

Marxism and the History of Philosophy

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How to conceptualise the relationship between Marxism and the history of philosophy? Why have Marxists, typically caught up in concrete political struggles, put so much emphasis on the history of philosophy? Is the current Hegel revival conducive to coming to terms with the current conjuncture?

While I was asked to speak at a conference in Bilbao in 2024¹ at a session on Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*² and Hegel's *Science of Logic*³, I decided not to engage in textual exegesis, but to go wide and to deal with Lenin's reading of Hegel in a much wider context and to address the current return to Hegel among some contemporary Marxists. My position would have stood in contrast to that Kevin Anderson, who was the other speaker at this session. However, my partner of many years, Sam Nolan, died unexpectedly, so I was speaking at his funeral instead of addressing this conference. Nevertheless, I still felt there was an argument I wanted to make, especially after being at subsequent conferences and hearing speakers focusing on *Science of Logic* in a way that I find problematic.

To get a better perspective, I think it best to focus on the relation of Marxism to Hegelianism within the whole history of philosophy and to move from there to reflect on tasks and priorities for Marxist philosophy in the current conjuncture. From this perspective, there arise questions of proportion as well as reversion with respect to Hegelianism.

There is not much attention to the history of philosophy these days. Philosophy departments have been closing down in the last decades. Some universities libraries have even sold off their philosophy collections. Where philosophy departments survive, philosophy tends to be seen in an ahistorical way. The various philosophers – Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel - are presented out of time and context. Their ideas are treated as discrete units, as if virtually independent of time or space, as if generated in autonomous activity with no necessary connection to economic, social, political, cultural or scientific developments. There is little sense of the flow, the process, the story of the history of philosophy, certainly not of its deep socio-historical context.

The foundational thinkers in the history of Marxism – Marx, Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, Gramsci, Lukacs – and many subsequent Marxists too - had an erudite knowledge of the history of philosophy, not just as a collection of thinkers and texts, but as a process, a complicated but coherent process, a process rooted in other processes, a process requiring engagement and forward movement. They understood that philosophy was the story of our species struggling to comprehend the universe and doing so within unfolding socio-historical conditions. They saw philosophy as representing the epochal consciousness of the era, even if, with all its ethereal abstractions and convoluted arguments, it did not always seem so. They felt within themselves the responsibility to discern the rhythms of the historical era in all its economic, social, cultural, scientific and philosophical complexity and to express the highest epochal consciousness for their own age. Even if they sometimes got caught up in what might seem to be detailed argument and textual exegesis, they never lost track of the big questions, the flow of history giving rise to them and the implications for their own time.

As someone working my way through the history of philosophy and later teaching the history of philosophy, it was important to me to discern the most basic issues and the recurring and developing patterns of answering them. After all the years of reading various histories of philosophy coming at it from various angles, from Copleston to Russell to Oizerman,⁴ and studying particular philosophers, there were two things that pushed me hardest to strive for the widest and deepest perspective on it.

One was becoming a Marxist, which drove me to see the history of philosophy as part of the history of everything, such that ideas arose in the very process of securing the material means of existence, evolving investigative procedures, economic and social structures, cultural rituals, moral norms. This made me look

again at everything I already knew in a way that was more highly integrated, more deeply grounded in the flow of socio-historical experience.

The other thing was teaching a one semester history of ideas course to students for whom this would be their one and only philosophy course. This forced me to get into the sharpest possible focus what were the most basic philosophical questions, what were the most basic patterns that played out in dealing with them and what were the most basic forces shaping how all this unfolded. I took a panoramic approach, sweeping through the centuries from the pre-Socratics to postmodernism in ten weeks, then in the last two weeks interrogating the exclusions as well as the inclusions, raising questions about class, race, gender, geography. All through it, although following the classical narrative of the western canon, I did my best to situate it always in material reality, in socio-historical context, never as an internalist history of ideas. I never explained the theory of historical materialism until we came to Marxism, but it informed every lecture. I presented it as an epic drama of our species struggling to understand the universe while also doing so within the same nexus of forces shaping the economics, politics, science, technology and culture of every period.

It became clear to me that the most basic philosophical questions are:

Do we explain the natural world by forces within the natural world or by forces outside it? By empirical investigation or supernatural projection? By science or divinities? By materialism or idealism?

Does our cognitive activity give us reliable knowledge of a world beyond ourselves? What is the relation between subject and object, between mind and matter, between knowing and being? Do we opt for realism or constructivism, empiricism or rationalism, objectivism or interactionism?

Do we believe that there is a comprehensive and discernible pattern to what we observe in the world? Or is it ultimately plural and random and unknowable?

What is the relation of individual to society? What drives history forward? Is it the will of God? Is it the decisions and desires of powerful people? Is it just one damn thing after another, with no rhyme or reason? Or is it a struggle for power among contending socio-historical forces?

How we answer these questions shapes how we think about everything, how we live every day, how we respond to every question, how we interpret every news broadcast, how we decide what we can do about the world, how we define every task.

From the earliest times, these questions were posed and debated, pulling this way and that way, posed again and debated again, evolving in scope and complexity in such a way that a broad narrative of recurring thesis-antithesis-synthesis can be plotted through the ages. Lenin in *Philosophical Notebooks* characterised the history of philosophy as a “spiral of the development of human thought in general”.⁵ The best philosophy has always emerged out of this sense of an ongoing process and often as a struggle between alternative, even contradictory, conceptualisations.

This approach to philosophy has set Marxism within the whole history of philosophy, within the whole battle of ideas of world culture in the milieu of every era. This approach has also set Marxism apart from other interpretations of the history of philosophy by articulating its connection to political economy, specifically to transformations in the mode of production and struggles among contending classes. For Marxism, the production of knowledge is grounded in the production of everything.

This approach has produced a stream of highly polemical texts, engaging seriously with virtually every major intellectual trend of their times and displaying an astute knowledge of the intellectual life of the epoch and the world historical context from which it emerged. The great thinkers of this tradition saw the grain of truth in every previous philosophy and situated Marxism in continuity with the centuries long struggle to conceptualise the universe.

They also acknowledged the partial perspectives in each of the contemporary trends contending with Marxism and argued that Marxism superseded every one-sided view of the world and brought philosophy to a higher synthesis than had ever been achieved, resisting every *cul de sac* fixating on parts of reality at the expense of others, whether the specificity of empirical sciences or the seductions of absolutist concepts. Marxism is both

integrative and grounded, a fresh way into the complex new problems of each new era. It has not only engaged in the battle of ideas, but has come on to the streets as a fighting force in a way that no other philosophical tradition has done with such scope and vigour.

There is a strong emphasis on the sociology of knowledge. Every concept is a condensation of collective labour, a product of centuries of social history. Every mode of production has generated characteristic modes of thought. Marxists have traced this through the evolution of the social division of labour in which the intellectual became possible, but became increasingly one-sided, atomised and impoverished, as mental and manual labour became increasingly disconnected, as the class freed to pursue knowledge became ever more remote from the class that produced the material basis of their existence. Class societies divided all of humanity's vital activities and fixed them in different sections of the population and could not achieve an integral overview. Even within thought itself, various aspects split ever further apart into subdisciplines of subdisciplines oriented to knowing more and more about less and less, while never interrogating the epistemological presuppositions structuring their inquiries.

In the early days of capital accumulation, in the struggle to break free of the fetters of feudalism, the bourgeoisie, the rising class, displayed a more explicit need for philosophy in their quest for hegemony. The intellectual dimension of their struggle for power brought forth the epistemologies of rationalism and empiricism, ontologies of mechanist materialism and dualist or monist idealism and the political philosophy of liberalism and individualism. All were subsequently rent by contradictions that could not be resolved within the system bringing them forth.

On its way up, the bourgeoisie, faced with traditions based on faith, blood and land to its right, had staked its lot with reason and science, but, once in power and faced with pressures from the left, it gave way to irrationalist, anti-realist and anti-materialist tendencies. With the degeneration of capitalism, its radius of cognition has tended to diminish. Capitalist intellectual culture tends to fly off in all directions, chasing one myopic version of reality after another, from the plodding particularity of positivism to the deconstructionist exotica of postmodernism. Attempts to break through this impasse tend to produce a leaky eclecticism but not a satisfactory synthesis. Only a philosophy with a critique of capitalism can generate unified vision. Meanwhile, there is a parade of new trends and neologisms: posthumanism, new materialism, object-oriented ontology, actor network theory, hyperobjects, mesh, rhizomes, assemblages, affordances, whatever.

Nevertheless, the dominant positions in contemporary intellectual life are various manifestations of myopic positivism and ever-new forms of obfuscating postmodernism. These days they rarely even name themselves as positivism or postmodernism, because they are degenerate forms of each, because they are generated by this same system in its decadent phase. The system is decadent but still dominant.

While positivism and postmodernism are opposite in many ways, the one narrow and technical and the other unmoored and obfuscating, they have much in common. They are both plays of the plural, skates along the surfaces, evasions of the heights and the depths. They are both anti-systemic philosophies. Both renounce grand narratives. Both block a way of thinking that is simultaneously empirical and synthesising. Both are dis-integrating philosophies generated by a dis-integrating system, a system invested in concealing the nature of itself as a system.

Marx and Engels came of age in an intellectual milieu dominated by classical German philosophy, particularly by Hegel. It was still the era of capitalism in the ascendant, playing out epistemologically in the struggle between rationalist and empiricist positions and romanticist reactions against both. Kant and Hegel and varieties of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism strove for synthesis, which could not be achieved within the bounds they strove to achieve that. It was a climactic point in bourgeois philosophy, in the consciousness of a ruling class believing that their idea, their will, created the evolving world, blind to its roots in class society, in a social division of labour creating an illusory separation of consciousness from the social and natural grounds of its existence. Caudwell saw the Hegelian dialectic as the high point of bourgeois consciousness, but it was logical structure and world historical grandeur divested of its ties to matter, thereby degenerating into mystical mumbo jumbo.⁶ Marx and Engels learned from the efforts of previous philosophers, but succeeded in breaking

the bonds constricting their efforts by situating philosophy within the mode of production shaping it and generating the division of labour and contradictions that could not be resolved within its boundaries.

There have been many tracts written on the relationship between Marx and Hegel and Lenin and Hegel and I have written along these lines myself. There are more still being written, although I don't know how much more there is to be said about that. There is more to be said, however, about the relationship between Marxism and Hegelianism and the current return to Hegel, which has captured the energies of a number of contemporary Marxists.

I want to address that, to map, however briefly, the spectrum of positions and to analyse the current state of play. From the beginning, there have been both Hegelian and anti-Hegelian strains in the history of Marxism. On the one side, Lukacs, Deborin, Bloch, Marcuse, Ilyenkov, Kosik, Dunayevskaya, Anderson and others. On the other side, Bernstein, Colletti, Althusser, Cohen and others. However, there have also been those, such as Bukharin, Stalin, Bernal, Caudwell, Schaff and others who were neither. I count myself in this category.

The Soviet philosophical debate of the 1920s was particularly interesting, because both sides more or less recognised the intellectual roots of Marxism in both the history of philosophy and the empirical sciences and it was a matter of relative emphasis. Writing my way through that history, it was clear to me that both needed to be given due weight. This was indeed the resolution of that particular debate and the mainstream position in Soviet philosophy, although arrived at in a very unsatisfactory process, that of the 1931 "new turn on the philosophical front" in the whole bolshevisation process, where many debates were bureaucratically closed down and one position on all issues was decreed to be *the* Marxist position.⁷

However, whatever way this unfolded in the USSR and Comintern, there has also been this tension in Marxism between a pull toward the Hegelian roots of Marxism and a greater emphasis on the evolution of scientific knowledge. The tendency of some forms of Hegelian Marxism, often characterised as Western Marxism, to draw a line between Marx and Engels, between history and nature, between the humanities and natural sciences. This is actually more Kantian than Hegelian, but there has been a tendency to take totality from Hegel and dualism from Kant, however contradictory. This stream has tended to leave nature and science to positivism instead of developing a non-positivist position on science. Much of the focus of my own work has been developing this position on science⁸, which I consider to be the mainstream of Marxism from Marx and Engels to the latest issues of *Monthly Review*.

In recent years, I have noticed a tendency at Historical Materialism conferences and elsewhere to characterise the terrain of contemporary Marxist philosophy to be either Hegelian or Althusserian Marxism. I have found this disconcerting, even alienating, because I do not consider myself to be either. I am definitely not anti-Hegelian and indeed I consider the Althusserian position to be a blind alley in the history of Marxism. The rejection of historicism and the appeal to an arid concept of science, which is far from the flow of actual science, which is so strong in the stream of Marxism in which I swim, that stemming from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, Bernal, Caudwell, Levins, Lewontin and others. At the same time, I am not a Hegelian Marxist. Often my issue is one of relative emphasis, but sometimes it is more than that, a tendency to slip back into idealist positions superseded by an integrative dynamic materialism.

I affirm the role played by Hegel and Hegelianism in the history of Marxism and specifically in the intellectual formation of Marx, Engels, Lenin and others. Hegel exercised a profound influence on Marx and Engels in developing their own thought as well as the agenda of other tendencies to which they had to respond. In a later period, Lenin also did so in relation to the agenda of his times. However, even if Marx confessed to coquetting Hegel, that does not mean that we need to do so too. The Polish Marxist philosopher Adam Schaff once said to me "We have to stop coquetting Hegel" and I agreed with him.

What is of value in Hegel? The idea that "The truth is the whole", totality, system, world historical consciousness, dialectical development. These values have been carried forward by Marxism, while transforming and earthing them, turning away from the absolutism, idealism, esotericism and reconstructing them in a more empirical, historicist, materialist synthesis.

Even though I affirm the thrust to totality, to system, to world historical consciousness, to dialectical development, I did not get these from Hegel, at least not directly. I got some of these notions, such as totality, from Catholicism, other notions from other thinkers in the history of philosophy, from other knowledge and experiences, and eventually from Marxism. Even Marx and Engels and Lenin didn't get these ideas and find reasons to affirm them exclusively from Hegel. Bernal made the point that Marxism was rooted in the whole history of knowledge and that it was not necessary to focus so much on Hegel. This is also my position.

What I am resisting here is the current return to Hegel among some Marxists and I am trying to figure out what is driving it. Why, in the face of the challenge to conceptualise the complex intellectual, scientific, cultural, political, economic forces of our times do they put so much stress, time and energy into Hegel and specifically on *Science of Logic*? Why, in the face of all that we have learned about the historicity of knowledge production do they refer to Absolute Truth? Do they accept the Marxist critique of reified abstractions? If so, why are they going on about Pure Being, Pure Reason, Pure Quantity (with great big capital letters even in English) as if Platonic Forms? Why, if they care about extending the influence of Marxism in advancing the cause of the left do they post esoteric quotes from Hegel on social media on a near daily basis?

As I was approaching writing my notes for the Bilbao event, I initiated a thread on Facebook to probe this trend. I wrote: "This is an honest question. Can anyone explain to me (in a way that is comprehensible both to me as a philosopher and to an intellectually engaged worker-activist) why there is currently so much focus on Hegel and in particular on Hegel's *Science of Logic*? I am finding it hard to understand why it should be such a priority." It incited quite a lot of engagement. There were many reassertions of importance of Hegel to Marx with much insistence that *Science of Logic* is necessary to understand *Capital*. There were many reminders of formulations I have heard many times, such as dialectics is the algebra of revolution. Most responses were along these lines, while several comments noted that they did not answer the question I posed. Midway through, I replied that I appreciated all the thoughtful responses and reiterated that I did recognise the importance of Hegel in the history of philosophy and in the history of Marxism, but I was still left with questions about proportion and priority in the current conjuncture.

Those who answered my question most directly asserted that it was a retreat from difficulties of actual political work into theoretical obscurity. One who did not participate in this this particular thread runs a list devoted to Marxist philosophy where he has admitted that he finds the situation in the world to be utterly desperate and hopeless and thinks activism completely pointless. He nevertheless immerses himself in an archival preoccupation with classical German philosophy and Hegelian Marxism. One respondent to my thread from Mongolia observed "If you want to understand Hegel, you need to go all the way and have to sacrifice your mental state...you will never be the same and you will be transformed forever as an illuminated one like Neo in *Matrix*." This reminded me that the Hegel bros on Facebook are also keen on sci fi and superheroes.

It sometimes seems as if immersing themselves in Hegel's *Science of Logic* will give them some mystical powers to break through the impasses of the era. Some set up a *Science of Logic* study group on zoom and uploaded it to You Tube. I clicked on one episode of it devoted entirely to Pure Quantity. Although I have no doubt about their sincerity, I find it hard to fathom why they are going in a direction away from where I believe Marxist philosophy should be going, aside from the fact that I believe it is just wrong. I don't believe in pure quantity, but see the concept of quantity arising out of a materialist history of our species needing to quantify. I don't believe in pure anything, because everything is what it is only in the web of its intricate interconnections with everything else.

Although my difference with many Hegelian Marxists is only a matter of relative emphasis, my bigger problem with Hegelian Marxism is that it often tilts too much to Hegelianism and away from Marxism, too much to convoluted absolutism and away from the fallibilist but fruitful production of knowledge of our times. Some, while still claiming to be materialist, nevertheless assert that the *Science of Logic* shows how the Absolute Idea differentiates and realizes itself as a concrete reality, going not from material to ideal, but from ideal to material, starting from sheer being, an abstract idea with no determination, and ends up at the end at a resulting whole called the Absolute Idea. For me, this is exactly the difference between idealism and materialism. Does the ideal come from the material or vice versa? In this respect, this foundational question, these are opposite approaches.

Others admit crossing over to idealism. Indeed, they suggest that Marxism reverse course on the whole trajectory of our philosophical development. Richard Seymour has openly declared a transition from materialism to idealism. Previously an Althusserian Marxist, he has found a new connection to classical German philosophy, while explicitly arguing for idealism as a superior foundation for dealing with the crises of our times. His arguments rest on such premises as: Consciousness is a primary reality that is not amenable to materialist explanation. Materialist monism is really dualism because it is the historical product of the mechanistic expulsion of mind from matter and eliminates rationality from the material world. His conclusion is that Marxism is proletarian idealism, an intellectually advantageous position and far superior starting point for considering the ecological crisis than materialism. ⁹

I reject all of these premises as well as the conclusion. I made my own transition from idealism to materialism decades ago and see no reason to turn back. The Marxist tradition has weighed these arguments for decades longer and I could summon all these arguments. In my own time, there have been a number of resurgences of idealism, along with disavowals of realism, materialism and determinism, from new left mysticism to academic postmodernism, sometimes claiming to have transcended Marxism and other times proposing a version of Marxism claiming Marx for a position breaking from the materialism of Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, Bernal and all of those who grounded their philosophical thinking in nature and science. I am interested in why in these difficult times do some Marxist retreat into idealist conceptualisations rather than affirming the materialist foundations that gives us much firmer grounding for dealing with our dilemmas.

It is true that Lenin turned to Hegel's *Science of Logic* at a time of crisis – the outbreak of war and breakup of the 2nd International. In this period, he was continuing his studies of the history of philosophy, not only Hegel, as well as current scientific theory. His emphasis in *Philosophical Notebooks* was somewhat different than in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, moving to a more sophisticated, activist, contextualist, critical form of realism. Indeed, he asserted “Man's consciousness not only reflects the world but creates it” ¹⁰, while still believing that human ideas were not simply created by thought itself but reflected the reality of the external world in however complex a way.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin directed his fire against attacks on materialism in the name of ever more sophisticated forms of idealism, but in *Philosophical Notebooks* he examined the positive aspects of idealism and the danger to the defence of materialism in neglecting such insights. He realized that “Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism”.¹¹ He no longer portrayed it as stupidity or trickery on the part of fools and charlatans. but instead as a one-sided development of the human search for truth. It was not groundless, but had real epistemological and sociological roots. It was not a matter of blindness or deceit but of myopia. At no time, however, did he move from his materialist foundations and slip into idealism.

Sometimes lately the references to Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* and Hegel's *Science of Logic* come close to indicating that cracking Hegel's *Science of Logic* might be the key to unlocking the dilemmas, to unblocking the impasses, of our times. Some of the discourse surrounding these texts has a mystifying effect. Those who are into it come across as an elect, while others, even ones highly educated others, think they must be stupid, because they just can't grasp it. I want to de-mystify the discourse around these texts. Indeed, I want to pour cold water on any return to Hegel – or even any return to Marx for that matter. I want for us to stand in our times, to take Marxism forward.

What will unlock the dilemmas of our times? What will unblock the impasses? There is no text with mystical powers. There is, however, the whole intellectual tradition of Marxism with the whole of its connections to other intellectual traditions, not only the history of philosophy, but constant study of the natural sciences, the cultural trends, the geo-political economic currents of our times.

What are the tasks of Marxism in the current conjuncture? In some areas, the tasks are obvious: In political economy, to monitor the shifting shapes of the global systems of production, distribution and consumption and to propose alternative pathways. In ecology, to track developments in environmental science and technology, to analyse these within an integrative philosophy and political economy, to point to systemic imperatives. In public health, to do the same with respect to epidemiological research, current policies and institutions and to point to alternative pathways.

What specifically, are the tasks of Marxist philosophy? To feel the pulse of contemporary mentalities, to analyse the landscape of academic philosophy and theory more generally in terms of underlying presuppositions and overarching patterns, to do the same in terms of contemporary intellectual culture generally. For example, in literature, film, television drama, social media, mainstream news and current affairs. To excavate the buried ideologies that shape degree programmes, academic publications, novels, tv series, twitter threads, news broadcasts. To contextualise the battle of ideas within scenario of contending socio-historical forces, especially class forces.

There is a confusion and charlatany and bluff predominating in the intellectual culture of our time. In popular culture, there is the clutter of celebrity gossip, sci fi and superheroes, murderous gaming, vacuous “reality tv”, the barrage of noise, lights and gyrations of popular music. It is camouflaging a vast emptiness.

There is a mental health crisis in our times. There is much discourse about mental health, an unhealthy obsession with mental health, which is often invoked as a way of avoiding responsibility or justifying further indulgence of the already indulged. The prevailing discourse never really gets to the core of the real mental health crisis and that is the utter lack of meaning, the hollowness at the core of academic and cultural production as well as everyday life.

The old world views have vanished. In Ireland, for example, Catholicism, once dominating public discourse and everyday life, has nearly disappeared from the arena. But what has taken its place? Nothing in that sphere. Only debris. People either swim in the shallows or drown in the depths. They go from one day to the next with nothing to bind it all together or they seek higher meaning in mystical mantras.

Most people in most places, including intellectuals, have never worked out their basic world views, thus they flounder without foundations. This is what Marxism has to offer: foundations, meaning.

We have a world view that is clear, coherent, comprehensive and credible. We bring a way to think that combines totality with historicity, a way of processing experience that is both integrative and empirical, a way of synthesising that is not an abstract unfolding of a mystified idea but a constant and dynamic interaction with nature and with labour in a material historical process.

We need to show how the system structuring their lives, capitalism, is responsible for the terrible injustices of the world, the ecological destruction of the world as well as for the cultural decadence and psychological disorder of the world. We offer, not only analysis in understanding the nature of system generating the most basic problems, but also a solution in a movement to expose this system and to bring about an alternative system, socialism. We offer both meaning and purpose.

We have a rich tradition of texts and movements and countries seeking to make this case and to bring this vision into being. We need to bring this tradition forward in texts, lectures, tweets, whatever media are possible for us. We need to do this without constantly writing texts about texts about texts as if an internalist history of ideas about ideas about ideas. I understand that this the way of academe, but it should not be the way of Marxists, even in making their academic careers, still less in writing for Marxist publications.

Here is what I wrote as a referee for one such journal “This article is based on a cluster of texts rather than on the world addressed by those texts. There is minimal reference to socio-historical context...The style of writing is unattractive, academic in the worst sense, overly abstract, stilted and too distant from the flow of experience. I know this the way academics are trained to write, but it is possible to write texts that are learned and philosophically astute in a more concrete, lively and attractive way. It is too ethereally abstract. It needs to be earthed, to be dynamically and organically connected to the concrete.” To be so oblivious of historical context and material basis in a journal entitled *Historical Materialism* is particularly problematic.

I believe that the starting point, the end point, the primary and constant reference point should be the world, the flow of experience of the world, with texts as secondary reference points. We need to be clearer, sharper, earthier. We need to do deeper and wider. Only in this way can we be relevant to the crisis of meaning in our time and be worthy of the great tradition in which we stand in doing so.

¹ Lenin Congress in Bilbao, 19-20 April 2024 [Lenin 1924-2024 – ISI](#) and '[Lenin 1924-2024' kongresua egin du ISIk, teoria iraultzailea gaurkotzeko asmoz | Actualidad | Gedar](#)

² V. I. Lenin *Philosophical Notebooks* Volume 38 of Collected Works London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961.

³ G.F.W. Hegel *Science of Logic* London: Allen & Unwin, 1969.

⁴ Frederick Copleston *A History of Philosophy* London: Continuum, 9 volumes published from 1946 to 1975. The author was a Jesuit priest. This was *the* history of philosophy in Catholic institutions; Bertrand Russell *A History of Western Philosophy* London: Allen & Unwin, 1946. The author saw philosophy from a positivist point of view, but in a richer way than most positivists tended to do; Teodor Oizerman *Problems of the History of Philosophy* Moscow: Progress, 1973. Oizerman was the most prominent Soviet author in history of philosophy.

⁵ Lenin PN 363

⁶ Christopher Caudwell *Studies and Further Studies in a Dying Culture* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

⁷ Helena Sheehan *Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History* Chapter 4, London: Verso, 2017.

⁸ Helena Sheehan “Marxism, Science, and Science Studies: From Marx and Engels to COVID-19 and COP26” *Monthly Review* May 2022 and “Totality: Decades of Debate and the Return of Nature” *Monthly Review* September 2023.

⁹ Richard Seymour “Duel and duality, or, degrowth and dialectics” 20 April 2023 [Duel and duality, or, degrowth and dialectics | Patreon](#)

¹⁰ Lenin PN 212

¹¹ Lenin PN 276