Brady, Malcolm ORCID: 0000-0002-4276-3976 and Trif, Aurora (2013) Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership. Industrial Relations Journal, 44 (3). pp. 258-275. ISSN 1468-2338
Abstract
This paper clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once-off and repeated prisoner’s dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article (Published) |
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Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Workplace partnership; Game theory; Prisoner’s dilemma; Time horizon; Trade unions |
Subjects: | Business > Unions, trade Business > Management |
DCU Faculties and Centres: | DCU Faculties and Schools > DCU Business School |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
Official URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irj.12016 |
Copyright Information: | © 2013 Wiley-Blackwell The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ |
Use License: | This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License |
ID Code: | 20962 |
Deposited On: | 22 Jan 2016 11:08 by Margaret Galuszynska . Last Modified 25 Nov 2020 13:45 |
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