Browse DORAS
Browse Theses
Search
Latest Additions
Creative Commons License
Except where otherwise noted, content on this site is licensed for use under a:

Polish business associations: flattened civil society or super lobbies?

McMenamin, Iain (2002) Polish business associations: flattened civil society or super lobbies? Business and Politics, 4 (3). pp. 301-317. ISSN 1469-3569

Full text available as:

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
131Kb
[img]Microsoft Word
114Kb

Abstract

This article tests two hypotheses about post-communist business associations. The first predicts weak business associations which are presented with insurmountable collective action problems by the flattened civil society inherited from totalitarianism. According to this hypothesis, no business associations are inherited from the previous regime, and associations are confronted with difficult-to-organize latent groups of large numbers of new small enterprises. The second hypothesis, as proposed by Mancur Olson, predicts strong business associations benefiting from the collective action advantages of the communist economic structure which was composed of small numbers of large enterprises. The hypotheses are tested with case studies of Poland's five most influential business associations. The conclusion is that the flattened civil society hypothesis is best borne out by the evidence. This suggests that, in other countries, political factors, rather than the standard communist economic structure, are more likely to explain the persistence of industrial super lobbies.

Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:capitalist democracy; economy; politics; communist systems; Poland; business associations;
Subjects:Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:The Berkeley Electronic Press
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369525021000158401
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:466
Deposited On:22 May 2008 by DORAS Administrator. Last Modified 16 Feb 2009 14:07

Download statistics

Archive Staff Only: edit this record