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Does corruption ease the burden of regulation? National and subnational evidence

Breen, Michael and Gillanders, Robert (2017) Does corruption ease the burden of regulation? National and subnational evidence. (Paper No. MPRA no. 82088). MPRA, Munich, Germany.

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Abstract

Does corruption ease the burden of regulation? We test this question using survey data on business managers’ experience of dealing with regulation and corruption. We find that there is substantial within-country variation in the burden of regulation and that corruption is associated with worse regulatory outcomes across a range of indicators at the country and subnational level. Our results, which hold over a number of specifications, are inconsistent with the hypothesis that corruption greases the wheels of commerce by easing the burden of regulation on the average firm in poor regulatory environments. Rather, our results suggest that corruption increases the burden and imposes large costs on businesses.

Item Type:Working Paper (No. MPRA no. 82088)
Refereed:No
Uncontrolled Keywords:Corruption; regulation; governance; entrepreneurship; business regulation
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
Business > Economics
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:MPRA
Copyright Information:© 2017 The Author
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:22104
Deposited On:01 Dec 2017 13:56 by Michael Breen. Last Modified 01 Dec 2017 13:56

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