Skip to main content
DORAS
DCU Online Research Access Service
Login (DCU Staff Only)
Why do authoritarian regimes adopt bicameralism? Cooptation, control, and masking controversial reforms

Baturo, Alexander ORCID: 0000-0002-1108-5287 and Elgie, Robert ORCID: 0000-0001-5334-4796 (2018) Why do authoritarian regimes adopt bicameralism? Cooptation, control, and masking controversial reforms. Democratization, 25 (5). pp. 919-937. ISSN 1351-0347

Full text available as:

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
360kB

Abstract

The adoption of bicameralism in the world is increasingly an authoritarian phenomenon: while the percentage of bicameral democracies is in decline, there has been a steady increase in bicameral non-democracies. What makes non-democracies turn to bicameralism? We argue that bicameralism may serve as a means of post-conflict reconciliation or control of the legislature when the opposition gains seats in the lower chamber. We also propose a novel explanation whereby the introduction of bicameralism helps to mask a set of more controversial constitutional reforms. Drawing on a new dataset on second chambers from 1945 to 2016, we find that bicameralism is more likely to be adopted during years when formal presidential term limits are in place or when leaders are in their last term. This is because bicameralism is often a by-product of broad institutional reform that assists in justifying and legitimating the need for constitutional revision and in masking the extension of presidential term limits. The findings improve our understanding of institutions and institutional origins in dictatorships.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bicameralism; authoritarianism; institutions in dictatorships; presidential term limits
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
Official URL:https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1444031
Copyright Information:© 2018 Taylor & Francis
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
Funders:Dublin City University Enhancing Performance Award
ID Code:25590
Deposited On:08 Mar 2021 11:50 by Thomas Murtagh . Last Modified 08 Mar 2021 11:50

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Archive Staff Only: edit this record

Altmetric
- Altmetric
+ Altmetric
  • Student Email
  • Staff Email
  • Student Apps
  • Staff Apps
  • Loop
  • Disclaimer
  • Privacy
  • Contact Us