

Vigilant journalism: the impact of lateral surveillance on journalists' lives

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Dimitri Bettoni

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ABSTRACT

This research argues that the technological means that allowed the development of citizen journalism can be redirected towards journalists themselves. It investigates the surveillance capacity that resides in the hands of citizens, and the extent to which this potential is being used. It argues that the existing power structures can attempt to coopt the public into the surveillance apparatus, recruiting the citizens as proxy-agents of surveillance.

The research draws its theoretical foundations from the field of surveillance studies in line with the tradition started by Michel Foucault and updated by scholars such as David Lyon and his “liquid surveillance”.

The project adopts a qualitative, mixed-method approach that involves two case studies and 12 semi-structured interviews conducted with media professionals, whose background and direct experiences with surveillance provided in-depth insights and information. The study reaches its findings through content and thematic analysis. Turkey and Italy were selected as case studies, with a comparative approach that aims at understanding the phenomena underlying the emergence of citizen-driven surveillance practices and the consequences on the professional and private lives of journalists.

The research points at a synthesis between the two paradigms, the Foucauldian panopticon and liquid surveillance by David Lyon, as an innovative combined framework to understand surveillance practices that both threaten and empower journalism, by harvesting from the experiences of selected journalists working in the field. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the environment in which journalism operates, how surveillance technologies and cultures shape it, and what threats and opportunities arise for journalism from states and non-state actors in this quickly developing scenario.

CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO SURVEILLANCE STUDIES AND JOURNALISM

1.1 The surveillance dilemma

Ligaiya Romero, a photographer, filmmaker and scholar who covered the protests that had spread in the US following the death of George Floyd, was quoted in a recent letter from the Authority Collective. She says:

As photographers/filmmakers, we need to ask ourselves, is this image sousveillance (from the bottom pointing up, holding powerholders and oppressors accountable) or are we furthering surveillance (from the top pointing down, adding to a history of violence and surveillance of Black, Indigenous, and POC bodies, and creating a document that can be used to further that violence)? (Romero 2020)

These words speak volumes about the complicated relationship between surveillance and journalism. Surveillance is a word that has (re)gained popularity in recent years. Scandals like Cambridge Analytica (Berghel 2018) or Edward Snowden's revelations on the NSA spying on the American people (Landau 2013) hit the headlines, sparking debate everywhere.

The Orwellian idea of surveillance as an enigmatic and disturbing presence that puts our lives under control is still strong in our heads, and with many reasons for being so. However, surveillance also allows our society to exist in its current shape. We can hardly imagine a healthcare system that works without data collection and constant monitoring, even if it is an exercise that we will have to engage with, sooner or later.

Technology is a dominant force that shapes everything, including how surveillance is performed. The increasingly expanding internet and the presence of billions of cameras, phones, drones and hundreds of other tools for (in)visible data collection are shaping our world. However, not everything can be explained by the changes introduced by the

evolution of our technologies. In Covid times, the pandemic emergency is pushing forward controversial technical solutions to our needs and fears, like tracing apps. Technology shapes society but, as has been well-argued by scholars of technology and society, ongoing social phenomena shape technology as well, since “cultural assumptions are embedded within instrumentation and instrumental practices” (Pinch and Bijker, 1986, p. 350).

Journalism cannot be immune from these dynamics, of course. In the era of what some scholars hailed as the “surveillance society” (Lyon 2001), journalists are still bound to their duty to protect their investigations, their stories, their sources and ultimately themselves from the peering eye. In order to do so, they need to be tech savvy, develop sharp awareness of modern technologies and their capabilities, reach out and seek financial support for securing their work, and obtain necessary legal protections.

However, the question that Romero poses is a fine example of how the relationship between surveillance and journalism is far from being simply the clash between the right to inform and the attempt to cripple it, and journalists are not just vulnerable targets of surveillance. They also actively participate in the surveillance mesh that covers the world. They use powerful intelligence gathering tools and software in their daily activities, they surf the web hunting for news, and they contribute to the circulation of a vast amount of information. Are they aware of their position and the dynamics that this position implies? What role can or should deontological and ethical standards play?

To further complicate the scenario, journalists and citizens are not as distinguishable as they used to be. Tools and solutions that once belonged to the exclusive domain of the newsrooms are now available to almost everyone, from the blogger uploading leaked information to the darknet, to the influencer with millions of viewers on social media platforms. While mentioning journalists, I am actually also referring to the citizens, and the billions of phones, computers, platforms and other resources they use to collect and circulate information.

This research project investigates the impact of surveillance on journalistic performances and journalists' professional and private lives, in order to understand how journalists' practices are shaped by it. In particular, it focuses on the horizontal dimension of surveillance relationships, also called lateral surveillance, with a focus on (digital) vigilantism (Trottier 2017) as a practice of citizens who engage in activities that are usually the exclusive domain of the police forces. The project recognizes that this horizontal dimension of surveillance is not independent from its vertical, top-down dimension, of which state surveillance is the primary recognized form, and therefore warrants closer attention.

Citizens and journalists now hold in their hands a potential surveillance capacity that can affect how journalism is performed, alter journalism's core mission of informing the public, and jeopardize journalists' lives and their well-being.

Moreover, the existing power structures can attempt to co-opt the public into the surveillance apparatus. The technological means that allowed the development of citizen journalism can be redirected against journalists themselves. Both the audience and the journalists can be recruited by the watchmen – the state, the economic élites or other groups of power – therefore reaffirming the supremacy of the controller over the controlled. The study is an attempt to provide for a better understanding of the impact of this colonisation of lateral surveillance by the state on the exercise of journalism.

The motivations behind this study stem from my years as correspondent in different countries, including Turkey, which is one of the case studies of this research, where I had the chance to witness, both personally and indirectly through other colleagues, the consequences of different forms of surveillance performed by different social actors on the exercise of journalism, but also on our private lives.

Contemporary developments such as the rise of populism, authoritarian drifts, increasing levels of distrust in media, polarisation within democratic and semi-democratic societies, and technological developments (Freedom of the Net 2018) shape the ways in which journalists can become targets of surveillance not only from above, by the institutions of power, but also from below, as citizens and journalists themselves are turned into proxy agents of surveillance (Mols and Pridmore 2019).

More recently, invasive laws with broad boundaries of application in fighting terrorism have come to be seen as an attack on privacy, on the media's capability to hold authorities accountable in the eyes of the citizenship, and on freedom of expression (Chang 2011). The emergence of authoritarian drifts in policy trends and the loosening of privacy safeguards, amid the establishment of legislative and governance measures that favour acquiring data to the detriment of privacy, is enough to compromise the power equilibrium among different actors and tilt it in favour of those who can exercise power over the others, governments and economic oligarchies interested in curbing social movements, activism, free flow of information and, more in general, a bottom-up and non-hierarchical social architecture.

Since only a fraction of surveillance practices occurs in plain sight, to achieve its aims and engage with its research questions, the research adopts an inductive approach and draws the data directly from journalists working in the field, eliciting their perceptions of surveillance, their stories and experiences of when, where and how they have been watched and monitored not only by state agencies, but by their colleagues and the public as well.

The research focuses on Turkey and Italy as case studies, with a comparative approach that aims at understanding the phenomena underlying the emergence of citizen-driven surveillance practices, either because of or regardless of the media system and the regime type of the two countries. As it will be illustrated in the fourth chapter, these two countries differ from many aspects: Italy is considered a solid Western democracy, a founding member of the European Union, where the rule of law is challenged but functioning. Its media system is flawed by clientelism, ownership concentration and a long standing issue with its defamation law, which criminalises defamation and therefore is not compliant with the general standards accepted in the EU, but it is nevertheless considered a free country with a free press (MPM 2021). On the other hand, Turkey's democracy is backsliding in an authoritarian spiral, its institutions are jeopardised by years of policies that advanced the overlapping of the state with the AKP, President Erdogan's party, which is ruling the country continuously for 20 years. Press freedoms are constantly violated, the numbers of human

right violation are constantly increasing, and the exercise of journalism is difficult and dangerous (MPM 2021).

1.2 Research questions

The research explores the nature of surveillance deployed by and against journalists and the consequences of this surveillance for the state of journalism and the journalists' own professional practices and well-being, through the following research questions:

RQ1: *What is the impact of lateral surveillance and (digital) vigilantism on journalistic practices and journalists' professional and private lives?*

This question explores the horizontal paths of surveillance practices, how they shape the way journalism is performed and the surveillance-mediated interactions between journalists and other social actors, how they are perceived by the media professionals, what is the level of awareness around them and what reactions and consequences they produce.

RQ2: *How and why are journalists and other members of the public being co-opted by the state in the surveillance apparatus deployed against journalists and media workers?*

By answering this question, the research analyses the intersection between lateral forms of surveillance and top-down, hierarchical ones, focussing on the role of the state.

By addressing these questions, the research aims to improve our understanding of what challenges, threats but also opportunities may arise from the current environment in which journalism operates, how surveillance technologies and cultures shape it, and what practices are in place as a consequence of this fast-developing scenario. It provides an updated assessment of the kinds of surveillance-related threats journalists face nowadays, evaluates the impact of these threats on journalists' well-being, and it suggests countermeasures and good practices to journalists to protect themselves and their work. Finally, the research aims to provide useful indications for future action on surveillance detection/evasion for media organizations and journalists under threat of surveillance, and to contribute to recommendations for policy development aimed at empowering and protecting independent journalism.

1.3 Dissertation outline

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), I outline the theoretical foundations from which this research project stems. I will start by introducing the notion of surveillance not only as a manifestation of power relations, but as the fundamental trait of our contemporary societies, able to shape every aspect of our lives, including the ecology in which the media operates.

In the third chapter (Chapter 3), I expand the theoretical and conceptual analysis toward the critical actors of this ecology, namely the journalist, the citizen and the watchman (or agent of surveillance), in particular by underscoring their hybrid nature. One of the assumptions the analysis rests on is the ongoing process of hybridization that involves these three types of social actors. The borders between these actors are being blurred by technology and social developments, including political decision-making processes. Surveillance technology is becoming cheaper and increasingly pervasive. The range of tools, software and equipment with immense intrusive capabilities available to citizen-journalists is today greater than ever. As the boundaries between the citizen and the journalist have been blurred by the rise of citizen journalism, similarly, the boundaries between the citizen and the “spy” are going through a process of hybridization, the extent of which is still largely unexplored.

The next chapter (Chapter 4) is dedicated to describing the context of the two country case studies, Italy and Turkey, in order to prepare the floor for a better understanding of the ensuing findings, and the differences and similarities between the two countries that can emerge from the analysis of the data collected through the interviews with journalists in both contexts.

In Chapter 5, the proposed methodology of this research is outlined and explained in light of the specific needs of this research, particularly regarding the invisibility of the surveillance phenomena and the resulting necessity of a different strategic approach. Ethical dilemmas regarding the research are also discussed here. In particular, this chapter

focuses on the challenges that stemmed from the Covid-19 pandemic and how the obstacles arising from it impacted the planned fieldwork. The methodological changes required to pursue the research project also produced a debate with my supervisor and other colleagues that I think is worth reporting and documenting here, not only because it shaped the outcome of the research, but also because it provides some food for thought for future research.

The sixth and seventh chapters reports on the key findings from the study, exploring the data collected through the interviews and highlighting the key phenomena and trends that emerged from the data collection and analysis. The findings chapter also applies a comparative lens to the findings from the two groups of interviewees (Turkish and Italian journalists and media workers) to assess the key similarities and differences arising from their experiences and their unique country contexts.

The eighth and final chapter provides a summary of the main findings from the case studies and interviews, and discusses the key theoretical and conceptual insights, as well as practical implications for policymaking and journalism practice. In this chapter, I also point out the limitations of the study and suggest directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF SURVEILLANCE

This chapter offers an overview of the concept of surveillance and how scholars interpret it, how it evolved over time and which role it plays in our contemporary society. I started introducing Foucault's work on surveillance because of the incredible influence it had on our understanding of the concept. Our imaginaries are still filled by the interpretations that came to us through Foucault's lenses. Moving forward from this starting point, I explored how other scholars criticised, improved, abandoned, or reinterpreted Foucault's work, until the emergence, at the beginning of this new century, of a new paradigm by the hand of the scholar David Lyon and his "Liquid surveillance". I conclude the chapter with a focus on the concept of lateral surveillance as a specific form of surveillance.

This chapter, therefore, allows us to understand the nature and peculiarities of surveillance through the eyes of these scholars, and then move on to the next chapter, where the concept of surveillance is applied to the world of journalism, to see how it shapes and influences the exercise of this profession, both in its horizontal form and in its top-down form exercised by the State, and which threats and opportunities arise from these interactions.

2.1 Rules of internalisation: surveillance in a Foucauldian perspective

The publication of the book *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1975) represents a landmark in the study of surveillance. Michel Foucault dates back modern techniques of surveillance to social developments that occurred in the 19th century. He borrows the concept of the panopticon from Jeremy Bentham's ideal model of prison. In the panopticon model, the agent of surveillance (watcher) cannot be seen or identified by the subject of surveillance (watched), who develops an impersonal and anonymous relationship with power. Invisibility is a key concept here. Without being able to verify the presence of the watcher, the watch starts to behave as if he is being constantly watched, without knowing for certain

whether or not this is the case, thus developing a self-regulatory discipline that leads to the internalisation of the norms and behaviours as desired by the ruling authority.

Foucault then observes the expansion of the panopticon's functionality all over the public and private spaces: from the schools to the military academies, from the hospitals to the factories.

The internalisation process leads to the creation of docile bodies, conceptualised as raw material destined to be shaped by and for power, aimed at optimising their efficiency and economy (Downing 2008). In this sense, Foucault's notion of surveillance is inextricably linked to the creation of the capitalist workforce (Ibid.): the body becomes the first and foremost place in and over which power operates, thus giving birth to the notion of biopower..

Disciplinary power and bio-power are fundamental concepts of Foucault's idea of governmentality, the possibility of an automated ruling that doesn't need the kind of direct intervention that makes power exercise both expensive and risky in terms of resources and social control.

Moreover, according to Foucault power is based on knowledge, and it makes use of it. But power also produces knowledge and shapes our truths, manipulating the spaces in which power is exercised (Foucault 1975). All forms of knowledge are merely the narration emerged from the victory of a certain ideology over the rival ones. That is, the winner makes history. Foucault establishes a link between power and truth, suggesting that we should instead talk of "power-knowledge" when we examine history. Since journalists are still to be counted among the information gatekeepers (Janowitz 1975), from a Foucauldian perspective journalists become legitimate targets of the authority that, by adopting techniques of surveillance, exerts power aimed at transforming them into docile bodies, therefore controlling the production and flow of knowledge.

2.2 Surveillance beyond Foucault

The panopticon model has come under scrutiny, with scholars debating whether it can keep up with the transformations that occurred in the last four decades.

Deleuze characterized these developments as the transformation of the disciplinary society into the “Societies of control” (Deleuze 1992), determined mainly by the changes in the capitalistic system, its impact over the structure of social institutions, and its increasing tendency toward commodification and marketization: “Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to floating modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies” (Deleuze 1992, pag.5). Deleuze analyses the changes in the school system, the prison system, the hospital system and the corporate system following the transformation of the nature of capitalism. As our media live within and by the very same capitalistic rules, we can consider media institutions and, more in general, media systems, as one of these Deleuzian societies of control.

Louis Amoore borrowed from Foucault the concept of bio-power and, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack and the following conceptualisation of the war on terror, developed the idea of biometric border. The fixed, physical space of the traditional border is internalised within the moving human body, toward which (digital) technologies and border management techniques are deployed: “The biometric border is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood” (Amoore 2006, pag.338). The biometric border implies that surveillance techniques now follow the moving bodies (including the ones of journalists) beyond the locked spaces of the Foucauldian panopticon.

The panopticon itself has been revisited through the creation of derived terminologies that attempt to update the functioning of the “veillance” in terms of origin of observation. Instead of the invisible, ever-watching central eye, we now find the synopticon (Mathiesen 1997). The synopticon is a shift from the “few watching the many” to “the many watch the few”. Aaron Doyle (2011) stressed that Mathiesen strategically framed his concept over the

traditional mass media, in which a large, invisible public watches a restricted number of individuals, essentially reversing the logic of the panopticon. Even with the advent of the digital (social) media, which contributed to an interactive communication, the synopticon is well alive and it finds itself at the foundation of the relationship between the media professionals and their audiences, which keep the journalist under the public scrutiny.

Ganascia instead coined the term catopticon, opposed to the Foucault's panopticon, to describe a social architecture that permits everyone to monitor everybody: "In practice, there is no hierarchy, i.e. no central tower, and everyone may communicate in total transparency" (Ganascia 2010, pag.9). The catopticon is made possible by the distribution of surveillance devices in the hands of the citizen, while the authority no longer exerts the exclusive dominion over ownership of surveillance techniques. Scholars like Ganascia argue that sousveillance, even if it always coexists with surveillance, is nowadays dominant in social dynamics.

This newly founded distribution of technology and social transformation led Mann and Ferenbok to develop the idea of Sousveillance. Sousveillance has been conceived as a countermeasure to surveillance, a bottom-up veillance representing the capability of the masses to watch those in power and hold them accountable. By approaching the subject from an etymological perspective, Mann and Ferenbok introduce the difference between surveillance (veillance from above) and sousveillance (veillance from below) and suggest a more crowdsourced and democratic nature of the latter compared to the former. They state that surveillance is "flawed by an inherent conflict of interest" (Mann and Ferenbok 2013, pag.20), since the power in charge of watching does not monitor itself, whereas sousveillance can counter this flaw by keeping authorities under scrutiny and accountable. If coupled with political action, sousveillance becomes a counter force that helps creating a kind of veillance equilibrium, that they call the *equiveillance* (Mann and Ferenbok 2013).

Mixed forms of surveillance and sousveillance have already been analysed in some works, as in the case of Internet Eyes, an online video notification system that allows the population to participate in surveillance: anyone can watch through the cameras from everywhere and spot and report anti-social behaviours and crimes (Ibid.). Marc Owen Jones focused on the "Hariqhum" Twitter account during the Bahrain uprising, whose owner

spent days disclosing information about what they deemed to be traitors of the state, posting pictures of people seen at anti-government rallies, circling their faces, disclosing their addresses, their places of work, and their phone numbers (Owens 2013).

Whitaker and Whitaker (2000) follow a similar discourse by evoking the “participatory panopticon”, an architecture that represents a form of collective “consensual submission to surveillance” (Andrejevic 2006), because the watched and the watcher are condensed in the same figure. Whitaker thinks that the increasing number sensor devices makes the control network more socially pervasive and distributed, generating a form of equality based on comprehensive full transparency. The mesh of the net becomes even finer when anyone can exercise horizontal control over their peers (Mallén 2012). Yet scholars like Deibert and Rohozinski have noted that the very same technologies that allow processes of democratization within the surveillance domain, can be harnessed by institutions of oppression (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010), resulting in a misleading perception of a field that does not allow *equivalence*, rather asymmetry of power.

My research argues that the powers interested in surveillance, usually the state, exploit the surveillance potential within *sousveillance* and, by co-opting the public, transform the latter into an agent of surveillance, in order to achieve complete control over media, eroding their independence and counter-hegemonic potential. In other words, *sousveillance* might be under attack by those powers interested in restoring a top-down circulation of ideas and information.

Following the visible thread of the multiplication of the recording devices that left Foucault’s watchtower, Andrejevic and Burdon (2015) instead hail the era of the “sensor society”. The sensor society represents a farther shift away from the panopticon model than the Deleuze’s control society, whose centralised architecture still recalls the one of the panopticon and its central eye.

Sensors of any kind “permeate daily life in technologically equipped societies” (Andrejevic and Burdon 2015, pag.19) and synergize with interactive online platforms, seen as another tool of data collection. As a result, they witness a transition from targeted, body-focused surveillance *veillance* in Foucault, to “always-on, ubiquitous, opportunistic ever-expanding forms of data capture” (Ibid.), facilitated by the increasing digitization of everyday life

(Graham and Wood 2003). We can think of smart cities as a prime example of the growing sensor society: our urban spaces are filled with these forms of data capture that are constantly at work, where citizens are subject to surveillance due to the simple fact that they inhabit the city.

Deleuze's control society is made of rigid architectures that entrap bodies within and put them under the scrutiny of the centralised tower control. Instead, the sensor society is based not only on the multiplication of sensors, but also on the surpassing of the sensor-produced data over the user-produced data, which still constituted one of the features of control societies: today our mobile phones generate much more information than the one we create solely by using them, like through our emails or messages. The handling of this large amount of data requires the development of new practices and the creation of new infrastructures for data collection and analysis. This sensor-driven data collection aims at the capturing of an overall image of a certain population or geography in the Foucauldian sense, thus making sensor-derived surveillance an "untargeted, non-systematic, and often opportunistic" approach that has an impact on our inhabited spaces.

A core element of the sensor society is its inherent asymmetry, opposed to Mann's equeveillance and Whitaker's participatory panopticon, and indeed very much like the panopticon. This asymmetry produces inequalities and power imbalances, because the required data-mining processes belong to corporations and governments with the financial and logistical capabilities to handle the large amounts of data produced by the sensor society (Andrejevic and Burdon 2015). The type of data collected by sensors scattered in our social landscapes is not limited to the one linked to human (inter)activity, but it originates from any possible source, like climate or biological life, as well as machine-produced data. "The upshot is that sensor-derived data accumulates faster than human hands can collect it and faster than human minds can comprehend it" (Andrejevic and Burdon 2015, pag.26). This leads to a dependency on machine-driven storage and analysis, including algorithms, machine-learning and various forms of artificial intelligence, de facto snatching agency and control from human hands, not differently from the smart weapons and the drones that, through algorithms and artificial intelligence, have taken over decision-making and the selection of targets.

The author acknowledges that sensor society is nested within the broader categories of information society (Weber 2006) and surveillance society (Lyon 2001), but it also isolates a peculiar aspect of emerging social logics as illustrated.

Information society stems from the increasing importance of computerised data in every aspect of our daily life, connected to the evolution of our capitalistic economic model. Weber points out five different types of definition of information society, each one of them focusing on a specific criterion that depends on how people conceive information: “technological, economic, occupational, spatial, cultural” (Webster 2006, pag.8). While all important, the latter two are of particular interest for this research. A spatial approach to the definition of information society points the finger at the creation of networks and the cyberspace that erodes spatial and temporal distances, with an emphasis on unrestricted, instantaneous information flow (Ibid. pag. 17), a peculiar characteristic inherited by contemporary electronic and digital surveillance. A cultural-oriented definition of information society stresses the fact that “we exist in a media-saturated environment, which means that life is quintessentially about symbolisation, about exchanging and receiving – or trying to exchange and resisting reception – messages about ourselves and others” (Ibid. pag. 20). In such an environment journalism fulfils a role of primary importance, bringing back into play the Foucauldian notion of power-knowledge.

2.3 A new paradigm: Liquid Surveillance

The evolution of surveillance studies as presented until here represents the various attempts to overcome the limitations of the panopticon model in the light of the evolution of our society in the last 40 years. Each of them embraces certain aspects of the Foucauldian conceptualisation, while attempting to move forward on some specific aspects that seem to clash with the contemporary times. None of these attempts, though, are able to produce a comprehensive, all-rounded interpretation of how surveillance is shaping the social, political and economic aspects of our world.

The work published in 2013 by Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, *Liquid surveillance*, is so far recognized as the most successful attempt to produce a new, organic vision on surveillance as a central dimension of postmodernity.

The work takes its first steps from the concept of liquid modernity as theorized by Bauman (2000) in his work. Bauman puts forward two primary characteristics of our contemporary society that translate into this liquidity. First, in our modern times all social structures melt faster than new ones can be created as replacement. It means that our present world shies away from the rigid solidity of the disciplinary institutions that characterized the work of Foucault, as we have already had the chance to glimpse in Deleuze's work. The second feature of liquid modernity is the split between power and politics: while the former is free to flow beyond the boundaries of the nations, politics are still anchored to the local institutions.

Foucault made accurate observations on surveillance as an imposed field of visibility that, once acknowledged by the subjects, forces responsibility for discipline onto them, thus revealing how power relations characterize all manner of social situations (Foucault 1975).

But in Bauman and Lyon's work, surveillance has become post-panopticon in nature and it "works at a distance in both space and time, circulating fluidly with, but beyond, nation-states", because "the architecture of electronic technologies through which power is asserted in today's mutable and mobile organizations" make the solid architectures of discipline largely redundant, inefficient, and costly (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.10).

The panopticon might be operative in our societies, especially through do-it-yourself devices of surveillance, like our mobile phones, a form of portable and commercially supplied mini-panopticons that we diligently carry with ourselves. To some extent, Foucault anticipated this future development with his prediction of the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault 1977). Beyond this, Lyon and Bauman claim that the Foucauldian panopticon "has clearly stopped being the universal pattern or strategy of domination that it is no longer even the principal or most commonly practised pattern or strategy (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.51).

But surveillance is not just about the new technologies allowing free flow of electronic power and control, power is unevenly distributed across the liquid modernity, and carries asymmetries and inequalities not dissimilar from the ones already aforementioned in the work of Andrejevic. Another element of distance between Foucault and Bauman/Lyon is represented by the relationship between surveillance and security. In Foucault, surveillance is focused on the here and now, it keeps the body firmly within the institution of discipline. Liquid surveillance not only grants power unlimited freedom of movement, but it is projected in the future: it attempts to foresee and anticipate what will happen. Surveillance activities like profiling, social sorting and risk forecasting are linked to this attempt to know the unfathomable future, activities designed to influence and to manage both individuals and populations. There are not per-se evil or despotic activities.

Scholars such as Anthony Giddens (2002) have stressed the importance of surveillance as an essential mechanism of modern states in providing citizens with services such as school or health care. More precisely, routine surveillance is a prerequisite of effective social organisation, something which we all benefit from as it allows the complexity of our times to be administered. Without it, we would witness a societal collapse.

Even before Giddens, in Foucault's work on security and population management (2007), the French philosopher elaborates on how policing technologies became an integral feature of modern states as they intermingled with the population which, by acknowledging surveillance not only as inevitable, but as essential to the sustenance of modern societies, thus making it possible to create a system of consent of the governed that lies at the foundations of modern western states.

This theoretical shift became possible once the notion of population replaced the individual as the central conception of modern state power in Foucault's discourse. The panopticon and its disciplinary, oppressive apparatus were replaced by the population through the somehow more benevolent mechanism of the apparatus of security (Lemke 2001).

Pemberton (1990) highlights that both Foucault and Giddens saw that the essence of power deployed by modern states is centred on the administrative apparatus, the bureaucratic machine that collects and digest knowledge, in the form of data, in order to exercise control over human behaviour.

To use David Lyon's words, "one key problem with contemporary surveillance is its myopic focus on control, which quickly excludes any concern with care" (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.37). Building on the late Foucault lesson, Lyon argues that responsible and even caring forms of surveillance are not only possible, but also coexists with the oppressive, threatening forms that were outlined with the panopticon theory.

Therefore, we can now acknowledge that, whether good intentioned or not, and beyond the subjective perception and acceptance of their necessity, surveillance activities inevitably carry a dramatic loss in terms of privacy and anonymity, as we as citizens need to be exposed to the public eye. On this aspect, Lyon accepts Foucault's interpretation of surveillance as an inherent feature of the security apparatus aimed at the management of the population and declares that "We submit our rights to privacy for slaughter of our own will" (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.24).

The erosion of anonymity is, on one hand, the result of the current architecture of the internet and social media, which involves a routine of surveillance non-existent in the predigital era, as well as the increasingly cheaper presence of (portable) sensors (Andrejevic and Burdon 2015). But on the other hand it is also a signal of "a change in people's views about what ought to be public and what ought to be private" (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.25), as surveillance systems penetrate every aspect of life of people that "implicitly (and perhaps unwittingly) consent to the greatest invasion of personal privacy in history" (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010).

Individuals seek to protect the boundaries of privacy, our personal territory where they can exercise our own sovereignty and power to decide 'what and who I am'. But Lyon stresses also on the fact that anonymity and privacy (usually understood as individual rights) are linked to a collective dimension of justice, civil liberties and human rights (Bauman and Lyon 2013).

Another element interposed in the relationship between security and surveillance is, according to Bauman, liquid modern society as an attempt to "make life with fear liveable" (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.87). Dubbed as policies of in/security, with their

corresponding surveillance infrastructures (Monahan 2006), ordinary citizens are struggling to cope with spontaneous, inflicted and self-inflicted fears, and are “encouraged to shoulder the burden by stockpiling supplies, installing alarms or buying insurance, endorse extreme measures that include torture and domestic spying” (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.89). Monahan’s unifying thread of this shut-away tendency of in/security is the “fear of the Other”: a neighbour, a passer-by, a stalker, a migrant: ultimately, every stranger. And, I argue, under specific circumstances, the journalist.

The solicited dream is a Garden of Eden that shuns fears through a complete transparency that holds no glitches nor threats. As Anna Minton (2012) suggests, the need for security can become addictive, and “we have become dependent on surveillance being done and being seen to be done” (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.90).

Finally, Bauman and Lyon debated the ability of liquid surveillance to work at distance, free of spatial limitations, similarly to what Weber presented as the spatial definition of his information society. But in Weber’s society of information, distance is mainly a physical attribute of the networks that will constitute, in Manuel Castell’s work (2004), one of the essential traits of his networked society.

In Bauman and Lyon’s, distance acquires an ethical dimension: surveillance is “the process of doing things at a distance, separating a person from the consequences of an action” (Bauman and Lyon 2013, pag.13). The authors point out two arising ethical issues here. The first one is the dominance of technology over ethics, as technology is no longer the tool to adjust our means to ethical ends, but “allows our ends to be determined by the available means” (Ibid. pag.75). The second is named adiaphorization, where moral obligations are diminished in front of phenomena that desensitize the person “against the committing of immoral deeds and the sole use of criteria of instrumental efficiency in the choice of ways to proceed” (Ibid. pag.82).

This overview of the work of Bauman and Lyon, paired with the Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian exploration of the concept of surveillance, allows a better start to situate the journalistic work within the context of surveillance in terms of affordances, threats and opportunities, merging the despotic, controlling connotation of the panopticon theory aimed at the individual, with the benevolent, caring form of the security apparatus that

target the population. In other words, the labels of threatening and caring forms of surveillance should not be seen as inherent characteristic of different surveillance practice, nor it should be used as a dichotomic categorisation tool to separate good practices from the bad ones. Each and every form of surveillance can be considered a threat or an act of care depending on the motivation that led to its deployment, the nature of the agent performing it, and the subjective perceptions and moral considerations that inevitably surround these practices. Rather, this work tries to understand whether certain professional journalistic practices can constitute forms of surveillance and acknowledges that they inherently carry both a threatening and a caring aspect.

While Michel Foucault and David Lyon were included in my work due to their peculiar and opposite in nature forms of surveillance (discipline-oriented and threatening top-down surveillance in Foucault, caring and liquid in Lyon), the chapter now better underlines that none of the scholar denied the existence of the other element of the dichotomy. Foucault sees forms of caring, functional surveillance in the security mechanism of the modern state, while Lyon does not deny that the panopticon is still alive, even within his liquid vision of surveillance.

Before moving to a more detailed exploration of the ecology of journalism and surveillance, we take a broad look at the economy of surveillance and to the specificity of the concept of lateral surveillance.

2.4 The economy of surveillance

Lyon and Bauman explored the economic conditions under which liquid surveillance thrives. In particular, they focus their attention to the concept of consumerism, the transformation of the status of consumers into “sellable commodities” (Bauman and Lyon 2013, p. 33), and its consequences on surveillance.

Quite uniquely in the panorama of surveillance studies, they state that the 9/11 attack did not “produce that obsession with security, it did much to promote the security surveillance boom that has both provided a major profit boost for related industries” (Ibid. p. 101).

The 2016 report on the Global Surveillance Industry (GSI 2016) published by the British Charity Privacy International states that this industry counts hundreds of companies that develops and trade around the world. Due to the secrecy that surrounds this industry, the available data is very limited, and acquiring new reliable information proved to be a challenge. The information that is currently available comes largely from investigative reporting, whistle-blowers, and government transparency reports. Most of these companies are based in first-world countries that are already involved in large arms exports. United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Israel are considered the top five countries in which this companies are headquartered.

The surveillance industry development is fostered by technological developments, weak regulatory mechanisms, the relatively low expense of such techniques, and their preference for policy makers to human intelligence gathering techniques.

A 2004 Amnesty International released report analysed the European export licensing restrictions that applied to surveillance and interception technologies, finding evidence that European companies and States had provided such technologies to a range of repressive regimes. A market that now offers spyware, stalkerware and much more for increasingly lower prices, expanding the potential buyers well beyond state agencies and corporation (Annual Amnesty report 2004).

In 2019, the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression of the Human Rights Council launched a “call for tighter regulation of surveillance exports and restrictions on their use, as well as a call for an immediate moratorium on the global sale and transfer of the tools of the private surveillance industry”, accused of undermining and threatening fundamental human rights through practices that included “arbitrary detention, sometimes to torture and possibly to extrajudicial killings” of journalists, activists, critics and opposition figures (Surveillance and human rights, 2019).

As scary as it sounds, the surveillance industry moves way beyond the opaque trade of intrusive equipment. Christian Fuchs explores the industry from a Marxist perspective and suggests that “At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, capitalist society has entered a global economic crisis. The continuous extension and intensification of

surveillance may be interpreted as a reactive attempt to manage such crises” (Fuchs 2013, p. 684). More than this, Fuchs’ approach to the economy of digital platforms stresses that their business model emerges from targeted advertising that implies not only mass surveillance, but also the “commodification of user data and user behaviour data for economic ends” (Ibid.), in line with what I quoted from Bauman and Lyon’s work.

The most comprehensive work around the economy of surveillance and its direct link with the capitalist economy comes from Shoshana Zuboff and her book *The age of surveillance capitalism* (2019). In Zuboff’s analysis, the capitalist economy underwent a radical transformation of the processes of accumulation in which, contrary to the precedent mass production, the population is now excluded from both employment and consumption. Instead, digital citizens are seen as sources of raw material for a digital-age production process aimed at a new business customer: the advertising industry. Masses are harvested of their behavioural data through data-mining procedures, trackers and other resources, as per the strategies and solutions developed particularly with big data surveillance in mind (Andrejevic and Gates 2014).

Surveillance capitalism as conceived by Zuboff is not specifically related to the targeting of journalists through surveillance, nor as journalists actively involved in surveillance practices. It is rather a generalized condition of citizens living in advanced digital economies. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that surveillance capitalism constitutes spurs toward the research of increasingly technical solutions that translates into new surveillance tools and products that, even if not originally conceived with targeting purposes, can be afterwards redirected against, or deployed by, journalists and media organisations as well. In other words, a critical approach to surveillance capitalism as proposed by Zuboff contributes to the understanding of the peculiarities of the environment in which journalists operate, the motivations behind private actors from the industry that promotes the circulation of surveillance technology in the hands of an increasing number of actors, and the affordances connected to the increasingly widespread availability of such technologies.

2.5 Lateral surveillance: a focus

Moving further, we can now understand the importance of contemplating a diversity of actors that might engage in surveillance activities and practices. Not only the state, but also corporations, criminal groups, political movements, individuals pushed by a wide range of motivations, even actors from the media industry itself. In other words, the surveillance assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2017), the melting of separate surveillance systems into a liquid surveillance apparatus, in which the journalist is immersed.

Mark Andrejevic dedicated many works to the horizontal dimension of the assemblage, and the new forms of lateral surveillance. This type of surveillance is certainly not something completely new. It actually represents a comeback of the “everyone-knows-everyone else’s-business world of traditional village life” (Andrejevic 2002, pag.481) through a new technological outfit that removes the curtain of the anonymity usually granted within our cities.

According to a preliminary definition offered by this author, lateral surveillance is the “peer-to-peer surveillance of spouses, friends, and relatives” (ibid.), opposed to the top-down monitoring of employees by employers, or citizens by the states’ agencies. While surveillance is conceptually linked to top-down impositions, user-led surveillance practices can either organically coexist or challenge vertical forms of surveillance (Trottier 2017). Still, the state authority will attempt to foster friendly forms of lateral surveillance, and to curb the opposing, unfriendly ones. In other words, “lateral surveillance takes place with an eye to the monitoring gaze of authorities, who set the guidelines for subjects responsible for security that includes keeping an eye on those around them” (Andrejevic 2006, pag.397). In this sense, Andrejevic doesn’t just recall the Foucauldian notion of docile bodies, but the one of “useful force”: authorities can put citizens into conscription service by enlisting the population into the above-mentioned monitoring gaze. These surveillance dynamics reveal the non-transparent power asymmetry that lies at the heart of panoptic institutions, and their constant attempt to deploy divide-and-conquer tactics against genuine, transparent forms of *sousveillance*. While the creation of the docile bodies preserves the distinction between the citizen and the watchmen, the creation of the useful force is the process that

lies behind the hybridization of these usually separated social actors. We need therefore to understand how this hybridization process affects the identity of journalists, their professional cultures, and the connected idea of what constitutes good journalism, and which impact has on the wider society that, by surrounding the journalist, shapes her professional practices.

2.6 Conclusions

The concept of surveillance has evolved from an instrument of discipline in Foucault, to an inherent characteristic of our modernity in Lyon. While it may not have completely lost its discipline purpose, Lyon recognises that surveillance has moved beyond that, mainly thanks to the technological developments that redesigned, among other elements, the circulation of information and the conditions of the exercise of power. Surveillance now constitutes an essential and functional trait of our society, to the point that it may as well assume functions that are beneficial to the citizenship.

In this study, I try to investigate whether it is the rigid and disciplinary surveillance of Foucault, or the liquid and at the same time threatening and caring surveillance of Lyon, which can better explain the challenges and the opportunities that journalism experiment during the exercise of their profession. But also, by examining the experiences and work of the journalists that I have interviewed, how these two interpretations of surveillance can coexist and contribute together to shape the environment and in which journalists perform and the practices of journalists working in the field. I am particularly interested in exploring how forms of horizontal surveillance, which are less researched than the top-down ones, interact with the exercise of journalism.

The next chapter explores the hybrid nature of the main actors involved in lateral surveillance in journalism, the journalist, the watchman and the citizen. It describes how this process of hybridization, with the impulse and the affordances of technological evolution, may contribute to explaining which forms of lateral surveillance are affecting journalism today and how. Together with the surveillance theories described here, I will try

to define an ecology of the journalist in the surveillance society, pointing out which threats and which opportunities may arise from it.

CHAPTER 3: HYBRID IDENTITIES IN THE SURVEILLANCE ECOLOGY

With a conceptualisation of surveillance clear in our mind, this chapter explores the identities of the journalist, the citizen and the watchman, the social actors in lateral surveillance. In order to understand when and how they can become hybrid, meaning that the functions, the roles and social collocation expected from one of these actors in a determined social context, are taken over by a different actor, and the two identities merge. The hybrid identity between the citizen and the journalist has been acknowledged and researched under the name of citizen-journalist, and the hybrid identity between the citizen and the watchman sees the vigilante as its recognized and researched outcome. There is no understanding or categorisation of the third hybrid type, the one between the journalist and the watchman. Indeed, all three of them can coexist at the same time in a single hybrid identity, which is the ultimate protagonist of lateral surveillance practices in journalism.

3.1 The citizen, the journalist, and the watchman

Talking about lateral surveillance, Andrejevic underlines that it nowadays allows the use of covert investigation as an alternative for information verification, and it paves the way to democratized investigatory expertise (Andrejevic 2002). The resemblance of these activities with journalistic practices can be seen as a clue on the hybridization of social actors (the citizen, the journalist and the watchman) that were once traditionally considered separate.

One of these tactics is the creation or mobilisation of state-friendly vigilantism. Trottier defines the online version of user-led surveillance as digital vigilantism, a practice “where citizens, collectively offended by other citizens’ activity, respond through coordinated retaliation on digital media, including mobile devices and social media platforms” (Trottier 2017). Digital vigilantism operates through several mechanisms: online public naming-and-shaming, the practice of doxing intended as the “use of the Internet to search for and publish identifying information about a particular individual” (Pittman 2018, p. 54), and the imposition of publicly accepted behaviours to citizens by other citizens.

The state historically encouraged citizens toward vigilantism, acts of informing, and in certain contexts even collectivist justice (Gabdulhakov 2018). These techniques cannot be separated out from approaches to governmentality that seeks to transfer to the population certain policing duties, that normally belong to the state apparatus, through do-it-yourself monitoring practices: a participatory panopticon pushed by urgencies of moral duties, and against the fears that originate from policies of in/security.

Forms of patriotic hacking (Lokot 2017) and vigilantism are the result of technical skills in the hands of those individuals who feel themselves compelled to obey moral and civic duties. Lokot provides examples of patriotic hacking in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, where groups of hackers are seen active in both the fighting camps. CyberBerkut is a pro-Russian hacker group, and the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance a pro-Ukrainian collective. Both groups had an active online presence, including on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, which are used as a space to present themselves as public actors, to narrate their exploits and to legitimise and normalise them, to elaborate and explain the meaning of their actions.

Muddying the waters further, some government security services informally encourage or tacitly approve of the actions of patriotic groups (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). These practices of vigilantism cannot flourish outside a climate of deference toward the authority, which grants in return a protective field of impunity in which state-friendly vigilantism can operate, or even forms of reward typical of clientelism.

In this sense, lateral surveillance cannot be explained simply through the increasingly available and cheaper monitoring technology. Andrejevic considers it the product of a “climate of generalized, redoubled risk” (Andrejevic 2002, p. 493) and the perceived necessity of bringing safety back into people’s hands.

Forms of lateral surveillance occur also within the world of journalistic practices. First of all, the range of surveillance tools, software and equipment available to journalists today is more powerful than ever. For instance, journalists have access to satellite imagery, sophisticated drone technology, and a very long list of intelligence gathering, tools, scraping software and techniques, real-time crowd monitoring resources both in the physical and the digital world. These tools have been used in several successful news reports, such as

the BBC Africa reportage in 2020 on Turkish ships carrying weapons to Libya despite the embargo placed on the country, which benefitted from surveillance tech such as satellites and naval traffic monitoring tools (Turkey's Ghost Ships – BBC Africa Eye documentary). In their daily professional activities, journalists use tools and equipment that hold immense intrusive capabilities, bound by the ethical norms of the profession, which may be weakened or entirely eluded by processes of adiaphorization as described by Bauman.

Interestingly, on the other hand citizen-journalism is seen as engagement in participatory media production (Atton 2009), which resounds with the participatory panopticon and the egalitarian idea behind its original conception. It means that indeed citizen-journalism and sousveillance share common ground or, as pointed out by Ganascia, citizen journalistic control can be seen as a form of sousveillance (Ganascia, 2010).

On the other hand, we might be tempted to take for granted that journalism acts as a watchdog on concentrations of power, ensuring the accountability of institutions in society (Wahl-Jorgensen K. et al. 2017). But journalists are to be seen as part of their society, immersed in it, and therefore not immune to bias, polarisation, partisanship. To the very extreme, journalist can assume the role of militants and vigilantes, even against their own colleagues.

Certain scholars would argue that, outside the Western journalistic tradition, the primary tasks of citizen and journalists go beyond the mere participation into the surveillance apparatus: their duty is to contribute to the nation-building processes by strengthening social unity and patriotism, while pluralism and freedom of the press are seen as secondary, or even damaging incumbencies (Stevenson 1994).

Political, social, economic conditions can facilitate the re-colonization of surveillance over sousveillance. Phenomena like economic crisis and tensions connected to migrations have an impact on the environment in which journalism is performed. Decreasing trust in media (Kellner 2012), hate speech, forms of direct communication allowed by social media between journalists and their audiences (Binns 2017), fake news, the promotion of conspiracies against media, all can lead to the perception that the media environment is untrustworthy, where “nothing is what it seems, and every statement is expected to advance some kind of hidden agenda” (Hoyng and Es 2017). More in general, Siaper and

Sighele consider publics important and overlooked stakeholders: “The loss of public trust in the news has had a pernicious effect on the public and socio-cultural sphere, as evidenced in the rise of online hate speech, the proliferation of fake news and widespread suspicion” (Siapera and Sighele 2017). Paired with the call to mobilization from authoritarian powers to the people, these phenomena facilitate the rise of online and offline vigilantism, which engages in surveillance activities. In an age in which an aura of suspicion is forced upon everyone in the eyes of the beholders, “we are invited to become spies – for our own good” (Andrejevic 2002, p. 494).

The distinction between the citizen and the watchman, between the controller and the controlled, has been blurred. In this sense, as the boundaries between the citizen and the journalist have been blurred by the rise of citizen-journalism, similarly, the boundaries between the citizen and the “spy” are going through a similar process of hybridization, the extent of which is still largely unexplored. Might we see a citizen-journalist-watchman at the end of the road? This research project seeks to further examine this under-researched nexus.

3.2 Vigilant journalism: ethical and deontological

To further explore the dilemmas behind the notion of digital vigilantism, I would return to the question that David Lyon put forward in his book *Liquid surveillance: A conversation* coauthored with Zygmunt Bauman: “Are responsible and even caring forms of digital surveillance possible?” (Bauman and Lyon 2013, p. 37).

Taking inspiration from this question, we ought to consider whether forms of caring surveillance exist in journalism alongside the better-known form of threatening surveillance. It implies that we need to understand which ethical and deontological approaches regulate caring surveillance in journalism, and whether such forms are adopted with a self-absolving approach by journalists, who rightly fear surveillance technology when it is used to threaten their professional independence, but may suddenly find it a useful, even beneficial tool when it’s put into use by journalists themselves.

Traditionally, surveillance in journalism has been depicted under an Orwellian aura that implies an inner negativity and malignity. Given the worrisome reports (Human Rights Council Special Report 2019), yearly produced from within (Sanches et al. 2020) and outside academia (Freedom of the Net 2018) on the mounting dangers and threats that journalism faces, especially in the digital realm, this scary depiction of surveillance is still dramatically true.

Since journalists are still to be counted among the information gatekeepers (Janowitz 1975), we can understand why, from a Foucauldian perspective, journalists can become targets of the authority that, by adopting surveillance techniques, exerts power aimed at transforming them into docile bodies, therefore controlling the production and flow of knowledge.

Beyond these forms of threatening surveillance, forms of surveillance practices daily occur in the exercise of journalism. During their professional activities, journalists regularly use tools and equipment that hold immense intrusive capabilities. This surveillance capacity is bounded and regulated not only by local and international laws in place (Findlay and McKinlay 2003), but by the deontological norms of the profession as well (Plaisance 2013).

These deontological norms may be weakened or entirely eluded by several factors, including the processes of adiaphorization that I have already mentioned in the previous chapter. Deontological and ethical considerations stem from the conceptualization of what journalism is and what constitutes its mission. Political decision-making processes contribute to shaping the way in which surveillance technologies are used, while the affordances of new technological developments that challenge the established norms, conventions and habits.

We might be tempted to take for granted that journalism acts as a watchdog on concentrations and misuse of power, ensuring the accountability of institutions in society (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2017). But journalists are to be seen as part of their society, immersed in it, and therefore not entirely immune to bias, polarisation, partisanship. Moreover, outside the Western journalistic tradition, the core mission of journalism may assume a different shape: the duty of journalism may be to contribute to the nation-building processes by strengthening social unity and patriotism, while pluralism and

freedom of the press are seen as secondary, or even damaging incumbencies (Stevenson 1994). Other forms of journalism exist beyond its traditional role of power's watchdog, or reinterpreting this role in a different way: alternative journalism (Atton and Hamilton 2008), radical journalism (Atton 2002), citizen journalism (Roberts 2019) and solution journalism (McIntyre 2019) are examples of different, even contested interpretations, and their existence stems from new or partially new ideas of what constitutes good journalism, and what a good journalist is expected to do over the course of the job.

If new forms of journalism are internally regulated by a diverse mesh of cultural and professional norms exist, how do these norms relate to surveillance practices, both from a cultural and a technological perspective? In the light of the challenges brought in by IT technologies and the surveillance society (Lyon 2001), do journalists need to review the ethical guidelines for the use of surveillance technology in journalism? Is there an emerging uncritical and "self-absolving" approach to its use? Should a debate within their community be stimulated through a bottom-up approach, and foster a new professional culture more aware of the opportunities, the dangers and the responsibilities connected to the use of such technology?

By searching for answers to these questions, we may come to understand that journalists are not mere passive subjects of surveillance practices. On the contrary, they have a powerful, active role in shaping the surveillance practices that occur in their social and political environment and within the media ecosystem.

3.2 An ecology of journalism under surveillance

Journalists working in such a complex environment find themselves in trouble. While the so-called "rule of transparency" pushes them to disclose the methods of their newsgathering so that the reliability of their work can be assessed (Allen D.S. 2008), it exposes them to a public eye that is often unfriendly to them. According to Allen, in Habermas' work we can find a defence of transparency central to Enlightenment ethics (Ibid.) and to the well-being of democracies. But Foucault raises the question about how

transparency is employed as an agent of discipline and punishment. In Foucault, transparency becomes a dangerous trap (Foucault 1977). Among forms of discipline to which citizens are increasingly subjected, is that of monitoring one another not in the sense of mutual watching, which implies transparent and reciprocal observation, but in the asymmetrical sense associated with lateral surveillance (Andrejevic 2006). Too much transparency serves only to tie citizens ever closer to disciplines established by the authority and limits the freedom of individuals (Allen D.S. 2008).

Technological evolution is a driving force that is changing the landscape in which information flows and journalism operates. Deibert and Rohozinski noted that the very same technologies which give voice to democratic activists living under authoritarian rule can also be harnessed by their oppressors. Cyber-communication has made possible some very extensive and efficient forms of social control and surveillance systems that penetrate every aspect of life (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). Because of the increasing number of devices and platforms with surveillance capabilities, the control network is becoming more socially pervasive. Social media empowers the regimes themselves to exercise harassment over political opponents and investigative journalists, as is evident from cases such as the pro-regime youth organization Ireli in Azerbaijan (Pearce 2015). Many of these forced upon controls do not stem from technology and are more related to inculcating norms, inducing compliant behaviour, and imposing rules (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010).

Without falling in the trap of pure technological determinism, I acknowledge that political decision-making processes are among the factors that contribute to shaping the way in which surveillance technologies are being used. For instance, when states turned their full attention to cyberspace, in/security policies initially treated it as a mainly defensive battlefield where critical infrastructures must be protected from both internal and external threats. But offensive capabilities are being increasingly considered equally important, if not more, and they require a more offensive posture (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010) of cyber-military forces, therefore pushing states toward the development and acquisition of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies. State and private actors are spearheading an era of Digital Authoritarianism (Freedom of the Net 2018) within a very frail normative and ethical framework. Governments from any part of the political spectrum

are developing or acquiring unprecedented surveillance capabilities. Surveillance technology is becoming increasingly pervasive and, more importantly, cheaper. The surveillance industry is one of the fastest growing industries in the world (Global Surveillance Industry Report 2016) and it moves around millions of dollars, quite often with the leniency or the complicity of state and regulatory authorities (Surveillance and human rights, UN report 2019).

Trust is the essential element of the relationship between the journalist and the public. Trust between recipients and news media is grounded in the willingness to continue this relationship (Blöbaum 2014). But journalism is also an acting mediator in the trust relationship between the citizens and the social institutions. Müller argues that “While a certain level of distrust towards democratic institutions (including the news media) is a healthy characteristic of a democratic system, a very low level of trust could endanger the proper functioning of the news media system. A very low believability is not helpful when it comes to informing the public” (Müller 2013), the core mission of journalism. In this sense, any interference in the journalist-public trust relationship also undermines the trust in social institutions and the democratic life. Part of the media coverage carries components that support the process of trust building towards the trustee on behalf of the trusting public – or the decline of trust and maybe even mistrust (Blöbaum 2014). Therefore, we also need to consider whether citizen-driven surveillance is an outright act of distrust toward journalism, that is perceived to have failed in its mission and is viewed as a traitorous enemy of the state, or rather an attempt by the public to rebuild the lost trust relationship by putting journalism under closer scrutiny.

A discriminating factor may be represented by the attempt of citizen-driven surveillance to restore the logic under which journalism operates at its best (autonomy, distinct professional norms and public service orientation), or to substitute this logic with the one of other power groups. Blöbaum argues that, within the process of democratic oriented trust building, journalism acts according to its own logic (Blöbaum 2014), which should be always different from the other actors’ logic. To act professionally means “to stick to the norms and values of journalism and to carry out the journalistic programs of research, selection, coordination and presentation in a professional way” (Ibid. 2014, pag.40). Müller

draws a list of normative preconditions for public trust in media and journalism: press freedom, plurality, independence of the press, Journalistic professionalism. According to him, professionalism “creates and maintains trust” and it “stands for journalism performing responsibly according to its values and norms. Trust in journalism is based on the journalistic capability to research, select, coordinate and present information in a professional way” (Müller 2013, p.21). Surveillance activities that impede, undermine or interfere with these activities represent an attack on the trust-building process and, consequently, democracy.

3.3 The challenges of the citizen journalist

We now see how the hybrid citizen-journalist faces several challenges in the world of contemporary surveillance. First, she is the target of multiple, coexisting and fluctuating “opticons” that now dot our physical and digital spaces, which are hybrid in nature as well.

The body of the journalist is trapped in Amoore’s portable biometric border. The body is indeed the biometric border itself, deployed as bio-power tactics of control of Foucauldian reminiscence: trackable, traceable, visible, datafied, targetable. It now represents a risk not only for the journalist herself, but also all the other contingent bodies around her, which in return represent a risk for the journalist.

The media she works for carry along the characteristics of societies of control, and she needs to decide whether to adapt to them, to avoid them, or to challenge them.

Her public keeps her under constant scrutiny, either as part of the legitimate process of trust-building between the journalist and the audience, or through surveillance tactics that can be exercised both in the physical and in the digital world, tracking her persona even in the most intimate spaces, be it the inside of her home or the electronic memory of her phone. If there is discontent toward the journalist, the public can suddenly turn against her, and use threats that include forms of surveillance such as the doxing, the collection of private information then published online as a way to attack or delegitimise someone.

Time and space are no longer an issue for those interested in monitoring her: countless sensors surround her physical and digital persona, ever recording, here included the ones that she willingly choose to carry with her because of her profession, such as her phone, her car, her laptop. She can get caught in the net of untargeted, randomised, opportunistic surveillance, such as the one derived from the advertising industry, whose data can then be harvested, sold or trafficked for much more malign purposes. She cannot shy away from transparency, or she would lose the visibility that grants her success, a readership, and legitimization. But she cannot be fully transparent, otherwise her sources would be exposed as well, nor fully anonymous, because she cannot avoid having a public persona and a relationship with the public that follows her work. She can be potentially threatened with arbitrary detention, harassment; physical and psychological violence, extrajudicial killing; finally, she can voluntarily turn herself to the service of those powers that her profession demands to keep accountable for their behaviour. How she can cope with all of this will be the subject of this research project.

With the fourth chapter, I introduce the methodology for the data collection and the data analysis I used for this study. It includes case studies as a method, namely Italy and Turkey, so in the fifth chapter I provide for a better contextualisation that justify the selection of these two specific countries.

By bringing together the theoretical concepts described up to here with the selected tools of the research, we will be finally able to dive into the collected data and explore the stories and the experiences collected from the interviewed journalists.

CHAPTER 4: SITUATING THE RESEARCH IN COUNTRY CONTEXTS

This chapter offers a contextualisation of the two selected case studies, Turkey and Italy, and an overview on the state of media in the two countries. This chapter allows to better situate the general issues presented in the previous chapters within the specific context of the two cases, while providing the readers with the necessary knowledge to understand and appreciate the content of the interviews that will be presented and analysed in the chapters 6 and 7.

4.1 Turkey

Turkey is a country in decline in terms of political and civil rights, with a steadily increasing authoritarianism and a crisis of its democratic institutions (Topak 2017). The judiciary is heavily influenced by the government, especially after the presidential reform in 2017, which turned the country in a competitive authoritarian state (Özbudun 2015, Berk and Gumuscu 2016), where competition for power is still possible, but democracy is deteriorated because elections are held in conditions that utterly favour the incumbent government and the space for political action is compromised.

Turkey is also afflicted by the conflict between the state and the armed forces of the Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK, who fights for the autonomy of the south-eastern region inhabited by the Kurdish ethnic majority (Ibrahim 2000). The conflict impacted both the freedom of using the Kurdish language (Cemiloglu 2009) and the possibility for Kurdish journalism to grow and thrive (Coşkun 2020).

In the summer 2013 the Gezi Park protests took place as a nationwide movement that demanded political and ecological rights (Tufekci 2017). It also saw a new flourishing of the Turkish citizen journalism as a reply to the inadequate coverage on behalf of traditional media, bounded by links of fear and clientelism to the incumbent government (Tunç 2014). As a reaction to the dominance of protesters' discourse in the digital sphere, the government promoted the creation of an army of trolls on behalf of the ruling party (Saka 2016) that intoxicated the public debate and engaged in threats and attacks against journalists. As the government stepped up its surveillance policies, Turkey even experienced

a state-driven contagion of malware targeting its own citizens (Bulut and Yörük 2017). Despite the difficulties, Turkey boasts a vibrant civil society, examples of ethically rigorous journalism, and creative realities of grass-root media (Tufekci 2017) such as the Dokuz8Haber news network (Yanardağöğlu 2015).

Turkey is currently experiencing an unprecedented crackdown on the media following a coup attempt in 2016 (Odabaş and Reynolds-Stenson 2018). According to the 2019 report from the International Press Institute, journalism in Turkey faces three main categories of threats: imprisonment and physical threats, mass firings and economic threats, (self)censorship and other professional threats (Kızılkaya 2019).

Turkey is indeed a country at the bottom in most of the well-established international indicators related to press freedom, such as the Freedom of the Net report published by Freedom House. In the 2020 Reporters without Borders' (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, Turkey ranked 154th out of 180 countries.

4.2 Italy

Italy, a founding member of the European Union, is a country with a fairly strong rule of law (WPJ rule of law index 2020), although it has been experiencing political turmoil amid dramatic polarization, and the rise of far-right and anti-establishment parties at the top of its institutions (Franzosi et al. 2015) in rotation with technocratic governments characterised by pro-European policies (De Fiores 2021). Media and journalism in the country are considered to be in an overall healthy state (Brogi 2018). Nevertheless, they face serious threats coming from powerful criminal organizations (Caselli 2019). Italy also hosts some important information technology companies that sell offensive intrusion and surveillance tools to a wide spectrum of customers (Marczak et al. 2014).

Threats and pressure from the Mafia and other forms of organised crime remains the main problem for the Italian journalism. According to the ECMPF 2018 Italy report, "Currently 21 journalists live with a police escort, defended by armed police, due to credible death threats. The police protect a further 167 with less comprehensive protection and vigilance measures" (ECMPF 2018 Italy report). According to the same report, "between 2016 and

2018 more than 3,721 Italian journalists, bloggers, video operators and photojournalists were targets of threats, intimidation, assault, damage, targeted theft, serious abuse of rights, and obstructed access to information” (Ibid.).

Despite these worrying data, Italy is considered a free country in the Freedom of the Net report published by Freedom House, and it ranks 57th out of 180 countries in the 2020 Reporters without Borders' (RSF) World Press Freedom Index.

4.3 The Media Pluralism Monitor as tool for a comparative analysis

Italy and Turkey can be compared in terms of risks for media pluralism. The Media Pluralism Monitor report, published yearly by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (CMPF) of the European University Institute (EUI), measures the conditions of media pluralism in several countries through a consolidated scheme of four indicators: Political Independency, Basic Protection, Social Inclusiveness and Market Plurality. The 2021 report allocates Turkey in high-risk areas in all the four indicators. On the other side, Italy scores medium risks in all the four categories, with a worrying backslide in recent years from its previous consolidated position of a low-risk country (MPM 2021).

Turkish media landscape is characterised by a high degree of political parallelism, which can be defined as system of stable and organic links between political actors and the media (Mancini 2012), in such a way that the media representations is influenced by political ideologies, motivation and conflicts of interest. In Turkey the state, as regulator and funder, exercises its prerogatives of regulator and funding entity by asserting its control over the media industry.

Even after the reforms of the '80s, when the then prime minister Turgut Özal liberalised the market through radical reforms (Öniş 2004), the passage to the capitalist private industry did not coincide with a cut of the ties between media and the state. Rather inaugurated a new season of clientelism (Zurcher and Turkey 2004) that resulted in a high level of concentration in media ownership that resists today,

In Turkey the risks related to fundamental rights in press freedom are among the highest in the world. For several years it scored the world record of jailed journalists and witness a very high level of attacks on press members that include physical violence, arbitrary detention, censorship and self-censorship, cancellation of press cards, unfair distribution of state funding to media organizations linked to the incumbent government, advertising bans on independent media, and a non-existent protection from political interference in editorial autonomy.

Italy, on the other side, has an overall acceptable situation, flawed by some severe unaddressed issues, such as a very high media ownership concentration, worsening economic sustainability for media enterprises which affect freelancers in particular, growing threats to the journalistic profession that include both physical attacks and digital threats, low political independence especially in the context of the public media institutions and lack of efficient protections against harmful speech.

More in general, there is no currently established indicator specifically related to surveillance, nor in the MPM or in other media freedom international reports. Surveillance related issues are distributed among the different indicators, such as the Basic Protection in the MPM, or not counted at all.

4.4 Surveillance, vigilantism, and journalism in Turkey

According to Topak, contemporary Turkey has the characteristics of an advanced surveillance assemblage (Topak 2019), which includes different coexisting surveillance systems that target areas such as the internet, popular dissent, media surveillance and an “informant collaborator surveillance system” (Topak 2019). All these systems are dependent on the state, which exercise its authority and capacity of control through this assemblage. The informant collaborator system is of particular interest for this work, as it is directly related to the involvement of the citizenship in policing activities. The state encourages citizens to spy on each other over the internet, creating a culture of online snitching (Yeşil and Sözeri 2017). For example, Turkey has recently officially reintroduced

the neighbourhood watches (called *bekçi* in Turkish). The state also relies on *muhtars* (elected village or neighbourhood heads) to spy on residents and report crimes, with the aid of an IT system connected to the Interior Ministry. The police have also launched a mobile application called EGM, that allows citizens to become informants of the law enforcement agencies by sending reports that may include audio-visual materials.

The government also reportedly created a group of state-sponsored hackers that the national press and scholars nicknamed *AKTrolls*, after the ruling party AKP of the President Tayyip Erdogan. AKTrolls are motivated by the objective of supporting the government in charge (Bulut and Yörük 2017).

4.5 Surveillance, vigilantism, and journalism in Italy

The Italian state seems to shy away from recruiting vigilantes among the citizenship. Vigilantism is not common in Italy, and the attempt to establish neighbourhood watches by local administrations seems to largely fail, although similar phenomena are rising as a reaction against migrants and foreigners (Gattinara 2019). One of the reasons is the historical heritage of the period of the fascist regime, when groups of citizens called *squadracce* became infamous for their political violence and became a tool for control of the regime (ibid. 2019). A news report in April 2021 made public a worrying news for the protection of journalists' sources: prosecutors in Trapani wiretapped at least five journalists working on issues related to migrations and human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly between Italy and Libya. The recorded conversations included both private moments and contacts with confidential sources and attorneys defending the journalists (Domani 2021). Despite this grave occurrence, there is no trace of a state-sponsored surveillance system in place, or anything like the Turkish assemblage described earlier.

Turkey and Italy present different challenges to journalism, and the peculiarities of their political architecture, social context and media system is likely to affect the kind of experiences that journalists working in the field have lived through. Having set the theoretical framework, a robust contextualisation, and the methodological approach to the

study, we now delve into the experiences of journalists working in Italy and Turkey and their stranded relationship with surveillance.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN

5.1 Finding the methods.

The selection of the most opportune methods was driven by several considerations I felt were needed to be taken into account. First of all, it was the necessity of reaching an in-depth understanding of the phenomena of lateral surveillance affecting journalism. I needed to be able to navigate through the experiences of the journalists, understanding not just their stories, but also their motivations, their background and their emotional state.

Deciding the strategy for building the sample also took a good amount of time, especially for finding a balance between representativity and depth of analysis, with the latter that took a decisive precedence in the final version of this methodology, and to overcome the difficulties linked to researching practices that often occur out of sight and without the knowledge of the subject.

Risk assessment also required a good amount of work. I felt that investigating surveillance, and especially threatening surveillance targeting journalism, deserved a profound consideration of all the potential risks foreseeable ahead. Risks for the participants, their network of acquaintances, all the professionals involved, and of course me. These issues were addressed during a long process guided by the Research Ethics Committee of the DCU university, which finally granted me the approval for conducting this study. Other people, from within and outside of DCU, also contributed to a research design that was safer as possible.

Then the Covid-19 pandemic burst in, disrupting the fieldwork, taking a huge toll from all of us, and forcing a deep review of the methodology (and of course another REC approval), since travelling was not possible anymore, and interviews were going to be conducted online.

The next paragraphs will be dedicated to a detailed explanation of this long journey.

5.2 Case studies

The research adopts an ethnographic approach and focuses on Turkey and Italy as case studies, comparing the two countries with the aim of understanding the phenomena underlying the emergence of citizen-driven surveillance practices. The two countries were initially selected for the familiarity with the context, a necessary requirement for the combination of selected methods for data collection and sampling, which require an extensive knowledge of the country's history, political environment, cultural values, and current affairs. Previous knowledge of the two case studies, thanks to the familiarity with my own country of origin and the many years I spent working as a journalist in the Anatolian peninsula, provided preliminary insights and helped both the sample building process and to contextualise the findings from the interviews. Coherently with the other methods selected, case studies are a solid choice if, as in this case, in-depth understanding of a phenomenon is favoured over representativeness and generalisation (Flyvbjerg 2006). More on Turkey and Italy will be provided in the next chapter, which will deal with the two countries extensively.

5.3 Data collection: semi-structured interviews

Since only a fraction of surveillance practices occurs in plain sight, the research adopts an inductive approach and it draws the data directly from journalists working in the field, their stories and experiences on when, where and how they have been watched and monitored not only by the state, but also by other social actors, including other media professionals and members of the public as well. The bulk of the data was collected through semi structured interviews with media professionals. Each interview lasted between 75 and 120 minutes and were conducted in English, Turkish and Italian. Interviews were chosen as preferred method for several reasons. First, they allow a deep dive into the experience and reasoning of the interviewee, and they respond to the need of favouring in-depth investigation over representativeness of the sample (Warren and Karner 2015). Interviews

have also the advantage of being a familiar tool for journalists and this choice facilitated the trust-building process required for research on a potentially sensitive issue such as the experience of being under surveillance (Opdenakker 2006). The use of interviews also imply that the body of knowledge is co-produced by the interviewer and the interviewee together (Fedyuk and Zentai 2018)., thus simulating and stimulating the kind of debate that can happen between fellow journalists discussing the topic, in accordance with the intention of stimulating a debate within the journalistic community and foster an informed professional culture on the issue of surveillance in journalism. The questionnaire was structured into three sections: general perception of the issue of journalism and surveillance in the relevant country, personal experiences with threatening surveillance, use of surveillance technology in professional activities and ethical and deontological norms in place. The questions were both open to favour the collection of personal interpretations, impressions and experiences, while capable of targeting the relevant topics without drifting away from the signed path.

5.4 Sampling methods and sample size

Following the advice for building a sample for qualitative research, I established three inclusion criteria (Robinson 2014) to select participants to the research project: a recognized professional background, residence in one of the two selected countries, and an ethnographic approach that ensured that all participants have relevant experiences that can contribute to the research.

Journalists working in the two selected countries (Italy and Turkey) were contacted through a combination of targeted and snowball sampling techniques. Heckathorn (1997) suggests these methods for investigating hidden populations, which have two characteristics: the size and the boundaries of the population are unknown, and members of the population are subject to a negative reputation or stigmatization. The scholar indicates as examples of hidden population the ones that are in relation to issues such as drug use, crime, homelessness or stigmatizing illness (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004). While journalism is not mentioned by Heckathorn, studying journalists under surveillance imply that subjects

may refuse cooperation to protect their privacy, out of fear of repercussions, or out of desire to avoid experiencing traumatic situations again. Moreover, the world of journalism is going through a reputational crisis that has a stigmatizing effect on the community. In Turkey for instance, it is common that journalists are labelled as spies working for foreign governments (Hoyng 2017), while in Italy journalism may be seen as toothless and connivant with people of power such as politicians, businessmen or crime lords (Gerli et al. 2018).

Since the population of this research shares the characteristics of a hidden population, I opted for a combination of snowball and targeted sampling techniques. These two methods taken individually are known to introduce biases into the sample. Heckathorn combined the two strategies into a chain-referral sampling method that allows the mitigation of the foreseeable potential bias risks of each method. Snowball sampling refers to the possibility of asking participants for other potential participants who might fit the inclusion criteria, leading to “referral chains” (Robinson 2014, pag. 37). Targeted sampling is used as a remedy to the structural deficiencies of the chain-referred sampling techniques, such as the snowball sampling. It requires a good knowledge of the field, which I had thanks to the familiarity I developed with the two case studies during the years of my work as journalist.

Participants were initially selected through the network that I developed in the years of work as a journalist in the field, diversifying the participants in terms such as region of origin, professional background, gender, and snowball sampling was applied afterwards. The sample was afterwards expanded through snowball technique in order to reach out other relevant participants. These sampling methods led to a high representativity of media professionals working as investigative journalists, but the sample also includes photographers, data journalists and street interviewers.

The interviews were conducted with 12 research participants, 6 from each country, all consenting adults recruited among media professionals out of a larger pool of contacted people. Final numbers were influenced by the ongoing Covid-19 Pandemic that limited the recruitment process significantly. The sample size has been determined keeping in mind the project timeline, its feasibility and with the prospect of reaching data saturation. All participants were provided with an informed consent form and plain language statement in English, Italian or Turkish (see Appendix A).

5.5 Data Analysis

Data in written form were manually analysed through content and thematic analysis methods, with no software automatization or assistance. Findings reveal common patterns and themes paired with the necessary strong contextualisation (Bazeley 2009) on how journalists perceive the use of surveillance technology, both as a threatening tool targeting journalism, and as a useful tool in job-related activities, thus outlining potential paths for self-regulatory deontological norms produced by the journalistic community itself.

Broad categories were built in advance and then tested against the collected data and the related findings:

- threatening versus caring surveillance, the distinction between surveillance that represents a threat and surveillance that constitutes a resource.
- targeted versus opportunistic surveillance, the distinction between surveillance explicitly targeted at a journalist as an individual, surveillance that affects journalists as a professional category and/or surveillance that targets the broader citizenship.
- visible versus invisible surveillance, surveillance as a tool for silencing and surveillance as a tool for acquiring information.

5.6 Research activities in threatening environments

Both Italy and Turkey represent scenarios that may lead to different potential risks for research participants. Three risks were taken into account during the research design phase: reputational risks and legal risks that might have originated from the participation in the research project, and psychological risks linked to the recall of potentially traumatic experiences.

Risks were partly connected to the fieldwork and the context of the research. Turkey, a non-EU country that in the last years raised concerns regarding the safety of journalists, as reported in the publications of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Amnesty International and Freedom House Italy, being a EU member, provides a stronger rule of law and a safer environment, but it also manifested cases of violence perpetrated against journalists, often with the complicity of the organised crime. Chapter 5 offers more on the risks connected to the situation in the two countries.

The experience I accumulated during several years of professional activity in the two countries, and the network of legal, diplomatic, professional contacts I developed during this period, allowed me to conduct a detailed assessment of all potential variables in place.

The recall of some experiences during the interview might have led to unpleasant memories and distress. All participants were therefore offered both free legal and psychological assistance, whenever the need may rise, or they might express the desire of receiving such support. Arrangements were made both in Italy and Turkey with professionals and local NGOs to provide for such support. I consider this a welcome novelty that should become a standard for academic research in risky environments. While none of the research participants asked for access to this form of support, the very fact that this measure was in place was explicitly welcomed by some of the interviewed journalists during the initial steps of negotiations and arrangements. I can therefore state that, beyond its purpose of practical support, such measures constitute a precious tool in the building of the trust relationship between the researcher and the participant.

Reputational risks were also considered, ones that may arise from the participation in this research project. Hence, I implemented a very rigid anonymisation process to ensure that no harm can come to the reputation of the participants. All data collected were anonymised by disaggregating them into separate digital files, all password protected and encrypted. References that may lead to the recognition of the identity of the participants were carefully erased from the data collection. Fake names were used to protect the participants' identity, and gender-based pronouns altered randomly to hide the belonging to a certain community. Encrypted laptops and hard-drives and the cloud service provided by DCU through its ISS office were used to store and handle the data.

An interview is always a disruptive event in the participant's life, so it requires preparation, and it has to happen in a reassuring environment. Shared arrangements, preparatory calls, transparency in data management, attention toward the participant's safety are all essential elements. Interviews were arranged and conducted through a careful planning to protect the participants' identity and a participatory approach was adopted for selecting the tools used for the interviews conducted online. Several options and platforms were offered as alternatives to the participants: Zoom, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, with the possibility of adopting the platform of choice of the participant. It is interesting to notice that 11 out of 12 participants opted for less secure options, such as WhatsApp or even Skype, which is known for its low level of security. Only one of the interviewees asked the use of Signal, which is considered among the safest possible options. Ultimately, the choice was mainly driven by comfort. I assume that easiness of use helped in creating the feeling of a safe environment as much as the strict analysis of their respective security features.

5.7 Interviewing during a pandemic: considerations.

A pandemic alters the conditions of the fieldwork and forces to review all the preparatory steps. The initial planned activities consisted in three months of preparatory work and eight months of fieldwork. Preparatory work was arranged through secondments as visiting researcher at the DART Center of the Columbia University and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in London, while the fieldwork was scheduled as visiting scholar at the Bilgi University of Istanbul and the Università di Bergamo in Italy. The Covid-19 pandemic made travelling becomes impossible and, in case of the interviewing method, to switch from face-to-face to remotely conducted interviews seemed the only option on the table.

This change in the methodology implied certain considerations and consequences. Since knowledge is contextual and it is shaped by the conditions in which it is produced, we should assume that the results were affected by the shift of the interviewing scenario from physical to digital: we lost physical presence within context and we ventured in a digital environment which is notably the theatre of many surveillance experiences, thus altering the trust-building process and the way the research participant will react to the

questionnaire. Phenomenon of self-censorship linked to the situation should be taken into account.

In order to partially mitigate the drawbacks of the new situation, I chose to strengthen the participatory approach to the interview planning by offering the participants further control over the choice of tools used to conduct the interviews. The reassuring environment has moved online, and new uncertainties were to be acknowledged: what if for instance the computer or the router of the participant are compromised and none of the safe communication solutions, we can offer can be actually safe? Losing partial control over the conditions of the interviewing process implied honesty and transparency during the negotiation steps with the research participants. Also, an interview is an intrinsically disruptive event in the already disrupted life of a person, who might have an altered mood, be working from home or surrounded by family members. Interviews in a pandemic are possible, but they require special sensitivity and careful consideration.

5.8 Ethics approval

This research project underwent an expedited review process by the Research Ethics Committee of the Dublin City University, which approved it in January 2020. Following the Covid-19 pandemic and the changes adopted in the new methodology, an amendment request was submitted. It was approved in October 2020 (see appendix A).

This process required a thoughtful consideration of all the potential risks that could have come to all the people involved in the research activities. Several mitigation measures were adopted in order to minimize all the identified risks.

The characteristics of the participants (all consenting adults) and the limited sensitive data collected (gender and union membership) didn't imply high risk levels per se.

Finally, part of the ethic consideration was about how to position myself as an academic researcher, given that I was myself, at different times, a journalist, a worker for an NGO, and an activist in the field of media-freedom. This reflexivity on my multiple interacting identities and my values helped me in finding a stance that allowed me to treasure from my

experiences while keeping under control the potential biases that could derive from my past. An invaluable contribution in this work was provided by my supervisor.

CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF THREATENING SURVEILLANCE ON JOURNALISM

Chapters 6 and 7 offer a detailed analysis of the data through the interviews and tie it to the relevant theoretical framework described before, while looking for common patterns, testing the literature, trying to provide for punctual answers to the research questions, and to contextualise the experiences that were told by the research participants during the interviewing process.

This chapter in particular deals with forms of threatening surveillance, forms that in some way jeopardize journalists' well-being, impact negatively their professional practices, provoke distressful emotional states, enforce upon them forms of avoidance or self-censorship, and ultimately interfere with the exercise of their work and of their social role as information gatekeepers, news providers and social mediators. Threatening surveillance is analysed through categories that can better explain the various forms it can take, its nature and its impact.

Offline surveillance occurs in the physical world and often affects the journalist's physical body, spaces, or equipment. On the other hand, online surveillance targets her digital personas and spaces. It is useful to remember that threatening surveillance affects journalist's private sphere and may also target other people who are not related to her by professional relationships, such as family, friends, neighbours, and acquaintances that enter, even temporarily, the social space of the journalist.

I also separated state surveillance from surveillance perpetrated by non-state and quasi state actors. State surveillance represents the epitome of vertical, hierarchical, top-down surveillance. Surveillance practices exercised by the other actors are better interpreted through the concept of fluidity, because the direction of the surveillance activities can vary in time and space depending on the actors involved and the technology deployed. Lateral surveillance is the one that occurs between subjects that are considered on the same hierarchical level, such in the case of colleagues, between citizens, or between the states.

Finally, another categorisation that I applied is between proven and imagined surveillance. Proven surveillance occurs when the journalist knows for sure and can demonstrate that

she was the target of surveillance. Imagined surveillance stems from two possibilities: either the journalist has suspicions that she was targeted by surveillance, or she assumes a priori that this is a sort of obvious condition dictated by the nature of her work and/or the peculiarities of the environment. For example, a journalist might be fully convinced that all foreign journalists working in certain country are monitored by the local authorities, including herself, even if she didn't experience anything in person.

6.1 Forms of state surveillance

When I called the Police Headquarters to ask for a comment, I received a ghost call, i.e., a phone call that then disappeared from my phone and of which there is no trace left in the register. Ghost calls are generally used for a variety of purposes, including pinpointing the physical location of the device. So much so that immediately afterwards I received a call. It was a manager of the police station who said: "I know you sent us these questions". I kept quiet, then added "I also know you just gave me a ghost call." At first, he pretended not to notice, then I said to him "Excuse me, is it normal for you to do this activity of identifying journalists?" And he says, "Now should I tell you our techniques?". It is a show of power.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are usually the actor tasked to exercise state surveillance. In this case, an Italian journalist describes the experience as a "show of power", and a tactic to put pressure on the journalist by making her feel the presence of the omnipresent eye. The officer does not reply to the journalist's questions and reinforces a threatening atmosphere of uncertainty, an element that reinforces the implicit threat: be aware that we are watching you. This tactic reproduces the characteristics of the Foucauldian panopticon and an attempt to create a docile body out of the journalist, who now understands that continuing her work implies a degree of danger.

The use of irony and transparency are tactics developed by journalists to cope with the presence of the watching eye:

Once I told the police you have a collection of my pictures: you should share them with me! Yeah, you have 100 pictures with me, and yet you are taking more and more of them.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

The journalist here wants to demonstrate that he is not afraid of being constantly monitored. On the contrary, he tries to establish a relationship with the authority. Here is how it describes it:

It is not random police following us. There is some special group, and we know them, they know us. I was once just taking two days for a vacation and a policeman told me: hey, you were out for two days, where have you been? It's like they're worried for you. It's like telling we are watching you, but today you were not in any news. It's something is tragic, but also, we are making jokes out of this. Even if it's not a joke.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

There is a negotiation process between the watcher and the watched, a way to search for recognition of the journalist's role and a legitimization of his visibility, in the public space and in the eyes of the authority. The dilemma between secrecy and transparency I illustrated in the theory chapters is working here. For instance, the logo of a media company can be problematic depending on the reputation of the media organisation among the different publics in the specific context. Here the journalist describes how the logo of the Turkish state TV broadcaster TRT is often not welcome in the southeast of the country, where part of the population opposes the state and supports the armed struggle of the PKK:

I am using this camera. By showing that I have my camera I don't need to show the press card, proving I am here just as a journalist. I interviewed some friends about

how they are feeling, and they say: if you use a bigger camera, you feel in a better situation, more comfortable. But logos are another threat.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, surveillance performed by LEAs can affect colleagues, friends and family members of the journalist, as in these two cases reported by one of the interviewees:

Once they went to my mum, who has business in the real estate sector. And they told her to convince me to stop reporting, or her business was going to have problems too.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

And again:

I met this lawyer, and we arranged an appointment in a hotel, we met in the room I used as temporary office. Two months later she wrote to me on WhatsApp: I want to inform you that you are being followed. They told me in my face, in Ankara, they said: You are the woman that was in the hotel room with that journalist.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

All these tactics build pressure on the shoulders of the journalist, who fears not only for herself, but also for the people she cares of. It is an attempt to persuade the journalist to give up his activities and to shy away from the public space where the profession is performed.

LEAs from foreign governments can put pressure on journalists residing in a different country by making their presence not visible, but clearly perceived. Visibility, insecurity, and censorship are negotiated at distance. The Regeni case is related to the killing of the young Italian researcher Giulio Regeni in Egypt in 2016. The killing shocked the Italian public and several media organisations launched independent investigation on the case. According to the Italian authorities and these international press investigations, Regeni was killed by Egyptian security forces. Egypt refuses this thesis and insists on a violent robbery by a criminal gang as the reason of the death of the researcher.

We witnessed attempts to hack phones, email accounts, and phishing attempts. Something that did not happen directly to me, but to a colleague who works for a daily, from groups linked to the Egyptian government. Especially in relation to the Giulio Regeni affair.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Here state surveillance reaches the digital domain, where technology crushes the limitations of space, allowing the gazing eye to reach its target very far away. Behind the liquidity of the information flow, there is still the solid hand of the power of the state.

State surveillance can interlace with the initiatives of other private actors, as in the following case in which the journalist fears that a strategic lawsuit against him might trigger a surveillance initiative as part of the litigation:

Following a reckless lawsuit, an (police) investigation is triggered, and wiretapping attempts can start from this investigation. This too is an important point to be considered.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

In such a case, the journalist has to live with the idea of being potentially under surveillance, at least accordingly to the national norms that regulate the use of wiretappings by the LEAs. No matter whether this surveillance actually happens or not, she lives in this limbo of uncertainty that generates imagined surveillance, which have real impact on a person's wellbeing and can modify her professional and private habits.

A similar situation happens with the next example, where a journalist find himself subject to an investigation following her reporting activities. Given the actors involved and the nature of the issue, the journalists assumes that he was the target of surveillance:

A colleague worked on a story on bank accounts of the Italian secret services. The police came to work, confiscated their computer's hard disk, froze a company's email box, and took the entire list of telephone numbers from cell phones connected to the email box. After a few months, they found themselves being investigated for a very serious offence: revealing a state secret, which in Italy provides for sentences of up to ten years. The policemen tried in every way to convince them to hand over my sources, but the request was refused. This story was part of a series of stories on espionage by rogue intelligence agents in Italy.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

State surveillance is particularly threatening for several reasons: the scale of power that the state can exert, the difficulty of making LEAs and state institutions accountable for potential misdemeanours, and the feeling that no matter what you try, how good you are at protecting yourself, you feel helpless in front of it, and journalists are aware of that.

Here's an example:

I would add something about the tools used to try to retrace the journalistic sources. The investigation involving a colleague was so widespread that the Guardia di Finanza sifted through the cell phone towers all cell phone owners who passed in

two hours through the centre of Rome in one day. It means cross-referencing hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than 1,000,000 telephone numbers, with those that belong to our companies, to try to trace numbers that could in some way lead back to the identity of the sources. They took from our phones all the communications to dozens of colleagues, Parliament staff, MPs and senators, managers, supervisors of financial authorities.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

These testimonies confirm that state surveillance is very much present in journalists' lives. It might be old-school tailing or sophisticated hacking techniques, resemble the characteristics of a panopticon or exploit the fluidity of modern IT architectures, and a lot depends on the specificity of the context. The state is engaged in reaffirming his dominance, extract information from journalist or impede the exercise of their job. We now move forward, and we examine the role of other kind of actors in exercising threatening surveillance against journalism.

6.2 Non-state and quasi-state actors

The data collected confirms that an increasing number of actors is now capable of using surveillance against journalists. They do not challenge the leadership of state surveillance, not in terms of sophistication, financial costs or sheer show of power. Nor they represent entirely a novelty in the landscape of the adversaries of journalism. The novelty comes from the new possibilities that technology allows.

Among the non-state actors involved in surveillance targeting journalism, organized crime is one of the most feared adversaries, and certainly an elusive one. Fear stems from the real or alleged power of such organisations and their easiness in exercising violence. Elusiveness comes from the fact that very little research and news reporting has so far shed light on the surveillance capabilities acquired by this type of organisations.

A journalist with a great deal of knowledge in the field states:

A state agency obviously has access to more pervasive technologies. But there are many signs, let's say, that entities such as various forms of organized crime have an increasingly sophisticated technological eye around them. People affiliated to the clans know where to find people who can do certain research, who know how to use a malware and other technologies, and so on...

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

We do not necessarily need to imagine a mafia member that abandons his gun for a mouse and a keyboard. Private intelligence agencies and hacking-for-hire groups can do the job. A possibility that sounds scary and, as pointed out by another of the interviewees, one that denies the protection that comes from being recognised as a legitimate journalist:

Like politicians or magistrates, journalism is living a reputational crisis. I believe that to be a respected journalists protects from many threats, but not from mafia members, because they respond to a different system of values.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

One fine example of this acquisition of surveillance capabilities by the organized crime is outlined by another journalist as such:

It does not directly concern the profiling of journalists, but the profiling of entrepreneurs who became the target of the organized crime, which is interested in acquiring their companies. There have been cases of actual hacking.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

And again:

Criminal organisations rely upon professionals and private companies when they target businessmen they want to rein in, or when they wish to acquire control of financially weakened companies that navigate in dire waters. [Surveillance activities are outsourced to] either a professional individual, who perhaps has a past in a security company, or some not too small security companies willing to do the job.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Other two journalists add that:

Honestly, I saw no trace of this (organized crime putting journalists under digital surveillance) until now. But it wouldn't surprise me to learn that some families acquired such technology. The mafia has always been at the forefront on the use of new technologies to make money and protect their interest.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

When it comes to stolen materials, confidential data, etc. taken from me, no, I don't think I've ever been a victim. Maybe there was some shadowing for a short time, but I don't have enough elements to tell the feeling. From a few instances where I'd tried to nab a person under a big money laundering investigation. And then, well, in the following days I thought I saw people around. But in short, we're talking at the level of impressions.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

So far, the use of surveillance tech by organised crime to target journalism belongs more to the realm of speculation, given the little-to-nothing data available. Nevertheless, the very fact that we have knowledge of surveillance used against other social actors such as businessmen marks a sign here. Several journalists with a strong investigative background and expertise in the topic find the possibility of organised crime engaging in surveillance a concrete possibility, something that will eventually happen sooner or later. The threat of imagined surveillance performed by organised crime has a real impact on the practices of journalists that deal with this issue. It's worth to be noted that it was exclusively reported by journalists operating in Italy, which may be more alert than their Turkish counterparts, or a development in the Italian context. Another consideration regarding surveillance by the organised crime is that it has the same trait of state surveillance: it's top-down, coercive, fear-inspiring. Given that organised crime has the tendency to dominate a territory and replace the state institutions that fail in governing it, it makes all sense that the kind of surveillance it performs is similar to the one performed (lawfully or not) by the state institutions.

Entrepreneurs and businessmen are not only targets of threatening surveillance: they can resort to it against journalists investigating into their businesses. The following journalist believes to having found himself target of surveillance by his very employer, a media company:

At the time I was working at the newspaper, I made my first reports of false accounting and false communications relating to the number of copies sold by the newspaper. I have the clear feeling, and even some documentary evidence, that someone had entered the newspaper's editorial system using shadow digital workstations and had hacked into my computer. I have a close friend, who is well versed in cybersecurity, he made me notice that there were more than possibilities.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

These forms of sophisticated online surveillance practices, usually aimed at data collection or theft, are generally invisible to the point that someone may not even know it happened. They are spotted by chance or by difficult analysis performed by IT professionals. The experience, either confirmed or not, left a scar in the journalist's mind. A hint of how the line between being monitored for real and believing it is very thin:

Undoubtedly the story relating to my whistleblowing, and then the other relating to the investigation of accounts and secret services, both weighed heavily on me, because I knew I was putting my career at risk. In fact, this actually happened.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

The fact that the media industry is not immune from the temptation of using surveillance tech against fellow colleagues is confirmed by another journalist with decades of experience as editor in chief, and renown for having close connections with the Turkish state's secret services:

In every newsroom in Turkey, you can find someone, often a journalist, appointed by the state to monitor and report on all the ongoing editorial activities.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

If this statement is to be believed, it confirms that state-sponsored vigilantism is well alive in the world of Turkish journalism, and that state entities are interested in harnessing the potential of lateral surveillance as a strategic asset for social control. The phenomenon is not ignored in Italy as well, although it takes a different shape:

I worked on an investigation on the local healthcare system, and it touched the nerves of some powerful people. A few days after, an article appeared on a local

media, owned by these very same people. It reported the claim that a relative of mine works in the healthcare industry, and that therefore my work was driven by family interests, not genuine journalism.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

The journalist that reports this event, knowing well that healthcare is one of the favoured businesses of the local powers, suggests that surveillance in the form of doxing is functional to a smear campaign targeting his professional reputation and the one of a family member as well.

Another reporter recounted his suspicion that he was being monitored by a private company, this time a foreign one:

An investigation I dealt with involved a Swiss cryptocurrency issued in one of the Cantons, with the collaboration of a local trustee who was later sentenced to three years for laundering 'Ndrangheta money. On that occasion, some of the people from this milieu, straddling the legal and the illegal economy, made me threats which showed that they were aware of the details of my family life. Most likely there was a follow-up action done through some form of dossier by private investigation firms.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Again, surveillance is something inferred through experience and intuition. The uncertainty produced acts as an augmenter of the fears that the watcher wishes to induce in the watched.

Alongside with both state and private actors engaging in surveillance, we can find hybrid forms of quasi-state and state-sponsored entities. They emerged from the interviews conducted in Turkey only, signalling that the specificity of the country and its longstanding culture of citizen-led policing provide the fertile environment for citizen-led surveillance to

thrive. Here a research participant reports his knowledge of the situation in the field, something that a journalist must keep in mind when going out for work:

They have this online portal, called *muhabir*. Muhtars (Local chiefs) use it to report unwanted activities in the neighbourhood under their administration to the interior ministry. And the Bekçi (neighbourhood watch tasked with security duties), they are just another tool.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

In small towns the social pressure from the peering eye of fellow villagers is even stronger, validating Andrejevic's statement about the nature of lateral surveillance (2006, pag.397): "Everyone-knows-everyone-else's-business world of traditional village life".

People are really afraid to speak in small villages, they are afraid of their own neighbours. People don't easily come to speak to a journalist, they say to not interview people. When there were conflicts in the streets, and people were fighting the state forces, there were some things that people were trying to share with us, information against local Kurdish radical armed groups. But they couldn't. All that people repeated was some speech that it's like memorized. You are speaking to many different people, but you get the same answer, because they are afraid to leave this comfort zone. They just repeat the memorized speech, so that they feel safe because it's used thousands of times.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

This self-censorship affects journalism's capability to perform in a valuable way not only because it deprives journalists of their sources, but also because the same gazing eyes that keeps the citizenship under control are also pointed at the journalists working in the same environment.

The research participant referred to local armed groups, who's strategy of control of the territory does not differ from the state's they are fighting against. So, surveillance performed through the recruitment of citizens in playing the spy affect journalism in the same way. And it also expands to the digital domain, as asserted by this other journalist:

It is a very common practice, especially for pro government social media accounts, to do some espionage on accounts of journalists from the opposing part, also to tag or mention the security directorate or governmental institutions so to inform them. This is commonly used as a threat: if someone posts something that another doesn't like, they immediately mention it to the security directorates. It works. In many cases, they (the police) come up with you to your house, but even if they don't, you'll feel threatened.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

The surveillance activities of these vigilantes relocate from the physical village to the digital village, and they prevent the journalist from engaging in the public debate I social media as in the square. Similar forms of vigilantism can also be traced in Italy, such as this one reported by one of the research participants:

In my experience there are two groups, one close to the Chinese government and one close to Falun Gong, this sort of sect banned in China which exercises strong propaganda abroad and tries to control the public discourse a little, perhaps even through actions of hacking, stalking, dossier, pressure. Also, since surveillance can have multiple and coexisting purposes, the collection of information can also imply the desire of an intimidating effect.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

The activities of these groups tend to target fellow nationals, often dissidents and exiled journalists. It is, at the end of the day, a form of power that tries to rein in and control those who somehow defied the authority. State-sponsored vigilantism represents the materialisation of power co-opting forms of horizontal veillance. And those powers who wish to replace the state adopt state-like tactics. In the specific context of Turkey's southeast region, theatre of the 40-years long conflict between the state and the Kurdish armed group of the PKK, surveillance against journalist is used as a tool of control and coercion by the armed guerrilla as well, as this journalist reports:

They (the Guerrilla) want you to just make propaganda for them. When you don't mess with them, it's not enough: you should also make propaganda for them in the streets. I don't remember if I was directly threatened by these groups. But generally, it happens on digital platforms. They are on Twitter, not few but big groups, looking for journalists to blame, saying these journalists did something against us.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

All these reported testimonies confirm that state surveillance is the most feared form of surveillance against journalists, independently from the generally recognized democratic or authoritarian nature of the institutions. Non-state and quasi-state actors, on the other hand, contribute to feeding the surveillance assemblage that journalism must face and navigate. If they are competitors of the state, the kind of surveillance they engage with often resembles the state's ones in terms of characteristics and aims. From the perspective of a journalist, it means a multiplication of the adversaries and the threats coming from them. If they have a clientelist relationship with the state, their surveillance activities complement and empower the state's ones, making the surveillance mesh even finer and more difficult to elude. Other players act exclusively on their own benefit and do not develop any form of relationship with the state: their surveillance practices are functional to their interests alone. Still, they represent another element of complexity in the surveillance mesh that is triggered by journalistic activities.

Most common experiences of offline surveillance, such as tailing, are generally aimed at producing a chilling effect, at enforcing self-censorship and at pushing the journalist to change the course of an investigation or even renounce to it. Online surveillance practices instead are usually invisible, except for forms of surveillance linked to other types of threats that target journalists, such as trolling, hate speech and harassment. They aim at data collection or theft, even more precious if it goes unnoticed. Their invisibility spell is broken by chance, out of luck, because of mistakes done by the perpetrator, or through difficult forensic analysis performed by IT professionals.

All forms of surveillance recounted by the journalists that were interviewed fall under the category of targeted surveillance. Indeed, the very fact that these journalists were or believed to be the target of unwanted and intrusive attention is what constitutes the core of the problem in their minds. Form of opportunistic surveillance emerge only in some forms of imagined surveillance where, in the eyes of the journalist, they maintain the vagueness of generalized and socially accepted truth: that they are all being watched, somehow. Other forms of opportunistic surveillance, such as the ones related to the advertising industry or connected to the technologies installed on mobile phone, were completely absent from the discourse and were not problematized nor perceived as a threat, rather a toll that they pay for the use of certain instruments. After all, these forms of surveillance are not explicitly aimed at journalism and therefore the category seems not to be concerned with them.

Proven and imagined surveillance are both capable of impacting severely the professional and private lives of journalists by feeding a climate fear and danger, no matter the real risks behind the curtain. Indeed, the blurred boundaries of imagined surveillance and the peculiar uncertainty that surrounds it seem to produce a stronger chilling effect and harsher emotional states on journalists compared to proven surveillance.

Promoting the public professional reputation is considered an efficient remedy when it comes to protecting journalists from forms of surveillance coming from private actors, or forms of surveillance that are intertwined with other threats such as slander, harassment, and physical violence in the streets. On the other hand, professional reputation is

considered irrelevant, or even detrimental, when dealing with state surveillance or surveillance deployed by criminal organisations.

It worth to notice that all the interviewed journalists were members of at least one professional organisation or union, but none of them mentioned her/his membership as an effective form of protection or support against threatening surveillance, indicating that more should be done in this direction.

All these forms of threatening surveillance are felt to a detrimental impact on the psychological well-being of journalists and those in their network of acquaintances.

Something we now explore further.

6.3 The psychological impact of threatening surveillance

Most of the interview journalists named three negative feelings experienced while being (or believing of being) under surveillance: fear, anxiety, stress. Some journalists managed to cope with the situation better than others, showing a mix of stoicism and realism as an efficient tactic of resistance:

They weren't such traumatic events. Not such as to give up the case no, just what I told you earlier, that money laundering case. As journalists, we may be unaware of the reality of this [surveillance] world. We're little trained and therefore sometimes you are afraid of situations that cannot occur, you are afraid of having the telephone under control because it hears noises, when in fact they are only line issues. A wiretapping hardly makes any noise. It must be said that I believe those involved in this type of activity have an interest in keeping the air cloudy.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

But for others, the burden is much heavier and the consequences on their private and professional lives more dire to deal with. It includes severe symptoms of distress and drastic decisions pertaining both the professional life, such as changing the way on exercise journalism, and the private one, even leaving the family or moving to a different location.

As in this case:

I was the subject of a U.S. Secret Service request for information that earned me some gastritis. Since then, I've been extremely more conservative in the way I work. I used to wake up with panic attacks: I was terrified by the fact that they could follow me. They didn't contact me directly, but they made sure they had all the information about our little project, and we had to give it. I can't go into more detail, but we abandoned that project after clarifying that there was no malicious intent. Back then, they tried to understand which side we were on, if we had hidden sponsors, the subject was whistleblowing. On the one hand, it achieved worldwide popularity with Julian Assange it, on the other, it all ended a little compromised, because everything related to whistleblowing had become dangerous and violent in the eyes of the authorities. Trusted people taught me to check if I'm being followed. At a certain point, some individuals told me "Whatever you do, stay in Italy". First, I left Italy, because I felt much safer and more protected outside Italy, in a place where I was not alone. I didn't want to be alone. Most of the project I managed from a commune in France, it was much more fun. The house was always full of people, I wasn't afraid at night because we're talking about a house where ten other misfits lived, who were by the way all physics engineers. I needed to be somewhere where there were other people physically seeing me. Why? The problem with this job is that many times you feel invisible. You run here and there and then go home to write your piece. It is obvious that solitude and silence make you feel a little more fragile, a little more isolated. Isolation is not easy to manage.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

For other journalists, reliance on technical solutions seems the way to go, even though in general there is a shared belief among the journalistic community that technology is in itself necessary, but not sufficient.

I had to equip myself with a Faraday cage to deactivate any impulse that comes from my mobile phone, so that I can move with real autonomy.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

In all the examined cases, such a high level of distress deeply affects the life of the journalist, which are pushed to take extreme solutions to find relief from the sense of suffocating presence that it's hard to get rid of:

I don't live at any of my official addresses anymore, and there were times during which I used to change my location quite frequently.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

I moved to another house, so not to stay with my family. If something happens, it happens to me only.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

All forms of threatening surveillance produce psychological discomfort of various degree, with fear, anxiety and stress quoted as the most common consequences. Nevertheless, journalists who had to deal with state surveillance recounted of tougher consequences in terms of damage to their psychic health. The pervasiveness of the presence of the state, and the impression, real or perceived, of having an invincible opponent in front of you produces a sense of helplessness that requires hard choices and a higher capacity of coping with the consequences. Interestingly, almost no participant ever thought of getting

psychological support during the times in which they experienced surveillance. It's something they considered only afterwards when the threat seemed to have faded. Still, all of them declared that psychological support would be welcome, and that they would have benefitted from it, if they were then offered the possibility. It suggests a need of a more proactive role on behalf of the organisations that support journalism, which cannot expect that journalists knock at their doors spontaneously demanding for a such sensitive assistance.

The next chapter will explore other forms of surveillance, the ones in the hands of journalists themselves, and that I labelled caring surveillance, borrowing the definition from David Lyon, as they are meant to serve journalism in a virtuously manner. We see that certain surveillance technologies, techniques and practices such as open-source intelligence (Osint) or hidden cameras have long been part of the tools used in newsrooms and by individual journalists. More challenging is to define whether these tools constitute actual surveillance or journalistic work is somehow different despite using intrusive tools, and what are the ethical guidelines and the deontological norms that guide journalism in the use of these technologies.

CHAPTER 7: FORMS OF CARING SURVEILLANCE FOR JOURNALISM

The previous chapter offered an analysis on threatening surveillance, the renowned dark side of surveillance and journalism. It showed how different forms of such surveillance coexist, interact, and even compete between themselves, shaping the hybrid environment in which the journalist, or we should say the citizen-journalist, not only exercises her profession, but also exists as a citizen and a human being affected by the surveillance assemblage.

The seventh chapter brings our attention to the concept of caring surveillance in journalism, and to the hybrid identity of the journalist-watchman. We start doing this by asking a fundamental question: care for who? In this study, I consider forms of caring surveillance: those technologies, techniques and practices that are beneficial to the journalistic activities: journalists engage with them for the sake of their own work, because they think they represent useful and legitimate tools and added value. Of course, those who are subject to these practices may or may not have a different opinion on the matter. Here is one of the key points: do journalists take the different possible perspectives into account? I investigate the imbalances in the perception of journalism in relation to surveillance. These imbalances depend on how journalists position themselves in relation to that flow in the exercise of power that constitutes a characteristic of surveillance in all the conceptualisations and paradigms that were analysed in the chapter dedicated to theories of surveillance.

We begin by describing a few common forms of caring surveillance used by the interviewed journalists, how they manage the treasured data collected through such practices, then we explore the deontological norms attached to this usage and the perception regarding the dynamics of power that are entrenched in surveillance.

7.1 Solutions of caring surveillance for Journalism

Among the most frequently mentioned surveillance practices during the interviews, doxing is certainly one of the most contested, where journalists showed very different

understanding and diverse perceptions on whether it should be included in the list of tools of journalism or not.

According to Douglas (2016 p.1), doxing is “the intentional public release onto the Internet of personal information about an individual by a third party, often with the intent to humiliate, threaten, intimidate, or punish the identified individual”. Trottier (2020 p. 206) adds that doxing implies “publishing any available information about them and inviting audiences to do the same, as well as to circulate any available information about the target”. According to these scholars, doxing happens online, involves the wider public and implies harmful intentions.

The journalists I interviewed showed a different understanding of what doxing is, more in line with digital activities that allow the creation of a dossier on a certain subject. When asked whether doxing can be part of the journalists’ toolkit and to which extent, one of the participants replied:

I'll give you a specific case that happened to me recently: I'm working on a book, there are people who are at the same time victims of usury and involved in the whole scheme. I wanted to understand what kind of lifestyle they lead, so I relied on open data and Osint to provide some context. Then maybe the context isn't criminally relevant, but if a character declares bankruptcy and then drives around with a big car and takes a picture of it, even if not relevant, it returns an idea of the character.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Here the activities of data collection and profiling are clearly invasive and produce an amount of knowledge on the investigated subject, but there is no online publication assumed and certainly there is no involvement of the public. The data are solely destined to the gazing eye of the journalist and to the benefit of her investigation. Another journalist associates doxing with otherwise traditional journalistic activities:

I have used doxing techniques, so to speak. For example, monitoring the social activities of people because they are already of journalistic interest, in order to carry out journalistic work. Never, never outside of an activity which should at least lead to produce articles. I once spent three days making a table with all Matteo Salvini's movements, because I needed to find the missing piece in his social networks: I knew he was in Russia.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Again, no direct publication nor audience involvement, and a clear journalistic purpose behind the activity. My understanding is that these journalists recognize the invasiveness of activities that go beyond what an average person can immediately find online, as they require a finer knowledge of the digital sphere and the tools used to gather the data. They are, in the end, aware that their role implies a sophisticated level of unrequested access into other people's lives and a position of discomfort that is nevertheless justified by mission of the journalist: search for facts and determine their newsworthiness in order to achieve the primary goal: to inform the public. The process is facilitated by the fact that, at the end of the day, journalists believe that the people they investigate on somehow deserve a lower level of privacy due to their position: a loan shark in the first case, a politician in the second one. This judgement relies solely on the journalists' good faith and the deontological norms that she applied. In this sense, the exercise of power stems from the process of determining the newsworthiness of a certain person involved in certain facts, an exercise that journalists normally claim to respond to the ethical mission that bounds journalism, but it also derives from commercial interests. Here lies also the legitimisation in the use of intrusive techniques that would be considered inappropriate if they were directed at the average citizen.

This becomes clearer from another statement of the same journalist quoted the last. He adds:

The problem with doxing is that if you are a journalist you are exposed to visibility. I happened to be harassed by anonymous users on Twitter, who insulted me because I am a feminist and, therefore, he claimed I hate men. Explain to me, what's the matter? At that point I know I am in a position of strength, which is expressed in the moment in which, at the umpteenth utterance of violent insults and threats towards me, which I have never really taken into consideration, and which lasted for months or perhaps a year, I did a few searches and, thanks to my skills, in 20 minutes I knew the identity of the person who was attacking me. I replied to him by writing the name. Obviously, he never told me what the name was. There I revealed that I knew who he was and asked him not to force me to act. Let's put it this way: it's because he drove me to exasperation. But on the other hand, I have never followed up on all this. He got scared, he closed his profiles after apologizing to me and if you ask me now, I don't even remember who he is.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

It is clear that the journalist is aware that his journalistic skills were put into use outside the perimeter of the legitimate exercise of the profession. And he somehow shows regret about this, even if he feels justified.

Also, here we have a limpid example of surveillance capacity used by a journalist as a tool of defence from other forms of online harassment, and to re-establish the accessibility of the public digital space and an appropriate digital inter-dialogue.

We mentioned how open-source intelligence is widely used by journalists (Westcott 2019). Social media intelligence, or Socmint shortened (Omand et al. 2012), is a subgroup of the Osint activities, one that focuses on social media platform. Here another journalist explains her experience with it.

I use SOCMINT as an invaluable tool to track the network of relations of affiliates of mafia families. Sometimes social media reveal links that are not immediately obvious, like two local politicians from opposing parties, both sitting in the board of

a company that entered the sphere of influence of a criminal clan. Then you spot them with a member of the clan at a private party, and you start to understand.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Here techniques of data gathering are deployed against the muddy world of organised crime and its impenetrability. Again, the legitimacy takes origin from the journalistic mission and how the journalist position herself in relation to the investigated subject. An interesting and controversial element of Socmint is that it relies on that grey zone between public and private digital space, where private data is publicly stored (Rønn and Sjøe 2019).

Here is the take of a data-journalist on the issue:

One of the key points here is to make people understand what this public data is, what are you actually sharing when you post something? By the way, it's given to itself it can be accessible to third parties. So, I'm not sure if anyone is truly aware of how this data can be used. You pile up the data and start digging into it, looking for some anomalies, and something important that you didn't consider will come up, and then you dig deeper...

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

This data is accessible due to the architectural nature of the social media platform that hosts it, often without the consent of even the knowledge of the interested subject (Rønn and Sjøe 2019). Journalists can position themselves very differently on this issue. They can put the burden of data management on the citizen's shoulders:

If you don't put privacy on Facebook, I mean, it's your problem. If a journalist "stumbles" on this data, you can't complain. If I go looking for them, there is still a lot of info that I collect and then I won't use, because I have a code of ethics and I must have the ability to separate things that are interesting for the public and what

is that person's private story that shouldn't interest me either. If that would be the case, I am not doing surveillance, I am stalking, which is a crime.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Or they can put it on the management of platforms:

I'm extensively using social media data and Twitter is the most frequent platform that I'm using. And so, I am allowed to use here, because the platform is the owner of the data, and it sets the rules.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

The only responsibility of the journalist is the decision whether the harvested data is something that has a public interest or not. In order to decide on that, the journalist must first have access it, and this self-awarded right to accessibility, that extends beyond the right to access information held by public bodies that is the fundament of another journalistic and civic tool such as FOI requests (Mendel 2003), is a prerogative that no journalist was willing to question.

The next example involves hidden cameras, another piece of surveillance equipment used in journalism that emerged from the conversations:

We heavily rely on the mobile phone cameras and other recording devices, although, with the latest developments, citizen journalism in Turkey is becoming harder, so we are considering the hidden cameras. The police are expanding their powers and their means to deal with journalists who are recording protests. So yes, that's fine.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

This quotation represents a lucid example of journalism practicing sousveillance to impose accountability for the behaviour of riot police in Turkey, an attempt to give partial remedy to the imbalances between the LEAs, empowered and protected by the state's legislation, and the journalists who side with the protesting citizenship.

All these forms of caring surveillance, mainly aimed at data extraction and collection, explain how thin is the line that journalism has to walk while using surveillance tools. However, the issue of caring does not end with practices for data collection, but also data retention, deletion, and accessibility. More in general, protocols for data management.

7.2 Managing data.

I used to archive everything, every day. It was essential to keep everything without ever deleting anything, always on multiple supports, to have the availability of safe supports even in case of problems of deterioration of the support. It has been fundamental on several occasions, also in front of legal disputes.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

I store my data offline and encrypted. There I collect data also obtained through surveillance technologies, and that you archive because you never know when, in the course of another journalistic job, you might need to retrieve certain information.

Interview conducted with a Turkish, translated by the author.

We keep multiple copies of hard drives also because you need to protect yourself from complaints worth millions of euros filed against you. We archive not just data, but also how we acquire them, all the procedures, and the timing. Then you can

prove yourself innocent, or at least deny any malicious intention, which translates into lack of felony.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Three quotations in line to return the overarching idea: journalists store everything for an indetermined amount of time. They have two main and quite valid reason to do so. The first one, is that journalistic archives constitute a formidable resource for future, also complex investigations, and for the preservation of collective historical memory. The second is that one of the greatest threats that journalism faces are lawsuits and strategic litigation as a tool to silence them (Barthet et al. 2021).

While it all sounds more that reasonable, the GDPR and the right to be forgotten imposing a stress on the existence of backups and archives (Politou et al. 2018), including the ones produced by journalists.

Only one journalist I interviewed showed a clear understanding of the issue and recounted to have protocols in place at his organisation.

Of course, you can request data deletion. We have done that, regarding some people who felt uneasy about information being stored on the news articles being written about them. We allow people to retract this information. No one can have access right away, they have to go through our management. Of course, it's not an open archive.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist.

He covered the role of assistant to the editor in chief, so he had duties pertaining the management of the news organisation. Other journalists, and especially freelancers, showed they have basically no personal policy or protocols that regulate data access and deletion from their privately owned archives.

7.3 Deontological norms of surveillance technology use

The ethical norms that regulate the profession of the journalist (Encabo 1995) were challenged by the emergence of the information communication technologies or ITCs (Díaz Campo and Segado-Boj 2015), with traditional dilemmas reposed in the digital environment, such as the reliability of the sources, and new one sprouting from the peculiarities of the digital world, as in the case of the principles of using links. “Given the vast amount of data and information in Internet determining the trustworthiness of online news can be a daunting – maybe a utopic – task” (Mateus 2019, p. 15).

Surveillance is a controversial topic and therefore ignites a debate that, in journalism, is very much at the frontline level, and it interestingly interact with the ability of a journalist to determine the newsworthiness of a fact, as we had the chance to appreciate in some of the former quotes in this chapter. Here a journalist elaborates the concept better:

That moment when you take responsibility and you give me the profile of a citizen because you believe there is newsworthiness, you must at least have a trace of what you have done, a blog, which helps demonstrate the correctness of your activities, and the lawfulness.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

First, responsibility is mentioned as an essential element of the newsworthiness process: the journalist decides, the journalist is accountable for her decision. And this remains true also when using surveillance practices to gather data on a certain subject. Secondly, responsibility is built upon good practices of transparency: to make the line of work visible and accessible means to justify the use of certain technology and legitimise the journalistic work.

This responsibility is due also to all the people involved in the journalistic activities, including the public:

We do not have a protocol yet, but regarding video recordings, we always try to remind our people not to take you directly in the face, so that people that are working during a protest or a social movement do not create the kind of evidence that the police will rely on. We try to encourage our reporters to take pictures from angles that will not reveal the (identity of) people who might not want to be visible.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

For some journalists, there are rigid limitations in place even beyond newsworthiness:

Even if I had the account and password of a citizen or public figure, I would never use them to access a system which I am not authorized to access to. OK, that's a huge red line. Computer intrusion is a crime and there is no mitigating circumstance such as the journalistic mission. That's a crime. In any case, journalists are not an authority, they're no public officials. It's legitimate for me to set up a stakeout in the street, so it's legitimate for me to go peek at all the politician's social media posts. It is not legitimate for me to enter a private house, consequently it is also not legitimate to enter a cell phone.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Interestingly, deontological norms for using technology that acts in the digital sphere are derived from consolidated examples from the physical world. Which is in line with what another journalist stated regarding the need of specific norms to regulate surveillance:

The norms that balance the right to privacy and the right to inform are already there and are very clear. They just need to be adapted to the new context.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

And another participant:

I believe that the technological tools available are sufficiently regulated to the extent that the interpretation of the law to protect the people and the realities journalists write about is also extended to the digital domain.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

Some journalists come to recognize the special status, and the special powers, of journalists:

We are in the position of being able to access a level of open source that is different from the one of the normal citizens, because we have a different role, because we do this every day. So, in my opinion, despite the fact that we do not have special rights compared to a normal citizen, in our opinion we must also have special obligations in the use of the Osint, precisely because of the role we have.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

According to this statement, journalists do not have special privileges, rather special duties and a higher level of responsibility. Not all journalists showed the same level of self reflectivity and they were surprised by their own answers and thinking during the interview, suggesting that even if the normative could be quickly adapted to the new context, a need of debate and thinking among the community is likely needed:

We are collaborating with a tech company that does social media analysis for us. We, of course, anonymize all the data that we receive before publishing anything.

Or we ask for consent of the users before quoting them. Okay... It seems that we do rely on surveillance technology to do our job.

Interview conducted with a Turkish journalist, translated by the author.

What is utterly absent from the journalists' mindset on caring surveillance is a discussion around the logics of power inherently linked to the use of these technologies. Issues related to fundamental rights and power-related problems are very present in the journalists' minds when dealing with threatening surveillance, but they tend to disappear from the discussion when it comes to the opportunistic/professional use of surveillance tools that are used during an investigation.

The main reason is that journalism is not perceived as the exercise of power, rather as the exercise of a right.

I experienced surveillance against a journalist through a colleague followed for weeks, photographed. It enters your daily sphere, and it has nothing to do with things that you put on your own initiative to the public (on social media). But more generally, it is journalistic work that does not have the purpose of the kind of surveillance as it happened with a colleague, followed for three weeks to then be shot and killed, or to prepare a dossier that embarrassed a Serbian colleague, who was videotaped to demonstrate that he lives a messed-up life and that he's a drug addict, which isn't true. That is not journalistic work, which by responding to a public interest cannot be defined as surveillance.

Interview conducted with an Italian journalist, translated by the author.

7.5 Conclusions

Most of the interviewed journalists frequently use different and several surveillance techniques and technologies as part of their professional activities. Journalistic practices

are shaped by these new affordances, which undoubtedly provide for new sharp tools for incisive journalism. Journalists often tend to indulge in self-justification regarding the use of surveillance technology, or do not recognize these techniques and tools as actual surveillance, rather redefining them as legitimate practices derived from the right to inform the public. This discourse does not make explicit the fact that the use of caring surveillance technology is established upon a decision of newsworthiness that, in such a way, becomes an expression of power: the journalist will decide whether a person should be subject to his tools of surveillance, whether his social media can or cannot be harvested, and so on. A discourse around the power relations and/or lack of transparency connected to surveillance technologies is missing from the debate, similarly to a debate over the possibility that caring surveillance may produce psychological distress to those who become subject to it. Something that could be assessed by researching the reaction of people whose digital lives were investigated by journalists.

Also, daily practices and work organisations often lack standardised protocols for data selection, retention, and deletion. Journalists archive data for an indefinite amount of time, either because it can be useful to future investigations and/or as a mean of legal protection against potential legal complaints. How these practices can comply with the most recent normative on data management (namely the GDPR) is a topic of discussion that will take place in the upcoming times.

Now that we have a detailed understanding of both threatening and caring surveillance and its relationship with journalism, it is time to tight it back to the principles analysed in the literature. The next and final chapter will draw some conclusions, point out limitations and foreseeable new research paths.

CHAPTER 8: THE SENSE OF VIGILANT JOURNALISM

This research started asking two questions that I would like to repropose here, in order to provide for exhaustive answers based on the work done.

RQ1: What is the impact of lateral surveillance and (digital) vigilantism on journalistic practices and journalists' professional and private lives?

RQ2: How and why are journalists and other members of the public being co-opted by the state in the surveillance apparatus deployed against journalists and media workers?

8.1 Hybrid journalist in hybrid surveillance

Journalists' lives and practices are affected by lateral surveillance and vigilantism not only as passive targets, but also as active agents that contribute to the surveillance mesh and play a role in the assemblage. This assemblage bears the features of both the discipline-oriented surveillance as in Foucault and the liquid surveillance paradigm developed by David Lyon. While Foucault's take on the issue may result outdated in the light of cultural and technological developments, his notions of disciplining power and biopower found new application in the contemporary context of liquid modernity. Lyon's paradigm, on the other hand, has captured many of traits of the modernity and how surveillance phenomena occur in our hybrid spaces. Moreover, he's idea of caring surveillance deserves great attention and it proved to be a fantastic key for interpreting certain phenomena while moving away from oversimplifications and stereotypical interpretations. Nevertheless, Lyon's approach does not deny that the role of the state and other important, powerful and aggressive players, is not ousted by the free flow of the liquid modernity and surveillance. Rather, the state learned how to take advantage from this liquidity in order to challenge the safeguards, the protections and the gains hardly obtained by the civil society and journalism in terms of safety from intrusive surveillance, source protection and fundamental freedoms of expression.

Therefore, this research acknowledges that technologies and practices that constitute forms of surveillance in the context of journalism, while depending on subjective perceptions and a moral compass that influences how they are performed and perceived, can rarely be seen as solely belonging to one of the extremes categories of threat or care: these two categories likely coexist within each contextualised form of surveillance.

The combined concepts of liquidity and panopticon can better represent the reality collected through the empirical work. The predominance of the threat emanated from the state in the experiences of the interviewed journalists is sided by examples of forms of multi-directional surveillance performed by a variety of actors that do not belong to the state domain. Journalistic surveillance practices in particular are a fine example of the complex relationship between the threatening and the caring dimensions, which occur in what could finally be redefined a reality of liquid panopticons.

Journalists adapted their habits and practices, looking for protection from surveillance that threatens their work and well-being, forms of surveillance that come not only from the state, but also from several other social actors that include organised crime, corporations, militant groups, armed insurgent groups, and private individuals with the motivation and the necessary know-how. These actors will likely play an increasing role in the future, and they will continue to pose a potential threat to journalists working in specific investigation on the very same actors. All threatening surveillance activities undermine the journalists' ability to carry out high-value, quality work, thus impacting the conditions under which democracy and freedoms may thrive. Caring surveillance represents an opportunity for journalists, who can empower their investigations and reach results that would not be otherwise possible. At the same time, journalism needs to sharpen its deontological norms when it comes to evaluate when surveillance in journalism cannot be dismissed as another tool in the box of the news professionals. Surveillance remains an exercise of power, indeed one that is immersed in a hybrid and hyperconnected context where the flow of data and information can indeed be unpredictable, no matter the benign intentions or the nobility of the mission of informing the public. Stronger ethics in the use of surveillance, whose opportunities are undeniable, mean also that journalism will be better equipped against

the state and other power-oriented actors that are interested in co-opting journalism and other social actors in vigilant-like and policing activities, provided that they can reaffirm their control on both the reluctant and the enthusiastic parts of the society. While this interest is not new, the ways in which it is made possible are multiplied by the fact that surveillance technologies are spreading in the hands of actors that once had no chance to acquire the necessary knowledge, let alone to afford expensive and rare tools and equipment. This democratisation of surveillance is pushed by logics of the capitalist market, not just the action of the state.

Quite clearly, differences between the two contexts emerged during the interviews. The most obvious ones are related to the different actors in place. For instance, organised crime is perceived as a serious surveillance threat in Italy, or a forthcoming one in the eyes of some of the interviewees. In Turkey, the stratified surveillance apparatus involves the organisation of groups that can be identified as quasi-state actors, such as the neighbourhood watches and the muhtars. While they are not formally part of the state institutions, their collaboration with the state is part of their reason to exist. The Italian context do not foresee anything similar, due to the diverse institutional architecture and surveillance cultures. On the other hand, because of the tensions that shackled the Anatolian country in the last years, Turkish journalists seem to be more combat-ready when it comes to push back against forms of threatening surveillance, paired with a fatalistic approach shared among the community that goes with “anything can happen in this country”. Proof of this is the fact that it was very simple to find in Turkey an association that provides psychological support and training against trauma specific for media professionals and newsrooms. Something that does not exist in Italy, where I had to resort to help from professionals who work with human rights activists. This very simple fact also points out a necessary and promising area of intervention for advocacy groups that are interested in providing support to the Italian community. More in general, the separation between the state and other politically motivated actors is more blurred in Turkey, where the surveillance apparatus is stratified in a thicker way, and where it seems to be easier to coopt non-state and quasi-state actors in surveillance and policing activities. It represents an interesting answer to the second research question, underlying the importance of the specific context

when it comes to assessing the attempts on behalf of the institutions to integrate forms of lateral surveillance into the more traditional top-down approach of the state institutions.

8.2 Limitation of the study

The study focuses on Turkey and Italy as two case studies. While representativity was considered of secondary importance compared to in-depth analysis, we learned that the social, political and historical specificities and the contingent conditions of the context play a crucial role in deciding which affordances that originate from general technological possibilities find actual realisation in the field.

The size of the sample was impacted by the impossibility of conducting research in the field due to travel restrictions linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the new methodology arranged as a result of the limited conditions, I realised that journalists contacted for recruitment were reluctant to engage in the research. This is due to several reasons. First, people may have been busy with health-related issues, themselves or people belonging to their network, and prioritised their time accordingly. I also noticed a common sense of discomfort related to the online environment, the very same environment where plenty of surveillance experiences had occurred, and that marked this space as unsafe in journalist's mind, despite their familiarity with technology that is used to protect digital privacy... Or rather, exactly because of that. Additionally, the pandemic forced people to spend way more time in front of screens, monitors, computers, which resulted in a general tiredness related to technology and the desire to find relief in their free time. Finally, the pandemic took a toll in terms of psychological fatigue and discomfort that I have also experienced, and that could not be mitigated by the most accommodating circumstances nor by providing external support. The sample was also limited by the lack of gender representativity, with only few participants coming from the non-male communities.

A limit in the research design resides in interviewing journalists and journalists only. Which are only one of actors involved in the phenomena.

8.3 Hints for future research

Further research should take place in countries other than the two of the selected countries, in order to continue the assessment around general traits of lateral surveillance in journalism versus context-related affordances and practices. This will bring into play new conditions determined by the characteristics of the country, new ethical and deontological values and different perspectives on what is good journalism and how to perform it through the affordances offered by surveillance technologies and practices.

Another stream of research is represented by investigating further the psychological impact of surveillance in terms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), given that the recounts offered by the research participants suggested strong similarities with other forms of traumatic experiences.

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APPENDIX A

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Informed Consent Form

I. Research Study Title

The study in which you are being requested to participate has the working title of '*Effects of lateral surveillance in journalism*'. It is being conducted by Dimitri Bettoni, a PhD student in the School of Communications, at the Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin, Ireland.

II. Clarification of the purpose of the research

The research investigates the impact of (digital) vigilantism and lateral surveillance on journalistic practices and on the professional and private lives of journalists. The research also investigates journalists' awareness of the surveillance technology used by individual journalists and within the newsrooms while carrying out their professional activities. This study aims to generate new insights into this important area.

III. Confirmation of particular requirements as highlighted in the Plain Language Statement

As stated in the Plain Language Statement, participants in this research will be requested to participate in at least one face-to-face or online interview, which the researcher will request to record. Photojournalists will be asked to produce photographic material that represents their personal experience in relation to the researched topic.

Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question)

<i>I have read the Plain Language Statement (or had it read to me)</i>	Yes/No
<i>I understand the information provided</i>	Yes/No
<i>I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study</i>	Yes/No
<i>I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions</i>	Yes/No
<i>I am aware that my interview will be audiotaped</i>	Yes/No

IV. Confirmation that involvement in the Research Study is voluntary

Participants' involvement in this study is totally voluntary. As a participant you may withdraw from the Research Study at any point. There will be no penalty for withdrawing before all stages of the Research Study have been completed.

V. Advice as to arrangements to be made to protect confidentiality of data.

Every effort will be made to respect participants' anonymity. The data collected will be analysed by the principal researcher and his supervisor alone. Participants' actual names will be protected. Anonymisation will be implemented by disaggregating data into separate, encrypted and password protected files. Fake names will be used if direct references are required. Interview notes, transcripts and photo materials will be held by the principal researcher and stored in a secure, encrypted location. Confidentiality of information provided is guaranteed within the limitations of the law. It is possible for the anonymised data to be subject to subpoena, freedom of information claims or mandated reporting by some professions.

VI. Signature:

I have read and understood the information in this form. My questions and concerns have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form. Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project

Participants Signature: _____
Name in Block Capitals: _____
Date: _____

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Foglio di consenso informato

I. Titolo della ricerca

La ricerca alla quale le è chiesto di prendere parte si intitola *"Effetti di sorveglianza laterale nel giornalismo"* [titolo originale *'Effects of lateral surveillance in journalism'*].

La ricerca è condotta da Dimitri Bettoni, student dottorando presso la Scuola di Comunicazione della Dublin City University (DCU), Dublino, Irlanda.

II. Scopo della ricerca

La ricerca si propone di investigare l'impatto di fenomeni di vigilantismo (anche digitale) e sorveglianza laterale, ovvero da parte di attori non-statali, sulla prassi giornalistica e le vite private di giornalisti e professionisti dei media.

Inoltre, la ricerca studia il livello di consapevolezza nell'uso di tecnologie di sorveglianza da parte di giornalisti, siano singoli individui o operativi all'interno di strutture redazionali, nell'ambito dell'esercizio della professione.

III. Conferma di requisiti fondamentali riportati nel documento Dichiarazione di progetto

Al partecipante al progetto di ricerca è richiesto di partecipare ad almeno un'intervista, da farsi di persona oppure online, che il ricercatore chiederà di registrare. Ai fotogiornalisti partecipanti verrà richiesto di produrre materiale fotografico che contribuisca alla narrazione personale della propria esperienza in relazione all'argomento trattato.

Partecipante – si prega di rispondere alle domande cerchiando sì/no per ciascuna di esse:

Ho letto la Dichiarazione di progetto (oppure mi è stata letta) Sì / No

Ho compreso le informazioni in essa contenute Sì / No

Ho avuto l'opportunità di discutere il progetto e porre eventuali mie domande Sì / No

Ho ricevuto risposta soddisfacente ad ogni mia domanda Sì / No

Sono consapevole che l'intervista verrà audioregistrata Sì / No

IV. Conferma della volontarietà della partecipazione alla ricerca

Il coinvolgimento del partecipante in questo progetto è completamente volontario. In quanto tale, il partecipante può ritirare la propria disponibilità in qualunque momento. Non vi sono penali né conseguenze di alcun genere che possono derivare dal ritiro della propria disponibilità.

V. Informativa circa la protezione della confidenzialità dei dati raccolti

Ogni sforzo è compiuto per tutelare l'anonimato dei partecipanti alla ricerca. I dati raccolti verranno trattati esclusivamente dal ricercatore e dalla sua relatrice. I nomi dei partecipanti alla ricerca sono protetti. L'anonimizzazione è garantita separando i dati in due file separati, protetti da password e crittografia, uno contenente i nomi dei partecipanti, un secondo con i dati raccolti attraverso l'intervista. Nomi falsi e pseudonimi possono essere utilizzati in caso di citazioni dirette necessarie. Le note delle interviste, le trascrizioni e i materiali audio e fotografico sono conservati dal ricercatore in località sicura e su dispositivi protetti da crittografia. La confidenzialità dei dati raccolti è soggetta ai limiti previsti dalla legge. È possibile che i dati anonimizzati siano oggetto di testimonianza in caso il ricercatore sia citato a testimoniare in sede di giudizio, di richieste in tema di libertà di informazione, oppure di relazione obbligatoria dettata da vincoli di natura professionale.

VI. Firma

Ho letto e compreso le informazioni contenute in questo document. Il ricercatore ha provveduto a rispondere alle mie domande e richieste di chiarimento. Posseggo una copia di questo documento. Pertanto, do il mio consenso alla partecipazione a questo progetto di ricerca.

Firma: _____

Nome in stampatello: _____

Data: _____

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Bilgilendirilmiş Onam Formu

I. Araştırma Çalışması Başlığı

Katılmanızın istendiği çalışmanın "Gazetecilikte yanal gözetlemenin etkileri" çalışma başlığı var. Bu, Dublin, İrlanda'daki Dublin Şehir Üniversitesi'nde (DCU) İletişim Okulu'nda doktora öğrencisi olan Dimitri Bettoni tarafından yürütülmektedir.

II. Araştırmanın amacının netleştirilmesi

Araştırma, (dijital) uyanıklığın ve yanal gözetimin gazetecilik pratikleri ve gazetecilerin profesyonel ve özel yaşamları üzerindeki etkisini araştırıyor. Araştırma aynı zamanda gazetecilerin, bireysel olarak gazeteciler tarafından ve haber merkezlerinde mesleki faaliyetlerini yürütürken kullandıkları gözetleme teknolojisine ilişkin farkındalıklarını da araştırıyor. Bu çalışma, bu önemli alana ilişkin yeni görüşler üretmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

III. Açık Dil Beyanında vurgulanan belirli gereksinimlerin teyidi

Sade Dil Beyanında belirtildiği gibi, bu araştırmadaki katılımcılardan, araştırmacının kaydetmesini isteyeceği en az bir yüz yüze veya çevrimiçi görüşmeye katılmaları istenecektir. Foto muhabirlerinden, araştırılan konuyla ilgili kişisel deneyimlerini temsil eden fotoğraf materyali üretmeleri istenecektir..

Katılımcı – lütfen aşağıdakileri doldurun (Her soru için Evet veya Hayır'ı daire içine alın)

Sade Dil Beyanını okudum (veya bana okuttu)	Evet/Hayır
Verilen bilgileri anladım	Evet/Hayır
Soru sorma ve bu çalışmayı tartışma fırsatım oldu.	Evet/Hayır
Tüm Sorularıma tatmin edici cevaplar aldım.	Evet/Hayır
Görüşmemin ses kaydına alınacağını farkındayım.	Evet/Hayır

IV. Araştırma Çalışmasına katılımın isteğe bağlı olduğunun teyidi

Katılımcıların bu çalışmaya katılımı tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Bir katılımcı olarak, istediğiniz zaman Araştırma Çalışmasından çekilebilirsiniz. Araştırma Çalışmasının tüm aşamaları tamamlanmadan geri çekilme için herhangi bir ceza uygulanmayacaktır.

V. Verilerin gizliliğinin korunması için yapılacak düzenlemelere ilişkin tavsiyeler.

Katılımcıların anonimliğine saygı gösterilmesi için her türlü çaba gösterilecektir. Toplanan veriler yalnızca sorumlu araştırmacı ve danışmanı tarafından analiz edilecektir. Katılımcıların gerçek isimleri korunacaktır. Anonimleştirme, verilerin ayrı, şifreli ve parola korumalı dosyalara ayrılmasıyla uygulanacaktır. Doğrudan referanslar gerekliyse sahte isimler kullanılacaktır. Mülakat notları, transkriptler ve fotoğraf materyalleri sorumlu araştırmacı tarafından tutulacak ve güvenli, şifreli bir yerde saklanacaktır. Sağlanan bilgilerin gizliliği, yasanın sınırlamaları dahilinde garanti edilmektedir. Anonim hale getirilen verilerin mahkeme celbine, bilgi edinme özgürlüğü iddialarına veya bazı meslekler tarafından zorunlu bildirim konusu olması mümkündür.

VI. İmza:

Bu formdaki bilgileri okudum ve anladım. Sorularım ve endişelerim araştırmacılar tarafından cevaplandı ve bu izin formunun bir kopyası bende var. Bu nedenle, bu araştırma projesinde yer almayı kabul ediyorum.

Katılımcı İmzası: _____
Büyük Harflerle İsim: _____
Tarih: _____

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Plain Language Statement

The present research study is titled “Effects of Lateral Surveillance in Journalism”. The Early Stage Researcher (ESR) Dimitri Bettoni is the principal investigator. Dr. Tanya Lokot is the research study’s supervisor. Both the principal investigator and the supervisor belong to the School of Communications (SoC) at the Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin, Ireland.

The principal investigator will conduct interviews with the participants. Through these interviews, the research collects the experiences of media professionals as targets of surveillance activities. The research also investigates the level of awareness of journalists around the use of professional surveillance tools and technology while carrying out job-related activities.

The duration of each interview can be approximately assessed in 1.5 hours, although changes can occur in relation to research needs. Participants will be offered a suitable venue for the meeting. In any case, the venue arrangement will be coordinated between the principal investigator and the participant in a way that satisfies both the involved parties. In case an in-person meeting is not possible, interviews can be conducted online. The participant will be offered a list of viable technical solutions for this purpose, and an explanation of the advantages and disadvantages each solution carries along.

The collected data will be audio recorded and transcribed. Participants with a professional background in photography will be asked to produce visual material that will be used both for research purposes and the dissemination of the research outcomes.

All data collected will be anonymised by disaggregating them into separate digital files, all password protected and encrypted. References that may lead to the recognition of the identity of the participants will be carefully erased from the data collection. Fake names can be used to protect the participants’ identity. Data will be stored on encrypted and password protected external hard drive and on a secure cloud service provided by DCU. The laptop and the audio recorder in use are encrypted and password protected.

The confidentiality of the provided information is guaranteed within the limitations of the law. It is possible for the anonymised data to be subject to subpoena, freedom of information claims or mandated reporting by some professions.

The collected data will be safely disposed after publication within 3 years. Digital images will be retained for dissemination purposes only following the explicit consent of the participants and after an anonymisation procedure to ensure that no harm of any kind can result from the dissemination.

The recall of some experiences during the interview might lead to unpleasant memories and distress. Reputational risks may arise from the participation in this research project: the anonymisation process is rigidly implemented to ensure that no harm can come to the reputation of the participants. All participants are offered both free legal and psychological assistance, whenever the need may arise or they might express the desire of receiving such support.

Participation in this research study is voluntary. Participants may withdraw from the present research study at any point, and they will receive no material benefits from their participation.

This project is funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska Curie grant agreement No. 765140.

If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please contact:

The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and Innovation Support, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Tel +353-1-7008000

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Dichiarazione di progetto

Il presente progetto di ricerca si intitola "Effetti di sorveglianza laterale nel giornalismo". Dimitri Bettoni ne è ricercatore responsabile. La Dott.ssa Tanya Lokot è relatrice del ricercatore. Entrambi appartengono alla School of Communications (SoC), presso la Dublin City University, Dublino, Irlanda.

Il ricercatore condurrà delle interviste con i partecipanti alla ricerca. Attraverso queste interviste, il progetto raccoglie le esperienze di professionisti dei media in quanto oggetto/bersaglio di attività di sorveglianza. Inoltre, il progetto indaga il livello di consapevolezza dei professionisti dei media circa l'uso di strumenti e tecnologie di sorveglianza nel corso di attività collegate alla loro professione.

La durata di ciascuna intervista è stimata in approssimativamente 1,5 ore, variabile a seconda dei bisogni specifici legati alla ricerca. Ai partecipanti verrà suggerito un luogo di incontro adeguato e in ogni caso concordato tra le parti affinché le esigenze di entrambe siano soddisfatte. Nel caso in cui non risulti possibile incontrarsi di persona, queste interviste possono essere realizzate online. Ai partecipanti sarà proposta una serie di soluzioni tecniche utili allo scopo, inclusa una spiegazione relativa a vantaggi e svantaggi che ciascuna soluzione offerta comporta.

I dati raccolti attraverso le interviste saranno audioregistrati e successivamente trascritti. Ai partecipanti con esperienza professionale nel fotogiornalismo sarà chiesto di produrre materiale fotografico utilizzato sia allo scopo di ricerca sia per la successiva fase di disseminazione dei risultati, con modalità specificamente concordate tra le parti.

Tutti i dati raccolti saranno anonimizzati disaggregandoli in file digitali separati, tutti protetti da password e criptati. Tutti i riferimenti che potrebbero ricondurre all'identità dei partecipanti saranno attentamente rimossi dalla collezione. Pseudonimi e nomi falsi possono essere usati a protezione dell'identità dei partecipanti. I dati raccolti saranno conservati su hard drive criptato e protetto da password, e su servizio di cloud sicuro fornito da DCU. Sia il portatile che il registratore utilizzati sono criptati e protetti da password.

La confidenzialità delle informazioni raccolte è garantita all'interno dei limiti di legge previsti. È possibile che i dati già anonimizzati siano soggetti a subpoena, richieste in materia di libertà di informazione, o relazione obbligatoria da parte di alcune categorie professionali.

I dati raccolti verranno eliminati attraverso distruzione sicura entro 3 anni dalla pubblicazione dei risultati della ricerca. Le immagini raccolte verranno conservate a scopo di divulgazione solo dietro esplicito consenso dei partecipanti e successivamente ad una procedura di anonimizzazione volta ad assicurare che nessun danno di alcun tipo possa scaturire dalla pubblicazione.

Il ricordare alcune esperienze durante l'intervista potrebbe condurre a stress e sensazioni spiacevoli. Rischi per la reputazione dei partecipanti possono derivare dalla partecipazione al progetto. Ogni procedura di anonimizzazione è rigorosamente implementata per scongiurare tali rischi. Tutti i partecipanti ottengono accesso a servizi gratuiti di consulenza legale e supporto psicologico, in qualunque momento vi sia necessità o esigenza, fino al termine del progetto fissato per Aprile 2022.

La partecipazione a questo studio è totalmente volontaria. I partecipanti possono ritirarsi dal progetto in qualunque momento. Nessun beneficio materiale deriva dalla partecipazione.

Questo progetto ha ricevuto finanziamenti dal programma di ricerca e innovazione Orizzonte 2020 dell'Unione europea in virtù della convenzione di sovvenzione Marie Skłodowska-Curie n. 765140.

I partecipanti che manifestassero perplessità circa questo studio, possono contattarci:

The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and Innovation Support, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Tel +353-1-7008000

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY Sade Dil İfadesi

Bu araştırma çalışması “Gazetecilikte Yanal Gözetlemenin Etkileri” başlığını taşımaktadır. Erken Aşama Araştırmacısı (ESR) Dimitri Bettoni baş araştırmacıdır. Dr. Tanya Lokot, araştırma çalışmasının süpervizörüdür. Hem baş araştırmacı hem de süpervizör, Dublin, İrlanda'daki Dublin Şehir Üniversitesi'ndeki (DCU) İletişim Okulu'na (SoC) aittir.

Sorumlu araştırmacı, katılımcılarla görüşmeleri yürütecektir. Araştırma, bu röportajlar aracılığıyla, gözetim faaliyetlerinin hedefi olarak medya profesyonellerinin deneyimlerini toplamaktadır. Araştırma aynı zamanda gazetecilerin işle ilgili faaliyetleri yürütürken profesyonel gözetim araçları ve teknolojinin kullanımı konusundaki farkındalık düzeylerini de araştırıyor.

Her görüşmenin süresi yaklaşık olarak 1,5 saat olarak değerlendirilebilir, ancak araştırma ihtiyaçlarına göre değişiklikler olabilir. Katılımcılara toplantı için uygun bir mekan teklif edilecektir. Her halükarda, mekan düzenlemesi sorumlu araştırmacı ile katılımcı arasında ilgili tarafları da tatmin edecek şekilde koordine edilecektir. Yüz yüze görüşmenin mümkün olmadığı durumlarda online olarak görüşme yapılabilir. Katılımcıya bu amaç için uygun teknik çözümlerin bir listesi ve her çözümün beraberinde getirdiği avantaj ve dezavantajların bir açıklaması sunulacaktır.

Toplanan veriler ses kaydına alınacak ve deşifre edilecektir. Fotoğrafçılıkta profesyonel geçmişe sahip katılımcılardan hem araştırma amaçlı hem de araştırma sonuçlarının yaygınlaştırılmasında kullanılacak görsel materyal üretmeleri istenecektir.

Toplanan tüm veriler, tümü şifre korumalı ve şifrelenmiş ayrı dijital dosyalara ayrıştırılarak anonim hale getirilecektir. Katılımcıların kimliğinin tanınmasına yol açabilecek referanslar veri toplama alanından dikkatlice silinecektir. Katılımcıların kimliğini korumak için sahte isimler kullanılabilir. Veriler, şifrelenmiş ve parola korumalı harici sabit sürücüde ve DCU tarafından sağlanan güvenli bir bulut hizmetinde saklanacaktır. Kullanılan dizüstü bilgisayar ve ses kaydedici şifrelenir ve parola korumalıdır.

Sağlanan bilgilerin gizliliği, yasanın sınırlamaları dahilinde garanti edilmektedir. Anonim hale getirilen verilerin mahkeme celbine, bilgi edinme özgürlüğü iddialarına veya bazı meslekler tarafından zorunlu bildirim konusu olması mümkündür.

Toplanan veriler, yayımlandıktan sonra 3 yıl içinde güvenli bir şekilde imha edilecektir. Dijital görseller, yalnızca katılımcıların açık rızasını takiben ve dağıtımdan herhangi bir zarar gelmeyeceğinden emin olmak için bir anonimleştirme prosedüründen sonra dağıtım amacıyla saklanacaktır.

Görüşme sırasında bazı deneyimlerin hatırlanması, hoş olmayan anılara ve sıkıntıya neden olabilir. İtibar riskleri bu araştırma projesine katılımdan doğabilir: katılımcıların itibarına herhangi bir zarar gelmemesini sağlamak için anonimleştirme süreci katı bir şekilde uygulanmaktadır. Tüm katılımcılara ihtiyaç duyduklarında veya destek almak istediklerini ifade ettiklerinde hem ücretsiz hukuki hem de psikolojik yardım sunulmaktadır.

Bu araştırma çalışmasına katılım isteğe bağlıdır. Katılımcılar herhangi bir noktada mevcut araştırma çalışmasından çekilebilir ve katılımlarından hiçbir maddi fayda elde edemezler..

Bu proje, Marie Skłodowska Curie hibe sözleşmesi No. 765140 kapsamında Avrupa Birliği'nin Horizon 2020 araştırma ve yenilik programı tarafından finanse edilmektedir.

Katılımcıların bu çalışmayla ilgili endişeleri varsa ve bağımsız bir kişiyle iletişime geçmek istiyorlarsa, lütfen şu adresle iletişime geçin:

The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and Innovation Support, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Tel +353-1-7008000

Mr. Dimitri Bettoni
School of Communications

Dr. Tanya Lokot
School of Communications

8th January 2020

REC Reference: DCUREC/2019/226

Proposal Title: EFFECTS OF LATERAL SURVEILLANCE IN JOURNALISM

Applicant(s) Mr. Dimitri Bettoni and Dr. Tanya Lokot

Dear Colleagues,

Further to expedited review, the DCU Research Ethics Committee approves this research proposal.

Materials used to recruit participants should note that ethical approval for this project has been obtained from the Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee.

Should substantial modifications to the research protocol be required at a later stage, a further amendment submission should be made to the REC.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading 'Geraldine Scanlon'.

Dr Geraldine Scanlon
Chairperson
DCU Research Ethics Committee



Taighde & Nuálaíocht Tacaíocht
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