

Creativity and culture: Four (mis)understandings

Vlad P. Glăveanu

Webster University Geneva, Switzerland

University of Bergen, Norway

Abstract. This chapter unpacks the ‘press’ or environment element of creativity by focusing on the relation between creativity and culture. It explores four ways of connecting the two constructs and explores their theoretical, methodological and practical implications: the creative mind (whereby culture exists ‘outside’ of the person and creativity starts from the ‘inside’), the original creator (whereby culture is associated with ‘sameness’ and creativity with ‘difference’), the rebel (whereby culture is tradition and creativity is progress), and the hero (whereby a contrast is established between high culture and everyday creativity). Each one of these understandings presents specific benefits but also considerable limitations. A sociocultural formulation of creativity as a distributed phenomenon, grounded in acts of collaboration, is advanced towards the end in order to reconnect creativity and culture in a conceptually meaningful and practically useful way.

Keywords: creativity, culture, environment, five A’s model, sociocultural psychology

When in the early 60s Mel Rhodes systematized the four P’s of creativity in the form of the creative person, product, process, and press, he gave the field more than a simple typology but a guiding framework, equally descriptive and prescriptive. While his ambition was to take stock of what had been published in this emerging area of research during his time, the basic classification he proposed ended up being more than the outcome of a review of definitions: it became the model against which research is located and to which it contributes. There are numerous examples of recent publications that refer to this framework as a conceptual organiser (e.g., Couger, Higgins & McIntyre, 1993; Isaksen, Dorval & Treffinger, 2011; Glăveanu, 2011a; Lin, Hong, Hwang & Ling, 2006; Murdock & Puccio, 1993; Smith & Smith, 2010). The present volume continues this tradition and develops it in a systematic manner, unpacking the features and processes specific for each one of the four P’s previously established. In doing so, one cannot help but wonder regarding what falls under the category ‘*press*’, perhaps the least transparent and discussed of the four.

Traditionally, creativity researchers tend to think about ‘press’ as the (pressing) influence of the environment over the creative person and process and the way its characteristics are reflected by creative products. But it is not any aspect of the environment that matters here. Indeed, what usually comes to the fore is the *social* element, the role of other people in creative work, either individuals or groups. This restrictive understanding not only excludes at least one other crucial dimension of any environment, the material one, but it also largely neglects the cultural constitution of any creative environment. While most studies falling under the ‘press’ category focus on the relation between creator and peers or evaluators (see this tradition exemplified by Amabile’s social psychology of creativity; Amabile, 1996), the connection

between creativity and culture did not emerge for a long time as a key research topic (for a recent illustration see Glăveanu, Gillespie & Valsiner, 2015; Glăveanu, 2020). This chapter corrects this oversight by focusing precisely on the multiple intersections between creativity and culture and how both terms have been conceptualised until now. It will be argued that our understanding of what creativity cannot be separated from an understanding of society and culture and, in fact, our present day conception of creativity talks as much about this phenomenon as it does about the creator's relation to his or her cultural environment. It will also describe the creative process as a fundamental collaborative act that engages human and non-human actors alongside various spaces, places, and institutions. In the end, a sociocultural perspective of distributed creativity will be advanced, blurring the lines between person and context in ways that problematise Rhodes's famous typology.

When creativity meets culture: Notes about theory, research, and practice

For decades after its emergence as a discipline (associated by many with Guilford's APA address encouraging fellow researchers to study and foster creativity; Guilford, 1950), the psychology of creativity suffered from an obvious *individualism*, at a theoretical level, and *reductionism*, at a methodological one. By locating the creative process inside the mind of the person and adopting a largely positivistic way of studying creativity as an objective quality of people or products, psychologists missed the opportunity to both understand and make a lasting impact with their research in concrete settings such as education and business. This is because any real-life study of creativity, outside of the laboratory or the testing situation, necessarily has to engage with people, objects and institutions beyond the person of the creator. Using Rhodes's terms, the 'press' factor is obvious for any practitioner, although researchers did not invest much in its study initially (Hennessey, 2003). Nonetheless, after the 1980s, more and more systemic ways of thinking about creativity emerged (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Gardner, 1982), and both society and culture appeared on the radar of creativity scholars. Interestingly though, this doesn't mean that prior to this period creativity theory developed in a 'cultural vacuum'. On the contrary, powerful ideas about what culture is stand at the very root of how we think about creativity and creative people and creative collaborations today, something that will become transparent as follows, with the analysis of four key (mis)conceptions.

The Creative Mind: Culture exists 'outside' the person, creativity starts from 'inside'

One of the most pervasive images of creativity coming out of psychology is that of the creative mind (taken by some to the extreme of talking about the creative brain; Herrmann, 1989), an understanding of creative processes as located mainly inside the head and being represented by special thinking operations. Among them one finds, besides divergent thinking, processes of creative association, analogy and metaphor, selective comparison, combination and recombination of elements, etc. (for more details see Lubart, 2003). Despite some diversity, what models of the creative mind have in common is an implicit dichotomy

between person and context, between mind and its (cultural) environment. The old Cartesian split (Jovchelovitch, 2007) is foundational for modern psychology which took as its privileged domain of investigation the human mind and its behavioural expression. What exists outside this mind? Other people, objects, institutions, and everything else, social and material, that makes up what we commonly call human 'culture'. One talks of the creative mind precisely because it can be distinguished from the outside world with which it may be in contact and have a series of exchanges, but this without affecting its status as a separate and self-contained entity in its own right. On the other hand, culture exists as such because individual minds constantly create material and symbolic forms that constitute the public domain. Through language and communication, cultural representations are made personal and private representations become public (for a discussion see Sperber's, 1994, epidemiological perspective).

The study of culture as a set of variables existing *independent* of the person and outside of him or her is best represented in psychology by the rise of cross-cultural psychology (for a critique see Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1990; Valsiner, 2013). In sharp contrast to this approach, cultural psychology starts from the premise that mind and culture are *mutually dependent and co-constitutive*. This fundamentally means that culture is not an environment external to the person but the very substance of individual minds. Instead of conceptualising culture mainly as a national-level phenomenon open to cross-cultural comparisons, sociocultural theory advances the notion of personal cultures (Valsiner, 2000) or the (creative) integration and transformation of cultural signs and tools in the making of the self and the shaping of a life-trajectory. Instead of a fixed set of elements with pre-determined properties, cultural artefacts are constantly appropriated by individuals in their everyday actions and interactions, thus gaining personal value as symbolic resources (for a detailed discussion, see Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & Psaltis, 2003).

Methodological implications

To study the relation between creativity and culture within the cross-cultural research paradigm means to inquire into the *influence, impact or role* of culture on creativity. The former is typically operationalised in terms of values, norms or beliefs, while the latter is captured either as a potential for creative expression (i.e., in the form of divergent thinking measures) or actual achievement (in case a concrete creative product is generated). This type of research is typically correlational because it is hard if not impossible to capture one cultural element, separate it from others, and manipulate it under standardised conditions. As such, the relation between culture and creativity assumes a certain direction of causality but fails to fully prove it empirically, at least with the means of classic quantitative measures. This is one of the reasons why culture itself has rarely been a concern for creativity researchers and most often they operationalised 'press' factors in a more micro and contained manner. The series of experiments initiated by Teresa Amabile and collaborators (see Amabile, 1996) on the role of surveillance or rewards on creative production illustrate such attempts. However, for as informative as findings about the impact of rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance might be, they are hardly sufficient to re-construct a whole cultural system in which

creative work is rewarded in different ways, by different people, and rewards themselves carry various meanings. The great methodological challenge of culture outside / creativity inside perspectives is precisely their inability to explain in a dynamic and developmental manner the exchanges between person and context, creator, and his or her environment.

Practical implications

This state of affairs has deep implications for practitioners. If we start from the premise that creativity exists inside the mind, then our primary focus will be to stimulate idea generation processes, leaving implementation to the side. Equally, if culture resides outside the individual but has an impact on 'internal' processes such as idea generation, then our concern should be on how to *design* better environments for creativity and shape social interaction around the creator. This is, in fact, the typical premise for many training programmes or strategies for creativity enhancement (see de Bono, 2007). The downside in this case lies precisely in the necessarily narrow conception of both creativity and culture such programmes tend to adopt. The material aspects of creative work, existing outside the mind, as well as the normative and historical dimensions of culture normally escape researchers working within this tradition. Moreover, the emphasis often falls on originality as a marker of creativity, the core of yet another dichotomy between creativity and culture to be discussed next.

The Original Creator: Culture as 'sameness', creativity as 'difference'

Adding to the creative mind view, this opposition between sameness and differences is crucial for, once more, separating creativity and culture. For many scholars culture is necessarily represented by all those elements that are *common* to a group of people (often a nation as we saw in cross-cultural psychology) and set them apart from other groups. Moreover, within culture there are elements that seem to be characteristic for all societies, thus gaining a universal status and emphasising once more sameness over difference at a phylogenetic level (Cole, 1996). On the other hand, creativity seems to be deliberately going in the opposite direction. Creators are typically considered people who stand apart because of a unique personality profile or cognitive abilities (Barron & Harrington, 1981). Creative works are defined not only by novelty but also originality or the distance between what existed before and what is being produced. Finally, the creative process is supposed to express something unique about the self of the creator, a view that is specific for the artistic field where the value of a given output is measured against notions of authenticity and personal cost. The greater the difference in expression and the personal cost attached to it, the more notable the creative person or product.

Under these circumstances it is easy to fall prey to a conception of culture as unitary and creativity as the personal quality making a difference and, as we shall see in the next section, changing culture. But are cultures homogenous and static entities? When considering cultural elements to be 'shared' what exactly

does this imply? In order to answer these questions, we can explore sociocultural approaches to culture such as the theory of social representations (Duveen, 2007; Jovchelovitch, 2007), which explicitly theorise social knowledge on the basis of it being possessed by more than one single individual. Following a mediational structure specific for cultural psychology, this theory relates the emergence of representations about different aspects of reality (and thus the emergence of culture) to acts of communication between people and groups. In this sense, the actual focus of social representation studies is not or should not be the content of a representation, or what is being shared, but the process of *representing* or the act of *sharing*. Adopting this dynamic and developmental perspective one becomes sensitive to the fact that constructing a common culture through dialogue and debate does not exclude conflict, difference of opinion or creativity. On the contrary, it places them at the centre of cultural processes for which sameness is only a partial achievement and never a given.

Methodological implications

To build a theory of creativity on the idea that creative work is original by comparison to the more conventional cultural background means to look for difference at the expense of understanding the *value* of sameness. In order to create *significant* difference, a minimum level of sharedness is required between creators and between them and their audiences (otherwise there is no possibility of communication). Creative acts use and recombine existing cultural elements and are based on our capacity to appreciate these elements in making sense of any novelty and its value (Glăveanu, 2011b). And yet, achieving a common understanding of what is novel is never as straightforward as it seems. This difficulty is well reflected by basic psychometric procedures used in creativity research (Plucker, & Renzulli, 1999). When scoring creativity tests, for instance, psychologists are interested not only in the number of answers offered (an indicator of fluency) but also how original these answers are and how many different categories they represent (indicators of originality and flexibility). A comparison is thus made between new answers and what a large sample of individuals from within the same population (often seen as a unitary culture) responded for the same items. Considering the typically short length of the answers in testing situations it is however problematic to assume that any two people taking the test and offering almost identical replies imagine *exactly* the same solution and invest it with the same *meaning*. Once again, language as a cultural tool allows us to share ideas but never in a completely linear, isomorphic fashion.

Practical implications

Since creativity is considered to be the process that helps us make a difference within our cultural system, its personal and societal value is augmented. Conversely, thinking about culture as sameness can increase the feeling of togetherness but it also makes creators feel sometimes claustrophobic within their social environment. For many, the 'press' factor is precisely one leading towards more sameness and, ultimately, conformity. On the other hand, the pressure towards creativity understood solely as *difference* risks

blurring the line between the creative and the simply bizarre. Culture and its system of shared values are not only about making people similar but giving them a general set of criteria for how to interpret and react to change and novelty. This set of criteria is nonetheless flexible since, without this 'quality', cultures never have the chance to develop and transform as a result of integrating novelty. The alternative view is hard to imagine and yet it has often been incorporated in creativity theory, as we will see next.

The Rebel: Culture as tradition, creativity as progress

From a view of culture as external to the person and essentially homogenous there is but a small step to considering it a *static* entity, oriented mainly towards the *past*. Indeed, it is not uncommon to think about institutions, a central form of cultural organisation, as driven by the need to establish clear routines, preserve them and look for stability rather than change (Douglas, 1986). This image of cultures resisting change is of course clashing with understandings of creativity as the very process of generating and implementing the 'new'. The status of creator is often awarded to those who visibly *revolutionise* a domain and are capable of leaving their mark on culture (Simonton, 1988, 1999). Creativity is therefore future oriented and capable of leading social progress. The question to ask here though is whether cultural forms are as static as we tend to imagine then and also whether creativity is always about producing change or can it also be involved in creating continuity.

To answer this we need to unpack the notion of *tradition*, a concept that is central to understanding culture and, I will argue, creativity as well. Traditions are often considered, both by scientific inquiry and common sense, as a set of old and stable beliefs and practices specific for certain groups or communities. As the very substance of culture, tradition is 'backward looking' and 'conservative' and, within an ever-changing and globalised world, there is struggle to keep traditions alive in the sense of keeping them unchanged. However, this conception ignores the fact that the mere survival of a traditional practice rests in its capacity to renew itself and adapt to dynamic environments (Negus & Pickering, 2004). Conversely, creative work always builds upon existing traditions and, when successful, is integrated by tradition (think here about the history of art and its changing canon). As such, the distinctive mark of authentic creativity is not the rupture it creates with the past but its capacity to transform what exists in ways that help it *continue* in a better and novel way. There are ample examples of this dynamic coming from various creative domains, not least the traditional practice of craft (for a detailed study of creativity in folk art see Glăveanu, 2013a). What they show is the fact that creativity depends on cultural traditions not only for its resources and standards but also for a background of meanings that renders creative acts intelligible.

Methodological implications

If the capacity to change culture resides within people and if culture itself is resistant to change, then creators need to have quite a unique personality profile in order to perform their activity. In particular, they

need to be able to take *risks* and *not conform* to cultural pressures, in other words, to display a rebellious nature that prevents them from adopting easy solutions and relying on traditional ways of doing things. Indeed, personality research into creativity often stresses risk taking and openness to new experiences (for more details see Feist, 1999) as central requirements for creative achievement in a wide range of areas. What this type of research is silent about, however, is the ontogenesis of such personal qualities, the way they play out within interpersonal contacts and how they are integrated by creators at an identity level. Being rebellious might be the conventional (indeed 'traditional') way of being creative within a Western cultural context, but this doesn't mean that there are no other competing conceptions of what defines a creative person (Lubart, 1999). In order to capture these alternatives methodologically however we would need to more consistently inquire about the cultural foundations of our concepts and theories and the biases we might have towards 'romantic' readings of creativity as a special, even dangerous quality.

Practical implications

A paradoxical relationship is established between creators and culture when adopting the (mis)understanding described here: on the one hand, creative people need to rely on cultural resources, on the other, they are pushed to believe they have to create things '*out of thin air*' because today's culture represents the past while their work concerns the future. This dilemma is surely experienced as a tension by many and we only need to consider the contemporary art scene to realise this. In fact though, any additions to the cultural heritage of a group or society should optimally alter this heritage in ways that create not simply novelty, but meaningful novelty. This is what systemic models of creativity also argue for (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) when proposing that creators are always in dialogue with a social field and a cultural domain. The question is though how do we appreciate what a cultural domain is? Answering this leads us towards the fourth and last dichotomy discussed in this chapter.

The Hero: High culture and everyday creativity

The idea of culture opposing creativity for being external, homogenous, and static, is mobilised more or less implicitly by creativity scholars in order to promote a certain view of creativity as an individual act, at the same time original and rebellious. But when trying to engage more deeply with the issue of culture, compelled by the fact that great creators are known to shape the cultural environment of particular societies, if not humanity as a whole, it is not this broad and 'democratic' understandings that comes to the fore. On the contrary, creativity theory has traditionally engaged solely with what can be called '*high culture*' or those cultural institutions, artefacts and practices held in high esteem and considered the top achievements of our species. High culture includes the arts and sciences without being limited to them. What it excludes nonetheless is the 'vulgar' or the 'mundane', precisely the widely shared elements of culture that were considered in previous sections essential for creative production. Indeed, while more and more creativity research is recently focusing on little or mini-c creative expression (Kaufman & Beghetto,

2009), or the potential to create something of (personal) value, these creations become irrelevant for theories of culture that consider only its most visible outcomes.

This reversal, from 'everyday' to 'high' culture, does not however change many of the attributes I discussed previously. High culture is still (and even more obviously) outside any particular person, it achieves a level of universality, and resists radical change because of its institutionalised nature. The creativity that addresses this cultural level is no longer that of ordinary people but of *geniuses* and there is a long-lasting interest for and fascination with the person of the genius, at least in the Western world, from Antiquity onwards (Glăveanu, 2010). This tradition accentuates the 'qualities' of creators mentioned in previous sections: the eminent expression of individual minds, the uniqueness of their contributions, the progressive and radical aspects of their productivity. Great creators tend to stand alone, they face few of their peers (since they are so different from them), and engage only with previous achievements inscribed into the specialised culture of their domain. This mythology of the genius has gradually been deconstructed not only by psychologists but by sociologists who rightfully refer to creators in this case as '*culture heroes*' (Schaffer, 1994), mistakenly considered to shape culture in an almost singlehanded manner. On the contrary, both sociological and sociocultural investigations reveal an intricate picture of creative collaborations, far more extensive than initially thought (for details see Becker, 2008; John-Steiner, 1992). In this account, the 'culture hero' becomes not a person but designates a privileged 'position' located within and connecting various collaborative networks.

Methodological implications

A focus on the structure and evolution of high culture has direct consequences for the study of creativity. If everyday life creations remain important perhaps for developmental research, studies of historical or Big-C creativity gain prominence in the field for dealing with 'pure' creativity, that is, creativity that transforms society and culture. There is a long tradition of engaging in research focused on *eminent or celebrated creators*, from Galton's (1874) well-known study of hereditary genius and up to much more nuanced and contextual descriptions of exemplary creators in a variety of domains (Gardner, 1993). In contrast to the latter, where detailed case studies are presented to the reader, introducing the life and work of an eminent creator, another vigorous line of research based on *historiometric* investigations adopts a radically nomothetic approach to the study of geniuses and culture (for details see Simonton, 1999). Regardless of the quantitative or qualitative nature of the research mentioned above, a focus on high-level creativity tends to obscure everyday creative acts made by people who don't contribute to 'high' culture but to their more immediate cultural environments, from homes to public spaces, from educational to organisational settings. To disregard this kind of creative expression means in the end to exclude a wide range of creative contributions, if not most of them, including the creativity of children who are not typically expected to contribute to culture in a significant way (Csikszentmihalyi in Sawyer et al., 2003).

Practical implications

A strict division between high and popular culture might be intuitively valid but it has a series of important negative consequences. While we might agree that some creative forms of expression are more visible than others and generate useful novelty for more than an individual or small group, there is no reason to take them as an absolute *measure* for all we call creativity. First of all, operating with this dichotomy hides the fact that most human action is neither 'little' or 'Big' when it comes to its creative value but somewhere 'in between' (see also the notion of community creativity in Glăveanu, 2010). If we add to this a temporal dimension, we will be able to notice as well that what might seem culturally minor at one point can prove to be extremely significant at another (the classic example being that of Van Gogh) or, more often, what was celebrated as new once gradually becomes the usual, no longer noticed by anyone (think about architectural styles or technological inventions). What does this mean for creators themselves? One direct consequence is that creators might very well feel pressured to achieve *social recognition* for their work and eager to embody the cultural model of the creative hero in their chosen domain. An even greater risk is not to be compelled to act creatively at all when falling short of achieving a significant contribution to culture.

Culture and creativity, beyond the 'press' factor

I have reviewed in this chapter four key (mis)conceptions concerning the nature of creativity and culture and their relationship. Each perspective was structured as a *dichotomy* since very often our understanding of what creativity is takes shape in contrast or in response to a certain view of culture. And this is valid even when we are not fully aware of using such antinomies. In theory, research and in practice, creativity is endowed with certain characteristics precisely because society and culture have the opposite features. Inside – outside, sameness – difference, static – dynamic, extraordinary – ordinary don't only separate culture and creativity but end up turning culture into the *opposite* of creativity. This is the main reason why creativity theory did not fully engage with this notion until relatively recently, in the last three decades, and also why, when it did, it created a clear separation between the creative person and his or her cultural environment. The classic way of conceptualising culture is to consider it as 'press', a constraining or enabling factor that can moderate the importance of cognitive or conative variables in creative work (see Amabile's, 1996, componential model of creativity, or Lubart's, 2003, multivariate approach). This certainly is a step forward in terms of acknowledging the role of environmental elements in creative work, but it rarely considers the *mutual dependency* between intra- and inter-psychological factors. This blind spot is reflected in and also endorsed by mainstream methodologies for the study of creativity, such as the wide use of experimental and psychometric tools. In striving for a more 'scientific' or 'objective' study of creativity, these methods start from the premise of the separation between person and context and thus reflect what Montuori and Purser (1997) called 'methodological reductionism'. A science of creativity that can deal with the complexities of systemic, collaborative, and emergent phenomena is still to be born.

What would be an alternative that can help us overcome harmful dichotomies within creativity theory and pave the way for new methodological developments? A proposal to rethink our current models of creativity comes from *cultural psychology*, an emerging inter-disciplinary field drawing not only on social and developmental psychological literature, but also on scholarship from other social sciences (like sociology and anthropology), the humanities (e.g., literary studies and history), and the natural sciences (drawing inspiration from biology, physics and, more recently, chemistry). A cultural or sociocultural model of creativity starts from the premise of the interdependence between creator and culture, both represented as dynamic, open systems (Glăveanu, 2010, 2011b; John-Steiner, 1992). From this perspective, the social and cultural environment is not an outside element imposing its own ‘press’ on the individual but a constitutive part of both mind and action. Creativity reflects this very well when theorised as a *distributed and collaborative phenomenon* (see Glăveanu, 2014), as action distributed along social, material and temporal lines. Extending creativity into the cultural world by emphasising processes of exchange, interaction, communication, resistance, and so on, gives our theories a new ground above and beyond what is traditionally a study of internal thinking processes. At the same time, culture gains a new meaning beyond the institutional and macro-level approaches mainly adopted by cross-cultural research and sociological studies of ‘high’ culture.

Starting to think relationally and culturally about creativity has important conceptual and practical implications, including making us challenge the established schema of the four P’s. While useful to systematise and locate one’s research, the four P’s model endorses the distinction between person and context (‘press’) and, despite Rhodes’s (1961) initial aims, offers a static and disjointed view of creative work by separating person, process, and product. Elsewhere I tried to reformulate this framework from a cultural perspective and proposed a focus on the interrelation or collaboration, in creative expression, between *actors, audiences, actions, artefacts, and affordances* (the five A’s model, see Glăveanu, 2013b). In this framework, culture is not outside of but intrinsic to actor – audience relations, to the use and generation of artefacts, and to creative actions aimed at exploiting and expanding existing affordances. Moreover, the ‘press’ factor acknowledges more than social relations and engages as well with the materiality of a creator’s environment. In the end, however, both the four P’s and five A’s models are descriptive rather than predictive or explanatory. In this sense, they don’t specify in advance the relation between their elements and invite researchers to discover them through research. Besides, they seem to cover more or less the same aspects but using a different terminology so the question arises in the end of *why* we should exchange one way of thinking for another.

The answer for me lies in the fact that, while similar on the surface, these two conceptions are radically different at an *epistemological and pragmatic level*. Dichotomising culture and creativity is not prevented (but rather encouraged) by the four P’s approach, while unconceivable within a sociocultural framework like the five A’s. Questions about correlation and causality formulated within one paradigm are also very different from the explanatory and interpretative focus of the other. But, most importantly, the ways in

which creativity is fostered differ greatly. The four P's model invites researchers and practitioners to think about how they can 'design' the environment to have an 'impact' on the creative person according to a simple (and simplistic) causal logic. The cultural approach advocated for here starts by focusing not on separate elements but on the *relations* between person and context and their co-development, on the bonds of collaboration that unite creators with other people and with their wider world. It also understands that there is no 'either/or' between creative and cultural acts and, as such, a concern for culture is not optional but essential for building comprehensive and viable models of creative phenomena.

References

- Amabile, T. M. (1996). *Creativity in context*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Barron, F., & Harrington, D. (1981). Creativity, intelligence, and personality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 32, 439-476.
- Becker, H. S. (2008). *Art worlds. Updated and expended*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cole, M. (1996). *Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
- Couger, J. D., Higgins, L. F., & McIntyre, S. C. (1993). (Un)structured creativity in information systems organizations. *MIS Quarterly*, 17, 375–397.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view of creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), *The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives* (pp. 325-339). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- de Bono, E. (2007). *How to have creative ideas: 62 exercises to develop the mind*. London: Vermillion.
- Douglas, M. (1986). *How institutions think*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Duveen, G. (2007). Culture and social representations. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology* (pp. 543-559). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feist, G. (1999). The influence of personality on artistic and scientific creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), *Handbook of creativity* (pp. 273-296). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Galton, F. (1874). *English men of science: Their nature and nurture*. London: MacMillan & Co.
- Gardner, H. (1982). *Art, mind, and brain: A cognitive approach to creativity*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Gardner, H. (1993). *Creating minds: An anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Ghani*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2010). Principles for a cultural psychology of creativity. *Culture & Psychology*, 16(2), 147-163.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2011a). Children and creativity: A most (un)likely pair? *Thinking Skills and Creativity*, 6, 122–131.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2011b). Creativity as cultural participation. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 41(1), 48-67.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2013a). Creativity and folk art: A study of creative action in traditional craft. *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*, 7(2), 140-154.

- Glăveanu, V. P. (2013b). Rewriting the language of creativity: The five A's framework. *Review of General Psychology*, 17(1), 69-81.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2014). *Distributed creativity: Thinking outside the box of the creative individual*. Cham: Springer.
- Glăveanu, V. P. (2020). A sociocultural theory of creativity: Bridging the social, the material, and the psychological. *Review of General Psychology*, 24(4), 335-354.
- Glăveanu, V. P., Gillespie A., & Valsiner, J. (2015). *Rethinking creativity: Contributions from cultural psychology*. London: Routledge.
- Guilford, J. P. (1950). Creativity. *American Psychologist*, 5, 444-454.
- Hennessey, B. (2003a). Is the social psychology of creativity really social? Moving beyond a focus on the individual. In P. Paulus and B. Nijstad (Eds.), *Group creativity: Innovation through collaboration* (pp. 181-201). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Herrmann, N. (1989). *The creative brain*. Lake Lure, NC: Brain Books.
- Isaksen, S. G., Dorval, K. B., & Treffinger, D. J. (2011). *Creative approaches to problem solving: A framework for innovation and change* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- John-Steiner, V. (1992). Creative lives, creative tensions. *Creativity Research Journal*, 5(1), 99-108.
- Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). *Knowledge in context: Representations, community and culture*. London: Routledge.
- Kaufman, J. C., & Beghetto, R. A. (2009). Beyond Big and little: The four C model of creativity. *Review of General Psychology*, 13(1), 1-12.
- Lin, C. L., Hong, J. C., Hwang, M. Y., & Ling, Y. L. (2006, June). *A study of the applicability of idea generation techniques*. Paper presented at the XVII International Society of Professional Innovation conference, Athens, Greece.
- Lubart, T. (1999). Creativity across cultures. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), *Handbook of creativity* (pp. 339-350). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lubart, T. (2003). *Psychologie de la créativité*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Montuori, A., & Purser, R. (1997). Social creativity: The challenge of complexity. Translation of Le dimensioni sociali della creatività. *Pluriverso*, 1(2), 78-88.
- Murdock, M. C., & Puccio, G. J. (1993). A contextual organizer for conducting creativity research. In S. G. Isaksen, M. C. Murdock, R. L. Firestien, & D. J. Treffinger (Eds.), *Understanding and recognizing creativity: The emergence of a discipline* (pp. 249-280). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Negus, K., & Pickering, M. (2004). *Creativity, communication and cultural value*. London: Sage Publications.
- Plucker, J., & Renzulli, J. (1999). Psychometric approaches to the study of human creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), *Handbook of creativity* (pp. 35-61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rhodes, M. (1961). An analysis of creativity. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 42, 305-311.
- Sawyer, R. K. et al. (2003). Key issues in creativity and development. Prepared by all authors. In R. K. Sawyer et al. (Eds.), *Creativity and development* (pp. 217-242). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Schaffer, S. (1994). Making up discovery. In M. Boden (Ed.), *Dimensions of creativity* (pp. 13-51). London: MIT Press / Badford Books.
- Simonton, D. K. (1988). *Scientific genius: A psychology of science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Simonton, D. K. (1999). Historiometry. In M. Runco & S. Pritzker (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of creativity*, vol 1 (pp. 815-822). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Smith, J. K., & Smith, L. F. (2010). Educational creativity. In J. C. Kaufman & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of creativity* (pp. 250-264). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Shweder, R. (1990). Cultural psychology – what is it? In J. Stigler, R. Shweder and G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural Psychology: Essays on comparative human development* (pp. 1-43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), *Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture* (pp. 39-67). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Valsiner, J. (2000). *Culture and human development: An introduction*. London: Sage.
- Valsiner, J. (2013). *An invitation to cultural psychology*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Zittoun, T., Duveen, G., Gillespie, A., Iverson, G., & Psaltis, C. (2003). The use of symbolic resources in developmental transitions. *Culture & Psychology*, 9(4), 415-448.