Specific hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been subject to a number of “side channel” attacks of late. A side channel is any information bearing emission that results from the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. Smartcard realisations have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to these attacks. Other more complex embedded cryptographic systems may also be vulnerable, and each new design needs to be tested. The vulnerability of a recently developed high speed cryptographic accelerator is examined. The purpose of this examination is not only to verify the integrity of the device, but also to allow its designers to make a determination of its level of conformance with any standard that they may wish to comply with. A number of attacks were reviewed initially and two were chosen for examination and implementation - Power Analysis and Electromagnetic Analysis. These particular attacks appeared to offer the greatest threat to this particular system. Experimental techniques were devised to implement these attacks and a simulation and micrcontroller emulation were setup to ensure these techniques were sound. Each experimental setup was successful in attacking the simulated data and the micrcontroller circuit. The significance of this was twofold in that it verified the integrity of the setup and proved that a real threat existed. However, the attacks on the cryptographic accelerator failed in all cases to reveal any significant information. Although this is considered a positive result, it does not prove the integrity of the device as it may be possible for an adversary with more resources to successfully attack the board. It does however increase the level of confidence in this particular product and acts as a stepping stone towards conformance of cryptographic standards. The experimental procedures developed can also be used by designers wishing to test the vulnerability of their own products to these attacks.