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State ownership and corruption

Billon, Steve and Gillanders, Robert ORCID: 0000-0001-9462-0005 (2016) State ownership and corruption. International Tax and Public Finance, 23 (6). pp. 1074-1092. ISSN 0927-5940

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Abstract

We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:State Ownership; Corruption; Privatisation; Bribery
Subjects:Business > Business ethics
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > DCU Business School
Publisher:Springer
Official URL:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-015-9390-z
Copyright Information:© 2016 Springer
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:22335
Deposited On:19 Apr 2018 15:16 by Thomas Murtagh . Last Modified 24 Jan 2019 14:17

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