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Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation

Elgie, Robert and McMenamin, Iain (2008) Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation. Public Choice, 136 (3-4). pp. 255-267. ISSN 1573-7101

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Abstract

One line of research finds the size of the deficit to be positively correlated with the number of political actors. This ‘political fragmentation’ hypothesis has been tested on OECD countries. We successfully replicate Volkerink and de Haan’s (Public Choice 109:221–242, 2001) model on an OECD sample. However, when we add ten non-OECD countries, the effect of political fragmentation disappears. We argue that the importance of political fragmentation varies according to the institutionalization of political systems. When we interact the age of a democracy with political fragmentation, we find that legislative fractionalisation increases the budget deficit as a democracy becomes more institutionalised.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Additional Information:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Uncontrolled Keywords:common-pool resource problem; fiscal deficit; political fragmentation; institutionalisation;
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Springer Netherlands
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9294-x
Copyright Information:© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:2078
Deposited On:04 Nov 2008 11:23 by Iain McMenamin. Last Modified 17 Feb 2009 12:19

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