This thesis focuses on Thomas Hobbes’ conception of a corporeal God and its role within
his overall philosophical system. I show that Hobbes’ corporeal God was not a late
development within his system but was something which was present from his early works.
To this end, my aim is twofold. First, I offer a mainly literal and sincere interpretation of
both Hobbes’ ontology and his corporeal God. I establish that Hobbes’ reliance upon God as
motion – to account for all aspects of the natural world – is consistent with his explicit
position that certain knowledge of the operations of the natural world is impossible. The
central claim I make is that Hobbes sought to do more than merely find a way of preserving
an abstract conception of God and, instead, wanted God to be an integral part of the
universe. I argue that Hobbes achieved this by equating his corporeal God with motion: the
constant effect of Hobbes’ corporeal God-as-motion on extension is responsible for the
manifestation of the natural world.
Secondly, I situate Hobbes’ corporeal God within its contemporaneous context. I argue that
while Hobbes’ characterization of his ontological system is certainly unusual, its purpose
was not. Hobbes was seeking to account for the activity of the natural world alongside a
passive understanding of bodies. I illustrate the strong parallels as well as the important
differences between Hobbes’ system and that of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and
Margaret Cavendish. To this end, I argue that Hobbes’ system can be understood as a form
of partially extended substance-dualism. I argue that if we must classify Hobbes’ position
with a philosophical label then we should understand his ontological theory as a modified
form of Stoicism.