Stalemated peace processes are indicative of serious problems for international order, relating to its legitimacy and viability. They may indicate potential opportunities or herald revisionist moments. Yet, the dominant research methodologies, conceptual, and practical doctrines of the post-Cold War order, related to peacemaking, have indicated a convergence around limited goals for peacemaking, peace missions, international mediation, and conflict resolution. At best, this has led to negative forms of peace, stalemates, or a victor’s peace in many conflict-affected states and regions. Such problemsolving approaches, which operate within the often contradictory frameworks of the liberal international order, Realism, multipolarity, and geopolitical pragmatism, have led to unintended consequences because of such parsimony. This article examines the post-Cold War consequences of these developments in peacemaking and related UN and other peace approaches in practice and in theory. It focuses on the emergence of the concept of “stalemated peace”.