JobBridge, the Irish national internship scheme, was a labour activation measure launched in July 2011 during a period of extreme economic crisis and was marketed as a chance for young people to gain career experience in quality work placements. Over 60 per cent of participants found employment after leaving the scheme but it suffered from high deadweight losses and was widely criticised as exploitative during its existence. This was quite predictable, which leaves the puzzle as to why JobBridge was designed without more regulations to protect the entry level jobs market and the interests of the unemployed? This paper will trace the processes behind this sub-optimal decision making. First, it will show the institutional factors influencing poor policy decisions on labour activation. Then it will explain the main incentives behind an under regulated programme, which were the need to develop a workable scheme as quickly as possible and to do this without significant funding. Finally, it will show how the decision making process prioritised the interests of the Labour party, government, business and the concerned parents of unemployed youth over the interests of the unemployed.