TOWARDS A CONCENTRIC SPATIAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL EDUCATION

BEYOND THE INTERLOCKING SPATIAL PILLARS OF MODERNISM

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Towards a Concentric Spatial Psychology for Social and Emotional Education
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We welcome contributions from colleagues who would like to share their work with others in the field.

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DEDICATION

For Aleksandra Jasniewicz-Downes and our children, Eva, Michael and Isabella Downes, with love

INTRODUCTION

Space matters. Without space we have no body, no texture of thought, no site for feeling or mediator for action. Space is the ubiquitous invisibility of our lives. Space is the fabric of our experience, the precondition for the pulse of our senses of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste. Space runs through the breath of our hearts and is seeped into our bodies. This book seeks to open up a crisis of meaning for space itself, to render space animate and not merely empty for experience and thought. This spatial crisis in the foundations of experience and thought is fraught with creative opportunity, for an opening in experience, a sustainable spatial system opening for inclusion and expansion of experiential contours.

A key purpose of this book is to highlight that foundational pillars of Western modernist experience and thought rest on an exclusion, a spatial exclusion, and that this spatial exclusion is significant, it is a loss that brings imbalance. This exclusion is argued to be brought about through a concrete spatial process and structure of exclusion, as diametric oppositional space, with a specific space being excluded, namely, concentric space. Space moulds and corrals our experiences and the contours of our understanding,

silently, surreptitiously with a smooth unobtrusiveness that must be called into question.

This book explores the relevance of this spatial exclusion and the need and possibility for a concentric spatial turn in many spheres of experience and understanding. This interrogation of a different space from diametric spatial opposition is necessarily an interdisciplinary one, traversing a range of domains across psychology, philosophy, education, anthropology, cultural studies and sociology. These are pertinent to strands of developmental, social and educational psychology, cross-cultural psychology, personality theory and psychoanalysis. The book's philosophical concerns with constructions of subjectivity enter terrains of phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as the history of ideas. For education, the area of social and emotional education is a central concern, resonant also with issues of equity and social inclusion in education, as well as lifelong learning. The predominant sociological concerns here pertain to social identity and critical theory, with a cultural studies' lens on foundations of culture offering distinctive fundamental challenges to both modernist and postmodernist discourses. Key pillars of modernist understandings are argued to rest on

spatial edifices, as cages of space, impinging on human experience and thought, underpinning a loss and imbalance for cultural foundations. The proposed conceptual synthesis and avenues for questioning build from anthropological concerns with structural anthropology, cultural anthropology and ethnography, while offering a spatial framework that is not locked within the confines of these paradigms.

As an interdisciplinary synthesis focused on space, building on but seeking to go beyond current invocations of the spatial turn across the humanities, education and the social sciences, a common domain of relevance is being excavated. This treats diametric and concentric spatial systems, processes and structures as a foundational set of interacting concepts with real system impacts, as a fabric of space framing and shaping fundamental thematics for the humanities, education and social sciences.

It is being postulated that psychology, in particular, must stretch its domains of relevance, its ambits of concern, to embrace these thematic areas that are frequently peripheral to its preoccupations. Space needs to be treated as both a method, a hermeneutic of inquiry to examine empirical truth claims and accounts of lived experience in qualitative

research and also be a unit of analysis, not simply for a phenomenology *of* space but a phenomenology *through* space, to interpret patterns of lived experiences in diverse cultural contexts and systems.

As well as the task of replenishing the relevance of depth psychology in spatial terms for a fresh encounter with social and emotional education, this book gives expression to multidimensional contours for a social and emotional education of the future, where spatial constructions of subjectivity are to the forefront. In doing so, a basis is being offered for a more cross-cultural social and emotional education that addresses spatial concerns with Western ethnocentrism and the straitjacket of diametric space, while exploring openings towards development of concentric spaces of experience and in wider systems, including education systems. Social and emotional education is an existential domain, a realm requiring phenomenological inquiry pertaining to fundamental features of being, of being human, of the human condition. Moreover, social and emotional education requires an acceleration of emphasis on inclusive systems to challenge othering, and sustainable systems to

overcome the othering of nature in experience and education structures.

Space turns through the very fibres of our being. Space embraces and shapes the threads of our breathing. Humans are not simply embodied but are embedded in spaces framing our modes of embodiment. We are embodied through different spaces including spaces of disembodiment. Embodiment presupposes different spatial ways of being in the body.

This book seeks to challenge a narrowed sedimentation of human experience that rests on a silent system of space. Key spatial fracturing, such as othering, ambivalence, scapegoating and human excision from the natural world, together with key spatial closures such as fear of freedom and the iron cage of Puritanism, must become basic reference points in a social and emotional education of the future – a social and emotional education attuned to phenomena of projections and relational spaces for the self within and the self in relation to others. Constructions of subjectivity are inevitably spatial. Sites of experience are needed where responses to existential quests for meaning in life are not met simply with new variants of instrumental

meanings locked into diametric spatial habits of experience but are opened to more expansive concentric spatial modes of being.

PART I

Setting the Scene for a Concentric Spatial Turn

CHAPTER 1

Challenging Western Ethnocentric Spatial Frames of Empty Space and Diametric Space as Pillars of Modernism: Towards a Concentric Spatial Turn

Beyond the Spatial Edifice Underpinning Five Pillars of Modernism

The spatial edifice of modernism in Western thought rests on five interlocking pillars. These foundations require reconstruction to encompass a broadening of experiential and conceptual spaces. The silent obviousness of space has obscured its power. The very obviousness of space obviates the need to scrutinise it further. The silent strings of space pull at every contour of our being and yet remain largely unapprehended, largely unnamed, invisible in their exigency upon human experiences. Human experience needs to be jolted open to enable a broadening of the capacity for our experience.

Space is *out of joint* in human experiences and wider systems. These five spatial pillars of modernism have constructed an imbalance in human experience and social systems. A first pillar is treatment of space as empty, a blank

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canvas, as mere interval. Empty space is a concept central to Western traditions of thought. Descartes' treatment of space, so influential in the history of Western thought, referred to 'empty space, which almost everyone is convinced is mere nonentity'.[i] A related conception of empty space in Western thought is the treatment of the child at birth as a blank slate, a *tabula rasa*, as part of a tradition of Western thought emanating from Locke.[ii] Locke rejected the notion of innate ideas, namely, the belief that some ideas exist in the mind without the benefit of experience. For Locke, a child was a blank slate upon which culture could inscribe itself.

A second spatial pillar of modernism is the diametric oppositional dualistic splits of Descartes between for example, mind and body, reason and emotion. These binary oppositions in the construction of the self are spatially imbued, as projections of diametric oppositional space. In developmental psychology, Kagan[iii] criticises Piaget for generalising Western A/Non-A logic, a diametric spatially structured oppositional logic based on an assumed separation between A and Non-A. Historically, the Western world has followed the logical principles of Aristotelian philosophy. This logic is based on the law of identity which states that A is A, the law of contradiction

(A is not non-A) and the law of the excluded middle (A cannot be A and non-A, neither A nor non-A). A rationality is required that goes beyond Western diametric spatially structured truths. While Jameson recognises that binary opposition is 'clearly a spatial concept',[iv] this specifically spatial aspect to binary oppositions – as diametric spatial structures and projections - underlying thought and experience is often overlooked.

Binary oppositions dividing the world into us versus them, good versus bad, sacred versus profane, norm versus other, male versus female, as well as the hierarchies of above versus below, offer a way of organising experience into schemas of diametric opposites. Yet this obvious organising principle is rarely treated in spatial terms as one of diametric oppositional *spatial* structures. Diametric opposition needs to be understood not only as a distinctive space but as a spatial system within a wider set of spatial systems organising experience.

Cartesian spaces of diametric splitting dualism and emptiness as nonentity are part of a Western metaphysics that has had powerful influence on expressing and shaping experiences and understandings, in its construction of

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modernist human identity based on a self-grounding Enlightenment faith in reason. The influence of Cartesianism in the development of modern Western culture is expressed by Küng's words:

> Cartesianism became very much more than a school. It became a movement, a way of thinking, a mental attitude, a matter of education as a whole. Its history is largely identified with the history of philosophy as such. Not only rationalism, psychologism and particularly idealism on the right, but – as a result of a sharp division of body and soul as two substances – also on the left, empiricism, mechanism and even materialism all invoke Descartes.[v]

This identification of five pillars to modernism operates against the backdrop of very much recognising variations within modernist thought and that in Berlin's words, 'the Enlightenment was certainly not, as is sometimes maintained, a kind of uniform movement of which all the members believed approximately the same things'.[vi] Different beliefs can nevertheless rest on a common spatial assumption

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structure, a pervasive thread of horizons of understanding that are spatially imbued with common repeated patterns.

A third spatial pillar of modernism is the 'iron cage' Weber identifies as pervading a mass cultural movement as the spirit of the development of modern Western capitalism.[vii] Weber interrogates a Protestant work ethic excavated through a range of identifiable features traceable to a worldly asceticism, a calling to labour that was ultimately part of a force towards instrumental reason and utility. Calvinist and related Protestant sects of pietism are Weber's main focus here. Within this Protestant work ethic, self-control operates as part of a diametric oppositional spatial split with spontaneity. This is as part of a concretely Cartesian cultural heritage encouraging a triumph of mind over body, reason over emotion, as Weber emphasises:

> Only a life guided by constant thought could achieve conquest over the state of nature. Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* was taken over by the contemporary Puritans with this ethical reinterpretation.[viii]

Weber characterises this self-control as a restricted space for experience, as an iron cage upon human experience, as a legacy of modernity.

A distinctive spatial challenge is being offered to these three pillars of modernism, namely, Locke's conception of humans as a blank slate, a *tabula rasa,* Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, I think therefore I am, and its dichotomies between reason/emotion, mind/body, and the Protestant ethic of the 'spirit of capitalism' outlined as an 'iron cage' by Weber in the construction of modern capitalist society. These strands of modernity are reliant on Enlightenment reason in various forms to reconfigure tradition reliant premodern societal meanings and practices. A fundamental thesis here is that modernist reason has relied on specific implicit spaces of understanding and that these spaces are questionable and ripe for reconfiguration in human experiences and understanding. The spatial bedrock of modernity needs to be uncovered and rendered molten. Change of spatial foundations and horizons for experience and understanding is both possible and necessary for an expansion of experience in holistic connective ways and for promoting inclusive education systems and societies.

This spatial challenge is not to deny many strengths of this modernist *Weltanschauung* or to seek recourse to an inversion into irrationalism. For example, the liberating aspect of a Lockean *tabula rasa* has been highlighted by medical historian Porter as 'it promoted a heroic vision of man making himself.'[ix] He emphasises that Locke's *tabula rasa* was linked to a removal of continuity of personal identity for a self, 'capable of unlimited programming',[x] where 'the body was no longer the yardstick for the integrity of the self...' with Locke's 'vision, rescuing and liberating the essential ego, the first person (or conscious selfhood) from the contingent and drossy encumbrance of mere corporeality'.[xi] Empty space untethered to the body as a site for abstraction is also an underlying assumption of strong social constructionist concepts of the human being, as well as the vast freedom of Sartrean existentialism extolling choice for the individual.

In proposing a shift from this spatial legacy to render space active and to reconfigure diametric spatial systems, a concrete spatial expansion is being proposed as a movement towards *concentric* spatial systems – in experience and in wider social and educational systems. The diametric spatial foundation of modernism is a malleable feature of a proposed

wider spatial system of relations that includes concentric spatial movements as dynamic spatial processes.

Concentric space is a very different space. Despite a tendency for concentric space to be treated as a sidekick of diametric space within the same lodging house of 'dualism', this distinctive spatial system of relations needs to be brought to the fore. The shackles need to be taken off concentric space so that it can be made more visible globally and to challenge this blind spot in a Western culture seeped within the diametric spatial foundations of modernism.

Berlin associates an empty space assumption as one of two fundamental tenets of romanticism, without being explicit that this is a specifically spatial assumption:

> The general proposition of the eighteenth century, indeed of all previous centuries, as I tirelessly repeat, is that there is a nature of things, there is a *rerum natura*, there is a structure of things. For the romantics this was profoundly false. There was no structure of things because that would hem us in, that would suffocate us.[xii]

Without entering into debate as to whether empty space rather than concentric space, or both, were key features of romanticism historically, so that Berlin's accentuation of empty space has occluded concentric spatial dimensions of romantic experience, the search here is for a more dynamic, porous, flexible space of experience than simply hardened structure, while nevertheless recognising it as not simple 'empty logical possibility' in the early Heidegger's words.[xiii] Concentric space as shape and relative direction of movement, as a life principle,[xiv] is not the same as a search for calcified, rigid structure to be pinned down like butterflies in a museum or turned to ash in a fist.

As the fourth proposed pillar of modernism, empty space is Kant's counterpart of transcendental freedom to contrast with natural determinism. Kant's (third) antinomy between freedom and causality[xv] operates within this Cartesian and Lockean legacy of freedom as empty space, as a blank page for free choice unconstrained. It is the pivotal spatial background that supports what Berlin describes as 'an obsessive central principle'[xvi] of Kant, as freedom of choice as humanity's defining feature. Berlin goes so far as to characterise Kant as an unlikely 'father of romanticism'[xvii] at

least in his moral philosophy on choice, freedom and responsibility.

This neutralisation of space as being empty is far from inevitable. Space may, on the contrary, be treated as active, dynamically patterned. The well-known Chinese Yin/yang symbol offers a conception of space as patterned.[xviii] These patterned spaces are a challenge to Western Cartesian and Lockean understandings of space as empty. This interrogation of space treats space as a system of active patterns and organising processes.[xix] Space offers a bridge to overcome the Cartesian split between the material and symbolic, between body and mind, as a precondition for both.

It is important however to recognise that Descartes did not invent or originate dualism, or indeed rationalism, there are many antecedents regarding both of these aspects. Ancient Greek thought was strongly concerned with polarities, as well as Socratic rationalism, while Aristotelian A/NonA logic is an example of diametric structured spatial opposition. As notably highlighted by Descola's work[xx] in structural anthropology, building on Lévi-Strauss, the nature-culture diametric dualistic opposition can be traced as a socio-historical product of ancient Roman culture, as a clear

forbearer of a Cartesian body-mind type of diametric spatial split opposition. The nature-culture diametric spatial opposition is the fifth proposed pillar of modernity requiring reconfiguration.

While Berlin highlights that in the eighteenth century alone there were at least two hundred 'meanings attached to the word 'nature',[xxi] Descola's cross-cultural anthropological review highlights the constructedness of this diametric opposition between nature and culture:

> This Roman landscape, together with all of the values associated with it that colonization had introduced around cities as far away as the banks of the Rhine and in Britain, was the landscape that introduced the notion of a polarity between the wild and the domesticated that we still recognize today. This opposition is neither an objective representation of the properties of things nor an expression of a timeless human nature[xxii]

The diametric spatial split between nature and culture is the forebearer of the Cartesian spatial divide between body

and mind in Western culture. For Descola, it is a Roman colonialist legacy built into Western spatialities. Thus, the Cartesian diametric oppositional split between mind and body was to some extent a summarising process, an embedding and concretising application of the preexisting Roman diametric oppositional split between culture and nature.

Space is not simply to be pared down to place and places, though space is also the precondition for place. Diametric oppositions between nature and culture, setting up a realm of the domesticated and the wild, is a socio-historical construct of Western culture. It is far from being a shared mode of human experience across diverse cultures. In other words, the West has constructed a diametric oppositional relation between humans and the natural world, where nature is an object, standing opposite and against humans, in juxtaposition. This diametric spatial relation needs to be undone.

The question of an education system that builds bridges to stronger attunement with the natural world and a receptiveness to being surrounded by such natural stimuli, rather than simply as observer apart from the natural world even when visiting it, is an issue for social and emotional education and more widely for all aspects of education. The

marginalisation of nature from school contexts runs more deeply than simply radical urban expansion, documented for example by historian Hobsbawn over the past two centuries.[xxiii] It is seeped not only into a Cartesian space of abstraction uprooting the human subject from nature through the self-consciousness of the *cogito.*

Running through Francis Bacon's exhortation to subjugate nature as part of humanity's domination over nature in the name of scientific progress in the Enlightenment,[xxiv] nevertheless the dominion of diametric space in relation to splitting from nature in understanding of self and other, as well as for school systems, precedes the Enlightenment. It is sustained by Kant's antinomy between freedom and causality, where freedom is associated with reason and causality with the determinism of the natural world. The Enlightenment exacerbated a prior tendency towards diametric splitting between the natural and the cultural brought about by reason in Western thought. Descola traces this diametric structured splitting to ancient Roman colonisation. Yet this diametric space, resonant with a Nietzschean will to power,[xxv] is far from being confined to our

relation to the natural world. It impinges much further into our experience.

Diametric space, empty space, the iron cage of self-conscious thought governing the body as asceticism, together with the diametric spatial splits between nature and culture, determinism and freedom are the interlocking spatial legacies of modernism embedded into human experiences and understandings.

Spatial Issues for Social and Emotional Education
Allied with a critique of Western spatial ethnocentrism as a predilection for the imbalanced predominance of both empty and diametric oppositional space, thereby suppressing concentric spatial alternatives, a central concern of this book is with shift from the diametric spatial conditions supporting othering. Construction of outgroups as the other rests on diametric oppositional space as a dimension of experience and an experiential shift is required in relational space to dismantle the psychological propensity for othering.

The implications of these five spatial pillars of modernism for social and emotional education also require firm consideration. Space shapes experience. Different spaces

shape different experiences. If different spaces shape different experiences, the question arises as to how change and movement occurs between these different spaces. What are the spatial options available to human experience, through which these changes of space can become manifested? A social and emotional education is being sought that is not tethered to the spaces of modernism and its pervasive principle of Cartesian rationalism. Already with Pascal's *Pensées*[xxvi] there was recognition that Descartes' *cogito*, I think therefore I am, was an attempted basis for certainty to overcome anxiety, a certainty that was simplistic and incomplete regarding wider horizons of experience, including emotions. Diametric space is an experiential foundation against uncertainty and not only a conceptual one.

Our NESET monograph published by the EU Commission [xxvii] set out the case for social and emotional education as a core curriculum across Europe based on international research on its benefits, with a focus also on social inclusion dimensions and recognising this area is relevant also as a cross-curricular focus. This helped the development of the 2019 new Key Competence for Lifelong Learning in Europe, Personal Social and Learning to Learn,

based on the EU Council Recommendation 2018 on this issue. Significantly, the conceptual framework for this key competence developed at EU Commission level acknowledges the importance of existential dimensions to social and emotional education.[xxviii]

Our NESET monograph raised concerns about some aspects of the OECD's 2015[xxix] agenda for social and emotional skills.[xxx] These included a potential agenda of social conformity in education to mould students as personality packages for the workplace, the neglect of the importance of strengths of introversion and the recognition of the need for privacy for the individual from the potentially intrusive gaze of the State on an individual's emotions and family life. A Weberian perspective on social control interpreted through a phenomenological lens of diametric space offers a further amplification of some of these concerns for social and emotional education. In doing so, it invites also consideration of Western bias in space and in general and the need for a broader cross-cultural framework for engaging with social and emotional education.

Core dimensions of social and emotional education, namely, to support students' empathy and perspective taking

capacities require understanding also in spatial and phenomenological terms of an experiential fluidity to engage with and move between concentric spaces of assumed connection and diametric spaces of assumed separation as detachment. Diametric space while being challenged in this book as an imbalanced spatial system shaping experience in Western experience and thought, is also at times needed, for example, there are times when it is important to be able to distrust some others who may be seeking to deceive you, as manifested in the context of human trafficking and betrayal by 'friends'. [xxxi]

Shadow sides to human experience are being explored for current purposes as dimensions of diametric spatially structured experience in terms of othering, double consciousness in a discriminatory society, scapegoating, ambivalence, social class and gendered exclusions, also embedded physically in spaces in society, including school, home and wider community systems of space. A spatial opening and broadening for social and emotional education is being sought to challenge Western ethnocentrism regarding relational space. This interrogates a spatial restructuring in experience regarding othering, the iron cage of instrumental

reason, fear of freedom, celebration of introversion and shift into more concentric spaces of experience attuned to nature and silence.

If social and emotional education is to be a vibrant process engaging with students' lived experiences and voices rather than a force towards manipulation, prescribed personalities and social conformity, it is important that underlying spaces in experience and school systems are rendered animate and brought to the fore. The shadow sides of experience and wider systems are spatially imbued.

Typical movements away from Cartesian rationalism in philosophy and psychology tend to reverse the Cartesian pinnacle of the mind by instead extolling the body. Thus, for example, Nietzsche's attack on modernism is a celebration of bodily passions and desires, fused with a Dionysian myth moving in this direction.[xxxii] Derrida's terrain of interest focuses on how specific senses like the ear and touch are embedded as presuppositions in language and thought.[xxxiii] Likewise neuropsychology challenges Cartesian divisions between reason and emotion,[xxxiv] while growing concerns with embodiment are a feature of conceptual metaphors and image schemas[xxxv] in cognitive linguistics. However,

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reconstructing space to recalibrate the foundations of modernism is not simply a matter of inversion from mind to body. Heidegger's concern with 'being' assailed a simple reversal in Nietzschean concerns as being merely inverted Platonism, as reversal from an ideal realm of ideas and forms to one of immanence in the body. A more complex restructuring than simple reversal into pure materiality of the body is needed.[xxxvi]

The current focus on lived experience of spaces gives expression to a spatial-phenomenology. Concern here is with breath in the body, for openings of experiences of breathing through the body. Breath psychology is a nascent field.[xxxvii] Edwards[xxxviii] notes how William James' famous 1890 metaphor of the stream of consciousness[xxxix] was drawn from the continuity of the stream of experience of the breath and that James was highly aware of Eastern traditions giving prominence to breath-based experiences. A shift here is to spirit as breath from spirit as mind in the German sense of *Geist,* of spirit as self-consciousness. A tradition of spirit as self-consciousness is firmly embedded in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit.*[xl] Current concerns with spatial experiential openings in breathing, in experience of the breath spaces in the body,

rather than split from the body or empty as noninteractive with the walls of the body, invites wider angles of experience than sheer self-consciousness.

The observing objectification of oneself as a heightened self-consciousness as spirit is not the epitome of being human as Hegel's Absolute Spirit and as Descartes would have it, in his maxim, I think therefore I am, *cogito ergo sum*. This mode of self-consciousness extolled in Western cultural traditions rests on a diametric spatial precondition for its foundations. The neutralisation of awareness of spaces of the breath must be undone. These spaces are not inert in human experience.

It is to be emphasised that this challenge to diametric spatial foundations of modernism, including empty space assumptions, is not an anti-Enlightenment position, it is not anti-modernist as imposing a new diametric splitting space upon modernism. A different spatial reconfiguring relation is needed, to modify diametric spatial foundations, to stretch and rotate them towards concentric spatial relations, as an expansion and restructuring of diametric space but not its obliteration. This shares structural anthropologist Descola's concern for 'a way of conceiving the diversity of the principles

of schematization of experience that is free of the preconceptions that modernity has led us to maintain regarding the state of the world'.[xli] To expose the diametric and empty spatial preconceptions of modernity is similarly for the purpose of an experiential expansion, though a spatial system is invoked of dynamic interacting change to challenge a view of diametric and concentric spaces as mere schemas, to offer a view of them that is more dynamic than the merely categorial. The very experiential mode of categorising itself requires fluidating to vivify experience beyond diametric spatial structuring. An expanded capacity for experiencing of space is being sought to rebalance rather than simply completely jettison diametric spatial responses.

There is well worn ground of criticism of modernist Enlightenment paradigms, embracing Montesquieu's questioning that it would be *un grand hazard* if the same laws applied to different nations' peoples[xlii] and Hume's skepticism regarding inferences of general laws by induction from specific examples resting on continuity of nature assumptions.[xliii] Elsewhere my work has engaged with the spatial assumption structures and horizons of understanding of a range of thinkers and intellectual movements that offer an assault in

multifarious ways on much of the modernist *Weltanschauung*, including psychoanalytic and Jungian thought,[xliv] Heidegger's question of being prior to the Cartesian *cogito*),[xlv] Nietzsche's assault on Enlightenment values and experience *via* his turn towards embodiment and the Dionysian,[xlvi] Schopenhauer's blind will as arguably more subtle than commentators'[xlvii] characterisations of his work as pessimistic[xlviii] and postmodernism,[1] including Derrida's deconstruction theory.[xlix] Psychological interrogation invites consideration of space as a protolanguage prior to and shaping language.[l] while noting

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[1] The structuralist tenet that meaning does not reside in an individual term or unit is applied to human subjectivity in poststructuralism. The individual becomes like a word in a structuralist network of signifiers, with no meaning of itself except in its difference, in its contrasts with other words, i.e., other people. The structuralist text for language and culture becomes extended to subsume the individual subject also, in the poststructuralist turn for postmodernism. However, this linguistic and cultural turn in postmodernism as a reaction against modernity is to be firmly distinguished from the proposed spatial turn, though in doing so this is not to reject postmodernism but rather to recognise its limitations. The spatial turn towards concentric spatial systems can be seen as building on postmodernist thought while not remaining within its straitjackets. Moreover, it is not being so to add another post to postmodernism, it is not a seeking of something 'after' postmodernism, it is a shift that is being sought out of such linear time trajectories.

that Taylor's[li] focus on a flattening of time in Western culture completely omits considerations of a flattening of space.[lii] The prevailing issue being addressed throughout my work is shifts in experience and understanding from the cages of diametric space towards more concentric spatial movements and openings. This scrutiny of lived experience and projections of concentric and diametric spaces is for a phenomenology not simply *of* space, but *through* space, to interrogate shifts to patterns of experience and thought.

There is a need to reclaim a space of interiority from the postmodern merging of the self with the social. Jameson's accounts of postmodern experience are ones of 'some central emptiness'.[liii] This invoking of an empty space is combined with diametric spatial features of a closure to new stimuli and rigid boundaries as part of a 'perceptual numbness'[liv] and 'waning of affect'.[lv]A perceptual and emotional closure of space is occurring – a loss for human experience - though without necessarily a view within postmodernist assumptions of this, as a detrimental force.

Postmodernism is simply the shifting of the same tectonic plates of nature-culture, freedom-determinism, inner-outer, as diametric spatial oppositions that were instilled

in modernism. Whereas modernism placed culture with freedom as part of reason, an inner reasoning self, postmodernism operates largely a diametric mirror image inversion where culture becomes identified with determinism and the inner becomes reduced to the outer in this process. The same grey slabs in different combinations are thrown in and out of the same basic compartments in the movement from modernism to postmodernism. The major difference here is that postmodernity operates as a monism, where the counter pole becomes flattened into its dominant and dominating opposite – thus, culture, determinism and the social thrive in their hegemony upon nature, freedom and the inner. Cartesian and Kantian frameworks reliant on diametric spatial oppositions become a saturated space of monism rather than empty space monism.

Concentric space needs to be a shaper of experience for future histories and not simply be shaped by history. This spatial opening can be construed as occurring at least on three distinct though related system levels. Firstly, through the direct experiential system of the individual, in the individual's inhabiting of diametric and concentric structured spaces of experience and their interaction. Secondly, as projections of

concentric and diametric spaces into the individuals' wider world of language, thought and social interaction. These are generative spaces of projection of which the individual can become aware. Thirdly, the pre-embedding of these system spaces of relation in wider social and physical systems, not only as physical spaces to instantiate the operation of power, love, distanciation and connection but also through these systems as relational spaces that may not be as physical places. These spaces are sustaining conditions for system operations. They are supporting conditions that are nevertheless malleable to bring shifts to the causal trajectories and meanings in these spatially imbued systems.

There are not just one or two concentric spatial experiences. Concentric spatial movements are a system precondition for modes of experience giving expression to assumptions of connection, of relative openness, as a unifying spatial directional process. These assumptions of connection are not simply a monistic fusion of a sea of undifferentiation but rather allow for a layer of distinction between both poles though they are co-located around a common space as their centre. Concentric spaces are a directional modification of diametric spaces, they reorientate diametric structures of

opposition for a more connective polarity. This directional reconfiguration of diametric oppositional spaces towards concentric unifying spaces is far from guaranteed, it is no inevitability that the spatial system in a given context can attain this developed spatial state. Concentric space is a fragile structure, it is far from being an ineluctable movement in experience and wider systems. As a unifying directional spatial movement, it can be construed as a healing space in experience. However, this is not simply an injunction to place concentric space in a diametric opposition with diametric space, where concentric space is blithely and blandly always to be associated with the 'good' and diametric space with the 'bad'. The functionality of diametric space requires respect for some system contexts and situations.

For scrutiny of educational systems, Ferrare & Apple seek a spatial turn for understandings of 'spatial processes in education, we not only need these 'new' theories, but we also need to employ methodological tools that 'think' spatially'.[lvi] Space is being proposed as both a methodology of interpretation and as an object of study, a domain of relevance for interrogating human experiences. It is not only a spatial turn for psychology, philosophy and education that is being

sought in this book, but a specific spatial turn, a concentric spatial turn.

This is not to treat diametric space as being a uniquely Western phenomenon, diametric oppositional spaces of ingroup versus outgroup are a prevalent psychology far beyond Western contexts. Yet there is a need to go beyond this tribal psychology reliant on diametric space to at least a capacity for an 'expanded tribe',[lvii] an expanded circle of identification such as in concentric relational space of assumed connection between self and other – where the other is internalised as an extension of self as a common humanity that is nevertheless, not equivalent to self. Concentric space offers a relational space of mediation between self and other.

Further evidence of the need to analyse space as a contested concept arises from cross-cultural research in psychology of perception. This research highlights the filtering of background contextual factors in Western modes of perception and comprehension, in contrast to examples from Eastern cultures where an appreciation of the active role of background dimensions is frequently given greater sustenance.[lviii] For example, Masuda and Nisbett[lix] presented realistic animated scenes of fish and other underwater objects

to Japanese and Americans and asked them to report what they had seen. The first statement by American participants usually referred to the focal fish ('there was what looked like a trout swimming to the right'), whereas the first statement by Japanese participants usually referred to background elements ('there was a lake or pond'). Japanese participants made about 70 per cent more statements about background aspects of the environment. In a subsequent recognition task, Japanese performance was weakened by showing the focal fish with the wrong background, indicating that the perception of the object had been intimately linked with the field in which it had appeared. In contrast, American recognition of the object was unaffected by the wrong background. Increased causal attribution to context rather than dispositional factors has been observed for an Indian–Hindu sample compared with an American sample.[lx]

It is arguable that Masuda and Nisbett have oversold this East/West contrast based on limited samples and limited statistical differences between the Japanese and US samples. Moreover, cultural comparison studies generally run the risk of nuisance variables, where researchers assume that the target groups do not differ except on the independent variable

or that differences on other variables are not a factor in the observed behavioural differences. Whether or not one accepts these contrasts of emphasis in perception, as well as language, as being conditioned by macrosystemic factors of Eastern and Western culture, the key issue is a malleability in lived experience of space and that space is not a simple, pregiven concept. Masuda & Nisbett's key insight was experiential *malleability* between foreground and background spatial perceptions, though their main focus was a cultural variability between East and West.

James' conception of mind as a stream or river, actively influencing what is within it, also contrasts a foreground of objects with the need to recognize a neglected dynamic interactive background:

> Traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river [stream of association] consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just

this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook.[lxi]

James' metaphor of a stream or river for consciousness needs to be taken further to treat this as a spatial questioning and one that goes beyond treatment of space as mere metaphor.[lxii].In doing so, James's stream of consciousness can be construed as a direct challenge to a Western Cartesian tradition of empty space, as James' emphasises, this stream is far from being a passive, empty background.

Scope of the Book

This book is structured in four parts. Part I excavates a range of basic spatial assumptions underpinning key pillars of modernist thought in a Western tradition. In doing so, it highlights not only the neglect of space generally but also of concentric space. It develops a framework of key contrasts between diametric and concentric space, regarding separation/connection, mirror image symmetry and relative closure/openness. Part II centrally examines the assumed separation feature of diametric space with regard to multiple

dimensions of othering, whether in terms of gender, ethnicity, race or social class, with a focus on spatial exclusions embedded in places, as well as the othering of nature. This is part of a quest to shift diametric spatial foundations of culture towards concentric relational spaces of assumed connection for human experience and understanding. Part III centrally examines the diametric spatial feature of relative closure with regard to Weber's iron cage upon experience of the Protestant ethic underpinning the development of capitalism and Fromm's fear of freedom. The diametric spatial feature of mirror image inverted symmetry is a key concern of the chapter on ambivalence and repression, while concentric spaces are explored here both for aspects of depth psychology, as well as developmental psychology regarding problem solving. Part IV seeks to draw out the wider fundamental cross-culturally meaningful spatial axis, as an interactive system for development of human experiences and understandings, beyond modernist and postmodernist spatial flattening.

Combining anthropological and sociological insights for a revitalisation of an expanded psychological terrain, together with continental philosophy, this book seeks to integrate a range of interdisciplinary understandings that have

tended to remain as the 'other' for psychology, as well as social and emotional education. Drawing on an expansion of Lévi-Strauss' contrasts between concentric and diametric structured systems in structuralist anthropology[lxiii] to develop a spatial emphasis for psychology, concepts such as De Beauvoir's othering,[lxiv] Weber's iron cage[lxv] and Fromm's fear of freedom[lxvi] are treated as psychologically relevant as fundamental structures of experience. A corollary of the broadening of the ambit of psychology to interrogate the lived experiences of othering, double consciousness, ambivalence, fear of freedom in spatial terms, is that the repertoire of resources for psychology to inform applied disciplines reliant on psychological understanding, such as social and emotional education, also undergoes an expansion. It is important to treat social and emotional education as a nascent area ripe for development, as well as integration, with a range of understandings in psychology, other disciplines and across diverse cultures.

Space is being treated here as a unit of analysis relevant to psychology regarding human experience, in a much wider psychological realm than simply perception, where much attention has been given to space in psychology. Space

is being interrogated as a structure and process of experience for psychology, as a system movement of spatialisation. It is also being developed as a methodology of interpretation, a spatial hermeneutics, to examine empirical observations, paradigmatic assumptions and phenomenological accounts of lived experiences. This spatial hermeneutic methodology *through* space enters philosophical terrains in their interplay with psychology, to focus on specific spatial projections in psychological data and theory. Such a spatial inquiry is consistent also with scientific understandings of theory-ladenness in empirical observations, that there is rarely naïve observation and that all scientific observations depend on domains of research, specific questions and hypotheses as part of its paradigm.[lxvii]

The primal relevance of space invades wider interdisciplinary terrains and the scope of this book seeks not simply to reconceptualise and import key aspects of anthropological, philosophical and sociological thought for a psychological and educational audience, as part of a proposed broadening of experience in spatial terms. It is to help create an interdisciplinary field of spatial phenomenology, a phenomenology not only *of* space but *through* space.

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It might be considered that the scope of the book is interdisciplinary as part of an argument for social and emotional education to embrace a range of disciplines, from philosophy to sociology to anthropology, and not simply psychology. However, my argument goes further than simply this, that psychology itself needs to stretch its domain of relevance to include these spatially imbued themes central to human experience. Psychology needs to explore these issues as spatial structures and processes shaping experience and thought capacities regarding expansion and closure, connection and separation. Bringing out the spatial structural features of these traditionally philosophical, sociological and anthropological areas helps move them into psychological terrains of pertinence. These fundamental issues for human experience and understanding cannot sustain an ostrich like response of psychology to bury its head and largely ignore their vitality for understanding human emotions, cognitions and actions, and for change to systems within which humans are embedded.

Specific concrete spatial modes or lived worlds of experience support and sustain different concepts of relations between self and other, different life attunements, as well as

more inclusionary or exclusionary education systems. Space is being understood here as a unit of analysis centrally relevant to experience but also as a process, as a spatial movement. Such spatial movements require recognition of space as a system, as a system of relations. This requires a spatial turn for systems theory, to address adequately this 'blind spot'[lxviii] of space, as what Luhmann terms 'a kind of invisible space'.[lxix] Multiple yet finite dimensions of space are available for observation, interpretation and interrogation as objects of study for the social sciences regarding human experience. It is being fully recognised that the examples being provided of concentric and diametric spaces are necessarily selective and illustrative to elucidate key terrains for this emerging area. Many focus also on qualitative research based on limited cultural contexts. A number of the examples in education in particular are drawn from qualitative research in an Irish context, including some of my own such research in this area. It is very much to be acknowledged that wider voices from a plethora of cultural contexts are further needed, as part of a phenomenological approach to relational spaces as conditions shaping children and young people's psychological development and experiences of educational systems.

This book will argue firstly that specific concrete spatial structures and processes are fundamental to human experiences and understandings. From these spaces, it will be further argued that concentric spaces in particular are central to a) an expansion of human experience, b) an increased sensitivity and openness to new stimuli in experience and c) an improved capacity for connective relation in a holistic way to self and to others. This interrogation of fundamental spaces of our experiences and understandings will situate space also in wider social systems and in particular education systems to highlight the key role of concentric spatial systems in developing more inclusive systems in education.

In seeking a jolt towards concentric spatial systems, both in the terrains of human experiences and in wider social systems including education, this involves a recognition that space is 'out of joint' in many experiential and social systems. The congealed spaces of much of human experience occur due to a narrowing and funnelling of experiencing and conceptual spaces along tired, tarred tracks. Some of these congealed spaces of understanding can be traced directly to central aspects of Western metaphysics, most notably but far from exclusively in a Cartesian tradition. A shift towards concentric

spatial systems offers a direct challenge to Cartesian splits of mind from body, reason from emotion, and space as being an empty nonentity. Descartes neutralised space and in doing so, paved the way for rigidities of abstraction in understanding that require a spatial reconstruction. A concentric spatial paradigm for psychology, including social and emotional education, seeks a phenomenology attuned to lived experiences also of marginalised groups in systems that may need reform at various levels. Such a concentric spatial turn also invites social and emotional education to interrogate its fundamental cultural understandings of space to seek a plurality of modes of experience and individual differences and voices, while avoiding sheer relativism and to seek a cross-cultural psychology pertaining to shared experiential dimensions of a common humanity.

A wider concentric spatial turn across disciplines identifies that thought itself is a space, a space that has literally been flattened. Thought is a projection of spatial experience through the breath in the body and is hence, in assumed connection with a real substance. It is being proposed that thought it is a fabric of itself, being shaped in spatial terms. A

new type of thinking is needed to apprehend this spatial

embedding in thought, as projections of experience.

CHAPTER 2

The Axis of Key Contrasts between Cross-Cultural Concentric and Diametric Spaces: Building on Lévi-Strauss' Interacting Cross-Cultural Structures of Relation

It is not only key experiential ideas such as othering, fear of freedom and the iron cage that have been situated on the periphery of psychology. Somewhat surprisingly, the elsewhere highly influential work of Lévi-Strauss in structural anthropology has resided in a location largely untouched by psychology. This is difficult to fathom. For example, Bronfenbrenner's[lxx] far-reaching ecological systems framework of concentric nested systems overlooks the cross-cultural observations of concentric spatial structures and their interaction with diametric spatial structures over a decade earlier by Lévi-Strauss and other anthropologists.

The insularity of a Western biased psychology is part of the problem here. The increased emphasis on cross-cultural and cultural psychology in recent decades[lxxi] has still nevertheless tended to omit engagement with Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology, possibly due to the increased interest in anthropology, on the cultural anthropology of Geertz[lxxii] that

called for more thick description and cultural contextual focus than the more birds-eye lens of Lévi-Strauss. Even the meaning of the term structuralism differs in psychology from Levi-Strauss' anthropological tradition, reliant on Saussure's insights in linguistics that meaning resides through difference, through contrasts, rather than being located in an individual term. Saussure and Lévi-Strauss' structuralism treats a sign, such as a word, as being arbitrary of itself and gaining meaning in a wider system of signs in relation to each other. Psychology tends to understand the term structuralism in the sense of Piaget, as a search for positive structures of mind. Structural anthropology and psychology have operated on parallel paths, as separate discourses, with the sole major exceptions of Bruner's cognitive and cultural psychology and Jahoda's attempt to bridge psychology and anthropology with a focus on polar oppositions in cross-cultural thought.

While it is not being sought to transfer all aspects of Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropological framework and findings over to psychology, it is the thorough neglect of a key aspect of Lévi-Strauss' accounts of concentric and diametric structured systems in physical and social structures, and diametric structures of myths that requires reconsideration for

psychology, with implications for its fundamental spatial understandings.

With some notable exceptions,[lxxiii] the terms of reference of dialogue in recent decades between the cognitive sciences and anthropology has tended to exclude the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss –his work generally and with regard to space and spatial polarities. Lévi-Strauss' work is not even a footnote in a range of reviews between these domains.[lxxiv] This is despite the conclusion of an earlier leading cross-cultural, anthropological review that 'the simplest and at the same time most common type of symbolic classification...is the dual one',[lxxv] building on the diametric and concentric dualisms central to Lévi-Strauss' concerns. Yet both Jahoda and Lévi-Strauss did not emphasise that duals as candidate universals are *spatial*, that cross-cultural diametric and concentric structures are *spaces* of relation.

Lévi-Strauss observed the fundamental role of the binary oppositional structure across varying cultures, basically diametric space:

Starting from a binary opposition, which affords the simples possible example of a system this construction

proceeds by the aggregation, at each of the two poles, of new terms chose because they stand in relations of opposition, correlation or analogy to it. [lxxvi]

He argued that this binary oppositional structure could lead to more abstract thought in supposedly 'primitive' cultures:

A society which defines its segments in terms of high and low, sky and land, day and night, can incorporate social or moral attitudes, such as conciliation and aggression, peace and war, justice and policing, good and bad, order and disorder, etc into the same structure of opposition. [lxxvii]

Lévi-Strauss' searching for constraints on the mind is part of his indebtedness to Kant, as he acknowledges in reply to a question on what he had retained from Kant, 'That the mind has its constraints, which it imposes on an ever-impenetrable reality and it reaches this reality only through them'. [lxxviii] The relational differences between concentric and diametric spatial movements are, most importantly, not being

subsumed within the Procrustean bed of Lévi-Strauss' search for Cartesian mental structures.[lxxix] Far from being displaced and arguably relegated to a realm of the metaphysical, these spatial projected structures are being proposed as existentially meaningful, they are phenomenological structures of experience, as a system shaping of experiences.

Drawing upon some Amerindian and Indonesian examples, Lévi-Strauss highlights two purportedly fundamental contrasting forms of binary opposition, namely a diametric and concentric structure.[lxxx] He drew on Radin's observations of the Winnebago tribe concerning the structure of their village, though Radin did not emphasise the importance of the two versions of the opposition. Lévi-Strauss states:

> For some of the natives the village was circular in form and was divided into two halves, with the lodges scattered throughout the circle. For the others, there remained a twofold partition of a circular village, but with two important differences. Instead of a diameter cutting the circle, there was a smaller circle within a larger one; and instead of a division of the nucleated

village, the inner circle represented the lodges grouped together, as against the outer circle, which represented the cleared ground and which was gain differentiated from the virgin forest that surrounded the whole.[lxxxi]

He emphasised that these were not simply ideal constructions but were real for the Winnebago, 'the discrepancy among the answers of the Winnebago informants expressed the remarkable fact that both of the forms described correspond to real arrangements'.[lxxxii]

Overlooked by Bronfenbrenner's[lxxxiii] work on nested systems in psychology and education, it is Lévi-Strauss' framework in structural anthropology that offers an understanding of dynamic spatial movement for concentric structured systems observed cross-culturally. Lévi-Strauss cites a range of cross-cultural observations of concentric structures by a number of anthropologists.[lxxxiv] These include: the village plan of Omarakana in the Trobriand Islands, published by Malinowski; the Baduj of western Java and the Negri-Sembilan of the Malay peninsula, observed by de Jong; the village of the Winnebago tribe observed by Radin and an

archaeological finding in the Lower Mississippi Valley. The consensus view of anthropologists is that Malinowski was more sensitive than Lévi-Strauss to local context, as the former spent more time living in the native culture.[lxxxv] Thus, the fact that the concentric relation observation in the Trobriand Islands comes from Malinowski, and not Lévi-Strauss directly, strengthens its evidential reliability. Concentric structures can be found also in Islamic, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Jewish, Celtic, African, ancient Greek and Estonian contexts,[lxxxvi] as well as in Scandinavian mythology.[lxxxvii] Jung locates the concentric mandala structure in Buddhist, Hindu and Christian traditions,[lxxxviii] while one of the earliest painted examples of a mandala known to exist in Japan is the Womb World mandala or *Garbhadhatu* (*Taizo¯kai*), in Kyoto, from the second half of the ninth century.[lxxxix] With regard to the Lower Mississippi Valley, Lévi-Strauss states:

> We are therefore dealing with a type of [concentric] structure which in America extends far back into antiquity, and whose later analogues were to be found in preconquest Peru and Bolivia and . . . in the

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> social structure of the Sioux in North America and of the Ge and related tribes in South America . . . This latter structure however was not simply bipolar but forming six concentric octagonal figures.[xc]

Whether interpreted as representations or projections and resisting appeals to an anthropological timelessness[xci] or neat periodisations of the premodern, modern and postmodern, further ancient examples of concentric spatial structures abound. Excavations of the Stone Age settlement site and ruin of the stone cist grave of the Early Metal Age in Kasekula, Estonia, reveal concentric structures.[xcii] Moreover, 3,000-year-old ring-graves (*kivikirstkalmed*) in Muuksi, Vohma and Kasekula, Estonia, have a concentric structure.[xciii] This concentric structure contrasts with the later (*tarandkalmed*) graves from the third to fifth century in Jaagupi, Estonia, which have a diametric structure. From the twelfth century at Kaku, in Saaremaa, Estonia, the circular, concentric structure of the burials vanishes.[xciv] In Jewish art and archaeology, the concentric structures of the 'Decorated Stone Doe of the Hulda Gates'[xcv] and the Zodiac from the Central Panel of the Mosaic floor of the sixth-century Beth

Alpha synagogue have been highlighted[xcvi]. An example of concentric spatial dualism from Iran is the 'talking tree' bowl, the tree being the symbol of the 'Fount of Life'[xcvii]. The 'talking tree' inside the inner concentric circle was according to the 'Book of Kings' (Shah-Nameh) seen by Alexander the Great in his search for the 'Fount of Life'.

Resonant with the Janus face of two heads looking in diametrically opposite directions in Greek mythology, Lévi-Strauss notes that examples of diametric dualism 'abound',[xcviii] citing specific tribes in North and South America. Moreover, the simple everyday cross-cultural oppositions between 'good' and 'bad' are structured in a diametric oppositional way. The diametric good–bad opposition also underlies myths such as those of the Shuswap, which treats the owl as a cannibalistic monster in contrast to the Kutenai, which treats the owl as a benefactor.[xcix] Moreover, the simple 'subjective'[c] everyday cross-cultural oppositions between 'good' and 'bad' are structured in a diametric oppositional way.

As Lévi-Strauss highlighted, a diametric spatial structure is one where a circle is split in half by a line which is its diameter or where a square or rectangle is similarly divided into two equal halves (see Figure 1). In a concentric spatial

structure, one circle is inscribed in another larger circle (or square); in pure form, the circles share a common central point (see Figure 2).

FIGRUE 1. Diametric Spatial Opposition

FIGURE 2. Concentric Space

A purportedly key distinguishing feature of concentric and diametric spaces, observed by Lévi-Strauss, is that they tend to coexist in 'functional relation'[ci] and not simply in isolation. They are structures of relation as part of a system of relations. With this interactive dimension Lévi-Strauss has uncovered a spatial axis of dynamic tension between concentric and diametric dimensions. Thus, they are to be viewed not simply as static images, categories or symbols, but more as opposing directions of spatial relation in dynamic tension. Meaning is in their contrasting relative differences, rather than in either space considered in isolated, absolute, atomistic or essentialist terms. They express a dynamic compensatory quality – a relational and temporal quality that appears to be missing from other cross-cultural, symbolic structures. This relational aspect brings a level of interactive dynamism between different oppositional structures which is not captured within other representations such as a triangle (e.g., the triangular schema of life–death–dream in Central Australia[cii]), the five-point star dividing the feudal cycle of marriage for the Kachin of Burma[ciii] or the diamond in Navajo art.[civ] Lévi-Strauss did not realise the full potential of his systemic insights or interrogate the transferability of these

dynamic diametric and concentric spaces to other kinds of systems,[cv] beyond myths and physical and social structures. He tended to treat diametric and concentric modes as structures and underemphasised their dynamic as spaces and as spatial systems. Significantly, Lévi-Strauss did not explore concentric and diametric structures in terms of individual phenomenology, as structures of lived experience and meaning for the individual.

While the examples of concentric and diametric spaces as ancient, cross-cultural physical and social structures are empirically stronger than those drawn from myths in Lévi-Strauss' work, the contrasts between diametric and concentric spaces in geometric terms need recognition as a distinct coherent justification of itself, with relevance for psychology. Weaknesses in the empirical examples documented, in particular, for myths tend to emphasise Lévi-Strauss' birds-eye distance from local cultures avoiding thick description,[cvi] self-selection of mythic examples, lack of replicability or transparency in the reasoning,[cvii] with contrasts in myths drawn from neighbouring tribes being more convincing than from wider sources to limit arbitrary preselection and omission.[cviii] With regard to diametric and concentric dualistic

spaces, the geometric lens of Lévi-Strauss' contrasts needs to be decoupled from the empirical examples of these geometric contrasts.

Diametric and concentric projected spatial structures of relation: assumed separation and assumed connection

A claim is not being made that the entailments of the relational differences between concentric and diametric spaces are qualities that are in some way essential or intrinsic to either structure, considered as individual isolated structures, abstracted from the context of their mutual relation. A key relative difference, overlooked by Lévi-Strauss' empiricism, is nevertheless, ascertainable in principle. It is evident that the inner and outer poles of concentric space are fundamentally attached to one another, unlike in diametric space. It is a self-evident entailment of concentric relation that both concentric poles coexist in the same space, and thus, the outer circle overlaps the space of the inner one; the outer circle surrounds and contains the inner circle. The opposite that is within the outer circle or shape cannot detach itself from being within this outer shape. That the outer circle or

shape can move in the direction of greater detachment from the inner circle notwithstanding, it cannot, in principle, fully detach itself from the inner circle in concentric relation (even if the inner circle becomes an increasingly smaller proportion of the outer). Full detachment could conceivably occur only through destroying or altering the form of the other pole. It can be concluded that full detachment could occur only through destroying the very concentric structure of the whole opposition itself. In contradistinction, in diametric space both oppositional realms are basically detached and can be further smoothly detached from the other. These conclusions operate for both spaces, whether they are viewed as being two dimensional or three dimensional.

A concentric space assumes connection between its parts and any separation is on the basis of assumed connection, whereas diametric space assumes separation and any connection between the parts is on the basis of this assumed separation. As structures in relational difference, this contrast is a relativistic one of degree.[cix] Concentric and diametric spaces thus can be seen to offer contrasting structures of differential relation. A concentric spatial relation is a structure of inclusion compared to a diametric spatial

structure of exclusion. In Bachelard's words, pertinent to diametric space, 'simple geometrical opposition becomes tinged with aggressivity'.^{cx} This is not a predilection for geometrical or mathematical models in general, rather, it is for this specific spatial system of relations based on geometric contrasts meaningful also for experience.

Interpreting these spatial structures dynamically as movements, as spatial movements, brings an implication of diametric space as assumed separation, namely, that it involves a movement of splitting, of imposing relations of splitting as part of the assumed separation built into its structure. Diametric space, in contrast to concentric space, brings a change to a system in the direction of fostering a splitting process, rather than developing a relational movement of assumed connection as that of a concentric spatial system. These spaces are being examined as fundamentally directions of movement rather than to be treated as simply static structures.^{cxi} A Japanese cultural context illustrates the entwinement between the spatial and the relational; it is suggested that 'the idea of inside/outside is not only a radical essential category of cultural characteristics, but [is] also universal',^{cxii} citing the view that the Japanese

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words *uchi* (inside) and *soto* (outside) express a characteristic cultural ethos, where *uchi* (inside) is exactly equal to that of one's family or group.[cxiii] Yet a diametric outsideness is an assumed separation that is radically different from the assumed connection of the outside pole to the inner pole of concentric space. Inner and outer need not necessarily be diametrically framed but may also be concentrically framed. The Japanese concept of *ma* can signify the space between one thing and another and can also be used for an understanding of human relationships.[cxiv] Concentric and diametric spatial structures of relation invite application to relations between self and other, thereby entwining the spatial and relational, as with the Japanese concept *ma*.

While Descola acknowledges a range of examples of concentric dualism he does not highlight a key feature of this space, one neglected also by Lévi-Strauss, namely, that both concentric poles are in assumed connection, they offer a connective relational space. Nevertheless, Descola does recognise that diametric opposition is a more absolute, radical distance than the toned down distance or distinctions of concentric relation. For the Chewong of the Pahang Province, Malaysia, Descola states, 'Their dualism is of a concentric

nature that tones down discontinuities close to home, the better to exclude those beyond the boundary; whereas ours is diametrical and draws absolute distinctions, the better to be inclusive'.[cxv]

The examples Descola draws upon of concentric spaces are of empirical examples in a given culture and the empirical does not necessarily reflect the geometric concentric feature of this space, as both poles coexisting around the shared space of a common centre. Thus, in appealing for a broadening beyond dualism to embrace wider cross-cultural experiences, Descola largely lumps together diametric and concentric spaces as cages to be escaped from under the rubric of dualism. In doing so, he advocates for an extended celebration of monism. for an anthropology that 'must shed its essential dualism and become fully monistic' though without reducing plurality to 'a unity of substance, finality and truth' of many nineteenth century philosophers.[cxvi]

The emphasis on the structural dimensions to concentric dualism in Lévi-Strauss' and Descola's structuralism served to lessen focus on the spatial aspects of these relations. It is not that the spatial aspect was ignored in structuralism but rather that relative to structure it was given diminished

attention. An implication of this attenuated scrutiny of the spatial aspect to concentric dualism is that the spatial feature that both concentric circles occupy the same space around a common centre - a shared co-centre embedded into concentric spaces – was neglected. This mutually overlapping space in a concentric geometric relation brings an assumed connection between both poles in concentric space – a contrast with the assumed separation of diametric spatial opposition that Lévi-Strauss did not highlight[2]. The implications of concentric relation as a space, and as a space of connection for system relations including for individual experience as a system is the key site for exploration in this book.

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[2] It is being sought to go beyond the limited spaces of monism and diametric space, where monism is little more than a variant of empty space, of blank space undifferentiation, of empty freedom. The shift sought in this book is the expansion from diametric spaces (and monistic spaces) towards concentric spaces where concentric spaces are to be treated geometrically as spaces of assumed connection. This distinguishes also treatment of concentric spaces through the lens of diametric spatial above/below hierarchical projections, as in Dante's concentric circles in *Paradiso*, where the inner circle was in hierarchical superiority to outer concentric circles. Other examples of empirical misconstruals of concentric space as hierarchical are discussed in Downes (2012).

Concentric space is a very different space from diametric dualism. It is not even a mere dualism, though often treated as a mere subspecies within dualism. Concentric space as a process is an expansive movement that encompasses infinite concentric polar relations within itself. The structural lens of Lévi-Strauss and Descola has hindered recognition of the dynamic feature of concentric space as a process, as an expanding movement.

Mirror Image Inverted Symmetry

Lévi-Strauss explicitly relates diametric structures to mirror image inversions between both diametric poles. He describes 'symmetrical inversions'[cxvii] in Mandan and Hidatsa myths:

> [...] these myths are diametrically opposed ... In the Mandan version ... two earth women who are not sisters go to heaven to become sisters-in-law by marrying celestial brothers. One who belongs to the Mandan tribe, separates from an ogre, Sun, with the help of a string which enables her to come back down to her village. In revenge, Sun places his legitimate son

at the head of the enemies of the Mandan, upon whom he declares war. In the Hidatsa version ... everything is exactly reversed. Two celestial brothers come down to earth to be conceived by human beings and born as children. Sun's sister, an ogress, is joined with an earthborn character by means of a string. She makes him her adopted son and puts him at the head of the enemies of the Hidatsa[cxviii]

He reiterates a view of diametric opposition as expressing qualities of inverted symmetry, when contrasting the myth of the Thompson and the Coeur d'Alene with that of the Chilcotin.[cxix]

Echoing a view of diametric symmetry as 'transformations which sometimes result in the meaning being turned inside out',[cxx] Lévi-Strauss invokes descriptions of myths framed by an understanding of their relation as involving a mirror image:

One often observes ... that mythological systems after passing through a minimal expression, recover their original fullness on the other side of the threshold. But

their reflection is inverted a bit like a bundle of light rays entering into a camera obscura through a pinpoint opening and forced by this obstacle to cross over each other. The same image seen rightside-up outside is reflected upside-down in the camera.[cxxi]

Strictly speaking, a mirror image is plane symmetry rather than the line (or point) symmetry of diametric space. Nevertheless, plane, line and point symmetry all accommodate a view of symmetry as reversal or inversion, as in diametric space. While Lévi-Strauss acknowledges the need for greater precision within his use of terms such as symmetry,[cxxii] it was a key concept in much of his work. He developed an argument for inverted symmetry in relation to diametric structures, through contrast with concentric ones. While Lévi-Strauss related diametric structured, mirror image symmetry to myths and sought 'unconscious'[cxxiii] structures, he did not integrate this with an examination of this structure's relevance to wider emotions, beyond a recognition of affect underlying attributions such as good and bad.

Noninteraction with Background as Relative Closure Versus More Fluid Interaction with Background as a Relative Openness

Another feature of diametric space, contrasted with concentric space, is highlighted by Lévi-Strauss. He argues that self-sufficiency and a split relation to the outside environment is a general quality of diametric structures and systems, 'In a diametric system … virgin land constitutes an irrelevant element; the moieties are defined by their opposition to each other, and the apparent symmetry of their closed structure creates the illusion of a closed system'.[cxxiv] While this makes sense for the immediate example given for social structures, it is not yet clear if non self-sufficiency and orientation to the outside environment is a general quality of concentric as opposed to diametric relation, as Lévi-Strauss claims:

> [In concentric relation] The system is not self-sufficient, and its frame of reference is always the environment. The opposition between cleared ground (central circle) and waste land (peripheral circle) demands a third element, brush or forest – that is, virgin land – which circumscribes the binary whole

while at the same time extending it, since cleared land is to waste land as waste land is to virgin land.[cxxv]

Lévi-Strauss rejects closure for concentric structures, by implying here that the relation of the background to both poles of the dualism is governed by the relation within the dualism itself, i.e., 'cleared land is to waste land as waste land is to [background] virgin land'. The mode of relation to the background is not extraneous to the respective modes of relation within the poles themselves. Thus, as the concentric poles are in assumed connection to each other, they are also in assumed connection to the background; and this assumed connection to the background resists closure within the concentric structure.

In contrast, diametric structures' relation to their own poles is one of assumed separation which then maintains an assumed separation with the background. There is minimal interaction between the structural poles of diametric relation and the background space (i.e., virgin land). Diametric structures' relation to their own poles is one of a mirror image division, which then maintains a cleavage from the background that becomes closed off. Moreover, diametric and

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concentric structures are dynamic processes as much as structures. Thus, a diametric structure tends to impose a diametric process in its interaction with the background, whereas a concentric structure initiates a concentric relation with the background. In this sense of involvement with the background, concentric relation is not a self-contained structure. There is a closer proximity between background and foreground within concentric relative to diametric space. In comparison, diametric space is a much more closed structure – closed off from the background. There is greater closure in a diametric spatial structure relative to a dis-closure process of relative opening in concentric spatial relation. A variant of the entailment of relative closure for diametric structures is that they bring decreased permeability (transparency) relative to the increased permeability (transparency) of concentric structures.

Conceptions of space as metaphor places space as subservient to language, as operating simply within language, rather than itself as a prior system shaping language. The need to go beyond the literal-metaphor distinction, as a residue of a Western metaphysical tradition dividing the world into the ideal and real, is an argument taken up in Ricoeur's work.[cxxvi]

Ricoeur's position arguably moves towards a spatial turn for hermeneutics.[cxxvii] These arguments in my earlier works will not be further rehearsed here.[cxxviii]

The argument here is that ancient concentric spatial structures such as yin/yang and the mandala are to be associated with Eastern cultures and many other cultures both beyond Western culture and in some Western cultural traditions, while diametric spatial structures are cross-cultural, yet strongly associated with Western culture in terms of Aristotelian logic. This picture is more nuanced that a simple mapping of concentric space as Eastern and diametric space as Western, though this could be stated as a tendency rather than as a global rule. Concentric space and concentric spatial systems offer a challenge to traditional spatial horizons in much of Western understandings, as they stretch beyond mere homogenous space as emptiness to a patterned space, and one that is irreducible to diametric space.

Science has long recognised that there is no such thing as naive direct observation, even in physics,[cxxix] and that all scientific observation is theory-laden,[cxxx] framed through paradigmatic assumptions.[cxxxi] Perceptual observation involves a combination of 'event recognition coupled with the

appropriate horizon recognition'.[cxxxii] The detailed contextual thick description sought in Geertz's cultural anthropology operates at the event recognition level, whereas the wider explanatory framework through concentric and diametric spaces offers angles for horizon recognition, as a complementary second-order level of explanation for anthropology integrated with empirical psychology.

This framework still supports concerns with individual differences and diversity for the four schools of American anthropology *(*archaeology, cultural, biological and linguistic anthropology). However, it adds a further second-order lens of interpretation at a different level of description. In doing so, it seeks to reconstruct a carefully circumscribed aspect of Lévi-Strauss' work that builds on a number of other well-known anthropologists, without endorsing the wider paradigm and empirical claims of Lévi-Strauss.

Whereas Johnson-Laird[cxxxiii] treats the dualism aspect of Lévi-Strauss' work as lacking specificity, the proposed framework adds multidimensional aspects, emphasising *spatial* features, uncovering neglected separation/connection inferences for diametric and concentric spaces. It treats diametric and concentric spaces as interactive systems, as

conditions supporting proximate mechanisms rather than simply as metaphor, while extending the domain of relevance to wider aspects of cognition, especially problem framing. The geometric relative differences between concentric and diametric spaces may not be exhaustive with others ripe for interrogation in future dialogue within psychology that includes anthropology, while respecting the distinctive levels of the event recognition of thick description and horizon recognition to allow for their interactive dialogue for a plurality of truth goals. Thought is a spatial system of relations, in Bachelard's words, recognition of inner/outer distinctions is a thoroughly spatial process, 'Philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think in terms of being and non-being. Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry which – whether we will or no – confers spatiality upon thought'.[cxxxiv] Yet inner/outer need not simply be understood spatially in a diametric oppositional way where one space excludes the other, as Bachelard does here.

This is not a predilection for a wider mathematicisation of experience or retreat to a Leibnizian mathematical search for life knowledge or for early Wittgenstein's logic-based view of life in terms of logic

pictures. However, it does challenge longstanding divisions between the geometric and the living in modernist thought, such as Pascal's contrast between an *esprit de geometrie* and an *esprit de finesse*.[cxxxv]

This refashioning of space for psychology is arguably complementary to critique of Cartesianism in other domains of psychology, such as in neuropsychology.[cxxxvi] Elsewhere I have argued that cognitive science's computational models of mind offer little more than an empty Cartesian preconception of space[cxxxvii] in their problem space models of Newell and Simon.[cxxxviii] It is notable that these models operate within a governing framework of treating space itself as merely a metaphor,[cxxxix] in other words, as a layer emptied of real impact in causally efficacious psychological systems. Consigning space to the level of metaphor excises space from scrutiny in real psychological systems; space as a background system is no mere passive wallflower, no shadowy promissory note. While the psychological domain of cognitive linguistics offers hugely important understandings of conceptual metaphor framing everyday language in English, the current concern with spaces has built on this elsewhere in my work, to relate concentric

and diametric spaces to a prior system to conceptual metaphor.[cxl]

To summarise, very basic aspects of experience (connection/separation, symmetry, relative openness/closure) are meaningful in spatial terms and cluster into contrasts between concentric and diametric spaces of relation. A concentric relation assumes connection between its parts, whereas diametric opposition assumes separation. Diametric spatial mirror image symmetry inversions include good/bad, powerful/powerless, active/passive, love/hate, sacred/profane, us/them, normal/other, win/lose, success/failure, and above/below hierarchy. Diametric opposition, as the basic schema for Western logic, is strongly associated with a Western priority for diametric over concentric spaces. Space is itself a system, a system of meaningful relations through the contrasts between diametric and concentric spaces.

PART II

Beyond Othering as Diametric Space

CHAPTER 3

Spatial Foundations of Othering in De Beauvoir and the Double Consciousness of Du Bois: Beyond Us/Them as Diametric Space

Othering is a multilayered concept with a core spatial underpinning principle of diametric space as polar opposition and us versus them exclusion. Building from de Beauvoir's and Said's explorations of othering for gender and ethnicity respectively, further dimensions of othering include early school leaving processes in education,[cxli] physical manifestations of exclusions in places, Du Bois' double consciousness, Bateson's double bind, ambivalent systems and the phenomenon of scapegoating, going beyond Girard, as part of school violence and bullying.

Spatial Foundations of Othering in De Beauvoir: Beyond Us/Them as Diametric Space

The tremors of De Beauvoir's famous account in 1949 of othering of women as the *Second Sex*,[cxlii] understood not on their own terms but only in reference to men as the norm

were embraced and extended by Said in 1978 to othering in terms of ethnicity.[cxliii] It is largely overlooked, however, that these processes of othering are spatially imbued. Othering processes are held together by a common spatial framing precondition of diametric oppositional space, where its polar oppositions are divided into us versus them.

De Beauvoir's characterisation of woman as 'other', explicitly relied on Lévi-Strauss' 'profound work'[cxliv] on diametric oppositions, though again not emphasising spatial aspects. De Beauvoir's *Second Sex* explicitly states that 'the category of the other is as primordial as consciousness itself'[cxlv] and thereby as preceding the duality of the sexes, 'this duality was not originally attached to the division of the sexes; it was not dependent on any empirical facts'.[cxlvi] In doing so, she directly cites the proofs from 1947 of Lévi-Strauss' *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, on the passage from a state of nature to a state of culture as contrasted with the other, as a duality of opposition – in effect, diametric spatial opposition:

Passage from the state of Nature to the state of Culture is marked by man's ability to view biological

relations as a series of contrasts; duality, alternation, opposition and symmetry, whether under definite or vague forms, constitute not so much phenomena to be explained as fundamental and immediately given data of social reality.[cxlvii]

The duality of diametric spatial opposition between self and other is the precondition for the very conception of the other, and this goes beyond gender-based terms, as de Beauvoir explicitly recognises. Other feminist thought that builds on De Beauvoir, such as Scales' work, perceives the male in terms tantamount to diametric space: 'the male model defines self, and other important concepts, by opposing the concept to a negative "other". Male rationality divides the world between all that is good and all that is bad'.[cxlviii] However, again a framework of concentric and diametric spaces associated with assumed connection and separation respectively is not simply a gender reliant claim, as these relational spaces are prior to gender.

Said explicitly points to the us/them structure requiring reconfiguration, when asking 'whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of

men into "us" (Westerners) and "they" (Orientals)'.[cxlix] Though without expressly treating this as a spatial issue or as a dimension of diametric spatial inversion, Said points to the role of inversion framing Eurocentric classifications:

> as Renan's whole treatise on the Semitic branch of the Oriental languages goes very far to show, is comparative: Indo-European is taken as the living, organic norm, and Semitic Oriental languages are seen comparatively to be inorganic. Time is transferred into the space of comparative classification, which at bottom is based on a rigid binary opposition between organic and inorganic languages.[cl]

Said deconstructs the '"We" are this, "they" are that'[cli] and 'the advanced/backward binarism so centrally advocated in late-nineteenth-century Orientalism'.[clii] Both de Beauvoir and Said share a concern with overcoming the binary opposition of us versus them. Yet neither take the further step of explicitly treating binary opposition in spatial terms, of treating diametric opposition as a phenomenon of movement

through distinctive interacting spatial systems to overcome othering. Space lurks in the background of their architecture of othering, without being fully brought to the fore.

While Lévi-Strauss tended to emphasise diametric opposition as a structure more than a space, Jameson recognises that binary opposition is 'clearly a spatial concept or category' that can 'take on temporal form and shape'.[cliii] Yet Jameson does not go far enough here to treat diametric (binary) space as a system, a systemic dimension that Lévi-Strauss incorporates in two ways. Lévi-Strauss treats diametric opposition as a system of relations in itself but also directly in structuralist terms as acquiring meaning through difference, namely, its difference from concentric structured systems. Thus, diametric (binary opposition) space is not a mere category, but a more interactive dimension as part of a wider dynamic system of interactive relations and tensions with concentric space. It is this dynamic spatial system of interactions that offers a space for change to, for reconfiguration from the diametric us/them space constituting the process of othering. Another spatial avenue beyond othering becomes possible as concentric spatial relations between self and other. Jameson's spatial interrogation of

oppositions[cliv] omits the key spatial dimension of concentric space, a dimension already apprehended by Lévi-Strauss, at least in rudimentary form.

De Beauvoir also treats the other as a *category*, 'otherness is a fundamental category of human thought'.[clv] Her systemic concerns are with the ways economic and cultural systems give flesh to this categorisation process in gendered terms. *The Second Sex* is very much preoccupied with a historical materialist view of 'the domestic slavery' of women 'this economic oppression that gives rise to the social oppression to which she is subjected',[clvi] including treatment of gender as a socio-historical process, as a social construction. De Beauvoir's main concerns also involve critique of Freudian psychoanalytic accounts of females to highlight the 'metaphysical assumptions behind all his dicta'[clvii] and that Freud 'simply adapted his account from that of the destiny of man, with slight modifications'.[clviii] She highlights that Freud does not study women's sexuality 'in particular'.[clix]

De Beauvoir explicitly builds from aspects of Lévi-Strauss' work on the incest taboo,[clx] on menstruation[clxi] and on patriarchal cultures' exchange of women in marriage to describe a different alterity constructed for the role of women

as 'the Absolute Other…the inessential'[clxii] where 'women…have never composed a separate group set up on its own account, over and against the male grouping. They have never entered into a direct and autonomous relation with the men'.[clxiii] Women are treated as a property that men possess.

Without resiling from any of these important and highly influential features of De Beauvoir's work, it is the spatial dimension of the us/them diametric opposition she uncovered for othering that is being amplified for current purposes of a spatial turn for psychology, education and beyond. In doing so, the diametric opposition of us/them mirror image inverted symmetry is not simply being treated as a socio-historically manifested fundamental, primordial category of consciousness, as De Beauvoir conceived it, based on Lévi-Strauss' early work. It is all this and more, building on Lévi-Strauss' later work, diametric spatial opposition is not only a category it is part of a wider system of spaces, of spaces in mutual tension. Categorisation is a dimension of a spatial process, but it is not the only option. A different mode of thought and experience is possible, that stretches open human thought and experience beyond the very mode of

categorization in diametric exclusionary terms, for self and other, and beyond this.

Resonant with earlier romanticist critiques of Enlightenment reason, Said offers a phenomenological appeal to lived experience to challenge the grey nets of the 'dehumanized thought'[clxiv] in abstraction and categorisation as such. It is this shift from the flow of experience to static categorization that is central to Said's phenomenological critique of othering:

> It would be converted from the consecutive experience of individual research into a sort of imaginary museum without walls, where everything gathered from the huge distances and varieties of Oriental culture became categorically Oriental.[clxv]

A spatial and phenomenological challenge to diametric space, as a category mode of us/them, embraces a concern with lived experience and with living space beyond mere closure of categorisation. To do so, it is vital that diametric and concentric spaces of relation in relation are treated as mutually dynamically interactive spatial systems, rather than as

categories or schemas. Said's conception of othering challenges the fundamental mode of the categorial, as an experiential shift in the categorial itself, to add to concerns with a conceptual and experiential movement beyond othering.

The gelid tracks of diametric spatial compartments invite concern with categorisation, with categories as a restricted mode of organising human experience and understanding. Documented by work on prototypes in cognitive psychology, including fuzzy boundaries around categories, 'one purpose of categorization' is 'to reduce the infinite differences among stimuli to behaviourally and cognitively usable proportions'[clxvi]. A similar function for categories is recognised in social psychology, namely, that of simplification for action.[clxvii] Categories harden social identities in terms of groups of belonging, as ingroups, in contrast with outgroups. Assumptions regarding categories shape understandings of identity of self and other. Yet what has been overlooked here is the specific spatial structure of diametric space underpinning the very mode of categorisation itself and its contrasting tension with the *élan vital* of concentric space.

Spaces offer processes to escape the dominion of the category. A more flexible movement underlying thought and experience is being sought than the stasis of categorisation and labelling. This invites acknowledgement of where categorisation is nevertheless a dynamic process of inflicting stasis on a system, as a process of diametric spatialisation. While the category is a spatial aspect, it is but one mode of spatial emerging.

This us/them[clxviii] inverted symmetry of diametric space underpinning othering is resonant with social cognition frames of ingroup/outgroup.[clxix] A concentric spatial relation treats the other as an extension of self, yet distinct; the other is the outer concentric pole to oneself as the inner pole, in assumed connection around a common centre.[clxx] Capacity to shift from diametric spatial exclusion to concentric spatial frames of inclusion that recognise difference as connection may address concern that the cognitive sciences have 'embarrassingly little to say' about intergroup conflict.[clxxi] The cognitive process of 'othering' requires interrogation in spatial system terms and as part of a wider terrain of experiential restructuring.

For De Beauvoir, othering takes place in different forms so that the othering of women is distinguished from other kinds of diametric opposition between men in competition or war. She imports distinctive diametric mirror image oppositions between the male and female, such as essential/inessential, real/unreal, socially meaningful and relevant/socially lacking in meaning and relevance. Women are confined to a shadowy social realm of insubstantiality from the vantage point of a patriarchal world. The male diametric oppositions between enemy/friend do not deny the substantiality of the opposing pole.

While the phenomenon of ingroups and outgroups is heavily researched in social psychology, it is somewhat surprising that De Beauvoir's concept of othering has gained more traction in education, philosophy and cultural studies than, for some reason, in psychology. While De Beauvoir clearly has had influence on research fields in psychology such as psychology of women and gender studies, perhaps one factor hindering wider reception of her work in psychology is that, for example, developmental psychology has tended to have lowered interest in phenomenological concerns with lived experiences, giving emphasis more to largescale

quantitative samples over qualitative research. Interest in children and young people's voices in US based psychology has not been aided by the fact that in 2024 the US remains the sole country in the world not to have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, where Article 12 gives emphasis to children and young people's right to be heard in matters affecting their welfare, with due recognition of differences in age and responsibility. The rather peripheral influence of De Beauvoir's conception of othering in psychology, also in its wider applications to social class othering and ethnicity othering, may also be due to a reticence in psychology to adequately address overtly political themes pertaining to power distribution in systems. In a similar vein, it is notable that Bronfenbrenner's almost ubiquitous ecological systems theory in educational, developmental and community psychology, is weak on power relations in systems, as well as system blockages pertaining to resistances to system change.[clxxii]

The shift from us versus them diametric space as othering towards an assumed connection between self and other is not simply a conceptual shift or even an external systemic shift, such as in education systems. It is furthermore

an experiential restructuring, in humanity's mode of being. Diametric space is a mode of being, a way of apprehending the world, and the self in relation to others and the world. Diametric space is an experiential mode of narrowing, a defensive retreat into a more closed experiential space, a more sealed compartmental way of being. This restricted space is a capacity for experience and at times a helpful and necessary capacity for experience. However, it is problematic as the sole or even dominant mode of lived experience, it is a surrender to flattened experiential possibilities. It is an *écrasement* of space, a flattening of space shaping our experiential contours, pushing us into an observing mode that treats one's own self as an object, an object of consciousness.

Othering as the Double Consciousness of Du Bois for Race: A Diametric Spatial Constellation

Decades before De Beauvoir's account of othering in gendered terms, in 1903, Du Bois [clxxiii] developed this understanding of us/them discrimination as an internal process of othering as double consciousness, an othering within the self for African Americans due to societal forces in the United States. For Du

Bois, the individual experiences a split duality. This is tantamount to the mirror image inversion of diametric space.

Du Bois' celebrated account of 'the twoness haunting and defining'[clxxiv] the *Souls of Black Folk* in US society offers a pertinent example of how a sense of otherness is constellated as a mirror image splitting in individual and collective experiences:

> It is a peculiar sensation this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring ones soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels the twoness…two souls; two thoughts; two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideas in one's dark body; whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder[clxxv]

This manifestation of being othered is ripe for construal spatially in diametric oppositional terms, as being pressured to look at oneself antithetically through the eyes of others, a diametric spatial split identity of being 'torn asunder'.

Othering is a phenomenon of relational space. It relies on a specific spatial process of diametric spatial opposition. It is being argued here that this diametric space is far from being a mere metaphor, such as an iron cage of Weber's restriction of experience in the development of capitalism. Rather diametric space is an assumption structure, a real system condition supporting relational and physical spaces of exclusion antithetical to inclusive systems in schools.

In a tradition somewhat resonant with Hegel regarding false consciousness, where the slave internalises the mentality of the master, Du Bois articulates a similar though distinctive double consciousness in terms of race. This is not only a manifestation of othering, it is itself an experiential reaction that constellates the same underlying spatial supporting condition of diametric oppositional space. A related common thread occurs not only between othering and false consciousness but also with the space of hierarchy; hierarchy is again a diametric spatial opposition based on an above and below mirror image inverted positioning in relational space.

Brand aptly recognises that Du Bois' double-consciousness requires to be understood in spatial terms to

challenge 'the spatial imaginary of white supremacy and its segregatory impulses at the turn of the 20th-century'.clxxvi Spatialising double-consciousness to reconstruct 'seeming immutable forms' of spaceclxxvii can be amplified through a diametric spatial questioning. Brand challenges a view of (Cartesian and Lockean) space as 'a static, blank slate devoid of racialized experiences and structuring'clxxviii and amplifies spatial dimensions to Du Bois' double-consciousness as combining critique and vision. This double consciousness, which Du Bois identifies for race, has also been expressed for gender to critique a patriarchal conformity to a symbolic system that alienates many women.clxxix

However, Du Bois is going further here than simply conformity. The double consciousness of Du Bois involves a celebration of the self-combined with recognition of its tension with how the self is viewed in the prevailing culture. Du Bois sustains a duality in this tension rather than being a Hegelian slave as a monistic subjugation to the master's reality or Kristeva's conformity. As Brand accentuates, there is a positive vision in Du Bois' double consciousness to celebrate one's own identity all the while that it is being suppressed by the wider culture.

Likewise, Meer[clxxx] emphasises the importance of not simply treating Du Bois' double consciousness as merely an extension of Hegel's master-slave relation. Meer points to the positive qualities of being 'gifted with a second sight'[clxxxi] that Du Bois invokes for African-Americans, an ability to see the world through the eyes of an excluded community that is not available to communities that are not so excluded. Meer highlights:

> The solution that Du Bois points to is not one of abandoning the double self but is, instead, to merge the "double self into a better and truer self" – one that does not deny experience and history but seeks to build on it.[clxxxii]

Du Bois gives expression to a range of spatial qualities of exclusion, walls and closure that are the hallmarks of diametric spatial structures in experience, referring to being 'hemmed in',[clxxxiii] 'The shades of the prison-house closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest',[clxxxiv] 'the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face',[clxxxv] 'the history of this strife', 'born with a veil'.[clxxxvi] As

part of this diametric spatial split and mirror image reversal, Du Bois exposes the diametric opposition of 'two unreconciled ideals' 'the contradiction of double aims'',[clxxxvii] as well as hierarchy of above/below underpinning the 'nameless prejudice' where an African-American 'humbly bows and meekly does obeisance'.[clxxxviii] Interpreting Du Bois as a spatial thinker is resonant with challenge to homogenous spaces in racial terms.[clxxxix]

At the outset of Chapter VI, Du Bois invokes concentric spatial imagery while seeking an expanded relational space of assumed connection, 'From the shimmering swirl of waters...arises a new human unity, pulling the ends of the earth nearer, and all... [people] black, yellow, and white' .[cxc] Diametric spatial oppositions are reconfigured for Du Bois, as a reduction of distance in relational space, as a 'pulling...nearer'.[cxci] Parekh[cxcii] describes Du Bois' second sight as an expansion of horizons of thought and human fulfilment. The question arises as to concentric spaces of experience as potentially playing a role in this expansion, as a spatial expansion of experience, as well as for horizons of understanding and development of inclusive education and social systems.[cxciii]

The us versus them divide that infiltrates the process of othering, whether the other is treated in race, gender, social class or ethnic terms, or intersectionally as a combination of each, requires amplification as being a concrete spatial process and structure. This spatial process and structure of diametric space exerts its dominion as a system upon experience. While Teo seeks to challenge ethnocentric intuitions in psychology,[cxciv] to expose Western biased concepts, space itself requires interrogation in such terms.

CHAPTER 4

Othering as Girard's Scapegoating Underpinned through Diametric Space

Diametric Space and the Dionysian Myth of Sacrificial Ritual

Scapegoating is a particularly violent form of othering with a long history across diverse cultures. The Dionysian myth and ancient Greek practice of sacrifice of a goat, other animal or even child is documented in some detail in its cruelty.[cxcv] These are as part of a reversal as atonement for the death of the young Dionysus as a child, a ritual as a compensatory mechanism. Nietzsche has celebrated a range of features of the Dionysian myth, a portrayal that is somewhat unmoored from more historically precise accounts.[cxcvi] Nietzsche extols a Dionysian engagement with bodily passions.

Beyond simply the famous Dionysian exemplification of scapegoating, Girard [cxcvii] highlights three particular features of this phenomenon. Firstly, this is a structuring of violence, as a killing, whether of a human or animal. This ordering structure is to control violence in a given society, it is a way of channelling a more widespread urge to disparate violence in a focused, controlled way. Secondly, he sees this as being a

founding principle of societies to provide stability through a society uniting in the killing of another. While this is a somewhat sweeping claim of Girard, requiring much stronger empirical proof and argument, his view of violence as function to unite a social group is one accepted elsewhere in social psychology.[cxcviii] A third key aspect of Girard's treatment of scapegoating is that he highlights a feeling state of mimesis that is central to scapegoating. This is basically a common group feeing, based on imitation, on 'borrowed desire…desire comes always from the other'.[cxcix] At times, he may even be read as stating that all human capacity for feeling is imitative, again arguably an overstatement. Jung and Fromm in particular argue for the importance of an individual's experience that is not mere imitation of group norms as a flattened adjustment of feeling.

Girard's position on mimesis is very much one of a feeling lacking individual intensity of emotion, even if a strong group force, echoing Le Bon's insight influential in psychology, that a crowd brings out the lowest common denominator across individuals regarding intelligence, sensitivity and tolerance.[cc] Anger habitually flattens an individual's response. For Girard, the group feels as a category, in the mimesis

process of imitative emotions, of emotional contagion. Whereas Girard emphasises the hostility of this group feeling of imitative emotion, the later Nietzsche, at least, tends to favour the elation of the group in these Dionysian ritual scapegoating processes. Dionysian elation and joy of scapegoating is a ritualistic example of the will to power principle central to later Nietzsche's work, in the turning from a life principle to a principle of will to power.

The hostile emotions of human groups transfer quickly to a violence out of control. Sacrificial ritual is the purported universal foundation of human culture. On Girard's reading of the myth of Adam and Eve, neither desire the apple but are exhorted to by another, whether the serpent for Eve or Eve for Adam. The other propagates desire in the self. Girard treats eating disorders as epitomising mimetic desire,[cci] as social conformity to idealised images of the crowd. Girard forecloses a freedom in experience through its surrender to conformity to the other, not only in deed but in desire.

Cayley elucidates Girard's position that sacrifice is 'the anchor of all social order. Without sacrifice, the social order becomes more fluid and more open to question, and this eventually sets free not just good things but that has been

contained and controlled by the old sacrificial order'.[ccii] The opening up of the diametric spatial structure of opposition between the group and sacrificed individual, where the diametric oppositional space was the channelling of the communal violence as imitation of feeling, may unleash the unstructured violent forces of a monistic free for all in a society, on this account of Girard. Thus, for Girard, fear of freedom is well founded at least at the level of social groups, chained into the ordering structure of diametric spaces. Fromm's concern with fear of freedom[cciii] is more at an individual level and he would reject feeling as being simply imitative, while recognising this as alienated feeling, as a loss of deeper sensitivity and attunement. Both Fromm and Girard are preoccupied with the closure of diametric space, but in mirror image reversed ways, Fromm seeks its expansive opening, Girard cautions against the destruction of this shell as opening a Pandora's box of violence.

Girard's extolling of the constraints of diametric spatial securities gives an emphasis to the importance of national borders, in stark contrast to Souto-Manning's critique of border ecology as excluding the identities of migrants in a US context.[cciv] Girard states, 'People don't realise that by doing

away with borders they are creating more and more the conditions of violence. What was the purpose of borders? To keep violence inside or to have violence between two nations or three but to prevent it from moving to the entire world'.[ccv] The sole spatial alternative to diametric space envisaged by Girard is that of monism, of a chaotic, undifferentiated free for all of violence. Another different space is possible as a reconfiguration of diametric space, namely, a concentric spatial opening, at least firstly at the level of individual's experiences.

The phenomenon of scapegoating is an issue of relational space; it is structured through diametric space that pervades it thoroughly. The diametric oppositional space is established between the group and the excluded scapegoat. This is an active movement of spatialisation inflicted upon the scapegoat victim through the physical aggression or killing and/or psychological violence of exclusion from the group. The diametric mirror image structured inversion of us versus them, opposes the group with the individual scapegoat.

This disconnection from empathy with the suffering of the scapegoat is a diametric spatial process of splitting from not only a feeling with the victim, it is frequently accompanied

by a cognitive process of dehumanising the scapegoat into being a mere thing, from the vantage point of the group's identity and unity based on common violence. Yet even this process is subject itself to a diametric spatial mirror image reversal in, for example, the Dionysian sacrificial ritual, where the sacrificial animal or child is elevated to the status of being itself a god, a substitute for the Dionysian god. A diametric opposition between elevated god and worthless object becomes the fate of many scapegoats in historical examples such as the Dionysian.

In Kerenyi's detailed and authoritative historical account of the Dionysian myth in ancient Greece, diametric mirror image inversions and splitting dominate, to an even greater degree than in Nietzsche's account in *Birth of Tragedy.* These are evident in the details of the Dionysian festivals' activities and sacrifices, the compensatory function of atonement displayed in these rituals, as well as the structure of the temporal changes; the two-year phase of the Dionysian year imports a diametric spatial inversion of absence and presence, times when the Dionysian is expected to arrive and times when it is absent. Examples of diametric mirror image inversion include the dancers around the enthroned in the

Dionysian festival are treated as both murderers and saviours, with the sacrifice being of god's representative and enemy:

> If the dancers had not previously danced around the child Dionysus in order, seemingly, to kill him, it would be impossible to understand how they could cease to be the child's saviors, as they were elsewhere in Greek mythology, and become his murderers. The development is from less humane to more humane gods, not the reverse. Ceasing to be murderers, they became saviors.[ccvi]

A further diametric spatial feature of the Dionysian rites is that of splitting. The diametric splitting involves the destruction and tearing asunder of the sacrificial animal. The bull is torn to pieces as a characterisation of the suffering dismembered god of Dionysus. On Kerenyi's accounts, the Dionysian ritual sacrifice involves a cutting out of the heart or phallus from the sacrificial animal, as part of the phallic procession. Kerenyi is clear on the cruelty ('cruel sacrifice') of these rituals, which also included at times tearing a sacrificial child to pieces, 'the infant Dionysus, like the sacrificed kid, was

first boiled and then roasted';[ccvii] 'These occasions, their feast days, must be regarded as realizations of aggressive, murderous life'.[ccviii] The cruelty in the historical Dionysian rituals in ancient Greece is directly confronted by Kerenyi: '[T]he sacrificial animal was dismembered, something was set aside and kept';[ccix] 'It was not a heart but a phallus'.[ccx] This was 'a cruel death, a repetition of the rending of Dionysus; such a death was re-enacted, probably in a very much abbreviated and simplified form, in each sacrifice of a goat'.[ccxi] Kerenyi continues:

> The bull games of the Cretans were a continuation of the bull capture, enacted in the form of a drama. It seems hardly credible that in a wild Dionysus cult such powerful animals should have been torn to pieces alive by the teeth of the participants and devoured raw, but we have express testimony showing that this monstrous rite occurred in a feast of Dionysus repeated every two years.[ccxii]

The function of this diametric splitting process was again a diametric one of mirror image inversion as a

compensation, a compensatory atonement through the sacrifice for the killing of Dionysus as a child; 'the somber Dionysian sacrifice, the murder of the god'[ccxiii] is compensated for in mirror image reverse symmetry fashion through the sacrificial animal, 'a substitutive sacrifice presupposing the identity of god, man and animal – a sacrifice characteristic of the Dionysian religion'.[ccxiv] As a compensatory atonement, the scapegoat animal such as the goat is in a diametric mirror image relation to the god and mask as god manifestation. In contrast, concentric space offers no such recompense; it is not within the borders of a compensatory reversal such as that of the diametric space of inversion. The function of atonement, of a kind of debtor–creditor relationship, is one of a diametric mirror image inversion. Otherness as substitute is within the diametric structure of sacrifice for atonement.

Dionysus as a life-bearing principle is, in Kerenyi's words, turned to death through the sacrificial rites. Again, this is a diametric mirror image reversal. Moreover, Kerenyi refers to the 'subterranean Dionysus'[ccxv] as a reversal of life itself. The dual aspect of Dionysus, recognised explicitly by Kerenyi, is that of protector of life and killer of life in death. Kerenyi described this ritual realisation in Dionysian festivals: 'The

murder of the Divine Child was his reduction to an organ from which – or as which – he could be reawakened'.[ccxvi] This led to 'phallus processions and merry Dionysian festivals ... held throughout the Greek countryside' for the Dionysus of the Athenians,[ccxvii] 'the protector of life', 'the lord of all living creatures'.[ccxviii] These ritual sacrifices betray a clear diametric mirror image inversion structure – including a shift from passive receipt of the death of the child Dionysus to active perpetration of death of a sacrificial animal or child in the Dionysian rites. The community exerts a power over the suffering, even through its diametric structured mirror image ambivalence of concern and aggression towards the sacrificial animal, whether he-goat, bull or indeed child.

The will to power dimension of scapegoating through a Nietzschean lens imports a diametric structured mirror image above/below relation of hierarchy between the group and the victim. Scapegoating is the violent exertion of the power of the group upon an individual rendered powerless, and even killed. The group's will to power is a desire to dominate the other.

The diametric mirror image reversal structure of ambivalence is for Girard embedded into the social process of

scapegoating, 'the victim who was reviled two minutes before will come to be considered as divine. The malefactor becomes a benefactor'.[ccxix] In the 'archaic sacred', 'He or she is very often the subject of ritual insults. Then, right after being killed, he or she becomes good'.[ccxx] For Girard culture begins with the discovery of the saving power of the scapegoat with the sacred a displacement of the community violence. 'At one moment you turn a man into a god. The next minute you turn him into your victim and scapegoat'.[ccxxi] The diametric spatial function here is not only one of exclusion but also of mirror image structure of ambivalence, the reversal from god to scapegoat and vice versa, in Girard's foundation of culture.

The Double Bind as Diametric Spatial Mirror Image Reverse Symmetry

Girard expressly links mimetic desire to Bateson's double bind. Girard states, "You receive the command "imitate me" and at the same time there is another command which is "do not imitate me"…the perfect form of the double bind is found in mimetic desire'[ccxxii] that transfers the group's hostilities onto an individual victim. Girard continues, "The individualistic guru

says, imitate me insofar as I am not an imitator. They put you in a double bind".[ccxxiii]

Family systems dynamics has long recognised the phenomenon of scapegoating, typically of the child who does not fit in with the consensus reality of the family as a group. Bateson's well-known concept of the double bind is a key insight here. This is where a split reverse reality takes place in the family dynamic, between an official and unofficial reality. So, for example, one child sees that their father is an alcoholic and states this honestly in the family group. The group represses this child's voice and completely denies and denigrates the truth of the child's lived experience. In doing so, the official and false reality of denial predominates to portray Daddy as drinking a lot but not in a problematic way or in being an alcoholic. Or in another example of a double bind, the official reality is that Mammy and Daddy are very happily married; the unofficial truth is that one or both are having an affair and it is the child that perceives the emotional reality of the family situation. The truthteller child as outsider, as system whistle blower, becomes the scapegoat in order to unite the family system dynamic in a common reality that suppresses the painful reality. The mental health impacts of these

scapegoating processes in the family dynamic are documented in the family systems dynamics tradition,[ccxxiv] while workplace examples of groups' uniting against a whistleblower are increasingly being recognised even by legislative protection of system whistleblowers.

Without necessarily endorsing an etiological role for the double bind in schizophrenia, as claimed by Bateson, though subsequently questioned,[ccxxv] nevertheless the double bind is a pertinent issue in family systems dynamics and beyond. The double bind in aspects of agency is highlighted in the paradox, 'You must be free, you must make your own choices'. The contradiction is that if you must be free, then you are not free.[ccxxvi] Bateson's systems focus in psychology defines the double bind as 'two contradictory injunctions at different levels of communication, involving two parties or entities, where it is not possible either to name the contradiction or to escape it'.[ccxxvii] It is a systemic mode of communication and need not involve two persons. In spatial terms, these are foreground/background splits or knots as reversals, a diametric mirror image inversion between the different relative levels of descriptions.

Double binds as mirror image reversals are applied to education by Bateson: 'learning a piece of the majority culture that makes you a betrayer of your family', 'the system proclaims the legitimacy of questioning – but only up to a point and then punishes it'.[ccxxviii] Similarly, Du Bois uncovers the phenomenon of many African Americans' double consciousness, as being pressured to look at oneself through the eyes of others, a diametric spatial split identity of being torn asunder. Diametric space as mirror image inversion offers a combinatory relational principle to bring together Bateson's double bind and Du Bois' double consciousness; diametric space offers two opposing forces splitting the identity of the individual in spatial relational terms, a splitting in relation to both others and self.

Bateson's double bind again bears all the hallmarks of diametric space. The individual or child expressing the unpalatable unofficial system reality is placed in an oppositional and exclusionary space of relation. The official reality of the family is diametrically opposed to the unofficial one (Daddy is either an alcoholic or not, One of the parents is or is not having an affair), as mirror image inversions. These double binds tend to operate in closed systems, shut off from

wider interactions; closure and noninteraction with background environment is again a diametric spatial system feature in contrast to the relative openness and interaction of concentric spaces of relation. New stimuli as wider voices or experiences are firmly resisted by this closed structure of the diametric family system dynamic as these might fluidate and hence, destabilise the forced rigidity of the official system realities and practices. Preserving this system 'team' brings also the imitative feeling to whitewash empathy with the scapegoat victim.

In the family system double bind, the family marshals all its resources to subjugate the recalcitrant individual member that threatens the very viability of its existence. Scapegoating here is not to kill but to stop the wider family system from being killed or at least dismantled in its current form. The scapegoaters' fear of being killed as a group is not clearly expressed by Girard's characterisation. However, it is implied in Girard's account of scapegoating that the society kills the scapegoat as an ordering principle – in other words, to stop itself, as a society, being killed. Laing's account of schizoid experience expresses this more directly, treating denial of being as a means of preservation of being,[ccxxix] kill to

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avoid being killed. This diametric spatial mirror image reversal of killing to stop being killed is at the heart of scapegoating, an ontological insecurity as assumed separation of distrust of its own future being, its own further survival and existence that is a further layer within this spatialisation process. The double bind system adds this other layer more explicitly regarding scapegoating that the family can be killed by the child and hence it seeks to crush the child, whereas it is not the actual scapegoat in Girard's rituals or in the Dionysian that directly threatens the society; any proxy scapegoat can serve this function of being killed to ensure the society survives, the actual threat to the coherence of the group is not the scapegoat itself.

The diametric spatial structures of exclusion, opposition, mirror image reversals of us/them and above/below hierarchy and closure all help the formation and sustenance of the process of scapegoating in a given system. Though these are far from being ineluctable, nonmalleable relational spaces, a system jolt is often needed to disrupt and dissolve the fixed comforts of diametric space in a movement towards concentric spatial systems of relation based on

connection and relative openness to unravel the strategy of scapegoating.

Scapegoating to Avoid Violence of Monism

The question arises as to the relation between processes of scapegoating and those of alienation, interpreted broadly as with Fromm as the turning of a person into an object, as a reifying process (not simply as alienation through work).[ccxxx] Both are processes bringing a dehumanising loss of subjectivity to the other rendered as object. While scapegoating may be more extreme than alienation, as an actual killing of the other, nevertheless at another level of description it can be construed as an interim process for the pure thinghood of alienation. Scapegoats are animate and made inanimate, not only through being killed but through being dehumanised. In the reification process of alienation, objects are inanimate and humans are made into these objects, humans are turned into machines as a more psychological form of killing their subjectivity.

Scapegoats are both physical and relational victims, while Girard emphasises that death is a goal of the

scapegoating group. This again may be questioned as being the sole goal of the group in all scapegoating processes, as an overstatement by Girard. Alienation may be a less obvious process than scapegoating, being a more surreptitious phenomenon. Scapegoating may be tied to more obvious events, whereas alienation is more a series of microsteps towards dehumanisation as a process more than event. Both scapegoating and alienation hinge on the gelid axis of disconnection and closure in diametric space, as recurrent processes in human experiences and societies.

Girard's account of scapegoating as a structuring of violence for a society is resonant with Hegel's self-other relation in the master/slave dialectic.[ccxxxi] Here Hegel treats the diametric structured master/slave opposition as itself being a development from one of pure violence and killing through at least some recognition of mutuality. Williams' reading of Hegel observes that the mirror image inverted opposites of master/slave amounts to some development, though highly limited, over raw violence:

> Note that master and slave, as miserable an institution as it is, nevertheless represents a relative ethical-

cultural advance over the sheer slaughter that would take place…Odd as it may seem, master and slave is a 'positive' development in that violence is stopped short of murder. Thus master/slave represents a cultural development away from sheer savagery and violence. However, while master/slave may represent a restraint upon violence, it also institutionalizes violence. Violence is *aufgehoben*, preserved, in the fundamental inequality of recognition: the master is recognized by the slave but does not reciprocally recognize the slave.[ccxxxii]

In spatial terms, a diametric spatial opposition here is, on this reading of Hegel, a development from mere monistic fusion, from the chaos and anarchy of a complete loss of structure in monism, bringing a free for all, so to speak, of violence and killing. Monism is not an expansion of experience as obliteration of all boundaries into a sea of fusion. Rather it is a one-sided victory for one pole of a diametric spatial opposition, the master kills the slave or the slave kills the master. Monism is an imbalance within diametric spatial

opposition, a limit horizon of diametric space where one pole fully subjugates the other.

The societal ordering function of scapegoats accentuated by Girard is resonant with a fear of freedom in case this diametric spatial closed system was to break up or be dissolved. For Girard, the loss of this ordering principle risks a society engaging in more violence, in more disparate and chaotic ways, rather than in the channelled violence towards the scapegoat. Similarly, the certainty of the closed diametric spatial structure of experience brings a fear of the freedom of change to this structure, as freedom may bring a worse situation than the 'devil you know'. De Tocqueville, directly invoked by Girard,[ccxxxiii] expresses a similar concern regarding the most dangerous period for an unpopular government being when it tries to reform. At an individual level, the diametric spatial system of closure ordering experience offers a security of a particular kind, a habitual familiarity. Sociologist Kohn interprets this in social class terms as a fear of change,[ccxxxiv] as change can make things worse. This social class reading is somewhat questionable as ability to take risks may occur for those with less to lose.

At an individual psychological level, Girard's overgeneralisation of one motivation for scapegoating, namely as a violence to maintain social order, must be strongly questioned. It is psychologically facile to propose one simple motivation for any given behaviour rather than treat scapegoating motivation as a compound process. Rothschild et al. conducted a range of studies to analyse individual motivation for scapegoating in terms of reducing guilt and increasing individual control.[ccxxxv] While recognising different perspectives in the psychological literature historically regarding scapegoating as an issue of personal or social identity, as an individual or group process, Rothschild et al. conclude:

> These results suggest that when individuals are confronted with a negative outcome framed as the result of their own harmful actions, they scapegoat in response to elevated feelings of personal guilt; when the cause of the harm is unknown, they scapegoat to compensate for decreased perceptions of personal control.[ccxxxvi]

Guilt and control are part of Girard's conception of scapegoating through violence though treated as a group phenomenon of mimetic desire; individual control could be construed as an aspect of the wider societal control function proposed by Girard.

Rothschild et al. state that their results do not comment directly on whether projection is involved in scapegoating. However, they do not consider projection as a phenomenon of diametric and concentric spatial projections.[ccxxxvii] Control and loss of control is a clear diametric mirror image symmetry of active/passive framing motivation, as is the group desire for violence and othering. The question of scapegoating requires examination as an issue of structure, process, social collective function and individual motivation. It is not being claimed that diametric space infiltrates all individual motivations for scapegoating, for example, the question must be left open for guilt and its relation to diametric spaces of emotion and experience. Nevertheless, the diametric oppositional feature of scapegoating as a process and as a function in a social group is arguably embedded in such relational spaces of physical and symbolic violence, as well as mirror image ambivalence and

above/below hierarchy, as a supporting precondition in some manifestations including the Dionysian myth regarding sacrificial rituals. A corollary of this is that concentric spaces of assumed connection, care and compassion are supporting conditions for alternative modes of human motivation and behaviour than scapegoating; they presuppose a basic nonviolence as assumed connection.[ccxxxviii]

In his interrogation of the other as *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*, it is striking how Kearney explicitly conceptualises in spatial terms, in his quest to 'explore further the spaces between polarities'[ccxxxix] and how, in doing so, a central thread in his thought is to challenge diametric spatial oppositions. He criticises 'overhasty acts of binary exclusion',[ccxl] problematising 'borderlands separating Us from Others',[ccxli] recognising further spatial divisions into pure/unpure.[ccxlii] His thinking here is replete with spatial understandings and assumptions pertaining to inclusion and exclusion, connection and separation, openness and closure. Moreover, his proposed 'diacritical hermeneutics' seeks a more nuanced connective dimension than the 'romantic hermeneutics' (endorsed by Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Gadamer) of sheer unity between self and other and the

'radical' hermeneutics (of Caputo, inspired by deconstructive approaches of Derrida, Blanchot and Lyotard) of assumed separation and splitting between self and other, in an 'irreducible difference and separation' as part of an 'unmediatable' alterity.[ccxliii] His questioning seeks a *via media* between 'collapse into sameness or exile itself into some inaccessible alterity',[ccxliv] a position that is ripe for construal in spatial background frames of monism (collapse into sameness) and diametric spatial splitting of assumed separation (exile).

While Kearney acknowledges Lévi-Strauss' accounts of binary oppositions, he does not explicitly draw on the counterpole to diametric space identified by Lévi-Strauss (for social and physical structures more than myths), namely, concentric spaces of relatively more openness and interaction with background. However, Kearney is seeking a more open mode of spatially imbued experiences as he 'accept[s] a certain decentering of the ego when opening the self to the novel'.[ccxlv]

It would appear that Kearney's search for 'a compassionate understanding of others'[ccxlvi] as well as for a 'distinct but not incompatible'[ccxlvii] relation is strongly resonant with concentric spatial relations as a space of compassion,[ccxlviii]

as well as one where concentric space offers a relation between polarities of assumed connection (around a common centre, a co-centre) that nevertheless, retains a distinction between the poles. This amplification of concentric space goes further than Lévi-Strauss, not only in examining its domain of relevance for phenomenology but also in expanding the range of relative differences between concentric and diametric spatial systems in terms of contrasts between assumptions of connection and separation in geometric terms. Akin to Kearney's search for a movement beyond the Scylla of monistic reduction and the Charybdis of diametric mirror image binary oppositions, a range of Nietzsche's fundamental concepts are susceptible to a spatial-phenomenological critique, as being largely locked into either monistic or diametric spatial frames.[ccxlix]

It is arguable that Kearney's work here is to be situated as part of a spatial turn for hermeneutics and phenomenology. His central understandings and concerns for a diacritical hermeneutics are thoroughly spatially imbued and invoke a connective, more open space that nevertheless allows for distinction between self and other. Even if Kearney does not explicitly frame such space as a concentric spatial-relational

quest, he is clearly seeking a transitional mode of interpretation and experience that mediates between monistic collapse of identity and an exclusionary oppositional diametric spatial us versus them – a transitional mode of interpretation and experience that is spatially involved as a background horizon of understanding to potentially inform a spatial turn for hermeneutics and phenomenology.

CHAPTER 5

Othering as an Embedding in Physical Space to Challenge Cartesian Splits between the Material and Symbolic: Building from Bourdieu's *Berber House* to School Systems of Exclusion

Diametric Spatial Othering Embedded in Place for Bourdieu's Berber House

It is important to shed the Cartesian mantle imposed upon space that characterises space as being either physical or symbolic, either physical or relational. It is both. The symbolisms of power relations, for example, can be physically instantiated in space. However, just because relational space can be physically embedded, this is not to state that it must always be physically embodied. Relational spaces of concentric and diametric systems are not simply reducible to space as place, though they can be and are often manifested in physical places. A notable feature of Massey's[ccl] interrogation of space in the domain of geography is to expand space beyond mere place. There is a wider appreciation needed that while space is embedded in places, place is not the only apparel to clothe space.

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A prominent example of this kind of interlocking scheme of diametric spatial oppositions and reversals seeped into shared meanings of place in domestic settings is evident from Bourdieu's *The Berber House or the World Reversed*, in his chapter *Festschrift* for Lévi-Strauss. Here diametric space is physically embedded in place, othering has a physical spatial dimension.

Diametric mirror image inversions of relational space can be physically instantiated, as is evident from Bourdieu's detailed account of such oppositions and power relations in *The Berber House,* including those between upper/lower, day/night, private/social, male/female, inside/outside. Bourdieu observes a cluster of spatial associations in the Berber House that are mutually entwined diametric oppositions of reversal:

> The low and dark part of the house is also opposed to the high part as the feminine is to the masculine: besides the fact that the division of work between the sexes, entrusts to the woman the responsibility of most objects which belong to the dark part of the

house – water-transport, and the carrying of wood and manure, for instance...[ccli]

Bourdieu goes further to uncover diametric spatial oppositions between inside and outside, again framed in gender terms:

the opposition between the upper part and the lower part reproduces within the space the house the opposition set up between the inside and the outside. This is the opposition between female space and male space, between the house and the garden...on the one hand, the privacy of all that is intimate, on the other the open space of social relations; on the one hand, the life of the senses and feelings, on the other, the life of relations between man and man, the life of dialogue and exchange.[cclii]

These diametric splits are resonant with a Cartesian division between mind and emotion, mind and the senses of the body, leading further to a domesticity/marketplace opposition along rigid diametric spatial lines.

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The strengths of Bourdieu's spatial analysis of diametric spatial oppositions in the house microsystem also betrays a weakness at another level of the need for further interrogation of these spatial arrangements as products of socio-historical societal arrangements linked to gender, industrialisation and the division of labour. For example, Hobsbawn's historical account of late nineteenth century industrialisation in the Western world recognises a 'drastic' effect of industrialisation on women. In contrast to an agriculturally focused economy where all the family contributed to labour on the farm, late nineteenth century industrialisation 'separated the household from the place of work. And in doing so it largely excluded [women] from the publicly recognised economy'.[ccliii] Diametricisation of space in forms of place and beyond place is socio-historically embedded and the levels of explanation of these processes may depend on the paradigm goals for analysis in a given discipline. A common criticism of Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology in general is its underplaying of the socio-historical dimension of change for given empirical observations.

The alliance of space with trajectories of cultural forces based on gender, class and ethnicity can scarcely be denied. Hobsbawn exposes the spatial concomitants of wider political forces impacting on gender divisions and power in late nineteenth century Europe, 'politics became essentially a man's affair, to be discussed in the inns and cafes, where men gathered or at meetings attended by them, while the women were confined to that part of life which was private and personal'.[ccliv] This diametric spatial division organised around gender lines in late nineteenth century industrialised society in Europe was a stark contrast with what preceded, as Hobsbawn articulates:

> In the popular politics of pre-industrial societies which ranged from the pressure of village opinion through riots in favour of the old "moral economy", to revolutions and barricades, poor women at least had not only a part but a recognised role. It had been the women of Paris who marched on Versailles to express the people's demand for controlled food prices to the king in the French Revolution. In the era of [political]

parties and general elections, they were pushed into the background.[cclv]

With such examples of diametric spatial divisions in the allocation of public and private spaces by gender, it is tempting to treat the spatial dimension as being mere decoration upon the driving forces of economics and gender relations. Space as place may tend to be treated here as being a mere epiphenomenon, at least as it pertains to place.

What are at stake here are different lenses of analysis. A causal socio-historical focus will clearly prioritise economics and gender over the relevance of space, at least for space as place. Yet another vantage point is possible, one that focuses on space as a sustaining condition for the continuity of social systems. It is a malleable system condition feature impinging on causal trajectories. This system condition malleability for space is also pertinent to individual experience treated itself as a spatial system projected into the world.

Bourdieu's account of space here treats gender as the driving principle of diametric spatial opposition and reversal; gender is the organising principle of place in this particular cultural context. However, this is not to underplay other

potential driving forces for physically embedded diametric spatial oppositions such as along social class and ethnicity lines in other cultural contexts of place. These are important avenues for future spatial questioning, including in school spaces as a whole and as distinct microspaces within a school, such as the classroom and yard.

A further question arises as to whether diametric space can of itself propagate its own systemic force or whether in a given cultural context of place, it is merely a vehicle for prior processes based on gender, class, ethnicity etc. A three-year ethnographic study identifies how male teenage street gangs in Chicago divide into diametric structured opposition in their communication, even though there is no tangible reason for the content of these oppositions such as ethnic, socio-economic, racial or regional differences.[cclvi] This points to diametric spatial systems as a self-organising movement, as a force of its own as a space, rather being simply a means to other power related identity processes.

This US ethnographic study observed that 'there are hundreds of gangs in Chicago, but all of them align with one of two Nations: People or Folks',[cclvii] emphasising that 'the division between the two Nations, People and Folks, is

absolutely arbitrary and constructed'.[cclviii] This is a division more in relational space than necessarily in physical spaces as place. Nevertheless, it does point to diametric spatial systems as a self-propagating principle of its own, not necessarily diametrically split from for example, economic forces, but nevertheless as active organising spatial processes of experience, social relations and communication.

While Brand's account of white spatial imaginaries points to important issues of colonialism embedded in places,[cclix] the question arises as to space being simply a vehicle for a prior identity as its driving force, such as gender, race etc. While these gendered and racialised associations with space and place, including diametric space, are a key lens for analysis and critique of power relations and injustices in education and wider society, the argument for current purposes is that space is more fundamental than particular socio-historically constructed identities. Space is a systemic driving forces of its own, manifested in diametric and concentric terms. While diametric space and empty space are being associated with Western space and Cartesianism and Lockean histories, as well as Roman colonialism in diametric oppositions between nature and culture,[cclx] this is not to excise

diametric space from cultures beyond the West or to simply associate concentric spaces with Eastern and wider non-Western cultures. Concentric and diametric spatial systems and projections of experience are being treated as embedded in human experience, as part of the human condition, as a governing principle of being, of being human and wider existence.

Directly resonant with Lévi-Strauss' account of diametric structured oppositions, Bourdieu expressly uses the term 'mirror image' as 'inversion',[cclxi] while recognising a hierarchical aspect to these reversals, 'The two symmetrical and inverse spaces are not interchangeable but hierarchised, the internal space being nothing but the inverted image or the mirror-reflection of the male space'.[cclxii] Bourdieu excavates further physically instantiated divisions that offer a diametric function associated with power symbolism referring to 'the centre of the dividing wall' as governing 'all the framework of the house'.[cclxiii] This 'main beam, which supports the roof, is identified with the protector of the family honour; sacrifices are often made to it…'.[cclxiv] The physicality of these divisions, of these diametric oppositions and reversals colonising the space of the Berber House in its thoroughness and detail points to a

vital dimension of questioning regarding similar physically embedded divisions as diametric spaces of exclusion in schools in terms of place and symbolism. In doing so, this is to recognise other examples of gender symbolism and physical space as diametric oppositions, such as documented in Carthagena, Columbia.[cclxv]

Building on Du Bois, Brand treats space as both material and symbolic, while recognising that 'space is a site and means through which racial oppressions are worked out'.[cclxvi] A focus on the propagation of diametric spatial segregations invites recognition that such intertwined physical and symbolic segregation may take place within the school and not only between schools. In a US context, it is recognised that:

> 'school integration' can mean children entering the same building in the morning, but then other structural arrangements and school policies resegregate the student body by race and class . . . more attention needs to be made to the places within the school that facilitate or inhibit social interactions

related to ERI (Ethnic/Racial Identity) development.[cclxvii]

This is tantamount to an appeal for specific challenge to diametric spatial processes of exclusion through segregation that may be occurring officially or unofficially in schools, and for development of concentric spaces of assumed connection, as social interaction opportunities. Moreover, it may also take place on social class lines of division. It is arguable that these concerns need to be taken further to focus not only on 'places within the school' bringing segregation processes but also on the relational spaces that may not be simply placed based. Relational spaces of concentric and diametric structures go beyond the Cartesian divide between the physical and relational.

Typical criticisms of Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology in general include that its 'birds' eye' view of cultures does not explore the lived experiences of subjective and different meanings of people in these cultures. This influenced a shift led by Geertz[cclxviii] towards cultural anthropology. A related concern is the lack of change, the dearth of a socio-historical vantage point in the pervasive,

purportedly fundamental structures described by Lévi-Strauss across different cultural contexts. Derrida makes a range of similar criticisms of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism.[cclxix]

It is against this backdrop that criticisms occur of Bourdieu's account of diametric spatial oppositions and reversals in *The Berber House*. Thus, a psychological account of domestic space in an Italian middle-class context seeks a more dynamic focus on lived experiences and interpersonal active 'negotiations' of space:

> Bourdieu does not offer an account of the manner in which the said oppositions are constructed and instituted, most importantly, he treats symbolic systems as being fixed, so that, although they do 'in practice' regenerate themselves, their transformative and inventive nature is neglected.[cclxx]

This critique is an important call for a phenomenology of space, of lived experiences of individuals. Going further it is important to recognise that diametric space can be interrogated for individual's experience and also that it is being construed, even by Lévi-Strauss, not in isolation but as

part of a wider dynamic system of interaction with concentric spatial systems. So even within Lévi-Strauss' structuralist framework that does not include a phenomenological dimension, change is incorporated, at least in restricted fashion in terms of shifts between interacting concentric and diametric spatial systems.

Going further, it is important to distinguish two levels in phenomenological approaches[cclxxi] – firstly the listening process in qualitative research to hear the lived experiences and voices of individuals and secondly, some analysis of the patterns, the commonalities and contrasts through different vantage points of perspective, to examine meaningful psychological, educational, anthropological and sociological lessons from these patterns of similarity and difference. It is within this second level of analysis that a spatial-phenomenology to examine diametric and concentric spaces, including change between them as potentially dynamic spatial processes, becomes meaningful. In other words, without seeking to defend the wider structuralist paradigm of Lévi-Strauss, this particular spatial systemic aspect of concentric and diametric spaces is relevant to system change processes regarding inclusion and exclusion, in education and wider

community spaces and beyond. Put simply, the lived experiences concern of cultural anthropology and much of qualitative research in psychology is complementary with the further level of spatial structural interrogation in phenomenological and wider terms.

Diametric Spaces of Othering in Social Class Terms in Education and Local Communities

Recognising the artificial construction of space as empty invites further interrogation of hierarchical spatial understandings as not simply being merely metaphors but as real system spatial conditions impacting on schools and societal macrosystems. Again, the above-below opposition requires recognition as exhibiting a diametric spatial system process of opposition. Diametric space is a system condition underpinning not only othering but also hierarchy; othering and hierarchy are conjoined through diametric space as a condition embedded in systems such as schools that leads to exclusionary structures and processes.

These physical manifestations of diametric spatial us/them hierarchies are translated into an educational context of poverty in the phenomenological accounts of early school

leavers in Limerick, Ireland.[cclxxii] Teacher favouritism and its corollary of social class-based discrimination was notably distilled into a specific diametric spatial arrangement in the classroom, where those from backgrounds experiencing poverty were put to the 'back of the class' in the seating arrangements, according to Blackett's interviewees:

> "There was fear in the classrooms and when you hadn't that kind of spark you were put to the back and they concentrated on the other kids that could perform and the favourites were put to the top of the class" (Female, mid 50's).

> "If you weren't quick enough or smart enough you were put to the back of the class" (Male, mid 40's).

> "...I was just lazy, so they put me to the back of the class" (Female, mid 20's).

> "I was always in the front but when he came in [particular teacher] he would put me to the back of

the class, he just didn't like me and I didn't like him"
(Male, 20) [cclxxiii]

This diametric mirror image front/back inscribed in
the physical space of the classroom is explicitly described as a
manifestation of social class divisions: According to one
participant the children most likely to be put to the 'back of
the class' were those from communities in Limerick city with
high levels of social exclusion:

> 'I went to secondary for a month I will never forget it,
> because we were from Weston she started tormenting
> us from one day to the next. She would say go back
> there ye! And we were put to the back of the class. We
> didn't exist as far as she was concerned. It was class
> distinction, they only wanted people from the more
> posh areas, whereas they roared at us and talked
> down to us' (Female, mid 40's). [cclxxiv]

This was a pervasive theme in other respondents' accounts:

'I was always good in school but when we were young the classes were so big and those whose mothers and fathers were working were up at the front and those at the back were just forgotten about. So that was the mentality back then of the teachers' (Female, late 40's).

'The nearest row inside the door all the girls from Corbally, the yuppies…and the last row was for the people from St. Mary's Park, what we call the Island Field (Female, mid 50's).[cclxxv]

The mirror image inverted symmetry of diametric space was directly constelled in the classroom seating arrangements and symbolic power, where the wealthier students were consistently placed in the front rows and the students from backgrounds of high poverty placed in the back rows. This diametric spatial mirror image oppositions had implications also for teacher engagement and attention for students, as expressed in these words on the teacher: 'She was more interested in rows one, but two got a bit of time as well' (Female, mid 50's).[cclxxvi] The last rows were embedded in a

diametric spatial structure of exclusion in the classroom systemic communication environment, as a concrete embodiment of social snobbery by teachers. Hierarchy becomes constellated as a diametric spatial process of mirror image good/bad labels, success/failure, rich/poor.

Industrial schools in Ireland offer another example of diametric spaces of exclusion embedded in institutions' places and practices.[cclxxvii] A distinctive diametric spatial projection was a feature of a dimension of practice accentuated by a Catholic dominated state and fuelled by a diametric spatial cognition that divided people into those that are 'fallen' and particularly associated with perceptions of sinfulness rather than virtue[cclxxviii]. First opened in Ireland in 1765 and by no means exclusive to Irish society, the Magdalene institutions became over time long-term residential places. Focus, for current purposes, is on a pervasive diametric splitting structure of exclusion in these institutions, as part of a religious ideology of a mirror image diametric good-bad projection, where the women were treated as 'fallen' sinners. Women and so-called 'bastard' children were both 'incarcerated for transgressing the narrow moral code of the time',[cclxxix] while the same religious congregations managed

the orphanages, reformatory schools and laundries. Thus, these facilities all helped sustain each other – girls from the reformatory and industrial schools often ended up working their entire lives in the Magdalen laundries.[cclxxx]

It is to be recognised that allegations of abuse were not simply confined to the Catholic Magdalene laundries but also to Protestant (Bethany) and State-run Irish Industrial schools. These physically spatial dividing practices were pervaded by a diametric exclusion from family, often for a lifetime:

> A different woman said she didn't receive any visitors "I never saw my mam. My aunt said the nuns told her I was quite happy there".[cclxxxi]

> A different woman, who was placed in a Magdalen Laundry as a young girl shortly following her discharge from industrial school, said "It was devastating to hear that door locked and I was never ever to walk out. There was a big wall. I knew I was there for life. When that door was locked my life ended. I never moved on from there".[cclxxxii]

Diametric space as physical exclusion was manifested through examples such as the following:

> "Entrance gates to the grounds of the convent were locked at night. External doors to all buildings were also locked for security reasons. Dormitory doors were locked to prevent people moving about the buildings. Designated sisters held the keys and were on duty during the night to ensure safety, access to toilets and to prevent someone running away".[cclxxxiii]

The Ryan report also highlights a diametric splitting in location and from family, as a key feature of Letterfrack residential Industrial School, run by the Christian Brothers when it was open from 1887 to 1974:

> The physical location of Letterfrack in remote Connemara created a very real sense of isolation, felt by both the boys and the Brothers in the School. The surrounding region could not supply the number of boys needed for the School, and most of the children

sent there came from many miles away. This created obvious difficulties for families wishing to visit their children. The isolated environment in Letterfrack nurtured an institutionalised culture separate from society and other institutions. It also led to another unforeseen problem: those people who chose to abuse boys physically and sexually were able to do so for longer periods of time, because they could escape detection and punishment by reason of the isolated environment in which they operated[cclxxxiv]

Further examples of diametric spaces as physical places at local community level emerges from research in South West Inner City Dublin in 2007, an area of high poverty. With regard to St. Teresa's Gardens, an apartment block in South Inner City Dublin, O'Connor noted in 2002 that "The layout of the complex encourages exclusion from all the surrounding area".[cclxxxv] She cites the words of a Dublin Corporation report which refers to "The segregation of these flats and estates from their surrounding areas".[cclxxxvi] She also highlights that children attend a large variety of schools in the

local area and there is not an obvious connection between area of residence and the school children attend.

Brudell, in 2005, also identified the extremely limited percentage of public open space in the area:

> While the southwest inner city does contain two recently constructed community facilities – Donore Avenue Hall and St. Catherine's Sports Centre – it should be noted that the provision of such facilities takes place within a quarter of the city, which contains a miniscule amount (5.6%) of public open space. Such a finding must be of concern to all those concerned with the health and well-being of adults and young people living in one of the most densely populated areas in the state[cclxxxvii]

Common community spaces of assumed connection as concentric space were minimal. This theme of fragmentation across different parts of South West Inner City Dublin was noted by a large number of people interviewed in a 2007 community consultation:

"Fragmentation is a disaster" - "Thomas St. is a dividing road" - "Liberties festival too focused on Meath St. and Thomas St." - "Used to be 7 a sides across the different communities, Donore, Teresa's, Fatima, Oliver Bond, James St., Francis St., in the late 80s and early 90s, held on the football pitch in Basin Lane" - "Very territorial, break down insular views" - "Everything in this area is political with a small "p" "
cclxxxviii

Features of these community spaces as diametric spaces of splitting, opposition and closure are further evident in these quotes from local respondents:

"Chronic divisiveness, in local community, small things that happen in the community can be blown up" "Ghetto mentality, unsafe if go outside, no big public space, lacking in town planning, very little parks, greenery" "The Liberties is a series of villages, for people in the Liberties 100 yards is a great distance, even streets that might be adjacent are a distance away" - "Communities don't interfere with each other,

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there was an unwritten agreement about who was running them" - James's – "two main communities go there and then they start fighting and all…" [cclxxxix]

These diametric spatial systems are infiltrated with an us versus them opposition of othering:

"Even in pubs today there would be a crew from that place, that place and this place" - "It's jealousy…which flats are better and which flats are harder." - "They come from all different places, the kids here don't go up there"[ccxc]

It is evident that there is a real lack of shared public spaces in this inner city Dublin area, spaces where young people from all parts of the area could feel they belong to them and are not associated with being the territory solely of "others" in the area. In other words, there is a dearth of concentric spaces of mediation to bring assumed connection while recognising differences. Other common private spaces, such as a shopping centre, is also lacking for adults and young people in the area:

There is a lack of a shopping centre, cinema, bowling alley, pool hall, etc that could serve as a shared space for young people in the area. While there are many buildings called "centres" in the area there is no centre designed for the area which would be a shared public space. The individual centres usually require prearranged visits, with limited opportunity for "drop in" spaces, especially for youth between 14-18. There are good reasons for this due to the need to have adequate ratios between adult staff and young people in a given centre. Nevertheless, shared spaces in the community, such as a shopping centre, cinema etc., would offer the virtue of allowing young people to visit and spend time in places without significant levels of planning in advance[ccxci]

Others interviewed agreed that schools are a shared space in the area, at least potentially, as children from different parts of the area attend them. Schools offer the potential to be concentric mediating spaces of assumed connection in this area.

Diametric and Concentric Spaces as Phenomenological Projections: Fundamental Structures of Exclusion and Inclusion Giorgi et al.'s account of lived experiences of eight Italian middleclass families regarding domestic space identify 'symbolic actions that are always oriented towards drawing boundaries between the self and others'[ccxcii] in the 'conquest' of space,[ccxciii] for example the condominium terrace. They also refer to 'residence of power and predominance'[ccxciv] in relation to household members' individual constructions of space. Giorgi et al. characterise the spatial concerns with boundaries, demarcations and thresholds as needing the 'permanently substituting the fluid concept of "appropriation" for the static qualities commonly associated with "territoriality"'.[ccxcv] This is part of a concern with 'relational dynamics' for spatial negotiations and to include an affective dimension to spatial representations. They very much accept that 'the spaces of the house are discursively constructed as an expression of someone's prevailing identity'.[ccxcvi] This incorporation of dynamic changing relations in space, of affect and identity related themes of belonging and connection, as well as differentiation are all dimensions pertinent to concentric and

diametric spatial systems of relation in relation, in dynamic interplay.

Going further, a phenomenological account of concentric and diametric spaces as projections, building on psychoanalytic and Jungian understandings of these terms[ccxcvii], is also resonant with the cultural anthropological focus on subjective experiences of individuals as 'the complex system of projections onto domestic space',[ccxcviii] namely, projections onto physical spaces identified by Giorgi et al.'s qualitative research. Yet the spatial-phenomenological claim for projection takes an additional step to treat this as a projection *of* systems of space and not simply a projection *onto* systems of space. Giorgi et al. describe lived experiences of physical domestic places in terms tantamount to the closure and assumed separation of diametric space, 'Born as projective islands and a defence from potential conflict, these kingdoms do not eliminate actual conflict but just make it either silent or "hidden"'.[ccxcix] This sealed space from background is not characterised by them explicitly as a diametric spatial projection though it betrays these key features of diametric space as a closed fortress from background interaction, as a defensive retreat in space away

from the more open, porous boundaries of concentric spatial interaction with background (directly recognised by Lévi-Strauss).

Said expressly conceives of othering as a 'projection' of Western culture onto the East 'Once we begin to think of Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient ...'.[ccc] In doing so, this invites a further level of examination of the dimensions to such projections, including spatial dimensions. Said also acknowledges the need for an understanding that not only deconstructs manipulative projections, but also seeks for expansive, open projections and relations, 'Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non repressive and nonmanipulative, perspective'.[ccci] Alternatives to the diametric spatial us/them projection need to be sought in specifically spatial terms, though Said does not take this extra spatial step of treating spatial projections as underlying abstract categories or essences.

The early Foucault postulates a fundamental structure of exclusion, a background structural dimension that

separated the supposedly 'mad' from the apparently reasonable. Confinement was merely one dimension of this process of development of the structure of exclusion in the seventeenth century:

> Confinement was merely the visible phenomenon on the surface of this deeper process, and an integral part of the whole of classical culture. There were certain experiences that the sixteenth century had either accepted or refused, formulated or sidelined, which were now taken up by the seventeenth century and grouped together and banished *en masse*, exiling them together with madness, creating a uniform world of Unreason.[cccii]

Foucault conceptualises, in effect, in diametric spatial terms both regarding the 'structure of exclusion' as a structure of assumed separation furnishing mirror image inversions in 'the binary structure of classical unreason (truth and error, world and fantasy, being and non-being, Day and Night)'.[ccciii] He treats what amounts to a diametric spatial structure as burgeoning at a distinct point in history, in the seventeenth

century. Yet, in developing this supposedly central argument, Foucault neither clarified the opposite to such a structure of exclusion, i.e., a structure of inclusion, nor explicitly considered other candidate structures of exclusion from other periods of history, nor cultures beyond Western ones.[ccciv] Early Foucault's concerns with a fundamental structure of exclusion is resonant with De Beauvoir's treatment of othering as a fundamental category of consciousness. While Foucault's later concerns moved away from structure to historically shifting discourses of exclusion, these concerns are not opposing but are rather different levels of description, different aspects for scrutiny.

CHAPTER 6

Beyond Diametric Space as the Othering of Nature in Society and Education: Descola's Movement Beyond Nature Versus Culture

The Covid-19 global pandemic and lockdowns 2020-2023 has challenged humanity's basic assumptions of space. This occurs most obviously with social distancing and options to work from home in a range of occupations. Spatial habits of experience are being thrown open into a destabilising flux. This has also intensified focus on the importance of children and young people's spatial access to nature and the social inequities of lockdown where many may have very limited access to parks, rivers, beaches and other greenery.

It is perhaps tempting to link the process of excising nature from school to the largescale shifts towards urbanisation over the past two centuries, to treat it as a problem of place more than relational space. In the words of Hobsbawn:

In 1848 the population of the world, even of Europe, still consisted overwhelmingly of countrymen. Even in

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Britain, the first industrialised economy, city-dwellers did not outnumber country-dwellers until 1851, and then only just (51 per cent). Nowhere else except in France, Belgium, Saxony, Prussia and the United States did more than one in ten of the population live in cities of 10,000 and over. By the middle and late 1870s this situation had been substantially modified, but with few exceptions the rural population still largely prevailed over the urban. So, for by far the greater part of humanity, the fortunes of life still depended on what happened to and on the land [cccv]

However, to simply focus on urbanization processes in recent centuries is to underplay the extent to which the nature-culture divide is seeped into and lodged within Western historical understandings. In structural anthropology, Descola uncovers how the diametric spatial split between nature and culture in Western traditions of understanding is one that emanates from ancient Rome:

This Roman landscape, together with all of the values associated with it that colonization had introduced

around cities as far away as the banks of the Rhine and in Britain, was the landscape that introduced the notion of a polarity between the wild and the domesticated that we still recognize today. This opposition is neither an objective representation of the properties of things nor an expression of a timeless human nature[cccvi]

Descola recognises that 'In China, India and Japan, it is hard to discover any dichotomy of "wild" and "domesticated" comparable to that which the Western world has forged'.[cccvii] This diametric spatial opposition between nature and culture is a construct, to some degree an artefact and it is one that has shaped the very boundaries and environments of many schools and educational presuppositions. Deconstructing this diametric space between nature and culture is still an issue that is only peripheral to social and emotional education concerns currently. However, a European Commission briefing paper recognises that nature is key for social emotional education as part of postpandemic response in education.[cccviii]

Descola's deconstruction of the diametric spatial split between nature and culture is part of an explicit critique he offers of modernity. He seeks:

> A way of conceiving the diversity of the principles of schematization of experience that is free of the preconceptions that modernity has led us to maintain regarding the state of the world.[cccix]

Descola is also seeking a broadening of the frames of experience, as part of a shift beyond Western constructs of modernity. Whereas in Blackett's [cccx] accounts from a Limerick, Ireland context, there is a consensus in the early school leavers' accounts of spatial divisions in school, leading to their exclusions and othering that is ripe for construal in diametric spatial terms, other Irish research in contexts of high poverty can describe different subjective experiences of local spaces and places in school that is also amenable to a second-layered analysis in terms of spatial-phenomenological concerns with diametric and concentric systems and processes. Phenomenology in psychology interrogates lived experiences, while a further structural concern is with abiding patterns to

these lived experiences. Massey seeks, for geography, what amounts to a phenomenology of space, as a 'concrete, grounded, real, lived' space[cccxi] as the first layer of description while also engaging with a further more structural level of analysis of space in terms of openness, closure, connections and separations. However, she does not relate these expressly to Lévi-Strauss' work on diametric and concentric structures as spaces.

Doyle's small scale qualitative research on five-year-old boys' experiences of space in a school of high poverty in inner city Dublin gives illustrative expression to this first phenomenological layer of documenting individuals' lived experiences of space through walking through their local neighbourhood. "I've never been this way before, it's like walking through another city" (Harvey, Walk 1).[cccxii] Doyle highlights the role of space for the children of connecting place with memory:

> From recalling where their dad's car broke down, to where they built a snowman, every place appeared to hold a story ready to be revealed. The children remembered these events in great detail and often

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with much fondness. When we arrived in Diamond
Park one of the children animatedly told us about
when he had his birthday in the park and pointed to
an exact spot on a ping pong table to inform us "I had
a cake right there" (Walk 3)[cccxiii]

Brady's small scale qualitative research on children's
experiences of a school garden in an urban school in an area
of high poverty in Dublin, highlighted perceived benefits by
the children pertinent to social and emotional education.[cccxiv]
Emerging themes from their voices are regarding improved
relational capacities, social connectedness, and inclusion due
to participation in the garden:

"[Child's name] used to always play tricks on me but
has stopped since the garden started. We get on way
better now" "Normally I wouldn't be friends with
[child's name] and [child's name], now we're starting
to be friends and we have more things in common"
(Emily, 8 yrs).

> "We're nicer to each other because we know each other more" as a result of participating in the school garden together (Leo, 8yrs).[cccxv]

There was also an improved motivation to learn stated by some children:

> "I got pupil of the week since I started doing the garden" (Conor, 8yrs).

> "after gardening I feel ready to learn" (James, 12yrs).[cccxvi]

The concentric spaces of assumed connection provided by the school gardens also brought reports of improved relaxation there:

> "You can think properly when you go back to class. Your mind isn't all fuzzy, it's straight and you can learn more when your mind is relaxed" (Yasmin, 11yrs).

"The garden makes me feel a bit more peaceful"
(Damien, 11yrs).

"If I go close to the plants, I have a good feeling. They
make me relax and be calm" (Ava, 8yrs).

"When I go back to class, I feel much more lighter and
better about myself" (Ava, 8yrs).

"Gardens are very calm places. Having one in school
gives us a place to relax" (Frank, 12yrs).[cccxvii]

Schools need to develop such spaces for wellbeing,
social development and treat them as relevant also to pupils'
learning capacities and expression of voice, as well as capacity
for interiority. A similar Irish small scale qualitative research
study of primary school pupils in a school of higher poverty
revealed benefits of hens for social and emotional education
of the pupils looking after hens in school.[cccxviii] This included
accounts of their developments in responsibility, empathy,
respect for the natural world, cooperation and relaxation.

The importance of nature was a strong theme in a phenomenological focus on spaces experienced by five-year-old boys in an area of high poverty in Dublin. The phenomenon of parks was observed as preferred spaces in the boys' accounts:

> Parks were by far the most referenced place. Indeed, only two children (Daniel and Conor) did not mention parks in any of the tasks. The local parks of Fairview Park, Diamond Park and Mountjoy Square Park were all mentioned by name.
>
> The type and quantity of resources available for play along with activities engaged in were the most cited reasons for preferring parks. Additionally, the children regularly referenced the emotional regulation programme in use in the school, zones of regulation, when talking about outdoor spaces [cccxix]

Doyle continues, raising themes directly pertinent to social and emotional education:

The children noticed the atmosphere within the parks and how that made them feel. Along with being fun places that "puts me in the yellow zone" (Walk 1), parks also provided a calming environment and Scott suggested that it would be nice to do meditation in the park (Walk 1)[cccxx]

A different potential benefit of such concentric spaces of assumed connection to nature in school is an implication of research on access to nature for young children and its influence on their motivation and learning in science. Controlling for other factors, the intense science-related interests of 4-year-old children predict the science self-concept and knowledge 4 years later, especially for girls.[cccxxi] This invites a focus on the experiences of young children of nature in their home and school environments, including outdoor education, as a key role for engaging their future educational interest in science and in developing basic skills in science. These natural environmental resources may include life science and nature (e.g., leaves, rotting logs, insects, animals and sea life, plants and trees) and Earth science (e.g., rocks and gems, bubbles, water, and the ocean).[cccxxii]

Studies of preschool- and schoolchildren exploring in a natural outdoor environment show that children's findings of natural elements and objects like e.g. insects, plants, rocks or puddles seem to interest and engage the children.[cccxxiii] Natural outdoor environment is here defined as an area outside the kindergarten or school's area that is largely unaffected by human intervention like e.g. a forest, river, or seashore-area. Natural outdoor environments offer possibilities for exploring science phenomena and elements that may be starting points for shared attention and exploration that may enhance question-asking of both lower and higher cognitive levels in the children for questions asked by children to their teachers in 2nd-4th grade, as well as in kindergartens.[cccxxiv] Natural outdoor environments offer an important source for providing children with knowledge of and experiences with science topics, as well as to stimulate the children's curiosity. Though in all the question-asking settings, it is important that the teacher follows up on the children's explorations,[cccxxv] with such teacher responsiveness also a key feature needed for maths learning.[cccxxvi] Providing the children with activities and tasks that are easy to accomplish and that offer some freedom in how to be performed, may facilitate the

children to ask questions about subject matter rather than practical questions. Moreover, activities that allow the children to explore a phenomenon over some time, give them first-hand experiences that in turn seem to enhance question-asking in the children.[cccxxvii]

When seeking to dismantle the diametric spatial division between nature and culture imported into schools, where schools tend to render nature peripheral to their task of developing children and young people's education as a process of culture, it is important to distinguish a diametric spatial importation of nature into school from a concentric space of assumed connection with nature. In other words, bringing nature into schools must go much further than simply nature as object and nature as tool to be manipulated, as both of these modes of relation rest on a diametric spatial division of assumed separation from nature. In these spaces, the child is not immersed in and surrounded by nature as in a concentric relational space. Concentric spatial relation to nature treats being there as an end of itself, as a mode of being. In the language of the early Heidegger, a concentric space of being-in, being alongside nature is being sought, rather than being side-by-side in a diametric spatial relation

that does not encounter nature or really touch nature beyond a distanciating mode of being an observer or manipulator of nature. Likewise, indigenous people in a Canadian context refer to 'walking alongside'[cccxxviii] as a relational mode that is resonant with a concentric spatial mode of assumed connection.[cccxxix]

Parkes' account of Chinese philosophy offering a relational networks approach to nature to challenge a dominating hierarchical mode tantamount to diametric space of above/below, where nature is below humans, is pertinent here.[cccxxx] Likewise, Illich's iconoclastic *Deschooling Society*, seeks to avoid children being schooled down to size where unmeasured experience is let slip out of their hands.[cccxxxi] This can be interpreted as an indirect assault at least on the excision of nature from school buildings, spaces and educational systems. Space is a system, a system where nature is or is not embedded and pervasive in schools to offer opportunities for development of children and young people's social and emotional education, as well as wider stimulation for learning.

PART III

A Concentric Spatial Turn for Social and Emotional Education

CHAPTER 7

Weber's Iron Cage of Diametric Space Underpinning Experience in Modern Capitalism: An Issue for Social and Emotional Education

When William Blake writes of 'A Robin Red breast in a Cage, Puts all Heaven in a Rage', Berlin recognises that 'the cage of which he speaks is the Enlightenment'.[cccxxxii] Blake's romantic assault is on the rationalists' logical ordering of the eighteenth century. Blake also offers a critique of mechanisation in terms of space that offers implicit contrasts between diametric space as mechanisation and concentric space:

> 'Of many wheels I view, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic
> Moving by compulsion each other, not as those in Eden, which,
> Wheel within Wheel, in freedom revolve in harmony and peace'[cccxxxiii]

The concentric image of the 'wheel within wheel' revolving in harmony and peace is juxtaposed with cogs in compulsion and

tyranny side by side to each other in an assumed separation of diametric space. These themes of mechanisation and a cage to be contrasted with a concentric space offer at least indirect echoes in Weber's later criticism of the 'iron cage'[cccxxxiv] of self-control underlying the worldview, the spirit of the Protestant ethic, driving the historical development of capitalism.

Weber analysed why many early capitalist entrepreneurs who were immensely committed to the endless accumulation of wealth seemed to have little interest in consuming that wealth, in what appeared to be an 'absolutely irrational' response.[cccxxxv] They extolled frugal self-discipline, cleanliness and avoided simple pleasures as an asceticism channelled to this world. Weber construed this as a reconfiguration of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination where work was a "calling" which the believer hoped would give expression to his or her status as either saved or damned. Work was undertaken for a totally non-material goal, to prove that one had been "elected". [cccxxxvi]

Weber's account of Puritan thought shaping the development of Western capitalism is replete with implicit diametric spatial descriptions in the portrayal of this *Weltanschauung*. A mirror image diametric spatial

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above/below hierarchy of mind above nature, of a diametric spatial split between humanity and nature is evident in the Cartesian legacy of Puritanism:

> Only a life guided by constant thought could achieve conquest over the state of nature. Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* was taken over by the contemporary Puritans with this ethical reinterpretation.[cccxxxvii]

This is buttressed by a diametric opposition between the rational and irrational, where mind opposes impulses and nature:

> It had developed a systematic method of rational conduct with the purpose of overcoming the *status naturæ,* to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his dependence on the world and on nature. It attempted to subject man to the supremacy of a purposeful will,[cccxxxviii]

Part of this diametric structure of exclusion of the body involved a denigration of the erotic, as well as an excision

of a sense of play in the arts or life, as being antithetical to the instrumental reason of self-control:

> The theatre was obnoxious to the Puritans, and with the strict exclusion of the erotic and of nudity from the realm of toleration, a radical view of either literature or art could not exist. The conceptions of idle talk, of superfluities, and of vain ostentation, all designations of an irrational attitude without objective purpose, thus not ascetic, and especially not serving the glory of God, but of man, were always at hand to serve in deciding in favour of sober utility as against any artistic tendencies [cccxxxix]

Further diametric mirror image spatial inversions subsumed within this Puritanism included transcendental purity of God versus impure corruption of the flesh, and a diametric split between reason and body, reason and emotion, again thoroughly imbued within a Cartesian modernist heritage:

> Combined with the harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God and the corruption of

everything pertaining to the flesh, this inner isolation of the individual contains, on the one hand, the reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture and in religion, ...[cccxl]

The Puritans repudiated the Apocrypha as not inspired, consistently with their sharp distinction between things divine and things of the flesh.[cccxli]

A fundamental division is manifested in this Protestant ethic along diametric spatial lines of firm oppositions between the holy elect and sinners, the saved and the damned as enemies of God:

This consciousness of divine grace of the elect and holy was accompanied by an attitude toward the sin of one's neighbour, not of sympathetic understanding based on consciousness of one's own weakness, but of hatred and contempt for him as an enemy of God bearing the signs of eternal damnation.[cccxlii]

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While this diametric spatial opposition is scarcely the preserve of Calvinist and Pietist traditions, being a fundamental spatial assumption that saturates the medieval world view, epitomised by Memling's *Last Judgment* with the vivid antitheses of diametric mirror image inversions between the saved and damned,[cccxliii] Weber brings forth a range of further diametric spatial oppositions suffusing the horizons of the modern Protestant ethic underlying the spirit of capitalism. While these diametric spatial oppositions are left implicit by Weber as *spatial* structures and processes, he does render in overt terms their relation to Cartesian constructions of the modern subject.

A diametric mirror image reversal in the purpose of work is identified by Weber, from one as a means to satisfaction of material needs to one in pursuit of a spirit of virtue as being saved as one of the elect:

> Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material

needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naïve point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under capitalistic influence. [cccxliv]

This is redolent of Nietzsche's portrayal of a reversal in spirit from origin to utility, from life to power again ripe for interpretation as being part of a wider diametric spatial process of inversion.[cccxlv] Moreover, a spatial separation embedded in physical places fuelled the diametric spatial division between work and home:

The modern rational organisation of the capitalistic enterprise would not have been possible without two other important factors in its development: the separation of business from the household, which completely dominates modern economic life, and closely connected with it, rational book-keeping. A spatial separation of places of work from those of residence exists elsewhere, as in the Oriental bazaar and the *ergasteria* of other cultures.[cccxlvi]

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A further example of this kind of interlocking scheme of diametric spatial oppositions and reversals seeped into shared meanings of place in domestic settings is evident from Bourdieu's *Berber House*, in his chapter *Festschrift* for Lévi-Strauss. This 'powerful tendency towards uniformity of life' recognised by Weber[cccxlvii] rests in part on a homogeneity of space as diametric space, one of sharp splitting divisions into mirror image oppositions and an overall attitude of mind[cccxlviii] of closure placing sharp boundaries of control around a fixed environment.

That this Protestant ethic spirit of capitalism is a joyless restriction in a closed experiential space is evident from Weber's conceptualisation of this ethic shaping experience as an 'iron cage' leading towards a mechanistic petrification, a desiccation from a life force as a destructive hardening into stone in experience.

> No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if

neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance.[cccxlix]

In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment". But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage [cccl]

This iron cage needs to be construed not merely as a metaphor. It is a concrete restricted boundary from interaction with background, as the closure operative in diametric spatially structured systems of experience. It is the sealed space of closed experience as a diametric spatial projection upon the world.

This calling is a feature of a person's personal identity rather than one's social identity:

He avoids ostentation and unnecessary expenditure, as well as conscious enjoyment of his power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social recognition which he receives[cccli]

In additional to the Cartesian diametric spatial splits between mind and body, reason and emotion, sharp diametric oppositional splits are enforced whether between work and leisure, frugality and comfort, the chosen and unchosen people, reason and emotion, self-control and spontaneity.

Weber hints at a form of reification in experience, as the individual becomes consumed by the objects acquired, as part of a diametric spatial mirror image reversal between the animate human and the inanimate object of consumption. Weber was not simply describing a Protestant ethic or spirit as a central limb invading the development of modern capitalism, he was circumscribing in some detail a specific spatial structure of experience, namely, diametric space as a space of stasis as control and as a movement of closure and splitting in the exertion of control of self and other. Moreover, Weber embeds this movement firmly as an instantiation of Cartesian prejudices of experience in the formation of modern capitalist society and subjectivity. Building on Weber's account, the iron cage of diametric space promulgated in at least aspects of modern capitalist society is a vehicle for social control of experience; it glues together the boundaries of people's dreams and aspirations, as part of a calling to acquire and

consume. Diametric opposition's restricted space influences the very structure of desire.

Weber's account took place before the arrival of the technological developments of the web and social media that arguably have served to operate a further diametric spatial mirror image reversal, where conspicuous consumption and lavish lifestyles are to be celebrated. The diametric spatial division between the self-control to work to acquire material goods and a spontaneity to luxuriate in them sensually and emotionally has arguably collapsed in recent decades into a monism, where wealth and work are to be combined with ostentatious luxury paraded across social media. Social identity has supplanted personal identity as the prime motivational field for acquisition. The key pervasive recurring element here is the surreptitious shaping of these modes of experiences through silent spaces, predominantly diametric oppositional spaces but also their reduction and collapse into monistic fusion, as a spatial principle for lived experiences in postmodern late capitalism of the image. The image has to some degree supplanted the object, though the image is itself still resting on a diametric spatial frame for experience, as the division between the perceiving subject and perceived object.

It is one thing to uncover a diametric process of spatialisation haunting the multiple layers and contours of the Protestant work ethic in Calvinism and related Puritan sects driving the development a modern capitalism historically; it is another to explore this dominion of diametric space as a driving force in similar vein for global education systems through a variant of social and emotional education that places cognitivism and self-regulation at its kernel. There is a need to thwart the development of new iron cages upon experience and education fuelled by diametric spatial movements that surrender the more open experiential possibilities and horizons of concentric space.

Against the backdrop of Weber's critique of the Protestant work ethic, the question must be asked as to whether the self-regulation emphasis of much of US based social and emotional education, such as that advocated by the character education of Elias[ccclii] and Durlak et al. 2015[cccliii] more broadly, risks being, in effect if not intent, a microwaved reheating of the Protestant work ethic identified by Weber. In other works, self-control is sought instead of spontaneity, as part of deferral of gratification of emotional, bodily needs and impulses. The goal is to create students 'above all temperate

and reliable' in Weber's words,[cccliv] as part of a shortcircuiting of experience towards cognitively oriented goals, resonant with Cartesian rationalism and certainty of a fixed self-explanatory conception of world as the cogito. At least in the European framework for social and emotional education,[ccclv] existential dimensions are included, resonant with a more contrasting recognition since Pascal's *Pensées*, that Cartesian certainly of the *cogito*, I think therefore I am, cannot provide resolution of existential and emotional needs for meaning for experience.   Calvinism 'held everything emotional to be illusory',[ccclvi] in Weber's words:

> They were men who had grown up in the hard school of life, calculating and daring at the same time, above all temperate and reliable, shrewd and completely devoted to their business, with strictly bourgeois opinions and principles.[ccclvii]

Concern needs to be expressed that social and emotional education may degenerate into a neo-Cartesianism of thought induced self and social control, a blending in[ccclviii] to societies and systems through inculcation of 'temperate and

reliable' people, ill-attuned to the spaces of their inner worlds. There are clear movements in this direction, not only the well-intentioned but largely conformist emphasis on character education and the emphasis in much US based Social and Emotional Education/Learning on *programmes* and on self-regulation. This social and emotional learning discourse of impulse regulation and control brings distinct echoes of this Protestant work ethic Puritanism in Weber's account:

> This active self-control, which formed the end of the *exercitia* of St. Ignatius and of the rational monastic virtues everywhere, was also the most important practical ideal of Puritanism.[ccclix]

Sobriety supplants spontaneity, work undercuts play in this dreary march of instrumental reason. An arid sobriety of instrumental meaning for social and emotional education, where future generations are to be inculcated with self-discipline, as disciples of the line.

Berlin's account of the mood of German pietism traces the contours of the walls of this iron cage and offers a path to concerns with fear of freedom:

> You gradually hedge yourself round with a kind of tight wall by which you seek to reduce your vulnerable surface – you want to be as little wounded as possible. Every kind of wound has been heaped upon you, and therefore you wish to contract yourself into the smallest possible area, so that as little of you as possible is exposed to further wounds'.[ccclx]

The closure of diametric space as a hedging in of oneself, as a compressed contracted space as structure and process, operates as a defence against pain, against openness. Consigning oneself to the closure of small habits, in fear of freedom, the restricted diametric space of rigid boundaries from background environment and world becomes itself an active process of stasis in experience to oppose change, as a basic motto of 'better the devil you know'.

CHAPTER 8

After the Iron Cage as Fromm's Fear of Freedom: Moving Beyond Diametric Spatial Defences in Experience

Already in the seventeenth century, Cartesian conceptual certainty through self-consciousness was recognised by Pascal as offering little for addressing existential questions of life meaning, of satisfying the need to support existential uncertainty.[ccclxi] In other words, Pascal treated what he described as 'useless and uncertain'[ccclxii] Cartesian self-conscious reason as a short-circuiting process in experience, a short-circuiting towards grounds as truth foundations that filter major ambits of human experience. Cartesian certainty offers little for meaning regarding the predicament of humanity as a frail vessel in a vast universe. This *Angst* is expressed in spatial terms by Pascal, 'the eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread'.[ccclxiii] He continues,

> I see the terrifying spaces of the universe hemming me in, and I find myself attached to one corner of this vast expanse without knowing why I have been put in this place rather than that, or why the brief span of

life allotted to me should be assigned to one moment rather than another of all the eternity which went before me and all that which will come after me.[ccclxiv]

This existential search for meaning as part of humanity's engagement with the world is expanded upon in Schopenhauer's words, that gained further currency through Nietzsche's citation of them as a key reference point in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Schopenhauer stated,

[T]rapped as he is in the *principium individuationis*, deceived by the veil of maya. – Just as a captain sits in a boat, trusting the weak little vessel as the raging, boundless sea raises up and casts down howling cliffs of waves; so the human individual sits calmly in a world full of sorrow, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis, which is how the individual cognizes things as appearance. The boundless world, everywhere full of suffering, with its infinite past and infinite future, is alien to him – in fact it is a fairy tale: his vanishing little person, his unextended present, his

momentary comfort, these alone have reality for him.[ccclxv]

This tension between a search for cognitive security in contrast to existential security runs through different strands of psychology currently and is particularly manifest in the area of social and emotional education. More cognitive approaches to social and emotional education emphasise the importance of self-regulation skills, of impulse control, of positive thinking. Yet these cognitive approaches bear all the hallmarks of Cartesian space, as both diametric spaces of splitting and closure, as well as empty space. Concern must be raised about the social control implications of such a psychology informing social and emotional education, as influencing the development of future generations in terms of a blending in,[ccclxvi] an adjusted personality package[ccclxvii] of social conformity, as part of distinctive socio-historical forces of conditioning based on real restrictions in the modernist constructions of human experiences and understandings.

An allied concern here is with the Western bias risked by this particular strand of social and emotional education. There are multiple dimensions to this Western bias that

require interrogation. One is the bias towards Cartesian rationalism as a shortcircuiting of existential needs of children and young people, as inculcating self-regulation as the dominant trajectory of organising experience. This also includes a bias toward diametric and empty space assumptions as part of a Weberian critique of an iron cage of Protestant puritanism that may also be reflected, not simply in the spirit of capitalism, but in particular strands of social and emotional education. This involves a related neglect of concentric spaces of experience that are more peripheral to Western experiences and understandings. In the words of Gilligan,[ccclxviii] the straight-line categories of Western thought may shut out a logic of feelings. A further layer of concern identified with a Western cultural colonization of experience through social and emotional education has already been identified in our NESET report[ccclxix] criticisms of OECD versions of social and emotional education[ccclxx] that relegate the importance of introversion and risk promotion of social conformity for compliant individuals in the workplace.

It is to be emphasised that these cautionary notes regarding social and emotional education take place against the backdrop of recognising the major importance of

developing social and emotional education throughout school curricula globally. This is not an attack on social and emotional education *per se* but on potentially alienated forms of it. As part of a commitment to spaces for expansion of experience in holistic, connective terms, concern must be raised regarding diametric space and empty space as the silent vehicles of a cultural colonisation in social and emotional education. Without a jolt in trajectory in spatial terms from diametric to concentric spaces of experience and inclusion in education, social and emotional education risks being reduced to a process of subliminal Western colonization internationally.

Part of the argument for an experiential spatial broadening in this book is for social and emotional education to embrace neglected issues such as fear of freedom, othering, an iron cage of self-control, drawn from the periphery of psychology and other disciplines such as anthropology, sociology and philosophy. It is a concern that social and emotional education, at least in some of its variants, may draw on too narrow a repertoire of resources from within psychology.

The stakes are high once the realm of emotions is drawn into the education world, as emotions clearly need to

be. Educational systems can no longer be ostriches with their heads in the sand regarding issues of children and young people's wellbeing and emotional states. However, an education and psychology of prescribed emotions, of desired personalities by the system and of cognitive-behavioural emotional programmes to follow is one that does not draw on students' own voices and experiences – and let's be clear, this type of social and emotional education is one of social control, of social control in effect, if not intent. A prescriptive social and emotional education is a hierarchical one, a diametric above/below spatial imposition upon students' experiences; it assumes older generations are more attuned to inner worlds than rising generations.

Self-regulation, so as not to act on every impulse, as a dimension of self-control, clearly has a role in social and emotional education. However, it is but one limb in a wider repertoire. Moreover, it bears a range of risks beyond simply authoritarian cultural conditioning and colonisation of experience as part of a regulated, 'adjusted' self. It risks repression of deeper emotions, relegation of traumatic emotions of loss to either insufficient acknowledgement or domination by cognition. Concern for current purposes also

goes beyond previous concerns raised with a blending in, a social conformity of prescribed personality packages in the education system. It is also with the shortcircuiting of existential *Angst* related experiences as part of the process of becoming aware of the narrower spaces of diametrically framed realities, customs and patterns in a given culture. It limits agency to challenge culturally constructed taken for granted customs and self-evident 'truths'.

A grid of self-regulation through cognition risks being the new iron cage upon experience offering more closed horizons of certainty than a trust and assumed connection to present, immediate, lived experiential truths. This iron cage risks a desiccation of feeling as children and young people are processed into prescribed roles, rather than education being child-centred, attuned directly to children's and young people's lived experiences and horizons that may differ from prior generations. Again, this is not an argument for irrationalism or mere impulse as one side of a rational, self-control diametric mirror image inverted symmetry. Rather it is for the promotion and attunement to concentric structured spaces of experience.

With his *principium individuationis*, Schopenhauer has arguably inaugurated a tradition, at least in Western thought, of preoccupation with foreground– background interaction in terms of opening and closure.[ccclxxi] This lineage can be traced through the early Nietzsche's quest for a musical opening from boundaried Apollonian experience to the abyss of the background storms in the Dionysian as part of 'the eternal wound of life',[ccclxxii] to Freud's economic principle[ccclxxiii] of tension reduction seeking to manage a level of acceptable stimuli for apprehension. This can be extended to Munch's *The Scream* within concentric background swirling storms as a primal scream through the universe that cannot be escaped from, even on the diametric spaces of the foreground bridge[ccclxxiv] and to Lévi-Strauss' recognition of diametric structured systems as a relative closure from background. It embraces Plath's *Bell Jar* and Fromm's fear of freedom,[ccclxxv] fear of an opening to a vast fluid storm of possibilities that engulf the individual and prompt a retreat into closure.

Plath's journals of 1952 offered an experiential account of an opening from the closure of the bell jar in anticipation of her later work:

It is like lifting a bell jar off a securely clockworklike functioning community, and seeing all the little busy people stop, gasp, blow up, and float in the inrush (or rather outrush) of the rarified scheduled atmosphere – poor little frightened people, flailing impotent arms in the aimless air. That's what it feels like: getting shed of a routine … one feels uncomfortable when jounced out of the repetitive rut.[ccclxxvi]

While all these concerns coalesce around a range of responses of opening and closure to a vast background, it is Lévi-Strauss and Munch who engage with this existential dilemma uniquely in spatial-structural terms, expanding on Schopenhauer's and subsequently Plath's accounts in pictorial terms. It is also arguable that Munch, like Lévi-Strauss, uncovered this dilemma in explicit spatial-structural terms of concentric and diametric space[ccclxxvii] in his iconic painting *The Scream*. Lévi-Strauss offered not only a concretisation of this dilemma in spatial-structural terms but also an expansion of the breadth of its relevance to cross-cultural contexts, building on the observations of other anthropologists, although without an existential or phenomenological focus.

Freud's economic principle of reducing tension and stimuli to experientially manageable levels is part of a theoretical movement in psychoanalysis which goes beyond the pleasure principle, as a different dimension to unconscious processes. Freud's economic dimension to anxiety relates to traumatic neurosis, 'in the experiences which lead to a traumatic neurosis the protective shield against external stimuli is broken through and excessive amounts of excitation impinge upon the mental apparatus'.[ccclxxviii] Such diametrically structured experience launches a greater barrier against external background stimuli than concentrically structured experience. This diametric spatial projection to narrow background stimuli through repetitive behaviour is an active process exerting its dominion as a compulsion and is not only a defensive structure. Infinite stimuli are filtered on Freud's economic principle, as a diametric spatialising process.

Freud directly relates a compulsion to repeat with the fixating factor of repression.[ccclxxix] Freud's economic dimension to the anxiety of traumatic neurosis observed a process of lessened interaction with background stimuli, as a defensive barrier against excessive stimulation. A barrier against external background stimuli is established. The trauma brings

an extremity of stimuli that is met with the structural simplification of a reduced emotional apprehension of the world. It is to be noted also that Winnicott treats one function of the transitional object as a 'defence against anxiety'[ccclxxx] as part of a similar closure of the world to threat through the reassurance of the transitional object; this diametric spatial function to the transitional object is to be contrasted in spatial terms with a less defensive concentric mediating spatial projection of assumed connection between self and other, where the other is the transitional object so that this transitional spatial process can be understood as being more than simply a defence, while recognising also its defensive function at particular times in the young child's development.

Fromm's Fear of Freedom: The Need to Reclaim a Spatial Process Dimension

Fromm's work has arguably gained much greater reception in education than in psychology. His distinction between fundamental modes of having and being[ccclxxxi] directly influenced Freire's celebrated banking concept of education, where knowledge is treated as a deposit into the minds of those who purportedly know nothing, from teachers who are

claimed to know everything.[ccclxxxii] Freire's trenchant critique of this banking model of 'having' knowledge rejects a blank page, empty space notion of the student, while seeking to dismantle the diametric spatial hierarchy and mirror image inversion between the omniscient teacher and ignorant student.

Fromm's other major influence on education is with regard to the 'being' aspect of his to have or to be model.[ccclxxxiii] The seminal UNESCO Faure report 1972 was titled, *Learning to Be.*[ccclxxxiv] However, the having mode of Fromm's framework was arguably better developed than his rather sparse conception of being, where being is largely in a modernist paradigm of freedom, independence and critical reason. The Faure report on *learning to be* was a direct influence on the subsequent Delors UNESCO report 1996[ccclxxxv] for global education that also embraced learning to be, as part of an extended framework that included learning to live together.

Against this backdrop, it is surprising how little influence Fromm's psychology has had on social and emotional education. One clear gap here is the central theme in Fromm's work on fear of freedom. Fromm's neo Freudian concerns build on Freud's economic principle of a motivation to reduce stimuli to manageable proportions and draw out its

implications as a fear of freedom, a fear of the openness of divergent stimuli, of novelty, choice and change. Fromm wondered why so many people prefer to live in invisible cages of their own making in their lives, rather than embracing a freedom and openness of change. He asked, 'Can freedom become a burden, too heavy for man to bear, something he tries to escape from?' .[ccclxxxvi]

Fromm still operates from a modernist vantage point of 'subjective self-consciousness' that brings humanity's diametric space of assumed separation as 'different from nature',[ccclxxxvii] with a view of 'freedom in the sense of emerging from the original oneness with nature'.[ccclxxxviii] He seeks a shift from monism to diametric spatial assumed separation here. Though elsewhere Fromm's work is influenced by Eastern thought, here regarding fear of freedom this is the basic Western Cartesian doctrine of mind separate from body and nature, to rise above nature into a realm of culture. Here Fromm shares a concern with Jung regarding the need for individuation at a personal level, though the meanings they ascribe to these terms differ somewhat.

Fromm's movement is more towards increased self-consciousness, in modernist fashion, as a pathway to freedom.

In doing so, his account of fear of freedom, while stating the influence of Freud, does not specify in particular the centrality of Freud's economic principle of stimuli reduction or Freud's extreme version of this as the Nirvana principle of a sealed compartment in the ego to radically reduce any new stimuli to zero, as a feature of a death principle. Indeed, Fromm treated the later Freud's death drive of *Thanathos* with a suspicion that also betrayed how locked within a modernist Enlightenment paradigm Fromm's framework ultimately became.[ccclxxxix] Fromm's fear of freedom was steering Freud's work away from its more Schopenhauerian roots on a blind will in the universe that offered a challenge to simple Enlightenment reason and self-consciousness.

This is not to deny that Fromm's fear of freedom conception drew explicitly upon Freud's death drive, if not directly his Nirvana principle, in associating the desire for a mechanical closure in experience of necrophiles, who live antithetically to a life principle, 'He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life. He is deeply afraid of life, it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature'.[cccxc] The diametric spatial mirror image of power/powerlessness frames this spatial movement towards closure, the closure of

rigid control. Here Fromm is offering an important insight that a mechanisation, as part of a closure in experience, is part of a loss of a life experiential capacity, 'The question is whether the principles of life are subordinate to those of mechanisation, or whether the principles of life are the dominant ones ?'.[cccxci] A wider argument for concentric space as a life principle and associating features of diametric space with a death drive, has been explored elsewhere in detail in my work.[cccxcii]

These movements away from the specific roots in Freud's thought on structural aspects of the economic principle shaping experience and Nirvana principle for the fear of freedom concept in Fromm's work,[cccxciii] and subsequently Freire's appropriation of this concept from Fromm for education and conscientization of oppressed communities, mean that the spatial processes underpinning fear of freedom have become occluded. Fromm's fear of freedom is untethered from spatial concerns, a spatial dimension to fear of freedom as closure that was more closely captured by Freud's economic principle of stimuli reduction as a filtering process through rigid boundaries. Moreover, these spatial processes of closure in a more Freudian fear of freedom also give a direction to this concept that is not simply the modernist

one, in a basically Kantian tradition, of freedom as self-consciousness for choice. Fromm's fear of freedom concept has somewhat unwittingly and implicitly twisted the fear of freedom principle of Freud out of its spatial moorings and away from its challenge to a sheer modernist Enlightenment reason paradigm of self-consciousness.

As Lévi-Strauss recognised, a diametric spatial system is one of closure and noninteraction with the background environment, as a kind of sealed space between the two oppositional poles. He did not link this diametric space to being a structure of experience, an existential state of being. He did however, contrast concentric spatial systems as being relatively more open and interactive with background. Concentric space offers more porous boundaries from background stimuli, it allows a wider range of stimuli to enter experience. A shift from diametric to concentric spaces of experience brings a relative opening to experience, as a freedom to embrace a wider field of experiential stimuli. Fear of freedom understood here in spatial structural phenomenological terms is the resistance of diametric spatial processes and structures of experience to the restructuring and modification towards concentric spaces of experience.

This stretching open of experiential spaces, this jolt in experience towards an expanded capacity for experience and reduction in a filtered mode of experience is an educational issue. Experience and capacity for experience is within the ambit of psychology, diametric and concentric spaces as processes and structures of experience are of central psychological relevance.

Concentric space is not an undifferentiated flood of monism, where monism is akin to a drug fuelled obliteration of boundaries in experience. The different expansive opening of concentric space compared to diametric space's rigid boundaries, is not a bland, generic, random opening process. Fear of freedom is a rational response if freedom is to mean as a monistic obliteration of self and meaning.

The assumption that one needs a purpose in life, that goals drive the meaning for existence is not only part of the diametric spatial movement of self-consciousness, it is a residue of instrumental reason, that living is a means to an end rather than a mode of being, of living as an end of itself. Even the term that life is empty of meaning operates within an assumption of empty, inert space. The conception of solution to 'fill' this empty space with meaning is largely a cognitive

approach to meaning making, though also potentially embracing emotions and desires. Yet filling an empty space may not be enough, it is the space itself that needs reconfiguration in experience rather than addition of objects into it.

Existential meaninglessness may need more than a cognitive and affective restructuring that still perpetuates the overarching diametric space dominating the structuring of the individual's experience. The diametric spatial movement is the very one demanding instrumentality to experience itself and life itself, as quest for purpose in life. It is the diametric spatial structure of experience itself that is to be rendered molten, as a fluidating of the capacity for experience, a lost or never experienced capacity that is central to the ache of existential meaninglessness.

A concentric mode of experience is as an end of itself, it lives in celebration of attunement to being, to being present in the moment. It is a forgotten or obscured experience, as a life principle displaced.[cccxciv] A related dimension here recognised in psychology is that of intrinsic motivation,[cccxcv] flow [cccxcvi] and play-based learning, where the experience and activity is joyous and life-giving as an end of itself, rather than

a staging post towards some purpose deferred in time. Immediacy in the moment, in being in this space of assumed connection to self, of assumed connection to another and the world, as concentric space, can be associated with a power of the now,[cccxcvii] building on Eastern traditions of a meditative emptying of the conscious mind in the moment. Meditation in schools is a relevant dimension also in contexts of socio-economic exclusion for pupils' wellbeing,[cccxcviii] though not as a distraction from structural issues of poverty.

Immersion in the moment of immediate experience offers a capacity for experience of spontaneity, of an energy and life force that fluidates experience, as a concentric space of opening. Against this backdrop, existential meaninglessness is the lack of capacity to engage with learning to be, with concentric spatial modes of experience that are not sheer displacements in time into the future or past.

To some degree, this different space for experience lies in tension with a Western psychology of emotional education emphasising the benefits of deferred gratification, such as the well-known marshmallow test of Goleman's emotional intelligence[cccxcix] in young children and the burgeoning research on self-regulation. Concentric space

offers the fluidity to move in and out of these different experiential spaces, to not simply be locked into diametric spaces of instrumental reason and hyperself-consciousness and control. Capacity to embrace a wider system of spaces offers an interplay between concentric and diametric spaces, while nevertheless also apprehending a dynamic tension between them, where one seeks not only a recalibration in its own direction but also a diminution and restructuring away from the other space.

CHAPTER 9

Developmental Relational Spaces Underlying Othering: Winnicott's Transitional Spaces

Giorgi and colleagues' qualitative accounts of domestic space highlight a key theme of cleanliness and disorder in the Cilos' Mum, 'Cleanliness and tidiness are her causes of pride. She states often that she is "jealous" of the house, and she does not want her daughters to create disorder'.[cd] This thematic of cleanliness and disorder is ripe for construal not only in diametric spatial terms but also in developmental terms, based on recent research.

While Lévi-Strauss has highlighted the cross-cultural prevalence of the diametric opposition between the sacred and the profane and Weber observes the concern with cleanliness in Protestant puritanism, these anthropological and sociological interests have only indirectly and recently gained strong attention in empirical developmental psychological research. Recent research on cognitive proximate mechanisms of separation and connection regarding cleansing[cdi] explicitly draws on the conceptual metaphor of morality is cleanliness/purity,[cdii] though not on

Lévi-Strauss' work on sacred/profane diametric oppositions,[cdiii] despite identifying acts of closure with separation, 'physical enclosure confers a sense of mental separation between what is inside and what is outside'.[cdiv] This body of research assumes that mental representations and functions are grounded in sensorimotor modalities for experiencing and interacting with physical reality, e.g., connection as touching an object, keeping it close,[cdv] treating its proposed proximate mechanism of separation through the grounded procedure of cleansing e.g., washing dirt away from hands as offering 'broader applicability' than the conceptual metaphor of morality as cleanliness.[cdvi]

Due to its evolutionary origin, physical cleansing grounded in basic emotions, such as disgust, is viewed as particularly robust and postulated universally for all separation/connection procedures based on approach and avoidance.[cdvii] As inverted symmetry and closure from background, diametric space offers prelinguistic structural affinity with animal perceptions framing objects to be sought (+)/to be avoided (-) and safely ignored. [cdviii] Framing processes of connection/separateness and toxicity/purity are not necessarily developmentally aligned.[cdix] Emphasis on the

spatial features of concentric spatial assumed connection and diametric spatial separateness as being fundamental would predict these are developmentally prior to toxicity/cleanliness awareness in infants. In other words, the diametric spatial experience opposing clean/unclean in early childhood development is but one instance, simply one example, of the shaping movements of diametric space.

The claim that proximate mechanisms of separation/connection are grounded in sensorimotor modalities[cdx] invites further research on the mediation of diametric and concentric spaces with the sensorimotor level, recognising also the recent expansion of interest in space at this level with visuospatial coding not restricted to early visual cortex but extending throughout the brain including the cerebellum, hippocampus, frontal eye fields, and the default mode network,[cdxi] including a visual pathway specialised for social perception.[cdxii] This is not to limit domains of relevance of concentric/diametric spaces to the visual.

Treating the clean/unclean diametric spatial opposition as but one developmental manifestation of diametric space regarding the infant's relation with the external world invites focus also on such spatial relations with

primary love objects of the child, namely the mother or primary care giver. Here Melanie Klein's work in splitting processes in early childhood relations offer another lens for diametric spatial processes in the self-other, self-world relational space.[cdxiii]

It is to be emphasised that early childhood development of the self-other relation also centrally recognises relational spaces in a psychoanalytic tradition, spaces such as transitional objects and spaces of Winnicott that are clear examples of concentric spatial experience. Winnicott highlights *transitional objects* and *transitional phenomena*, such as a cuddly toy or tune as being a more subtle experience than the diametric framed mirror image one of 'me' and 'not-me':

> The transitional object is different from 'me', yet still in an assumed connection to 'me', as a tendency on the part of the infant to weave other-than-me objects into the personal pattern.[cdxiv]

Distinction from 'me' on the basis of assumed connection is a key concentric spatial feature. Concentric

space weaves a connective relation that is more proximate than the distanciation of sheer otherness. For Winnicott, this kind of relational space is needed as emotional security for the developing infant. Whereas Said referred to othering as a kind of projection, Winnicott is interrogating the developmental processes of othering as projections, including projections associated with space, though without explicit recourse to terminology of diametric and concentric spaces.

The concentric mediating space of assumed connection around a common centre between nevertheless distinct poles offers a model for understanding of Winnicott's description of 'the separation that is not a separation but a form of union'.[cdxv] Winnicott explicitly characterizes this in spatial terms as 'a potential space'– a space 'in relation to a feeling of confidence' for the baby,[cdxvi] a space of assumed connection as 'trust'.[cdxvii] This opens a pathway to a different underlying projected structure than diametric space in the self-other relation and of pure monistic fusion of the self into the other. Concentric space is such a transitional mediating space of connection that still offers fluid boundaries between the inner pole of self and the surrounding outer pole of the other, whether the other is a person or transitional object.

Winnicott suggests that, 'The [transitional] object represents the infant's transition from a state of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation to the mother as something outside and separate'.[cdxviii] As a transition in time, it is not yet within the frame of an external other, nor reducible to a state of non-differentiation from the 'me' or the mother. It is for Winnicott, 'the place in space and time where and when the mother is in transition from being (in the baby's mind) merged in with the infant and alternatively being experienced as an object to be perceived rather than conceived of '.[cdxix] Concentric space is a mediator in the shift from monistic fusion with mother or primary care giver.

Winnicott seeks to describe a structure which incorporates difference within identity, 'The use of an object symbolizes the union of two now separate things, baby and mother, at the point in time and space of the initiation of their state of separateness'.[cdxx] The outer pole of a concentric relation is in an assumed connection of unity with the inner pole, while also including a space of separation from the inner pole. This aspect of the child's relational world locates the child in the inner circle, with the transitional object in the outer circle as the transitional state before a diametric

opposition between the child and objects to be perceived as external. These concentric spatial projections are indirectly supported by findings elsewhere that the concentric structure of mandalas (along with sunschemas) are basic designs which young children typically employ in their first attempts at human figure drawing.[cdxxi]

Winnicott explicitly contrasts the transitional object with Klein's *internal object*;[cdxxii] the transitional object is neither internal nor external,[cdxxiii] fitting into neither of these diametrically framed alternatives. He links ego formation to assumed separation, thereby implicitly supporting a view of diametric spatial structures as constitutive of the ego, 'As soon as there is the ego organisation available, the baby allows the object the quality of being not-me or separate'.[cdxxiv] From this vantage point, the unclean/clean diametric spatial process of development occurs at a later stage, as part of ego organisation in the developing infant, as the child gains a sense of fuller separation from the primary love 'object' of the parent or care giver. Referring to a burgeoning 'objectification of the object'[cdxxv] and recognition of it as 'an entity in its own right',[cdxxvi] the assumed separation between object and the child herself/himself is a later aspect of the temporal

sequence of establishing capacity for relation. The concentric structured capacity for relation expressed in the transitional object is later superseded to some degree by the diametric structured relation necessary for objectification.

While Winnicott locates the transitional object within the child's experience ranging with 'wide variations'[cdxxvii] between four and twelve months, he observes that the transitional object also has relevance for older children, 'Patterns set in infancy may persist into childhood, so that the original soft object continues to be absolutely necessary at bed-time or at time of loneliness or when a depressed mood threatens. In health, however, there is a gradual extension of range of interest …'.[cdxxviii] From this it can be extracted that diametric space can also become the function of the transitional object as the child gets older, it can offer a closed space of retreat against danger, such as loneliness. The features of relational space do not reside in the transitional object as such but rather in the child's orientation to it, as part of their changing developmental needs.

Winnicott aptly describes the use of the transitional object or phenomena as a 'paradox';[cdxxix] this 'intermediate area of experience between the thumb and the teddy bear,

between the oral eroticism and the true object relationship'.[cdxxx]   This is paradoxical within a diametric structured Western Enlightenment tradition, reliant on a clearcut division or assumed separation between subject and object. This early developmental expression of concentric space structuring experience between self and other offers a challenge to the reifying processes of other in scapegoating, where connection between the scapegoating victim is radically severed in diametric oppositional ways of violent splitting. It also offers a more nuanced self-other relation in concentric space than one reliant on what Ricoeur terms the 'distanciation'[cdxxxi] underpinning the modern subject-object dualism. The other need not be mere object in relation to self; concentric space offers a realm for this significant spatial shift in experience and understanding that needs not be confined to early childhood development. As a safe space for experience, the question also arises as how to develop similar concentric spaces of trust in the school environment, as mediating spaces of assumed connection for the individual and groups of students experiencing distrust and disconnection from school.

Winnicott highlights the temporal dimension in experience of the transitional object, 'the infant's journey from the purely subjective to objectivity … the transitional object (piece of blanket etc) is what we see of this journey of progress towards experiencing'.[cdxxxii] This dimension of time allows for objectification of the transitional object, so that the relation to it changes spatially from a concentric to a diametric structured projection. This does not fully address the question as to whether concentric spaces then simply disappear from experience or whether this process of objectification brings a capacity for both concentric and diametric spaces of experience.

It is Bowlby's attachment theory[cdxxxiii] framework that offers further understanding here of the interplay between concentric and diametric spaces in early childhood development. Concentric space as the assumed connection needed for secure attachment and diametric space as mirror image inversions underpinning ambivalent anxious attachment and as the splitting of assumed separation for avoidant attachment is discussed in more detail in *The Primordial Dance*.[cdxxxiv]

CHAPTER 10

The Othering of Self Within: Ambivalence and Repression in Freud

At first glance, Freud can be construed as having launched a vehement attack on the citadel of modernist rationalism. His recognition that the conscious ego is not master in its own house[cdxxxv] but is buffered between conflicting forces of the instinctual id and the cultural conscience of the superego is a direct challenge to the potency of the Cartesian *cogito*. The thinking self-conscious subject is in thrall to darker unconscious forces outside its control, with Freudian thought being identified in a tradition with Schopenhauer[cdxxxvi] that treats the universe as a blind will without meaning.

        While Rousseau's autobiographical *Confessions*[cdxxxvii] first drew associations between childhood experiences impacting on the formation of the adult personality, Freud's radical expansion of this rudimentary insight of Rousseau opened the door to recognition of the enduring detrimental influence of childhood trauma on adult mental health.[cdxxxviii] Contemporary concerns with obsessive compulsive disorder and the impact of adverse childhood experiences[cdxxxix] can all

trace a direct lineage to Freud. Freud took childhood emotions very seriously and in doing so, can be said to be one of the unacknowledged architects of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 that gives emphasis in Art 12 to the voices of children and young people. In a Victorian era of the late nineteenth century, Freud also lifted the lid on child sexual abuse, though ultimately fleeing from recognition of its scale. He sought to remove guilt and shame around the body from young children's experiences around premature toilet training. He cautioned against a repressive culture that turns children into little adults. Freud's 1920 recognition of separation anxiety [cdxl] paved the way for Bowlby's subsequent more empirically grounded framework of attachment theory; whereas Freud's ambit of concern tended to be the child in the adult, Bowlby observed children's development more directly. Elsewhere, the centrality of concentric and diametric spaces to later Freud's framework on the life and death drives, Eros and Thanathos have been discussed in detail.[cdxli]

A further layer of Freud's thought that lays assault at least indirectly to Cartesianism is his recognition that repressed pain from childhood trauma may lodge in the body as part of what he described as hysterical neurosis. This

approach firmly connects experience with the body and does not operate within the chains of Cartesian divisions between reason and emotion but traces rational roots to all emotions and behavioural manifestations of emotional trauma that may on the surface appear nonsensical.

Despite these trenchant oppositions between Cartesian rationalism in the modernist tradition and Freud's psychoanalysis, the current argument traces common spatial affinities in both frameworks of thought. In other words, the trajectories of diametric spatial oppositions haunt the Freudian unconscious in pervasive fashion. Freud's account of defence mechanisms is replete with diametric spatial assumptions. His unconscious system rests on the background precondition of a diametric spatial system of arrangements underpinning his key concepts of repression and ambivalence.

Interestingly, Fromm characterises Freud as a modernist thinker, 'Freud, the last great representative of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, the first to demonstrate its limitations. He dared to interrupt the songs of triumph of mere intellect'.[cdxlii] Freud's rationality to emotion is being contrasted here with Descartes' split between reason and emotion. Nevertheless, Fromm's situating of Freud within a broader

tradition of modernism tends to underplay Freud's links to Schopenhauer[cdxliii] and the later Freud's view of the death drive as an active force.[cdxliv]

While uncovering these spatial systems underlying often unconscious experience, lurking in the shadows of experience, a key concept here from the vantage point of social and emotional education is that of projection. Self-awareness and projection are ineluctably intertwined. While Anna Freud recognised the potential of psychoanalytic insights to be translated more widely into educational contexts,[cdxlv] as part of self-growth and self-awareness, this promise is left largely apart from more US based social and emotional education aspects[cdxlvi] that tend not to be influenced by psychological approaches to the unconscious.

Entering this psychoanalytic terrain largely neglected in social and emotional education is not to advocate for a role of teacher as therapist in social and emotional education. A clear distinction must be made between a teacher's legitimate role in mental health promotion and stress prevention, including bullying prevention and intervention, and where a teacher exceeds such a role through being a therapist in the classroom.[cdxlvii] It is not the role of the teacher to engage in

probing to rake up past traumas of a child or to pry into family background issues, though some, otherwise helpful, examples of attachment coping styles go further to seek to extend the teacher's role into this area;[cdxlviii] this requires critique.[cdxlix] Privacy is a key and neglected issue pertaining to social and emotional education.[cdl] The teacher is to be involved with the current emotions and emotional state of the child or young person and must know when to refer to specialist emotional counsellors/therapists. A difficulty occurs, of course, if these are not available in schools, they are in many countries internationally and must become a core feature of all schools.[cdli] Teachers cannot be therapists, when undertaking their work in social and emotional education across the curriculum and at whole school levels.

Freud's *Introductory Lectures of 1916–17,* characterised resistance and repression in similar terms of a kind of inverted symmetry, echoing also his *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*:[cdlii]

> Every mental process . . . [except external perception] exists to begin with in an unconscious stage or phase . . . it is only from there that the process passes over

> into the conscious phase, just as a photographic picture begins as a negative and only becomes a picture after being turned into a positive. Not every negative, however, necessarily becomes a positive; nor is it necessary that every unconscious mental process should turn into a conscious one.[cdliii]

Freud's underlying vision here is that meaning is, as in Lévi-Strauss' words, 'turned inside out'.[cdliv]

Freud's discussion of obsessional neurosis is similarly framed through a diametric spatial mirror image inverted symmetry opposition of love versus hate, as a feature of ambivalence, where he observes a denial of 'hostile feelings against the dead loved one' and a 'contrast between conscious pain and unconscious satisfaction over the death that has occurred'.[cdlv] A mirror image is not identical but rather a left–right inversion. Such a mirror image reversal as diametric spatial opposition is central to Freud's accounts of obsessional neurosis. In *Wolf Man*, Freud strongly emphasises the interplay of two diametrically opposing states:

In following up a single instinctual repression we have thus had to recognize a convergence of two such processes. The two instinctual impulses have been overtaken by repression – sadistic aggressiveness towards the father and a tender passive attitude to him – form a pair of opposites.[cdlvi]

The passive orientation is a mirror image of the active one involved in aggression, while the tender attitude towards the father is a mirror image of the sadistic attitude. He extends this diametric spatial structure, in effect, making it a general feature of obsessional neurosis:

> The symptoms belonging to this [obsessional] neurosis fall, in general, into two groups, each having an opposite trend. They are either prohibitions, precautions and expiations – that is, negative in character – or they are, on the contrary, substitutive satisfactions which often appear in symbolic disguise.[cdlvii]

Diametric space is arguably a hallmark of much of Freud's thought.[cdlviii] Moreover, in a US sample of ninth and twelfth grade and undergraduate students, it has been observed that subjects who score highest on repression scales are statistically more likely to adopt judgements dividing reality into diametric oppositions between good and bad across all these age levels.[cdlix] In effect, they project a diametric spatial structure onto the world.

In his comments on Freud's *Rat Man* case, Sherwood implies that this inverted symmetry insight of Freud regarding ambivalence challenges conventional Western logic: 'And why should the patient have felt such remorse at the father's death if he hated him? It is items like these which present at least a *prima facie* incongruity'.[cdlx] Freud, in effect, conceptualises beyond Western A/Non-A logic with mirror image structures.

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, diametric projection underlies the spatial structure of play highlighted in Freud's account of his grandson Ernst's game of *fort-da* inviting an interplay of disappearance-return of a wooden reel. According to Freud, the child compensated himself for the instinctual renunciation he had made in allowing his mother to go away, without protesting, by staging the disappearance and return

of the objects within his reach. Turning his experience into a game: 'At the outset he was in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the experience; but by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active part'.[cdlxi] Freud conceptualised the function of repetitive play as the child becoming an active 'master of the situation', through repeating that which had left a significant emotional impression. Freud assessed the goal or function of repetitive play as follows:

> It is clear that in their play children repeat everything that has made a great impression on them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression and . . . make themselves master of the situation . . . As the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the game, he hands on the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute.[cdlxii]

The game of disappearance-return is an example of reversal expressing diametric structured behaviour and experience.

This mirror image reversal is not a cancelling of one pole by the other. Both coexist in an uneasy tension.

Freud acknowledges that 'instead of a single repression we have found a collection of them'.[cdlxiii] His account of the history of the psychoanalytic movement states, in relation to his framework at the end of the Breuer period, that 'I looked upon psychical splitting itself as an effect of a process of repelling which at that time I called "defence", and later, "repression"'.[cdlxiv] Much later, Freud also explores a 'splitting of the ego in the process of defence' discussing 'a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on'.[cdlxv] That splitting or assumed separation is, for Freud, not simply an outcome but also a process associated with repression can be seen in his *The Ego and the Id* where he argues: 'The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the resistances of repression'.[cdlxvi] From this, it is evident that the assumed separation of diametric spatial structures gives expression to a key feature of repression as a splitting process and that diametric space offers both a structure and a dynamic process of inducing assumed separation in its movement and projection.

Kerenyi explicates a dual reversal dimension of ambivalence in the Dionysian myth:

[T]he two statues stood for festivals of two kinds: one centering on the apparent slaying and mutilation of the god and the real slaying of his representative, the kid; the other expressing joy at the happy end of the somber action that had been performed a year before';[cdlxvii] 'the sacrifice ... a highly ambivalent action of which people did not like to speak'.[cdlxviii]

Ambivalence is the epitome of a diametric spatial–relational mirror image splitting projection. Parkes highlights the mask-related feature of the game of the Dionysian duality: 'The duplex being of Dionysus governs the various dualities of the mask as bidirectional mediator between self and other, inside and outside',[cdlxix] including self-deception and of others. This is again amenable to interpretation in terms of diametric space as mirror image reversal. Moreover, as Kerenyi explicates: 'When the trieteris was replaced by the one year period – a process probably completed in the sixth century – the sad and joyful elements were combined in a complex

game'.[cdlxx] Nietzsche's twist is that there is also a sadistic happiness in the cruelty, a revelling in the cruelty as an end in itself. Kerenyi highlights the systemic 'logic' to the Dionysian ritual: 'The Dionysian sacrificial rite with its complex structure and strict inner logic was one of the basic facts of Greek religious history'.[cdlxxi] The further step here is to characterise this 'game' as a diametric spatial systemic logic.

The unconscious spatial projections of diametric space, such as the mirror image inversions of ambivalence point to the centrality of the unconscious as being a system. It needs to be a key feature of an ecological systems framework, as part of a concern with experience of the individual. Freud was arguably psychology's first fundamental systems theory thinker. That he constantly referred to the unconscious as a system is often neglected. Key features of Freud's unconscious as a system, include displacement, inertia, movement of libido energy. Though conceptualising more loosely in systems terms than Freud, William James is another who can lay claim to priority regarding a systems' focus in psychology, with his recognition of consciousness as a stream, a background space of interaction.[cdlxxii] Yet Bronfenbrenner left out these major figures as antecedents to his ecological systems framework,

through the major omission not so much of the individual but of the individual's experience *as itself a system*.

Bronfenbrenner's widely cited concentric structured ecological systems model[cdlxxiii] has been the most influential framework for systems theory approaches in developmental and educational psychology. Notably it is a spatial model and one that gives explicit succour to concentric structures in systemic understandings of interrelated mutually influencing relations between macro-exo-meso and microsystems.[cdlxxiv] However, when focusing on how people develop in system contexts, Bronfenbrenner's specifically concentric spatial understanding has been left underdeveloped,[cdlxxv] both in his own work and subsequent critical commentary. Systems as concentric spaces are in need of amplification for Bronfenbrenner's work to recognise how innovative this concentric structured understanding is compared to the spatial presuppositions underpinning the key pillars of modern thought.

As noted earlier, Bronfenbrenner's work has tended to overlook the concentric spatial systems observed cross culturally by Lévi-Strauss and a range of other structural anthropologists in the decades preceding Bronfenbrenner's

1979 *Ecology of Human Development.* A consequence of this neglect of Lévi-Strauss by Bronfenbrenner's systems framework is that Bronfenbrenner did not interrogate spatial system models that were not nested concentrically, that are not in mutual connection, such as diametric spatial structural systems of opposition observed in structural anthropology as interacting with concentric spaces.[cdlxxvi] In his earlier and later works, Bronfenbrenner thus largely omitted a focus on system blockages, on split systems juxtaposed with each other, by not seeing a diametric spatial counterpole to his concentric structured systems.[cdlxxvii]

As well as Bronfenbrenner's neglect of the interplay between concentric and diametric spatial systems, there is another remarkable omission in both his early and later systems frameworks, namely, that he does not treat individual experience as itself being a system or concentric spatial system as part of the other nested concentric system spaces. Bronfenbrenner does commit to a paradigm exploring phenomenological dimensions, in other words, lived experiences of individuals in systems but he does not take the further step of treating such phenomenology either in spatial terms or in concentric spatial terms. He also explicitly notes

that his concern with phenomenology is not a 'predilection' for existential aspects of lived experience,[cdlxxviii] he suspends his position on the importance of existential-phenomenological issues of search for meaning and anxiety is a world of displacement of meaning. In similar vein, he does not offer contours for experience that bring bridges to a systems theory of the unconscious world. His concentric structured systems conception of human development in contexts of concrete systems did not extend to Freud or Jung's accounts of experiential systems.

These *caesurae* in Bronfenbrenner's works, his underdevelopment of implications of concentric spaces through lack of engagement with Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology, leading also to omission of diametric spatial systems of opposition, splitting, ambivalence, blockage and fragmentation, his failure to apply his own concentric systems space to individual experience and Bronfenbrenner's neglect of psychoanalytic and existential traditions in psychology are important to address in a systems focus on social and emotional education. Social and emotional education recognises a systems dimension regarding whole school system approaches. However, experience itself needs to be

treated as being itself a system, a system in operation that rests on malleable conditions of diametric and concentric spaces shaping experience, both consciously and unconsciously.

CHAPTER 11

Voice as a Concentric Space of Assumed Connection in Gilligan's Different Voice

Gilligan's *In a different voice* offers a framework for understanding not only of voices of children and young people, with a particular emphasis on girls' voices that were not heard in much of developmental psychology.[cdlxxix] This work anticipated the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 which seven years later gave direct expression to children and young people's voices in Art 12 where children and young people have a right to be consulted on matters pertaining to their own welfare, with due consideration for their age and maturity. Yet Gilligan's work can be construed as taking a further vital step. It also offers an implicit shift of spatial understandings, a different space for framing self and other relations. This capacity to shift relational spaces for problem solving is directly pertinent to the key issue of strengthening perspective-taking as part of social and emotional development. Moreover, social and emotional education has yet to foster a strong developmental aspect and must critique

rigid stage theories of adolescent development promoted by Erikson in a neo-Freudian tradition, strongly challenged by Gilligan.

The relevance of concentric and diametric spatial system contrasts to problem framing conditions encompasses Gilligan's qualitative research in a US context highlighting two contrasting relational states framing moral reasoning.[cdlxxx] While many others have also highlighted the key role of framing a problem, including through conceptual metaphors[cdlxxxi] and spatial metaphors in legal problems,[cdlxxxii] Gilligan's key insight is that these frames are structured modes of relation as assumed connection and separation, respectively. This insight is extended here in specific spatial terms as concentric and diametric framing conditions.

As characterised by Gilligan, assumptions of separation are rooted in Kohlberg's stages of development of moral reasoning. Kohlberg distinguished preconventional, conventional and postconventional morality, to reflect a purported growth in moral understanding from an individual to societal to universal point of view.[cdlxxxiii] Gilligan's well-known critique of Kohlberg's stages exposed the assumption of Kohlberg's moral reasoning as being in relation to an

abstract other, 'abstract[ing] the moral problem from the interpersonal situation, finding in the logic of fairness and objective way to decide who will win the dispute'.[cdlxxxiv] It is this separation from relationship that is a diametric spatial framing condition gluing together this whole logic of justice framework.

As an illustrative example to a problem of 'Heinz's dilemma', Gilligan contrasts two eleven-year-old children's modes of relation:

> To Jake, responsibility means not doing what he wants because he is thinking of others; to Amy, it means doing what others are counting on her to do regardless of what she herself wants … she, *assuming connection*, begins to explore the parameters of separation, while he, *assuming separation*, begins to explore the parameters of connection.[cdlxxxv]

The contrasts between frames of assumed separation in a logic of justice and assumed connection in an ethic of care offer direct correspondence with diametric and concentric spatial framing conditions, respectively. The need for a wider

sampling[cdlxxxvi] to include African, Hispanic and Asian Americans was addressed,[cdlxxxvii] though wider cultural interrogation is clearly needed.

The approach of 'Jeffrey' and 'Karen' to a moral dilemma is contrasted, 'Both children deal with the issues of exclusion and priority created by choice but while Jeffrey thinks about what goes first, Karen focuses on who is left out'.[cdlxxxviii] Karen's approach is an inclusive one of concentric structured assumed connection rather than through a diametric spatial assumed separation from the person who is left out. Karen's reasoning serves to avoid a diametric spatial exclusion as splitting in relation, while an ethic of care rests on 'the premise of nonviolence – that no one should be hurt'.[cdlxxxix] The concentric spatial assumption structure of connection is a condition framing non-violence.

Gilligan's specific relational paradigm shift represents an important step in the critique of Western abstraction as a mode of diametric spatial thinking, based on an assumed separation between not only self and other, but also self and world. Diametric and concentric assumption structures are pivotal spatial-relational conditions for framing the two different modes of Gilligan's moral reasoning process. The two

views of morality are 'complementary rather than sequential or opposed':[cdxc]

> ...this hierarchical ordering (treated as an impersonal conflict of claims) with its imagery of winning and losing and the potential for violence which it contains, give way ... to a network of connection, a web of relationships that is sustained by a process of communication.[cdxci]

Diametric spatial separation and inverted symmetry frame winning/losing, success/failure oppositions. In Gergen's words, diametric space as binary opposition brings 'a ferocious flattening of the world and a silence of other voices'.[cdxcii]

Likewise, competition as diametric and cooperation as concentric assumed connection are fundamental spatial-relational frames relevant to recent cognitive science research on perspective taking as competition and cooperation. Cultural differences in the perception of "helping" (cooperative) versus "hurting" (competitive) interspecies relationships,[cdxciii] include contrasts between US and Ngöbe participants' beliefs about basic intentional capacities of

animals.[cdxciv] These are replete with spatial framing assumptions through concentric space of assumed connection in cooperation and diametric space of assumed separation in win/lose competition.[cdxcv] Concentric space of assumed connection frames common ground reciprocal processing perspective taking, in contrast to diametric spatial assumed separation as egocentric processing,[cdxcvi] themes relevant also to memory and language use.[cdxcvii]

In 2008, Keller et al.[cdxcviii] observed a shift in cross-cultural psychology from conceptions of a grand divide between models of interdependence and dependence[cdxcix] towards acknowledgement of the need for envisaging the dialectic coexistence of different cultural models within one cultural group.[d] Keller et al. examine the cultural nuances of meaning regarding relatedness and autonomy in a Cameroonian Nso context and conceptualise them also as being in dialectic interrelation. This dialectical interrelation and concern with assumptions of connection and separation offer a domain of relevance for examination of interaction between concentric and diametric structures of relation.

Building on conceptual metaphor understanding of embodied mathematics, where subtraction presupposes

separation,[di] physical procedures of separation and connection prime subtraction and addition solutions respectively.[dii] While these are proposed as linked to cleansing behaviour,[diii] the mathematical problem assumption structure of connection and separation rests on concentric and diametric spatial conditions.

Psychological research on perspective taking recognises rapid shifting between common ground and egocentric states and seek an interactive systems framework.[div] Concentric and diametric modes can serve as interacting spatial systems relevant to search for a more integrative framework for common ground and egocentric perspective taking.[dv] A mechanism of integration is suggested whereby people can *simultaneously* be other- *and* egocentric, and where, even in similar contexts, simple cues can impact on spontaneous perspective-taking behaviour.[dvi] Similarly, that the proposed categories of care and justice are distinct does not preclude that they can be simultaneously invoked for a given problem.[dvii]

Malleability between contrasting, interacting spatial conditions of diametric and concentric space is being proposed as key to diverse problem framing options. This

malleability may extend not only to switching between these two modes of spatial assumption structures but through processes of *interactive restructuring between diametric and concentric spatial systems*. These spaces are to be construed in systemic terms as candidate cross-cultural relational spaces. The question of *how* to develop malleability between concentric and diametric spatial systems requires further examination, building on calls for future research into the spontaneous or strategic interplay between grounded procedures of separation and connection in people's minds and social reality,[dviii] including cultural and individual differences.[dix]

Gilligan's later work engages with dimensions of loss of assumed connection in intrapsychic, as well as interpersonal, experience. Significantly, there is a specific recognition of the need to challenge Western cultural assumptions and conventions of experience that negate other spaces for experience. Thus, Gilligan highlights the tensions between female adolescent experience and a Western logic based on rigid dualisms:

The either/or logic that Gail was learning as an adolescent, the straightline categories of Western thinking (self/other, mind/body, thoughts/feelings, past/present) and the if/then construction of linear reasoning threatened to undermine Gail's knowledge of human relationships by washing out the logic of feelings.[dx]

Here Gilligan is, in effect, seeking a non-Western mode of experience that challenges diametric spatial intuitions.

Diametric spatial structures of mirror image inversion are also adverted to by Brown & Gilligan, for girls 'at the edge of adolescence', where 'what feels and seems unloving to girls is often called love; what feels and sounds mean or cruel in women is often covered by sweetness and called "sweet" or "nice"';[dxi] they characterize this diametric split in spatial terms as 'the wall' of 'relational impasse' .[dxii] Again an explicit tension with Western culture is invoked for a twelve/thirteen-year-old girl 'Jennifer' who moves 'into the sea of Western culture and a profound psychological loss'.[dxiii] This Western culture is viewed by Gilligan in terms of a diametric spatial splitting, 'The either-or framing (selfish or selfless, self or relationship) marks

an inner psychological split or division. Taking on moral language, girls take in the dichotomies of a culture which splits good from bad women and divides the selfish from the selfless'.[dxiv] Diametric spatial projections of assumed separation impinge upon experience and language.

Gilligan's phenomenological work on distinctive lived experiences of girls and women offers an antidote to many psychological traditions in developmental psychology and psychology of motivation that are locked within the Procrustean bed of diametric space. Gilligan offers direct challenge to hierarchical diametric spatial above/below mirror image schemes of Kohlberg based on male experience for moral reasoning, as well as Erikson's diametrically framed alternatives for each stage of human development, such as trust versus mistrust, identity versus role diffusion. Gilligan offers a different space. In doing so, she is not locked within the diametric spatial frames of positive versus negative reinforcement instilled at the core of Skinner's behaviorism. She also eschews the Cartesian split in Maslow's hierarchy of needs between basic bodily needs and growth psychological needs; Maslow adopts an implicit body/mind split for his psychology of motivation that is then wrapped within a

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diametric spatial edifice of above/below hierarchy in his hierarchy of needs in humanistic psychology. Gilligan's experiential and voice-based concerns offer a different space, a more open space, a concentric space of assumed connection between self and other, and importantly within the self as part of a listening process of attunement to one's self. Her expansion of understanding of relational spaces for frames in problem solving offers a vital lens for supporting development of perspective taking in social and emotional education, once these spaces are treated not simply as alternatives, but as contrasting vantage points in relational space that all humans need to foster.

The spatial framing dimension to Gilligan's 1982 accounts of choosing, reasoning and problem solving are not simply buried in terms such as assumed connection and assumed separation. She goes further to engage with concepts such as hierarchy and networks to underpin her contrasting modes of logic of justice versus ethic of care that rest on spatial conditions, though she does not amplify these as specifically spatial foundations. Yet a significant implication of Gilligan's spatial frames requires recognition. Gilligan has highlighted that there are some constraints on the spatial

frames for choice in problem solving reasoning. Different spaces bring radically different choosing processes. The shaping roles of spatial assumption structures regarding self and other are not inert or neutral; they are active organising systems. In other words, Kant's empty space frames for choice are being implicitly challenged in Gilligan's account.

Gilligan does not replace hierarchy with a blank space approach to power in systems, to assume that hierarchy's only alternative is an empty space to power that either ignores power relations in education and social groups or one which treats power as so diffuse and disparate as to offer no organising principle for it. Empty space is Kant's counterpole of transcendental freedom to contrast with natural determinism.[dxv] Kant's (third) antinomy between freedom and causality operates within this Cartesian and Lockean legacy of freedom as empty space, as a blank page for free choice unconstrained. It is the pivotal spatial background that supports what Berlin describes as 'an obsessive central principle' [dxvi] of Kant, as freedom of choice as humanity's defining feature. Berlin goes so far as to characterise Kant as an unlikely 'father of romanticism'[dxvii] at least in his moral philosophy on choice, freedom and responsibility.

Kant's framework is the often-silent backdrop to structural determinism versus agency oppositions in the social sciences.[dxviii] Kant's antinomies of pure reason are expressed as a thesis and antithesis; for example, his Third Antinomy: Thesis – There are in the world causes through freedom. Antithesis – There is no freedom, but all is nature. For Kant, both sides of the antinomy can be equally permitted to stand on their own terms.[3] This proposed intelligible ground of a transcendental cause as freedom concerns 'thought in the pure understanding'.[dxix] Kant treats freedom as a transcendental 'idea', as the counterpole to empirical causality:

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[3] In explicating his Third Antinomy, Kant (1781A) outlines the well-known, self-referential problem of infinite regress in causal explanations for empirical realism: The causality of a cause, therefore, through which something takes place is itself an event which, again according to the law of nature, presupposes an anterior state and its causality, and this again an anterior state, and so on. (p. A474) According to the laws of nature, there will never be a 'first beginning', and the series is incomplete; Kant (1781A) thus asks about a counterpole to causality as part of this antinomy: 'is it not possible that empirical causality itself could nevertheless without in the least breaking its connection with natural causes, be an effect of a nonempirical, intelligible causality?' (p. A572).)

> Reason, therefore, acts freely, without being
> determined dynamically in the chain of natural causes
> by external or internal conditions earlier in time. That
> freedom must then not only be regarded negatively,
> as independence of empirical conditions . . . but
> should be defined positively also, as the power of
> beginning spontaneously a series of events.[dxx]

Reason is not to be regarded as a 'concurrent agency only, but
as complete in itself".[dxxi] On this view of Kant, reason is
'*determining*, not *determined*'.[dxxii] Kant offers a position of
creativity, freedom or agency *ex nihilo*, as an empty space for
choice unrestrained by the diametric oppositional counterpole
of the determined natural world. A more detailed analysis of
Kant's Third Antinomy in terms of diametric mirror image
spatial inversions has been undertaken elsewhere, as well as
regarding interplay between Gilligan's modes of spatial
reasoning.[dxxiii]

Gilligan's different spaces are not Kant's, Descartes' or
Locke's empty spaces for choosing, but specific concrete
spatial systems of experience as the assumed separation of
diametric space (for logic of justice) and assumed connection

of concentric space (for ethic of care). Her work is tantamount to a reconstruction not only of stage theories in developmental psychology such as those of Kohlberg and Erikson, Gilligan has also shifted the sands of the modernist edifice of space. In doing so, she offers not a simple deconstruction of modernism but rather a significant broadening of the kinds of rationality that are possible in perspective taking for decision making.

Concentric Spaces of Silence as Attunement: Reconfiguring Spaces in School

As part of the remit of social and emotional education at a whole school level, there is a need to challenge a diametric opposition between voice and silence, where silence is mere absence of voice in education and society, as tends to be assumed in Gilligan's work. Gilligan's work describes what amounts to a diametric structured, mirror image inversion between voice and silence as a feature of repressive cultural communication, 'Girls in the study live in a territory between voice and silence: If they continue to speak from their experience, they may find that their voice is out of relationship, too loud, off key. If they remain silent, they are in

immediate danger of disappearing'.[dxxiv] Connection in relationship to others is envisaged as a pathway out of such fragmentation. Yet spaces of silence can offer positive possibilities of their own in education as part of connection within oneself.

There are many calibrations of silence and an attunement to concentric spatial modes of experience - as an opening to a more intense apprehension of silence in experience - invites a challenge to many prevailing portrayals of silence. Thus, silence need not be simply a loss of voice as a cultural marginalisation; it need not be a silence of fear and terror of authority in an authoritarian punitive regime stifling freedom of expression. Silence does not have to serve a role simply as counterfoil to sound, as in James's account:

> Into the awareness of thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps in and continues; for when we hear thunder crashing, it is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it [dxxv]

Silence need not be reduced to a role of empty space, as mere interval between sounds. It need not be a sheer thwarting of sound. Spaces of silence are possible as concentric spaces of assumed connection to self in school. Illustrative responses to the questions, 'Is there a room in your school where anyone can go if they just want some peace and quiet, some time to think ? Do you think it would be a good idea if there was a room like this?' from females age 11-12 in a Dublin school context of higher poverty were as follows:

> "there is no room like that but I wish there was",
> "I would love if there was a room like that because I have a lot to think about",
> "yes I think that's a good idea because you might need to think about a problem",
> "No there is no room in my school like that I would really like one",
> "Yes that would be excellent for people so they can think alone"[dxxvi]

Part of this need was related to confined spaces at home:

"a great idea because you don't need people shouting, sometimes need your own space to think",

"if too much noise in the house I go to the library so I can hear myself think",

"I'd like that, give you time to think and relax"[dxxvii]

Concentric spaces of silence in school can help attunement to self, as part of a listening process within rather than a hall of mirrors of endless reflection of gazing within through self-analysis. These spaces can offer distancing from the inauthenticity of much of the social world, including the reflections of endless photos of self and other in social media. In doing so, this serves to recognise that the world of images is a layer of human discourse but far from being fundamental to experience.

Advocating for concentric spaces of silence in schools is still to acknowledge historical accounts of oppositional silence as diametric spaces. One hallmark of the Magdalen Laundries in Ireland was diametric exclusion through silence. Accounts of this in the Ryan report 2009 include the following, 'A woman who entered a Magdalen Laundry following an

earlier time in an industrial school said ...that she was "never allowed talk. If you were caught you'd be moved to other end of laundry"'.[dxxviii] A further silencing diametric exclusion occurred through censorship:

> The women who shared their experiences of the Magdalen Laundries with the Committee spoke of very similar experiences in relation to communication by letter with family or friends. They told the Committee that all letters which they sent or received were read by the Sisters.
> One woman said that in the Magdalen Laundry "Your letters were checked and letters in were definitely checked".[dxxix]

> Another woman described the practice as follows: "They read them and they didn't get out or in if they didn't suit". [dxxx]

A strategy of a diametric structure of exclusion through silence was also evident for Letterfrack industrial school in Ireland:

> Transferring Br. Leveret to Salthill, which was the way in which the problem was dealt with, did nothing to reduce his propensity for violence in his dealings with boys.[dxxxi]

This pernicious dominion of diametric space operated not only at an intentional level but also, perhaps more insidiously, as a background taken for granted assumption, a pre-reflective acceptance, what Heidegger[dxxxii] would term a horizon of understanding.

Whereas Berger & Neuhaus[dxxxiii] seek mediating structures between the individual and State, the current focus is on mediating spaces in and around schools, spaces of assumed connection between self and other, and within oneself. As well as silent spaces, these can include community lifelong learning centres that offer a welcoming, nonthreatening environment,[dxxxiv] the school as a 'safe haven',[dxxxv] with nurture rooms, multisensory rooms, safe yard spaces and spaces for students' voices.[dxxxvi] Such concentric spatial systems of mediation need to be part of an assertive outreach strategy to engage so-called harder to reach groups,

to focus on the relational space between the person communicating with these groups, to focus on the how of communication as well as the credibility and cultural competence and sociocultural barriers of distrust, as part of the who question. In contrast, focus tends to be on the *what* question, as part of an information processing type of flawed communicative approach. Diametric oppositional spaces of distrust and fracturing need active steps to be overcome as part of a relational spatial focus on bridge building across social class and ethnic divides.

Concentric spaces of assumed connection in school foster trust as a protective factor against bullying [dxxxvii] relevant also for an early school leaving prevention focus.[dxxxviii] There relational spaces are also central to a connective school climate that is a key background for any formative assessment dimension to social and emotional education. Inclusion, exclusion and marginalisation are spatially imbued concepts, while school bullying prevention is a core dimension of a strategic approach to early school leaving prevention as part of a social inclusion in education agenda.

CHAPTER 12

Jung's Search for Meaning and the Concentric Spatial Mandala as the Central Archetype of the Collective Unconscious

The argument for a spatial expansion in experience towards concentric space and fostering of concentric spatial systems to facilitate this process is in full recognition of the fragility of such a process, both as a stress on the system of the individual and as a historically uncertain step. This is an argument far removed from a view of concentric spaces as an irresistible cultural force. Social forces may swallow the subtlety of an individual's personal identity and experience to further bury and entomb the ripples of concentric space in experience, even if the calling of the human heart seeks these holistic experiential spaces with an accelerated intensity. Historical narratives of progress must give way, as postmodern thought and indeed Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*[dxxxix] recognises, to an ebb and flow of openings and closures across epochs.

Of additional concern is the OECD's 2015 prescription towards extraversion over introversion[dxl] in a manner that is directly anathema to Jung's own emphasises on the key distinctive strengths of introversion as attuning to psychic energy within. A more European approach to Social and Emotional Education has been sought to be developed, not only to challenge the reductionism of aspects of the OECD's agenda as part of an employment led shaping of students' experiences, but also to foreground children and young people's voices and experiences, as part of a children's rights based agenda[dxli] that is on less secure footing in US contexts given that it is the sole country yet to ratify the UN CRC. Put simply, a social and emotional education that does not engage centrally with children and young people's lived experiences and voices, through co-constructed approaches, becomes a vehicle of social control of future generations and potentially a process of cultural and ethnic colonisation.

This is not an apologia for a diametric mirror image reversal of self-control into sheer, random impulsivity but rather a quest for a different space, a concentric space, one that is not so firmly betrothed to Western modern rationalist traditions of Cartesianism, Puritanism and Lockean *tabula*

rasa. Diametric space as a foundation for self-consciousness is being viewed for current purposes as a displacement from concentric spatial modes of experience; concentric spaces are prior to the distanciation of assumed separation from self needed to observe the self. Fromm[dxlii] linked the observing mode to a mechanisation in experience; the observing mode to self-awareness is different from a listening to self, that does not involve a distanciation in our spatial mode of being. Listening within does not require the self to be an object for consciousness, it is a more proximate relation and space. However, concentric space as a mode of being, is not confined simply to the aural sense.

In seeking to jolt human modes of being out of the dominance of self-consciousness that rest on diametric spatial modes of being reliant on assumed separation as a basic splitting from self, others and world, this is not to obliterate self-consciousness but rather to seek an acceleration of conscious awareness, as a capacity for expansion of stimuli. Concentric spatial modes of being are more open, less hardened in boundaries, more receptive to new stimuli though they are a relative openness not an absolute openness that obliterates all boundaries to fuse oneself in a monistic space

of infinite stimuli. Concentric spatial modes of being offer a more fluid structural opening than a simply generic mode of opening in experience. Far from obliterating rationalism, concentric space offers a different kind of rationality embedded and attuned with the breath and emotions.

The diametric spatially structured Cartesian mode of experience promotes a conception of inwardness as a self-conscious observing state, with self as object. It rests on what Ricoeur describes as the 'distanciation' upon which the subject-object division is based, except here it is the subject that makes an object of itself in self-consciousness. Concentric space keeps an inwardness of self though this is a different interiority to that of diametric space. The inward space of concentric relation is in an assumed connection with the outer space, of others and the social world. Yet assumed connection is still a distinct space that is not to be collapsed into a monistic relation to the social, where the self is nothing but the social.

Most importantly, concentric spatial inwardness differs from the interiority of the contours of diametric spatial opposition, concentric space is not self-conscious awareness of self as object but is a pre-self-conscious immanence, an immediacy of experience in the moment. This individual

immanence in being oneself, in lived experience and attunement of self in concentric space is not the same as self-conscious or hyper self-conscious awareness. It is a pre-representational mode of experience, a precognitive state of being, a spontaneity in experience that is pre-reflective. Whether treated as a meditative state of emptying of consciousness, a pre-representational state of rapture in music as Schopenhauer and the early Nietzsche sought[4] or far beyond, there are myriad experiences of concentric spaces of being, rather than a simple one to one correspondence with just one kind of such experience. The question arises as to how social and emotional education can embrace concentric spatial modes of lived experience and not simply be chained into diametric spaces of self-consciousness seeped within the limitations of the Western modernist paradigm.

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[4] Early Nietzsche's prerepresentational experience was linked with a listening process in his emphasis on music. However, the Dionysian myth he invoked is unhelpful as it conflates his earlier and later concerns. It is also inaccurate as the experiential expansion he described is different from the actual historical myth of Dionysus. The later Nietzsche and the Dionysian betray many of the hallmarks of an acceleration of diametric space and not a recalibration of experience into a different kind of space (Downes 2020a).

In this reconfiguration of spaces of experience away from the diametric spatial foundations of modernist modes of experience, this is not to move towards a postmodernist collapse of all inwardness into the social. A more subtle movement, a more nuanced space is needed to breathe life into the sedimented walls of much of current human experience. A spatial turn is needed for social and emotional education, resonant with wider calls in education,[dxliii] psychology,[dxliv] philosophy[dxlv] and the social sciences for a spatial turn.

To challenge othering is to challenge its diametric spatial foundations and to do so requires a replacement in these spatial foundations of diametric space with a different space, a concentric spatial precondition for multifarious modes of experience. Challenge to othering requires not only a cognitive shift from the hardened boundaries of diametric space, it also requires a restructuring in experience from this 'thick partition[dxlvi]' between self and other, as part of what Schopenhauer characterises as a mode of compassion. Elsewhere, I have argued that Schopenhauer's compassion is tantamount to a concentric spatial relation between self and other, where oneself suffers with the other (*Mitleid*), in

assumed connection with the other around the common centre – the concentric spatial co-centre; – the other encompasses part of yourself, you and the other are not fundamentally separate but coexist through a common humanity.

Concentric space recognises boundaries between self and other though they coexist as more fluid boundaries than the calcified walls of diametric space as the atomised self splitting from the other. There is a clear need to broaden social and emotional education beyond Western biased constructs of motivation. For example, Mulla and Krishnan identify two dimensions of Karma-Yoga, namely, sense of duty or obligation towards others and an absence of desire for rewards; the latter dimension offers a clear challenge to Western assumptions.[dxlvii] Karma-Yoga differs from conventional Western models of motivation reliant on an individualistic hedonistic bias and which are largely based on cognitive calculative processes.[dxlviii] Skinner's radical behaviourism[dxlix] is framed within diametric structured alternatives of positive reinforcement (reward) and negative reinforcement (punishment), whereas Karma-Yoga seeks an alternative to

such diametric structured conceptions of reality split into polar opposites.

Influenced by Eastern traditions of understanding, Jung's work is probably best known for four key concepts, namely, individual differences of extraversion/introversion, the midlife crisis of meaning, individuation and the collective unconscious. Jung coined the distinction between extraversion and introversion, as part of a concern with individual differences in personality.[dl] An extraverted mode receives psychic energy (libido is a sense wider than the sexual) from the outside world, an introverted mode of experience receives energy from within. This concept is more subtle than simply placing people into categories as they are for Jung two modes of experience, two capacities for experience, not mere personality labels.[dli] The OECD's extolling of extraversion over introversion for its proposed variant of social and emotional education as 'skills' completely misunderstands the strengths of introversion and the weaknesses of extraversion in terms of conformity, lack of sensitivity and formulaic thinking emphasised by Jung.[dlii]

A second influential concept of Jung's is his emphasis on search for meaning in life as part of a midlife crisis of

meaning, resonant with the existential *Angst* of for example, Munch's painting *The Scream*.[dliii] This dissatisfaction with meaning in life often having attained life's conventional goals is particularly insistent 'with the onset of middle age'[dliv] as a root of the mid-life crisis, a notion usually accredited to Jung and further emphasised by Erikson.[dlv] Jung recognised that this anxiety and loss of meaning in the individual takes place against a wider cultural backdrop of a loss of collective meanings as myths, including with the decline in organised religion. Individuals are being increasingly forced to construct their own myths regarding meaning in life, rather than rely on deposited myths laid down to them. An individual crisis of being is part of a wider collective crisis of being, as Jung recognised already in the first part of the twentieth century.

The loss of myths as collective meanings was part of Jung's preoccupation with myth. Lévi-Strauss firmly distinguished his own concern with myth from Jungian concerns, as his structuralist framework in anthropology focused on contrasts between myths rather than in the lived experience of a myth treated in isolation. Moreover, Jung's work was more directly concerned with the individual, with phenomenological aspects of lived experience[dlvi], than Lévi-

Strauss' account of myths. Jung's central concept here was that of individuation, that the individual needs to separate from the herd, from the crowd as a key step towards personal development; personal identity is not to be flattened and submerged into group identity, the social (as distinct from the interpersonal in close personal relationships) is not the pathway into the cavernous depths of the individual's spaces of interiority. The social mask or persona, as Jung termed it, is a mechanical aspect of the ego that may devour the depths of the self for those ill-attuned to their personal development and self-awareness.

Jung is also well known for his broadening of early Freud's unconscious beyond simply a repository for repressed memories, as a site for painful, often traumatic memories to treat the unconscious as an active source of energy, as psychic energy in an experiential system. He treated the unconscious world as a wider phenomenon, as a collective unconscious, transpersonal in structure, whether through myths or recurrent patterns shaping human experience across diverse cultures, patterns he called archetypes, such as the hero archetype. Like Freud though, he sought modes of experience more fundamental than the Cartesian *cogito*, Jung's terrain

entered spaces of experience and understanding below the edifice of modernism. The Cartesian cognitive ego was not denied by Jung, but he was aware of the limits of its domain of potency in the spaces of many individuals' experiences, as part of his recognition of a psychology facilitating and celebrating individual differences.

Allied with his accentuation of lived experiences and individual differences, a notable feature of Jung's work is his trenchant critique of a psychology promoting imitation. In stark contrast to the subsequent cognitive-behavioural emphasis of Bandura on role modelling, Jung rejected advocacy for role models in the task of an adult's personal growth. Jung viewed role models as the need of children and animals. His psychology sought a process of individuation where the individual resisted the pressure of the group, to forge their own individual identity. Antithetical also to Girard's mimetic desire in scapegoating, imitation of others, including of a group or groups' norms, was not the pathway towards meaning in life for a Jungian psychology. Jung eschewed imitation and conformity for the individual in personal growth. The journey towards a concentric spatially structured mode of experience in quest for the level of the Self in experience and

in restriction and restructuring of the diametric spatial ego[dlvii] involves the shedding of a herd mentality.

Jung recognised that a collapse in shared meaning through group myths as making sense of life was taking place rapidly in Western culture. His response was ultimately not a nostalgia for past myths but rather that the individual confronts this mythic fragmentation, this dissipation of shared meanings. This confrontation is part of the individuation process towards attunement to a deeper layer of experience that Jung termed the Self, in contrast with the ego layer including the social mask of a mechanised, routinised persona. While Jung was hugely influenced by and explicitly drew on Eastern thought, in stark contrast to the much more Western cultural motivation structure of Maslow's hierarchy of needs for personal development, the ego layer was for Jung not simply illusory as in a Buddhist sense of *samsara* but functional as part of a defensive structure as part of personality formation. Nevertheless, the ego required modification and restructuring for Jung as part of a personal growth life journey to attune to deeper levels of experience as the self.

For Jung, the individual is to find her or his own pathways to meaning, not *ex nihilo* – not as a blank page as a Lockean *tabula rasa* – but rather through this existential journey towards a deeper mode of awareness, as the concentric structured 'self' layer of experience. He stated that a collapse of the Christian myth in Western culture requires replacement with other sources of meaning that anticipated a major cultural void of meaninglessness with the turn away from traditional conventional religions.

A focus on the ego-self axis as dynamic interacting spaces, as spatial systems of mutual tension, brings a shift in focus for the collective unconscious. This shift is away from past-historical myths shaping the collective unconscious (a position not far removed from that of Freud in his reliance on the ancient Greek Oedipus myth for his Oedipus complex in the father-son developmental dynamic). It opens the door to spaces as a current, dynamically active feature of a current collective unconscious, not simply betrothed to past cultural experiences.

The matrix of a collective unconscious that invokes the mandala as its central and unifying archetype is quite different from the outer layer of one simply reliant on myths

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and cultural archetypes. This mandala structured matrix is a currently active process, where collective experience impacts upon the individual's experiential space. The individual and collective are not to be collapsed into one, as with postmodern understandings of the social text. The individual's experiential spatial systems and the collective unconscious spaces can be in assumed connection while remaining distinct.

While technological developments with the worldwide web and social media display a shared space of public images and texts as a kind of collective consciousness, this perhaps makes it easier to imagine Jung's idea of a dynamic collective space of experience that is unconscious, the collective unconscious. Jung sought a rebalancing of Western experience away from extraversion and towards introversion, as part of personal growth that restructures both aspects. In doing so, he grew to view the unifying archetype of the collective unconscious as a mandala structure – in other words, a concentric spatial structure of experience. Lessons from the Covid pandemic lockdown offers some opportunities for an accelerated attunement to introversion, including a confrontation with silence in a world blitzed with external stimuli.

The Mandala as a Concentric Space Structuring Experience:
Jung's Central Archetype of the Collective Unconscious

While Jung's work tends to emphasise primordial images as past-historical dimensions shaping the collective unconscious, the proposed primordial dance of spaces between a diametric spatially structured ego and a concentric spatial system of the self, operates at a level of description prior to images and symbols. Valsiner highlights the need for greater focus on Eastern dimensions to understanding of opposition in constructing a universal, culture-inclusive and context-sensitive psychology:

> What we can learn from different cultural histories is the variety of common language (and sense) bases for creating an abstract universal science. For example— the need for considering opposites united within the same whole—and the whole capable of new forms of synthesis—where the Hindu indigenous psychological heritage can in principle innovate psychological science.[dlviii]

He notes that traditional Western thought tends to neglect these concerns and though they exist in Hegelian dialectics, applications of Hegel to psychology have been 'rare'[dlix], with exceptions including the work of Vygotsky,[dlx] as well as Riegel[dlxi] and Markova.[dlxii] Jung could also be added to this list of exceptions. Jung's theoretical reliance on opposition has gone so far as to earn him the perhaps polemical title of the dialectician in history who has put the most emphasis on opposition.[dlxiii]

In humanistic psychology, Maslow[dlxiv] employed a hierarchical schema within which to frame his Cartesian type of theory of motivation based on a mind/body split transported into psychological terminology of growth and survival needs. This hierarchical schema gave minimal consideration to Eastern ascetic traditions in his explication of a purportedly universal theory of motivation. One of Jung's key background frames is the mandala symbol (see Fig.3). He highlighted the cross-cultural prevalence of the primordial mandala symbol in passages such as the following:

> Just as the stupas preserve relics of the Buddha in their innermost sanctuary, so in the interior of the

Lamaic quadrangle, and again in the Chinese earthsquare, there is a Holy of Holies with its magical agent, the cosmic source of energy, be it the god Shiva, the Buddha, a bodhisattva or a great teacher. In China, it is Ch'ien—heaven—with the four cosmic effluences radiating from it. [dlxv]

FIGURE 3. Mandala

Similarly, he noted that 'in the Western mandalas of medieval Christendom the deity is enthroned at the centre, often in the form of the triumphant redeemer together with the four symbolical figures of the evangelists'.[dlxvi] This mandala

symbol is an expression of purportedly transcendent experience, a source of depth of energy in some mysterious way, across varying cultures historically. While elsewhere he emphasised multiple disparate dimensions to the Self,[dlxvii] Jung affirmed the centrality of concentric structures with the following words:

> The mythological motifs whose presence have been demonstrated by the exploration of the unconscious form in themselves a multiplicity, but *this culminates in a concentric or radial order which constitutes the true centre or essence of the collective unconscious.* On account of the remarkable agreement between the insights of yoga and the results of psychological research, I have chosen the Sanskrit term *mandala* for this central symbol.[dlxviii]

This is a very large claim being made by Jung. Working through the complexity of images emerging from an individual's personal history and also the collective unconscious, there is ostensibly an underlying unity or at least potential unity within this multiplicity. On this view a unified

meaning to experience is possible. The mandala is implicated in this potential unity, while Jung also went further than simply recognising the necessity of fragmentation through acknowledging the need to embrace the diversity of multiple primordial images in the collective unconscious. Jung clearly privileged this concentric spatial structure, the mandala, over other archetypal images that may occupy the collective unconscious, stating that the mandala 'symbolises, by its central point, the ultimate unity of all archetypes as well as of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world'.[dlxix]

However, Jung frequently reiterated the importance of the 'quaternity' or four corners of the outer square in the mandala. Jung relied upon the structural feature of the quaternity drawn from his interpretation of the mandala structure, to criticise the incompleteness of a science based on a 'trinity' of space, time and causality.[dlxx] To move from a trinity to a quaternity, a fourth element is supposedly needed, which Jung termed synchronicity, an acausal connecting principle. [dlxxi] Most centrally to his psychological thought, his non-hierarchical quaternity of the four functions drawn from the four corners of the mandala, placed feeling diagonally opposite to thinking[dlxxii] so that 'real thinking…must rigorously

exclude feeling'.[dlxxiii] Van der Post (1978,) was keen to emphasise the archetypal importance of number for Jung.[dlxxiv] Moreover, Jung strongly emphasised archetypal form drawn from the mandala when mentioning that his particular characterisations of personality into four or eight psychological types are not the only possible characterisations, though the number of the types would remain constant. In Jung's words, 'But whatever the criterion for a classification of types may be, a comparison of the various forms of habitual attitudes will result in an equal number of psychological types'.[dlxxv] The quaternity dimension to the mandala structure allowed for a conception of a diagonally opposed function as the unconscious undeveloped 'shadow' function, so that feeling would be the shadow function for thinking, intuition the shadow function for sensation and vice-versa. This whole framework for interpretation of the mandala structure relied not upon concentric features to the mandala but on an interpretation of the mandala as a square, where the inner circle becomes largely superfluous, except as a level of wholeness to overcome the separate functions into a transcendent function.

Not only did this emphasise on the quaternity in the mandala amount to a neglect of the concentric dimensions to the mandala, it was an emphasis on diametric features of the mandala (as a square) which is made explicit in Jung's position that 'thinking and feeling are so *diametrically opposed* that thinking almost automatically throws out feeling values and vice-versa' (my italics).[dlxxvi] Jung's reliance on purported diametric dimensions to the mandala obfuscates the concentric dimensions.

Jung identified a concentric spatial structure of experience as the central archetype of the collective unconscious, as a fundamental layer of experience, though he did not bring to the fore the distinctive spatial features of concentric space as a system in experience. However, he did invoke a compensatory interplay between ego and self, with the self as the mandala, though not making fully explicit these spatial systemic movements as a diametric and concentric spatial interplay. [dlxxvii]

A Meditative Social and Emotional Education of the Breath

Taking the breath seriously as a fundamental mode of experience leads to challenging the very frames within which most of Western psychology operates. As Jung acknowledged, in the East 'the psyche is…all important; it is all-pervading Breath, the Buddha-essence'.[dlxxviii] Eastern frames, thus, need to be developed for psychology, ones which could give expression to modes of experience which recognise the pivotal importance of breathing. Breath is not reducible to body, to hierarchy, to mind as computer space. Movement beyond a static reified image of the mandala through accommodation of a dimension of time is being sought to breathe life into the mandala symbol.

The idea of a breathing mandala can be developed beyond a metaphor by closer examination of concentric and diametric structures of relation in relation to the breath. Contrasts between a concentric and diametric mode of relation can be related to human experience regarding breathing. A concentric relation of the breath as an inner circle within the outer circle of the body, assumes a basic connection involving awareness of the breath in the body, whereas a diametric relation of the breath to the body splits awareness of breathing as a basic experience. In the words of a 10-year-

old, Irish girl, in a questionnaire response, 'It's good to talk about your feelings, you feel relaxed and relieved instead of holding your breath'.[dlxxix] Breathing is a process of relation, which can be expressed through the primordial structures of relation of concentric and diametric modes in dynamic tension. Meditation as the emptying of the mind invites a more intense awareness of the breathing process. This emphasis on breathing as part of connection to a transcendent or transpersonal level of experience (for example, through holotropic breathing) challenges a view of spirit as mind, and reclaims the association between spirit and breath in a range of cultures.

As Edwards notes,[dlxxx] spirit, as mind or intellect, contrasts with, for example, the Latin etymology of *spiritus* as breath. He highlights the etymological links between breath and spirit across ancient African, Indian, Greek and Chinese traditions. As well as the languages highlighted by Edwards, it can be observed that spirit as breath is also still evident in, for example, Finno-Ugric languages, Russian and Hebrew. For example, spirit in Finnish is *henki* (breath) and spiritual (*hengillinen*) literally means breathful. Similarly, in Estonian, hing (spirit) is expressed through *hingama* (to breathe) and

hingeohk (breath). Moreover, in Russian, *duch* means spirit, *dusha* means soul, both of which have clear associations with *dychanie* (breath) and *dyshat* (to breathe). Similarly, the Hebrew etymology of *ruach* unites spirit and wind. These roots are largely lost to an English association of spirit as mind and a German, or at least Hegelian, treatment of spirit as *Geist* or self-consciousness. Nevertheless, association between spirit and breath is implicit in English terms such as respiration.

The mandala can be interpreted as a circular space opened in the structure of the heart for the awareness of the flow of the breath. A compressed circle, in other words, a line, expresses the closure of a space giving awareness of the breath flow. Recognition of the dimensions of breathing as a mode of awareness challenges traditional Western reliance on empirical experience through the five senses, such as in Descartes and Kant. However, Homer's *Odyssey* furnishes an indirect point of reference in traditional Western thought for associations between spirit and breath, with occasional examples of their interconnection, such as in the following passages:

> …to let a coward breathe/Spirit enough to dare his brother's death? [dlxxxi]

> The spirit of that little, that the whole/A sacred odour breath'd about the bowl.[dlxxxii] But deity/Hath giv'n so many other sighs and cares/To my attendant state.[dlxxxiii]

Acceptance of the dimensions of breathing as a mode of awareness also challenges other Western views, which rely on assumptions of intentionality, where consciousness is assumed to have an object, whereas meditative expansiveness of breathing is more an objectless experience.

Despite some scepticism on his part, Jung did acknowledge accounts of the experience of *satori* in Eastern cultures, including a level of imageless experience. Jung gives an account of Edward Maitland's emphasis on 'suspension of breathing' where ordinary breathing stops and is replaced by an internal respiration, 'as if by breathing of a distinct personality within and other than the physical organism'.[dlxxxiv] However, Jung's own tendency to associate spirit with mind and abstraction in Hegelian *Geist*-like fashion, is evident, for

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example, in his letter to Wolfgang Pauli (24 October 1953).[dlxxxv]
It is notable that the assumed separation, or what Ricoeur calls
the 'distanciation',[dlxxxvi] built into the subject–object dualism, is
a diametric structured feature for image-based experience. In
other words, perception of an image requires a perceiving
subject and a perceived object, real or imaginary and a
necessary condition for this mode of experience is that it is a
diametric structured one, based on this assumed separation
between subject and object. Thus, movement into imageless
in experience in *satori* requires a shift from diametric
structures of relation, and arguably towards the
complementary pole of concentric structures of relation for
experience. On this view, concentric modes of experience are
associated with an emptying of mind and new angle of relation
to experience of the breath.

This invites the question as to breath awareness and
meditation as being embedded in a social and emotional
education of the present and future, as part of a social and
emotional education that goes beyond Western cages of
diametric spatial experience for a fluidity of the breath. Breath
awareness is a key part of a spatial opening for social and
emotional education, as part of a broadened social and

emotional education to embrace issues of spatial restructuring in experience regarding othering, the iron cage of instrumental reason, fear of freedom, celebration of introversion and shift into more concentric spaces of experience attuned to nature and silence. This social and emotional education is an expansion beyond the Cartesian *cogito* of cognitive 'skills' and the postmodern reduction of interiority to the social group. In celebrating individuals' voices and differences, social and emotional education can offer a panorama for global education systems to avoid, in Porter's words, 'the torment of talent thwarted',[dlxxxvii] as well as for promoting inclusive systems in education.[dlxxxviii]

Spaces of silence can offer an emptying in meditation from the self-conscious mind, of self as object. A social and emotional education is needed for attunement to breathing, as spaces of the breath, for a concentric relation between breath and the body, to freshen the sedimented walls of the flesh and breath inside the body.

PART IV

**Contours of a Fundamental Dynamic Spatial
Axis Projected Through Experience and
Thought**

CHAPTER 13

Uncovering the System Axis of Interacting Spaces Shaping Experience, Thought and Language

It is being argued that space frequently operates surreptitiously to sustain imbalanced system habits and practices, typically towards diametric and monistic spaces, and away from concentric spaces. Concentric and diametric spaces express a mutual interactive tension where increase in one brings a decrease in the other. They operate in a mutually compensatory relation, where one is a structural modification, a restructuring of the other; concentric poles become broken into diametric split spaces of juxtaposition. However, a wider system of spaces can also be uncovered building on the fundamental reference points of concentric and diametric spatial systems. This axis of spatial systems involves the following additional modes or atmospheres of spatial system relation in experience and understanding – figure-ground, and monism. Yin/yang will be seen to give expression to an interplay between concentric and diametric spaces.

Gestalt figure–ground spatial relations as a variant of diametric space

The well-known artistic distinction between figure and ground is illustrated in the ambiguous figure (Fig. 4) devised by the Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin. Hofstadter's discussion of the figure–ground distinction highlights the importance of foreground–background interaction for Gestalt psychology:

> When a figure or positive space (e.g., a human form, or a letter, or a still life) is drawn inside a frame, an unavoidable consequence is that its complementary shape also called the 'ground' or 'background' or 'negative space' has also been drawn. In most drawings, however, the figure–ground relationship plays little role. The artist is much less interested in the ground than the figure. But sometimes, an artist will take interest in the ground as well.[dlxxxix]

FIGURE 4. Figure-Ground

Hofstadter states the need to distinguish between two kinds of figure, cursively drawable ones and recursive ones. A cursively drawable figure is one whose ground [space] is merely an accidental by-product of the drawing act. A recursive figure is one whose ground [space] can be seen as a figure in its own right. This is typically quite deliberate on the part of the artist.

The question arises as to the relationship between the Gestalt figure–ground and diametric and concentric spaces. The interaction between Gestalt figure and ground is not one where the ground tends to surround the figure (e.g., face to vase, the face does not surround the vase) unlike the outer concentric structure surrounding the inner concentric structure. The realm for active interaction between Gestalt

figure and ground is limited to one side only of each shape –
there are still two distinct halves in the Gestalt figure–ground
as with diametric rather than concentric space. Moreover,
these two halves can be smoothly detached from one another
without losing their overall structure as with diametric space.
The shape of each is only mutually self-defining in a limited
sense, namely, that their interactive mutuality depends on the
closure and definition of the other parts of both figure and
ground – the parts that are not in active interaction. Only a
limited aspect of both poles engage with the other in figure–
ground interaction. This all highlights that the Gestalt figure–
ground is more a diametric than concentric structure. It is
arguably, however, a less extreme form of diametric relation,
as there is at least the implication of a reciprocal,
complementary relation between both aspects, the figure and
ground in their mutual self-defining roles. On a view of
concentric relation as a trajectory for change to diametric
relation, a figure– ground diametric relation illustrates a
dimension of movement from diametric relation *simpliciter* in
its interplay with the process of concentric relational space.

Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* offers an example of
figure-ground spaces projected into conceptual frames of

understanding.[dxc] Nietzsche predominantly conceptualises the Apollo–Dionysus relation as a figure–ground relation where both are in assumed separation from the other, yet mutually defining the other's shape: 'the reconciliation of two adversaries, clearly defining the boundaries to be respected'.[dxci] As 'adversaries', they are fundamentally in a diametric space of assumed separation, which is the starting point from which a 'reconciliation' arrives as a figure–ground relation of some interaction. This is not a transformational restructuring but a figure– ground relation, as Nietzsche expressly refers to 'boundaries' being 'respected'.

For Nietzsche, this figure–ground relation between the Apollonian and Dionysian is 'a relationship of reciprocal stimulation and intensification',[dxcii] which is to 'run in parallel with one another' 'coupled with one another'.[dxciii] A parallel coupling again is consistent with a figure–ground duality. They are in a relation of complementary reciprocity as being mutually self-defining. Yet each can exist without the other. Thus, they are in a real and not simply modal distinction.[dxciv] This real distinction is possible with figure–ground relations as each can exist in shape and meaning without the other, although their reciprocal relation can add 'intensification' to

their mutual meaning. The opening paragraph of *Birth of Tragedy* compares the Apollonian and Dionysian to intercourse between the sexes for 'more energetic births'.[dxcv] The sexual imagery to describe the relation between both at the outset is very much resonant with a figure–ground relation, as both can exist in shape and meaning without the other; again reciprocal stimulation and intensification in a sexual sense offers a mode of interaction that still relies on two distinct entities coming together, as in a figure–ground reciprocity.

The Active Spaces of Yin/Yang

Jahoda's 1982 cross-cultural survey of anthropological research concludes that 'the simplest and at the same time most common type of symbolic classification...is the dual one'.[dxcvi] He notes that the Chinese classification of yin/yang (see Fig. 5) is 'perhaps the best known case of this'.[dxcvii] Similarly, Osgood [dxcviii] refers to the Chinese symbol of yin and yang to argue for the fundamental role of bipolar oppositions.

FIGURE 5. Yin/Yang

An obvious though neglected feature of the yin/yang symbol is that it provides a prelinguistic spatial set of implications. It offers an apprehension of reality that is prior to language and Western conceptions of truth in late Wittgensteinian terms as language games.[dxcix] A coherent silent discourse can emerge from interpretation of yin/yang. This discourse of implication is to be distinguished from the traditional associations with yin/yang; it emerges from the relations between concentric and diametric dualism. A first step in examining this spatial discourse of implication in yin/yang is to recognise that the opposition between light and dark in yin/yang is predominantly a complementary one, where there is a neutrality as to which is to gain priority. The very notion of balance in yin/yang suggests that it is a state of

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being in the centre between light and dark that is the basic priority—neither of the states of light or darkness themselves are to be prioritised.

The very harmony and intuitive appeal of yin/yang is where there is an exact equivalence of light relative to darkness, rather than where one direction is winning out over the other. If one direction predominates over the other, this implies an imbalance according to yin/ yang, as this predominance brings deviation from a neutral centre of balance. Therefore, the yin/yang symbolic structure implies relativism and equality between the states of light and dark. In yin/yang, if white replaced black and black replaced white, the overall pattern would not be challenged. While there is evidently some scope within yin/yang for a directional aspect, it is fundamentally limited as being a deviation from a positional centre.

Yin/yang is an example of two concentric spatial dualisms (the light within the dark half and the dark within the light half). Yet these concentric halves can be smoothly separated from each other and are located within a frame that is basically that of a diametric spatial dualism. The ancient Chinese saying, *tien yuan, ti fan*— heaven round, earth

square[dc]— helps in drawing attention to the fact that the two halves of yin and yang are not squares as in a typical diametric dualism but include a curved, round dimension; the dividing membrane between both halves is curved and not simply linear. This does not limit the diametric feature as two halves that can be cleanly separated from each other. However, it does imply that there is a directional movement towards a circular more concentric state away from the starting point of the diametric structure. It invites a contrast between a diametric position and a more concentric directional process.

In yin/yang, the small realm of light in the larger dark realm, and dark in the larger light realm suggests movement from light to dark and vice versa. In the dark realm there is a directional force towards light, and in the light realm there is a directional force towards darkness. There is also an implication within yin/yang that movement in the light direction within the dark realm (and in the dark direction within the light realm), allows for the reverse process, namely, that the dark realm itself is not simply a positional state but is also a directional one. Likewise, the predominantly light realm is itself also a directional movement within itself and not simply when it is immersed as the minor quality in the dark realm.

Yin/yang includes not only a bipolar relation but also implies a directional process of change to some degree. It is not simply to be viewed as a static symbolic structure. The two halves of yin/yang, in other words, the diametric spatial frame within which the two concentric spaces are located, express one way that concentric and diametric structures can be related. On this view, concentric and diametric dualisms are subsumed as part of yin/yang.

A Prior Concentric Process to Yin/Yang

It is very significant that in Chinese culture, yin/yang was conceived as a product of a prior process—a prior concentric process. The Chinese initial world egg myth is described by Wilhelm, whereby 'the separation of heaven and earth out of the cosmogenic egg is almost uniformly the first act of this process of creation'.[dci] The egg is itself a concentric structure and Wilhelm's quotation from an ancient Chinese text indicates that this concentric egg structure was viewed as a preceding state from which yin/yang emerged:

> [In the beginning], heaven and earth were in the state of chaos [*hun-tun*], which was shaped like an egg...After 18,000 years heaven and earth split apart, the yang, being limpid, formed heaven, the yin, being turbid formed earth.[dcii]

This concentric egg background prior to yin/yang invites the implication that interplay between concentric and diametric spaces is not simply reducible to being elements of yin/yang but is in some way a prior background to yin/yang. The question arises as to how a fundamental relation between concentric and diametric spaces could build on yin/yang and its relativism through engagement with its concentric structured background space of the egg myth. Concentric and diametric spaces relate to yin/yang not simply at the level of yin/yang itself, but at the level of the potential connection between the original background concentric egg structure and its later yin/yang form. Interplay between the relativistic diametrically framed yin/yang structure and its early background egg concentric structure implies a greater priority to a concentric background. This contrasts with the priority

given in yin/yang to the diametric spatial positional frame locating the two concentric spatial dualisms.

While diametric and concentric spaces are embedded in yin/yang, they are not reducible to the yin/yang structure as they also relate to the background egg structure preceding yin/yang. Yin/yang subsumes concentric dualism within a diametric structure; yet it does not go much further without taking the potential influence of the concentric egg background into account. A relational perspective on yin/yang treats this symbol not just as a symbol *of* relation but a symbol *in* relation—in relation to its prior concentric egg background. On this view, yin/yang is not to be viewed as existing as a figure against some kind of blank page background, as residing in some kind of abstract non-interactive Cartesian type of empty space. Yin/yang needs to move beyond being perceived as just a reified image painted upon a dull blank background. Treating yin/yang in relation to its prior concentric egg background serves to destabilise and invite reconfiguration of the diametrically framed concentric structures constituting yin/yang. The tendency towards a concentric background is a movement away from the diametric structure grounding yin/yang.

In yin/ yang, the light male yang is contained within the dark female yin, and vice-versa.[dciii] Using Jungian language, yin/yang is an ego resolution of concentric and diametric interaction; whereas the background concentric egg's interaction with yin/yang implies another mode of interaction with a background Self.[dciv]

As a symbol of harmony or synthesis, yin/yang may be characterised as the postmodernist both/and, whereas concentric and diametric structures of relation are not simply in complementary interaction but also in dynamic tension. Concentric and diametric structures thus express a *both* both/and *and* either/or perspective. However, at another self-referential level of implication, yin/yang is an either/or symbol. This either/or dimension is because yin/yang prefers both/and to either/or and preference assumes choice between (either/or) alternatives. Yin/yang adopts an either/or position where, in a choice between either both/and or either/or, preference is given to both/and. This is a consequence of its implicit favouring of a centre—of a balance reconciled by exact equality at a centre so both states are supported.

Yin/Yang and its Socio-historical associations: Different from a Spatial Framework of Implication

The associations historically given by the yin/yang symbol must be distinguished from this prelinguistic discourse of concentric and diametric spaces of relation. In ancient Chinese culture, yin represents feminine, dark, weak, night, moon, earth, etc. and yang represents masculine, light, strong, day, sun, sky, etc. Yin/yang may be seen as a symbol which gives rise to certain associations. However, it is the key process of the jump from the symbol to the associations that needs to be scrutinised. There is no self-evidently necessary (experiential or strictly logical or spatial) connection between the symbol and, for example, masculinity or femininity. Nor is there a necessary connection between the associative parts themselves, for example, femininity and weakness, masculinity and sun. However, other associations of dark and night and, hence, moon do have a publicly justifiable referential quality.

Another example of cross-cultural associations that may not have a publicly justifiable referential quality is provided by Needham.[dcv] Right is usually cross-culturally associated with male, superior, above, life, health, abundance,

and left with female, inferior, below, death, sickness and poverty.[dcvi] Beattie [dcvii] attacks the representativeness of the specific dualisms of Needham, but Jahoda notes that 'Beattie (1976) did not question the existence of complementary dualism which, he agreed, is found in "most cultures"'.[dcviii] This cautionary note regarding the links concerning yin/yang and (i) its associations and (ii) between the associations themselves, is not to assert that this symbol is somehow 'wrong' or lacking in meaning for the Chinese sociocultural historical conditions in which it is expressed. These associations may make perfect sense as an expression of the socially constructed, historical reality of the ancient Chinese culture from which yin/yang emerged. The associations offer an experiential validity as a contextual truth. Commitment in psychology to pluralistic truths must acknowledge the experiential importance of purely contextual realities. Yet, these associative realities may not translate to other cultures; the richness of the yin/yang symbol is not confined to the historical associations it has given rise to.

The argument for the cross-cultural relevance of yin/yang is regarding its interaction between two active organising spaces, concentric and diametric dualisms. These

are far from being empty, inert spaces. They are neither empty of structure, nor empty of meaning. With the concentric egg myth as background, yin/yang offers a further spatial layer of foreground-background interaction.

Monism as a Variant of Empty Space

Lockean freedom as empty space, as a blank slate is one version of a monistic approach to space. Empty space is the diametric mirror image inversion of spatial fusion in infinite stimuli as another form of monism. A diametric spatial splitting operates upon monist reductions of experience, where, on the one hand, there is a sea of infinite stimuli as total fullness and undifferentiation and on the other hand, there is total emptiness as blank space.

Both monistic spaces surrender all boundaries, even as diametric opposites to each other. Both obliterate the individual in different ways. As a blank page of infinite possibility this empty space aggrandises the individual into infinity of possibility, empty actuality as endless possibility, whereas an infinite sea of stimuli drowns the individual into being a sheer nothingness of irrelevance. While monistic reduction takes two diametrically inverted forms, namely,

infinite stimuli or total empty space, monism is also an extreme within diametric space, where one pole totally subjugates the other. Monism both obliterates boundaries and the counterpole. Monism is the limit horizon for diametric spatial opposites' tension, when one opposite annihilates the other.

The failure to furnish a concentric structured state mediating between a diametric spatial mode of being and monistic fusion with the background environment is most clearly articulated in the following phenomenological account, by Laing, regarding 'James', as an example of schizoid experience:

> when walking on a summer evening in the park alone, watching the couples making love, he suddenly began to feel a tremendous oneness with the whole world, with the sky and trees and flowers and grass – with the lovers too. He ran home in panic and immersed himself in his books. He told himself that he had no right to this experience, but more than that, he was terrified at the threatened loss of identity involved in tis merging and fusion of his self with the whole world.

> *He knew of no halfway stage between radical isolation*
> *in self-absorbtion or complete absorbtion into all there*
> *was.* He was afraid of being absorbed into nature,
> engulfed by her, with irrevocable loss of his self; yet
> what he most dreaded, that also he most longed
> for.[dcix]

The halfway stage between an identity of horizonless monism and a diametric detached relation of self is a concentric mode of relation.

The diametric opposition between a connection with the background wholeness and identity of a detached self is further expressed, in Laing's words, 'His longing is for complete union. But of this very longing he is terrified, because it will be the end of his self … He does not conceive of a dialectical relationship'.[dcx] The end of his self is as a complete drowning and annihilation of identity in monism. He lacks a transitional mode of being, namely, of concentric structured experience, where connection includes difference.

Eigen further illustrates monistic fusion with the background flood of stimuli, for an individual experiencing psychosis,

'Things raced, leaped out at me. It was as if I were being attacked by the sight and sound of things. There was a heightening of everything, a glistening, a landslide. Things went faster and faster and angles were sharper … It all had this incredible speed yet was so endless. Not that there wasn't any time. It's just that time stood still it went so fast'[dcxi]

This extreme is of attempted connection with background stimuli and consequent invasion by this background. In this experience, the person has moved out of diametric structured experience, but his/her concentric structured experience is insufficiently established as a mode of relation with the background stimuli. The attack on self is as monistic merging into background, as a landslide submerging individual identity.

In phenomenological accounts of psychosis, the extreme attempts at detachment from the body and interpersonal communication are paralleled by an exaggerated attempt at detachment from the background 'landscape' for fear of monistic merging with it. Non-interaction between foreground and background is a feature

of diametric more than concentric spatial structures. Yet the interaction of concentric structures with their background needs to be distinguished from a fear of fusion with or drowning in the background stimuli. The phenomenology of a monistic boundary-less interaction with the background and need for strategies to cope with this interaction for schizoid experience, is highlighted by Laing. He describes a patient's 'magical camouflage to help her over her anxiety', when she was twelve years old:

> It struck me that if I stared long enough at the environment that I would blend with it and disappear just as if the place was empty and I had disappeared. It is as if you get yourself to feel you don't know who you are or where you are. To blend into the scenery so to speak. Then you are scared of it because it begins to come on without encouragement. I would just be walking along and felt that I had blended with the landscape. Then I would get frightened and repeat my name over and over again to bring me back to life, so to speak[dcxii]

Laing comments that, 'self-consciousness comes to be relied upon to help sustain the individual's precarious ontological security'.[dcxiii] This is a variant of the Cartesian *cogito* for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a diametric spatial ground as a challenge to monism. Self-conscious identity is a defence against sheer monistic immersion in a flood of stimuli. A way out of these alternatives is needed through concentric space. Freud's account of Schreber's 'compulsion to think' to avoid God's withdrawal,[dcxiv] offers another illustration of self-consciousness as diametric spatial detachment from monistic fusion.

The person's name is one path to construct a diametric spatial identity which separates the person from a monistic relation of being overwhelmed by and sucked into the 'landscape' or background. Self-consciousness helps to keep her separate from the background environment, 'Our little girl blended with the landscape. Now, someone who only too easily blends with other people … and is frightened of losing his identity thereby, uses his awareness of his self as a means of remaining detached and aloof'.[dcxv] A willed self-consciousness or detachment from the background is her reactive strategy of diametric spatial projection to the terror

of engulfment by monistic background stimuli. She is unable to obtain a middle state of assumed connection to the background, while still being distinct from the background 'landscape'. Her inability to maintain a concentric structured mode of relation to self and background forces the strategy of exaggerated, willed diametric separation from the background. For Laing, the schizoid state requires an extreme reaction against being merged with the background; this reaction is through construction of a detached diametric spatial ego, spliced away from the background.

These accounts of switches between total monistic fusion and rigid diametric spatial detachment and splitting in schizoid experience highlight not only the inability to develop a transitional mediating state of concentric spaces of experience. It also calls into question the rigidity of wider approaches in Western experiences and understandings that are locked into a similar frozen interplay between these two inadequate spatial strategies of monistic fusion and diametric spatial splitting. Western modernist traditions of thought that rely overwhelmingly on this blank space-diametric space interplay are resonant with schizoid strategies of experience. This blank space-diametric space interplay that is a hallmark

of modernist thought in Cartesian and Lockean assumptions involves a failure to engage with wider spaces, with transitional mediating spaces of connection that are concentrically structured. This schizoid structure pervading Western thought requires challenge to its own experiential and conceptual inertia, it needs reconfiguration as a jolt towards concentric space. To do so, must challenge not only Western traditional habits of thought but also fundamental spatial habits of experience.

CHAPTER 14

A Spatial Hermeneutics as an Interpretative Methodology:

Beyond Monism, Static Schemas and Meta-Spaces

An Interdisciplinary Spatial Hermeneutics

A spatial dance[dcxvi] of a spatial hermeneutics is being uncovered that is more dynamic than the dry meeting of categories. These 'dancing' spaces are being proposed not as categories but as generative spatial processes through a mutually interacting system of experience framing the boundaries of categorisation and categories. A key layer of description to uncover diametric and concentric spatial systems is variously described as frames, projections, the assumption structure,[dcxvii] the unthought, horizons of understanding,[dcxviii] lived conditions of experience and social imaginaries,[dcxix] generative metaphor[dcxx] and spatial imaginaries.[dcxxi] Similarly, in philosophy of science reference tends to be made to theory-ladenness in observation,[dcxxii] while a spatial interrogation here postulates that such theory-ladenness is far from random and unstructured, being a range

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of distinctive spatial patterns projected into observation and theoretical frames giving meaning to these observations.

In psychology, Johnson-Laird & Byrne's empirical argument that people tend to reason deductively with mental models rather than formal logic rules[dcxxiii] is, strictly speaking, an argument at the relativistic level. This relativistic level is that x (mental models) is a better explanation than y (formal logic rules), rather than simply x is, 'no amount of data, of course, can pick out one theory against all comers. Infinitely many theories are compatible with any finite set of observations. But, our problem is simpler: it is to decide amongst three possibilities',[dcxxiv] namely, formal rules, content-specific rules and mental models for deduction.

It is this jump from observation to infinite possible hypothetical constructs that is a key limit to traditional empirical methods.[dcxxv] Johnson-Laird and Byrne seek to resolve this problem by selecting between three purportedly mutually exclusive alternatives, in seeking grounds for preference of one hypothetical construct over another. Similarly, it is to be recognized that the empirical claim for assumed connection and concentric spatial relation (plus openness to background, symmetry as unity) and assumed

separation and diametric spatial relation (plus closure from background, mirror image inverted symmetry) is at a relativistic level that one operationalization is evidence of one spatial structure *more than* the other one. As well as the options of concentric or diametric space, a third option can be one of monism, a monistic fusion as a flattening obliteration of any spatial polarity. It is their relative, relational differences that are being focused upon as referential inferences for these spatial structures, with figure-ground as a fourth interacting space rooted in diametric space but as a directional movement towards concentric space along this spatial axis of tension.

Heidegger's concerns with avoiding the reduction of the metaphysical to the physical are expressed in his critique of Nietzsche:

> A path must be cleared for a new interpretation of the sensuous on the basis of a new hierarchy of the sensuous and nonsensuous. The new hierarchy does not simply wish to reverse matters within the old structural order, now reverencing the sensuous and scorning the nonsensuous.[dcxxvi]

Heidegger seeks a movement more nuanced than simple diametric mirror image spatial inversion, to go beyond being still locked within the same old structural order of sensuous and nonsensuous. Heidegger's concerns with being, pertinent to wellbeing assumptions in social and emotional education, offer a critique of a Nietzschean reversal that simply favours the body, as Heidegger construes Nietzsche as doing. A concentric spatial relation can challenge this diametric spatial structural order of mirror image inversions.[dcxxvii] This is resonant also with the diametric spatial inversions in the above/below hierarchical approaches characterised by Descola for cultures infused with naturalism and animism:

> Naturalism and animism are all-inclusive hierarchical schemas that are the polar opposites of each other. In the one, the universality of physicality extends its system to cover the contingencies of interiority; in the other, the generalization of interiority becomes a means of attenuating the effects of physicality.[dcxxviii]

As Lévi-Strauss overlooked the assumed connection feature of concentric space, the question arises as to whether

these relations are necessarily diametric oppositions within naturalism and animism. Descola advocates for a monism, a monism that is not being sought in the argument of this book:

> The two-story edifice of dualism, built to last by the great architects of the classical age, is, to be sure, still solid, for it is subject to constant restoration…However, its structural faults are becoming increasingly apparent to those who do not take up residence there in a mechanical fashion and to those who would prefer to find lodgings that can accommodate peoples who are accustomed to different kinds of dwellings.[dcxxix]

He seeks 'the schematization of experience'[dcxxx] reviewing cross-cultural structures of experience in anthropology and distinguishes four overarching modes, namely, animism, naturalism, totemism and analogy. In doing so, Descola concludes that:

> we cannot fail to recognize that the major frameworks for the schematization of human experience change

very little, in particular ontological regimes and the dominant relational modes that structure praxis; and this does not apply solely to the societies that Lévi-Strauss called "cold" because they seek to neutralize the effects of historical contingency. Stability then, is due, not to an unlikely absence of movement, but to a suppression of movement or, more precisely, to the obstacles placed in the way of its normal course by mechanisms that inhibit its immediate consequence.[dcxxxi]

The proposed spatial axis in this book, as spatial frames for experiences, goes further here in identifying diametric space, concentric space, monism and figure-ground as potentially dynamic interactive foundations of experience, not as static schemas but as malleable spaces. Malleability must be distinguished from an empty space malleability of postmodernism.

A Different Kind of Interiority of Spaces for Experience and a Vertical Spatial Axis for Thought: A Jolting Open Beyond Postmodernism

It has been argued elsewhere that later Nietzsche's concerns are with shift to these habits of experience, though he largely ignored their spatial features and emphasised fundamental values as habits, rather than treating these directly as a phenomenological terrain as shift to habits of experience.[dcxxxii] In social psychology, Gergen's *saturated self* [dcxxxiii] offers a postmodern vision of loosely connected selves, situationally constructed, and ultimately constructed socially by society and with assumptions of consistency or even connection between these multiple selves being open to question. Experience of the self, saturated by the cultural text or matrix, is part of a postmodern socio-historical linguistic turn that emphasises language more than space and commits to a sheer relativism of truth claims with no basis for prioritising one mode of experience over others. While some postmodern thinkers do explicitly address themes of space, such as Soja's *Thirdspace*,[dcxxxiv] it is important to emphasise that the current challenge to five pillars of modern thought in spatial terms is not for postmodern goals, even though this challenge seeks to go beyond modernism. Spatial phenomenology is seeking to uncover a fundamental spatial axis of thought and experience,

it is a reclaiming of depths as space for experience from a postmodern flattening into surface realities and experiences.

Postmodern constructions of self reject all inwardness, seeing this as a vestige of a Cartesian heritage of a detached self-hovering above the world. In doing so, the inner is surrendered to the outer pole of a diametric spatial opposition, collapsing into a monistic fusion of self with social, cultural forces. The postmodern self has no terrain of privacy, no deeper world to drive any substantive resistance to external sociocultural forces. The text is but one kind of system, even where postmodern systems thinkers such as Luhmann[dcxxxv] and Teubner[dcxxxvi] treat this system as an unstoppable self-perpetuating force within which the individual is subsumed.[dcxxxvii] A concentric spatial relation offers a different kind of interiority from the diametric split opposition between inner and outer based on the self-conscious ego of Descartes. A concentric space retains an inner pole in assumed connection with the outer though nevertheless distinct. Concentric space is in dynamic interaction with an outer social systems' pole but is a different inward mode of listening in experience than the detached self-

consciousness of self as an object to self that is hinged on diametric space and Cartesian reflection.

It is important to situate the contours of postmodern understandings in relation to Kant's Third Antinomy of freedom and causality. Kant situates a transcendental freedom as an empty space for reason to colonise, with the diametric mirror image inverted pole of natural causal determinism, as part of an ideal-real diametric spatial dualism. Postmodernism, in effect, if not explicitly, operates so as to reduce Kant's Third Antinomy to a monism where the transcendental freedom aspect of culture is transposed as a collapse into the causal determinism pole of this antinomy. Culture becomes a process of sheer determinism, where the individual is trapped and bereft of agency. Whereas Kant's modernity placed reason in the transcendental freedom compartment of his antinomy, postmodernism reverses this to place it in the determinism aspect. This antinomy of Kant (as a diametric spatial mirror image inversion) is folded in postmodernism into a monism.

Whereas Heller identifies the Renaissance as an era of acceleration in time, where there was 'a quickening of the pace',[dcxxxviii] a key task of our time is a quickening of the pace

to mediate the transformation of human experience from diametric spaces of exclusion towards concentric spaces of assumed connection as framing conditions for care and compassion, as part of a wider capacity to embrace stimuli. The iron cage of diametric space needs to be engaged with in social and emotional education, as part of a shift towards appreciation and support for the development of more fluid concentric spaces, spaces to be distinguished from an undifferentiated morass of monism.

An accentuated dynamism, where there is an acceleration of movement back and forth between diametric and concentric spaces, and a concentric spatial movement of expansion in experience and understanding, has remained *hors de vue* in Western traditions. Descola's reference to 'suppression of movement'[dcxxxix] in structures of experience is being interpreted for current purposes as resistances to shift from diametric spaces as cages of experience towards concentric spaces of relative opening.

Spatial Hermeneutics as a Concentric Spatial Turn, as a Dynamic Revolving Axis for Experience and Thought

The interacting systems of spatial frames and projections into the assumption structure of various key concepts for psychology, philosophy and education envisages understanding as a thought-fabric, a thought-tissue being stretched open through concentric space, as a jolt restructuring diametric space and monism of both empty space and infinite stimuli. This is a spatial hermeneutics *through* space, not simply *of* space, concentrating on the between-ness claims in texts, bringing these background relational claims to the fore as spatial, as mediating spatial assumptions and dynamic systems.

Challenge to thought as being embedded in empty space is to treat thought itself as a fabric spatially imbued. Thought as a spatial system of relations does not need to rely on inert space. This assumption that these spaces are merely metaphysical is itself part of a Cartesian legacy (with roots also going back to Plato and other thinkers in Ancient Greece) that requires to be assaulted. It assumes their very emptiness as they hover in an abstract realm of the *meta*. Confining these implicit spatial understandings to a realm of the metaphysical is to conspire with the de-animation of space that they propagate. Rather than consigning these Cartesian

understandings merely to some abstract metaphysical realm, it is being sought to treat these assumptions as systems, as systems of space with real world impact as supporting and sustaining conditions for shaping human experiences, understandings and ultimately actions. In other words, these spatial underpinnings for Cartesianism are psychologically relevant, operating within psychological domains of relevance. There are not merely scattered to a subsidiary domain as simply spatial metaphors operating solely in the realm of the ideal, based on an ideal-real world split of modernity. Space must resist reduction to sheer metaphors but be understood immanently as supporting and contingent conditions affecting causal trajectories in living systems of human experience, thought, emotion and action. A division of labour in psychology and the social sciences into meaning explanations and causal ones, resting on the ideal-real Cartesian divide, is suffused with the common background frames of space, of spatial conditions.

There is a need to challenge the homogenising of space in the meta-spatial, space as an abstract blank canvas, as a passive noninteractive background for thought and experience. The meta-spatial is the Cartesian bias of space as

a nonentity. Yet this rendering passive of space paves the way for the meta-spatial, involving the lack of apprehension of the concrete projections of space embedded in the fabric of thought. It being postulated that there is a limited range of spatially structured projections shaping experience that are manifested in thought and language- diametric space, concentric space, monism and figure-ground. These spatial constraints upon experience, nevertheless, offer the basis for experiential openings towards concentric spatially structured experiences. This is not also to preclude interrogation of additional potential spatial dimensions along this spatial axis.

A task needs to be undertaken of not simply dismantling the metaphysical into the physical but to make the 'meta' spatial. This spatialisation of thought renders thought not simply as a shadow-like substance but with real impacts, an impactful structural aspect of the material world – not only through the actions leading from thoughts but as thought itself, as a propagation of impactful spatial systems. Space needs to be uncovered as a new axis for thought. This is further than a spatial turn, sought elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences, including education. A concentric spatial revolution is needed to give full sense to space as revolving in

thought, to make clear the spatial movement is a rotation from diametric spatial juxtaposition of poles (and monistic flattening into homogenised space) to a concentric spatial mutual embedding of poles.

The proposed multidimensional system of spatial conditions actively and dynamically embedded in societal and individual systems of experience are a system axis itself in mutual tension. This multiple spatial system of tensions is itself lodged in other systems. These are not being proposed as abstract spatial forms but rather concrete spatial projections already actively shaping our human experiences, as caverns through the human heart. A key challenge for social and emotional education is to combine the connective compassionate and perspective-taking strengths of concentric space with its expansive direction of opening that is not opening as sheer obliteration of boundaries, that is not identity and meaning as in a monistic directional movement from diametric spatial structures of experience and understanding.

A vertical axis of space of concentric and diametric spatial networks of interaction offers a layer of depth as a turn towards a sustainable, relative experiential opening. This

spatial layer is embedded in linguistic and cultural texts rather than being simply split from these levels and hence it accepts many features of postmodern thought regarding the forces of cultural conditioning on the individual, though challenging these as ineluctable features of closure upon individual experience and social systems. It does not accept the postmodern resonance with behaviourist psychology in terms of sheer environmental conditioning through diametric structured spaces of reward and sanction, positive and negative reinforcement as the only show in town for human experience. Whereas postmodernism places the individual as saturated within a cultural text, this is itself a diametric mirror image inversion of behaviourist psychology's assumption that the individual is a blank page, an empty space upon which an environment inscribes its conditionings in terms of reinforcements.

There is a need to jolt thought out of this simply flattened horizontal axis of lifeless space embedded in thought to uncover its vertical spatial axis underlying the horizontal. This vertical spatial axis transcends simply horizontal thought as a more embedded immanence of space. A vertical spatial axis for understanding is a transcendental spatial horizon of

immanence and new dimension beyond one dimensional thought. This extension is to add a dimension of space to experience to challenge, resonant with Marcuse,[dcxl] one dimensional people whose experience has been flattened into imitative needs.

This is not simply a spatial turn but a spatial revolving in our experience and thought fabric. This challenge is to one dimensional, merely horizontal thought, flattened out of spatial breath. This new axis of breath and light for thought is a dimension of space, of opened permeable space, embracing expansion in structures of experience. Thought as a living system needs living spaces and not ossified thought into flattened space, into inanimate spaces. Just as horizons of the earth were seen as lines and flat, though really a curve, our thought horizons are not simply along a flat axis but include another dimension as a spatial background opening from a vertical axis source. Space often glues together outmoded and crassly flattening modes of experience and understanding. To unflatten space, the constrained range of movements within this spatial system shaping human experience and thought needs to be uncovered.

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cdlxxiv   For Bronfenbrenner (1979), the microsystem is the immediate setting the individual participates within. A mesosystem involves interrelations among two or more settings in which the developing person actively participates – for a child, home, school neighbourhood and peer group and, for an adult, family, work and social life. An exosystem involves one or more settings that do not involve the developing person as an active participant, but in which events occur that affect or are affected by what happens in the setting containing the developing person. Communication between an education ministry and health ministry is one such exosystem relation. For Bronfenbrenner, all of these are mutually embedded in a concentric structure, together with the wider societal and global macrosystem level.

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Keywords

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