Which autocratic elites are more likely to return to cabinet in democracy? Elites’ incentives are at the core of the explanations of why, how and when democratization happens, yet existing studies on elites’ post-democratization trajectory is mostly anecdotal, case study-based, region specific or based on aggregate, slow moving structural variables. This paper offers a novel theory and systematic empirical evidence of autocratic revolving doors that explain which former autocratic elites are more likely to return to cabinet positions under democracy. Using a demand and supply logic of cabinet formation, the paper proposes that the return of former autocratic elites to cabinet is explained by the need of cabinet leaders for ministers with policymaking experience, and to appease old autocratic elites and their interests. More specifically, the theory proposes that the political experience and the characteristics of the position political elites held under autocracy explains which of them are more likely to meet these objectives and return to cabinet in democracy. These theoretical propositions receive support in a quantitative analysis using a novel measure of returning elites for 13,572 former autocratic elites from 72 new democracies between 1966 and 2020.