The Paris Agreement (hereafter 'PA') created a framework for global action commensurate with the original UNFCCC objective of preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change (in so far as this is still possible). PA Article 2(1) specified, for the first time, a globally agreed quantitative mitigation objective in the form of a global temperature rise limit: 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C'. Crucially, PA Article 2(2) committed the Parties to implementation that reflects '... equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances' (CBDR-RC). PA Article 3 then prescribed a bottom-up architecture, placing the onus on the Parties themselves—nation states and regional blocs such as the European Union (EU)—to ensure that their mitigation plans, presented in statements of voluntary nationally determined contributions, adequately reflect these objectives and obligations. As a corollary we suggest that any good faith Party to the Agreement, in developing its mitigation objectives, should itself explicitly and transparently test these for consistency with the Agreement; and continue to do so on an ongoing basis as circumstances (both global and local) evolve. However: while it is commonplace to see political assertions that this or that national plan is 'aligned' with the Paris Agreement, it is much less common to see this supported by transparent quantitative analysis, grounded in explicit provision for CBDR-RC. One interesting exception is the case of Ireland. In this Perspective, we briefly describe, and also critique, this exemplar case of a transparent national 'Paris Test' of domestic mitigation ambition. In the conclusion, we relate this case to other PA Parties and consider the need for broader adoption of such an approach.