Every couple of years, a new corruption scandal of the oil industry draws the attention of worldwide media: the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists describes the complex schemes of shell companies, international transfers, and hidden tax havens that the political elites of resource-rich countries exploit to embezzle the wealth of the land they should be protecting; tens of books discuss at length how kleptocrats and their informal circles spend millions of dollars virtually undisturbed in the general hypocrisy of world leaders. This is what we know, but how do the actors of the oil sector shape their relationships through informality? Using Kazakhstan as a case study, this research explores the various ways in which corruption and informal governance converge, shaped by the everchanging power dynamics between the different actors participating in the industry. Complemented by discussions on other rentier economies, each practice of the taxonomy is presented as a specific strategy employed by the predatory elite to achieve different governance objectives. As these practices normalise, their effects trickle down into an increasing inequality that contributes to the generalised informality of the lowest ranks of the industry. Theoretically, this research extends the taxonomisation effort of the Global Informality Project by discussing practices identified through the active participation of the researcher. Empirically, it offers a detailed account of corruption scandals in Kazakhstan adding layers of complexity to the process of homogenisation caused by quantitative analyses. Methodologically, it relies on systematic reviews, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis to triangulate data on taboo topics.