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Economic actors' political activity in 'overlap issues': privatisation and EU state aid control

Chari, Raj S. and Cavatorta, Francesco (2002) Economic actors' political activity in 'overlap issues': privatisation and EU state aid control. West European Politics, 25 (4). pp. 119-142. ISSN 0140-2382

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Abstract

This paper considers the political activity of economic actors in what we refer to as ‘overlap issues.’ Such issues consist of two separate, but related, domestic and supranational decisions that are taken at both levels of European governance. Examined here are the domestic level privatisation policy-making processes in Spain, France and Ireland, and the subsequent European Commission decisions on the state aids given during the sales. The research argues that although the influence of economic actors is crucial in understanding the domestic-level privatisation aid negotiations, such actors’ participation is absent in the supranational decision-making process that witnessed all the aids being approved. In order to explain this limited political activity of firms at the EU-level, attention is focused on both the role of the member state and the paradoxes in EU policies that simultaneously guide and constrain the Commission from making a decision against capital. The conclusions situate our findings within the ‘elite pluralist’ literature on economic actors’ political activity in Europe while also considering the idea of the structural dependence of the EU on capital.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Routledge
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713601645
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:470
Deposited On:23 May 2008 by DORAS Administrator. Last Modified 16 Feb 2009 14:10

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