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Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France

Elgie, Robert and McMenamin, Iain (2005) Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France. British Journal of Politcial Science, 35 (3). pp. 531-548. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. this article focuses on independent administrative authorities (autorités administratives indépendantes) in France. We demonstrate that these institutions enjoy varying degrees of independence. We find that the degree of independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:French politics; autorités administratives indépendantes;
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
Official URL:http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JPS
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:59
Deposited On:14 Dec 2006 by DORAS Administrator. Last Modified 30 Jan 2009 12:11

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