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Yes, minister: The impact of decision-making rules on geographically targeted particularistic spending

Suiter, Jane and O'Malley, Eoin (2012) Yes, minister: The impact of decision-making rules on geographically targeted particularistic spending. Working Papers in International Studies. (Paper No. 2012-1). Dublin City University.

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Abstract

This paper tests a number of hypotheses which have been used to explain particularistic political spending. Using constituency level data we can better evaluate the competing merits of theories predicting whether parties reward their voters or target floating or swing voters to maximise the party’s electoral return. We also test the hypothesis that the spending decision-making rule is most important and may determine which of the loyal or marginal voters are targeted, or indeed whether another group might be rewarded. We find that the decision rule is indeed most important, and the unusual level of discretion to ministers in Ireland will determine where these monies go. This finding adds greatly to our theoretical knowledge of geographically targeted spending and is consistent with empirical findings in other countries.

Item Type:Working Paper (No. 2012-1)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Constituency spending; particularistic spending; pork-barrel politics; electoral systems; decision-rules; PR-STV; Ireland
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS) > Working Papers in International Studies Series
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Dublin City University
Copyright Information:© 2012 Dublin City University
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:16842
Deposited On:15 Feb 2012 09:23 by Shane Martin. Last Modified 15 Feb 2012 09:23

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