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Verifying privacy by little interaction and no process equivalence

Butin, Denis Frédéric and Bella, Giampaolo (2012) Verifying privacy by little interaction and no process equivalence. In: SECRYPT 2012, 24-27 Jul 2012, Rome, Italy.

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While machine-assisted verification of classical security goals such as confidentiality and authentication is well-established, it is less mature for recent ones. Electronic voting protocols claim properties such as voter privacy. The most common modelling involves indistinguishability, and is specified via trace equivalence in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. However, it has shown restrictions. We describe a novel model, based on unlinkability between two pieces of information. Specifying it as an extension to the Inductive Method allows us to establish voter privacy without the need for approximation or session bounding. The two models and their latest specifications are contrasted.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Event Type:Conference
Uncontrolled Keywords:E-voting; Privacy; Inductive Method; cryptography
Subjects:Computer Science > Computer security
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Engineering and Computing > School of Computing
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:17069
Deposited On:16 Aug 2012 10:59 by Fran Callaghan. Last Modified 15 Nov 2012 12:14

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