15 times; 11 of which were by *Nation Africa*. It predominantly explored women’s recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ into extremist groups and their roles within such groups. Noting that most extremist organisations recruit women because “they attract far less suspicion than men”. This means women can get past security checks more easily, making them “the best agents in accomplishing terror missions”\textsuperscript{201}. This argument draws on gender norms about women being nurturing, inherently peaceful and apolitical. The article even claims that “after all, terrorism has always been a mainly male affair” to downplay the involvement of women. Such assumptions are also visible in security practices. Another article commemorating the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the 1997 US embassy attack in Kenya\textsuperscript{202} notes that while Kenya’s culture of policing has changed from having relatively few security officers in the streets to “most building entrances being manned by uniformed guards” and armed security officers patrolling the streets and “randomly” searching people. Still, “women are searched far less thoroughly than men”. From such assumptions, women’s motivations are often personalised, sexualised, and depoliticised.

The article assumes women are motivated by marriage, sex, and love, whereas men’s motivations are assumed to be political. Such claims about women range from measured assertions such as “a number of them, beguiled by jihadi romance are finding their way to Somalia and Syria to ‘bear children for the martyrs’”\textsuperscript{203} and “the women being radicalised

\textsuperscript{197} See Sunday Nation Team (2016).
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{199} See Daily Nation Reporter (2015) ‘This is a home-bred problem, so the solution can only be found among us’, Nation Africa, 8 April.
\textsuperscript{200} See Daily Nation Reporter (2017).
\textsuperscript{202} See Kubania, J. (2018) ‘American embassy attack was Kenya’s wake up call’, Nation Africa, 7 August.
\textsuperscript{203} See Abdi (2015).
are youths in their marriage age\textsuperscript{204}. To conclusive statements that allege “regardless of how they [women] join the terror groups, upon arrival they are all hit with the hard reality of their existence in the camps where they are just sex objects”\textsuperscript{205}. These assumptions only view women as playing secondary roles in extremist organisations compared to men who play roles in combat, planning and executing operations. While some women act “as recruiters, spies, cooks and cleaners”\textsuperscript{206}, others are groomed and forcefully recruited into extremist organisations\textsuperscript{207}. Assumptions about women’s motivations being personal and women playing secondary roles in extremist organisations overemphasises their innocence and shifts the blame to their male relations who lured, recruited and radicalised them. This scenario played out in the September 2016 attack on Central Police Station in Mombasa. Besides the attackers’ motivations and ‘radicalisation’ being linked to violent counterterrorism and Muslim marginalisation. Coverage still blamed their ‘radicalisation’ and violence on their online “jihadist circles”\textsuperscript{208}.

**Representation of young people in cultural-related themes**

Cultural-related themes often blamed the ‘radicalisation’ of young people on other powerful actors. Under the ideological theme, “young people” were radicalised and recruited by religious elites and opportunistic leaders. “Students”, “learners”, and “children” received improper socialisation from their parents. In terms of gender, “young women” were lured by their male relations and by al-Shabaab female recruiters in a few instances. Young people were often identified and classified using their ages, sex, gender, religion, and nationality. For example, youth actors were classified: by age such as “the youth”, “youth”, “young people”, “17-year-old Zuleka”, “children”; by age and gender such as “young men and women”, “young boys and girls”; by age, gender and religion such as “young Muslim women”, “Muslim youth”; and finally by age, gender and nationality such as “young Kenyans”, “Kenyan women”, “young Kenyan men and women”, and “Kenyan youths”. In discourses of ‘radicalisation’, youth constitute the main Othered category, thus also the main object of classification.

Overemphasising the age of young people serves two contradictory functions. On the one hand, it hints at young people’s antisocial behaviour or, more commonly, infers youth crime. On the other hand, it attempts to create sympathy for youth because it draws on narratives

\textsuperscript{204} See Sunday Nation Team (2016).
\textsuperscript{205} See Wabala, D. (2018b) ‘I was Lured into Sex Slavery by Al Shabaab Militants through Facebook’, The Standard, 3 February.
\textsuperscript{207} See Wabala (2018a).
\textsuperscript{208} See Sanga (2016).
about youth and childhood periods that signify naivety, innocence and vulnerability. Age is combined with the classifications of sex, gender, nationality and religion to establish hierarchies of dangerousness and victimhood. Sex and gender classes positioned young women as in danger, thus needing to be protected and saved from young men who were a threat to them. Nationality reinforced the idea that these youth are part of us and our society; thus we—as Kenyans—have a responsibility to help them.

Religion as a way of differentiating actors was used to achieve different representational effects. Representing them as “Muslim youths” highlighted what category of young people are dangerous. This strategy emphasised the Otherness of young Muslims, implying that they are part of a problematic culture. This is more apparent considering we live in an age where terrorism is predominantly and synonymously used with ‘Islamic extremism’ qua Muslims. Such a representation helps locate the issue of ‘radicalisation’ within the prism of cultural clashes. In addition, religion was used to reinforce the victimhood of “Muslim women” while juxtaposing it with the dangerousness posed by “their Muslim men”; specifically to “Muslim women” and to society as a whole.

Another common strategy of representation was functionalisation. Young people were reduced to their roles. Youth, in general, were functionalised as “students”, “interns”, and “learners” to define what they did in their day-to-day life. By representing youth in highly-valued activities, such as studying and learning, functionalisation, positively evaluated youth as legitimate and decent members of society. This further reinforced ideas about youth victimhood, i.e. they are just students and learners who are being misled by powerful Others.

Functionalisation was also used to describe the activities of young men and women. Young men were functionalised as “IS fighters”, “al-Shabaab fighters”, “al-Shabaab extremists”, “killers” and “terrorists”. Whereas young women were functionalised as “recruiters”, “cooks”, “spies”, “cleaners”, “comforters of fighters”, “jihadi brides”, and “wives”. The fact that the young men were engaged in destructive activities functionalisation encouraged the reader to evaluate them negatively. As for the women, functionalisation primarily highlighted their secondary roles within extremist organisations thus delegitimising them as political actors and downplaying their involvement. Except for the women involved in the Police Station attack who were functionalised as “would-be killers”. Functionalisation intensified the absurdity of women as political actors because ‘women are not violent; women are inherently peaceful and nurturing’. Hence, it is unbelievable that the three women (“would-be killers”) did what they did. Functionalisation thus ensured that terrorism continues to be understood and interpreted with men as the foci.
Nomination was predominantly used to represent social actors who were considered perpetrators such as “returnees”, “attackers”, and “foreign fighters”. Often these were identified by their names: formally, e.g. “Ms Yakub” or “Mr Bwire”; semi-formally, e.g. “Anthony Kiprop Rotich aka Abdul Hakim Kiprotich” or “Salwa Abdalla”; and informally, e.g. “Ahmed”, “Ali”, and “Zuleka”. Formal and informal nominations highlighted the social actors’ unique identities and independent characters. Thus encouraging the readers to see and know who was being talked about and their actions/decisions. Making the social actors appear more realistic. However, nomination also highlighted the social actors’ Islamic identity. Hence it could have been deliberately used to add to the moral panic about the apparent link between Islam, Muslims and terrorism.

Most of these representational strategies were used in combination. In most articles, social actors were nominated, classified, and functionalised simultaneously to achieve different representational effects. For example, in Ombati’s article, titled “Police name Kenyan suspects luring youth to join Al Shabaab”, classification, nomination and functionalisation were used. Classification highlighted youth’s naivety and innocence which makes them vulnerable to exploitation. Functionalisation foregrounded some young people like “Ahmed Awadh Said alias Biggy” negative actions, thus prompting readers to evaluate them negatively. Whilst nomination mapped the boundaries of dangerousness by foregrounding sex and religious details contained in names. From these representational choices, we can see what type of a young person is considered a victim, what type is deemed dangerous, and how each should be engaged.

**Politico-economic concerns**

Another dominant discourse highlighted the broader context within which ‘radicalisation’ occurs. Coding query results indicate this discourse was present in 25 articles. It suggested that debilitating economic conditions, heavy-handed counterterrorism, porous borders, proximity to unstable states, and historical injustices were conducive to ‘radicalisation’ (see figure 5.3). In addition, coverage focused on specific spaces where ‘radicalisation’ occurs and geographical locations whose youth continue to join extremist organisations and organised gangs (see figure 5.3).

---

209 Individuals who travel to a foreign territory to join extremist groups.
Figure 5.3 - Distribution of Politico-economic Themes

Economic determinants

Coverage highlighting poor economic conditions as favourable for ‘radicalisation’ was prevalent in the column and article genre of Nation Africa and The Standard respectively. This theme identified high youth unemployment as the leading cause of disillusionment. It argued that young people become disillusioned when they cannot secure employment, making them “easy targets for radicalisation”\(^\text{210}\). Accordingly, “unemployed youth, for example, have been easily radicalised because they cannot imagine a future where they will be economically liberated”\(^\text{211}\). Prolonged unemployment thus contributes to idleness and frustration causing youth to become “mentally disturbed” because they cannot secure “decent incomes”\(^\text{212}\). In the absence of legitimate employment, extremist organisations and organised crime groups have become appealing ventures because they offer material incentives. In addition, corruption also impacted youth economic empowerment in several ways. For example, corruption “limits education and job opportunities for those who refuse to pay bribes”. This results in economic exclusion, which “fuels frustration and desperation among the youth”, forcing “some” into criminal groups\(^\text{213}\). Also, Mogambi advances that programs such as “National Youth Enterprise Fund, the discredited Kazi kwa Vijana and

\(^{210}\) See Ahmed and Nyassy (2017).
\(^{212}\) See Mogambi (2018).
\(^{213}\) Ibid.
Uwezo Fund” have mostly “collapsed due to mismanagement and corruption”. This has denied youth “real opportunities to participate and express themselves,” possibly pushing them into crime and violence.

This theme also identified historical injustices of some regions and communities as enabling ‘radicalisation’. In The Standard, such injustices were related to discriminatory practices when applying for identity cards (ID), especially in the Northeastern region. Inability to acquire IDs caused disillusionment among youth as they could neither pursue higher education nor seek employment. It is the frustration of not being able to “engage in meaningful activities” that made youth “out of desperation” turn into “terror recruitment which doesn’t require an [sic] ID to be ‘hired’”214. Lack of IDs among Northeastern communities fostered inequality. Unlike youth from other regions of Kenya who can secure IDs promptly and participate in the labour market, those in Northeastern cannot participate in the labour market hence becoming economically disenfranchised.

‘Radicalisation’ was also facilitated by the historical marginalisation of regions in resource allocation. While inequalities resulting from unequal resource allocation continue to be the root causes of conflicts in Kenya, they were only mentioned in passing in the press. The Standard argued that socio-economic alienation of communities created a conducive environment for ‘radicalisation’. This is because alienation causes “resentment and undermines [sic] cooperation with government”, thus increasing “the pool of recruits to terrorism”215. Historical marginalisation could be addressed through “devolution of resources through county governments”, which would foster unity and inclusion216.

Where corruption was identified as a condition that facilitates young peoples’ recruitment and ‘radicalisation’, it was predominantly seen from the perspective of corrupt security structures. Accordingly, there is a link between “terrorism and organised crimes such as corruption, money-laundering and wildlife crimes”217. Corruption directly aids terrorism through border patrol. Corruption, for instance, “allows undocumented foreigners to enter the country using fake documents”218, implying that these foreigners may be terrorists. A case in point is “Abdifatah Abubakar Ahmed”, from Somalia who “grew up mostly in Kenya”. Abdifatah possessed “a fraudulent Kenyan identity card and was deported to Somalia in

216 Ibid.
2008 for harbouring Harun Fazul and Saleh Nabhan\(^{219}\). In addition, corrupt structures aid terrorism through bribe seeking behaviour in the police force. Accordingly, this "encourages police harassment of youth"\(^{220}\), which then breeds resentment among those disaffected, and some may "see a need for rectification"\(^{221}\).

Corruption can also aid terrorism in terms of how the security forces operate. For example, the GUC attack could have been avoided had the security forces heeded "intelligence reports that a university was to be attacked, and that Garissa and Mandera were at risk"\(^{222}\). However, no mitigation measures were pursued because of corruption within the security architecture. Further, during the attack, "it took 11 hours for specialist officers trained in dealing with terrorists to swing into action"\(^{223}\) because some police helicopters had mechanical problems while another plane meant to transport the security personnel was being used to fly a police chief’s family back from holiday. As a result, military personnel travelled to Garissa by road, which took nearly 7 hours.

**Violent counterterrorism**

Coverage also identified heavy-handed counterterrorism as contributing to ‘radicalisation’. This theme appeared in all the thematic areas sampled for 2015. In *Nation Africa*, it only appeared in the column genre, whereas in *The Standard*, it appeared in the hard-news genre. The theme established a relationship between heavy-handed counterterrorism and the growth of recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ of Kenyan Muslim communities into extremist groups. Warah observes that the Kenyan state and security forces “have treated vulnerable populations with heavy-handed brutality and arrogance”\(^{224}\). For example, “in 2013 security forces set ablaze the main market in Garissa, which effectively shut down the town’s economic lifeline”. Similarly, in 2014, they “randomly rounded up and detained thousands of ethnic Somalis in Eastleigh”. Such actions have “not won [sic] the hearts and minds of poor, unemployed youth”; rather, they have fostered resentment and created a conducive environment for al-Shabaab to recruit them. Al-Shabaab, has thus “waged its war” not just through “Somalis” but also other “disenfranchised and radicalised Kenyans”\(^{225}\).

---

\(^{219}\) See Ombati (2015). Harun Fazul or Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was a Comorian-Kenyan al-Qaeda member and lead planner of the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

\(^{220}\) See Mogambi (2018).

\(^{221}\) See Ngwiri (2017).


\(^{223}\) Ibid.

\(^{224}\) See Warah, R. (2015a) ‘Garissa could have been avoided if we had learned from past attacks’, Nation Africa, 5 April.

\(^{225}\) Ibid.
Heavy-handed counterterrorism caused alienation and fuelled resentment. Jamah noted that "indiscriminate counterterrorism tactics such as mass arrests and detention, closure of mosques, extrajudicial killings and disappearances" targeting Muslims pushes vulnerable communities "into the hands of extremists". This is because targeted communities get alienated. In turn, such communities may resonate with "al-Shabaab's [sic] claim that it is defending historically marginalised Muslim and Somali communities". Also, heavy-handed counterterrorism undermines the opportunity for communities to cooperate with security forces and the government and affects deradicalisation efforts.

Local conflict dynamics

Local conflict dynamics were also used to understand 'radicalisation'. Political interference, the politics of ethnicity and nepotism were all seen as facilitating 'radicalisation'. This theme appeared in Nation Africa in 2017. It advanced that nepotism and favouritism are significant causes of injustice in Kenya. Some young people, "in situations where they observe unequal application of the law so that those who steal billions of shillings from the public are never punished while pickpockets are jailed for years, they see a need for rectification". Here the desire to rectify a past injustice or prevent future injustices is a factor in the 'radicalisation' of youth. Also, the politics of ethnicity or tribalism were seen as fostering divisions, hatred and inciting violence against outsiders.

Spaces and places

News coverage also connected 'radicalisation' to certain places and spaces. Specific geographical locations in Kenya were considered “hot-spots” or “high-risk” areas of 'radicalisation' and terrorism. Among these areas were the Coastal region, Northeastern and Nairobi suburbs of Majengo and Eastleigh. These places have "facilitated networks of recruiters" that "indoctrinate and recruit youth and later transport them" to join groups such as "al-Shabaab and ISIS" based in Somalia and Syria, respectively. These "facilitated networks" are led by "Abdifatah Abubakar Ahmed, Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, Ahmed Iman Ali, Shamsa Shariff Mohamed and Saada Bilal". Further, these individuals "have a sway on the youths in Mombasa and the entire coastal region". These networks conduct recruitment in learning institutions such as schools, universities, and madrasas.

---

228 Ibid.
229 See Ngwiri (2017).
places of worship such as mosques, and in homes and leisure venues such as coffee houses.

This theme first labels these places as crime-ridden because they harbour criminals, in this case, recruiters and radicalisers. This claim, however, does not specify the places or venues within, e.g. the Coastal region where ‘radicalisation’ is rampant. Second, the areas termed “hot-spots” are primarily Muslim-inhabited areas. Thus this theme reinforces the apparent link between Islam and terrorism. This constructs Kenyan Muslim communities as internal threats or the enemy within. Despite the Coastal region being inhabited by diverse cultural and language groups, generalising the region as a hotspot reinforces the idea that the entire region is ‘a problem’. Also, it creates the effect that “all Muslims are the same” to the readers, hence reinforcing the idea that Muslims are the enemies within.

Apart from places, this theme also linked ‘radicalisation’ to online spaces. This was emphasised in columns and hard-news genre of Nation Africa and The Standard, respectively. This theme was also more common in 2015, 2016, 2018 and marginal in 2017. Emphasis was placed on the internet more generally and social media as sites where recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ occur. It was argued that social media is a virtual space where radical networks operate. Such networks use this space to disseminate their propaganda, create ideological communities such as what has been termed “jihadist circles”, communicate with other extremist actors, and recruit and radicalise and groom “vulnerable youth”. Also, in comparison to “the old jihadists”, the “new generation of jihadists” are increasingly “self-radicalising” via the internet. Thus, the internet and social media are seen as gradually replacing face-to-face or “direct recruitment” and ‘radicalisation’.

Externalising threats

The final theme in the coverage focused on identifying the physical source of extremist threats. This theme especially approached ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ as phenomena that originated outside Kenya’s borders. Coverage framed the threat of terrorism as originating from neighbouring countries such as Somalia, South Sudan and distant countries in the Middle East. Somalia was constructed as “the epicenter of terrorism”, South Sudan as a country “at risk of terrorism”, and the Middle East as the “hotbed of terrorism”233. Somalia, South Sudan and the Middle East were considered volatile due to the ongoing “civil wars and state collapse”. These conditions led to the “collapse of public order”, from which various extremist groups and criminal gangs emerged. The existing criminal gangs, coupled

with high unemployment and illiteracy rates, makes South Sudan the “second epicenter of violent extremism”. These debilitating conditions create a “safe haven for terrorists”.

Given that Kenya borders these “epicenters of terrorism”, it is in danger for three reasons. First, because Kenya has porous borders and a large border region that is not efficiently patrolled, there is a risk that extremists from outside can easily enter Kenya. Such extremists are non-Kenyans, returnees and foreign fighters as well. Second, there is a risk of conflict spill-over, which will affect Kenya’s national security and economic growth. Finally, Kenya is at high risk because its corrupt immigration officials tend to dispense documents without scrutiny. Such practices compromise Kenya’s national security. While this theme highlights governance issues that need consideration in understanding ‘extremism’, it also entirely associates terrorism with ‘other’ countries, regions, and people—implying that the perpetrators are not like ‘us’. Such an emphasis on ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism as a problem originating from outside Kenya’s borders also appeared in policy texts and presidential speeches and statements.

Representation of young people in structural discourses

Apart from the representational strategies already discussed, structural-related themes also used classification and relational identification. In some instances, classification was used to create sympathy for “the youth” rather than add to the moral panic about young people. The assumption was that these “youth” are from deprived areas, also termed “hotspot or at-risk areas” with many social problems. Hence these young people make the decisions they make for survival because the system tasked with providing for them has failed them. Viewing young people’s decision-making processes in this manner enabled coverage to highlight the concrete social issues such as poverty, unemployment, police brutality, corruption, poor security policies, and other injustices that young people navigate. Such representational choices enabled the coverage to highlight where the actual responsibility lies, which is with the government.

Besides classification, this discourse also represented youth through relational identification strategies. Relational identification described youth in terms of their kinship and personal relations to other social actors. Relational identifications are normally possessivatated through pronouns such as “his/hers”, “my”, “our”, and “their”. Relational identifications were realised through references such as “our youth”, “our children” and “their peers”. This showed young people as dependent social actors, thus explaining why youth “need protection”. Also, relational identification was used to signal a sense of community. Kenya’s children going to Somalia is a loss of Kenya’s “potential,” that is, youth as an economic resource, and a loss of Kenya’s community. Thus, relational identification implies that
“parents” and Kenya as a nation have a responsibility towards its children. A similar argument also appears in presidential speeches and statements.

In summary, the analysis demonstrated that the media’s understanding of ‘radicalisation’ draws on individual-level, cultural-level and structural-level discourses. These discourses advanced arguments about what causes ‘radicalisation’, and what types of social actors are affected by ‘radicalisation’. The discourses constructed young people as either ‘dangerous’ or ‘victims’ by creatively combining referential strategies of classification, functionalisation, nomination, relational identification and differentiation. In the next section, I show how the press employed legitimation strategies of authorisation and moral evaluation to support these discourses.

(De)legitimating Emerging Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’

To substantiate their content, the press primarily utilised authorisation and moral evaluation. Thirteen articles entirely utilised authorisation, four employed moral evaluation, and 25 combined authorisation and moral evaluation (as shown in figure 5.4). Four other articles did not use any form of legitimation strategies.

![Figure 5.4 - Distribution of Legitimation Strategies in the Press](image)

**Authorisation**

Authorisation was expressed by referring to authority. Essentially, authority legitimation answers the question why should we look at this issue—i.e. ‘radicalisation’—this way? In
the press, personal, expert and impersonal authority were used. Personal authority was the most predominant form of authorisation. It appeared in thirty-three articles. Ninety-eight references cited either institutions, e.g. ministry departments, security agencies or individuals working for such institutions. Personal authority legitimation was primarily expressed through verbs indicating verbal processes such as “say”, “announce”, and “report” among others and/or in quotation marks through direct or indirect speech. For instance, in Menya’s article titled “President Kenyatta declares 3 days of mourning”

President Uhuru Kenyatta has declared three days of national mourning in honour of the 147 people who were killed in Garissa University College by al-Shabaab [sic] terrorists. During the three days, the national flag will fly at half mast, the President announced yesterday in an address to the nation after meeting the national security team at State House, Nairobi. …It was unfortunate, he said, that the radicalisation that breeds terrorism takes place in the full glare of day, in madrassas, in homes and in mosques with rogue Imams and urged the public to share this information with the government to help it combat terrorism. According to President Kenyatta, it is unfortunate the narrative being propagated that Kenyan Somalis and Muslims are victims of marginalisation and oppression by the rest of Kenya. "Nothing could be further from the truth. They enjoy the full rights, privileges and duties of every Kenyan," he said.234

The article quotes President Kenyatta’s speech made after the GUC attack. Direct and indirect speech is used throughout the article. Direct speech is especially powerful because the journalist can incorporate another person’s words as a different voice, thus maintaining the integrity and authenticity of the quoted voice. At the same time, quoting sources in journalism is good practice and functions to increase the readers’ level of confidence in the news and journalists. However, more than that, citing authoritative figures functions to legitimise the journalist's own reading of events.

The excerpt above is based on President Kenyatta’s perspective on who is to blame for ‘radicalisation’. Which the president identifies as religious elites characterised and evaluated as “rogue imams”. The article also advances that ‘radicalisation’ occurs openly in specific places such as “madrasa’s, mosques and homes”. The article dismisses claims of marginalisation and oppression experienced by Muslims as “not true”. Instead, it situates ‘radicalisation’ within cultural-related concerns by hinting at Islamic religious ideologies through mentioning actors and spaces associated with Muslims. The journalist quotes the president as an authoritative figure. Because as the president, he leads the republic of Kenya, commands the armed forces and chairs the national security council of Kenya. Thus president Kenyatta is quoted because he has authority to speak on social issues affecting

Kenya, more so on national security threats like ‘radicalisation’. Hence, the press quoted the president to legitimise their own understanding of ‘radicalisation’ as being caused by Islamic religious ideologies and facilitated by Imams.

Apart from the president, press coverage also referenced other authoritative figures such as leaders from elite nations, e.g. the former US president Barrack Obama; third nation institutions such as the Supreme Court of India; government ministries/ministers, e.g. the Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’i; Magistrates; Prisons Commissioners; University Chancellors; national religious bodies, e.g. SUPKEMs secretary-general Mr. Adan Wachu; and Political leaders such as Majority Leader Aden Duale among others. When using authoritative figures as sources of information, it is crucial to remember that these figures also espouse their own worldviews, which may obscure other ways of understanding the issue at hand.

Expert authority also appeared in 19 articles. Forty-seven references cited various experts such as authoritative reports, research, statistics, and scholars; thus legitimation was achieved by expertise and not status. Expert authority was mainly realised through verbal process clauses and sometimes mental-process clauses using verbs such as “said”, “showed”, “argued,” and “suggest”. Sanga’s article titled “Why young women opt to train as suicide bombers” reveals different types of expert authority:

Sociologists say many women are easily swayed into the life of a jihadi bride because of the romanticisation of the role. "They have all these lofty ideas of a life with little to no rules where you interpret life and religion in a manner that suits you. They do not know the amount of servitude and suffering that will accompany this decision," sociologist Loice Okello says… Security analysts now say authorities have until recently ignored the role of women in jihad circles and their capacity to take part in war…. "There are few cases in the history of Islam where women have been involved in actual combat. One that comes to mind is the battle of camel," said Dr Hassan Mwakimako, a lecturer of Islamic Studies at the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Pwani University.

**Comforters of fighters**
He said female jihadists in the region mostly played the role of comforters of male fighters or jihad brides, although radicalised. He added that in other parts of the world women have carried out attacks. [bold section in original]

In the aftermath of the 2016 Central Police Station attack, several press publications were dedicated to unpacking the motivations of the three female attackers and the roles women play within extremist organisations. The above excerpt quotes sociologists, security analysts and academics weighing in on the issue of women and political violence.
The sociologist's position legitimates discourses on ‘radicalisation’ that personalise women’s motivations. Security experts focus on women’s roles within extremist organisations, highlighting how authorities have failed to look at women’s participation in extremist organisations and how women also can engage in combat roles. However, the journalist cites an expert of Islamic Studies to downplay the views of security experts. Instead, the article views the Central police attackers as an exception. Advancing the position that women are primarily comforters of fighters. A lecturer of Islamic Studies advances this claim. Arguing that while in East Africa, women mostly play the role of comforters of male fighters—with the police station attack being one of the unique instances that women were in combat—in other parts of the world women have engaged in “actual combat”. He attributes the low numbers of women in combatant roles to Islamic teachings that “disdain women who engage in actual combat”. In summary, the appeals to expert authority aim to frame women’s motivations as personal and their roles in extremist organisations as secondary while shifting the blame to the women’s male relations. Expert authority here legitimates ideas about women being naïve and apolitical, thus in need of saving. There were only three articles by Nation Africa that appealed to impersonal authority, specifically laws, policies and regulations. In total, three references cited laws and regulations. This strategy of authorisation has been discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

Moral evaluation

Coverage also employed moral legitimation, which draws on value systems to justify assertions or why a certain course of action needs to be pursued. Moral legitimation mainly occurred through evaluative adjectives and analogies. Eighteen articles referenced evaluative adjectives. In total, 33 references covertly made evaluations regarding the causes of ‘radicalisation’, youth social actors, and the causes of action that need to be pursued to mitigate ‘radicalisation’. Explicit uses of evaluative adjectives were realised through the deployment of words such as “hateful”, “evil”, “destructive”, and “poor”. Themes attributing ‘radicalisation’ to extreme religious ideologies, for instance, argued that: “In Kenya, and around the world, studies have shown that violent extremism does not just affect the poor. Individuals from any group in society can be lured into a destructive and hateful ideology”235. Or

National Counter Terrorism Director Martin Kimani praised the city's joint efforts to fight religious extremism... "The action plan has simple priorities that are implementable. At a minimum, I believe, it states how to rid Mombasa of hateful ideologies peddled by Al Shabaab and engage the youth and women, and inform

---

235 See Zeuthen (2016).
and empower residents to identify and appropriately respond to radicalisation," he said.\textsuperscript{236}

These examples combine other legitimation strategies with evaluative adjectives to attribute ‘radicalisation’ to extreme religious ideologies. The first uses expert authority and evaluative adjectives. Expert authority justifies the assertion that ‘radicalisation’ is an outcome of extreme religious ideologies and that it can affect different individuals, not just “the poor”, as studies have shown. Here the belief is that experts know more about ‘radicalisation’. Thus, their assertions are credible. The second example uses personal authority and evaluative adjectives. By quoting an authoritative figure—the director of NCTC—the news story legitimises the action plan as the appropriate course of action for getting rid of extreme religious ideologies.

These examples use evaluative adjectives “destructive and hateful” to critique inappropriate religious ideologies. Evaluating religious ideologies as hateful or delightful draws on ideas about what’s normal and abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable belief systems. There are many discourses on moral values that are the basis of such judgements. But the most common in politics is secularism which emphasises the separation of religion from civic affairs and the state. The idea is that religion should be confined to the private sphere. Thus those religions that are seen as entering the public sphere or not having strict boundaries, for example, by advocating for the creation of societies according to religious principles, are evaluated as “destructive and hateful”. By evaluating such religious ideologies as “destructive and hateful”, both articles legitimated solutions and practices that would regulate religious practices and groups and build resilient religious communities.

Another strategy of moral evaluation in the press were analogies. Analogies compare two types of behaviours or activities to justify assertions or why a particular course of action is necessary. In the wake of the 2016 battle of El-Adde\textsuperscript{237}, during a lecture about France—Kenya bilateral relations at Aga Khan Academy the French Ambassador to Kenya Rémi Maréchaux said the two countries suffer similar problems like terrorist attacks that have moved them to forge closer partnerships. “Two months ago Paris was struck by a terrorist attack much in the same way as Kenya has suffered. We are confronted with the same mechanism of radicalisation and attacks which bring us together,” said Mr Maréchaux. "Kenya is fighting Al-

\textsuperscript{236} See Oketch (2017).
\textsuperscript{237} The battle of El-Adde occurred on 15th January 2016 when al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan-run AMISOM army base in the town of El Adde, Gedo in Somalia. It is considered to be the deadliest attacks on AMISOM peace support mission and KDF’s largest defeat since Kenya gained independence in 1963. The Kenyan government has not officially declared how many of its soldiers died during this attack but CNN and Al-Jazeera estimate that 141 and 173 soldiers were killed respectively.
Shabaab on its soil as well as in Somalia. France is fighting ISIS on its soil as well as in Syria," he added.238

In this excerpt, analogies by similarity conjunction and circumstances of comparison are used. Comparison between France and Kenya is expressed through similarity conjunctions such as "similar", "in the same way as", "same", and "as well as". Further, the French ambassador repeatedly compares the circumstances of France and Kenya. Both countries are evaluated as suffering from similar problems with terrorism. While France constantly endures attacks by ISIS, Kenya endures attacks by al-Shabaab. France and Kenya also experience similar 'radicalisation' mechanisms. While France is confronted with homegrown and foreign terrorists, so is Kenya. Moreover, the comparison also looks at the responses of both countries. Both France and Kenya are actively implementing counterterrorism measures locally and abroad. The analogy frames France—Kenya relations as necessary because both countries have similar interests. This analogy legitimates the need for Kenya and France to work together and forge closer partnerships.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown three media discourses on 'radicalisation', with the most prominent being the cultural discourse. Individual related discourses attributed 'radicalisation' to identity factors and personal experiences. Here, age, class, gender, sex, and religion represented and constructed young people as 'vulnerable' or 'at-risk'. As discussed in chapter three and four, the implication of individualising 'radicalisation' is that it constructs dangerousness around particular identities (Mohamed, 2021) while ignoring the socio-historical and political exclusionary policies of the state. Thus it encourages measures that will target identities framed as 'a problem' while leaving intact the systemic exclusionary policies and the power relations that sustain them. It would appear that such conditions and power relations are acknowledged and challenged when viewing 'radicalisation' through politico-economic lenses. Highlighting the contextual particularities of 'radicalisation' reflected the numerous conflict dimensions that are often silenced in glocal (global and local) discourses of terrorism. This critical stance helped to advocate for economic reforms— as shown in Nation Africa's columns—and security/police reforms—as highlighted in The Standard's hard news. Such reforms will not just benefit minority communities or those deemed dangerous. But can potentially address patterns and structures of inequality, injustice and oppression thus reducing grievances, improving livelihoods, promoting meaningful cohesion and inclusion and enhancing community–police trust and collaboration (Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith, 2018a). These are reforms that could address the myriad

systemic conditions connected to various types of conflicts in Kenya as repeatedly recommended by various government commissions.²³⁹

The most prominent discourse in the media advanced cultural claims. Cultural discourses predominantly recontextualised global discourses on terrorism which view ideologies with an Islamic orientation as inherent to violence (Jackson, 2007; Raphael, 2009; Gunning and Jackson, 2011). As already historicised in the literature review and also argued in chapter three, this recontextualisation was possible because Kenya’s state building process had already instituted a framework that constructs its minority—and specifically Coastal Muslim community as a problem (Mohamed, 2022). Thus global discourse was used to ideologically reinforce the differentiations between ‘us’ and ‘them’, thus enabling a (re)constitution of local identities. This type of coverage created discourses about suspect communities by (re)producing widely held Islamophobic discourses. This finding also appears in other studies on discourses of terrorism in Kenya (see Omanga, 2012; Badurdeen and Goldsmith, 2018; Mohamed, 2021) and the media’s role in shaping these discourses (see Media Council of Kenya, 2014). And while it was beyond the scope of this study to systematically measure the impact of such coverage, it has been shown that such coverage has actively legitimised the adoption and implementation of unconventional security policies targeting Muslims (Breidlid, 2021). My own study found that the media legitimised such policies, including a construction of dangerousness around the youth identity through privileging official sources.

By using CDA this chapter shows how media practices of sourcing play a role in structuring and framing news discourses (Devitt, 2002). Sourcing patterns are thus crucial to understanding social power (Berkowitz, 2008), since sources could shape the news agenda, define the boundaries of debate and shape ideology (O’Neill and O’Connor, 2008). Extensive debates have looked at the practicality (Becker and Vlad, 2008), efficiency and cultural authority that journalists afford news reports (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). It is widely agreed that sources granted media access are typically associated with powerful institutions such as the government, police, and large corporations, thus playing a significant primary role in shaping news narratives and defining the boundaries of public discourse on various issues (Hall et al., 2013). Criticism has been levelled against this perspective for overlooking source motivations (Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Berkowitz, 2008) and the media’s ability to shape and influence public understanding and perception of events (Miller, 1993). Nevertheless, these debates have provided a theoretical framework

²³⁹ See the Waki Commission Reports; the 1999 Akiwumi, the 2008 Sharawe, and the 2013 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission reports.
for examining the connections between political and media elites. Studies on the influence of media practices of sourcing and news coverage of terrorism reveal conflicting findings.

Some UK and USA studies have shown that there is an overreliance on official sources when reporting terrorism, which has in turn reinforced elite political discourses on terrorism (Li and Izard, 2003; Woods, 2007; Miller and Sabir, 2012). In their study on the media reporting of ‘failed and foiled’ attacks in the UK between 2006 and 2008, Miller and Sabir (2012) found that the way official sources communicated the threat of terrorism was disproportionate to the relative risk. Further, they find that this attempt to accentuate the threat of ‘Islamist’ terrorism by official sources could be by mistake or by design in an attempt to influence how the media reported the events (Miller and Sabir, 2012). Other studies have challenged the perception that official sources tend to promote a government agenda. Arguing that while the UK’s coverage of ‘Islamist’ terrorist plots does rely on official sources, these sources were diverse in nature thus providing a balanced account of events (Matthews, 2013b).

My research reveals a more complicated pattern. First, it shows that the issues raised by Miller and Sabir (2012), Li and Izard (2003) and Woods (2007) play out similarly in the Kenyan context. For example that the media does over rely on official sources. However, this over reliance is not covert; rather it is masked by the use of diverse sourcing. Albeit based on the assumption that the diversity of sources indicates that the media “are able to function as an arena for participation in public debate” (Sjøvaag and Pedersen, 2019, p. 215). The data shows that 46.41 per cent and 43.25 per cent of news relied on unilateral and diverse sources, respectively. And while the diversity of sources indicates balanced, accurate and impartial coverage (Matthews, 2013a). The second contribution of my analysis which is afforded by my choice of methodology–cda–reveals that while diverse sources were used, most of them comprised official and/or state sources. On the one hand, other studies may argue that this could be an outcome of: rigid internal guidelines (Powers and Fico, 1994; Berkowitz, 2008); practical considerations such as time and resource limitations that may restrict the amount of time journalists have to identify, select and investigate stories they think are worthy of coverage (Davis, 2003); news routines (Becker and Vlad, 2008; Berkowitz, 2008); and levels of professionalism, among others (Esipisu and Khaguli, 2009; Lohner, Banjac and Neverla, 2016).

On the other hand, the choice of sources may also be influenced by the political economy of the media (Becker and Vlad, 2008; Matthews, 2013a; Ireri and Ochieng, 2020). Issues of media ownership and state interests are especially important in Kenya (Ireri and Ochieng, 2020). The Kenyan media landscape encompasses diverse ownership structures, including
state-owned, private, and non-commercial community media organisations (Lohner, Banjac and Neverla, 2016). However, this pluralism is a façade, as there is a significant level of ownership concentration, cross-media ownership, and concerns related to political ownership i.e. most media organisations, including the ones under assessment, being (in)directly owned by elites serving in or connected to state institutions. According to Lohner, Banjac and Neverla (2016) such complexities in ownership could affect editorial decisions and news content by shaping the parameters of the debate. In this study, we have seen how this occurs through practices of sourcing—who is authorised to speak about ‘radicalisation’, and the naturalisation of elite views by uncritically repeating words, phrases and frames. In addition, political influences may also exert control on media outputs (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). Such influences can be in the form of imposing regulatory frameworks (Ochilo, 1993; BBC News, 2013) and direct political pressure and intimidation by elites (HRHF, 2006).

The former has more often than not occurred in Kenya. With the most recent example being in 2013 where Kenyatta’s administration passed a bill aimed at self-censoring the media (BBC News, 2013). This bill was passed in the aftermath of the Westgate attack, this context is particularly important because media reporting of the Westgate attack exposed looting by security forces, internal tensions between the different forces, and contradictory information shared by security officials during the attack (ALJazeera, 2013; Swanson, 2013). Thus the bill was a direct attempt to discipline the media, as it proposed heavy penalties on journalists and media houses found guilty of violating code of ethics. However, more astounding is the vagueness of the bill which did not stipulate what constitutes violations but only indicated that they were to be determined by a state agency—a government-controlled regulatory board (Ndonye, 2022). Given the vagueness of the bill and Kenya’s tumultuous relationship with the media, undoubtedly the bill aimed to silence critical reporting (CPJ, 2013) thus advancing personal and political interests.

The latter (political pressure and intimidation of the media) was more commonplace during Moi and Kibaki’s administration (Onyango, 2019). However, Kenyatta’s administration also directly intimidated journalists. For instance, in February 2018 during a police service conference, the president ordered journalists to switch off their cameras and leave (Ndonye, 2022). Kenyatta’s administration also withdrew advertising revenue from mainstream media and instead redirected the funds to “a state-run pullout and website, MyGov, which carried all advertising from government agencies. This was coordinated through a newly established body, the Government Advertising Agency” (Ndonye, 2022). It is estimated that this decision led to a 30 per cent loss of total media advertising revenue. And while theoretically this opens room for media organisations to find alternative ways of generating
income thus freeing themselves from government control (Ibid). In practice, there are a multitude of other aspects that still constrain which and how events are reported. These include the instituted regulatory frameworks, institutional corruption and widespread impunity which shapes media operations (Lohner, Banjac and Neverla, 2016; Ireri and Ochieng, 2020).

In addition, local reporting is also shaped by international news media—specifically US-dominated mass media—which sets the agenda and tone of reporting (Thussu and Freedman, 2003). The US-dominated mass media—which reflects western interests and cultural practices—exerts influence over regional and local news organisations by shaping their practices and content (Thussu, 2003). Studies on journalism in Africa have argued that the media in most African countries has been known to “mostly republish wire stories or cut and paste reports from Western media” (Jacobs, 2015, p. 73). In part this could be attributed to limited resources that impede local journalists from travelling between countries (Ibid). However, it is also an outcome of the global news market which allows powerful corporations and larger media organisations to expand their influence and control over communication spaces, thus leading to cultural imperialism where dominant cultures exert their influence over others (Thussu, 2003). The consequence is that the recontextualization of news practices and content reinforces geo-political realities of western powers, western economic interests and corporate interests.

In this chapter, this has been shown by how Kenya’s media (re)produces dominant discourses, and frames on terrorism. This was done more directly by uncritically using frameworks such as ‘Islamist terrorism’ and related concepts that are common in western media. At the same time, it was also done more implicitly by privileging and publicising official sources, as the official and credible voices on ‘radicalisation’. I have argued that, while official sources reproduce dominant western discourses and frames on terrorism to mobilise specific policy actions. Media actors are also driven by a complex web of intersecting factors. This analysis thus raises questions about the quality of reporting and journalism’s capacity to act in public interest.
Chapter 6. ‘Radicalisation’ from a Practitioners’ Points of View: Analysis of Interviews with PCVE Civil Society Practitioners

This chapter seeks to explain how civil society working to transform, prevent and counter violent extremism (T/PCVE) understand and translate ‘radicalisation’ into their work through an analysis of expert interviews conducted with practitioners in the summer and winter of 2019. The chapter aims to show a) how practitioners describe ‘radicalisation’ by employing narratives that resonate with everyday conflicts and social organisation, and b) how practitioners’ constructions characterise social actors, c) how these constructions discursively legitimise or delegitimise what is dominantly considered ‘radicalisation’ and, d) what interventions the dominant discourses make possible. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first analyses the dominant discourses on ‘radicalisation’. ‘Radicalisation’ is represented as "an issue of culture and identity", “a political construct”, and “the outcome of socio-economic and political injustices". The first and the third discourses also appear in policy documents, elite and media discourses, but the relationship between culture and ‘radicalisation’ is articulated with variations. For example, elite and media discourses predominantly focussed on socialisation particularly parenting and role modelling. CSO stakeholders also highlighted socialisation. In addition, they nuanced the link between ‘radicalisation’ and idealised notions of masculinity and femininity; attitudes regarding gender norms and roles. Suggesting that violent extremism is as much about norms and beliefs concerning the power relations between men and women. This is a finding that also appears in other studies on ‘radicalisation’ and violent extremism in countries such as Iraq, and Nigeria (Matfess, 2017; Kaya, 2019). CSOs also linked ‘radicalisation’ to socio-political conditions. To a large degree this discourse was articulated in similar ways as it was in the local policy i.e. the Mombasa County Action Plan for CVE. This could partly be because the formulation, adoption and implementation of the MCAP was a consultative process that continues to be largely steered by Mombasa-based CSO networks. And partly because majority of the CSO stakeholders interviewed were born and/or raised in Mombasa, meaning they drew their ideas from their lived experiences. These overlaps could explain the many cross parallels between what is contained in the MCAP and what practitioners articulated during key informant interviews.

Another unique discourse so far is that of approaching ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct. This discourse has not appeared in any text analysed so far but it was prominent among CSOs. This could significantly be attributed to CSOs experience with violent counterterrorism. Not only have they been threatened by Kenyatta’s administration for being critical of government policy (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015). But they also face considerable
pressure from the government and donors alike (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, 2016; Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016; Badurdeen, 2023). Such competing interests could shape what and how they implement in the domain of PCVE. Based on these constrictions—and limited funding—it is not surprising why while CSOs identify myriad discourses, their efforts are mostly focussed on the cultural shaping of identities, good parenting, equality of opportunities, respect for the rule of law, and to some extent the desecuritisation of terrorism-related issues. The findings also show that civil society discourses on ‘radicalisation’ portray young people within competing frameworks of perpetrators vs victims, while elites are constructed as opportunistic entities. In the second section, this chapter shows that the three discourses on ‘radicalisation’ are made manageable and normalised by employing strategies of moral evaluation such as analogies. The third section concludes by arguing that while civil society makes a compelling case for approaching ‘radicalisation’ as partly an outcome of debilitating socio-economic conditions, most of their preventative work is directed at culturally shaping young people and communities. This could be because they have limited financial means. Or because they have a limited civic space which they fear losing should they be too critical of the state.

Dominant Discourses

Of the 19 expert interviews conducted; 11 engaged participants directly working in capacities implementing T/PCVE projects and programs; three served in administrative capacities and the remaining four served in top management positions. By organisational level, one participant worked for a locally-headed INGO. Ten participants were drawn from NGOs; seven of which worked in locally-initiated and headed NGO’s, whereas the remaining three worked in an internationally-headed NGO; of these three participants, two were locals and one was an international employee. Seven other participants were drawn from CBO’s that were locally-initiated and headed and the remaining one participant worked for a student association (see appendix F). Running an NVivo matrix coding query on the transcripts revealed six competing discourses on a) ‘radicalisation’ as a consequence of culture and identity; b) ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct; c) ‘radicalisation’ as a product of powerful Others; d) ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of economic conditions; e) ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of violent counterterrorism; and f) ‘radicalisation’ as the outcome of historical marginalisation. In the following section I will examine each of these discourses separately highlighting the main arguments it advances; how it uses language to describe events and social actors, and the interventions the discourse makes possible.
‘Radicalisation’, Culture and Identity

The discourse of ‘radicalisation’ as a consequence of culture and identity was the most prominent discourse among practitioners. All eighteen participants cited themes related to identity and culture. Most themes referenced the role of cultural relationships, the surrounding environment an individual grows up in, and ideology in the ‘radicalisation’ process.

Socialisation

_They are who they are because of where and how they were raised_

- MP1620

Participants highlighted the role of the home environment, parents, and traditional gender assumptions on the socialisation of children and youth. MP0120 argued that sometimes it is the home environment… while working in Majengo, we discovered that children did not get good parenting…and you can see from how they behave. There are places like Majengo and Kisauni where children are very abusive. And when you meet their parents’, you also see and hear them use the same language. So, if this is the environment these youth grow up in, how do you think they'll turn out?

FP1419, giving an example of her own community—Old Town—argued that,

In our communities, the boy-child is given more priority and power…when he does something wrong, it is unlikely that the parents will step in to discipline him and it is because we assume that he is a man, he will rectify his own behaviour. This attitude creates conflict in the household. A father may want more freedom for the boy and not the girl. This emboldens the boy-child. Once he knows that even his mother cannot discipline him, he is not afraid to do anything and anywhere because he knows there will be no repercussions. We have received a report where a boy physically abused his mother because he was reprimanded. And this is bound to happen when the child has already been told ‘he is a man. Therefore, he can do whatever he wants’. This type of socialisation is bad. In other instances, parents already hold extreme views. So, they wouldn't allow their children to participate in this project because they believe sports is *haram*. Such children hear so much from their parents, so this is all they think about as they grow.

Both MP0120 and FP1419 reiterate that the home environment is crucial. They argue that it can either shape a child to be a better person or mould them to be anti-social and violent.

---

240 MP0120, NGO project manager.
241 FP1419, CBO co-founder and volunteer.
242 An Arabic word meaning that which is forbidden or unlawful according to Islamic principles.
Giving the example of children from specific areas—Majengo and Kisauni—MP0120 argues that parents are role models to their children. To an extent, they can shape how a child behaves. If a child grows up in a household and environment where curse words are normalised, such children are most likely to engage in criminal activities.

FP1419 stresses the importance of role modelling arguing that children who grow up under parents with extreme views such as "sports being haram", get radicalised within the home environment. Because as such children grow up, they only have access to a single narrative. FP1419 also highlights the role of normative gender assumptions in socialisation. She argues that—in her community which is both predominantly Swahili and Islamic—boys are socialised to view themselves as superior because of their gender. This superiority accords boys more freedom and impunity from punishment even when they engage in abhorrent behaviours such as physical abuse. According to FP1419, such boys are more likely to engage in crime because they have been raised to believe they are invincible. Not only does the affirmation “he is a man. Therefore, he can do whatever he wants” give him the freedom to act, but it also disregards the responsibility of his actions in relation to others. Both MP0120 and FP1419's accounts evaluate socialisation as good/bad and highlight its impacts on children and youth growing up within the household and communities.

The theme of socialisation also appears in policy documents, elite discourses, the media and as well as in CSO accounts. Notably, while some CSO accounts made explicit reference to fathers and mothers, predominantly the claim is usually made in reference to mothers—for an explicit example see the socialisation section in chapter five—as in patriarchal societal arrangements, parenting is almost entirely the responsibility of mothers. The idea that there is a correlation between poor parenting and children exhibiting troubled behaviours in later life is widely cited in ‘radicalisation’ literature (Botha, 2014; Githigaro, 2018). Particularly this literature as well as—policies, elites, the media and—CSOs primarily raises two issues in terms of socialisation. Firstly, because parents are inattentive they are unable to spot the signs of ‘radicalisation’ in their children earlier on. Secondly, that children learn their behaviours and attitudes from their parents thus, radical parents transfer their ideologies to their children. Thus by constructing parenting practices as bad, most stakeholders and as well as CSOs propose support structures and parenting advice as measures that could help prevent and counter ‘radicalisation’. With the idea that more attentive parents can spot ‘radicalisation’ signs very early, and better parents will be positive role models for children and youth. And while the focus on parenting style and skills is crucial, it often ignores that many people in Mombasa live in abject poverty. Forty-four per cent of the population live on less than £1.50 a day. In addition, the 2019 census revealed that Mombasa county has 378,422 households. And while this data does not include a
breakdown for households headed by gender, the 2009 census indicated that 23 per cent of the households in Mombasa are female-headed. Moreover, such households do not have access to extra material support, and as a result, children as young as 5 years old are more likely to be burdened with housework or take up jobs to contribute towards household costs.\footnote{See KNBS 2019 census.}

These dynamics reveal class and religious expectations projected on parents with little to no regard for the material dimensions. Hence, arguments surrounding socialisation shift the responsibility of preventing ‘radicalisation’ to parents and individual families while ignoring the material conditions they live in. Here, surveillance is extended into homes, as evidenced by the numerous sensitization programs designed to encourage parents to monitor their children when they are at home, and ‘radicalisation’ signs to look out for and when, where and how to report their troubled and/or missing children. Surveillance has also been extended into schools through peace clubs and societies— as highlighted in chapter four. Here, teachers—those acting as peace club patrons—cooperate with CSOs to examine apparent signs of ‘radicalisation’ who then intervene to provide critical thinking and life skills for the at-risk children. CSOs also conduct general awareness programs, and specific programs aimed at parents of at-risk youth to empower them with knowledge and skills on how they can better nurture and protect their children. These proposed efforts, however, ignore the lived realities of the children, youth and their parents, and instead place more emphasis on producing good parents.

Another theme on culture emphasised the role of ideology in ‘radicalisation’. MP1520 identified “hizb-ut-tahrir”\footnote{An international pan-Islamic political organisation also considered a fundamentalist organisation because of its advocacy of re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. It differentiates itself from groups such as ISIS by encouraging the use of non-violent methods towards achieving its goals.} as a major ideology “used in the early 2010s to indoctrinate people”\footnote{MP1520, local NGO director.}. MP0319 elaborated that ideologies can exist in many spheres of social life, including religion. Using several analogies of circumstances of comparison and similarity conjunctions, he narrated that

There are people whose ideology of parenting is extreme. They hold their children so dearly…such that they can't withstand anybody giving developmental feedback about their child's growth or even criticism about their approach. They could even get physical if you did so…then some people are extreme Christians who cannot withstand any other religion. To the extent that they feel the occurrence of certain religions is contamination to Christianity and Christian values. These people will go the extra mile to ensure such contamination does not occur. Similarly, there are Muslims who can be extreme like those who … feel that everybody who is not a Muslim is a kaffir... For them, as long as
you don't proclaim Islam in their manner, you are an infidel, and you will go to hell or don't deserve to exist.

For MP1520, ‘radicalisation’ happens through indoctrination. Where an individual is taught to accept a set of beliefs uncritically. MP1520 described indoctrination as involving “the delivery of an elaborate belief system through preaching”. The preachers usually are well-trained on matters of religion. Still, they may even consult more qualified preachers within “their command structure” if they receive challenging queries from their target audiences.

MP0319, however, suggests that ‘radicalisation’ can exist in many spheres. He gives the example of parents who adhere to specific beliefs and practices about parenting and will not hear otherwise. He also offers examples of Christians and Muslims who adhere to belief systems that exclude everyone who is not a member of their in-group. He sees similarities in these three cases in that they all involve specific belief systems and members who adhere to them. In his view, the three actors can conform to their ideologies, but it only becomes a problem when they enforce their way on others. Examples by MP1520 and MP0319 attribute ‘radicalisation’ to different belief systems. The participants refer to the internalisation and normalisation of such beliefs and highlight violence targeting those deemed "different" or "out-group members".

**Debating Identity: ‘radicalisation’ as a ‘youth problem’**

Other prominent themes in this discourse were those related to identity. These themes focused on socio-demographic backgrounds and life experiences to project vulnerability to specific identity groups. Most participants identified those at-risk of ‘radicalisation’ to be youth. MP1220 suggested that for the most part "we work with the constitutional definition of youth which encompasses individuals in the age group of 18 to 35 years". MP0319, from his experience in peace and security, he found that persons below 18 were also ‘at-risk’. He stated that children in "the adolescence stage as young as 10 years to 17 years are also susceptible to being influenced into extremist groups and violent gangs. Because they are undergoing adolescence which comes with its challenges". Other participants added that "the youth phase is a period when individuals undergo an identity crisis" where they are trying to understand who they are and their place in the world. During this period, they can

---

246 MP0319, INGO program manager.
247 MP1220, CBO public relations officer.
248 FP1319, local NGO program officer.
be deceived because of their lack of awareness, exposure, and knowledge on complex matters.

Another psychological risk factor was a low sense of self-esteem. MP1519 narrated that he has encountered "some youth" who

join violent groups because it feels good having a rifle, being seen as a commander, or being told you are the general of this army. For him, being seen as a commander gives him a sense of pride. He starts thinking 'I am somebody'.

Others, MP1519 added, join because they want to belong and want to be accepted. Other traits used to project vulnerability were associated with completing significant milestones in one’s life. These milestones were those related to completing formal schooling and/or traditionally accepted ways of being young. Hence, the categories of young people listed as vulnerable included school dropouts, idle youth, youth with a previous criminal history, youth in gangs or part of rowdy football clubs, those who have been victims of gang-related violence, those living in high crime areas such as Kisauni and Majengo, and those who have lost their relatives or friends to extremist groups or violent counterterrorism practices. These youth walk with fear as they are suspects. This makes them vulnerable because they are already fighting for their safety besides struggling for their subsistence and how to access services such as basic education.

Besides micro-level processes and social factors, MP1320 also singled out "graduates and young people in colleges and universities" as at a higher risk of recruitment into extremist organisations "because of self-interest". MP1320 argued that "some youth will do anything to live the life they want. But because our country does not provide sufficient means to achieve their goals, extremist groups offering material incentives become an opportunity for such youth".

MP1620, however, sees the increase in youth joining violent organisations as an outcome of economic disillusionment. He stressed that "the prospects of finding employment in Kenya are low, so extremist groups capitalise on the disillusionment caused by joblessness.

---

249 FP2119, local NGO program officer.
250 MP2719, local NGO director.
251 FP2119, interview.
252 MP1519, local NGO program officer.
253 MP2219, CBO program officer.
254 MP0120, interview.
255 MP0319, interview.
256 MP1320, director of a local association.
257 MP1620, NGO project manager.
to recruit graduates in exchange for money, "It's like a job". MP1620 added that extremist groups target graduates with specific skills-set. He observed that engineering, medicine, nursing, and pharmaceutical fields are the expertise most required by extremist groups. If you review the profiles of the different individuals suspected or charged with joining extremist groups in Kenya, you will find that most of them were students or graduates in these fields.

Most of these graduates might have been offered “better pay for their knowledge and skills”. In such cases, MP1620 argued that "it is the knowledge or skills you possess that puts you at risk". Both MP1320 and MP1620 highlight economic pressures as conditions for ‘extremism’. Whilst MP1320 individualises the problem viewing some youth as "self-interested", MP1620 suggests that unemployment is a structural problem. He cites how "the prospects" of getting employed after graduating are low and how this might pressure people into illicit activities. Both opinions propose different interventions to address the problem of ‘extremism’. MP1320 suggests that "talking to young people to remind them why they pursue higher education is important". MP1620 advises that "issues of the economy", e.g. unemployment, inequality in hiring practices, and economic marginalisation need to be addressed through "policies and practices" as these are the "real causes" of crime.

Besides educational qualifications, gender was also identified as an essential element in making individuals vulnerable. It was argued that "young Muslim women from the ages of 17-258 are especially vulnerable to recruitment by militant organisations. MP2319 alleged that "young Muslim women are easily recruited by extremist groups, with the promise of marriage and heaven in the hereafter". This vulnerability is attributed to cultural and religious expectations projected on women by their societies. There is an expectation of getting married at a certain age that is notably lower in Muslim communities. These expectations create societal pressure, especially for girls leading "some to walk into marriages, without knowing the activities their husbands-to-be are involved in". But other girls "choose to marry militants because they believe they are fulfilling their religious duty". In Islam, "there is a belief that by getting married one fulfils half of their religion". If a girl believes in this "coupled with the rewards of jihad, it is unsurprising that she will get into such arrangements". In MP2319's view, women's vulnerability results from normative gender assumptions and cultural expectations. Both examples stress that women's involvement stems from pressure from their cultural and/or religious communities.

The discourse of ‘radicalisation’ as a youth problem draws on several narratives about social-demographic, social, and political conditions young people navigate. This discourse

258 MP2319, CBO director.
predominantly indeterminated young people as “some young people” before using contextual details to distinguish between groups of youth. Hence, differentiation was used to construct the problem of ‘radicalisation’ as an issue of specific youth rather than all youth. These "certain individuals" were the ones represented using the "at-risk" youth framework. This framework encompassed youth from dysfunctional families, those undergoing an identity crisis, those with criminal backgrounds, unemployed graduates, and young Muslim women. By framing it as a problem of specific individuals from specific areas the participants Othered particular identities that were seen as deviating from the traditionally accepted notions of being young. As a result, their interventions, such as "setting up early warning systems in schools, and institutions of higher learning, and mentoring or talking to ‘problematic youth’", were tailored towards the cultural shaping of individual behaviours.

The role of powerful Others in ‘radicalisation’

Another common theme described ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of cultural relations. This theme stressed the role of social networks in orienting young people with extremist content and eventually introducing them to violent extremist groups. This theme which I call a ‘powerful Other’ was cited by 15 participants and it identifies different individuals who play legitimate and illegitimate roles in society. FP1619\(^{259}\), argues that there are actors who “manipulate the grievances of young people to further their agendas”. Such actors "could be religious groups, gangs or it could even be a politician or other people with grievances". These actors are similar in that they all have hidden motives. While the motives of "religious groups could be religious, those of politicians could aim at creating instability”.

Other participants echoed similar views. They identified "religious extremists and radicalisers" as actors that "put ideas in the minds of children and youth" to "prompt them to act violently against others"\(^{260}\). More specific examples of powerful Others included "al-Shabaab"\(^{261}\), and "Aboud Rogo"\(^{262}\). FP2119 shared that a powerful Other "could be someone in school or the community". Often such an individual is "an adult or someone from the older generation". FP2119 sees adults as powerful Others based on the idea of socialisation. She claims that "a young person (man) will pick up what their father says, a young woman will pick up what their mother and aunts are saying. So, it still goes back to the generation that came before us". For FP2119, young people learn about many things from the adults around them and mostly from their family members, especially during their

---

\(^{259}\) FP1619, NGO programme director.
\(^{260}\) FP1720, CBO administrator.
\(^{261}\) MP0719, local NGO project assistant.
\(^{262}\) MP2719 identified Aboud Rogo—a Kenyan Muslim controversial cleric that was alleged to have ties with al-Shabaab. At the time of his murder on August 27, 2012, Rogo was facing criminal charges for terrorism-related offences.
early stages of development. During these stages, “someone hasn't developed critical thinking skills, they are still growing up, they are still learning”. Thus, if they are exposed to positive things, they will pick those up.

FP2119 understanding assumes that knowledge, values and behaviour is transmitted or learned through intergenerational relations. The focus here being primarily familial generations (as evidenced by the mentioning of father, mother, aunt etc.) as the source of knowledge, values and behaviour. This argument makes several assumptions about the nature of familial relationships. The child or youth is assumed to be inexperienced, innocent, and naïve thus depending on the adult for guidance; and the adult is considered knowledgeable and experienced. This structural positioning means children have less power than adults. Adults can use their generational power to regulate children's behaviour; thus constraining their power. From this view, the relationship between children and adults is a one-way flow of power where adults significantly influence children. This view shifts the responsibility and blame of ‘radicalisation’ entirely to adults. This is because adults are assumed to be in control in the intergenerational relationship and having the wisdom and intelligence to make moral judgements.

Another powerful Other was the husband. Reflecting on the increasing ‘radicalisation’ of women in the Muslim community, MP2319 argued that powerful Others also tend to be “male relations”. They could be the “husbands-to-be who capitalise on the rewards of jihad and convince Muslim ladies that if they become a bride of a jihadist, then they will go to heaven”. This example highlights how gender relations are used to recruit and radicalise women into extremist organisations. It suggests that women's traditional role as wives (wife of the jihadi) is exploited to encourage them to join extremist organisations. Also, it stresses that extremist individuals take advantage of women's desire to fulfil their religious obligations and cultural expectations. From MP2319 account, most women who are religious can be convinced by such arguments. Coupled with the high possibility that most of these women come from backgrounds that expect or even pressure women to get married after completing secondary school, such marital advances are likely to be seen as an opportunity to achieve the cultural milestone.

In rare cases, women were also described as a powerful Other. MP2219, for instance, looking at the youth gangs—these are also considered extremist groups—operating in Mtongwe area, argues that

Women have been luring men, they use their beauty to fake an attraction, and they target people who are new to the area, e.g. Navy officers or people who have no

263FP1419, interview.
idea that this is the current trend of crime. So, they may invite you out, but once you show up, they hand you over to the men who will harass you and rob you. In return, the women will receive a share of the proceeds. So far, this is what has been happening in Mtongwe. It is different from what is happening in Kisimani. Wakware babes\textsuperscript{264} are outright dangerous; you do not want to meet them, especially if you are a young man. They are hardened criminals; they will lure you and deal with you themselves.

In MP2219’s example, we see women in different extremist groups using their sexuality to lure unsuspecting men. The women in such situations are out to achieve financial benefit. The Mtongwe example highlights the presence of strong patriarchal systems even in organised crime. The roles women and men play in the Mtongwe example, are determined by understandings of gender roles and relations; where physical tasks are left to men while women execute the emotional and psychological ones. Also, the gendered understanding of violence reduces women’s involvement primarily to "economic gain" but subsumes men’s motivations to be ideological. But in the Kisimani example, the women in extremist groups are viewed as navigating different roles, i.e. recruiters, leaders, and enforcers. Through crime such women break traditional gender roles but despite this nuance, the Kisimani women are still viewed as exceptional. For instance, MP2219 qualifies them as "outright dangerous" and “hardened criminals” as opposed to the Mtongwe women. This representation resonates with dominant notions of femininity. The Mtongwe women, while engaged in crime, are still seen as feminine because the assumption is that all they do is lure you and leave the men to take care of the rest. In contrast, the Kisimani women deviate from acceptable ways of femininity. Evaluating them as “outright dangerous” and “hardened criminals”, implies they are non-feminine, because they exhibit traits that would most often be attributed to male criminals.

Another participant, MP1620, nuanced powerful Others to include peers. Peers introduced, groomed and lured other youth into extremist organisations. Mostly this happened "in the school environment, but in other times also in the community". MP2219, for example, said that

There are things that these children are capable of doing… and you wouldn’t know. Take the simple example of everyday routine. To you, your child never leaves the house. They go to school in the morning and return home straight from school in the evening. When you get home, they are already home. Their homework and every task you allocated is completed. So even if you get reports that your child has been abusive or assaulted someone, you will deny and say ‘it’s impossible, my child is

\textsuperscript{264} A criminal group that calls itself ‘Horny Babes’ and has been operating in Kisimani areas of Kisauni sub-county.
well-behaved, they are incapable’... but in reality, they did it... but you wouldn’t know because they know how to cover up their steps.

Using narrativisation of comparison, MP2219 tells a short story about how “children”—he uses the word children to collectively refer to children and youth—behave. He argues that parents may not know everything about their children. Thus, if a child is reported to have been abusive, their parents may guarantee that their child is incapable. But children can deliberately mislead their parents to pursue what they want. In this analogy, the parent is represented as naïve, and the child is given adult-like qualities. The analogy implies the child is not innocent like other children; thus, they are assumed to know better. MP2219 uses this analogy to argue that some children knowingly groom and lure their peers into extremist organisations. Thus suggesting that some youth are dangerous.

Besides differentiation (as discussed in the debating identity section), participants also employed classification to identify social actors. Classification is a strategy that describes social actors based on major categories of social organisation in a given society. Age, sexual orientation, gender, race, religion and ethnicity are major categories of social organisation. Throughout the discussion, participants classified social actors according to their age, gender and religion. Such references were realised through phrases such as “the youth, the young people, the Muslim community” and at times without the article “the” hence just “young people, young men and young Muslim women”. In this discourse, classification provided detailed attributes about the actor without mentioning their names. Besides, classification also stressed the relevance of age, gender, and religion to understanding those at risk of ‘radicalisation’.

Notably, powerful actors considered to have a high status in the society were categorised and represented through their functions or roles. For instance, participants used the word “politicians” to describe leaders involved in the ‘radicalisation’ of youth. This strategy contrasted the occupational roles these social actors are supposed to play in society versus the divisive actions they are engaged in. Functionalisation was used to draw the reader’s attention to the negative activities of elites such as “manipulating” and “instigating” violence in the society.

Also, collectivisation was used to assimilate youth social actors as groups. Collectivisation was realised through the label “youth or sometimes vijana”. Despite the emphasis on difference highlighted in most interviews, youth were often represented as a group. Collectivisation eroded differences and maintained vagueness regarding which youth and religious actors were being referenced. In the case of youth, collectivisation was primarily

---

265 *Vijana* is a Swahili word for youth in its plural form.
evoked to stress the passivity of young people, in general, thus constructing them as "helpless victims". Thus, collectivisation perpetuated stereotypes and prejudices that hinder young people's paths towards autonomy.

The discourse of 'radicalisation' as an outcome of culture and identity had important ramifications for the appropriate interventions to prevent youth from joining extremist and other criminal groups. Participants highlighted the need for mentoring, building resilient communities, tolerance and anti-bias training, changing the home environment to prevent youth from growing into criminals, providing youth with vocational training, linking youth with internship opportunities, and advocacy for inclusivity in hiring practices. Whilst some of these interventions can help, others continue to 'other' non-conforming identities and could potentially be used to justify profiling and extension of surveillance into homes and school environments.

'Radicalisation' as a Political Construct

For sixteen participants, 'radicalisation' and its related lexicon can mean many things in different situations. Participants associate the flexibility of the concept to local political dynamics, the political culture, and geopolitics. Many participants expressed that they started noticing increased use of the word 'radicalisation' in Kenya since 2012.

The relativity of 'radicalisation'

There are aspects of radicalism that steer up change in our communities and those are important. We look at people like Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X and others who were very radical or had a radical stance and influenced people to change how they perceive society.

- MP1519, PCVE practitioner

When asked to describe 'radicalisation', practitioners viewed it on a spectrum. They saw it as a "gradual process" that "progresses towards a certain goal". MP2319, used two analogies to share his conception of 'radicalisation'. He stated that:

Radicalisation occurs when a person adopts an ideology that may be positive from their perspectives but negative from others ... Radicalisation is a process of influencing other parties or individuals close to us to buy into our perception or our ideology, in the best way you can. For example, I love coffee, especially Cappuccino. And because you are my friend, I would want to persuade you to believe that coffee is the best thing.... In persuading you, I could tell you about the importance of coffee, its advantages and even allude to how you cannot survive without coffee. But I become a radical when I go the extra mile. For example, when I get irritated if I hear someone else speaking negatively about coffee. I may want to
change the perception or even confront them, break the bond and only want to associate with people who share my view.

He also used a political example to stress his interpretation. MP2319 suggested that:

Political sycophants are people who are radicalised. These are people who are always ready and out to defend a political leader they like. They always want to show you the positive traits of that leader. So, suppose you spoke negatively about the leader; they will brand you their political enemy and even claim that you have been sent over to tarnish his image.

From both examples there are several assertions. First, that ‘radicalisation’ is a process that begins and ends somewhere; certain goals drive it; and there are means of achieving the goals. Second, the behaviour of the individual (i.e. radical) gradually changes from persuasion through dialogue, ending relations to only associating with like-minded people. Third, that ‘radicalisation’ is relative. The participant notes that what one perceives positively may be negative to others. Thus, it depends on normative moral values of each context. When asked about the normative moral values and who decides those, participants spoke of mainstream culture and society.

MP2519 spoke about "a deviation from community norms". According to him, ‘radicalisation’ "is when an individual takes a direction different than what is normally accepted by their community". In MP2519's description, emphasis is placed on community norms. These norms, according to FP2119, are set by "the majority of people at a particular time. So, it's about what people think in relation to something". These people were also referred to as mainstream society. Several participants listed the society, elected political leaders, religious institutions, elites, and organised groups (women's groups, youth groups) as actors making up the mainstream society. FP2119 reiterated that, "elites have more power in deciding what is acceptable or not". Apart from access which they gain from holding elective positions, they are also representative of society. As the mainstream, "they set norms encompassing; roles and responsibilities of community members towards each other, community positions on the means for achieving political goals, the acceptable forms of organising and acceptable behaviour and identities". FP2119 uses an analogy that compares the circumstances of the Mau Mau—among other liberation movements that picked up after the Second World War—with al-Shabaab in the contemporary times. She narrated that

During the struggle for independence, many African movements were termed terrorists. But as African societies and more generally colonised groups, we did not see our actions as terrorism. And this is because violence was the only way that

---

266 MP2519, local NGO program officer.
guaranteed us economic, cultural, social and political independence. And our societies accepted violent methods in that context. In this same way that now we do not accept the use of violence to effect change. Even though the goals being pursued might make sense, the means is not acceptable.

In other words, FP2119 and MP2219 highlight that a majority of people (the mainstream) in a specific context come to a consensus about an acceptable way of bringing about political change. As Kenyans, we do not evaluate Mau Mau’s actions as extreme because we share their goals and accepted their methods. In contrast, we morally evaluate al-Shabaab's activities today as extreme because most Kenyans do not share their goals and certainly do not agree with their means. In contemporary times, mainstream political culture values different processes for creating political change, including voting, communal agreements and lawful expressions of disapproval such as protests and demonstrations. FP2119 suggests that

We now live in a time when there are legal means for bringing about change. But during the Mau Mau era legal systems did not serve Black people and that is why violence was seen as an acceptable means by the majority. However, there were also exceptions, for instance, some tribal chiefs who had allied with the British Empire and were directly benefiting from colonisation, did not agree with Mau Mau’s ways and quest for independence. These chiefs gave up the plans and hideouts of the Mau Mau to the colonial administrators.

The circumstances being compared comprise of several actors with different interests and values. During the liberation era, the Mau Mau wanted freedom for Kenya from all forms of domination by the British Empire. The British Empire wanted to continue its colonial rule to exploit cheap labour and resources. The tribal chiefs—the intermediaries—gained favour with the British Empire by spying and policing their communities. In return, the chiefs received material incentives and became the ruling elite after the departure of the colonial administrators.

Comparing the Mau Mau circumstances to al-Shabaab and its activities, we can also identify several actors and their interests. Al-Shabaab is the leading actor in the conflict. They cite their interests as aiming to govern Somalia by Shariah Law and liberate Kenyan Muslims from oppression by a Christian majority regime. By capitalising on existing inequalities and injustices experienced by Kenyan Muslims at the Coast and North-eastern region, al-Shabaab aims to grow in capacity by recruiting more members, securing territory and allegiance. Also, by capitalising on these pre-existing issues, al-Shabaab presents itself as a saviour; thus, it can gain support among locals in the said regions and expand its territory with little resistance. The arguments advanced show how and why many Kenyan elites and

267 Sometimes the tribal chiefs are also referred to as collaborators or loyalists.
practitioners approach ‘radicalisation’, specifically in relation to al-Shabaab. They evaluate al-Shabaab’s actions based on currently acceptable norms of conducting politics (for countries ascribing to democratic forms of governance) and their interests on the matter. FP2119 sums it up neatly by stating that "radicalisation can be negative or positive depending on where you are standing". Because of this value-ladenness, practitioners use the word *itikadi Kali* in their outreach activities and only use ‘radicalisation’ for programming.

**The conceptual debate continues**

*It was terrorism, then radicalisation and now we are at extremism*

- MP0619, PCVE practitioner

There were contradictory perceptions on the association between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Most participants argued that the two concepts were different but interrelated. MP2219, for instance, argued that "extremism happens when the individual is willing to use whatever means to impose their worldview on others". Other participants echoed similar views and highlighted "whatever means" to include the use of physical violence or even legislation. Some participants, such as MP2519, argued that in their experience, "radicalisation happens first because you have an idea or a goal and then we speak of violent extremism when you use violence to achieve your goal". Many participants spoke of al-Shabaab or ISIS's implementation of Sharia Law as an example of violent extremism. Similarly, MP0619 described the two concepts "as a chain of events. First 'radicalisation' happens when you use violence to effect political goals then we talk of violent extremism. So, one leads to the other". MP0619's use of the word chain demonstrates he views the concepts in a linear relationship where ‘radicalisation’ comes first and violent extremism manifests at the end.

Other participants had differing views about the relations between the concepts. MP0319 emphasised that:

Extremism is not a portion of radicalisation or for the radicalised. Extremism is natural; it is just like a game, an element of elasticity. A child who is so possessed, by his candy to the extent that they will bite their mother’s hand if that candy were to be taken away from them so that they can go take a bath. That is extremism in itself. You are extremely attached to that candy, to the extent that you do not want anyone, even that person who gave it to you, to touch it.

---

268 A Swahili phrase that translates to extreme ideas, beliefs or worldviews.
269 MP0619, CBO media relations officer.
For MP0319, we are all extreme in different ways. By his logic, ‘extremism’ precedes ‘radicalisation’. MP0319 believes that we all hold extreme positions on different matters and that it is quite normal. He uses the word “possessed” and this advances several assumptions. First, when one is possessed, they are no longer in control but something else takes power over them and manifests itself in their actions. Second, when one is not in control, they cannot act rationally. That is why the child does not realise that biting their mother (the candy provider) is wrong.

This analogy is an example of a more relatable day-to-day experience of parenting. The analogy makes complex concepts accessible and draws parallels between actions we may not treat as dangerous to those we think are dangerous. For instance, it is only when the child bites his mother's hand that we realise the extent of the problem. But if the child were to continue indulging in their candy, they would go unnoticed. By this logic, the act of biting (physical violence) makes the child's possession into a problem. The analogy argues that ‘extremism’ is not bad, but when coupled with violence, it becomes dangerous.

MP0319 also gives more political examples of ‘extremism’ to support his position. He narrates that

…. Some people are strong Christians who cannot withstand any other religion, for instance, the New Zealand Christchurch attacker. When you feel the occurrence of certain people is a contamination of Christianity and Christian values and embark on eliminating them, then that is extremism. And then now there are some Muslims, for example, those who keep a beard and feel everybody else is a lesser believer or not a believer at all. Or those who think that every non-Muslim is a kaffir and needs to be eliminated, then that's extremism. So, extremism is a phenomenon of moving over the cliff about anything. So, it is not just a portion for the radicalised.

Accordingly, ‘extremism’ is naturally occurring, and you need not be a radical to be a violent extremist. There are different forms of extremists in the examples, but they are all similar in their use of violence to pursue their goals. MP0319 does not refute that ‘radicalisation’ happens. He clarifies that “there are extremists who are also radicalised” and these he labels as "the top category". He compares the top category to those who are just radicals and observes that

It's like if you were to light a matchstick when somebody is extreme and radicalised, it would light very fast than somebody who may be radicalised, but he was not in their nature of extreme. So, extremism comes first and then the other part that may follow is radicalisation. … Radicalisation on the other side occurs through experience or the spoken word or exposure to certain groups who look at things through a certain lens.
MP0319’s understanding alludes to the different pathways towards terrorism. He suggests that: not all individuals become violent extremists; some extremists never use violence to advance their agenda, in a similar way that some people have radical ideas but never pursue them. MP0319 uses the modal verb “may” to express that there are other possible outcomes. He also adds that individuals who may be pushed to act violently are those who already hold extreme views on an issue (e.g. inequality or religion) and then encounter people who help them understand their situation through a specific framework. This example of ‘radicalisation’ highlights the role of social interaction, suggesting that through discussions with like-minded people, individuals may rationalise their worldviews and act to correct what they see as an injustice or an anomaly.

Notably, while most participants were certain about the differences between the concepts and their value-ladenness, I also noticed that the concepts were often used interchangeably or together. The phrase "radicalisation extremism" is one example where the concepts were coalesced. These contradictions could indicate the elusiveness of the concepts and the broader confusion about the relationship between the concepts. The next section will focus on the social justice framework to understand the relations between disparate issues, policies, and institutions in ‘radicalisation’.

‘Radicalisation’ and Social Justice

Other participants viewed ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of social injustice(s). This discourse was more prevalent among participants MP1620, MP0120, FP1619 and MP0719. The former three work at a foreign-headed NGO whereas the latter works at locally-initiated and headed NGO. They highlighted social, political and economic injustice(s) as conditions favourable for ‘radicalisation’.

On economic injustice(s)

Fourteen participants identified unequal development, unequal access to employment opportunities, unemployment, poverty and other forms of historical marginalisation as conditions that encouraged the growth of radicalism in Mombasa. MP0120 argued that I would call it 'economic extremism'. Because poverty is driving people into these extremist groups… every community believes that if they have their community member as the president, they will have chances of accessing the resources. The reason of MRCs' existence is access to resources, and so is the conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot.

MP0120 argues for ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of economic conditions in two ways. First, he sees most people getting involved with extremist groups because of the material
incentives they offer. Second, he argues that if there was equality in distributing resources, we would have fewer violent conflicts. He singles out the presidency position arguing that most communities believe holding the president's office would give them access to resources. He bases his argument by looking at how both the Rift Valley and Central Kenya—as the two regions where all Kenyan presidents have originated from—have developed compared to other regions. His claim draws on narratives of nepotism and how nepotism fuels unequal distribution of wealth.

MP1620, also gives examples of two projects—launched under President Uhuru Kenyatta's administration: the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR)-only Cargo Haulage directive and the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Program. The former aimed to transfer most of the Port's cargo haulage functions from the Port of Mombasa to an Inland Container Depot in Nairobi. The latter is a regional infrastructure project building a northern corridor connecting Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan to transport crude oil. Both projects have been accused of side-lining Coastal natives. If implemented, the SGR-only Cargo haulage directive will transfer the transportation and logistics functions from Mombasa to Nairobi, Kisumu and Eldoret. Since Mombasa County primarily relies on haulage and logistics for revenue, the move will further marginalise an already underdeveloped area.

Local CSOs have objected to the SGR-only Cargo Haulage directive. MP0719 argues that,

With the directive most Container Freight Station Services (CFS) operating in Mombasa have shut down their operations. This shutdown has pushed many workers out of jobs. Our analysis shows that about 4000 people working for these shipping companies lost their jobs. If these workers were staying in rental houses, they have had to vacate them because they could no longer afford the rents. Meaning those houses now do not have tenants; hence the landlord is not making any meaningful returns from his investment. These workers relied on bodabodas and tuktuks to get to their workplaces but because CFS's have closed, most tuktuks and bodaboda businesses operating in those areas have also been affected. There were cafes and restaurants, mechanics, fuel-service stations, spare-part dealers, and hawkers based in the port area. Those have also had to shut down as there are no customers anymore. Now think of it in terms of the dependents these 4000 workers had. What will happen to their families? How will their children go to school? Access basic needs?...they can go back to the villages, but most will not because we have a huge land issue in the Coast Province, so farming is not feasible. Because of such problems, most of these workers would rather stay in the cities and use any means necessary to survive, and it is this desire to survive that people end

270 Motorbikes used as public transport.
271 A three-wheeled motor vehicle commonly used as a taxi.
up in violent groups. So, there are some things that the government does that contributes to further pushing people into violent groups.

MP0719’s account shows how some government decisions can have ripple effects. Also, the above extract shows how certain decisions can limit the opportunities available for people to earn a living legitimately.

MP0719 highlights the impact of legislative directives in reinforcing existing economic inequalities in Kenya. Using the SGR-only Cargo Haulage directive, he shows how the economy of Mombasa—which mostly relied on the port’s logistical operations—has been disrupted. According to MP0719, “the directive violated article 10 and 47 of the constitution. It was implemented without consulting the people of Mombasa”. MP1620 adds that “there have been demonstrations called Black Monday to push the government to rescind the directive. But the government has tear-gassed and arrested demonstrators. What other means do you think these people may turn to?” Both accounts explicitly link economic grievances and ‘radicalisation’. MP1620 observes that if constitutional means of expressing dissatisfaction are frustrated, it may push people to resort to “other means”. Apart from creating economic injustices, the government is also accused of silencing activism against inequality. From this theme we see a relationship of inequality and/or subordination—domination.

The theme uses several referential strategies to situate different actors. Functionalisation referred to social actors using their activities, occupations and roles. Individuals were characterised as "workers", "the landlord", "mechanics", "hawkers" and "spare parts dealers". Both economically and politically, these identities serve a high value in society. Thus, functionalisation positively evaluated the social actors above as legitimate and decent members of their society. Besides, functionalisation also served the rhetorical aims of the theme which was to highlight the economic injustices against the people of Mombasa in general.

The theme also used collectivisation. The category "we" was frequently used to describe the Coastal Community. The participants' then show how the "we", are victims of regime steered economic inequalities and poverty. Moreover, it is articulated that desperation resulting from unemployment leads some of the "we", to ‘radicalisation’. In this theme, the "we", are the victims of the "them", which comprises the government and "non-Coastal" communities. This binary positioning in the narrations draws on historical relations between the Coast as the periphery and the centre as Nairobi qua inland Kenya. Historically, despite largely contributing to Kenya’s economy through tourism, the Port and rare mineral
resources, the Coast has not benefited equally from employment in these sectors or infrastructural development. Thus, civil society proposes

they need to come and sort out that mess… things are not going to get solved if issues of the economy are not solved. Historical injustices and economic inequalities that exist are the issues that need to be addressed, now.

In this extract, the "they" refers to the government. Looking at ‘radicalisation’ in this manner serves to, first, stress the role of the government in fostering inequalities it is tasked with addressing. By making references to accepted narratives of historical injustices such as the land injustices at the Coast, this construction of the Coast as "the victim" facilitated the binary division between the government (them) and the Coast (us). Where the government is tasked with solving the problem it created. Second, the construction of the Coast-as-a-victim highlights the brutality of the regime. The regime is portrayed as fostering inequalities and deprivation and violently attacking critics pushing back against disenfranchisement.

‘Radicalisation’ as an outcome of violent counterterrorism

Other participants, especially those categorised as "radical" civil society, highlighted violent counterterrorism policies' role in facilitating 'radicalisation’. Fourteen participants reiterated this theme which was central in constructing the image of security apparatuses—as stakeholders tasked with addressing ‘radicalisation’—as violent actors. MP2219, argued that

there are things that happen in the community and we overlook; we only focus on the symptoms … people attacking each other with machetes is just a symptom. The real causes … are still here, and these include things that people go through. For instance, police brutality. You know the way the police can come into the neighbourhood, we are used to it, they come in, and even though it is one person who has messed up, many will suffer just to get to that one person.

Or, as MP1219272 narrated:

There have been cases of some Muslim youth disappearing and police harassing their family members. They constantly harass the family members to reveal the whereabouts of the young man. They do not want to know that you do not know the whereabouts of your son or brother. And this harassment and even extortion...remember Operation Sanitize Eastleigh...can go on for a long time. The younger children within that family grow up witnessing such harassment and all that, so it may reach a point that these young people find solace in violent groups. Because violent groups also use issues of police harassment to validate such lived experiences and encourage the aggrieved to seek revenge.

272 MP1219, CBO co-founder and volunteer.
Similarly, MP2319 added that

Some young people join violent groups because they have lived and experienced what the system does. The same system that should protect them—in the first place—becomes the predator.

These three examples highlight several issues. First, MP2219’s account stresses the use of extreme force by the police as a common practice during counterterrorism operations. He stresses that police brutality is the main cause of ‘radicalisation’, but one that is rarely discussed openly, perhaps because people are afraid. He adds that people often focus on youth gangs, which are just a symptom of bigger underlying problems such as police brutality.

Second, MP2219 and MP1219 highlight two competing issues: collective punishment and profiling in counterterrorism. They argue that security forces often administer collective punishment during counterterrorism operations, relying on assumptions that individuals are guilty by association. According to MP1219, children who grow up experiencing police harassment and profiling harbour resentment for the authorities. When such children are exposed to al-Shabaab narratives about discrimination and profiling of Muslims by Kenyan security forces, they feel their own experiences are validated.

These extracts make clear the relationship between “violent counterterrorism” and “radicalisation”. In this theme, counterterrorism is enforced on the communities by security forces. The participants identified security forces (and by extension “the system,” i.e. the government) as social actors who are primarily violent, brutal and to use MP2319 characterisation “the predator”. This characterisation is reinforced by the active side-to-side comparison of “the police” with “young children”. Specifically, the use of “young children” invokes ideas of innocence and the childhood period as unproblematic and free of decision making. This creates the expectation that adults—in this case “the police”—are supposed to protect children’s innocence and guide them into becoming principled adults. However, in the above examples, the adult endangers and attacks the child through their actions instead of safeguarding them. Also, in these examples, just like the “young children”, “the community” and “the family” are represented as recipients of police violence. The proximity of the words “the family” and “young children” extends the assumptions about childhood and children's traits to “the family” and “the community” at large thus “the community” is also seen as helpless and innocent.

MP2219 draws on his personal experience with police brutality. He uses the phrase "you know the way the police can come into the neighbourhood; we are used to it" to describe habitual behaviours exhibited by the police. Also, because I (the researcher) come from the
same area, MP2219 is confident that I am familiar with collective punishment as a dominant practice of policing in Kenya. The description of behaviours exhibited by the police during their operations reinforces the image of the "brutal police". Unlike "the community's" inaction, MP1219's narration shows that once "young children" who were victims of police harassment grow up, they try to take action to correct the injustices meted on them. One of the actions they pursue is to join violent groups that promise them a chance to "revenge". What these children grow up to be is an outcome of their childhood experiences. By this logic, ‘radicalisation’ is a reaction to violent counterterrorism with the two mutually acting on each other.

MP2319, suggested that "to break this cycle, there is a need for a candid discussion. But my only worry is the government is not willing to be open. They will never be open". Also, MP0719 shared his thoughts on what needs to be done. He argued for putting up proper structures and procedures... but putting these up in a context of mistrust on either side will be very difficult. For example, in meetings with security forces and the community, security forces always say they will do better, but they do the complete opposite during their operations. So, we cannot move forward if there is no commitment to change.

The participants suggest several interventions to counterterrorism that will help break the never-ending cycle of ‘radicalisation’ if implemented. MP2319 suggested "discussions" with all stakeholders. He qualifies "discussions" with the adjective "candid" to suggest that discussions are happening, but these have not been truthful or open. While he sees "candid discussions" as a step towards change, he is not optimistic about the likelihood of such discussions occurring. Because in his view, "the government is not willing to be open. They will never be open". And this lack of openness stems from the idea that matters of security are highly securitised. MP2319 uses the modal verb "will" to express the government's unwillingness to engage in open dialogue. His claim stems from his familiarity with the governments' lack of openness, especially on security-related matters.

Similarly, MP0719 suggests that counterterrorism can be improved "by putting proper structures and procedures" in place. He identifies legal structures and procedures as "making police reforms, changing the culture of policing, holding the police accountable for violations of law and professional ethics". According to MP0719, if these structures are implemented and adhered to, there will be fewer cases of "extrajudicial disappearances, violations of human rights, rampant corruption in the security force and mistrust by the community and CSO's". However, for MP0719, the main impediment to implementing these structures is “the mistrust between the police and the CSOs and the police and the community, and the lack of commitment to change”. MP0719 does not think the police are
committed to change. Perhaps, this lack of commitment is accounted for by the nature of traditional policing which is action-oriented and places greater emphasis on the use of force rather than mediation and relationship building approaches. Hence, with traditional forms of policing MP0719 suggests that counterterrorism will remain counterproductive.

(De)legitimising Discourses on ‘Radicalisation’

The discourses propounded by civil society drew on their experiences of working, living and being part of communities that are often the targets or beneficiaries of counterterrorism or other forms of PCVE. Civil society evaluated their discourses on ‘radicalisation’ by (co)vertly referencing value systems they ascribed to. These included values such as human rights, fairness, honesty, the do-no-harm principle and trust, among others. Sometimes these evaluations were made explicitly by using adjectives such as “good” and “bad”. For instance, the links between socialisation and ‘radicalisation’ were legitimised by evaluating socialisation and parenting as “good parenting” and “bad socialisation”. In this discourse, it was argued that when a child does not receive proper upbringing, they will likely end up in violent groups because they were not taught to become productive members of society. Such concerns are not unique, but they have been areas of government concern since the colonial period. They are primarily founded on traditional ideas that approach children as passive objects of socialisation, needing their futures to be forged for them.

These ideas are connected to child welfare interventions since the heightened struggle for Kenya’s independence from the British Empire in 1952 (Maloba, 2005). For instance, the Ministry of Community Development was established in 1954 by the colonial government to provide social welfare through services such as education, probation and community development (Mbugua, 2012). Similarly, in 1955 the Prevention of Cruelty to and Neglect of Children Ordinance was enacted to protect the wellbeing of children (Ibid) by specifically focusing on ‘juveniles in need of care’. This paved way for establishing a state corporation—the Child Welfare Society of Kenya (CWSK) in December 1955. CWSK also caters to the welfare of children. Concerns with children are linked to discourses of moral values on what is considered ideal upbringing, the role of parents and society in the upbringing process, the duties of the child, and what kind of adults’ children ought to become. These child welfare discourses are constantly argued out explicitly, as in the example above, where socialisation is evaluated as “good or bad”. At other times these discourses are passed off as common-sense knowledge in day-to-day conversations through statements such as they are who they are because of where and how they were raised.

Another common discursive strategy used by civil society were analogies or comparisons. Analogies "express moral evaluation" thus "have a legitimatory or delegitimatory function"
(Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 99). Analogies do not just draw comparisons. But by using an activity belonging to one social practice as an example to make sense of another, they transfer the values (negative or positive) associated with one activity to another. Practitioners expressed comparisons through similarity conjunctions, circumstances of comparison and narrativisation of comparison. Analogies by similarity conjunctions were expressed using conjunctions such as "like", "similarly" and "as". For instance, it was narrated that being part of extremist groups ‘is like a job’, you join these groups and in exchange, you get paid while they benefit from your skills”.

This analogy compares being part of violent groups to a job or employment opportunity. Through this analogy, MP1620 suggests that the idea of a job is to use your knowledge and skills to fulfil tasks and get paid for your services in exchange. This transaction has two actors: the employer (who buys services) and the employee (who sells their services). The two actors agree about how tasks will be fulfilled and how remunerations will be made. In the employer—employee relationship both actors win. Because jobs, as long as they are legitimate, are generally evaluated in positive terms, comparing the logic behind legitimate employment to ‘working in violent groups’ legitimises the argument that some young people solely get involved with such groups for material incentives. This analogy explains how high unemployment rates encourage the growth of criminal enterprises. At the same time, the comparison enables us (as outsiders) to understand how a decision deemed irrational is entirely rational to the actors involved. This analogy cautions on the dangers of high unemployment while also suggesting that solving the unemployment crisis ought to be a priority area of prevention efforts by the government.

Another example of analogies was expressed through the narrativisation of comparison. This type of analogy compares one social practice to another through a narrative. For instance, in the discourse of ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct, MP0319 compared ‘extremism’ to possession by referencing the example of "a child who is addicted to candy". He states that:

Extravagism is natural, it is just like a game, an element of elasticity. A child who is so possessed by his candy to the extent that they will bite their mother’s hand if that candy were to be taken away from them so that they can go take a bath. That is extremism in itself. You are extremely attached to that candy, to the extent that you do not want anyone, even that person who gave it to you, to touch it.

This comparison invokes cultural references about childhood, where a child is regarded as incapable of making rational choices. As such, a child does not realise that they can leave the candy aside, take a shower, and come back to it. Instead, when their mother reaches out for the candy to store it away, the child bites their mother's hand. The mother is an actor
dissuading the child from bad behaviour, because correcting children's behaviours is part of "good parenting". The action of biting is a form of violence and defiance, and the candy represents something (it can be an ideology whether religious or political) that should be taken in moderation. The bath initiated by the mother is an intervention that functions to distract the child from the candy. This analogy depicts the child's frustration and anger towards the mother, a measure of aggression.

The participant draws this analogy from his own experience as a parent and as a practitioner implementing Transforming Violent Extremism (TVE) interventions. The analogy was used to conceptualise 'extremism', suggesting that extreme views exist but in most cases in moderation and hence not harmful. However, the child's obsession with the candy grows to the point that they bite the mother when it is taken away. The action of biting is regarded as irrational, and this is used to evaluate the actions of extremist actors as irrational too.

**Conclusion**

This chapter analysed how the civil society implementing T/PCVE in Mombasa describe and interpret 'radicalisation'. By analysing interviews conducted with civil society practitioners—in the summer and winter of 2019—this chapter provides an overview of the 'radicalisation' debate. This chapter through CDA exposes the local character of 'radicalisation' discourses which are also reflected in the MCAP. The analysis revealed three competing discourses; ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of culture and identity, a political construct and an outcome of social injustices.

‘Radicalisation’ as an outcome of culture and religion approaches ‘radicalisation’ as an issue of particular violent cultures and identities. This discourse suggests that socialisation plays a huge role in modelling a child. It argues that children who grow up in dysfunctional families and toxic environments are more likely to end up in crime than children who receive “good socialisation”. In the adolescence and young adult phases, especially when characterised with a search for identity, belonging, lack of exposure, a low sense of self-esteem and self-image, individuals can be easily lured into violent groups. This discourse identified powerful social actors—such as politicians, religious leaders, extremist groups, elites and peers—as manipulating young people for self-interests. Further, the discourse primarily identified different categories of youth as vulnerable. These included school dropouts, troubled youth, those with criminal histories, victims of extremist groups and violent counterterrorism, unemployed graduates and young Muslim women.

Overall, this discourse is informed by cognitive and behavioural theories to ‘radicalisation' which argue for more focus on interpersonal and cultural dynamics to effectively understand
what individuals are likely to take up violent causes (Monaghan and Molnar, 2016). This discourse unintentionally Others certain youth and religious identities as problematic. As a result, it makes possible interventions aimed at cultural shaping identities for example facilitating inter-faith dialogues and training of Imams. While in theory extremist ideologies could encompass various ideologies, in the context of Kenya, it is already conceived within the framework of ‘Islamist’ extremism (Mwangi, 2019; Mohamed, 2022; Badurdeen, 2023). Such a conception coalesces a variety of Islamic ideologies constructed as opposing democracy according to western liberal ideals as risky and at-risk groups or what other scholars refer to as suspect communities (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Lynch, 2013; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Ragazzi, 2015; Abbas, 2019). Thus PCVE programs aimed at cultural shaping could be (ab)used by law enforcement to justify their targeting of ‘problematic’ youth and cultures. At the same time, Badurdeen (2023, pp. 3, 11) cautions that CSOs conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ stems from “the harmonisation of PCVE projects and policies of INGOs and local NGOs along government-led PCVE strategies”. In order to continue implementing PCVE with ease, CSOs are forced to align their programs with the government (Ibid). This closes the space for resistance. But even worse it erodes civil society–community trust (Al-Bulushi, 2018, 2021), as the at-risk and risky groups may feel CSOs are a proxy of government surveillance.

The second discourse approached ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct. All practitioners approached ‘radicalisation’ as a process, perhaps in line with the consensus among academics and experts. But while for some it is a process with a clear beginning and an end, for others ‘radicalisation’ could follow different trajectories. In addition, practitioners stressed the elusiveness of ‘radicalisation’. Arguing that dominant political culture and geopolitics need to be considered to understand why a specific description is more dominant over others. This discourse employed analogies. Specifically, comparison through narrativisation placed Mau Mau and al-Shabaab side-by-side to establish Kenya’s understanding of ‘radicalisation’ as embedded in its political interests and values. Such as being an anchor-state in the GWOT, building its image as a ‘progressive’ and ‘secular’ country, and locally, creating a compliant population. Al-Shabaab’s actions are morally evaluated as illegitimate based on Kenya’s national values and principles of governance including but not limited to the rule of law, patriotism, national unity, democracy, human dignity, inclusiveness, equality and equity. This discourse implies that unlike the Mau Mau, al-Shabaab are against the values that Kenya was founded on and adheres to. This discourse was made possible by CSOs’ lived realities. Not only have Mombasa-based

---

273 It is important to note as I have shown in chapter 2, 3 and 4 that the primary definer of these concepts remains to be the government. Meaning power politics influence the naming process.

229
CSOs—especially those with an Islamic orientation—have been threatened by Kenyatta’s administration for being critical of government policy (Kiai, 2015; Mohamed, 2015). But CSOs also face considerable pressure from donors to define ‘radicalisation’ and extremism within the political context of western interventions (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, 2016; Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016; Badurdeen, 2023; Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023). At the level of implementation, CSOs also encounter resistance and pressure by local communities who might construct them as proxies of the government or western interests (Al-Bulushi, 2018, 2021).

Thus, CSOs’ worldviews and interventions navigate manifold interests. This could explain why the discourse of ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct did not appear in policy, elite and media discourses. In addition, it is also safer to be critical of government policy in one-to-one conversations particularly when anonymity is guaranteed. This discourse allowed CSOs to disrupt the understanding of ‘radicalisation’ as a static and a stable concept. The analogy of *Mau Mau* was intentionally used to privilege prevailing knowledge about ‘radicalisation’. However, the analogy also invited readers to situate the concept within existing power structures and understand how power structures shape what can be known as ‘radicalisation’. This discourse was a critique to more simple definitions and descriptions of ‘radicalisation’. By approaching ‘radicalisation’ this way, during implementation most CSOs allow local communities to define violent extremism and best ways to address it. Often the emerging local definitions are shaped by unique drivers and manifestations that are specific to different cultural contexts. By recognising the inherent power dynamics in the (re)production of ‘radicalisation’ and extremism, CSOs have room to develop contextually relevant programs that are grounded in lived experiences rather than one-size-fits-all interventions.

The discourse of ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct opened space for a consideration of local contextual dynamics. Often as Badurdeen (2023), Oando (2022) and Oando and Achieng’ (2021) have shown, local contextual particularities continue to be marginalised by western constructions of terrorism and counterterrorism interventions. Oando and Achieng’ (2021) warn that not only do such approaches then deny space and voice to subaltern ways of knowing, but they also maintain colonial hierarchies. As such, the third discourse encompassed claims that were mediated by localised meanings and conflicts. It highlighted the underlying socio-economic and political conditions, including historical land-related grievances, narratives of harassment of the Muslim constituency, violent counterterrorism, and the suppression of legitimate forms of activism, that exacerbate ‘radicalisation’. Drawing

\[^{274}\text{Interview with FP2119, and MP2519.}\]
on these particularities allowed CSOs to first, historicise ‘radicalisation’. Instead of approaching it as a ‘new’ and ‘unique’ problem they grounded it in long standing social injustices and inequalities. And second, rather than seeing ideology as a separate dimension, they nuanced the complex interplay between social conditions and belief systems. Here social injustices and inequalities are positioned as driving the ideologies that lead people to resort to violence as a means of expressing their grievances and/or seeking change.

Studies by Breidlid (2021) and Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith (2018b) consistently highlight that violent extremist ideologies are rooted in lack of socioeconomic opportunities, marginalisation and discrimination, poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law, and unresolved conflicts. Thus, PCVE efforts cannot be successful if they only focus on addressing ideologies without addressing the material conditions of ‘radicalisation’. This discourse thus, is first, a critique to national policy discourses, elite discourses and media discourses that deny any significance to the structural material causes of ‘radicalisation’ and instead focus on promoting moderate Islam or acceptable values of Kenyanness as a way of disrupting radical ideologies. This way of approaching ‘radicalisation’ should be seen as a way of resisting top-down approaches and/or universal knowledge systems (Oando and Achieng’, 2021) in favour of specific knowledge systems grounded in local geographic and socio-cultural contexts.

By highlighting the role of social injustice and inequalities in ‘radicalisation’ this discourse provokes a reassessment of counterterrorism policies. It reiterates the importance of addressing economic marginalisation through creating job opportunities. Several CSOs offer entrepreneurial training and loans for young people to improve their livelihoods by investing in small businesses. Others advocacy work centres on the re-assessment of historical and contemporary economic policies, with a view that ‘inclusion’ so far has not benefited Coastal populations. Hence, they advocate for meaningful inclusion. Which to name but a few includes resolving historical land injustices, and repealing unfair economic policies such as the SGR-only Cargo Haulage directive. CSOs have also actively advocated for reforming policing and empowering police, young people and communities through offering civic education.

Collectively these discourses also served to discursively construct the identities of perpetrators and their victims. The perpetrators were constructed as brutal, manipulative, and cunning whereas their victims were represented as naïve, innocent, and lacking experience. On the one hand, depending on the discourse, the perpetrators ranged from powerful elites, extremist groups, religious groups, al-Shabaab, husbands, and peers to the
police and security forces and by extension the government. On the other hand, the victims ranged from children, youth, young Muslim Women, the community and the Coastal community in general. The inclusion of state security forces and by extension the government into the perpetrator category prompted moral reflection on counterterrorism practices and more generally the policing culture in Kenya.

In summary, this chapter has shown that ‘radicalisation’ acquires its meaning by weaving analogies, narratives, words and language in such a way that it makes possible certain causal interpretations which in turn opens space for certain dialogues and policy possibilities. By building local discourses that are informed by local conflict dynamics civil society establishes itself as a credible ally in the communities within which it operates while also resisting eurocentric driven discourses. However, while civil society attributes ‘radicalisation’ to diverse issues, most of their preventative work largely focuses on civic education, moderating religion through interfaith dialogues and training of imams, and advocacy work. Fewer activities are addressing endemic corruption, impunity and inequality. Perhaps this is because civil society has limited civic space, that is, to operate with relative simplicity and safety they can not be too critical of government policy.
Chapter 7. Youth Perspectives on ‘Radicalisation’: An Analysis of Focus Groups with Young People in Mombasa

While the previous chapter has engaged with popular discourses in the civil society domain, this chapter revisits some of the discourses—such as those highlighting the role of culture, identity and politics—but also identifies, describe and analyses other emerging themes dominant among young people who are often the targets and beneficiaries of counterterrorism and PCVE efforts. Data for this chapter came from two FGDs conducted with 11 young people working and living in different areas of Mombasa County. The analysis will first look at discourses that project vulnerability by focusing on individual-related processes and experiences, as has been discussed by practitioners in Chapter Six. This section shows that young people who have experienced humiliation are likely to react violently towards those demeaning them to improve their self-image and status. The second section will centre on cultural values and relations that render ‘radicalisation’ possible. In this section, I show how ‘radicalisation’ is viewed as an outcome of extreme religious beliefs, opportunistic social networks and cultural imperatives on marriage, masculinity and femininity. The chapter shows that broader cultural systems provide individuals with the motive for action and act as a lens through which individuals interpret events in their surroundings. The third section analyses a discourse titled ‘the political context’. This discourse focuses on the broader structural dynamics within which ‘radicalisation’ occurs. By analysing this discourse, I show that youth construct their understanding of ‘radicalisation’ in relation to the prevailing political culture. The fourth section analyses the referential and legitimation strategies used by young people to identify and characterise themselves and others in relation to ‘radicalisation’. This section shows how the "us" vs "them" dichotomy is purposely created by youth through analogies to distance themselves from the other youth deemed dangerous. The concluding section critically engages with the various discourses highlighting their main arguments. This section underlines that both dominant and marginal discourses on ‘radicalisation’ normalise surveillance and policing of youth by constructing youth as ‘dangerous’ (or not). Such constructions rely on traditional assumptions about acceptable youth behaviours.

Emerging Discourses

This chapter is based on data from two focus groups (coded FGD1 and FGD2) with 11 young people conducted in 2019. Data from the focus groups was coded and analysed separately, because the discussions were conducted on different days and places\textsuperscript{275} thus

\textsuperscript{275} FGD1 occurred in Kisauni on 14.06.2019 while FGD2 occurred in Likoni on 22.06.2019.
analysing them separately maintained the nuance and allowed for cross-comparisons. Also, FGD1 was homogenous religiously, ethnically and in terms of participants’ work capacity while FGD2 was diverse on all categories thus data was analysed separately to monitor inter-group dynamics. The focus groups were designed to explore young people’s perceptions and experiences in relation to ‘radicalisation’. Participants were young people from two CBOs based in Mombasa County. The discussions dwelled on their understanding of what constitutes (and does not constitute) ‘radicalisation’, the language used, how youth are positioned in discussions of ‘radicalisation’ and how they judge and position themselves regarding the same. FGD1 was conducted in Kisauni, with five participants: four men and one woman. All participants identified as Muslims and belonged to ethnic groups indigenous to the Coastal region. FGD2 was conducted in Likoni, with six participants: four men and two women. With two participants identifying as Muslims and belonging to ethnic groups indigenous to the Coastal region. The remaining four identified as Christians and belonged to ethnic groups non-indigenous to the Coast. Three of the four were born and raised in Mombasa, whereas the fourth moved there for work.

All participants were familiar with Coastal dynamics and politics. They were formally introduced to PCVE interventions through different organisations’ peace and security programs in Mombasa County. Some of these programs ran outreach activities, awareness campaigns and income-generating activities targeting young people. By regularly attending such events, the participants later organised themselves and registered as youth groups (as in FGD1) or joined existing CBOs to engage other young people (as was the case in FGD2). FGD1 participants worked for a grass-root organisation they founded in 2012. The organisation’s capacity and resources are limited thus they only implement activities in Kisauni—an electoral constituency of Mombasa County.

In contrast, FGD2 participants worked and volunteered for a locally based CBO founded in 2008 in Mombasa. The CBO implements activities in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi counties. Both CBO’s are youth-led and engage communities through theatre, music, dance, and graffiti art. The participants are familiar with the concepts under analysis as they use them in their work and as young people they are subjected to them through labelling.

This chapter focuses on what participants shared during the focus groups, and what objects their accounts construct, and how these objects are constructed. An NVivo coding query revealed three major discourses. Those attributing ‘radicalisation’ to a) individual concerns, 

276 Participants are pseudonymised by their genders. MP refers to male participant and FP to female participant. The number following the initials MP1 indicates the order of speaking during the discussion.
277 Also, implements small-scale farming to empower youth.
b) cultural concerns, and c) the political context. In the next section, I will analyse each discourse separately, highlighting the arguments foregrounded and their assumptions.

**Individual Concerns: ‘what someone is going through matters’**

Individual concerns were most prevalent in FGD1. When discussing both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ participants highlighted individual concerns, also referred to as psychosocial factors in academic and policy literature. I captured the individual concerns under the phrase ‘what someone is going through matters’ to highlight that the participants viewed ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ as outcomes of events and processes happening at the individual level. Individual concerns were identified and described using terms and phrases related to “self-esteem”, “self-image”, “trust”, and “personal experiences”. Participants in FGD1 articulated that:

MP1: there are other young people who get everything from home. But they feel they were demeaned or dehumanised by someone else.

FP2: Some youth might have been to the club and were made to feel inferior. So they feel by being part of Chafu they will be protected and secure.

MP1: if I am part of a gang, I know, I have the protection I need. And when people see me they know 'I'm a commander, shega ile mbaya'.

MP3: yes, that is how it happens.

MP4: Did you hear about the young Technical University of Mombasa (TUM) student who was killed recently?...it is claimed that there was something with the guy that stabbed him… His wife was killed recently, but the police did little in helping him obtain justice. He felt humiliated and weak. To prove he was not helpless he decided to avenge his wife by stabbing the TUM student, when there was high police presence in the area. In this case, the attacker wanted to show other people that he can stand up for himself and he will not be bullied. (FGD1)

The accounts given by the participants highlights possible scenarios of how individuals get radicalised. In this extract, participants collaborate to produce an account identifying and reproducing a narrative of ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of different micro-level processes. This narrative is shared by several participants in the group, and not challenged by others, so it emerges as the dominant narrative from this discussion. While constructing the

---

278 The literal translation of Chafu is dirty. However, one of the infamous youth gangs in Mombasa County calls itself Chafu. Chafu mostly operates in Likoni but its members come from different areas of Mombasa County including Mtongwe, Kongowea, Kisauni, Shika-adabu and Majengo among others.

279 Slang phrase used to mean feeling extremely good/accomplished about oneself. In this context, the phrase is used to mean by joining Chafu and being seen as a commander, one’s self-image improves.
narrative, from the extract, there are two observable shifts (as shown in figure 7.1). The first focuses on generic examples regarding the wide range of factors linked to the process of ‘radicalisation’ and violent extremism. MP1, FP2 and MP3 first rely on their first-hand knowledge as experts. They identified individual triggers and a search for identity among young people as crucial to ‘radicalisation’. ‘Radicalisation’ was individualised by linguistically employing the strategies of indetermination and differentiation. Indetermination identified social actors using indefinite pronouns “some” and “other” which served as nouns. Specific details about the young persons—such as names—involved were omitted. Instead, they were anonymised by referring to them as “some youth” and “other young people”. Perhaps MP1 and FP2 assumed both the researcher and their peers understood what they were referring to without being elaborate. It is also possible that anonymisation was used because the participants were giving generic examples. Indetermination maintained vagueness and left open the claim for alternative interpretations. Also, indetermination maintains impartiality. Especially, in this discussion where all participants were youth, by anonymising those youths deemed a problem, MP1 and FP2 were able to present their assessments as objective, thus positioning themselves as knowledgeable and experienced.

Also, MP1 used differentiation to highlight ‘the vulnerable young person’. Participants explicitly differentiate such youth as those who have experienced events that caused them to lose their dignity and respect. Other similar youth are those who have been: subjected to degrading treatment, and made to feel worthless. Participants assumed that these experiences reduce one’s self-worth, self-perception, and how they wish to be seen by others. It is suggested that such young people in a bid to improve their self-esteem and self-image and feel secure and confident they may join violent groups like Chafu. The second shift occurs with MP1 and MP2’s illustrations. MP1 draws on his direct experience of being recruited into a pressure group when he was a teenager (as is shown in the cultural context section). MP1 emphasises that anticipated gains actively catalyse ‘radicalisation’ especially among youth experiencing an identity crisis. By being part of such infamous groups, individuals get respected, awed, and protected—since everyone sees them as “a commander” (a similar observation was made by practitioners). MP3 corroborates his peers’ assessment by reiterating “yes, that is how it happens”. Such a phrase endorses their peers account as objective.

Also, MP4 emphasises the role of micro-level processes in ‘radicalisation’ by using a vivid example. Detailing the role of personal tragedy (or personal grievances as referred to in the literature) in catalysing ‘radicalisation’, MP4’s example traces a series of events resulting from a man’s personal tragedy. The man’s grievance stems from the murder of his wife and his frustrated attempts at obtaining justice which stems from the police’s apathy. His
personal grievances are seen as having directly drove him into using violence to avenge the death of his wife and to prove to the police and society that he was not helpless i.e. “he could stand up for himself”. This incident highlights issues of self-esteem and status and raises concerns on how humiliation and powerlessness—from frustrations with the justice system—can emasculate individuals and consequently play a role in their ‘radicalisation’. From this extract the exchange between the participants shows their shared perception about ‘radicalisation’. Participants constructed their knowledge of ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of micro-level processes by drawing on their shared discursive resources. They used their knowledge of hypothetical and specific case examples to advanced several claims. First, that ‘radicalisation’ is more likely to occur to individuals seeking vengeance because of an injustice they suffered. This vengeance, is linked to ideas about status and self-worth and it is a means of preventing further injustices. Second, ‘radicalisation’ is linked with a desire to improve one’s self-esteem, self-image, and status. This claim is advanced using the “commander youth”. The “commander” joins Chafu so that they can be protected perhaps from other rival gangs. Also, moral evaluation by analogy is expressed through the phrase “I am a commander”. The term commander is imported from the military. MP1 uses it in reference to Chafu members who use it to categorise themselves in their chain of command. This analogy suggests that some young people join violent groups to achieve status. By being in Chafu individuals carry out tasks and responsibilities equated with military commanders’ tasks. Since a commander is a respected military officer rank, this comparison suggests that youth in violent organisations may enjoy similar respect from their peers and the organisation. This analogy transfers the positive values of being a commander to legitimise how youth joining violent groups is linked with an internalisation of beliefs and ideas about status, self-esteem and self-image. This discourse (c)overtly evaluates certain experiences and traits as pre-conditions for ‘radicalisation’ thus positioning the youth undergoing them as dangerous. These claims were shared among the focus group participants, as evidenced by MP3’s explicitly agreement using the phrase “yes that is how it happens”. This phrase was used to evaluate the shared assertions as objective, position young people (i.e. the group members) as knowledgeable of an issue affecting them. Also, the phrase was invoked to mobilise group agreement.
**Figure 7.1**—Consensus and agreements in FGD1

**Key:** Red lines show theme connections to participants and dashed-arrow symbols show the direction of communication and the tensions in the discussion.

The Cultural Context: making values and relations matter

Another discourse highlighted the role of the cultural context where ‘radicalisation’ occurs. Both focus groups unpacked a wide range of cultural issues. From cultural values and beliefs that justify the use of violence and social relations that are used to mobilise youth to engage in violence. To the traditional values related to hegemonic masculinity and femininity and their role in facilitating the ‘radicalisation’ and recruitment of young men and women into violent extremism. I will discuss each theme separately showing how it facilitates ‘radicalisation’.

Religious beliefs and violence

FGD2 participants specifically highlighted religion as the most common form of ideological socialisation of youth to effect change through violence, often targeting those considered ‘enemies’. For example, FGD2 participants stated that:

MP1: I approach radicalisation as instilling thoughts and beliefs in someone. Beliefs and thoughts that can make them change their perspective from the acceptable way of seeing things. For example, if I'm radicalised by religion, I am told that to make our society better it is supposed to be purely Islamic. And to achieve this, I need to kill infidels that is Christians. And if I kill them my reward in the hereafter will be 72 virgins, and given that in my entire life I have not encountered a virgin, of course I
will do it. To me it is largely the reward that drives such people. And maybe just a little bit about their contributions to their community. So if I kill, I will get these rewards, so then I do it for these rewards. That's how I look at radicalisation.

MP2: I think MP1 has summarised it well. But it is not just Islam, is it?

MP1: No, it is not just religion. It could be many other things as well. You could be told your government is discriminatory. For instance, Christians get most of their holidays recognised and prioritised more than Muslims. And if you look at it, you may realise yeah it is true as Muslims we do not enjoy similar privileges, we are being discriminated. These are real things and they happen. (FGD2)

Participants identified how religion was used to mobilise youth and discussed how such problematic religious beliefs are passed on to young people. The verb “instil” invoked familiar terms such as ‘indoctrination’ and ‘brainwashing’ that persist in media and policy circles. These terms often suggest that during ‘radicalisation’ youth are passive recipients of information given to them by religious leaders. Such an assumption then positions youth as victims.

This theme also advances that in any given context there is an ‘acceptable way of seeing things’ and other worldviews that deviate from the ‘acceptable one’ are what constitutes radical ideas. MP1 acknowledges these dynamics by arguing that in religious socialisation—specifically Islam—the goal maybe to create a “purely Islamic society”, and youth are mobilised to achieve this goal through violent means i.e. “killing kafirs280, that is Christians”. Youth committing such violence are reassured that by killing kafirs they will be rewarded with 72 virgins in the hereafter. According to MP1 such youth are “largely” driven by the reward of 72 virgins than their actual contribution to society. MP1 reinforces their reading of ‘radicalisation’ by using the modal verb phrase “supposed to” to express requirement. MP1 shows two things. First, that religious elites phrase their goals as requirements rather than desirables, and second, that the actions to be taken are framed as obligations rather than voluntary by employing the modal verb “need”. By using language in this manner, MP1 unpacks some of the logics behind ‘religious radicalisation’. MP2, however, challenges MP1’s opinion—see interaction in figure 7.2—regarding other forms of ideological socialisation based on religion other than Islam. MP1 acknowledged that ‘radicalisation’ could also be catalysed by “real experiences of discrimination and inequality” in the society. Despite this acknowledgment, MP1’s new example still emphasises the centrality of religious identity in interpreting grievances. Thus, he viewed Islamic religious identity as increasing the risk of ‘radicalisation’. Despite MP2’s disagreement, MP1 still

280 An Arabic word for non-believer or infidel as per Islam. The word derives from the Arabic word Kufr, which means disbelief. With the rise of ‘Islamist extremist’ groups Kafir has been used to refer to all non-Muslims and to an extent Muslims who do not agree with the interpretation or politics of these groups.
holds his opinion. FP3, attempts a dissenting voice to try and disagree with MP1’s opinion. She gave a comparative example of ‘religious radicalisation’, articulating that:

FP3: do you remember those two court cases one involving a pastor in Malindi and another I think a sheikh or a madrasa teacher?

MP4: He was a madrasa teacher not a sheikh.

FP3: Okay. These two cases demonstrate how radicalisation occurs. Both individuals instilled religious beliefs on youth and even children. In the pastor’s case, those youth even left their homes, refused secular schools, and moved into the church compound to continue following his teachings and form their own community. (FGD2)

FP3\textsuperscript{281} tries to shift from seeing ‘radicalisation’ purely in Islamic terms by showing that it can also be influenced by Christian religious teachings. She uses an example of a pastor (Paul Mackenzie) who was arrested in 2017 for radicalising his children and youth worshippers. FP3 also cites a similar case involving a madrassa teacher. She draws parallels between the two examples arguing that “both individuals instilled religious beliefs on youth and even children”. To an extent that the children and youth “left their homes, refused to attend secular schools and moved into the church compound”. The pastors’ goal was to “form his own community”. FP3’s account does not discount MP1’s but it highlights similarities between different forms of ‘religious radicalisation’. It also reiterates MP1’s ideas about “instilling beliefs” on children and youth, thus positioning these actors as passive recipients.

\textsuperscript{281} FP3’s example shows that radicalisation also happens in other religions such as Christianity. FP3 who identified as a non-practicing Muslim, might have brought up this nuance to highlight that while radicalisation happens in other religions it is rarely given the same attention. Her example draws parallels between the pastor’s, the madrasa teacher’s actions and MP1’s example. Her assessment implies of these three cases are similar thus should be evaluated similarly.
The (dis)agreements raised during the discussion were likely informed by various axes of identities including religion, ethnicity, education, and current occupational position. While discussing the issue of religious ideologies and ‘radicalisation’, there was hesitancy among the participants. MP1 and MP2 identified as Christians and given that FGD2 was religiously diverse, MP2 could have challenged MP1’s worldview (as a fellow Christian) to make him reflect on his biases or because the revelation was made in the researcher’s presence, who was visibly Muslim.

It is also logical how and why MP1 would examine ‘radicalisation’ via the lens of *Islamist ideologies*, as this is Kenya’s dominant lens. Hence MP1 as a Christian and originally from a non-indigenous ethnicity, considers himself a minority on several fronts. Ethnically, as a non-indigenous, his claims could be informed by him positioning himself as being on the receiving end of indigeneity claims made by groups like MRC. Claims which position him as a non-native, thus an outsider and not belonging in the Coast. Religiously, as a Christian, he is on the receiving end of hateful rhetoric and actions targeting Christians (for example, views espoused by Jihadist groups like al-Shabaab, ISIS and Boko Haram among others). Additionally, religious identity is more salient in Mombasa’s politics, and it is frequently used to mobilise for resources and advocate for certain policies. Hence, MP1 positions himself a victim of accusations levelled against Christians seen as privileging from and perpetuating the oppression of Muslims. Alternatively, the disagreement could also be understood as
MP2’s attempt to challenge MP1’s simplified account to position himself as more aware and knowledgeable than his peer, especially in the researcher’s presence. This could especially be the case since MP2 had higher educational qualifications and a permanent contract with the CBO whereas MP1 was a high-school graduate and only a volunteer with the CBO. Thus, MP2 could have positioned himself as an expert by challenging MP1’s viewpoint.

In the discussion, MP2 and FP3—see figure 7.3—attempt to be dissenting voices by disagreeing with the dominant view regarding the apparent link between Islamic beliefs and ‘radicalisation’. They are not opposed to the idea of religious radicalisation, but only its sole focus on Islam. In this way, the dominant view of religious radicalisation is upheld. From how the discussion unfolds, it is evident that individual’s opinion reflect the views of several other group members. This dominant view stems from the participants’ understanding of Islamic values and ideas on; jihad, historical battles and moral ideas about social justice. Participants argue that these narratives on religious values are used by recruiters and radicalisers to shame and encourage young Muslim men and women to take action to correct injustices suffered by Muslims. Such narratives positions believers as morally responsible for bringing about positive change (in this case justice). Whether by waging war against those perpetrating injustices as illustrated using the examples of “Islamic radicalisation”; or forming an isolated community of believers that adheres to its own activities and practices as illustrated by pastor Mackenzie.

![Figure 7.3—Dissenting voices in FGD2](image)

**Key:** Red lines show theme connections to participants and dashed-arrow symbols show the direction of communication and the tensions in the discussion.
Cultural relations as enablers of ‘radicalisation’

Cultural discourses also highlighted a theme focusing on the role of cultural relations in ‘radicalisation’. Social networks were seen as mobilising, radicalising and recruiting young people into violent groups. The relationship between the radicaliser (elites) and the radicalised (youth) was characterised as one of unequal power relations. Where elites were more knowledgeable, and/or held positions in the public domain. Their positions give them credibility allowing them access to the private and public spheres. However, they take advantage of their positions and trust society has on them to pursue personal and political interests such as financial gains and retaining power. Elites achieve these interests by mobilising youth to act violently against their opponents. This theme assumes young people have less ability to act thus they are victims of opportunistic elites who are characterised as exploitative using terms and phrases such “manipulative”, “driven by personal interests”, “they are very intimidating” and “they are just charismatic” (FGD1).

In FGD1, the relationship between opportunistic elites and young people was articulated more explicitly:

MP1: … when politicians want to mobilise for support they use the divide and rule tactic. Because we are in a society divided by ethnicity they take advantage of this weakness … They incite their ethnic communities against other communities. And because we believe zimwi likujualo halikuli likakumaliza, we do not see past their antics. So when they start campaigning they normally recruit youth into pressure groups. All politicians have these groups. You’ll find that pressure groups do not comprise of very educated people like university and high school-leavers but are mostly comprised of high school and primary school dropouts. As a group we get high and cause chaos at political events and if there is another group from a rival politician we fight each other. During the campaign period these youngsters are paid to engage in violence or instigate hate, and the politician always bails them out, they are basically untouchable. And this goes on a year before the elections until the election has been completed. After the politician has been sworn in those pressure groups are no longer needed but the politician needs learned people. So the politician goes into office and starts employing learned people, who can work according to the protocols in place. …So because the pressure groups do not fit in the new arrangement, they are just left to their own devices. If in the past one year the pressure group members had been receiving Kshs.500 per day for their ‘activities’ all that ceases. But in the one year these youth acclimatised to chaos and violence. That is why after their one year is over most of them decide to carry machetes and met violence on the community. It is because during the past year, they were untouchable. The politician had told them to do whatever they wanted and

282 A Swahili proverb that means ‘a ghost that knows you will not devour you completely’. This proverb is comparable to the idiom ‘better the devil you know than the angel you do not know’. The proverb cautions people about making bad choices especially when forming relations or electing leaders. The proverb assumes that a person you are familiar with may not completely cause you harm, in contrast to a stranger that can devour you without remorse.
that he had their backs. We have such people to date that will not tolerate you being
critical of their political figure. ... In my opinion that's how radicalisation happens,
and I am saying this as someone who experienced being part of such pressure
groups. I have personally been absorbed into such groups to cause chaos.

MP5: Yes, I agree with MP1, these things do happen. Even close to elections you'll
notice that politicians normally hold sports tournaments. They bring their own teams
to those tournaments. Those teams are normally the youth they recruited as their
pressure groups. Such youth get allowances for participating in the tournaments.
But once elections are over, the tournaments are also gone. How do you think such
youth will keep earning money? A few, who are highly aware may walk away, but
most end up being recruited into gangs and such.

FP2: have you seen Watatu the film?
R: I think I might have watched it, but I am not sure.

FP2: In this film you will also see that radicalisation happens through social media,
and friends. They are told let us go and join this group, they are giving out money to
whoever joins their cause.

MP3: You may be going through something and then a friend comes and tells you
they are going through a similar issue. Your friend then introduces you to someone
or a group of people who are also going through something similar but they also
have a plan on what needs to be done to change things. (FGD1)

As shown in figure 7.4, participants collaborated to produce an account of ‘radicalisation’
as an outcome of social networks. During this discussion agreement and consensus was
produced more directly by using affirmative statements such as Yes, I agree with MP1 to
countersign another participant's assessment. At times, agreement was also achieved by
adding more context or other examples to elaborate a concept. Using this extract we can
see how the discussion focuses on cultural relations ranging from opportunistic elites—
politicians—and peers to online sites where young people establish connections with
extremist groups and recruiters. Participants narrate that elites use tactics of “divide and
rule”, to “incite hatred”. Then they form “pressure groups” typically comprised of school
dropout youth. These groups receive money in exchange for intimidating political opponents
and the community with a goal to influence election outcomes. All the while such groups
are exempted and protected from the consequences of their actions. However, after
elections politicians discard their pressure groups and instead hire “educated youth” to run
their projects. While some pressure group members may find legitimate ventures, others
turn to crime to support themselves and their dependents.

MP1 conceptualises the role of social networks through an analogy. He draws on his past
experience as a member of a pressure group and compares his circumstances to other
young people absorbed into pressure groups. Also, participants argued that peers can
recruit their friends into violent organisations. Through circumstances of comparison FP2 cites the *Watatu* film which captures the journey of Yusuf, a young unemployed Muslim man who gets recruited into an extremist organisation by his friend. While MP3 through a hypothetical example uses similarity conjunctions to explain how ‘radicalisation’ occurs through peer networks.

---

**Figure 7.4**—FGD1 interactions about cultural relations

**Key:** Red lines show theme connections to participants and dashed-arrow symbols show the direction of communication and the tensions in the discussion.

The relationship between opportunistic elites and youth was captured as where:

**MP2:** one individual has a more advanced understanding of an aspect than the other. The powerful one has a specific goal they want to achieve and so they examine the weaknesses of the other actor. They then manipulate those weaknesses which could be the lack of proper meals, an income, and belonging among others. So the less powerful actor is convinced to join and in turn their needs are fulfilled…. So it's about someone with more knowledge manipulating the other who is less aware.

**MP4:** It has a lot to do with how much faith we place on people.

**MP2:** yes it has a lot to do with trust. For example, for the pastor-follower relationship to work there has to be trust. The former is in a position the latter looks up to. So the pastor uses his position and the existing trust to radicalise the latter. …as time

---

283 *Watatu* is a popular film produced by Safe-Pwani. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Dfzm0I79Xk.

245
passes he uses trust to get me as a follower to bring in other members. ...So there is an element of power. The radicaliser is older, and in a position of leadership so you trust they are wise and so the cycle goes on. (FGD2)

Apart from reiterating opportunistic elites’ manipulative traits, FGD2 also highlighted the role of trust in the radicaliser—radicalised relationship. MP2 and MP4 worked together to highlight the nature of this relationship. While it is MP2 who led the discussion, MP4 stepped in to elaborate MP1’s account through rephrasing perhaps with the intention to clarify what was shared by his peer. MP1 agreed with the rephrasing using the affirmative exclamation yes and reiterating MP4 viewpoints by paraphrasing it as it has a lot to do with trust. Arguing that, frequently, trust is built by first, the generational differences. Since the radicaliser is often older they are wiser and knowledgeable. Thus the radicalised trusts their opinion and judgements on issues. Second, trust is built by the radicaliser’s role in the public domain. Their position as religious or political leaders gives them credibility in their communities. Thus, both focus groups highlight the unequal relations of power between elites and youth. This relationship accords the “powerful other” more privileges, thus guaranteeing and securing their superiority over those who are less powerful.

This theme employed functionalisation which categorises social actors by their roles or occupations. It is a common strategy for representing high-status social actors such as elites. In the extracts, there is a similar trend where elites are represented by their roles. For instance, “the politicians” role is to represent people, allocate resources and make policies, whereas “the pastor” is a beacon of wisdom and morality in society. These extracts used functionalisation not to glorify elites but to illustrate the duality of their roles i.e. he is the pastor and at the same time the radicaliser. Functionalisation also categorised youth actors. FGD1’s extract speaks of “the pressure groups” and “pressure groups”, to highlight the negative activities the groups conduct. In the extract, “pressure groups” that are represented in terms of their functional categories were also engaged in actions such as “violence”, “instigating hate”, “causing chaos”, “carrying machetes”, and “meting violence on their communities”. Functionalising youth actors highlighted the impact of their negative actions.

In summary this theme suggests that inequality or experiences of marginalisation both real and perceived can set the stage for recruitment of youth into violent organisations. By manipulating existing grievances social networks mobilise, recruit, and incite individuals to violent action. Besides religious leaders, opportunistic elites, peers, and women married to mujahideen (as I show in the next section) are also engaged in radicalising youth.
Positioning gendered narratives in ‘radicalisation’

Another cultural-related theme that was repeatedly mentioned was the role of traditions in ‘radicalisation’. Participants recognised that gender-related narratives encouraged and justified the use of violence to bring about social and political change. Gender-related narratives defined ideal forms of masculinity and femininity which were largely expressed through locally-shared phrases and practices such as ‘siku hizi hakuna wanaume kwa hivyo hiyo ni kheri imekuja usikatae’ and ‘mwanamume kufa kitandani ni hasara, mwanamume wa kisawasawa yuataa afe vitani’. These phrases codify desirable behaviours, roles and meanings prescribed to men and women in society. FGD1 Participants collaborated to produce an account of the gendered narratives used to recruit and radicalise youth. They argued that:

MP1: so many beliefs encourage this behaviour. For instance, you’ll be told by other men that it is a loss to society for a man to die in bed [die in his sleep], a real man should die in the battlefield.

MP5: yes, that’s what they say. To them the death of a man who died in his sleep is not iconic.

FP2: it’s actually true. Often, we hear these arguments being reiterated by the young gangs

MP1: like when they hear xxx died in ‘battle’, they normally say that is how it is supposed to be. That is how a real man should ‘go’, xxx died a real man.

MP4: even when one of those youth in Chafu are gunned down, you will hear the remaining ones narrating that: my mate was shot four times, he died very bravely, and his beneti was just beside him. He was very tough.

284 A popular phrase among Muslim communities in Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu counties. This phrase argues that there is a scarcity of men due to men’s population size being lower in comparison to women’s; the drug menace at the Coast that has rendered most eligible men addicts and criminals; contemporary lifestyles where men prefer casual sex over marriage; and irresponsibility among men. Thus, the phrase suggests that a man approaching a woman for marriage is a rare blessing. Hence, society expects the woman to accept as such opportunities rarely come twice. This phrase serves to pressure women who are hesitant in accepting marriage proposals. Hence, this phrase acts as a guideline for women’s behaviours and social interaction. It reinforces marriage as a measure of ideal femininity.

285 A Swahili phrase that means ‘it is a loss for a man to die in his sleep rather a real man should die in the battlefield’. This phrase describes ideal forms of masculinity which entail being courageous, powerful, in control, and ready to take responsibility by whatever means possible. This phrase is used in conflict situations and in relation to bread-winning responsibilities with the assumption that real men should do whatever it takes to make ends meet. This expression encourages and even shames men into acting particularly where they display hesitancy, fear, or passivity.

286 A slang term for a bayonet but it is used by youth gangs to refer to machetes, knives and other small weapons. Beneti is used when the speakers do not want to draw attention to themselves. Also, this terminology is deployed to exclude outgroup members. Hence, young men sitting at the makeshift may use this word when they notice a passer-by or someone sitting with them but who
FP2: so yeah, other young people hear such things and think that is the brave way to die. So you can imagine what such words can do to those who already feel marginalised.

MP3: yeah, they do incite people into action. Because I mean you are already dealing with so much. Maybe you cannot even afford meals for yourself or your family, you do not have any money or even a stable place to shelter. Basically, you are going through so much to an extent that you do not think there is a difference between being alive or dead. So you make a decision to die like a real man.

MP5: and those who use jihad also frame it in a similar manner. They put it in very convincing ways. (FGD1)

MP1 opened the discussion by speaking about appropriate behaviours for men. He shares that these gender norms are propagated and enforced by “other men” to shame men into compliance (to act accordingly). MP5 agrees with MP1’s assessments using an affirmative phrase. He adds more context to MP1’s view by sharing how death is qualified in society. He argues that certain deaths (i.e. by combat) are idolised while others (dying while sleeping) are frowned upon and considered a loss of manhood. These cultural phrases are used to set the standards for how men should act. FP2 interacts with MP5 and MP1. She agrees with their assessments of societal expectations for men. She adds that these claims about masculine behaviours are invoked in society's everyday practices. She draws parallels between these cultural claims and those espoused by youth gangs and adds that such gender norms could rationalise violence among those who already feel aggrieved.

In summary, in this extract, participants identify and describe some narratives on masculinity and how they are used to justify the use of violence to effect change. Through hypothetical and real-life examples participants demonstrate how cultural expectations about manliness shape gender roles and behaviours. They argue that dominant values on masculinity are associated with bravery, being in control; tough and violent. These values promote certain masculine ideals while emasculating others. For instance, men who “die in combat” or aggressive men are considered “real men” whereas those who “die in their sleep” on non-violent are not considered real men. Such cultural imperatives on masculinity position and judge who gets to be accepted as a ‘real man’. The cultural expectations were expressed as obligatory through modal verbs “should” and “supposed to”. These verbs express obligation as well as expectation. Participants use such language to acknowledge the cultural imperatives on masculinity and to express their disagreement with these values.

The discussions showed that cultural imperatives are used to shame and pressure young men to use violence for them to be accepted as ‘real men’. Such imperatives glorified
violence and “death by the gun” because it symbolised manliness, and was used to encourage other young men to pick up arms. These imperatives on masculine ideals were transmitted by “Other men” who made evaluations about what is acceptable and unacceptable: deaths, and behaviours for ‘real men’. Overall, their evaluations distinguished ‘real men’ from non-masculine men by privileging certain ways of acting and being which only consider certain experiences.

FGD2 participants also discussed cultural imperatives—on femininity—and their contribution to the increasing ‘radicalisation’ of women. Participants commented on the cultural valuation of marriage among Islamic communities. Arguing that:

FP5: there are also young Muslim women, who are told if they are married to mujahideen that is their pass to heaven. So they think it’s a privilege to be married to such a man. Currently most of the recruitment is done in secret by women because there is a lot of surveillance on men. And it is the women who have been married off to mujahideen that do it. Mostly, these women had never met these men [mujahideen] prior to the marriage. They were just told about the men and they were satisfied and were married off.

MP4: I would also look at it in terms of traditions. I mean these women are told about the status they will achieve in the hereafter if they marry such men. But also, these women are normally told, mostly by their mothers, aunts, and other female relatives, that siku hizi hakuna wanaume kwa hivyo hiyo ni kheri imekuja, usikatae. If some girls are in such a situation they will accept.

FP5: yes people like saying this.

FP3: I agree with MP4. Of course, they will accept and especially if you look around your community and see unmarried women and how they are scorned. You will accept so that you can be considered yani wanasema mwanamke wa kisawasawa, mwanamke wa kukamilika. (FGD2)

Participants discussed the various ways that gender contributes to the ‘radicalisation’ of young women. Participants collaborated and raised several concerns related to cultural imperatives on femininity. FP5 identified the religious glorification of jihad and the adulation of mujahideen status as dynamics that influence many young Muslim women and men’s decisions to join extremist organisations. Since, the Islamic community believes that a woman who marries a mujahid is guaranteed heaven, some young Muslim women are “married off”, in other words forced into marrying mujahideen to secure their path to paradise. Often some of these young women do not know their husbands-to-be well enough. Except that they are mujahideen and by marrying mujahideen they will be fulfilling

---

287 Mwanamke wa kisawasawa and Mwanamke wa kukamilika are phrases that allude to being a ‘proper woman’ or ‘to be fully feminine’.
a religious role. For such women the essence is to be married to mujahideen and support their husbands activities. Some of these women end up taking recruiting roles because security forces are less suspicious of women.

MP4 agreed with FP5 assessment but nuanced the conversation further by adding that it is not only the religious valuation of jihad and the adulation of mujahideen that accounts for the growth of women in violent organisation. But also traditional values on marriage. Marriage is considered an important milestone for every woman and a measurement of ideal femininity. Accordingly, such values are transmitted by female members of the family and women in general. FP5 and FP3 agreed with MP4 accounts that “some women” in such situations “will accept” to marry mujahideen. After all they are socialised to believe that there is a deficit of men for various reasons including crime, drug use and abuse, population deficits and contemporary lifestyles. Thus a woman should consider a marriage proposal a blessing and just accept it as such blessings are rare. According to this account, women ought to pursue marriage by all means. FP5 agreed with the nuance shared by MP4. FP3 also agreed with MP4 and contributed by drawing several nuances. She argued that the young Muslim women are pressured into accepting such men because they want to achieve traditional idealised notions of femininity which hold that to be fully feminine one must be married. Unmarried women are not only unfeminine but society also looks down on them. They are not consider “real women” or “woman enough”. It is such societal expectations that shape young women’s recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ paths.

The cultural imperatives on femininity and masculinity impact the behaviours and roles of young men and women. Idealised masculinities position mujahideen as real men and other men as unmasculine. Similarly, idealised femininities position married women as real women and unmarried women as unfeminine. Both positionings are based on religious and traditional norms, expectations and assumptions about what men and women should be and how they should act. Such gendered ideas are transmitted in the society by several actors including “other men” and “women”, who set ideal standards of ‘real men' and ‘real women' respectively.

This section has shown how society uses preferred notions on masculinity to shame and pressure young men to join violent groups and/or use violence to effect change. Consequently, preferred notions on femininity (un)intentionally pressure and encourage young Muslim women to support and/or actively partake in extremist activities. Also, this section demonstrates that marriage as a social institution actively facilitates the recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ of young women into violent organisations. Other studies on gender and ‘extremism’ in Kenya found similar patterns (see Ndung’u and Salifu, 2017; Salifu and Ndung’u, 2017; Badurdeen, 2018b, 2018c).
The Political Context: ‘system ya majambazi’

Another recurring discourse approached ‘radicalisation’ as a political construct. This discourse was especially prevalent in FGD1. It was advanced through two main themes. The first theme cited that there are existing material conditions including widespread corruption, heavy-handed counterterrorism, inequalities, deep social divisions, and unemployment, among other socioeconomic injustices that correlate with the increasing use of violence to effect social and political change. However, these conditions rarely receive in-depth consideration when analysing ‘radicalisation’ because they will elicit debates about the need: to hold abusers of public offices and resources accountable; for redistribution; and to reconsider current realities as long-term consequences of various injustices and abuse of power. Thus, bringing up such nuances could threaten the interests of the ruling elites. The second theme advances that prevailing political cultures inform how ‘radicalisation’ is described and understood. Participants highlighted the role of historical and political developments and geographical location in determining what constitutes ‘radicalisation’ and who can (cannot) be labelled a radical. Participants argued that ‘radicalisation’ as a concept is described and deployed for specific purposes. Including maintaining and extending elites’ power, discrediting dissenting voices, criminalising specific identities to shape a governable population, and attracting donor funding.

This discourse was articulated in different ways. Participants highlighted the relativity of the concepts of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ by debating that:

MP5: …I believe extremism could mean having extreme views on anything and does not have to be linked to al-Shabaab but sadly whenever we hear extremism it is mostly used as a shorthand for anything al-Shabaab or some would say ‘Muslim-related’…al-Shabaab is a new group but before them we had Mungiki, Mashifta, and many others. …while they [these groups] have different membership composition, and goals …they are all against the government system. But some of these groups were never called ‘extremist’, for instance Mungiki. I do not recall this word being used on them…so who does the naming and how do they arrive at it? Even when you speak openly like this you could be called a radical…yani hii ni system ni ya majambazim

MP3: yes, there are vocal people and human rights activists that have been called radicals. It is because they called out the system for different injustices. Anyone who does not conform can be labelled a radical.

MP4: …in Mombasa if you want to cause conflict you can use religion. Because there are two broad religious groups in Mombasa… But in other places religion is

---

288 System ya majambazi is Swahili for a system of thugs or criminals. It is an idiom that highlights the political, economic, social and cultural flaws in Kenya’s governing system. Majambazi refers to criminals, thugs or gangsters.
not necessarily an issue, you can use ethnicity for instance in Kisumu, or rift valley. But in Mombasa ethnicity is difficult to manipulate, because there are so many ethnicities. … That is why what happens in Mombasa is always attributed to al-Shabaab. Because the majority of people in Mombasa are Muslims and al-Shabaab are Muslims too. So when religion is used the story is consistent and convincing…But if we go to Kisumu, or any other area of Kenya, we use ethnicity, hence, what happens will be attributed to criminals. There is a lot of politics in the language of PCVE. That is why any kind of violence or even human rights activism happening in Mombasa can be categorised as religiously motivated…But when these same people go to Kisumu, they will call similar groups there extremist (in quotes) but base it on ethnicity because in Kisumu ethnicity is more salient as is religion here. As a matter of fact, we only saw them call them extremists recently. But most of the time we hear of criminals. (FGD1)

Participants arrived at a shared narrative by using examples they are familiar with and also analogies. They used their familiarity with politics and political practices to problematise ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. By doing this they highlighted several issues. First, that while these concepts are predominantly associated with ‘Muslim-related’ events and activism, they should be viewed in their plurality, i.e. there are many forms of extremisms and individuals can be radical about different things. However, at present, the concepts are solely deployed to define Islamic activities and actors thus they reinforce the apparent link between Islam and terrorism. This reinforces the idea that there exists a terrorist profile based on a specific religious orientation. Second, participant accounts highlight the political interests that are served by deploying the concepts. Both ‘extremism’ and radical are used on individuals seen as non-conformists. Non-conformists include extremists like al-Shabaab and critics of government policies also broadly characterised as “vocal people”, “human rights activists”, and anyone “who speaks openly”.

Third, participants identified the role of prevailing forms of social organisations in characterising events. Arguing that events happening in Mombasa are reduced to ‘extremism’ qua al-Shabaab whereas those happening in Kisumu are categorised as criminal. This naming arises from religion and ethnicity being major forms of social organisation in the respective regions. Naming makes salient what is deemed relevant and what aligns with dominant understandings about conflict in the said regions. Such naming simplifies complex matters and determines what is conceivable by silencing alternative interpretations. For instance, an alternative interpretation could approach conflicts in both regions as outcomes of continued failure of successive administrations to address socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. Thus, participants’ accounts demonstrate how the current deployment of ‘radicalisation’ is mobilised to criminalise non-conforming identities and ‘unacceptable’ forms of activism.
Participants’ accounts also indicate that naming conflicts as ‘extremism’ especially those involving Muslims fits with broader eurocentric views on terrorism and Islam and has been locally used to mobilise for donor funds. Participants commented that:

MP1: in my opinion, I think it’s a business.... And I am saying it’s a business because sometime last year/earlier this year many of our military personnel in Somalia died. But the government hid this information, all we heard was that it was an al-Shabaab attack. But it is alleged that most of those who died were in the coal business with those ‘folks’ and they got ambushed and many got killed. So, that’s where the business aspect comes in. Our military is profiting from being in Somalia. And the government too profits a lot from this al-Shabaab issue. The government is receiving a lot of funding to tackle al-Shabaab. Just think of how at times it is so calm, and we do not hear of any incidences and how at other times we constantly hear of these incidents. Some of the things they share or blasts we hear about are necessary to keep the wheels turning... So, there are times when nothing is happening and I guess when they feel it is too silent, they make it happen maybe so that donors can come in and give more funds, and the military can continue getting more money for their operations in that area.

MP4: to add on that we have seen many incidences for example Westgate, dusitd2 it is even clear from the name for example, Mwangi who this individual is and where they come from. But often they will add the Islamic bit e.g. Ismail, in such a way to just make it fit with the narrative. You will never see Mwangi Kariuki or Edward Wanjala. So, they will always make sure they emphasise on the Islamic name before his ethnic name just to show that they fit it in the box. Just to show that it’s a Muslim before we look at him as a Kikuyu. … I think it is politically steered, to make sure the narrative is similar to what western donors believe is the threat. The story always has to have a Muslim villain, if we want to convince western donors we are struggling with a similar problem.

FP2: the radicalisation problem is just like the heroin problem. They let it go on because they gain from it. They have a stake in it, so they cannot stop it.

MP3: if the government wants, they will end this issue. All they need to do is make that decision. ... but it is either the governments doing and if not, they are gaining a lot from it, so they will not stop it. In the same way that we work on radicalisation, as artists, when these issues keep happening it means we are still on the job but if not where will we get our daily meal? So, use this same logic to understand the groups and government actions... For instance, once a returnee is back, we have laws and procedures of arrest, questioning and such. … But what they do is kill this person or make them disappear... What will that do to my children? They will get radicalised and the cycle continues.

MP5: yes, it is a cycle that the government is keeping because they are benefiting from it. Kill them in front of their children, so their children witness and get older and become radicalised and the cycle continues. And they benefit from donor funding and the likes.
Participants highlighted the political nature of ‘radicalisation’ by characterising it as “a business”, where several actors were involved and each gained in a different way. MP1 highlights the illegal coal business the KDF in Somalia is involved in. Arguing that the military and al-Shabaab—whom he refers to using the noun “folks”—had a falling out over the transaction, resulting in the killing of Kenyan soldiers. However, he alleges that such details are never made public, instead, we are only told “it was an al-Shabaab attack”. This way the administration can use the attack to advocate for more donor funding and mobilise support for continuing security operations. MP1 alleges that some attacks are fabricated by the administration to mobilise for donor funding. MP4 detailed how focusing on the perpetrators religious identity helps to create a coherent narrative on the apparent link between ‘Islam and terrorism’. According to MP4, this ensures the local narrative fits within the eurocentric views on terrorism. By doing so, the Kenyan administration shows that Kenya is also affected by ‘Islamic extremism’, hence, reinforcing the idea that we are all fighting the same problem, or we are on the same side.

FP2 uses an analogy by similarity conjunctions to express her frustration with the government’s reluctance to address the problem of ‘radicalisation’. She argues that the government sustains the problem—through violent counterterrorism—so that it can continue benefiting from it. The ‘radicalisation' problem is equated to the heroin problem. In this analogy, the heroin trade is controlled by a network of powerful political elites who frustrate any effort to address the drug problem because it threatens their livelihoods. Such elites also actively safeguard their supply chains by penetrating state institutions through bribery and corruption. Thus despite heroin being a major public health concern, interventions to end illicit heroin trade are beset with obstacles. From authorities’ unwillingness to help in implementing measures, making information available, to actively sabotaging efforts to disband supply networks. FP2 uses this analogy to evaluate ‘radicalisation’ as a profitable venture to some elites. By FP2’s logical argument, elites are reluctant to address ‘radicalisation’ as this will affect their income flow.

MP3 agrees with FP2’s assessment of ‘radicalisation’ serving different interests. He highlights how as artists their income comes from theatrical performances aimed to sensitise communities about ‘radicalisation’, thus he fears losing such income in case the problem of ‘radicalisation’ is addressed. In the same way, he implies the government and other actors are also benefitting from ‘radicalisation’. He highlights how the government employs violent counterterrorism to sustain the issue. ‘Radicalisation’ is thus a never-ending cycle sustained by violent counterterrorism responses, political and economic interests.

Ultimately, participants’ accounts highlight the political nature of naming and the role of systemic practices (such as corruption, and violent counterterrorism) in enabling
‘radicalisation’. The discussions suggest that Kenya’s political system is run by criminals and serves criminals. Thus ‘radicalisation’ is a political tool deployed to advance the administrations financial and diplomatic interests. By drawing on local political and conflict dynamics and global developments on the threat of ‘Islamic extremism’ the administration has increasingly framed its Muslim populace as a problem. Meanwhile critics of government policies on counterterrorism have also been labelled ‘extremists’ or criminal. This theme foregrounds alternative arguments about the role of structural conditions in enabling the increasing ‘radicalisation’ of marginalised groups.

Constructing the self and other in discourse(s) of ‘radicalisation’

Apart from advancing certain explanations on ‘radicalisation’ the individual, cultural and political themes also made claims about who is considered dangerous or not. Participants used certain language to express who they are (are not) and what others are (are not). To understand how participants built theirs/others identities, I analysed the discursive strategies of representing social actors they used during the focus groups. Besides indetermination (which is discussed in the individual concerns discourses and by practitioners) other common strategies used were nomination, differentiation and functionalisation.

Participants, particularly, referred to themselves informally using their given names. Nomination revealed their unique identities. For example, MP1 narrates his encounter with the police while he was on a work assignment in Nairobi (see Box 7.1). In his narration he asserts who he is (by identifying himself using his given name) and subsequently using the first-person pronoun “I”. Nomination helped participants to cast themselves as knowers and different from the Other youth who were often classified as “the youth” or “dangerous young people”.

255
The first challenge is that people do not trust us, as youth, people do not trust us anymore. Take this example, if you go to Nairobi, Kisumu or Eldoret and say you are from Kisauni everyone thinks you have run away from something. Two months ago, I was arrested in Nairobi right next to my hotel, by two police officers. I had gone downstairs to buy a soda, left my identity card and phone in the hotel room. I was already dressed in my pyjamas and got arrested with a soda in my hand. They wanted my identity card. I told them it is upstairs, and they accused me of violating the law because I did not have it. I told them I will go get it, they refused and handcuffed me. When we walked for a bit, they asked where I was from and I told them Kisauni and they said ‘Kisauni! Young man, so, you are the radicalised guys who have run away from there to hide here?’ I was very upset by this characterisation. Because I was not running away from anything. But because of my origin, they immediately started creating an image of me using that of Kisauni. Saying people from Kisauni run from Kisauni after committing a crime to hide in Nairobi. But then again, can a criminal escape from Mombasa and hide out in a hotel and still go about his duties normally? So when they kept at it I told them first lets have some respect for each other, all my credentials are at the hotel, I am not a criminal and I am here on company business. They uncuffed me and asked me to give cash I told them all the money I have is in my phone. They gave me their phone to use it and call someone to come with money. All this is because I am from Kisauni thus I needed to buy my innocence. I told them I have no money and I will not give money and my geographical origin should not define who I am. I am MP1 and I want to be judged as Me, not by the snippets you see on the media or the claims you hear. I told them if they wanted to arrest me, they could go ahead and do it and that I know my rights and I will not be intimidated. But I am lucky, as MP1 because I know my rights, but most people do not. And that is the advantage of working with these organisations, you get to know your rights. So, I told them they could file charges if they wished, I will have my identity card delivered at the station and then I can leave. All they said was ‘young man you are very rude’, but eventually they let me go. But already the person they are talking about, that image is the image of a youth. Because in al-Shabaab its mostly youth, in gang groups it is also youth. Everyone is behaving as if there aren’t older persons engaging in such criminal acts. So, this has given us as youth a bad image in the community. If you come from Kisauni even in Likoni everyone thinks you have engaged in crime and now you are seeking refuge elsewhere. This image is damaging. Yes, there are criminal youth, but we are not all like that. I am a law-abiding young person, and I am sure you are and so is she. (MP1—FGD1).

There was only one exception in the data where the ‘Other youth’ were nominated. This occurs in FP3’s narration of her encounter (see Box 7.2) with two young people who identified as members of Shiranga289. FP3 names one of the two perpetrators using their

---

289 Shiranga is another gang groups mostly operational in Likoni areas of Mombasa County.
nickname i.e. “Dr”. Both examples highlight the unique identity of social actors and personalise their accounts.

**Box 7.2 - Encounters with Shiranga**

Recently, I was sitting outside our house with my cousin and two young men walked to us carrying a paper bag. They told us that the paper bag has maize flour meal and that they did not have money to buy vegetables, so they wanted us to help them with Kshs.50 that they can use to buy vegetables. But clearly the bag did not have any maize flour meal, it had something like a cloth maybe a t-shirt. My cousin told them, we did not have any money. They were unhappy and started citing the people they know in that area to intimidate us. But I told them I know all those people as well. They told us they are Shiranga and I responded that it is okay, we do not want any trouble. They were so loud, so my mum came outside to see what was happening. When my mum asked them they changed their story saying they do neighbourhood patrols so they are collecting payment for those services. And I confronted them that they should be honest about what has transpired, and they threatened to physically hurt me. My mum got scared and wanted to give them the money. But I told my mum we will not give any money, let them do what they will. So, they left. It is important how we respond to these youth. But they did not leave peacefully. Right outside our house there was a kitten roaming and because they were upset about not getting what they wanted, they grabbed it and threw it on our neighbour’s rooftop. They took out their frustrations on the poor kitten. In my opinion, if they come at you and are loud you need to be louder than them. Do not get intimidated, that way they’ll know you are not afraid. But you also need to be aware of your surroundings. I would not have challenged them if I was out of my comfort zone. But in this case, I was sure they would not try anything stupid. One of the boys was ‘Dr’… Dr. had physically assaulted a woman a few days earlier and the police were already out looking for him. So while he was harassing us, the police were after him for another assault. (FP3—FGD2).

Apart from this, nomination also served a contrasting function in the two examples. In the former, participants used nomination to cast themselves as knowers. MP1 aligns himself with certain behaviours and acts through expressions such as “I know my rights and I will not be intimidated”, “I am not running away from anything”, “I am not a criminal”, and “I am here on company business”. The words and phrases describe his behaviours as positive and actions as legitimate. In the latter, nomination was used in combination with differentiation to cast the Other youth as violent. Further, the additional details about the threats “Dr and his friend” directed to FP3 and their abuse of the cat aligns them with barbarism. Further, the analysis will show that this form of other-presentation as negative and barbaric naturalises and legitimises the need to regulate youth behaviour and mould them into desired adults. In turn such approaches play important roles in reinforcing cultural
imperatives about the ideal youth and simultaneously constructing any form of deviation as delinquency.

Participants also used differentiation to identify and describe ‘Other young people’ as problematic and characterise their actions as illegitimate. MP1 while characterising himself in a positive manner (see Box 7.1), he uses differentiation to single out “criminal youth” as the problem. Differentiation was realised linguistically through pronouns “I” and “we” and “them” to distinguish in-group from out-groups. To emphasise such distinctions, MP1 used phrases such as “we are not all like that”, “Yes, there are criminal youth, but we are not all like that”, “I am a law-abiding young person, and I am sure you are and so is she”. He identifies himself and several others who are present in the discussion—including the researcher—as “law-abiding young people”. A characterisation that contrasts him (and us) from ‘the youth’ the police were generalising him with. Differentiation creates a boundary between us (law-abiding/good youth) and them (criminal/bad youth). While differentiation encourages the police officers and the listeners to view MP4 as an individual, who is different from the group of ‘the youth’ thus not deserving to be harassed, the strategy also unintentionally legitimises the idea that “criminal youth” deserve to be harassed by the police.

Another example of differentiation was evident in FGD2. When discussing the prevailing image, of ‘young people as dangerous’, participants creatively distanced themselves from this characterisation by commenting that

FP5: we do not look at them [at-risk youth] as dangerous they are our peers in the community. But there are certain choices and circumstances that got them where they are…I am approaching them as someone young just like them and I do not judge them. Meanwhile I am fully aware that if I take some alleys this same youth may accost and harm me… by making them feel dangerous we are emboldening them, we are making them feel mighty, and unbreakable. They are taking advantage because we are building an image of them as something worth to fear.

MP2: she raised a very important issue... We may not think they are dangerous because we do not see them as any different from us. But women, for instance, are scared of going to certain areas when they are all alone. And if you question them, they will actually talk about the dangerous boys who hang around those areas.

FP3: Youth are not always violent except for a minority. But even among these minority, most of them do what they do because they lack opportunities. But that should not be an excuse. I come from the same environment, but I am not like them. *Lazima wajikaze*²⁹⁰ (FGD2)

²⁹⁰ A phrase translating to they must try harder. It is often used to encourage people to try harder or persevere during difficult situations.
At first glance, FP5’s account negates the construction of youth as dangerous. Instead, FP5 identifies and classifies herself and those considered dangerous as all young people. Young people here being a major age category by which the society differentiates between classes of people. FP5 uses classification by focusing on only one identity trait. Thus classification blurs the distinction between young people. According to FP5 the “dangerous youth” are “our peers in the community”. She also acknowledges the power dynamics between herself and those considered dangerous. Ascertaining that while they are “peers from the same community”, the latter encountered circumstances that led them to make poor choices. This is the first instance she differentiates such dangerous youth i.e. “them” from herself and other youth like her i.e. “us”. FP5 also reiterates that she does not judge such youth, however, she does admit that when she engages “them” she is fully aware about “the threat they pose”. Her admission uses differentiation subtly to assign bad behaviour and negative actions to a specific group of youth. However, she cautions against viewing them as dangerous arguing that it emboldens them to act more violently.

Other participants, however, explicitly employ differentiation to draw boundaries between dangerous youth and other youth. MP2 argues that while FP5 is right, dangerous youth are indeed a real threat, maybe not to other young people but to other classes of people—such as women. He identifies and describes them as “dangerous boys”. Thus infantilises them but also highlights that boys are a threat to women. MP2 highlights gendered power relations. Where while young boys may not threaten other young boys, they definitely threaten women and potentially girls. FP3 utilises differentiation to distinguish three categories of social actors. She identifies dangerous youth as “a minority of youth” who are different from “the majority of youth” who are harmless. FP3 adds that even those in the dangerous youth category only a minority are problematic while most ended up in such situations for lack of better opportunities and/or personal initiative to do better. FP3 recognises systemic barriers but almost immediately she shifts the blame from the politico-economic institutions responsible for such barriers to the individual. The individual is blamed for not having tried hard enough to overcome the challenges they encounter.

Participants also used functionalisation to represent themselves positively and others negatively. Functionalisation was relevant in all themes to draw distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘us’ varied across themes. In some themes, it encompasses “law-abiding” youth, and in others refers to “youth” in general. The ‘them’ includes “criminal youth”, “at-risk youth”, “violent/corrupt police officers”, “opportunistic elites” and in other themes “other men” and “female relatives”. Most of these individuals were identified by their activities. For instance, MP1—FGD2 characterised himself as a “role model”, while MP1—FGD1 identified himself as a “hard-working young man”. When functionalisation is used in a positive sense
it characterises the social actors as productive members of the society. Thus positively evaluating them as legitimate and descent members of their community. In contrast, functionalisation was used to mock bad behaviours exhibited by elites (see section on cultural relations).

Also, youth gangs were often functionalised as “vijana wa mapanga” or “the Machete youth”. This characterisation presents ‘Other youth’ as walking around armed and their actions are described as “going on a mission” (MP4—FGD2) which in other words refers to attacking people and causing havoc in the community. Functionalisation served to evoke fear and anxiety about “the Machete youth”. However, because often it is difficult to discern who is (is not) armed without profiling, functionalisation evokes fear and anxiety about youth in general. Thus even those who are “law-abiding”, they will be profiled and stigmatised because they belong to a certain age/generational category.

Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation reinforced a specific idea about who is (is not) dangerous. Focusing on the category of young people, I have shown that the main assumption behind this construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is that “the youth” i.e. ‘them’ are distinctly different from the ‘us’. This boundary advances several closely related but also distinct and contradictory assumptions about what makes ‘them’ more vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’. First, it suggests that systemic barriers (lack of opportunities) and practices (police harassment, corruption, cultural imperatives about youth, and stereotypes about ‘radicalisation hotspots’) cause ‘radicalisation’ and more generally an increase in youth crime. Second, that while youth may come from similar areas, “some youth” are more prone to ‘radicalisation’ and violence because they made bad choices and could not overcome structural obstacles in their surroundings. Hence, this claim holds the individual as personally responsible for overcoming structural obstacles many of which are beyond individual control—such as violent counterterrorism, profiling, socio-economic exclusion and corruption.

Third, some participants advance that “minority youth” are just prone to violence. No explanation is given to account for their actions except that they are just “criminals” or as MP4 put it “the ones in Kisauni are just sick”. Since no plausible explanations can suffice to explain why they deviate from the ‘norm’, they are dismissed as being “sick”, in other words “mentally ill”. Meanwhile a majority of those involved in crime are dismissed as “not having tried hard enough” to choose a different path. Ultimately, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ boundary while nuancing the self and other identities, it unintentionally perpetuates the idea that

291 Mapanga is plural for machete and vijana is plural for youth, but often vijana is generically used in the masculine sense i.e. to refer to young men. Thus, the slang phrase literally translates to the Machete Youth.
individuals are to blame for allowing themselves to be radicalised. In the next section I will discuss the implications of the themes raised in terms of the counterterrorism and PCVE interventions they make possible.

**Conclusion**

By looking at the interaction between participants during the focus groups several observations can be made. For example, due to the homogeneity of FGD1, participants did not challenge each other's viewpoints. Instead, individual opinions were sometimes used to represent group opinions. This was especially done by using the pronoun ‘we’. MP1 for example when discussing opportunistic elites, said “Because we are in a society divided by ethnicity they take advantage of this weakness … And because we believe …, we do not see past their antics”. This pronoun was used to signal a shared narrative. Thus MP1 positions himself as speaking on behalf of the group. A similar move also occurred in FGD2. However, due to FGD2’s diversity there were different shifts in interactions—as shown in the diagrams—during the session. Participants challenged each other's opinions which were partly informed by elite discourses of ‘radicalisation’. An example of this is FGD2’s discussion on the relationship between religious beliefs and violence. By challenging this apparent relationship, participants allow transformations in the discourse. Thus they were not just disagreeing with their peers but participants were challenging universal knowledge claims. In the process, they positioned themselves as knowers, contrary to popular stereotypes about youth.

It should be noted that participants presented more nuanced accounts than any other stakeholder analysed in this research. They drew their knowledge from various discursive resources. On the one hand, the meaning that young people attributed to ‘radicalisation’ was informed by their lived experiences of the type of insecurities they encounter and navigate on a daily basis. This is a finding that recently published research on understanding how violent extremism is defined and shaped in Kenya also corroborates (Oando and Achieng', 2021; Oando, 2022; Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023). Accordingly, my study found that participants' experience of everyday insecurities are shaped by gender, geography, space, social status, ethnicity, religion and their interactions with their communities and the state. For example, women and men's quest for personal and cultural fulfilment exposed them to extremist networks. This was particularly the case for individuals that grew up in strict patriarchal families and community structures. Hence, the pursuit of ideal femininity and masculinity played a crucial role in exposing young women and men to extremist networks.
At the same time the need for personal security and protection in environments characterised by violence and insecurity—from state security forces and gang related activities—played a crucial role in the engagement of teenagers and youth in extremist networks—with such networks widely conceived as those tied to criminal gangs and extremist organisations such as al-Shabaab. These everyday lives and experiences on (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016) crucially informed young people’s interpretation of ‘radicalisation’, and shaped their behaviours—as can be seen in MP1’s reaction to his unlawful arrest by the police. Their resistance discourses in a way challenged elite-centred perspectives on ‘radicalisation’ by highlighting the oft taken-for-granted assumptions in elite discourses (Jarvis and Lister, 2013) and open space for negotiating contemporary and dominant understandings of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016, p. 26). Also, it shows that young people are not passive recipients of security interventions “but can and do” actively “shape (in)security politics throughout their daily lives” (Ibid, p. 26). Thus their interpretations of (in)security underscores the need for PCVE that is context-based, “multi-perspective, and multi-layered” (Badurdeen, 2023, p. 19). Such an approach could address short-term interests about violent ideologies driving ‘radicalisation’. Also, it could cater to long-term needs such as economic reforms, police reforms and measures tailored to address various forms of other everyday insecurities including gender-based and sexual violence.

On the other hand, young people’s understanding of ‘radicalisation’ was also informed by their engagement with PCVE. As earlier mentioned, FGD participants were drawn from youth-initiated and led community-based organisations. This means these young people are uniquely placed in a position where they are not just beneficiaries but also implementers and targets of PCVE. This unique positioning means they are exposed to top-down discourses and policy practices which centre notions of ‘Islamist extremism’ as the primary framework for understanding terrorism (Gunning and Jackson, 2011; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2015; Mohamed, 2022), and construct the at-risk and risky categories as in need of shaping—this construction appears in both elite and non-elite discourses as I have shown in chapter three, four, five, and six as well (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Amoore and De Goede, 2008b; Heath-Kelly, 2013). This framework is based on western interests and their conceptions of (in)security (Duffield, 2001; Chandler, 2009).

Often state-led interventions are developed with this framework in mind. Such interventions (re)produce elite-centric ideas—qua western conceptions—which are then passed to communities through implementation thus shaping the meanings communities attribute to ‘radicalisation’, extremism and terrorism more broadly (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016). Hence, it is a co-constitutive process where discursive and non-discursive events
continually shape each other. In my study, this played out with young peoples’ echoing of elite discourses. For example, in FGD2 MP1 frames his understanding of ‘radicalisation’ within the ‘Islamist extremism’ narrative which remains the primary framework of Kenya’s official approach to terrorism. Even the resistance discourse that was raised by MP2, FP3 and MP4, endorsed the idea that in general ‘radicalisation’ is inherent to religion. Thus, both views “reinforce dominant identity-based (in)securitizing logics about the self and other and the alignment of threat with the latter” (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016, p. 18). At the same time, fostering measures that are tailored towards shaping ‘problematic’ identities.

By looking at the representation of youth in the preceding texts and focus groups with young people, I have also shown that youth are (re)produced as capable of participating in and/or resisting extremist organisations but also as a group needing protection from extremist organisations and powerful Others. And perhaps in a more nuanced way than in the other chapters, the participants were more aware of the gendered nature of how ‘radicalisation’ affects young men and women. Their accounts demonstrated their approach to gender as complex and contextual set of beliefs that shape women’s and men’s behaviour. Showing that women and men can play diverse roles in recruitment and ‘radicalisation’. Thus young peoples agency may not be exclusively positive and non-violent but by-and-large dependent on their experiences, and contributions on conflicts and other situations (Barker, 2005; Barker and Ricardo, 2005; Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, 2006). These contradictions and nuances challenge oversimplified explanations and dichotomies about youth naivety and impulsiveness which need to be problematised as they are grounded in paternalistic logics and these continue to be the basis of PCVE policies.
Conclusion: Re-thinking the Discursive Construction of ‘Radicalisation’ and Youth Vulnerability in Kenya

This study interrogated and problematised the underlying assumptions around ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya. Its core purpose was to analyse how producers, consumers and targets of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) interventions and knowledge described ‘radicalisation’ and what bearings their understandings have on the types of PCVE measures adopted. In most cases, elites, the media and civil society are the main knowledge producers and consumers, hence more likely the subjects of academic inquiry. But this study also took into account the voices of young people, as the primary beneficiaries and targets of PCVE, to gauge their understanding of ‘radicalisation’ and how their subjectivities converge with or diverge from those of others active in this area. The study employed a critical discourse analysis approach. I analysed both written and spoken data. As regards written data, I analysed two major PCVE policies: the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE—declassified version) and the Mombasa County Action Plan for CVE. I also analysed 57 speeches and statements of President Kenyatta, and 474 online press articles published by Nation Africa and The Standard. As regards spoken data, I analysed 19 interview transcripts derived from semi-structured interviews conducted with PCVE practitioners and two focus groups conducted with 11 young people in Mombasa County, Kenya, in 2019.

By analysing PCVE policies, elite speeches and statements, press articles, and interviews, this study accomplished three tasks. First, it described and analysed elite and popular discourses on ‘radicalisation’ and the different discursive strategies used to (de)legitimise the concept. The study shows that several psychosocial, cultural, theological, and political themes are central to how ‘radicalisation’ is understood in Kenya which are largely similar to findings on ‘radicalisation’ in Egypt, India, the UK, US, and several countries in the EU such as France and the Netherlands—as reviewed in chapter one. Chapters Three to Five showed that national discourses attributed ‘radicalisation’ to individual-level (psychosocial), cultural and theological explanations while discrediting the contexts and processes facilitating recruitment and ‘radicalisation’ of youth. These discourses were justified and (de)legitimated through strategies of authorisation and moral evaluation. In contrast, local discourses often but not exclusively described ‘radicalisation’ as an outcome of cultural, social and political injustices (see Chapters Six and Seven). ‘Radicalisation’ was linked to other longstanding socio-economic, cultural and political grievances. These discourses were justified and (de)legitimated through moral evaluation, particularly, analogies of: similarity conjunctions, evaluative adjectives and narrativisation of comparison.
Second, the analysis shows that these discourses on ‘radicalisation’ are enabled by a particular conceptualisation of young people. By analysing referential strategies this study shows how national and local discourses categorise young people in contradictory ways. On the one hand, through genericisation, all young people are seen as victims ‘at-risk’ of becoming violent due to the socio-economic circumstances and cultural contexts that young people live in. On the other hand, genericisation, indetermination, differentiation and functionalisation are contradictorily employed to characterise youth in general, and sometimes specific youth as ‘a dangerous Other’ who threaten Kenya’s peace, stability and prosperity. Accordingly, young people’s experiences and perceptions blur the distinctions between the categories of those considered victims and dangerous, highlighting that neither are mutually exclusive categories. The study described the structural and institutional forces that have a bearing on youths' decisions to remain destitute, act against real or perceived threats, and put an end to personal and societal injustices. Thus the study highlighted how the aspects of vulnerability and how youth exercise of agency in such contexts coexist.

This conclusion aims to broaden the discussion from the preceding chapters by looking at the tensions, agreements and disagreements between the discourses with an aim to show how power is productive of (in)security and PCVE. This chapter further demonstrates that it is the a priori conceptualisation of youth—as more than an identity category—that makes possible and sustains our understanding of ‘radicalisation’ as we presently know it. As the different empirical chapters have shown, there are often competing and contradictory ways of how ‘radicalisation’ is conceptualised. However, what unites such disparate categories is the particular social construction and Otherisation of the youth category. Where “youth”—frequently used as a shorthand for young men—is not just a category but more comprehensively an amorphous discourse that characterises a wide range of situations, circumstances and people including but not limited to unemployment, idleness, deviancy, dangerousness, aggression, hostility, criminality, instability, unreliability, risk-taking behaviours, irresponsibility, entitlement, and naivety.

In North America and Europe linking youth as a social category to security concerns has roots in industrial capitalism where elites were concerned with issues of idle youth, adolescents, and unsupervised young people in growing industrial cities (Katz, 1997). In Kenya, such logics appeared in colonial policies and practices where young men and especially the unemployed were seen as a threat to the empire. And within the context of vagrancy law, they were seen as idle—therefore radicalised—which was criminalised (Ojiambo, 2017). This justified the institutionalisation and encampment of youth in Borstal Institutions—as outlined in the Borstal Institutions Act, 1963—and approved schools.
The trend of linking youth to security concerns continued in independent Kenya as can be observed in the securitisation and criminalisation of: University student protests and demonstrations since the 1970s (Branch, 2011), of Mungiki—mainly comprising of young disenfranchised Kikuyu men—since the 1980s (Rasmussen, 2010), the Islamic Party of Kenya in the 1990s (Ndovu, 2012), the Mombasa Republican Council since 2011 (Willis and Gona, 2013) and the present securitisation and criminalisation of youth in War on terror discourses (Mattsson, Hammarén and Odenbring, 2016; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2018). As shown in chapters three to seven, I argue that such a conceptualisation stems from paternalistic logics that create an absolute boundary between good adults and evil youth. On the one hand, We or US—the adults therefore the good people—constitutes those tasked with saving the Them i.e. youth who in these discourses often appear as the symbol of dangerousness (Mohamed, 2021) or a lurking evil in society (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and De Winter, 2015), which allows ‘radicalisation’ to be rendered as an ever present possibility.

On the other hand, while theoretically the Them is deployed as a unified collective, in practice it is operationalised in two mutually constitutive ways. Firstly, particularly in the context of the GWOT and the ensuing security practices, the Them is further differentiated on gendered, religious and other racialised categories thus used as a shorthand for singling out young, unemployed, Somali, Coastal, and Muslim people, especially men. Secondly, it works as a special identity category deployed against the unemployed, low income groups, and socio-cultural outcasts. Within this deployment, it disproportionately affects young men because the social construction of youth is also gendered. Thus such a conceptualisation of youth obscures differences within ‘radicalisation’ discourses and allows cooperation between different security stakeholders as all of them can agree with each other that ‘radicalisation’ is a ‘youth issue’ without having to unpack what they each mean by ‘youth’ or even ‘radicalisation’.

This conclusion is divided into three main sections. The first section starts by exploring the tensions in policy texts, elite, media, practitioners and beneficiary i.e. young people's accounts on ‘radicalisation’. It shows that these discourses are products and productive of multiple practices of power (power relations) and particular representations of youth as a social category that make up the boundaries of what can be intelligibly considered as ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE. The section then proceeds to detail how this specific conceptualisations of youth has been made possible and how it solidifies the different 292 These are individuals that defy socio-cultural norms—behaviours and mannerisms—of ideal youthhood. For an expanded discussion see Mohamed (2021).
discourses. In the second section, I highlight the contributions of this research before concluding the chapter by exploring the limits of this research and suggesting areas for future research.

**Tensions and (dis)agreements**

Current theorising of ‘radicalisation’ needs to be understood as a discursive process that occurs through several sites of power. Producers, beneficiaries, and targets of PCVE knowledge and practices all define ‘radicalisation’ in a myriad of ways. At the elite-level, which is also predominantly reproduced at the media-level, insecurity is referenced with the state as a referent. Thus, ‘radicalisation’ is approached as anything that threatens state or national security. As shown in chapter three and four, ideologies such as Islamist ideologies are seen as threatening state legitimacy and national security interests.

Research has suggested the importance of ideology as a causal determinant for violence. These studies have argued that religious belief systems drive conflicts because they are irreconcilable and produce fixed and non-negotiable identities (Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1993; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Kepel, 2006; Taarnby, 2007; Von Hippel, 2007). For some, particularly Islamist ideologies are the root cause of violence (Neumann, 2013; Hoffman, 2017). For others, it is the contextualisation of Islamism within a Manichean worldview that is problematic (Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). Such worldviews, for example, may focus on different gendered ideas to recruit and radicalise men and women. For women, they have been known to significantly align their private lives–e.g. Marriage and piety–with their public lives i.e. shariah, whereas for men ideas about retributive justice and threats to masculinity have been the main focus (Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020; Badurdeen, 2018b). Similar patterns were highlighted in this study, particularly in discussions with practitioners and young people–see chapter six and seven–albeit revealing that the local and ‘beneficiary’ more clearly ‘knows’ their situation, thus their accounts should be taken seriously. Elite-level accounts–as shown in chapter three, four and five–however, assumed that it was the lack of knowledge or deep understanding of the real Islam that made youth more susceptible to ‘radicalisation’. This understanding is also present in past research that attributes ‘radicalisation’ to a lack of deep knowledge of proper Islam, or a distorted interpretation of Islam (Kepel, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006). This partly stems from the disproportionately high numbers of young people in ‘Islamist’ extremist organisations (Awan, 2016), and youth bulge theories that propagate normative assumptions linking youthhood to naivety especially on political matters (Cincotta and Doces, 2012) making it easy to associate youthhood with ignorance. Based on this, the different stakeholders assume youth, in general, are susceptible to being
“brainwashed” by powerful Others. And for young women, negative gendered stereotypes about women and girls’ agency fuel claims that they are manipulated by a powerful Other, framed as “married off”, or “lured” by a male relative, partner or suitor. It is in only a few instances, particularly those highlighted by youth participants in chapter seven, where women’s journeys into extremism were linked to a search for status or empowerment. This demonstrated participants’ complex understanding of agency. Hence, at the elite level, such ideologies and the social actors—such as Islamist groups including local extremists affiliates and radical youth—that propagate them, as well as other dividing ideologies that are advanced by opportunistic elites, and even critics of governments’ policy are seen as threatening national security, thus justifying the adoption of stringent (non)security countermeasures.

Similar discourses were echoed by the media. As I have shown in chapter five, Nation Africa and The Standard emphasised narratives that more or less viewed ‘radicalisation’ as primarily an outcome of extremist ideologies and cultural relations. The media reproduced elite discourses through its sourcing patterns and practices. It is widely known that the process of news production is influenced by many ideas and practices considered acceptable in the media landscape. News routines (Becker and Vlad, 2008; North, 2009; Ross, 2010), efficiency, practical considerations (Hallin, Manoff and Weddle, 1993) and the cultural authority journalists afford to news reports (Herman and Chomsky, 1994) are just a few of the practices that determine who gets access to the media, hence whose ideas and opinions count as credible. As such, journalists tend to defer to official sources when seeking information.

Just as in this research, other research has also shown an overreliance on official sources in the coverage of terrorism (Li and Izard, 2003; Woods, 2007). Furthermore, news stories tend to be sensationalist, speculative, unsubstantiated (Oborne, 2006; Miller and Sabir, 2012) and often disproportionate to the risk it poses (Jackson, 2005). Partly because terrorism is still a highly securitised issue thus information on it may only be accessible from official sources. It is also commonplace for coverage to rely on official sources based on the belief that they have better intelligence, expertise and experience on security issues. However, elites also have interests. Official sources granted access to the media have in some cases deliberately (mis)represented details to heighten the severity of attacks as shown in studies of foiled attacks (Miller and Sabir, 2012). As shown in chapter five, official sources set the boundaries of what can be intelligibly considered ‘radicalisation’ by sharing specific ideas and opinions about the nature of the threat, the social actors involved, and what society can do to prevent ‘radicalisation’. Similar to elite discourses—highlighted in chapters three and four—the media also individualised ‘radicalisation’, and attributed it to
cultural ideologies and identities while de-emphasising the socio-economic and political conditions where such identities gain prominence. In instances where such conditions were discussed, they were primarily from less “legitimate” sources and were primarily covered in columns and commentaries—see chapter five—thus reducing their credibility. By unpacking these sourcing patterns and the practices that shape them, we can understand why certain ideas, opinions and topics on ‘radicalisation’ are included while others are excluded from the debate. This demonstrates how power works not only in defining (in)security and shaping how we might(not) think of ‘radicalisation’ but also in shaping what measures are deemed (un)acceptable.

At the local level, which in this research encompasses the civil society and young people, both ‘radicalisation’ and extremism were defined in accordance with the everyday local realities. As this and other research has shown such lived realities range from threats posed by gangs, injustices, violent counterterrorism and the lack of livelihood—both an outcome of state policy or otherwise (Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023). Individual factors such as a search for status, belonging and identity were also highlighted. However, participants’ accounts of ‘radicalisation’ were also gendered thus hinting at different mechanisms of ‘radicalisation’ for young men and young women. Participants, for example, characterised young men as potentially dangerous due to their adulation of violent masculinities, at times leading to young men being blamed. At other times, the adulation of violent masculinities was seen as a response to violent counterterrorism, systemic inequalities and injustices and the exclusion of young people, thus the governance system was blamed.

On the contrary, normative assumptions about women’s naivety and their inherent peacefulness often resulted in their ‘radicalisation’ being blamed on others. For practitioners and some of the FGD participants this blame was projected onto the women’s male relatives and their families. To a substantial extent, these accounts were also found in the media—see chapter five—and paved the way for narratives about jihadi brides, al-Shabaab sex-slaves, and other sensationalist stories about young women’s grooming. In Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and UK, gender stereotypes were found to co-constitute perceptions about ‘radicalisation’ mechanisms which in turn impacts the kinds of counterterrorism practices and PCVE responses implemented (Martini, 2018; Winterbotham and Pearson, 2020; Jackson, 2021). However, for some other participants the mechanisms were more complex. For example, some young women and men were attributed less agency, at the same time, participants emphasised that some young men
and women deliberately sought self improvement and extremist groups\textsuperscript{293} were seen as an avenue for this. However, for the women who sought self improvement through extremist groups, such improvement is limited. This is because groups such as al-Shabaab function within patriarchal configurations that relegate women into subordinate and unequal social relations with men. Thus promoting the belief that men are ‘naturally’ superior in comparison to women. Hence, these groups frame their narratives as liberatory for young women; where a woman’s true path to empowerment is to choose to subordinate herself and be a womb for the cause (Mattheis and Winter, 2019). However negative, destructive and problematic such performances of masculinity and femininity are (Barker, 2005; Barker and Ricardo, 2005; Mattheis and Winter, 2019; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020) they do provide crucial insights into how disempowerment and subjugation could heighten the need for young (wo)men to demonstrate they have agency, even if it is destructive. Such an illuminating perspective from the beneficiaries help us better understand the complexities of both agency and mechanisms of ‘radicalisation’. In addition, such insights are relevant for the designing and implementing of better PCVE that are not just concerned with fitting young women and men into the victim–perpetrator binary.

From this brief discussion we can see that ‘radicalisation’ is politically used by different security stakeholders to represent various manifestations of violence in ways that exclude their own violence. For example, elite stakeholders frame the violence of Others targeting the state as ‘radicalisation’ and extremism that could eventually lead to terrorism. While doing this, they exclude or minimise the state’s role in violent counterterrorism and policing, and state neglect in addressing inequalities (Martini and Njoku, 2017). Accordingly, elite discourse fixation on the violence of the Other reflects existing power asymmetries (Martini, 2021), where the Other constitutes those seen as acting outside the realm of political decision-making, based on established norms and hierarchies. But even then, this research has shown that the Other—the local—is actively resisting being associated with dangerousness and instead highlighting marginalised explanations of ‘radicalisation’ that elite-level and institutional discourses ignore. In the section that follows, I will discuss the conditions of possibility that allow the different stakeholders to approach ‘radicalisation’ the way they do.

\textsuperscript{293} Here the term extremist groups was also used to largely refer to young gangs such as \textit{wakware} babes. See MP2219 discussions in chapter six.
Where the present mirrors the past

When we hear or read of ‘radicalisation’ most if not all of us think of troubling images of young Muslim men (in)directly supporting activities of extremist groups such as ISIS, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda among others. It is also true that not many decades ago radicalism positively defined progressives. However, the discursive shifts in meaning have occurred overtime (Mandel, 2009; Silke and Brown, 2016). In Kenya, ‘radicalisation’ and its derivatives can be traced as far back to the British colonial authorities. They conflated radicalism with almost everything that did not support the active labouring on behalf of the colonial project i.e. the capitalist expansion of the empire. Hence, encompassed but was not limited to idleness, unemployment, homelessness, and young people growing in cities (Ojiambo, 2017). These social actors threatened the survival of the empire. This was especially relevant given the racist colonial land policies that massively dispossessed Kenyans of their land (Kanyinga, 2000). Thus creating acute land shortages, landlessness, forced migration into cities (Ocobock, 2006) and discontent among Africans which fuelled the Mau Mau uprisings that launched guerilla warfare on colonial authorities and settlers. Not only did the colonial government view Mau Mau as threatening the British colonial administration, but the belief that they engaged in oath making rituals to recruit and gain the support and cooperation of the Kikuyu populace (Green, 1990) led the entire Kikuyu population to be constructed as a suspect community. Thus, idleness, unemployment, and homelessness were criminalised, and the young people growing up in cities were termed radicalised.

This was the first–as far back as I could trace–attempt at establishing ‘radicalisation’ in the discourse of states within the framework of fighting crime. Notably, these statements were not dispersed but they formed a coherent discourse that adhered to specific rules and patterns including constituting the kind of people that can be radicals or to use Ditrych’s (2013, p. 225) characterisation “the terrorist subject”. There was broad consensus in the colonial administration that a certain type of identity–African-young-kikuyu (mostly but not exclusively)-urban dwelling men–was especially susceptible to recruitment by Mau Mau and thus should be apriori identified as radicalised and criminalised (Anderson, 1993; Pfingst and Kimari, 2021). Because radicalism first, threatened British colonial interests in Kenya and second and more importantly, it threatened the survival of the empire, i.e. the existing order. The ‘radical’ in this discourse was not just a criminal but also a savage/barbarian Other that sought to destabilise the existing order (Mohamed, 2022). Thus they were not only a threat to the British but ultimately to Kenyans. Particularly, in these paternalistic accounts, a civilised British person would be juxtaposed against the savage and backward Other that the British had a duty and moral obligation to redeem (Elkins, 2005). For this
reason, it was deemed necessary and urgent to secure order through extreme measures such as the forceful programs that confined native Kikuyus in fortified settlements to cut off *Mau Mau* supplies (Karari, 2018); military methods such as flogging, incarceration, torture and execution to deter nonconformists (Anderson, 2006); and the institutionalisation and encampment of youth in youth training camps, workhouses, and prisons (including Borstal institutions) and industrial schools (Campbell, 2002; Ocobock, 2006) with an aim to influence them to denounce *Mau Mau* teachings, which would ultimately help in creating a governable population (Ojiambo, 2017).

Contemporary elite discourses show a great deal of continuity with this colonial discourse. As I have shown in this research, contemporary discourses also depoliticise the conditions within which radicalism emerges, thus by extension depoliticising the social actors involved, thus they are subjectified in different ways. However, there are marginal discourses emanating from local actors that challenge the totality of state discourses. For example, they push against the individualising narratives of ‘radicalisation’ to highlight the structural conditions within which radicalism occurs and the political nature of the concept of ‘radicalisation’. Hence suggesting ‘radicalisation’ as a reaction to state violence, and explicating the role of power in the production of discourse and the connections between power and violence. At the same time, these discourses discontinue from elite discourses by representing young people in multiple mutually constitutive positions. Where young people are not seen as irrational violent actors or disenfranchised victims looking for redress, but as political agents, even though at times their expression of agency is negative.

The discourses emanating from the different security stakeholders are made possible by the condition of linearity (Jarvis, 2008). In this reading, Kenya’s disparate categories of past and contemporary events are viewed and depicted as falling within a single trajectory. As I have shown throughout the analysis and by looking at the colonial state discourses on ‘radicalisation’ we can see parallels in ideas of who constitutes a ‘radical’. It is almost entirely the category youth, which often is a constellation of a wide range of ideas, situations and circumstances including but not limited to unemployment, idleness, deviancy, dangerousness, aggression, hostility, criminality, instability, unreliability, risk-taking behaviours, irresponsibility, entitlement, poverty and naivety. Against this backdrop, contemporary efforts to counter and prevent ‘radicalisation’ are intended to contain the ‘crisis’ of youth whether these measures are economic as I have shown in chapters three and four, or whether they are socio-cultural as detailed in chapter three, four, and five. The condition of linearity, allows elite level discourses to ahistoricise and depoliticise ‘radicalisation’. Which forecloses any possibility to address legacies of violent policing (Anderson, 1993; H. Whittaker, 2012; Karari, 2018), as well as historical injustices and
marginalisation that were (and are) created by colonial administration and the subsequent post-independence regimes. Instead, for the state ‘radicalisation’ can be externalised as a youth problem. At the same time, the condition of linearity allows elite security stakeholders to collapse geographies. It allows dominant states’ policies, preferences and norms to be applied globally. Hence, ‘radicalisation’ happening in Kenya is interpreted as connected to wider ideologies and events happening in Somalia, Syria, Europe and North America. Local conflicts are thus inscribed into the global events, advancing the idea that we are facing a universal problem hence the need to unite and call for universal action (Jackson, 2005; Jarvis, 2008; Ditrych, 2013). This further allows discourse transformations, for example legal instruments such as the UNSCR 2250 among others have been crafted as precautionary policies, even with the prevailing unresolved definitional challenges.

In summary, the logics of ‘radicalisation’ emanating from the different sites of power are compatible because they conflate youth identity with insecurity, unemployment, unruliness, deviancy, opposed to the rule of law. Thus constructing youth as an everyday and ever-present suspect community that requires exceptional measures to be managed because of its potentially threatening nature. By criminalising youth as a potentially dangerous Other, national-level discourses detach violence from the internal space. It is these compatibilities that enable ‘radicalisation’ to be conceptualised the way it is. They also enable the successes and shortcomings of PCVE by delimiting the boundaries of possible responses and solutions. In addition, the positioning of youths through narratives of victimhood allows the entirety of the youth identity to be depicted as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’. Identity, then, and not political goals can be claimed as the problem requiring intervention. This can be likened to Stamnitzky’s (2014, p. 180) argument that, in contemporary times, terrorists have come to be seen as perpetuating terrorism because they are (evil) terrorists, making terrorism the “uncaused cause” (Zehfuss, 2003, p. 521).

**Theoretical and Methodological reflections**

Departing from a CTS standpoint, this research has advanced the argument that language matters and it matters particularly in defining both (in)security and the appropriate methods for addressing it. Using the example of Kenya, this research contributes to CTS research by showing that the understanding of ‘radicalisation’ in Kenya continues to be informed by international discourses (see Dowd, 2016; Badurdeen, Aroussi and Jakala, 2023), which consequently results in PCVE interventions that are designed and implemented based on western interests rather than local needs (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). Not only does this extend imperial control by western powers and perpetuate eurocentric views as universal, but it also reproduces contested knowledge claims and ignores and underplays “specificity,
context, history, and nuance” (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning, 2009b, p. 222). However, the study has also shown that the recontextualization of knowledge and discourse is resisted by local actors. While local actors' understanding of ‘radicalisation’ may match knowledge claims advanced by elites, about problematic identities, youth participants show that such identities are consequences of specific contextual and historical events past and present. They challenge universal knowledge claims and demonstrate that the subaltern knows their situation better and thus their accounts need to be taken seriously. My research has contributed by bringing in voices that are otherwise silenced by universal knowledge systems. The contradictions and nuances raised by the local actors encourage CTS and other scholars alike to first, avoid oversimplified explanations and dichotomies. And second, to consider the different manifestations of agency, even if they do not fit within eurocentric ideas on ‘empowerment’.

In addition, this research contributes to Fairclough’s three dimensional CDA framework by adding an ethnographic component in order to understand the social relations within which texts come into being. FGDs were especially necessary for providing context to the data and gaining an insider’s perspective of how, why, and which discourses are adapted in particular ways across different spaces and time. Often CDA research is prone to top-down approaches, or limiting its analysis to structured institutional texts. By using FGDs this research shows that discourse production is dispersed in various sites of power, interactions and situations. Thus, through FGDs I could explore semi-public and private views on contentious issues and their connections and relations (or lack thereof) to elite-level and media-level discourses. This was particularly relevant given the theoretical conceptualisation of power used in this study.

Areas for future research

This study advances debates about the role of language and power in the production of (in)security, particularly ‘radicalisation’ and PCVE. However, due to logistical constraints and a lack of proper methodological training–see an elaborated discussion in chapter two; text selection–this research was not able to trace the evolution of ‘radicalisation’ in its entirety. Hence, future research could trace the evolution of ‘radicalisation’ from colonial Kenya to contemporary times through archival research. What could add more nuance would be to theorise these evolutions using a postcolonial framework. Such a study could yield more nuances on the conditions of possibility that have allowed the discursive (re)emergence and variances of states ‘radicalisation’ discourses throughout time and space.
References


Al-Bulushi, S. (2021) ‘Race, space, and “terror”: Notes from East Africa’, Security
Dialogue, 52(1_suppl), pp. 115–123. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211024418.


CIVICUS (2022) *KENYA: ‘Holding police officers accountable for killings in a court of law*


Kiai, M. (2015) ‘On terrorism, the Executive wants to be the judge, jury and executioner”, *Nation Africa*, 10 April.


Kitzinger, J. (1994) ‘The methodology of Focus Groups: the importance of interaction between research participants’, *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 16(1), pp. 103–121. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.ep11347023.


Ombati, C. (2016) 'Kenya sets new regulations for religious leaders, churches', *The


Appendix A: Overview of Policy Texts

1) National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)

Overall, the NSCVE has six preliminary sections. These comprise the table of contents, abbreviations and acronyms, definitions of terms, a foreword by President Uhuru Kenyatta, an overview of the strategy by Major General (RTD) Joseph Nkaissery the cabinet secretary of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, and executive summary that summarises the main sections of the text. The remainder of the document is composed of five content sections. The first section makes a case for the development of NSCVE by nuancing the nature of threats in Kenya, what is at stake, and the objectives of the proposed strategy. The second section unpacks the issue of ‘radicalisation’ along three areas its drivers, the spaces and places where it happens, and the phases of radicalisation used to conceptualise the different stages of ‘radicalisation’. Section three focuses on the structuring of CVE that is organised into five issue areas: approaches to intervention, work pillars for CVE, disengagement and reintegration, nation and local action, and the research agenda for CVE. Section four details each CVE stakeholder’s entry points, while section five outlines a framework that will be used to measure the impact of CVE efforts. The remaining pages contain a reference list to the images used and NCTC contacts.

2) Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP)

The MCAP contains an acknowledgment, list of acronyms, definition of terms, table of contents, a foreword by Hassan Joho the governor of Mombasa County, a message from the county commissioner of Mombasa County, a message from Haki Africa (the facilitator in the development of the action plan), and an executive summary giving an overview of the document. The remaining part of the document consists of eight chapters. Chapter one outlines what the action plan is about, and how it was developed. Chapter two provides a historical background of Mombasa county, traces different forms of conflicts that have riddled the area from the 12th century, the rise of radicalisation and current realities related to devolution as a system of governance. Chapter three situates the MCAP within a theory of change informed by Mombasa County Government’s Strong Citizenship framework. This chapter also contains several tables (e.g. a SWOT analysis, pp.’s 28-30; PESTLE analysis, pp.’s 30-33; stakeholder analysis, pp.’s 34-40; an

294 This section uses the theoretical model developed by the NYPD (also known as steps-model). Surprisingly, it is not referenced but the phases and how they are defined in the original article are the same. Only key words are replaced in the Kenyan strategy.
implementation matrix, pp.’s 52 to 73) and diagrams (e.g. the Danish model, p.27) that visualise different relationships. Chapter four outlines the vision, mission, goal, and strategic objectives of the action plan while chapter five describes the methodology for implementing CVE. This chapter outlines and prioritises the different pillars of CVE that are contextually relevant in addition to those proposed by the NSCVE. Chapter six details the implementation plan. This plan highlights the roles of different stakeholders, the engagement organogram (see diagram on p.51), the implementation matrix for the MCAP (pp.’s 52-73), and the proposed financial budget for the next five years. Chapter seven describes how the results and effects of CVE will be measured while chapter eight concludes by giving a summary of what, where, why, when and how the document seeks to prevent and counter violent extremism. Pages 78-85 consists of appendices; appendix 1 is the logical framework detailing how the MCAP will achieve its objectives and appendix 2 is a risk assessment matrix. The last page of the document contains the logos of the organisations that participated in its formulation.
Appendix B: List of Speeches and Statements


2. Statement by H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta on the Terrorist Attack at Garissa University College, Garissa County, Delivered During a Live Address to the Nation, 4th April, 2015.


4. Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta During the 2015 Madaraka Day Celebrations at Nyayo National Stadium, 1st June, 2015.


8. Statement by his Excellency President Uhuru Kenyatta at State House, Mombasa, on 1st September, 2015.


10. Statement by H.E President Uhuru Kenyatta During the High Level Meeting of Amisom Troop and Police Contributing Countries, 28th September, 2015.


32. Statement by his Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces During a Joint
Press Briefing with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan at State House, Nairobi, 26th August, 2016.


38. Statement by His Excellency President Uhuru Kenyatta at the Inauguration of his Excellency Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, President of the Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 22nd February, 2017.


43. Statement by his Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces During the Africa Outreach Meeting at the G7 Summit in Taormina, Italy, 27th May, 2017.

44. Speech by his Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces During the 54th Madaraka Day Celebrations at Kabiru-Ini Stadium, Nyeri, 1st June, 2017.

46. Speech by his Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander in Chief of The Defence Forces During the 2017 Mashujaa Day Celebrations at Uhuru Park Grounds, Nairobi, 20th October, 2017.


Appendix C: Press Articles sampled for CDA

3. Warah, R. (2015a) ‘Garissa could have been avoided if we had learned from past attacks’, Nation Africa, 5 April.
8. Daily Nation Reporter (2015) ‘This is a home-bred problem, so the solution can only be found among us’, Nation Africa, 8 April.
42. Wabala, D. (2018b) ‘I was Lured into Sex Slavery by Al Shabaab Militants through Facebook’, *The Standard*, 3 February.
Appendix D: Attribute Coding for Press Articles

PART 1: QUANTITATIVE

SECTION A: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

This section of the codebook focuses on the quantitative x-tics of the news item which comprises the unit of analysis.

General information: basic information on the news item. It could be the absence or presence of characteristics being measured by the study. For this study they were as follows:

A. OUTLET
   Nation Africa = 0
   The Standard = 1

B. TYPE OF EDITION
   Daily Edition = 0
   Weekend edition = 1

C. JOURNALIST GENDER
   Man = 0
   Woman = 1
   Both = 2
   NA = 86

SECTION B: STORY CHARACTERISTICS (focuses on the characteristics of the story being covered. Including but not limited to topics, geographical focus, type of story and the section the story was placed in the publication webpage)

D. TOPIC: Asks what is the main theme of the news story? i.e. looks at title and lead sentence as in most cases that is where the overall topic is hinted)
   1. Government/Legislature: all government activities from policy declarations, legislations to activities of state and the legislature
      ● State activities = 0
      ● IR & Diplomacy = 1
      ● Devolved Government/Parliament = 2
      ● National Government/Parliament = 3
      ● Judicial Activities (e.g. rulings) = 4
      ● Public Holidays = 5
      ● NA = 86
   2. Housing infrastructure and public Works= 0 Referencing terrorism affecting telecommunications, housing, land and neighbourhoods
   3. Health = 1 It also deals with stories of pandemics, epidemics, etc. that focus on the impact of health conditions on groups of people. e.g. Impacts of GUC attack in terms of mental health and physical health.
   4. Faith & Faith Organisations = 2 References related to the spiritual development of individuals and the general population, considering the
activities of institutions that administer faith (churches, for example), as well
as debates on society’s beliefs, values, morality. e.g. Masjid Musa, Likoni
Pentecostal church.

5. Human rights = 3 Refers to different freedoms; civil, political, cultural, information.

6. Demonstrations & protests = 4 Situations, facts and actions that show conflict between 2 or more actors-demonstrate social dispute.

7. Social Problem = 5 References matters of inequality; poverty, development e.g. women and counterterrorism.

8. Campaigns & elections = 6 All stories primarily about elections for government posts at local, state and national levels, or stories focused primarily on the actions of political parties. Stories on elections/campaigns/politics, election/campaign abuses and scandals, politics and religion should be coded here.


10. Police & Crime = 8 this involves crime incidents, white-collar crime/corruption, crime trends (such as statistical data on crimes or a national crime survey), crime deterrence, and trials regarding a specific crime event. Aspects associated with public safety and order, prisons and delinquency in general are considered part of this topic. It can also refer to stories of terrorist events, the causes and impact or the efforts by the police and/or other agencies to prevent terrorist acts within the country.

11. Court = 9 Refers to the inner workings of the court system such as the appointment of judges, motions that are NOT solely about a specific crime, and other inner-workings. This code includes stories on court/legal system, federal Supreme Court system or lower court system/internal (any court below the federal supreme court).

12. Defense & Military = 10 Military operations-ATPU, NCTC; Counter-terrorism strategies Nyumba Kumi; Security starts with me;

13. Economy & Business = 11 Reference to events or policies targeting business premises and interests

14. Education = 12 Reference to education and co-curricular activities; drama festivals, sports, clubs but terrorism is alluded to/cause of?

15. Rule of Law = 13 stories focusing on assented security laws.


17. Others = 15

18. N/A = 86 Stories that don't fit in any of the above categories

E. GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS

- Local = 0
- National = 1
- International = 2
- Regional = 3
- Continent = 4
- Global = 5
- Don’t know = 6
- N/A = 7
F. STORY TYPE

- **Brief** = 0 A short news item that reports information of contingent events. It has up to three paragraphs, and does not usually include subtitles.
- **Article** = 1 this is the most frequent type of story: report information of contingent events. This is the classic news item. It covers what, who, how, when and where an event happened.
- **Feature/Chronicle** = 2 this kind of news item tends to be similar in length to a reportage. To be coded in this category, the news items must describe individual experiences and testimonials by the author as a witness to one or more events, or use literary language that correspond to fiction (dialogues, hyperboles, setting descriptions, characterisation of people, among others).
- **Opinion** = 3
- **Editorial** = 4 stories written by the news editor or editorial team.
- **Column** = 5
- **Guest blog** = 6
- **Items published in sports/lifestyle/entertainment/economy/business** = 7
- **Letters to editor** = 8
- **Commentary** = 9

G. PLACEMENT: Entails the position the news story is placed on the outlet page. Main i.e. 0 equals to the main page when the website opens, 1 equals to county news tab and 2 refers to all others i.e. columns, editorials, features, health and lifestyle tabs.

Main = 0
County = 1
Other = 2

SECTION C: SOURCES AND REPORTING METHODS

Sources: looks at the persons or actors who sentences, statements and phrases are attributed to. On this level, the focus of coding is on the number of sources present in each news items, nature of the sources and type of source.

H. SOURCES

1. **Document sources**: captures the presence or absence of policy documents, reports, books, magazines as news sources
   - No = 0
   - Yes = 1

2. **Human Sources**: the presence or absence of human beings as news sources
   - No = 0
   - Yes = 1

3. **Source Type**: “This refers to the source’s institutional affiliation or subjective position within the news item. In general, journalists are asked to identify who they quote in their stories, according to their relevance and association with the
topic/news item. You should code the absence or presence of each type of source.”

a) **State source**: this attribute looks at different sources arranged on a binary. State sources refers to personnel that work administering the national, and devolved government. Contains a wide array of government employees, including bureaucrats, administrators, representatives, executives, etc., who participate in governmental activities.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

b) **Political party source**: This refers to members of a political party, with or without parliamentary representation.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

c) **Business/Company source**: refers to Spokesperson/Representative from the commercial sector.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

d) **Civil Society Source**: It refers to members of an organised civil society, such as a NGO, union, church, or similar social organisation, other than the State and business world.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

e) **Ordinary people source**: This category contains regular citizens. These sources are defined as those who are speaking for themselves.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

f) **Media source**: refers to spokesperson/representative/member of communication media outlet, or journalists as individuals, other than the author of the news item.
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

g) **Expert source**: refers to specialists in a specific area. Can include “researchers from universities, applied research institutes, hospitals, or any other institution that is recognised for its output of knowledge. It also includes private research centres. It does not include researchers or experts from public services, or other technical organisms that generally provide specialists, and should be categorised in Executive Power. ”
   No = 0  
   Yes = 1

h) **Anonymous source**: “This refers to unidentified sources; sources whose identity is not mentioned and to sources who are explicitly referred to as anonymous”
i) Religious Sources: Here we code for sources speaking on a religious capacity and not on a capacity by virtue of being affiliated to a religious CSO.
   No = 0
   Yes = 1

j) Foreign sources
   J1. Elite Nations refers to states in the global north especially countries in Central Europe, and North America
   No = 0
   Yes = 1
   J2. Bretton woods Institutions: references the IMF and World Bank institutions as news sources
   No = 0
   Yes = 1
   J3. Third Nation elites: all sources from countries beyond the nation state. This especially includes countries that are neighbours to Kenya and culturally similar but not necessarily economically or politically powerful.
   No = 0
   Yes = 1
   J4. Intergovernmental organisations: makes references to AU, EU, NATO, IGAD, East African Community, and other similar institutions
   No = 0
   Yes = 1
   J5. Other FOREIGN source: any other source that doesn't fit in the other foreign categories
   No = 0
   Yes = 1
   J6. Foreign Research: references studies by foreign academic and non-academic sources
   No = 0
   Yes = 1

k) Local Research: contains reference to research or studies whether conducted by academic or organisations
   No = 0
   Yes = 1

l) Terror Organisation: contains reference to al-Shabaab members especially the groups formal commanders, spokesperson, or backed sources or their media sources e.g. websites, social media sites, magazine etc.
   No = 0
   Yes = 1

4. Main source: codes for the most quoted source category in a news items.
   - State source = 0
   - Political party = 1
Reporting Methods: “pay attention and give importance to how the facts are reported, and what strategies and professional rules are used to justify the truth of assertions about reality. In other words, we must focus on the use that the journalist makes of determining procedures and conventions to face reality.”

I. **Balance**: Diversity of sources and points of view. “To what extent does the news item present a balanced perspective, with diverse sources and points of view?”
   - Absence of sources and/or PoV = 0
   - Unilateral coverage = 1 when one source is present or only sources and perspectives from one side.
   - Presence of different sources and PoV with different weighing within the story = 2 greater presence of some PoV over others.
   - Presence of different sources and PoV with the same weighing within the story = 3

J. **Verifiable evidence/Hard data**: includes data such as figures, facts (statistics) and any information that can be verified by a third party “that does not correspond to either the author’s or the sources’ subjective thoughts, feelings or opinion”.
   - Less factual and verifiable information than non-verifiable information = 0
   - Balance between verifiable and non-verifiable information = 1
   - More factual and verifiable information than non-verifiable information = 2
   - Only factual or verifiable information = 3

K. **Conditional Use**: use of verbs in conditional form e.g. ‘it would be…’.)
   - No = 0
   - Yes = 1

L. **Argumentation**: use of logic to prove/challenge/refute/reaffirm facts or events. Can be visible through use of vocabulary such as ‘due to’, ‘since’, ‘however’)
   - Arguments are not used = 0
   - There is one argument = 1
   - There are two arguments = 2
   - There are more than two arguments = 3
SECTION D: TYPES OF FRAMES

This section looks at the types of frames present in a news item. I used Snow and Benford’s (1988) category of frames typology to code the type of frames occurring the data. **Diagnostic frames** are frames that focused on defining the causes of ‘radicalisation’ and/or identifying who is to blame for ‘radicalisation’. **Prognostic frames** focused on identifying solutions/remedies to the problem; **Symptomatic frames** identify why an issues is a problem by focusing on the consequences, and **motivational frames** focus on rallying individuals against a cause. Hence, they move past the ‘who is to blame and the consequences’ and instead puts forward the moral reasons why the speaker should be concerned.

M. ‘radicalisation’ mentioned in passing: contains references to ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’, terrorism in relation to young people whether in passing or detailed. Values range between 0 for it is not the main issue in focus/only passing and 1 it was the main issue being discussed. Those that are coded at 1 will undergo a detailed second cycle of coding to further identify primary and secondary frames, themes, the events under discussion, actors, and their actions.

Not present = 0
Present = 1

N. Frames

- Diagnostic Frame = 0
- Prognostic = 1
- Symptomatic = 2
- Motivational = 3
- Others = 4
Appendix E: Interview Guide

Interview Guide for Practitioners

1. Could you please share some information about yourself such as your age, sex, gender, ethnicity, religious identity, level of education, and your employment status?
2. How do you understand the term ‘extremism’?
3. How do you define the term ‘radicalisation’?
4. How would you describe the differences between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’?
5. What meanings do these terms imply in the drafting and implementation of CVE programs?
6. From your expertise in CVE, how are youth viewed in relation to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’?
7. Do you think this characterisation is manifested in the approaches of CVE towards youth?
8. Can you give an example or two based on your experience in CVE of how such characterisations of youth have manifested themselves?
9. Do you think there is any connection between how youth are portrayed in the security debate and CVE in practice?
10. Are there any differences between youth themselves regarding the degree at-risk in relation to ‘radicalisation’? i.e. what type of a young person considered to be more at-risk and why?
11. Based on your experience in CVE how do you think the discourse of youth at-risk manifests itself in the context of Mombasa, Kenya, regionally and beyond?
12. What is the role of CVE in creating, reinforcing or challenging how youth are viewed in relation to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’?

Guiding Questions for FGDs

1. Could you please share some information about yourself such as your age, sex, gender, ethnicity, religious identity, level of education, and your employment status?
2. How do you understand the term ‘extremism’?
3. What do you understand by the term ‘radicalisation’?
4. How would you describe the differences between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’?
5. In your own words, how would you define CVE, and what do you think is the role and purpose of CVE?
6. How are young people viewed in relation to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’? i) in the security debate of Kenya? And ii) in CVE initiatives?
7. Are there any connections between how youth are portrayed in the security debate and CVE in practice?
8. What actions reflect CVE understanding of this ‘youth identity’?
9. Would you draw any differences between youth themselves in terms of the degree at-risk in relation to ‘radicalisation’? i.e. which young people are considered to be more at-risk and why?
10. Does this characterisation reflect how you view yourself? If not, then how do you view yourself? And how do you contest/challenge or appropriate the identity constructed by CVE initiatives?
11. How does this common understanding of ‘youth at risk’ impact your life?
### Appendix F: Expert Interview Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Position &amp; Organisation</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Type of Program</th>
<th>Mode of Interview</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Location of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP0719</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>07/12/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MP2219</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>22/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>FP1319</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>13/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>FP2119</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>21/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MP0619</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Media Relations Officer</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>22/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MP1519</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>15/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MP0319</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>TVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>03/12/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MP2719</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Director,</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>27/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>MP1620</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>16/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MP0120</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>16/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FP1619</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>Virtual</td>
<td>16/12/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>MP1520</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>15/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FP1419</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Founder &amp; Volunteer</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>13/12/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MP1219</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Founder &amp; Volunteer</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>13/12/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>MP2319</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>22/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MP1220</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Public Relations Officer</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Equality &amp; HR</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>15/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>FP1720</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Equality &amp; HR</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>15/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MP1320</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Non-Coastal</td>
<td>Upcountry</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>13/01/2020</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MP2519</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>In-person</td>
<td>25/06/2019</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G: Applying CDA in NVivo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical focus</th>
<th>Process engaged in NVivo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1 &amp; 2: Reading and initial noting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Open coding</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial noting examines broadly <em>when</em> the term ‘radicalisation’ is used, in <em>what</em> context and <em>how</em> it is used. Once this was accomplished, I developed a set of codes (initial codes) looking at:</td>
<td>a) <strong>Attribute coding</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The definition of ‘radicalisation’.</td>
<td>For press articles, I record attributes detailing the general characteristics of the news articles, the characteristics of the news story, reporting and sourcing methods, and types of frames used (see Appendix D for a comprehensive overview). For interviews and FGD transcripts, I record attributes on personal details such as participants sex, gender, ethnicity, religion, region of origin, type of organisation they work for, and their capacity in the organisation. Attribute coding helps to analyse the contents and distribution of categories in the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What causes ‘radicalisation’? By looking at the expressions that were used to explain the issue.</td>
<td>b) <strong>Language coding</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who is to blame for ‘radicalisation’? Were the actors named? if so, who does the naming?</td>
<td>Two policy texts, 57 speeches and statements, 46 press articles, 19 interview transcripts and two FGD transcripts were examined for language. The focus is on when the term ‘radicalisation’ is used, in what context and how it is used. I arrive at this by running a <em>word frequency query</em> and <em>tree diagrams</em> and then refine them with <em>text searches</em> and <em>queries</em>. This helps to identify terms frequently occurring with ‘radicalisation’ and where they occur in the content. The query results and issues that are identified while reviewing literature are also used to develop codes. At this coding stage, I also use texts/participants’ words to form descriptive phrases. This reduces the original data and helps to summarise the meaning being conveyed. Then I code for words, sentences or paragraphs into existing codes and create new ones for those that did not appear while reviewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the solutions or what can be done to prevent ‘radicalisation’?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim of this step is to provide: |
| • Descriptive comments on the contents of the article |
| • Linguistic comments on how language has been used |
| • Conceptual comments to interrogate and reflect on the text in preparation for interpretation. |

| 329 |
Step 3: Developing emerging themes
Looking for patterns and connections in the data. Once the initial coding has been done, the next task is to comprehensively analyse the text for how it uses language. I use the following guiding questions:

- What issues are foregrounded when talking about 'radicalisation'?
- How were youth actors represented in these arguments?
  - What aspects about youth are foregrounded and backgrounded?
  - What vocabulary is used to describe young people?
  - What social situations are young people portrayed in?
    - What assumptions drive these descriptions?
    - Who is making the arguments?
  - Are the arguments advanced based on expert research and analysis, laws, statistics, and authority figures?
    - What and how do the arguments reference moral values?

Category creation (subordinate themes)
A duplicate ‘category’ folder is created and it holds a copy of the open codes. Each code is based on the categories identified in step 1 & 2. Each code is then reviewed in this category folder, and they are reordered into broader categories (added either as parent or child codes), merged and renamed to reflect coded content and participants understanding of ‘radicalisation’.

literature or initial reading. This process is repetitive and involves going through each text several times to code, re-code and add reflexive and interrogative comments:
- On code names which summarise description of the content.
- Descriptive comments/annotations and memos provide coding transparency, as they include the code description.
- Notes to capture reflexive and conceptual comments to understand methodological decisions.
f. What are the functions of these discursive practices (referential and legitimation strategies)?

g. How does the language create, maintain or challenge existing power relations?

The purpose of this phase is to develop themes which reflect the texts’ original words/thoughts and the researcher’s interpretation.

NB: some of the analysis in this phase occurred outside NVivo.

**Step 4: Searching for connections across emergent themes.**

This step intends to map out how themes fit together by employing several strategies developed by Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009)

- Abstraction and Polarisation involves a process of examining similarities and differences between themes. Once this is established, the cluster is placed under a new name.
- Contextualisation: involves identifying the narrative or conceptual elements in the analysis. These could include temporal and cultural themes. An advantage of this strategy is that it is useful in highlighting localised understanding of the issue being analysed.
- Function: is a strategy that concerns itself with examining themes for their specific function in the text.

**Category development (superordinate themes)**

The focus is on evaluating whether categories can be linked/reduced further into emergent themes. Aim of this step is to summarise the data into a few themes relevant to the research question. This also helps to prompt deeper thinking about the data. Afterwards, codes are merged (see figure 2.3) for ease tracking of relations between themes and for visualisation purposes.

NB: A code refers to a word, or a descriptive phrase that captures the core feature of the data. Codes include: unemployment, corruption, low level of education, among others. A theme refers to a collection of several related codes. For instance, unemployment, corruption, and low levels of education all refer to socio-economic conditions. Thus they belong to the theme socio-economic grievances. Together with other themes on e.g. historical injustices, political marginalisation, they all form structural discourses on radicalisation or politico-economic concerns as I refer to them in this thesis.

**Step 5: Moving to the next case**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All the above processes are repeated for each text.</th>
<th>The logic behind this is that each text is treated as a new analysis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 6 &amp; 7: Looking for patterns across cases</strong>&lt;br&gt;Themes are evaluated to detect patterns across texts. Connections are identified, and more specifically the most potent themes, and how the themes illuminate each other. This step moves the analysis to a deeper theoretical level as the superordinate themes may reflect concepts shared by all cases. It is noticeable that the analysis has gradually moved from the individual parts to the whole. Interestingly, as CDA involves moving back and forth, during this step the analysis is reversed and the whole viewed in terms of its constituent parts.</td>
<td><strong>Writing analytical memos, testing, validating and revising analytical memos</strong>&lt;br&gt;This phase involves accurately summarising the content of each category, the coding patterns, situating the relations of codes to each other, and their importance to the research question. In addition, the memos, coding matrices are useful in tracking coding patterns. In addition, exporting the data to excel helps to generate visualisations that can summarise the contents of the texts under analysis. Here the coding is also compared to the attribute coding done on the texts to assess any patterns that may exist in relation to the texts profiles. In addition, this step tests the memos to self-audit the proposed findings and seek evidence beyond textual quotes to support the findings and expand deeper meaning of the data. Finally, the analytical memos are synthesised into the findings (most of these in my project appear as footnotes). Finalising this phase will result in the production of five empirical chapters and a conclusion chapter reflecting on what the findings mean for our understanding of 'radicalisation' and PCVE efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>