International organisations such as the EU, IMF, and OECD represent some of the most powerful institutions in the global economy. All three survey their members in a process designed to detect economic threats and evaluate domestic policy. This is one of the most important tools available for preventing financial crises. Each IO uses a combination of peer and public pressure to stimulate reform among its members. While scholars have begun to examine the surveillance function of IOs in greater detail, many questions remain. Specifically, we have a relatively low understanding of the impact that economic surveillance has when released to the public. This thesis examines the impact of economic surveillance on a crucial set of public stakeholders – financial market participants. Most research that has explored this question previously has conceptualised surveillance by IOs differently. Additionally, these studies have also only examined reactions to surveillance by one organisation. By using an event study method that captures unexpected financial market reactions to surveillance by three IOs over a 17 year period, this study illuminates the relationship between IOs, domestic governments, and financial market participants. Furthermore, this research adds to the growing body of literature that is concerned with the role of IOs as providers of information in the global economy.