

Governance and Citizenship in contested states: the Northern Ireland peace agreement as internationalised governance.

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The Good Friday Agreement signed in Belfast in 1998, but still in a process of development, is one of a number of peace agreements emerging from apparently intractable conflicts, since the end of the cold war. This article focuses on a relatively unexamined aspect of the Agreement - the international relevance of its innovative provisions on equality of citizenship and internationalised governance. The Belfast Agreement both implicitly and explicitly deals with the problematic issue of citizenship in a state which is highly contested at the constitutional level. Its development of an equality agenda and dynamic cross-border institutions of governance in a situation where ultimate sovereignty and allegiance remains contested is a departure from current international norms. The peace process around the Agreement also reflects a significantly increased international involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict. External support and mediation was essential in brokering an Agreement and will inevitably be important in sustaining the new forms of citizenship which are promised in its provisions. Both in its processes and in the framework for citizenship and governance suggested by the Agreement, Northern Ireland can provide a useful example to the increasing number of nationalist conflicts in the post cold war world.

The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement offer a number of challenges to the international literature on citizenship, which has to date not engaged with the issues and problems thrown up when the nature and existence of the state are contested. This is reflected in the theoretical assumptions about the nature of citizenship that have underpinned political analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and its potential solutions. The dominant analysis assumes that most nationalists would prioritise justice and equality over constitutional issues,¹ and secondly that unionists prioritise the Union over discriminatory measures and would support internal reform if the constitutional threat were removed.² These assumptions are based on the idea that the existing state will gain legitimacy and the conflict will end when nationalists are offered and accept full citizenship of the British state. The conflict resolution strategies resulting from this approach sharply divided sovereignty and equality and sought a trade-off between the two. This strategy failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is not clear that nationalists are in fact willing to abandon nationalism for justice. Neither is there any evidence that unionists see such a trade off as practicable or in their interests. Rather, as discussed below, Ulster unionists fear that concessions on issues of equality would strengthen Irish nationalism and weaken the Union. Thus exclusion of nationalists from the public sphere and full citizenship continues to be an important element of modern Ulster unionism.

The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement have made progress because they abandoned previous dogma which saw equality as a concession to be granted once the constitutional challenge to the Northern state was ended. The Agreement has sought to fundamentally change the nature of citizenship, by dividing issues of citizenship rights, institutions of governance and the

¹ e.g. Smith, David and Gerald Chambers, *Inequality in Northern Ireland*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991).

² e.g. pamphlets by the Cadogan Group, *Lost Accord: The 1995 Frameworks and the Search for a Settlement in Northern Ireland*, 1995 and *Square Circles: Round Tables and the Path to Peace in Northern Ireland*, (Belfast, 1996).

ethos of the state from the question of formal sovereignty. The debate on the equality agenda has therefore become part of the definition of citizenship rather than a material 'carrot' to entice people away from the allegedly symbolic arena of nationalism. If the Good Friday Agreement succeeds it will have done so without requiring nationalists or unionists to abandon their political goals or their political and ethnic identities. It will have established power-sharing government, implemented a wide-ranging process of internal reform and established significant and dynamic supranational institutions of governance.

Within Northern Ireland the major source of opposition to the Agreement has come from the unionist population. Their disagreements with the peace process are not confined to the central constitutional issues but also embrace the reform provisions around the equality agenda. This absolute rejection of the extension of citizenship rights which would be seen as uncontroversial in most democratic states, to the nationalist population, is incomprehensible in the context of the mainstream academic literature on citizenship and highlights its inadequacy in contested states. The debate on equality in Northern Ireland - reflected in such issues as policing, fair employment, cultural rights and Orange marches - has been highly controversial because the issues involved clearly reflect the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland. Unionists do not see the demand for 'parity of esteem' or 'equality of citizenship' as an unproblematic demand for the granting of democratic rights. Equality issues are seen as inevitably bound up with the nature of the state. Unionists feel threatened by the debate on equality of citizenship and 'parity of esteem' and know that their position is not understood by those outside the unionist community. This is because the debate on equality has been associated with nationalist demands for change or even republican attempts to undermine the state. Senior Ulster Unionist negotiator Dermot Nesbitt, speaking in the Northern Ireland Forum, articulated this clearly saying 'we have a nationalist position that is portrayed as moderate, modern and forward thinking ... on the other hand we are portrayed as

hard-line, bigoted, sectarian and narrow-minded'.³ Patricia Campbell (UUP) produces a typical example of an argument that makes little sense outside of unionists' own framework, when she says that 'the Sinn Féin pursuit of the equality agenda stands between us and our goal of a just society. It is perceived as part of their attack on our state and our being, an effort to undermine our society'.⁴ In a similar vein, Jim Rodgers (UUP) in an attack on Sinn Féin councillors says that they 'were churning out their hate, as usual, lecturing the council about "parity of esteem", equality, inclusiveness'.⁵ Unionists themselves are aware that they are often speaking in terms which are misunderstood outside Northern Ireland. Their poor external image has been a constant feature in unionist discourse and, at least until the late 1980s, and to some extent until today, it resulted in a withdrawal from analytical debate.⁶ The rejection by mainstream unionism of the extension of full and equal citizenship to northern nationalists on the grounds that it would weaken the Union is at the heart of their opposition to the Good Friday Agreement. Given the weakness of dissident nationalist and republican movements it is the unionist opposition which offers the greatest barrier to the successful implementation of the Agreement and therefore an understanding of their perspective is essential to political progress.

Citizenship in a Contested State

Unionists' rejection of the 'equality agenda' put forward by nationalists on the grounds that it threatens the Union, is not simply paranoia, or a cultural predisposition to reduce all matters to history or sovereignty.⁷ In a sense, unionist elites are right. The Northern Ireland state is contested on all fronts. The refusal of nationalists to support the RUC, their desire to include nationalist symbols in the

³NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p. 52.

⁴ *Irish News*, 19 May 1998.

⁵ NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p.38.

⁶ Arthur Aughey, *Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement*, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1989), vii.

⁷ See Maurna Crozier, *Cultural Traditions in Ireland*, (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queens University Belfast, 1989), 20.

public sphere, opposition to Orange marches and the desire for stronger fair employment legislation are not just individual stand alone issues of justice. They are for nationalists part of a broader political programme. Gerry Adams was quite explicit in arguing that if unionism rests on power and privilege, as he believed it did, then the mobilisation of a nationalist consensus with sufficient international support to make progress on an 'equality agenda' would weaken unionism.⁸ Sinn Féin recognised that such a consensus could not be mobilised to press for a British withdrawal, but that it could be built around 'equality' issues and North-South links and it would be difficult for the British government to resist the pressure for reform.

Mainstream unionism does not believe that making compromises on equality and citizenship will secure the Union or even that it can be done without endangering the state. This is most clearly expressed in the debate around the issue of consent, where mainstream unionists have argued that a 'guarantee' on the final handover of sovereignty is irrelevant if unionists cannot prevent changes in the actual ethos and governance of the state.⁹ Reform measures are opposed not only on their own merits but because they represent a shift in the political resources available to each community. They are part of the 'war of position' over the future of Northern Ireland, part of the hegemonic battle which precedes the struggle for ultimate political power.¹⁰ Each of the key areas of the equality agenda in Northern Ireland, would be described in the international literature as citizen-rights within a state, yet in spite of this, reforms in these areas are seen by unionists as having the potential to undermine the state. If the nature of citizenship in Northern Ireland is changed,

⁸ See Gerry Adams *Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace*, (Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon, 1995), 231.

⁹ e.g. David Trimble, NI Forum, 12 Sept. 1997, vol. 42, p.3.

Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p. 38.

Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p.4.

UUP *Response to Frameworks for the Future*, 1995 [on www.uup.org, 20 May 1997].

¹⁰ Phrase 'war of position' from Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith eds. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

mainstream unionists believe that nationalists will use their increased economic, political and cultural resources to challenge the constitutional position.¹¹

The demands made by nationalists for reform under the banner of equality reflect this link between citizen rights and the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland. Mainstream unionists believe that RUC reform will weaken the capacity of the state to defend itself, as nationalist recruits, nationalist influenced controlling bodies and a force with a non-unionist ethos would not be committed to the defence of the Union.¹² Even symbolic changes to the RUC's name or use of emblems are rejected.¹³ Ken Maginnis, attacked proposals to replace the symbols and Royal prefix of the RUC, claiming that this would produce a 'neutered RUC, bereft of identity and effectiveness from a lack of self confidence'. Likewise, he rejected the need to replace the oath of allegiance to the Queen because taking the oath shows 'loyalty to the state, the constitution ... towards those subjects who seek the maintenance of their freedom, civil rights and security and protection against crime and subversion'.¹⁴ Those refusing to swear allegiance to the Queen are, in Maginnis' view, not suitable police officers.

Fair employment legislation is seen by the major unionist parties to weaken the link between loyalty and material rewards, reduce nationalist emigration and shift the population balance. It increases the economic resources and ultimately the political resources available to nationalism, through its impact in key institutions such as the civil service.¹⁵ Mainstream unionist parties also reject the need to include nationalist

¹¹ Peter King (UUP), *Ulster Review*, no. 23, Autumn 1997.

¹² Peter Weir (UUP), NI Forum, 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58, p.44.

¹³ e.g. Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, vol. 303, col. 61-9.

David Trimble in same debate at col. 96.

Extensive debate in NI Forum 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58.

¹⁴ Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, cols. 63 & 69.

¹⁵ e.g. John Taylor, House of Commons, NI Committee, 16 May 1991, col. 14.

Orange Standard, July 1993.

Response by UUP to SACHR Review of fair employment legislation, 4 Jan. 1996 [www.uup.org, 29 Nov. 1996].

cultural symbols in the public sphere, or reduce the use of exclusively British or unionist symbols, because such action reduces the 'Britishness' of Northern Ireland,¹⁶ and the dropping of the British anthem at Queen's University Belfast, for example, was a hugely important issue for unionists. As Bob McCartney said, it was irrelevant that most British universities did not play the anthem at graduations, since their Britishness was not in question.¹⁷ The increased number of Orange marches since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is also an expression of this need to capture the public space as Orange marches are an effective means of demonstrating communal power and solidarity. The right to march in any part of Northern Ireland is important for unionists because they reject the idea that there are 'nationalist' areas. Ian Paisley jnr., speaking about Drumcree, for example, claimed that 'the media repeatedly and wrongly insisted that this was a march through a Catholic area. The parade at Drumcree was a march past an area where many Roman Catholics live ... the Queen's highway'.¹⁸ Likewise Robert McCartney said the Drumcree crisis was 'effectively about setting up a "defacto" section of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland'.¹⁹ Unionists make these direct links between citizenship rights and state authority because the state *is* contested and unsettled. Citizenship for mainstream unionists is inevitably an expression of rights and duties, which exists to support the state and which can only be expressed in that context.

The peace process has also seen unionist politicians publicly express their fears that internal reform based on 'parity of esteem', allied with North-South links, would weaken support for unionism among elements of their own community.²⁰ A very simplistic view of European Union functionalism is often utilised to argue that North-

¹⁶ e.g. Jeffrey Donaldson, NI Forum, 20 June 1997, vol. 35, p.12.

Ken Maginnis, *Irish Independent*, 21 Aug. 1986.

¹⁷ *Belfast Telegraph*, 19 Jan. 1995.

Similar views from David Trimble, *Newsletter*, 22 Dec. 1994.

¹⁸ NI Forum, 19 July 1996, vol. 6, p. 41.

¹⁹ *Irish Times*, 7 July 1997.

²⁰ e.g. Cedric Wilson, NI Forum, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, p.41.

South bodies would inevitably develop deep and wide roots and that the people involved in them would 'go native' and lose their allegiance to unionism.²¹ Unionist political elites have been openly critical of leading employers and business organisations from their own community, seeing them as less than wholehearted in their support for the positions adopted by mainstream unionism and willing to at least partly shift their allegiance or their political practice for the economic benefits of a Dublin-Belfast economic corridor, all-Ireland or cross-Border EU funding arrangements and the promotion of tourism and investment on an all-Ireland basis.²²

It is clear that mainstream Ulster Unionism does not make a sharp distinction between issues of sovereignty and issues of governance and public policy in Northern Ireland. From fair employment and policing to Orange marches and North-South bodies Ulster unionism sees concessions on the nature of governance or on the equality agenda as weakening their political position and the economic, social and cultural power of their community. Progress on equal citizenship in Northern Ireland is therefore unlikely to be made based on a simple trade-off between equal citizenship and formal sovereignty.

Citizenship in an International Context

The increased focus on citizenship in the international academic literature in recent years reflects a global debate on the nature of individuals' and communities' relationship with the state. Conflicting pressures in the global political environment - many of them related to the ending of the Cold War - have heightened the importance of these issues. The nation-state as a construct is under pressure from economic globalisation and regional integration. Yet the end of the Cold War has also unleashed a significant rise in nationalist challenges to existing states, not only

²¹ e.g. Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 29 Nov. 1996, vol. 20. p.2-5.

²² e.g. St Clair McAlister (DUP), NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p. 32. John Hunter (UUP), NI Forum, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p. 10, claims that 'The sort of stooges that represent the business community tend to be of the pan-Nationalist front'.

in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but in Africa and potentially in Western Europe. The breakdown in the post-war consensus on the welfare state during the 1980s has raised important questions about the rights and duties of citizens, which have yet to be resolved in either a new consensus or even clear alternative paradigms. The increased focus on individualism in the economic sphere has however been challenged by arguments to 'extend citizenship' to deal explicitly with inequality based on class, gender and race.²³

The very limited engagement with the idea of the contested state is, however, a crucial weakness in the contemporary literature on citizenship. When the nature and boundaries of the state are contested, debates on the nature of citizenship are inevitably framed by that context. The treatment of Palestinians in Israel or the Occupied Territories, of Russians in the Baltic states, or non-Russians in the peripheral Russian Republics is not adequately addressed by debates on ethnicity, minority rights or even citizen duties. These issues are given a specific resonance when changes in the nature of citizenship are not simply about the distribution of rights and resources within the state but are part of a conflict over the existence of the state itself. Citizenship as currently conceptualised in the international academic literature does not therefore provide a framework in which 'parity of esteem' can be developed in Northern Ireland. The three dominant models of citizenship in the current international literature are so heavily premised on being constituted within an uncontested nation-state that they lose their strength in a situation such as Northern Ireland and can even reinforce the tendency for exclusion in unionist ideology.

²³ See for example, Raymond Plant, 'Citizenship and Rights,' pp. 1-32 in Raymond Plant and Norman Barry *Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher's Britain: Two Views*, (London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1990).
Chantal Mouffe, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, (London: Verso, 1992).
Ruth Lister, *Citizenship: feminist perspectives*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

The Republican or assimilationist model of citizenship is clearly not appropriate in analysing current citizen-relations in Northern Ireland. There is little evidence of assimilationist perspectives in mainstream unionists' view of citizenship, rather exclusion has been the dominant response. Mainstream unionists do not express the confidence of traditional French citizenship ideals, which would allow them to seek to absorb nationalists into their citizen community. Such a move would be seen as inevitably threatening their own position. The Republican model also assumes that all members of a society want to be citizens in the mould of existing citizens. This is clearly not the case in a contested state. In addition to offering inclusion, this approach allows the dominant community to insist on assimilation on their terms. Such insistence would deny nationalist identity and not provide the type of equality of citizenship which they seek. Thus Norman Porter in his review of unionist political ideas, argues that even though Robert McCartney uses the language of individual rights, his vision is as exclusivist as traditional unionism in practice.²⁴ This argument has been reinforced by McCartney's alliance with Paisley since the Good Friday Agreement. Indeed McCartney himself was quite explicit that 'parity of esteem' in his view could only be offered to Catholics, not nationalists.²⁵

The multi-cultural model, in contrast to assimilationism, does allow for ethnic and cultural differences to be given expression in the public sphere. This could be seen as providing a comparative context at least for the moderate unionism of the Alliance Party. The difficulty with multiculturalist views is that they too are premised on an acceptance of the nature and boundaries of the state. Multi-culturalism is seen as an expression of citizenship *within* a clearly defined state. It has not to date been discussed in the context of contested and unsettled states. Moderate unionists are closer to a multi-cultural position, generally arguing that giving nationalists a greater sense of ownership would reduce nationalist 'alienation' and ultimately stabilise the

²⁴ Norman Porter, *Rethinking Unionism: an Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1996), 167-8.

²⁵ *Irish Times*, 16 June 1995.

state. Even moderate unionists, however, set clear limits to what forms of pluralist expression are acceptable - rejecting for example nationalist criticisms of the RUC and the official use of overt symbols of Irish nationalism such as the tricolour.²⁶ If multiculturalism is used as a comparative model for the position articulated by Alliance it is a limited pluralism, premised on the constitutional *status quo* and according allegiance to the British state, thus offering equality as an alternative to nationalism rather than in conjunction with it. It is also, as represented by Alliance's electoral support a minority and diminishing perspective within unionism.

The ethnic model of citizenship, classically represented by the German system of citizenship through blood-line rather than residence at birth/naturalisation - has some similarities to mainstream unionists' closed view of citizenship. Its focus on 'belonging' and its incapacity to fully integrate 'new' entrants reflect elements of the unionist perspective. The classic ethnic model of citizenship does not, however, capture the totality of unionists' exclusionary views. Certainly in broad terms nationalists could be said to be excluded as an ethnic group, but fundamentally it is their political allegiance rather than their ethnic inheritance which is at issue. Theoretically at least, unionists can include the mythical quiet Catholic who is not a nationalist. It is nationalists' political aspirations which are used to exclude them. Catholics who support the union can be allowed within the citizen band even if there are few in reality. Perhaps more significantly, Protestants who 'go native' who take an anti-unionist political position are excluded despite their 'ethnic' inheritance.²⁷ The nature of exclusion is driven by the political threat to the Union rather than by the dangers of cultural mixing highlighted by Barker and McVeigh as characterising 'new

²⁶ John Alderdice, *Irish Times*, 10 Jan. 1995.

Alliance Party submission to the Patten commission on the RUC, 15 Oct. 1998.

²⁷ See for example unionist reaction to Protestants in the Women's Coalition, in the business organisations or in the churches when they challenge mainstream unionist positions.

e.g. Jack McKee (DUP), *NI Forum*, 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p. 46.

John Hunter (UUP), *NI Forum*, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p.10.

David Campbell (UUP), *NI Forum*, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, pp. 37-8.

racism'.²⁸ Ethnic exclusion is traditionally characterised by a fear that allowing 'outsiders' to enter the body politic will change the nature of society, simply because they are 'different'. In classic ethnic exclusion it is their presence and their difference which is highlighted and not their political aspirations. In Northern Ireland, it is nationalists' political opinions, the perceived threat from the Republic of Ireland, unionists' image of the British government as an unreliable ally, and their siege mentality, which drives exclusionary politics within unionism and not a fear of ethnic dilution.

There are other problems with trying to conceptualise mainstream unionism's view of citizenship as simply a reflection of ethnic citizenship, primarily related to the nature of the Northern Ireland state. The ethnic model as normally defined reflects the exclusion by a dominant community of relatively small minority ethnic communities, who are seeking inclusion, within a settled state. In Germany for example there is no political demand for Turkish self-government and no threat to the dominant position of 'ethnic-Germans', even from a reasonably large Turkish community. In Northern Ireland however it is the unsettled and contested nature of the state which defines ethnic communities. The term 'minority', even if mathematically accurate, conjures images of small communities not a cohesive group making up over 40% of the population. Furthermore there is a real and substantial possibility of change in state boundaries. The ethnic model of citizenship as traditionally defined does not deal with these tensions and is therefore not adequate in analysing the politics of inequality in Northern Ireland.

Ethnic models of citizenship, despite their common emphasis on exclusion, also have a difficulty in dealing with unionists' relationship, as citizens, to the British state.

²⁸ M. Barker, *The New Racism* (London: Junction. 1981) and Robbie McVeigh, 'Is Sectarianism Racism? Theorising the Racism/ Sectarianism Interface', pp. 179-198 in David Miller (ed.) *Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism*. (London: Longman, 1998).

Attitude surveys have shown an increase over the years in the proportion of unionists who use the self-description 'British' to define their national or ethnic identity.²⁹ However it is not an identity that is accorded to them by most of the wider British public, who tend to see unionists as being outside of their own 'imagined community'³⁰. These elements of the unionist position are also not captured in the traditional ethnic-citizenship model.

It is the unsettled nature of the state historically and demographically which leads unionists to put such weight on the need for dominance and exclusion of nationalists and which leads them to see demands for equality of citizenship as a threat. Mainstream unionism believed that its strength prior to 1967 was built on hegemonic control as much as repressive control. Opponents of the regime saw little prospect of change and so were less likely even to try to demand reform. It is this hegemonic strength, not the precise structures of the pre-1972 Stormont government, which unionists wish to re-establish. There is some division within unionism on the best way to achieve this, over devolution versus integration for example. Mainstream unionists seek to defend their position not just against direct assaults on the partition settlement but against changes to the nature of citizenship within Northern Ireland. The loss of unionist hegemony is not simply a perception by unionists that they have lost power resources, it marks an actual shift in both symbolic and material power and represents a deepening of the 'unsettled' and contested nature of the Northern Ireland state. Mainstream unionist elites do not therefore view their position on reform of citizenship as unreasonable. Compromise on the equality agenda is not an issue of 'low politics' or of limited importance. The proposition that if unionists gain on the constitution (through the principle of consent) they can give on equal

²⁹ As shown in surveys by Rose, Richard, *Governing without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*. (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Edward Moxon-Browne, *Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland*, (Aldershot: Gower, 1983) and David Smith, *Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland: Part Three: Perceptions and views*. (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1987).

³⁰ Phrase from Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991).

citizenship does not fit within their paradigm. Rather than trading 'equality issues' for security, mainstream unionism believes that a model of citizenship as implied in the 'equality agenda' would fatally weaken its own position by strengthening nationalism and therefore they are not easily persuaded to follow this approach in negotiations.

The importance of the contested nature of the Northern Ireland state in unionist conceptions of citizenship lead to a political strategy based on resistance to reform and defence of the status quo. This heightens unionists' siege mentality and acts as a disincentive to political reform including moves towards equal citizenship. There are also however pressures for change in citizen relations in Northern Ireland. The increasing internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict, while adding somewhat to unionists' sense of siege mentality also creates, at times, irresistible pressures for change. The split within unionism in response to the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement might be seen as evidence of an emerging different perspective on citizenship within unionism, or the Agreement itself could be viewed as a trade off between inclusiveness and constitutional guarantees for unionists. However, such interpretations would be a misreading of unionism's reaction to the peace process. The split on the Agreement and the decision by pro-agreement unionists to support the deal is best understood as a tactical divide in response to the changing political environment in which unionism operates. The different tactical responses by unionists have created very sharp and bitter divisions but have not led to any ideological realignment. There is little to suggest that pro-Agreement unionists have fundamentally altered their view of citizenship, but they have a stronger pragmatic sense of what is possible. There was also a fear that the British and Irish governments might have implemented even more far reaching reforms over unionists' heads if they had withdrawn from talks.³¹ It is therefore a tactical divide

³¹ e.g. Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p.10.
Reinforced even after the agreement during various difficulties in its implementation e.g. David Ervine (PUP), *Irish Times*, 21 Jan. 1999.

which is at the heart of this dispute in unionism, rather than an ideological disagreement on the nature of citizenship.

A Changing International Environment

Until the ending of the Cold War the international pressures for a resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict were very minimal. Neither superpower had any significant interest in intervening. The USSR saw little potential beyond raising human rights issues as a trade off in forums such as the CSCE. The USA was unwilling to challenge its most important NATO ally. Despite the occasionally high profile of Irish-American political activity, US government policy was firmly within the context of the 'special relationship' with Britain.³² Northern Ireland was seen as an internal British affair and Irish governments were politely informed that the US administration would not intervene.³³ Even during crisis situations such as the civil rights period and the 1981 hunger-strikes this policy held firm.³⁴ Other international interventions were equally low key. The UN Security Council was never likely to get involved as Britain held a permanent seat and a veto. The EEC/EC also took a minimalist view.³⁵ No other government, apart from the Irish and British had any national interests to pursue and so the only other state level intervention came from rogue states such as Libya and Iran - with their own separate motives for attacking the British government. There were occasional signs of a countervailing view such as US President Jimmy Carter's ban on arms sales to the RUC and Ronald Reagan's pressure on Margaret Thatcher to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement and there was constant NGO criticism of British policy in Northern Ireland but the level of international pressure was never enough to have a significant impact.

³² See Joseph O'Grady, 'An Irish Policy Born in the USA', *Foreign Affairs*, 75:2, (1996), 2-7.

³³ See Sean Cronin, *Washington's Irish Policy 1916 - 1986: Independence, Partition, Neutrality*, (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1987), 192 and Dermot Keogh, *Twentieth Century Ireland*, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1994), 194.

³⁴ See Cronin, (1987), 320 and Andrew J. Wilson, *Irish America and the Ulster Conflict, 1968-1995*, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1995), 64.

³⁵ See Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland, power, conflict and emancipation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 280. Also statement by Jacques Delors, *Irish Times*, 4 Nov. 1992, cited in Ruane and Todd (1996), 280.

The ending of the Cold War however opened up much greater possibilities. It weakened or at least lessened the absolute priority accorded to strategic security and military alliances in US (and indeed British) foreign policy. This gave Bill Clinton, the first US President elected after the Cold War, the flexibility to pursue foreign policy goals which might strain relations with Britain. Relieved of the overwhelming weight of Cold War concerns, Clinton could ignore the advice of the US State Department, the FBI and the CIA in granting Gerry Adams a visa to enter the USA³⁶ and in intervening more forcefully in the developing Irish peace process. It is difficult to conceive a US President making those decisions during the Cold War. This is not to ignore the domestic pressure on Clinton, a product of his party's need to win back Irish Americans who were part of the Reagan-Democrat bloc and also under pressure from a much more professional and influential Irish American lobby - itself partly a response to the changing strategy of Sinn Féin in Ireland.³⁷ Both the domestic pressures and the urgings of Irish governments could have been ignored if global strategic interests were at stake. The fact that the US administration and President Clinton personally have been so heavily involved in the negotiation process undeniably increased the pressure on political actors, including unionists, to reach agreement.

Other international factors were also significant at this time. Political conflicts and 'struggles' which the Sinn Féin leadership had drawn inspiration from or sought to compare themselves with, in South Africa, Palestine and Central America were moving towards peace negotiations and settlements.³⁸ The post-Cold War world

³⁶ Niall O'Dowd, cited in Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1995 and the Search for Peace*, (London: Hutchinson.1995), 373.

³⁷ Niall O'Dowd, 'The Greening of the White House: Clinton's Irish Agenda', *Irish America Magazine*, (Jan./Feb. 1993), 20.

³⁸ Michael Cox 'Bringing in the International: the IRA cease-fire and the end of the Cold War', *International Affairs*, 73:4 (1997), 676 & 682; Michael Cox, 'Northern Ireland: the war that came in from the cold', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 9 (1998), 75-7.; Ronnie Munck, 'Irish Republicanism: A New Beginning?', pp. 176-92 in James Anderson and James

would leave limited room for 'national liberation movements' which had drawn heavily on socialist ideology or Soviet support. Though the Republican Movement did not face significant financial or military material losses they were affected by the political climate which these developments created and were part of. At an ideological level, and in the case of South Africa at the level of extensive personal contacts,³⁹ the emergence of international peace processes had a significant impact on republican thinking. Finally, in a post-Cold War world there was always the possibility that a British establishment, relieved of its Cold War fears, would be less antagonistic to new political arrangements for the island of Ireland, if a new dynamic could be created to put Northern Ireland on the international agenda. A new military dynamic was unlikely, given the stalemate between the IRA and the British Army and RUC and so pressure mounted for a new 'unarmed strategy' with the republican movement.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, unionists by virtue of their siege mentality had made limited use of international contacts. Such parallels as were drawn tended to be with what were perceived as similar communities under siege such as Israel, Turkish Cypriots and apartheid South Africa or other 'abandoned' British settlers such as the white community in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.⁴⁰ As white rule became not only discredited but increasingly unstable it was clear that drawing such parallels did the unionist cause more harm than good. Furthermore as the Israeli government opened talks with the PLO, and the white South African government with the ANC, so pressure mounted on unionists, and the British government, to engage with Sinn Féin and seek progress in Northern Ireland.

Goodman (eds.) *Dis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles, Hopes*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 178. Also see *An Phoblacht*, 11 Nov. 1993.

³⁹ *Irish Times*, 20 Apr. 1998; 30 Apr. 1998.

⁴⁰ Pamela Clayton, *Enemies and Passing Friends: settler ideologies in twentieth century Ulster*. (London: Pluto Press, 1996), 40-6. See also:

Combat, Aug. 1974; Sept. 1974

Jim Kilfedder, House of Commons, 6 Mar. 1978, vol., 945, col. 1003.

David Trimble, House of Commons, 30 Oct. 1996, col. 633.

These changes increased the pressure on unionism to engage with the mainstream international community and in particular with Washington. Unionists could not credibly argue it was a purely internal 'British' matter when the British government was increasingly involving the Irish government in the search for a settlement⁴¹ and this added to the pressure to relate to the international community more seriously. Post cease-fire unionism has had a greater level of serious contact with the US administration than any previous generation of unionist leaders and it has not all been negative and defensive. There is now a section of the UUP which believes it can engage with the USA - traditionally seen as unsupportive - and make progress.⁴² Such engagement is however a two way process. As unionist leaders deepen their contact with senior US policy makers, so too are they open to pressure from the US to shift their own position in response to US efforts at mediation. In many ways this is a follow on from the UUP's self image as an insider group in Westminster politics and their preference for insider deals. The emphasis placed by the UUP on their good contacts leaves them open to reverse pressure. The influence of the White House and US talks chairperson George Mitchell during the negotiations is well documented⁴³ and the personal intervention of President Clinton in making phone calls to the leading negotiators including David Trimble on the eve of the Good Friday Agreement being reached is further evidence of the pressure for a settlement from the US administration.

Domestic Pressures for Change

In addition to these international influences unionist political elites had also to respond to the strategic changes within Irish nationalism and republicanism, itself strongly related to the changing international relations environment. The strategic

⁴¹ Ruane and Todd, (1996), 289.

⁴² Ruane and Todd, (1996), 321.

⁴³ e.g. George Mitchell, *Making Peace: the inside storey of the making of the Good Friday Agreement*, (London: Heinemann, 1999).

shifts in republican thinking and the response to those changes by Irish nationalists are crucial to the building of a new political environment for unionism. It is important therefore to establish the fundamental basis of these strategic developments to contextualise the response of unionist political elites. While unionism has held a relatively undifferentiated view of Irish nationalism, it has benefited from the sharp divisions within nationalist elites on the use of political violence. The first signs of 'new thinking' and the creation of a new political environment came in the late 1980s. Sinn Féin acknowledged publicly that the republican movement was not strong enough, on its own, to achieve a united Ireland and that therefore a 'broad front' of nationalist parties and organisations or a 'nationalist consensus' was required to achieve that goal.⁴⁴ There followed a shift in attitudes to constitutional nationalism.⁴⁵ Though still rivals in elections and for leadership, the SDLP and the Irish government (especially Fianna Fáil and to some extent Labour) were now seen as potential political allies rather than as simple collaborators with British rule. In a new policy document *Towards a Lasting Peace* (1992) Sinn Féin placed the Irish government, and the need for a nationalist consensus, at the heart of its political strategy - marking a reversal of previous perspectives.

The narrative of the peace process has been provided elsewhere, but it is clear that a new political momentum was released by the process. The IRA cease-fire and the dynamic of the peace process quite suddenly placed Ulster unionism in a position where standing still was not an option. The actions of the Irish government, constitutional nationalism, the US administration and to some extent the EU, in seeking to reinforce the cease-fires and the peace process created a dynamic for

⁴⁴ See Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, 'Scenarios for Progress in Northern Ireland', pp. 206-19 in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.) *The Future of Northern Ireland*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 213. Private Documents from the republican leadership from this period were later published by the *Sunday Tribune*, 23 Apr. 1995, which substantiate this analysis.

⁴⁵ This is clearly reflected in the editorial style of *An Phoblacht* (the republican weekly newspaper). The pejorative term 'Free State' was no longer used to describe the Republic and its government but more neutral terms like 'the South' or the '26 Counties' and the 'Dublin administration'.

political progress. While the reliance of the Conservative British government led by John Major on UUP support at Westminster relieved some of the pressure on unionism, this rebounded on unionists when Labour came to power in Britain in May 1997. Determined not to follow the Conservative's reluctant engagement with the peace process, and imbued with a generalised commitment to constitutional reform, the new Labour government, with its large Westminster majority added to the pressure on unionists to involve themselves actively in the process and that process was inevitably going to include reform of citizenship and developments in the equality agenda.

Ulster Unionism was faced with an Irish nationalist consensus that was growing and becoming increasingly politically united. In addition, the leaders of Irish nationalism, including northern nationalists, had formed an effective alliance with a US administration and a reasonable working relationship with the British Labour government which seemed likely to be in power for a considerable time. Northern nationalists now made up over 40% of the voting population, moderate unionism as represented by Alliance could mobilise at least 5 or 6%; the centrist Northern Ireland Women's' Coalition (NIWC) 1% and the loyalist paramilitaries 3%. Mainstream unionism, for the first time since Partition, was faced with the possibility that it could become an electoral minority within Northern Ireland.⁴⁶ Nationalists were still a long way from securing a majority for a united Ireland, but if nationalists were united they could clearly secure majority support in Northern Ireland in a referendum for far-reaching political change. The UUP leadership were quite explicit about this threat during the negotiations. Antony Alcock argued that if the UUP walked out it was likely that a section of mainstream unionists would vote in a referendum to accept a peace deal which had been negotiated in their absence.⁴⁷ The bottom line for the

⁴⁶ See article by Brendan O'Leary 'Unionists will lose electoral dominance', *Irish Times* 2 July 1997.

⁴⁷ NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p.10.

UUP leadership was that however unhappy they were with key elements of the deal, any likely alternative was going to be much worse from a unionist perspective.

The rejection of the deal by the DUP, the smaller UKUP and UUP dissidents was not surprising as they had been on the record over many years as opposing compromises and reform well short of what was in the Good Friday agreement. From Sunningdale to the present they have followed a relatively consistent position. All mainstream unionist elites have traditionally insisted that there is little point having a veto on the 'final handover' of sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions which change the character of the state and/or which move them towards a united Ireland. This position was articulated by all the major unionist parties, including those who ultimately supported the agreement, as recently as 1997.⁴⁸ It is the adherence of the unionists who oppose the agreement to traditional unionist positions that presents difficulties for David Trimble. He must convince unionists that either the commitments on sovereignty are more absolute now than they have been previously, a difficult task, or persuade unionists that they have little choice but to go down this route - a more accurate but politically difficult message to sell.⁴⁹

The importance of this analysis is not in coming to definitive conclusions as to the responses of Ulster unionism to the Good Friday Agreement but rather to show the limited extent to which the deal has required mainstream unionist elites to abandon the ideological basis of their previous positions. The opponents of the deal might offer the clearest continuity with the traditional and exclusionary model of citizenship but even those unionists supporting the deal have not, as yet, been required to break with it decisively. The key elements of the mainstream unionist approach to the talks - the strong exclusionary view of citizenship, the resistance to accept internal reforms

⁴⁸ For example UUP response to the framework documents [www.uup.org, 20 May 1997] and Antony Alcock, NI Forum, 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p.21.

⁴⁹ At least one unionist academic has attacked the 'lip-service' paid to the principle of consent in the run up to the Agreement. See Paul Dixon, 'The politics of antagonism: explaining McGarry and O'Leary', , *Irish Political Studies* 11 (1996), 132.

as a *quid pro quo* for constitutional guarantees and a lack of trust in British intentions - which have acted as a restraint on political reform are still visible in the public statements of mainstream unionists who support the agreement.⁵⁰ It is also clear that the state is still contested and 'unsettled'. It is stretching credibility to suggest that Sinn Féin or indeed even the Irish state have ended their political ambitions for a united Ireland. David Trimble focused on the 'consent principle' and the changes to Articles 2 and 3 to argue that the state is now more secure than previously and that therefore the Good Friday Agreement could be supported. Paul Bew also argued this point.⁵¹ However the attitude of pro-Agreement unionist elites since the Agreement is not indicative of a group who believe their political future has been secured, rather the reluctance to engage with this process was outweighed by the considerable external pressures to enter talks and support the deal. It was external pressure and innovative thinking in the framing of the Agreement rather than internal shifts in the nature of dominant ideologies in Northern Ireland which led to the Good Friday Accord. It may be that pro-Agreement unionists and nationalists will fundamentally alter their political perspectives, over time, but it was not necessary for them to do so to sign the deal in April 1998. The talks leading to the Agreement were successful not because of a change in internal attitudes to match the previous conflict resolution strategies, but rather due to the new international environment, related changes in Sinn Féin and because the designers of the Agreement moved beyond absolute sovereignty to create new visions of citizenship and governance.

A new vision of citizenship?

The centrality of the contested state to politics in Northern Ireland is by no means unique. The period since the end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the level of secessionist challenges to existing states. Initially the focus of this debate was

⁵⁰ e.g. David Trimble, *Irish Times*, 23 June 1999.

⁵¹ *Irish Times*, 15 May 1998.

limited to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and it was assumed that the impact would be limited to that geographical region or to former communist states. However, in Central Africa, the Middle East, East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sudan, Quebec, Scotland and Spain, to give just some contemporary examples, there are now significant and continuing challenges to state boundaries. It is also now clear that change in the territory of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe was not a once off event but will have a continuing impact in the Russian border regions, the Caucuses and the Balkans at least. Indeed, the sharp link between citizenship and national identity in contested states was starkly highlighted by the actions of the Serbian police in Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, in stripping fleeing Kosovars of their official badges of citizenship - passports, identity cards, birth certificates and even car registration plates.⁵² While not all of these states share the historic experience of Northern Ireland - not all contested states enclose settler societies - secession and boundary change is no longer a marginal issue for international relations and academic debates need to reflect this changed environment. Specifically, the debate on citizenship needs to be able to move beyond its assumption of uncontested and settled nation states.

Political conflict in contested states is almost by definition based on challenges to, and defence of, the political status quo. In a situation where a dominant community has based their entire political programme around the defence of the status quo there is often no incentive for them to move or compromise on ideas of equal citizenship. External intervention is necessary to provide an incentive to move towards political negotiations and compromise. The nature of international intervention in regional conflicts is, however, changing since the end of the Cold War. Released from the grip of superpower confrontation, international and regional organisations have the potential to provide a more flexible response to regional conflicts. The major international organisations and the dominant states within them,

⁵² *Irish Times*, 9 April 1999.

however, still act on the assumption that state borders are best left unchanged in most circumstances, though there are some shifts in this position in situations such as East Timor. The Rambouillet plan for Kosovo, was also a departure of sorts in that it sought to guarantee by external intervention, levels of autonomy which in fact would have fundamentally changed the nature of citizenship in Kosovo. This was reinforced in the proposals by the French and German governments in early 1999 for EU or UN protectorate status for Kosovo, within the Yugoslav federation.

There is, however, no consistent basis for intervention by either international organisations or indeed by individual states, and *realpolitik* has left the Kurds, for example, outside such new dialogue for the moment at least. The main international organisations such as the UN, or individual powers such as the USA, can in conflict situations, decide to uphold the status quo or insist on a search for a negotiated solution. It is in the situation of engagement that new models of citizenship become a normative requirement, if solutions that combine justice with political stability are to be achieved. As, interference in the 'internal affairs' of sovereign states is now out of the realm of superpower conflict, intervention is less likely to involve covert operations and aid to irregular forces and instead it is more likely to be based on formal and open public debates and interventions by the UN, NATO and the USA. The shift from covert or arms length operations to open interventions requires new procedures and agreements on the nature of, and the basis for, such decisions. It also indicates a shift from interventions designed to secure a victory for one side to a process where mediation, peace negotiations and future external guarantees of citizenship rights are of greater relevance. In the post-Cold War situation, there is a need for new models of citizenship and new modes of externally guaranteeing political agreements which may be based on a state remaining contested but where the form of the contest is peaceful rather than violent, in the hope that in an externally guaranteed 'safe' situation, a stable political solution can emerge over time. The resort to military action against Iraq and Yugoslavia does not necessarily invalidate

this argument. These attacks were designed to bomb political leaders into political submission or bring them to the negotiation table but the 'enemy state' was intended to survive the military strikes and thus ultimately negotiations were, and are, required to finalise the details of the new situation.

These new forms of intervention are clearly developing in a security context framed by the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as an unchallenged single superpower. There are however other dimensions to the post-Cold War international environment. The increasing globalisation of news broadcasting gives secessionist and sub-state political movements access to an international audience. Coverage of famine, genocide and 'ethnic cleansing' can increase domestic pressure on western governments to 'do something'. This factor clearly influenced the US decision to enter Somalia. However, in the context of US failure there, TV coverage was ultimately insufficient to mobilise them to act in Rwanda in 1994, though it may have prevented some Western governments seeking to maintain the Hutu regime in power. The growth of transnational social movements and lobby groups, most notably on the environment, but to some degree on human rights has also added to the capacity of civil rights or nationalist movements to link into a potential support network in industrialised societies. The mobilisation of Irish Americans in the MacBride Principles campaign on fair employment in the mid 1980s and the efforts of the Irish American lobby to influence Bill Clinton during the 1990s is evidence in the Irish context of the growing linkages between domestic politics, transnational movements and foreign policy.

In spite of the development of new pressures for intervention in regional conflicts there has been no equivalent debate on the new forms of citizenship and governance which will be needed to broker settlements in contested states. The existing models of supranational governance or minority rights provisions are inadequate to the task. A new discourse on citizenship is required, that can explain developments in

citizenship in contested states and that can create new models of citizenship capable of guaranteeing subordinate national or ethnic groups their citizenship rights outside the context of a 'settled' nation-state. This is not simply a matter of allowing dual citizenship or making citizenship and allegiance a private choice. Rather it requires changes in the public relationship between citizenship and state allegiance. The dominant perspectives on citizenship are analytically inadequate when transported outside of their Anglo-American and continental western European origins. The nature of citizenship in much of the world cannot be adequately analysed without situating citizen-relations in the context of the contested state - the context often having its roots in colonialism. The existing literature does not explain the basis of the perspective on citizenship held by Ulster unionists. Attempts which have been made to reduce all such conflicts to being, in effect, extreme versions of German ethnic-nationalism are not plausible. Citizenship in Israel, for example, is about more than alternative identities (though it includes an ethnic dimension): it is also grounded in Israel's security dilemma, the wider Middle East conflict and the impact of settler colonial ideologies.

Citizenship is not a unitary value - the product of a simple modernisation process. The model set out by T. H. Marshall of slowly evolving citizenship rights from civil to political to social is not (and was never intended by Marshall to be) an analytical paradigm for all societies.⁵³ Rather, citizenship is part of the arena of political conflict and models of citizenship are part of the outcome of such conflicts. Just as the national-democratic revolutions of the nineteenth century advanced demands for parliamentary democracy and political citizenship (at least for men), and the class conflicts of the nineteenth and twentieth century developed social rights in industrial democracies, so too do political conflicts over colonialism and over the boundaries and nature of the state mould the form of citizenship in contested states. This

⁵³ T. H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Crossroads* and other essays. (London: Heinemann, 1963).

relationship of politics to citizenship is recognised to a significant degree in debates on class and gender but it needs to be extended to include political conflicts over ethnic and national allegiances.

A new discourse on citizenship in contested states, in addition to offering a much more convincing explanation of the nature of citizenship, and the perspectives held by political actors in such states, can also play a role in developing new visions of citizenship. A new model of citizenship is clearly required in Northern Ireland and in other similar societies. This vision of citizenship needs to assert that members of such national or ethnic communities have a right to all of the traditional and contemporary rights of citizens, while retaining their own identity and political aspirations, regardless of their unwillingness to give allegiance to the dominant state. It must assert rights to equality such as employment, cultural rights, and a fair and acceptable form of policing. These rights need to be clearly expressed in both individual and groups terms and need to be grounded in a commitment to see a new vision of equal citizenship reflected in concrete public policies, designed to promote actual equality of treatment between the communities.

Even with a commitment to guarantee traditional rights of citizenship outside the context of an agreed state, some of the issues of contention in Northern Ireland would remain unresolved. For example, disputes over Orange marches and unionists' insistence on a monopoly of British symbolism in the public space would not be resolved by reference to traditional debates on citizenship rights. Disputes on the use of 'political' symbols are a common feature of conflict in contested states.⁵⁴

An additional element is, therefore, also required if a new model of citizenship is to

⁵⁴ See for example As'ad Ghanem, 'State and minority in Israel: the case of the ethnic state and the predicament of its minority', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21:3, (1998); Eliezer Ben-Rafael, 'Arab Citizenship in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21:3 (1998); Nadim N Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Memmi, Albert (1990) *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, (London: Earthscan, 1990).

have a significant egalitarian impact. In addition to guaranteeing contemporary forms of citizenship, such as civil, political and economic rights in a new context, a model of equal citizenship for contested states also needs to offer new rights of citizenship. Citizenship needs to be extended to include a specific right to hold allegiance to a nationalist identity other than the previously dominant one and to have that reflected in the culture of the public sphere.

A new model of citizenship designed to operate in contested states therefore requires two distinct elements. Firstly a *new form* of citizenship which is guaranteed outside the framework of an uncontested state and secondly an *extension* of citizenship to cover new types of rights - specifically, in the case of Northern Ireland, focused on nationalists' right to have their group identity reflected in the ethos, culture and practice of the state.

This requirement for new forms of citizenship will clearly often conflict with the *realpolitik* of individual political disputes. There is at present no global structures of governance capable of providing any consistent guidelines for intervention. Yet, as in the case of Northern Ireland, citizenship in contested states is only likely to be transformed with a significant international intervention. Indeed almost by definition, a model of equal citizenship in a contested state will rely much more on transnational governance than citizenship in a 'settled' state. Contemporary forms of transnational governance are too fragmented, based on power inequalities, inconsistent and dominated by US/Western *realpolitik* rather than ideas of supranational law, to provide this external dimension on anything other than an ad-hoc basis. Current international governance simply does not possess the necessary human rights and citizenship protections found in democratic states and which are needed to implement equal citizenship in contested states.

Given the absence of suitable supranational institutions or legal mechanism, for the present at least, the only short-term potential for external mediation and mechanisms to guarantee citizenship in contested states is in the real political benefits such an approach can bring to key political players involved in the conflict, the protagonists, neighbouring states and interested international or regional powers. If a new more equal model of citizenship can provide lasting and stable political settlements, it may play a useful role, even in a world dominated by *realpolitik*. While this provides a less democratic and less consistent approach than a global or regional human rights and citizenship framework it is the motivation most likely to operate in practice.

In Northern Ireland a combination of *realpolitik*, the historic and geographic framework, and the post-Cold War environment produced a type of external intervention which proved acceptable to the political actors and yet provided the necessary dynamic to push the peace process forward. The role of the Irish and British governments operating as both political actors in their own right and also as external guarantors, combined with US mediation, proved successful in reaching an agreement in Northern Ireland. There was also a history of external pressure on fair employment in particular, through the MacBride Principles campaign, but to some extent on policing, through reports from human rights groups and cases in the European Court of Human Rights. Controversial Orange marches have in recent years also attracted many international observers adding to the pressure on the Orange Order to reimagine their parades as cultural rather than political events. It is also clear that there are limits to this level of international intervention. There are already signs that the two governments would like to move on to other priorities of their own and leave the implementation of the deal to the parties in Northern Ireland. Continuing high level US interest is not guaranteed beyond the Clinton Presidency. However, without external pressure the Good Friday Agreement would not have been signed and without continuing external involvement it will not survive. External

intervention, in Northern Ireland cannot be seen as a once off mediation role at a conference or in negotiations, it will need to continue for some time.

It is beyond the scope of this article to set out the parameters for such external intervention or specific elements for peace agreements on a global scale, but the Northern Ireland case does provide some indications of the important elements. Irish government involvement in the early 1990s offered the Republican Movement an alternative strategy to armed struggle, in putting together a nationalist consensus to pressurise the British government towards a position of reform. US involvement was seen to strengthen this alliance. Continuing Irish government involvement as set out in the Agreement, the North-South Ministerial Council and its cross-border and all-Ireland implementation bodies, also offer long-term constitutional links recognising the identity of nationalists in Northern Ireland and providing an institutional framework for North-South co-operation which is dynamic rather than static and which can develop over time. British government involvement offered similar comfort to unionists, though never seen as equivalent by them. The British government, as the sovereign power, also held out the threat that if no deal was reached then they could proceed with an imposed programme of reform including fair employment, cultural rights, a new police force, prisoner releases if the ceasefires held, and even a North-South council made up of nominated rather than elected persons. US involvement produced individual decisions such as the visa for Gerry Adams, which helped produce a ceasefire, a mediation role during the talks and some external guarantee that the agreement would be implemented. Crucially, however, the Good Friday Agreement contains institutions of transnational governance in the North-South Ministerial Council and the Inter-governmental conference (and to some extent in the British-Irish Council), which creates a structured basis for continued external involvement.

The mediation role of 'external' players is however just one dimension of the Good Friday Agreement's international significance. More importantly perhaps, is its role in exploring new solutions to conflicts. The provisions on equal citizenship are a central part of the Agreement, seen by Republicans as offering a dynamic for future change which allowed them to accept a deal which re-affirms partition in the short to medium term. Unionist opposition to equality measures are also placed, for the first time, in their proper context - as part of their broader political position, rather than a negotiating ploy, hiding a more accommodating bottom line. Citizenship in contested states is part of the constitutional framework, not something separate from it - a second prize for the 'losing' side.

Although many aspects of the Northern Ireland problem and peace process are specific to that conflict, there are a number of essential elements which could be the basis of peace agreements and new forms of citizenship elsewhere. External pressure, recognition in institutional structures and in citizenship of competing national and ethnic identities, and external guarantees of security are likely to be important elements of a solution in many contested states. These issues cannot be resolved within the state (by definition of it being contested) and cannot at present be guaranteed at the global level because there is no agreement on the basis on which intervention should take place. The international literature on citizenship needs to address these issues around the nature and mode of external intervention and the forms of citizenship which might be developed in such peace processes. The direct link between citizenship and the traditional national ideal reflected in the nation state can in this way be loosened, if not quite broken. The Northern Ireland case certainly emphasises the importance of external involvement to overcome the almost inevitable lack of internal dynamic towards a peaceful solution in such conflicts. The negotiations in Northern Ireland, were also from the outset structured to link elements of transnational governance and the implementation of citizenship rights in the equality agenda. Under the procedure of 'sufficient consensus' in decision making

and 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed', mainstream unionists could only block the North-South body and the equality issues at the cost of collapsing the talks. The Good Friday Agreement also points towards new models of citizenship more appropriate to contested states than those traditionally discussed in the academic literature and drawn upon in conflict resolution strategies. Though still in a state of transition, the Good Friday Agreement has a great deal to offer an international debate on equal citizenship in contested states.