



Bank insolvency risk, Z-score measures and unimodal returns: A refinement

Mathieu Mercadier^a, Frank Strobel^{b,*}

^a DCU Business School, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland

^b Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B152TT, UK

ARTICLE INFO

JEL classification:

G21
C46

Keywords:

Bank
Insolvency risk
Z-score
Unimodality
One-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality

ABSTRACT

We develop refined probability bounds for bank insolvency risk measures based on the Z-score, analogous to those given by Cantelli's inequality under the additional assumption of unimodality of returns, drawing on the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality. Illustrating empirically for US banks, we argue that (i) unimodality of returns is not an overly restrictive assumption in this context, and (ii) the refined measures provide a less conservative alternative to insolvency probability bounds drawing on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality, particularly for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk.

1. Introduction

The Z-score is frequently used to assess a bank's probability of insolvency;¹ the metric is generally chosen because it is simple, intuitive, and requires only easily available accounting data.² While it is commonly attributed to Boyd and Graham (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993), a more refined probabilistic foundation for it was given in Lepetit and Strobel (2015), drawing on the Cantelli (1928) inequality, the one-sided equivalent of the Chebyshev (1867) inequality.

For the unimodal returns case, Strobel (2011) earlier presented upper bounds of the probability of insolvency drawing on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii and Petunin (1980) inequality; in this paper, we develop refined versions of such bounds using the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality derived in Mercadier and Strobel (2021). Illustrating empirically for a large sample of US banks, for the period 2001q1-2020q1, we then firstly demonstrate that unimodality of returns is not an overly restrictive assumption in this context. As a consequence, we then argue that the refined measures provide an appropriate, less conservative alternative to insolvency probability bounds drawing on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality, a refinement that proves particularly significant for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk. Our results might, therefore, prove useful for a large range of practical applications in the area of banking and financial stability where more precise measures of a bank's probability of insolvency are relevant.

Section 2 now derives our refined, Z-score based insolvency probability bounds for unimodal returns; Section 3 provides an empirical illustration of our results; and Section 4 concludes the paper.

2. Refined insolvency probability bounds with unimodal returns

With car a bank's capital-asset ratio and roa its return on assets, the bank is considered insolvent if $(car + roa) \leq 0$; we want to assess the corresponding probability of default $\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car)$. Generally, if roa is a random variable with mean μ_{roa} and variance σ_{roa}^2 , and defining the Z-score as $Z \equiv (car + \mu_{roa}) / \sigma_{roa}$, this implies

$$\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car) = \mathbb{P}\left(\frac{roa - \mu_{roa}}{\sigma_{roa}} \leq -Z\right).$$

For roa a unimodal random variable, Strobel (2011) draws on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality to obtain upper bounds of this probability of insolvency as

$$\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car) \leq \begin{cases} \frac{4}{9}Z^{-2} & \text{for } Z \geq \sqrt{\frac{8}{3}}, \\ \frac{4}{3}Z^{-2} - \frac{1}{3} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

However, drawing on the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality, derived in Mercadier and Strobel (2021) for unimodal random

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: mathieu.mercadier@dcu.ie (M. Mercadier), f.strobel@bham.ac.uk (F. Strobel).

¹ For some recent papers using this methodology, see e.g. Dang and Nguyen (2022), Klein and Weill (2022), Mateev et al. (2022), Bayeh et al. (2021), Nyola et al. (2021), Ardekani et al. (2020), Berger et al. (2017), Mare et al. (2017), Berger et al. (2016), Hakenes et al. (2015), Delis et al. (2014), Fang et al. (2014), Fu et al. (2014), Michalak and Uhde (2012).

² Note this measure is distinct from the Altman (1968) Z-score used in the corporate finance literature.




Fig. 1. (Theoretical) insolvency probability bounds for Cantelli’s vs. one & two-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequalities (OSVP & VP), for range of Z-scores.

variable X as

$$\mathbb{P}(X - E[X] \geq r) \leq \begin{cases} \frac{4}{9} \frac{V(X)}{r^2 + V(X)} & \text{for } r^2 \geq \frac{5}{3} V(X), \\ \frac{4}{3} \frac{V(X)}{r^2 + V(X)} - \frac{1}{3} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

we can obtain refined upper bounds of this probability of insolvency as

$$\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car) \leq \begin{cases} \frac{4}{9} (1 + Z^2)^{-1} & \text{for } Z \geq \sqrt{\frac{5}{3}}, \\ \frac{4}{3} (1 + Z^2)^{-1} - \frac{1}{3} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Fig. 1 graphs the relationship between Z-scores and the insolvency probability bounds given by Cantelli’s vs. the one and two-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequalities.³ We note the significantly tighter bounds provided using the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality.

3. Empirical illustration

We now illustrate how the insolvency probability bounds defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) (as well as in Footnote 3) compare when taken to the data. For this, we examine a dataset based on quarterly call reports for US banks, extracted from Wharton Research Data Services. We compute time-varying Z-scores using moving mean and standard deviation estimates for roa (with window width twelve quarters),⁴ combined with current period values of car . We retain all banks for which we are able to construct a contiguous set of time-varying Z-scores of at least 20 quarters for the period 2001q1-2020q1; this results in data for 7493 banks in total.

We first test for unimodality in the returns series, for each of the 7493 banks and their respective full available samples in the period 2001q1-2020q1 (representing, on average, 37.6 quarters). We apply the widely used Hartigan’s dip test for unimodality (Hartigan & Hartigan, 1985),⁵ which is robust to outliers; resulting p-values are compared to the usual threshold of $\alpha = 0.05$. Our results show that the null hypothesis of unimodality is not rejected in 99.03% of all cases;⁶ we

³ The corresponding probability bound using Cantelli’s inequality is $\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car) \leq (1 + Z^2)^{-1}$, see Lepetit and Strobel (2015).

⁴ This follows Boyd et al. (2006) and DeYoung and Torna (2013); it corresponds to the commonly used annual frequency of three years (see Lepetit and Strobel 2013).

⁵ Note that it is commonly used for cluster analysis (see e.g. Adolfsson et al. 2019, Banerjee et al. 2017, Garcia-Dias et al. 2020); more recent unimodality tests focus on testing unimodality in a multivariate set-up (see e.g. Ahmed and Walther 2012, Burman and Polonik 2009, Siffer et al. 2018).

⁶ For a threshold of $\alpha = 0.01$, this rises to 99.81% of all cases.

would argue that unimodality of returns might not represent an overly restrictive assumption for many practical applications in this context.

Table 1 then gives descriptive statistics for Z-scores and the respective insolvency probability bounds considered. We note that the average relative difference between the insolvency probability bounds given by the one & two-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequalities is 1.567%, with a maximum value of 199.912%. For banks with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, i.e. banks with a more pronounced risk of becoming insolvent, the average relative difference between the two measures rises substantially to 14.184%. The average relative difference between the insolvency probability bounds given by Cantelli’s and the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality is 124.409% overall, with a maximum value of 125%;⁷ this illustrates the significant refinement in upper bounds of the probability of insolvency achievable when unimodality of returns can be assumed.⁸

Our empirical illustration for US banks thus demonstrates that (i) unimodality of returns is arguably not an overly restrictive assumption in this context, and (ii) the refined probability bound drawing on the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality developed in this paper provides a less conservative alternative to probability bounds drawing on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality, with the improvement being most significant for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk.

4. Conclusion

We develop refined probability bounds for bank insolvency risk measures based on the Z-score, analogous to those given by Cantelli’s inequality under the additional assumption of unimodality of returns, drawing on the one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality. Illustrating empirically for a large sample of US banks, we then argue that unimodality of returns is not an overly restrictive assumption in this context, and that, hence, the refined measures represent an appropriate, less conservative alternative to insolvency probability bounds drawing on the (two-sided) Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality, of particular relevance for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk. As a consequence, they might prove useful for a wide range of practical applications in the area of banking and financial stability where greater precision in the measurement of a bank’s probability of insolvency is important.

⁷ For the banks with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, the average relative difference between the two measures is slightly lower at 119.092%; see also Fig. 1.

⁸ Note that while normality of returns, as assumed by e.g. Boyd and Graham (1986) and Strobel (2010) in this context, would in theory provide even tighter probability bounds in the form of $\mathbb{P}(roa \leq -car) = \Phi(-Z)$, it is generally considered a poor description of actual return series in practice.

Table 1

Comparison of insolvency probability bounds given by Cantelli's and one & two-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequalities, for sample of US banks (N=7493) & period 2001q1-2020q1.

All bank observations (n=281801)

	mean	sd	min	max
Zscore	41.239	33.384	0.000	670.598
Prob(Cantelli)	0.011	0.063	0.000	1.000
Prob(VP)	0.010	0.077	0.000	1.000
Prob(OSVP)	0.007	0.053	0.000	1.000
Rel. diff. Cantelli/OSVP (%)	124.409	7.822	0.000	125.000
Rel. diff. VP/OSVP (%)	1.567	11.689	0.000	199.912

Bank observations with lowest 10% Z-scores (n=28181)

	mean	sd	min	max
Zscore	5.357	2.527	0.000	9.283
Prob(Cantelli)	0.099	0.177	0.011	1.000
Prob(VP)	0.090	0.227	0.005	1.000
Prob(OSVP)	0.062	0.158	0.005	1.000
Rel. diff. Cantelli/OSVP (%)	119.092	24.092	0.000	125.000
Rel. diff. VP/OSVP (%)	14.184	34.483	0.000	199.912

Note: Z-scores computed using moving mean & standard deviation estimates for return on assets (window width twelve quarters), combined with current period values of capital-asset ratio; OSVP & VP are short for one & two-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequalities; relative difference between Cantelli & OSVP bounds is defined as $100 \cdot (\text{Prob}(\text{Cantelli})/\text{Prob}(\text{OSVP})-1)$, and similarly for VP & OSVP bounds.

References

- Adolfsson, A., Ackerman, M., & Brownstein, N. C. (2019). To cluster, or not to cluster: An analysis of clusterability methods. *Pattern Recognition*, 88, 13–26.
- Ahmed, M. O., & Walther, G. (2012). Investigating the multimodality of multivariate data with principal curves. *Computational Statistics & Data Analysis*, 56(12), 4462–4469.
- Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. *The Journal of Finance*, 23(4), 589–609.
- Ardekani, A. M., Distinguin, I., & Tarazi, A. (2020). Do banks change their liquidity ratios based on network characteristics? *European Journal of Operational Research*, 285(2), 789–803.
- Banerjee, T., Mukherjee, G., & Radchenko, P. (2017). Feature screening in large scale cluster analysis. *Journal of Multivariate Analysis*, 161, 191–212.
- Bayeh, A., Bitar, M., Burlacu, R., & Walker, T. (2021). Competition, securitization, and efficiency in US banks. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 80, 553–576.
- Berger, A. N., Bouwman, C. H., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2016). Bank liquidity creation following regulatory interventions and capital support. *Journal of Financial Intermediation*, 26, 115–141.
- Berger, A. N., El Ghouli, S., Guedhami, O., & Roman, R. A. (2017). Internationalization and bank risk. *Management Science*, 63(7), 2283–2301.
- Boyd, J., De Nicoló, G., & Jalal, A. (2006). Bank risk-taking and competition revisited: new theory and new evidence. IMF Working Paper 06/297 Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Boyd, J. H., & Graham, S. L. (1986). Risk, regulation, and bank holding company expansion into nonbanking. *Quarterly Review Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis*, 10(2), 2–17.
- Boyd, J. H., Graham, S. L., & Hewitt, R. S. (1993). Bank holding company mergers with nonbank financial firms: effects on the risk of failure. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 17, 43–63.
- Burman, P., & Polonik, W. (2009). Multivariate mode hunting: Data analytic tools with measures of significance. *Journal of Multivariate Analysis*, 100(6), 1198–1218.
- Cantelli, F. P. (1928). Sui confini della probabilità. *Atti del Congresso Internazionale dei Matematici*, 6, 47–59.
- Chebyshev, P. L. (1867). Des valeurs moyennes. *Journal de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées*, 12, 177–184.
- Dang, V. D., & Nguyen, H. C. (2022). Bank profitability under uncertainty. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 83, 119–134.
- Delis, M. D., Hasan, I., & Tsionas, E. G. (2014). The risk of financial intermediaries. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 44, 1–12.
- DeYoung, R., & Torna, G. (2013). Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis. *Journal of Financial Intermediation*, 22(3), 397–421.
- Fang, Y., Hasan, I., & Marton, K. (2014). Institutional development and bank stability: evidence from transition countries. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 39, 160–176.
- Fu, X. M., Lin, Y. R., & Molyneux, P. (2014). Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 38, 64–77.
- Garcia-Dias, R., Vieira, S., Lopez Pinaya, W. H., & Mechelli, A. (2020). Chapter 13 - Clustering analysis. In A. Mechelli, & S. Vieira (Eds.), *Machine learning* (pp. 227–247). Academic Press.
- Hakenes, H., Hasan, I., Molyneux, P., & Xie, R. (2015). Small banks and local economic development. *Review of Finance*, 19(2), 653–683.
- Hannan, T., & Hanweck, G. (1988). Bank insolvency risk and the market for large certificates of deposit. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 20(2), 203–211.
- Hartigan, J. A., & Hartigan, P. M. (1985). The DIP test of unimodality. *The Annals of Statistics*, 13(1), 70–84.
- Klein, P. O., & Weill, L. (2022). Bank profitability and economic growth. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 84, 183–199.
- Lepetit, L., & Strobel, F. (2013). Bank insolvency risk and time-varying Z-score measures. *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money*, 25, 73–87.
- Lepetit, L., & Strobel, F. (2015). Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures: A refinement. *Finance Research Letters*, 13, 214–224.
- Mare, D. S., Moreira, F., & Rossi, R. (2017). Nonstationary Z-Score measures. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 260(1), 348–358.
- Mateev, M., Nasr, T., & Sahyouni, A. (2022). Capital regulation, market power and bank risk-taking in the MENA region: New evidence for Islamic and conventional banks. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 86, 134–155.
- Mercadier, M., & Strobel, F. (2021). A one-sided Vysochanskii-Petunin inequality with financial applications. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 295(1), 374–377.
- Michalak, T. C., & Uhde, A. (2012). Credit risk securitization and bank soundness in Europe. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 52(3), 272–285.
- Nyola, A. P., Sauviat, A., Tarazi, A., & Danisman, G. O. (2021). How organizational and geographic complexity influence performance: Evidence from European banks. *Journal of Financial Stability*, 55, Article 100894.
- Siffer, A., Fouque, P.-A., Termier, A., & LARGOUËT, C. (2018). Are your data gathered? In *Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery & data mining* (pp. 2210–2218).
- Strobel, F. (2010). Bank insolvency risk and aggregate Z-score measures: A caveat. *Economics Bulletin*, 30(4), 2576–2578.
- Strobel, F. (2011). Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures with unimodal returns. *Applied Economics Letters*, 18(17), 1683–1685.
- Vysochanskii, D., & Petunin, Y. (1980). Justification of the 3σ rule for unimodal distributions. *Theory of Probability and Mathematical Statistics*, 21, 25–36.