In this dissertation I examine the technological advances benefiting health care today. I point to the fact that such progress is accompanied by a number of ethical concerns. With the assistance of technology, for example, the life of a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) can be prolonged. This raises ethical questions including when we morally ought to, or ought not to, enable a patient to live or to die. Some ethicists attempt to answer such questions by distinguishing between the concept of person and human being. The former (ie person) automatically qualifies for moral consideration, whereas the latter (ie human being) does not. The concept of person, compared to human being, can offer a clearer benchmark for deciding whom to include in the moral domain. In the case of a patient in a PVS it may be easier to let go when we ascertain that s/he is no longer a person with any moral claims on us. Although the distinction between human being and person might be helpful in ethical decision-making, the concept of person tends to end up excluding a large number of human beings from the moral realm. In lieu of this, I outline a concept of person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance. My concept attempts to dismantle the arbitrary boundaries of exclusion that are erected by contemporary definitions of person. Finally, I examine some of the implications of the concept of person for the European Charter of Patients’ Rights. I contend that the rights outlined can be logically denied to those who are not strictly persons Against this, I argue that my concept of person may provide a possible route to counteract the Charter from becoming an exclusive rather than an inclusive code.