The case I make for judicial review avoids what I, among others, see as the basic flaw in most of the justifications that have been offered previously. It does not rely on the notion that judges are more enlightened than legislators in respect to the resolution of rights questions. It does not hold that judicial insight is such that, with judicial review, outcomes are more likely to treat individuals with equal concern and respect. This means that the “fact of reasonable disagreement on rights” objection cannot be leveled at my case in the way that it can be leveled at legal constitutionalist cases. The republican understanding of democracy upon which I build my case not only accounts for this fact of disagreement, it relies quite heavily on it. In turn, my case relies on that fact of disagreement. I don’t think that Richard Bellamy addresses this aspect of my argument satisfactorily in his response. In fact, I think he effectively denies it and that he thereby mischaracterizes my republican case for judicial review. The clarification as to how, I suggest, helps illuminate two important and related points about my case.