What effect if any, do Targeted Killings (TKs) have on cycles of violence? This study explores and offers a perspective on the claimed successes of counter-terrorist policies, the issues that underpin them with a focus on pre-emptive actions aimed at disrupting or removing the terrorist threat. The study examines counter-terrorism activities in Northern Ireland in order to provide a detailed analysis of the implications of the policy of selective TKs. For heuristic purposes the literature review will be primarily based on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The core case study is the use of TKs against Irish republican paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, in particular the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in East Tyrone. In a detailed analysis of both the immediate and broader implications of such activities in attempting to respond to terrorism, the strength of the arguments related to ‘lessons learned’ will be reinforced via such analysis. Equally this study is part of a current debate that hopefully will have an intellectual significance, especially given the number of TKs being conducted since 9/11 despite the virtual absence of a sustained public and scholarly debate on the means and the ends of TKs. Assessing the impact of TKs on insurgencies is as difficult as it is important. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the strategies and tactical repertoire of insurgent groups. Hafez and Hatfield (2006), identified four pillars of the Repression/ Rebellion Puzzle which tests the widest range of hypothesis, specifically, that terrorist targeting: (1) deter militant organisations; (2) produce a backlash effect; (3) cause a disruption effect and (4) a diminishing capacity when combined with other security enablers. By assessing common themes and experiences, preliminary conclusions will be presented in light of the expected and subsequent successes or failures of pre-emptive actions. This will facilitate a critical analysis of the Northern Ireland case study and implications for the current and future use of TKs in other operational theatres. The focus of this work is not whether any sort of TKs policy can be legally, morally and politically justified, rather what effect does such a policy have on levels of violence. This study found that TKs over a prolonged period predicated on accurate intelligence had no discernible deterrent effect on PIRA; the desire for backlash was always inherent but negated by security forces measures; with regard to disruption, TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a cumulative effect on the operational capability of PIRA; and finally in relation to diminishing capacity while PIRA initiated substitution equally under this pillar TKs caused a gradual but incremental decline in operational efficiency and effectiveness. My findings from the Northern Ireland case study focused on East Tyrone PIRA suggest that TKs however, should not be presented as an absolute proven solution in themselves to patterns of political violence. But when combined with other factors if utilised surgically and in a discrete manner they are a factor and therefore as a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility cannot be dismissed.