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The dependence of election coverage on political institutions: political competition and policy framing in Germany and the United Kingdom

McMenamin, Iain orcid logoORCID: 0000-0002-1704-390X, Courtney, Michael, Breen, Michael orcid logoORCID: 0000-0002-5857-9938 and McNulty, Gemma orcid logoORCID: 0000-0002-6909-6958 (2021) The dependence of election coverage on political institutions: political competition and policy framing in Germany and the United Kingdom. Journalism, 24 (6). ISSN 1464-8849

Abstract
Election coverage is often assumed to be different to everyday political coverage. We argue that this depends on political institutions. In majoritarian countries, where elections choose governments, election coverage should decisively move towards political competition and away from policy. In consensual countries, where coalitions are based on policy negotiations, there should be a less pronounced shift towards political competition and away from policy. To test this argument, we use an automatic coding system to study 0.9 billion words in Die Welt for 12 years and in the Financial Times for 30 years. The results support our institutional hypothesis.
Metadata
Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Elections; newspapers; political journalism; Germany; United Kingdom; automatic text analysis
Subjects:Social Sciences > Journalism
Social Sciences > Mass media
Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:SAGE Publications
Official URL:https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849211060700
Copyright Information:© 2021 The Authors.
ID Code:26687
Deposited On:09 Feb 2022 15:38 by Michael Breen . Last Modified 27 Oct 2023 14:01
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