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The 2023 IMO Greenhouse Gas Strategy: Considerations of Equity

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Abstract

In 2023, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new strategy to decarbonise international shipping, revising the one IMO adopted in 2018. This article analyses how considerations of equity are incorporated into the 2023 strategy. Some of the language included in the 2023 strategy reflects and – sometimes – explicitly refers to principles and norms of the international climate change regime. This article aims to shed light on the meaning of a just and equitable energy transition of international shipping on the basis of its understanding of the international climate change regime.

Keywords

just and equitable transition – shipping decarbonisation – International Maritime Organization – CBDRRRC – equity – 2023 IMO GHG Strategy – maritime transport – climate change

Introduction*

On 7 July 2023, at the 80th meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed on a new strategy for the decarbonisation of international maritime transport.¹ The decarbonisation of this sector is a crucial component of global efforts to meet the Paris Agreement temperature goal² as international shipping accounts for about 3 per cent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is set to become an even larger contributor under a business-as-usual scenario.³

The 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships⁴ (2023 Strategy) revises the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships,⁵ adopted in 2018 (2018 Strategy). This is the latest major output of IMO to reduce GHG emissions from shipping since the Organization started working on this issue in 1997.⁶ The revised strategy represents a significant step forward for the decarbonisation of international shipping.⁷ It envisions the sector will become net-zero 'by or around, i.e., close to 2050';⁸ this is a much more stringent ambition level compared to the aim to achieve at least 50 per cent emissions reductions by 2050 over 2008 levels included in the 2018

* The Carlsberg Foundation – Project: International Law-Making: Actors in Shipping and Climate Change (InterAct) Grant number: CF20-0600.

1 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, IMO Res MEPC.377(80) (7 July 2023).

2 Paris Agreement (Paris, 12 December 2015, in force 4 November 2016) 3156 *UNTS* 79, Article 2.

3 J Faber *et al.*, 'Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020' (IMO, 2020) available at <https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx>.

4 IMO 2023 (n 1).

5 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 'Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships' (IMO, 2018).

6 A Chircop, 'The IMO Initial Strategy for the Reduction of GHGs from International Shipping: A Commentary' (2019) 34(1) *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (IJMCL)* 482.

7 A Friedman, 'The International Maritime Organization's Revised Greenhouse Gas Strategy: A Political Signal of Shipping's Regulatory Future' (2024) 39(4) *IJMCL* 685.

8 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 3.3.4.

Strategy.⁹ The 2023 Strategy also includes interim checkpoints for 2030 and 2040,¹⁰ which can help to ensure the 2050 ambition level will be met.¹¹

Scholars have analysed the 2018 Strategy extensively in terms of its alignment with the Paris Agreement, its relevance for the decarbonisation of international shipping,¹² while others have analysed potential ways to support the equitable energy transition of the sector in light of the process that led to the revised strategy.¹³

Recent scholarship discusses the 2023 Strategy from the perspective of its relevance for the decarbonisation of the international shipping sector.¹⁴ This commentary adds to this research by delving into a key development of the 2023 Strategy, that is, the considerations on equity. Equity has so far received little attention in the scholarship looking at the nexus between climate change and IMO,¹⁵ and it is becoming central in the discussions on the measures to be adopted in 2025 to achieve the 2023 IMO strategy.¹⁶ It is a common experience of those attending the meetings of the MEPC and the Intersessional Working

9 IMO 2018 (n 5), para 3.1.3.

10 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 3.4.

11 Friedman (n 7), at p. 9.

12 Chircop (n 6); M Doelle and A Chircop, 'Decarbonizing International Shipping: An Appraisal of the IMO's Initial Strategy' (2019) 28(3) *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 268; TH Joung *et al.*, 'The IMO Initial Strategy for Reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions, and Its Follow-up Actions towards 2050' (2020) 4(1) *Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping* 1.

13 Y Chen, 'Reconciling Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Principle and No More Favourable Treatment Principle in Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping' (2021) 123 *Marine Policy* 104317; G Dominioni and D Englert, 'Carbon Revenues from International Shipping: Enabling an Effective and Equitable Energy Transition – Technical Paper' (2022) available at <https://hdl.handle.net/10986/37240>; A Shaw and C De Beukelaer, 'Why Should We Talk about a "Just and Equitable" Transition for Shipping?' (UNCTAD, 2022) available at <https://unctad.org/news/why-should-we-talk-about-just-and-equitable-transition-shipping>; G Dominioni, 'Towards an Equitable Transition in the Decarbonization of International Maritime Transport: Exemptions or Carbon Revenues?' (2023) 154 *Marine Policy* 105669; G Dominioni *et al.*, 'Distributing Carbon Revenues from Shipping' (2023) available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/39876>.

14 Friedman (n 7); L Bilgili and AI Ölçer, 'IMO 2023 Strategy – Where Are We and What's Next?' (2024) 160 *Marine Policy* 105953.

15 For an analysis of the equitable transition of international shipping at IMO and international trade law, see G Dominioni, 'Carbon Pricing for International Shipping, Equity, and WTO Law' (2024) 33 *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 19. For a discussion of how principles of international environmental law can help define shipping's fair share of the burden to mitigate climate change, see BP Kerr, 'Shipping's Fair Share' (2024) 54 *Environmental Law Reporter* 10410.

16 Dominioni (n 15).

Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG)¹⁷ to realise that country delegations sometimes may have different understandings of equity-related language included in the 2023 Strategy. This commentary aims to delve into the meaning of equity in shipping decarbonisation in light of the meaning given to it in international environmental law, in particular the understanding of equity in the international climate change regime. Indeed, some of the language related to equity included in the 2023 IMO GHG Strategy reflects – and sometimes explicitly refers – to principles and norms included in the international climate change regime.

Equity-Related Considerations in the 2023 Strategy

The key language related to equity was included in Section 3 and Section 4 of the 2018 Strategy, devoted to ‘guiding principles’ and ‘impacts of States’, respectively. The amendments to these sections incorporated by the 2023 Strategy are discussed below. The discussion coalesces around the relevance of equity in the 2023 Strategy and its relationship with the need for a just and equitable transition for the shipping sector.

Guiding Principles

At IMO, equity-related considerations have been included in the regulation of GHG through acknowledging ‘the need to be cognizant’ of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), as ‘enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement’.¹⁸ The CBDR-RC principle,¹⁹ one of the cornerstone principles in the international

17 This is a working group that works on the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping providing additional room for IMO Member States and observer organizations to negotiate on this matter.

18 IMO 2018 (n 5), para 3.2.

19 Formulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol 1) reprinted in (1992) 31 *ILM* 874, Principle 7 states: ‘In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command’. The principle has been enshrined in international environmental treaties beyond the climate change regime, such as the Montreal

climate change regime,²⁰ recognises the common responsibility of countries to address climate change, while also providing for differentiation on the basis of countries' GHG emissions and capability to address climate change.²¹ Within the international climate change regime, the principle has evolved over time and in the Paris Agreement, the language 'in the light of different national circumstances' was added. This has been interpreted as suggesting a more nuanced and dynamic interpretation of the principle, which recognises that differentiation needs to reflect changes in the national circumstances of countries.²² The inclusion of this language in the 2018 Strategy²³ suggests that IMO aligns with a similar evolving view of CBDR-RC.

The exact meaning of the CBDR-RC principle, and its operationalisation, remain, however, contested in the international climate change regime context,²⁴ and the principle does not enjoy the status of customary international law.²⁵ Similarly, IMO Member States are not set on how the principle of CBDR-RC is to be operationalised in the context of measures to address the decarbonisation of this shipping sector at IMO. Also, although the CBDR-RC principle has been embodied in the IMO negotiating process, there is an equal acknowledgement of the need to 'being cognizant' of principles enshrined in IMO, that is, those referring to equal treatment of ships.²⁶

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989) 1522 *UNTS* 3.

20 GM Duran and J Scott, 'Global EU Climate Action and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities' (European University Institute, 2024) available at <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/76653> accessed 21 January 2025; P Sands and J Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).

21 Sands and Peel (n 20), at p. 244.

22 C Voigt and F Ferreira, 'Dynamic Differentiation': The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement' (2016) 5 *Transnational Environmental Law* 285; see also R Barnes, 'Global Solidarity and the Law of the Sea' (2020) 51 *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 107, at Section 5.4.1.

23 IMO 2018 (n 5), para 3.2.

24 L Rajamani, 'Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics' (2016) 65(2) *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 493; B Martinez Romera and H van Asselt, 'The International Regulation of Aviation Emissions: Putting Differential Treatment into Practice' (2015) 27(2) *Journal of Environmental Law* 259.

25 U Beyerlin, 'Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law Policies, Principles, and Rules' in D Bodansky, J Brunnée and E Hey (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) available at <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552153.013.0018>; accessed 28 January 2025.

26 B Martinez Romera *Regime Interaction and Climate Change: The Case of International Aviation and Maritime Transport* (Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) 101–103, 194–196.

The guiding principles section has remained substantially unchanged in the 2023 Strategy, as many IMO Member States preferred not to risk starting a negotiation on principles where significant disagreement was likely to emerge. Thus, considerations that apply to the 2018 Strategy are still valid after MEPC 80.

Impacts on States

Both the 2018 and the 2023 Strategies include a section titled 'impacts on States', which relates to potential impacts on States from the implementation of GHG measures, such as those on import and export opportunities, gross domestic product, and the availability of transport services.²⁷

The text of this section included in the 2023 Strategy replicates almost entirely the 2018 Strategy. The revised strategy still calls for assessing and taking into account these impacts before specific GHG measures are adopted.²⁸ The (non-exclusive) list of criteria to be taken into account to assess impacts remains the same as in the 2018 Strategy, that is, 'geographic remoteness of and connectivity to main markets; cargo value and type; transport dependency; transport costs; food security; disaster response; cost-effectiveness; and socio-economic progress and development'.²⁹

In addition, both the 2018 and 2023 strategies state that '[p]articular attention should be paid to the needs of developing countries, in particular, LDCs [least developed countries] and SIDS [small island developing States]'.³⁰ Both versions also state that disproportionately negative impacts need to be assessed and addressed as appropriate.³¹ Therefore the 2023 Strategy does not provide further clarification on what constitutes a 'disproportionate' impact. In this situation, it is likely that different countries will hold different understandings, and this item will remain a point of contention in the development of the mid-term measures.

However, there are two additions to the 2023 Strategy. First, it is stated that once the GHG measures are implemented, their impacts need to be kept under review to allow for potential adjustments.³² This is aligned with Organisation

27 For a literature review of impacts on states from a GHG pricing mechanism, see I Rojon *et al.*, 'The Impacts of Carbon Pricing on Maritime Transport Costs and Their Implications for Developing Economies' (2021) 132 *Marine Policy* 104653.

28 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 4.10.

29 *Ibid.*, para 4.12.

30 *Ibid.*, para 4.10.

31 *Ibid.*, para 4.13.

32 *Ibid.*, para 4.14.

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) good policy practices.³³ Second, and arguably most importantly, the 2023 Strategy establishes that the MEPC should consider the results of a comprehensive impact assessment (CIA) to inform the implementation of GHG policies before their adoption.³⁴ The CIA was led by a Steering Committee composed of representatives from IMO Member States and observer organisations and was carried out by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) based on terms of reference established at MEPC 80.³⁵ The CIA is an important component of the 2023 Strategy as it allows for an inclusive, transparent, and cooperative procedure to assess the impacts of a given GHG measure on States. Without CIA in place, studies on impacts commissioned by individual countries or a group of countries, and then submitted to ISWG-GHG or MEPC, would have risked a less transparent, inclusive and cooperative procedure.³⁶ CIA, created through a commonly agreed terms, seems like as a step forward from a procedural justice perspective since it incorporates the interests of all countries involved.

The results from the CIA initiated in summer 2023 have been submitted to MEPC 82³⁷ and are expected to inform any measures adopted in fulfilment of the 2023 Strategy. At MEPC 82, it was agreed that additional work will be carried out before MEPC 83 on the impacts of mid-term measures on food security.³⁸

33 OECD, *Reviewing the Stock of Regulation* (OECD, Paris, 2020) available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/reviewing-the-stock-of-regulation_1a8f33bc-en; accessed 21 September 2023.

34 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 4.11.

35 Establishment of the Steering Committee on the Comprehensive Impact Assessment of the Basket of Candidate Mid-Term Measures, IMO Circular Letter No. 4766 (2023). DNV led the work on the impacts of mid-term measures on the fleet, while UNCTAD led the work on the impacts of mid-term measures on States.

36 For instance, Brazil has previously submitted a study (P Pereda *et al.*, 'Carbon Tax in the Shipping Sector: Assessing Economic and Environmental Impacts' (Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), 2023) Working Paper 2023_04, available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/spa/wpaper/2023wpecon4.html>; accessed 1 August 2023) on the impacts of a GHG levy to IMO.

37 Report of the Steering Committee on the Comprehensive Impact Assessment of the Basket of Candidate GHG Reduction Mid-Term Measures Executive Summary of the Report on Task 3 (Impacts on States), Submitted by the IMO Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC82/INF.8/Add.2 (5 August 2024); Report of the Comprehensive Impact Assessment of the Basket of Candidate GHG Reduction Mid-Term Measures – Full Report on Task 2 (Impacts on the Fleet), Note by the Secretariat (Report by DNV), IMO Doc MEPC82/INF.8/Add.1 (2 August 2024).

38 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Eighty-Second Session, IMO Doc MEPC 82/17 (28 October 2024), para 7.42.2.

Various countries expressed concerns that mid-term measures can increase transport costs and therefore exacerbate food security risks.³⁹

Just and Equitable Transition

A key development of the 2023 Strategy is the explicit mention of a 'just and equitable transition' for shipping decarbonisation. This language appears three times in the 2023 Strategy. The first time it appears is in the vision statement of the document, it is mentioned that IMO 'remains committed to reducing GHG emissions from international shipping ... while promoting ... a just and equitable transition'.⁴⁰ A reference to 'just and equitable transition' appears also with regard to mid-term measures, where it is stated that the measures should contribute to a just and equitable transition.⁴¹ Finally, reference to a 'just transition' is further made when IMO is requested 'to assess its instruments, guidance and training standards to help ensure a just transition for seafarers and other maritime workforce that leaves no one behind'.⁴²

Understandings on Equity in the Decarbonisation of Shipping

Building on the previous analysis, the sections below discuss the meaning of the inclusion of 'just and equitable transition' in the context of the 2023 Strategy with regards to two key concepts, namely, *equitable transition* and *just transition*. Resort is made to international environmental law, in particular the international climate change regime, to shed light on the use of equity in the IMO process and how it could be embodied in the forthcoming regulation.

Equitable Transition

There is no definition for the term 'equitable transition' in the 2023 Strategy. This lack of definition is not particular to the IMO realm, as it applies also to the international climate change regime. Despite being at the core of international climate change law, the principle of equity remains broadly undefined.⁴³ This ambiguity has led to various interpretations of what equity

39 T Smith *et al.*, *An Overview of the Discussions from IMO's 82nd Marine Environment Protection Committee* (UCL Bartlett Energy Institute, 2024).

40 IMO 2023 (n 1), section 2.

41 *Ibid.*, sections 4.5, 5.3.

42 *Ibid.*, section 5.6.

43 B Mayer, 'Conceiving the Rationale for International Climate Law' (2015) 130 *Climatic Change* 371; C Carlarne and JD Colavecchio, 'Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement & The Future of International Climate Change Law' (2019) 27 *N.Y.U.*

means in the climate change regime and its relation to the CBDR-RC principle.⁴⁴ The two principles are often seen as intertwined, with some authors arguing that equity provides an overarching framework and of which the CBDR-RC principle is a component.⁴⁵

The 2023 Strategy does not make explicit reference to any of the climate change treaties when referring to the 'equitable transition' and it is, unclear whether the concept of 'equity' in the IMO context has the same features as in the context of the climate change regime. Nonetheless, the separate use of 'equitable transition' and 'being cognizant of CBDR-RC' in the text of the 2023 Strategy suggests that these two concepts do not fully overlap, with the former having a different, or at least broader, meaning than the latter. This interpretation is also consistent with submissions from some Pacific Island States in the lead-up to MEPC 80.⁴⁶ These submissions attempted to provide conceptual clarity on what constitutes an equitable transition in the context of shipping's decarbonisation. In their view, equity in the 2023 Strategy has four main components: (i) ensuring the alignment of the shipping sector with a pathway consistent with the 1.5°C temperature goal set in the Paris Agreement; (ii) ensuring procedural fairness, whereby developing countries, and in particular SIDS and LDCs, participate in the decision-making process related to the energy transition of the sector; (iii) ensuring that all countries have access to the development benefits related to the production and distribution of 'new energy and fuels'; and (iv) ensuring that the majority of any revenues generated from GHG policies to decarbonise international shipping are used to address climate impacts in developing countries, and in particular SIDS and LDCs.⁴⁷

Environmental Law Journal 107; U Will and C Manger-Nestler, 'Fairness, Equity, and Justice in the Paris Agreement: Terms and Operationalization of Differentiation' (2021) 34(2) *Leiden Journal of International Law* 397.

44 Carlarne and Colavecchio (n 43).

45 *Ibid.*; V Johansson, 'Just Transition as an Evolving Concept in International Climate Law' (2023) 35(2) *Journal of Environmental Law* 229. Johansson (2023) also argues that 'just transition' is another component of an equitable transition. The language included in the 2023 IMO GHG Strategy suggests that this may not apply in the IMO context, as 'just' and 'equitable' are used together, suggesting that they have an (at least partially) separated meaning.

46 Embedding an Equitable Transition in the Revised IMO GHG Strategy, Submitted by Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands, IMO Doc ISWG-GHG 13/3/6 (28 August 2022); Defining an "Equitable Transition" and Related Terminology "Just", "Fair" and "Inclusive" to Aid Delegations in the Choice of Wording for Use in the Revised Strategy, Submitted by Fiji *et al.*, IMO Doc ISWG-GHG 14/2/5 (13 February 2023).

47 Fiji *et al.* (n 46), para 7.

While not all these components appear in it, the 2023 Strategy, includes language that aligns with the Pacific Island States' proposals.⁴⁸ In particular, the Strategy recognises the challenges faced by some developing countries, especially SIDS and LDCs, in attending IMO negotiations.⁴⁹ To address this, IMO is expected to periodically assess the provision of financial resources to support the attendance of these countries at MEPC and ISWG-GHG meetings through the Voluntary Multi-Donor Trust Fund.⁵⁰ In addition, the 2023 Strategy recognises the need to ensure that developing countries, including SIDS and LDCs, benefit from the economic opportunities offered by the energy transition of the sector – in particular, regarding the production of zero and near-zero maritime fuels.⁵¹ In this respect, the IMO may 'initiate efforts to explore renewable fuel production', especially in developing countries.⁵²

Just Transition and Maritime Workers

Although the term 'just transition' is not defined in the 2023 Strategy, it is generally understood at IMO meetings that 'just transition' refers to the rights and welfare of maritime workers. In this connection, the 2023 Strategy calls on IMO to ensure 'a *just* transition for seafarers and other maritime workforce that leaves no one behind'.⁵³ This interpretation is also aligned with various States' submissions to the IMO process.⁵⁴ As with 'equitable transition', there is no explicit reference to the climate change regime in the 2023 Strategy with regards to understanding what a 'just transition' means in the shipping context. Nonetheless, there is a parallel between the use of just transition in the 2023 Strategy and in international climate change law. In the latter, just transition remains undefined but is generally understood as the need to 'minimis[e] the adverse and potentially unequal socioeconomic effects that climate policies may have on various vulnerable groups and communities'.⁵⁵ However, some

48 IMO 2023 (n 1), Section 5.

49 These difficulties were highlighted in some submissions to IMO, for example, Comments on Document MEPC 74/7/1 on Possible Future Working Arrangements to Support the Follow-up Actions of the IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, Submitted by Kiribati *et al.*, IMO Doc MEPC 74/7/12 (10 April 2019).

50 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 5.2.

51 *Ibid.*, para 5.9.

52 *Ibid.*, para 5.11.4.

53 *Ibid.*, para 5.6.

54 Reflecting the Principles of a Just Transition in the Revised IMO GHG Strategy, Submitted by ILO, IMO Doc MEPC 79/7/25 (18 August 2022); Revision of the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc ISWG-GHG 13/3/4 (31 August 2022); Fiji *et al.* (n 44).

55 Johansson (n 45), at p. 230.

legal scholars suggest a narrower interpretation of just transition that focuses on the rights and interests of the workforce.⁵⁶

The inclusion of an explicit reference to the need for a 'just transition' in the 2023 Strategy emphasises the need to protect and ensure the well-being of maritime workers. Besides the provisions mentioned above, the 2023 Strategy further recognises the need to ensure the safe implementation of the energy transition, including addressing the 'human element'.⁵⁷ These considerations were included in the text because some of the zero-carbon bunker fuels that are likely to be deployed at scale to decarbonise international shipping pose safety concerns for workers of the shipping industry. For instance, hydrogen poses explosion and cryogenic risks, while risks related to the use of ammonia refer to toxicity and corrosiveness.⁵⁸ Relatedly, the 2023 Strategy recognises the training needs of maritime workers with regard to safety issues related to the use of alternative shipping fuels.⁵⁹

Conclusion

The 2023 Strategy has been recognised as an important step forward in the decarbonisation of international shipping. This article highlights that the 2023 Strategy advances the role of equity in the decarbonisation of shipping.

Although the guiding principles embodied in the 2018 Strategy remain unchanged in the 2023 Strategy, the latter embraces a broader set of equity-related considerations than those included previously. In particular, the inclusion of language on the need for a just and equitable transition indicates that IMO Member States have agreed to move beyond the general statements on CBDR-RC. The text agreed to in 2023 gives more attention to equity-related concerns expressed by developing countries, and especially SIDS and LDCs – both in relation to substantive and procedural aspects of the equitable transition – and puts more emphasis on the need to support the welfare of maritime workers.

56 AM Eisenberg, 'Just Transitions' (2019) 92 (101) *Southern California Law Review* 273.

57 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 5.5.

58 OB Inal, B Zincir and C Deniz, 'Investigation on the Decarbonization of Shipping: An Approach to Hydrogen and Ammonia' (2022) 47(45) *International Journal of Hydrogen Energy* 19888.

59 IMO 2023 (n 1), para 5.6.