Billon, Steve and Gillanders, Robert ORCID: 0000-0001-9462-0005 (2016) State ownership and corruption. International Tax and Public Finance, 23 (6). pp. 1074-1092. ISSN 0927-5940
Abstract
We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of
the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between
politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with
more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of
costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest
that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the
total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability
that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We
refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our
Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result
and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article (Published) |
---|---|
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | State Ownership; Corruption; Privatisation; Bribery |
Subjects: | Business > Business ethics |
DCU Faculties and Centres: | DCU Faculties and Schools > DCU Business School |
Publisher: | Springer |
Official URL: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-015-9390-z |
Copyright Information: | © 2016 Springer |
Use License: | This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License |
ID Code: | 22335 |
Deposited On: | 19 Apr 2018 15:16 by Thomas Murtagh . Last Modified 24 Jan 2019 14:17 |
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