Imazighen of France; Developing Indigeneity in Diaspora

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This chapter examines how the Amazigh (pl. Imazighen) diaspora in France is developing forms of solidarity and citizenship within and beyond the State, partly through articulations of Indigenous identity. France is home to a large Amazigh diaspora; hundreds of organizations group together hundreds of thousands of individuals who are united by a common interest in the preservation and promotion of *Amazighité*, that is, the quality of being Amazigh. Indigenous to North Africa (Tamazgha) and distinct from Arabic, Amazigh language (Tamazight) and culture have long been minoritized by state policies dating from the colonial period and accelerated in the post-colonial era. These policies have privileged Arabic as the language of administration, education, literature and media as well as religion, and coded Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan national identities as exclusively 'Arabic' until very recently. The areas where Amazigh culture and identity have remained alive are typically underdeveloped, remote and mountainous regions in North Africa as well as in the sizable European diaspora, where Amazigh associations and activists openly champion Amazigh language, culture, heritage and more recently territorial rights. Due to its connectedness, access to resources, and the presence of several exiled leaders, the diaspora has long been a dynamic influence within the Amazigh movement, and a key contributor to regional development (Aïtel, 2013). This contribution is most often informally undertaken, in ways that bypass state structures, particularly in the region of Kabylia. Articulating indigeneity as Imazighen, we will argue, diaspora leaders challenge and subvert the Jacobin, state-led notions of development and sustainability that occlude or marginalize Amazigh identity.

The Amazigh diaspora today is diverse, complex and divided, comprising various regional sub-groups. In France, Kabyles from modern Algeria are most dominant, but other important groups include Chleuhs, Chaouis, Riffians, and Tuaregs. Over the past century, Imazighen have become well-established in cultural associations and village committees located across most French towns and cities. This diaspora does not merely exist as an automatic consequence of immigration, but is continually reproduced by its multiple structures, events and practices. As such, the Amazigh diaspora can be understood best as a social movement. By referring to it as 'the diasporic Amazigh movement', we seek to constantly position the diaspora and Amazigh identity in an ongoing process of becoming. In this chapter, we focus on one geopolitical element of this process – developing indigeneity in diaspora – and consider its impacts on diasporic perceptions of economic, social and political development in Tamazgha.

At first the idea that a diaspora can be Indigenous might seem like a contradiction, as diasporas are so frequently imagined to be mobile and urban, whilst Indigenous peoples are seen to be fixed in remote, rural places. However, James Clifford (2013) has argued that "when diasporic displacements, memories, networks, and reidentifications are recognized as integral to tribal,

aboriginal, native survival and dynamism, a lived, historical landscape of ruptures and affiliations becomes more visible" (2013:71). Clifford draws on Stuart Hall's concept of articulation, which describes how seemingly disparate "ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse" (1996:141). As such, the Indigenous and the diasporic are understood to be articulated in the discourses and practices of the Amazigh movement. However, most Amazigh activists are ambivalent about claiming indigeneity explicitly. Firstly, the term used in French, *autochtonie*, has a much stronger territorial association with birthplace. This makes it even more difficult to reconcile diasporic and Indigenous categories of identity, particularly when paired with French ideals of 'Jacobin' civic nationalism which identify an individual's cultural identity by their citizenship, and resist any differentiation in that citizenship based on region, race or creed. Secondly, the colonial history of North Africa is such that all North Africans, whether Amazigh or Arab, would see themselves as *autochtones* in relation to the European settlers of recent memory. Regardless of whether the label is claimed or rejected, however, we demonstrate through this chapter that the diaspora Imazighen bear many of the hallmarks of indigeneity.

Tuhiwai Smith's (2004) twenty-five 'indigenous projects', provide us with a non-prescriptive starting point for identifying a series of indigenous articulations in the diasporic Amazigh movement. These include *claiming* indigeneity as a fixed and knowable category within an *indigenizing* process, *revitalizing/regenerating* Tamazight as a language and literary culture, *representing* and *story-telling* through annual Yennayer celebrations, *gendering* Amazigh activism in diaspora, and *protecting/restoring* forms of village politics, sociability and habitation. In outlining these articulations, we seek to outline a space where 'traditional' modes of being and organizing are undergoing processes of renewal and rupture. In the process, Amazigh communities are redefining development and sustainability to go beyond the strictly economic to include environmental, linguistic, cultural and territorial concerns.

Claiming **Indigeneity**

The diasporic Amazigh movement's most self-evident articulations of indigeneity position the Amazigh within the global movement of Indigenous peoples, *claiming* indigeneity as a supposedly fixed and knowable category of ethnic identity. The clearest example can be found in the Paris-based *World Amazigh Congress* (CMA). Secretary General Belkacem Lounes described the group's beginnings as when activists met "under the guise of indigeneity at the UN" (Harris, 2020a:5) in the early 1990s when the issue of indigenous rights was gaining momentum. In 1995, over one hundred Amazigh delegates from across North Africa and the diaspora held the first 'pre-congress' in the small southern French village of Saint-Rome-de-Dolan, led by Mohand Dahmani, Masin Ferkal and others. Since then, this group of activists with wide political and legal experience both in North Africa and France have stepped into the spaces created by the global Indigenous movement within international institutions and used them to champion the rights of Amazigh people. At UN and African Union meetings and fora CMA activists network with and are exposed to the political arguments of Indigenous delegates from across the globe. CMA delegates like human rights lawyer Hassan Id Balkassm or activist

Kamira Naït Sid use these fora as platforms for raising awareness of the Amazigh movement. They attend a range of international meetings as representatives of the Imazighen, exchange statements of solidarity with other Indigenous leaders and activists, and challenge state governments by bringing human rights cases to the attention of relevant experts. These practices repeatedly draw comparisons between the Amazigh struggle and those of Indigenous peoples around the world, particularly from the 'New World' where indigeneity has in places become an important paradigm in electoral politics, comparisons which are then articulated in the wider diasporic Amazigh movement. However, it should be recognized that these links with the global Indigenous groups are "not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time" (Hall, 1996:141). They are articulated by Amazigh diaspora activists seeking to position themselves outside the state narratives of identity and belonging in France and North Africa. In claiming indigeneity in relation to these other groups and structures, Amazigh activists are working out and redefining the meanings and subjectivities of indigeneity in the diaspora. They do so in view of the different states concerned, to be met with differing levels of attention and cooperation. For example, such globalized identity referents have been effectively mobilized in touristic development in Morocco, such that *Amazighité* is used to attract private and state investment in local economic and social development, including education in Tamazight. Despite occurring on the international stage, these seemingly straightforward articulations of indigeneity are only a small part of the picture of the diasporic Amazigh movement, whose everyday practices and politics worked out in cultural associations are unpacked in the following sections.

Revitalizing **language and literature**

The central identity claim of the Amazigh movement hinges on its *revitalizing* of the Tamazight language. The language is, in and of itself, a symbolic territorial reference, including for those Imazighen that do not use it. Imazighen see the language as the essential vehicle of Amazigh identity and describe progressive Arabization as a form of 'cultural denial', 'erasure', or even 'extermination'. Since at least the 1940s, the Amazigh diaspora has been a key hub of Tamazight literary production, media and academic work (Chaker, 1995) made difficult by State suppression and lack of resources in Tamazgha itself.

Developing Tamazight literature has involved the de/reconstruction of 'traditional' forms and practices. Whilst, for Tamazight, song remains the privileged medium of diffusion reaching a mass audience, revitalization of the language is linked to the emergence of hybrid collaborations aimed at originality, secularization and the enrichment of a diversified literature. Hybridity is the result of a renewal of forms, genres, registers and subjects (e.g. the body, existential questions, sexuality, femininity, money) that combines with the realities of exile, political engagement, nostalgia, and alienation from the land, enriching frames and fields of reference. Innovation is a hallmark of this literary production, which includes writing for digital audiences, alternating between languages, and using video and multimedia. The pioneering Amazigh Kabyle writers of the late twentieth-century such as Mohya (1986) and Rachid Aliche (1981) paved the way for novel forms of literary production amongst diaspora writers since

2000. Their prose and poetry have served as a point of reference for a generation of writers who have reappropriated a common Mediterranean cosmology, for example, *Tiwizi* (collaborative spoken word) (Kezzar and Lounaci, 2018) and *Tisutar igenwan* (Rabia and Kezzar, 2020). The original work of Djidji Nait (2012) on the feminine experience, and Arezki Rabia (2015) exemplify a modern aesthetic that makes use of ancient references alongside others, to great effect.

Through interpersonal exchange, these authors have developed a dynamic of writing and circulating literature and other media dedicated to the development of the language, both innovating and drawing on traditional repertoires. The webpages of the Amazigh diaspora, where users engage in debate about and using Tamazight, are sites of avowed plurilingualism. Diasporic writers envision the radical heterogeneity of Amazigh space, and invite their readerships to view the Amazigh sub-groups outside the centralizing logic of the state – leaving the production and discussion of categories and typologies to politicians and academics. From outside the spaces of formal politics, the diaspora's writers propose a renewal of their culture and language that is both in solidarity with populations 'at home', and open to a world of new expressions, ideas and exchange. For example, despite the difficulties of inter-dialect comprehensibility, the Tuareg poet Hawad makes trans-Amazigh links by linking the history of the Tuareg people to the material and symbolic violence to which Imazighen are subjected across Tamazgha (Hawad, 2017). His work puts the ancient Tifinagh script to use in the modern context (in what he calls "furigraphy"), joining a long line of diaspora intellectuals in *revitalizing* Tamazight through this unique script, which had fallen into disuse for centuries except by Tuaregs until it was adopted by (mostly Kabyle) diaspora activists in the 1960s. Tifinagh has since been adopted by Moroccan state institutions and is widely used across North Africa, but the use of Latin characters has remained the standard among most Amazigh writers, especially Kabyles, owing to its popularity and accessibility (Abrous, 2015).

Writing online has created an important space of expression and continues to impact creative dynamics, textual presence and media reception (Allioui, 2012). A challenge for these authors is fair and economical access to global readerships through translations of their work. Some have achieved this through success in international literary competitions and prizes – the work of Salem Zenia (Prix Voix Libre 2011 and *Ostana* 2017) and Noufel Bouzboudja (*Alfred Landecker Grant* 2020) clearly illustrate the mobilization of indigeneity in this sphere. However, the success of some authors who have gained international recognition obscures the difficulties faced by most who lack sponsorship, literary rights, and institutional support. In particular, Algerian, Moroccan and French national prizes tend to go to local authors leaving Tamazight diaspora writers overlooked, caught between the purview of different state institutions.

What of *revitalizing* Tamazight as a spoken, everyday language? Out of a desire to transmit Tamazight to the next generation, many Amazigh cultural associations in the diaspora try to create a secure linguistic environment, where Tamazight occupies a privileged place within association life. For example, even if French is the universal language, zones of linguistic

exclusivity are sought out in conversation classes and literary events (Harris, 2020a). However, the reality is often more complex, and a secure linguistic environment is difficult to achieve owing to wildly varying levels of literacy, low availability of literature, and the pre-dominance of other languages in public and domestic spheres, particularly online.

For several years, Tamazight language teaching in French associations has been eligible for Algerian and Moroccan state funding through the ELCO (*enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine*) provision, but this support for learning the language has not extended to the development of its literature. *ACB 44 de Nantes*, *Tamazgha-Oc de Toulouse*, and *AFK 13 Marseille* are all examples of associations that have established regular Tamazight writing classes with significant results. Recently, Riffian associations in the south of France have greatly increased in their linguistic activity, using the internet to collaborate with other Riffians across France, the Netherlands, and Morocco following the initiative of scholar-activist Khalid Bouyaala and his Riffian colleagues. The CBF are likewise building an online language learning platform. However, these are exceptional cases: the largest associations such as the *ACB de Paris*, one of the most long-established and popular associations in France, have not developed beyond weekly language classes despite their wide reach.

The problem is that language teaching often struggles to engage with written literary production, which requires considerable resources and time. As a result, most learning continues through songs, games and performances. Because most association classes exist along with a range of community services financed by municipal authorities, such as homework clubs, legal advice, and French classes for recent immigrants, language classes can quickly become low priority activities. In general, the collective promotion of Tamazight may be a stated objective of most associations, but support for its teaching and writing remains marginal. This feeds into a lack of quality, longevity, and reception that keeps associations' activities fixed on local services, with many cultural activities focused on occasional festivals and entertainment.

Representing **and** ***story-telling*****: Yennayer, the Amazigh New Year**

One key festival, Yennayer (Amazigh New Year), is celebrated across North Africa and the diaspora around the 12th-14th of January. Encompassing a diverse range of ancient agrarian traditions, the festival was recently re-popularized by Amazigh associations inspired by the Paris-based *Académie Berbère* in the 1960s.

Yennayer is a time of year when Amazigh associations are particularly active, organizing various parties, concerts, dinners and conferences. Traditionally celebrated in the home with family around a special meal (*Imensi n Yennayer*), it has become a key event for the Amazigh diaspora. Within a state that is officially blind to racial and religious categories of differences through its philosophy of *laïcité*, Yennayer is an important moment of state representation for the diasporic Amazigh movement. The *Hôtel de Ville de Paris* began to host a Yennayer celebration in 2002, and other city halls across France have since followed suit. Yennayer is presented by both Amazigh and French authorities as a secular festival predating monotheistic

religions in North Africa, and as such is one that it is politically acceptable to celebrate within French state institutions. Whilst such events are generally popular, they have been criticized by radical Amazigh activists as political performances orchestrated by French state institutions to win the Amazigh community support rather than allowing for more meaningful representation. In Paris, the public Yennayer at the city hall includes not only the Mayor, but also often representatives from the Moroccan, Algerian and Malian embassies – validating state institutions over indigenous Amazigh ones. Although the 'purely cultural' credentials of the event are extolled to justify the presence of French state representatives, themselves under scrutiny to maintain *laïcité*, (the separation of all religious activities from public affairs), the traditional rites of Yennayer itself are barely included. This is for several reasons, including because they occur around a meal, have been lost, or require a knowledge of Tamazight that is beyond most in the diaspora. This loss contributes to the sense of these events being 'folkloric' in nature.

Instead, speeches from dignitaries and musical performances from Amazigh stars entertain a crowd in much the same way as a political rally. The practices of Yennayer's celebration today have been adapted to the diasporic, modern and urban context. Association members and leaders alike express a desire not to simply celebrate Yennayer in a 'folkloric' way, all dancing and singing with no substance. However, rather than coming from the agrarian practices of Yennayer they imagined or remembered being practiced in the Amazigh villages of Tamazgha, the content of the events often comes from a political discourse woven into speeches, songs and dancing. This political discourse tells a story of the Amazigh as an Indigenous people distinct from and preceding Roman, Arab and European presence in Tamazgha, maintaining strong cultural institutions but learning to live alongside those of different cultures. This story then links to the diaspora context, where this unique historical and cultural ability to integrate portrays the Imazighen as ideal immigrants to French society (Harris, 2020b).

Gendering **Amazigh diaspora activism**

Colonization and migration both have disruptive effects on gender relations, and in the case of the diasporic Amazigh movement, the reconfiguration of Amazigh social space points towards a growing feminine agency. In the diaspora, the inferiority implied by both mobility and status in countries of origin (Yacine, 2018) meets with both the strongly egalitarian ideals held and expressed within French society and the less than equal reality. The first sign of change has been women's access to positions of leadership, leading to greater visibility within the movement. This change has been happening partly as a result of a revalorization and reconfiguration of women's roles in traditional Amazigh society, including in political decision making.

Samia Bensalem Ould Amara, elected municipal official in the diverse suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis north of Paris, explicitly articulates her local political work with the valorization of Kabyle culture. She strategically supports and profiles Kabyle cultural activities, such as a Kabyle spelling bee and other activities around the International Mother Language Day, and exhibiting Amazigh artwork at '*La Maison Kabyle'* (The Kabyle House) association, which is

led by her sister Hayet Bensalem. She describes the Kabyle diaspora as the 'storehouse' of Seine-Saint-Denis, its culture an intrinsic public good to be shared widely in the multicultural environment. Her sister's association is run almost entirely by women, in contrast to the village committee run almost entirely by men. It is *La Maison Kabyle*, however, that has been more successful in developing the imprint and vitality of Amazigh culture in Seine-Saint-Denis, partly through outwardly engaging with other cultural groups via the municipality. Similarly Rahma Houzig, a Moroccan Amazigh leader in nearby Clichy, is a long-time proponent of solidarity amongst Indigenous Amazigh women. Since attending a meeting of "*Femmes Autochtones d'Afrique*" (Indigenous Women of Africa) in the 1990s in Agadir, she has been building links across Tamazgha through the medium of shared cultural artefacts such as textiles and handicrafts. This kind of 'shared moment' of transnational networking prompted her to approach other cultural groups in her association's locality with the aim of building intercultural cooperation and solidarity. In Marseille, AFK13 leader Nora Amara amplifies Kabyle women's voices to condemn violence and repression on the other side of the Mediterranean. These examples illustrate ways in which female leaders within the diasporic Amazigh movement have been able to assume a role as protectors and sharers of culture, articulating leadership with traditional home crafts and developing them within the context of life in multicultural urban France.

In recent years, the Kabyle independence movement (*MAK-Anavad*) has become a key political force in the diasporic Amazigh movement (Harris, 2020b), and women play an important role in its growth. Sonia Ait Yahia of the *Union des Femmes Kabyles* (Kabyle Women's Union) founded in 2019, estimating that indigeneity can encompass both Amazigh and Kabyle levels of cultural expression, is seeking distinct Kabyle representation at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues for 2021. The *Aza Rouge-Solidaire*, the Tifinagh symbol Aza "ⵣ" replacing the Red 'Cross' or 'Crescent' in this humanitarian mission for Kabylia, has been a largely female-led project. From their position in the diaspora, Kabyle women have long led and supported efforts to provide humanitarian aid to populations 'at home', often in the form of access to medical care and support to students. For example, during the 2001 'Black Spring' of violence in Kabylia, diaspora groups organized to support refugees and to pay for medical care for the wounded. One Kabyle singer described how the implication of women "is well received as we make organizations work, but […] access to leadership is not always well appreciated. Women should remain a lively and amenable resource. The error would be to wait and not to take the initiative" (Interview with author, 2018). For Ouarda Lahouazi, a radio producer, the opportunities for women that come with being in France don't end with the possibility of having a career, but with taking center stage in public life. She said, "the considerable accomplishments of women activists are counterbalanced by their invisibility or forms of invisibilization, of relegation. It is up to [diaspora Amazigh] women to take initiative, to exploit the openings offered by the host county" (Interview with author, 2019).

Finally, recently women have begun to not only access but to lead previously male-only village committees, the locus of local political decision-making in Tamazgha. For example, a young

woman Sarah Addouche now acts as president of the diaspora association of Taguemount Azouz. In September 2020, an all-female assembly gathered in the village of Illoula Oumalou in Kabylia, composed of female students and older women. The progressive arrival of women in leadership after decades ofvunder-representation in both the diaspora and in North Africa points towards widespread social change, which is both influenced by European ideas of gender equality and a reassessment of gender within indigenous Amazigh institutions. These forms of leadership have yet to become embedded, and have a long way to go to fundamentally change gendered power dynamics. By articulating this gendered form of indigeneity, however, Amazigh activists are focusing their development efforts on cultural activism, alternative forms of leadership, and the preservation of indigenous institutions.

Protecting/restoring **forms of village politics, sociability and habitation**

The diasporic Amazigh movement is also thinking of development in more material and environmental terms. The development and preservation of Tamazgha's villages and regions is a recurrent concern for the diasporic Amazigh movement. Both formal and informal structures work to promote and to finance collective forms of *protecting/restoring* in home villages, including ecological and aesthetic preservation. As pollution and urbanization threaten the self-sufficiency and societal cohesion of Amazigh society, some diaspora Amazigh activists argue, something has to be done to preserve it. For these activists, the argument is that if indigenous village institutions were strong, then Amazigh society would be better equipped to deal with the social and ecological problems they face.

One key village institution is the autonomous village assembly, known as the Jamâa or Tajmaât. Amongst diaspora Kabyles particularly but also Chleuhs and others, these long-standing political fora form the basis for a form of development based in collective action and mutual support, known as '*Tiwizi*'. These village assemblies organize collections for various 'collective remittances' (Lacroix, 2013), financing the maintenance and improvement of village infrastructure, aid in times of ecological and political crisis, and returning the bodies of deceased community members for burial in home soil. They also support newcomers arriving in France, orienting them and helping them find work and accommodation. In the words of Parisian café-owner 'Bob' Kemechi, "It's the village transplanted to France. We have a single money pot. That's what really helps Kabylia … that's what has allowed us to resist the external powers" (Interview with author, 2016).

Being 'transplanted to France' has impacted the institution of *Tajmaât*, subtly transforming its forms and meanings. Historically a strictly patriarchal structure that excluded women's participation, in diaspora the *Tajmaât* has slowly opened to women to the point that some are now led by their female members, as discussed above. As informal structures outside the equality legislation that governs cultural associations in France, these village committees have not changed as a result of external pressures but rather because of changing attitudes within the group. Elsewhere, the *Tajmaât* has been appropriated by the *MAK-Anavad* to explicitly frame its vision for a Kabyle parliament. Beyond representing a pre-colonial Kabyle political institution and therefore lending weight to Kabylia's right to self-determination, these activists

suggested this idea because they themselves were invested in their existent village assemblies and believed that they represented durable political institutions capable of governing Kabyle political life and incubating a Kabyle form of development.

International cooperation between diaspora groups and their home villages are often explicitly aimed at the preservation of both indigenous institutions and particular sites of cultural value. The rehabilitation of such sites within the village environment, notably the *Tajmaât* (meeting place) and the *Tala* (fountain), which are seen as central places of Amazigh sociability, is often funded by the diaspora population. France-based diaspora development organizations focused on Amazigh regions in North Africa such as *IDmediterranée* have had limited success in raising funds and carrying out co-development project partnerships, but small groups and individuals frequently play a part in the rehabilitation such symbolic sites:

> "I'm very attached to the fountain of my village. The fountain is a symbol. […] I've worked so that these fountains might be rehabilitated, embellished, for the pleasure of the village" (*IDMediterranée* member, cited in Harris, 2020a:5).

These words encapsulate a recurring narrative of the diasporic Amazigh movement, of nostalgia for an Amazigh village society, whose social, political and economic institutions should be preserved in the face of transformative forces and processes. The co-development initiatives of larger diaspora organizations also seek to articulate Indigenous knowledges and practices. For example, AMSED (Migration Solidarity and Exchanges for Development Association) funds ecological projects, particularly with Kabyle women in rural villages, aimed at synthesizing local with diasporic knowledge of agricultural and artisanal textile production for local and international markets.

Diaspora Amazigh seek to elaborate a uniquely Amazigh architectural tradition, a touchstone for a way of life and a cosmology that is distinct from both Western and Islamic worldviews. The form of the Kabyle house (*axxam*) is celebrated as a model of sustainability through both its use of renewable materials and through its relational character - spatially arranged to accommodate the extended family and to provide graded spaces for interaction with the village community, notably through the lack of a 'front door'. Famously the subject of one of Pierre Bourdieu's earliest essays, the *axxam* exists as a powerful imaginary for the Kabyle diaspora, removed from 'home' and nostalgic for it. Bourdieu's essay was written following fieldwork carried out amongst displaced populations living in the French resettlement villages during the Algerian War (Goodman and Silverstein, 2009), and so the *axxam* he describes, with all its complex symbolisms, dualisms, forms and structures, is an abstract ideal, remembered through the collective memory of an exiled group. Today, in the Amazigh diaspora, the *axxam* remains a powerful identity symbol as well as a locus of territoriality. Whilst social, economic and environmental change continues to transform the landscapes of Tamazgha's villages, symbolic architectural cosmological references continue to occupy a key place in the spatial imagination of the Amazigh movement, motivating cultural resistance and the protection of the lived environment. In contrast to the essentialism of official patrimonialization, and despite their

physical distance, the homeland development of diaspora Imazighen remains closely implicated in the survival pre-colonial Indigenous knowledge, forms and practices.

Conclusion

The development of indigeneity in the diaspora is happening through a process of articulation. Rather than serving any single political purpose, it is appropriated and articulated in different, contentious ways. There is often disagreement as a result of balancing the demands of citizenship within the host country with the maintenance of indigenous cultural identity. However, articulations of indigeneity have implications for the Amazigh's visions for development of Tamazgha: in its society as gender roles are renegotiated and as the Amazigh movement demands greater political rights to territory, sovereignty and resources; in its language as Tamazight becomes an official language of more states; and in its environment as remote, rural village institutions and landscapes are the sites of diasporic efforts to create social and economic change.

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